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Balance of Payments
1.1) Definition
Balance of payments is an accounting record of all monetary transactions of a country with rest
of the world which includes payments for exports and imports of goods, services, capital and
financial transfers for a specific period, usually a year, and is prepared in a single currency,
typically the domestic currency for the country concerned. The transactions are presented in the
form of double-entry book keeping.
Reserve Bank of India defines Balance of payment as
The balance of payments of a country is a systematic record of all economic transactions
between the residents of a country and the rest of the world. It presents a classified record of all
receipts on account of goods exported, services rendered and capital received by residents and
payments made by them on account of goods imported and services received and capital
transferred to non-residents or foreigners.
Currency reserves, such as the U.S. Dollar, that are accepted currencies for settlement of
international debts.
The Current Account: It reports the various trades in import and export plus income
derived from tourism, profits earned overseas, and payments of interest
The capital account: It reports sum of bank deposits, private investments and debt
securities sold by a central bank or official government agencies.
The official reserve account: It is a subdivision of the capital account which contains
foreign currency and securities held by the government or the central bank, which is used
to balance the payments from year to year. It is known as the balancing item and can be
considered a "plug factor" for summing the balance of payments accounts to zero.
Overall balance of payment = Current Account Balance+ Capital account balance+ Official
Reserve Account
1.4) Uses :
BoP data gives a comprehensive overview of the macro-economic and monetary situation
of national economy and is very vital for monetary and financial monitoring purposes for
policy deliberations in both the domestic and international contexts. The data provides
objective basis for assessing the macro-economic and monetary situation of an economy.
BoP analysis helps in macro-economic review on the following aspects of an economy :
o income growth
o external orientation
o relationships between trade in goods and services and direct investment flows
o international banking transactions
o assets securitization and financial market developments
o external debt situation
Study on prospects for direct investment. Direct investment income data which is
available in the BoP current account and the economy's stock of direct investment
provides a methodology for analyzing profitability of FDI.
1.5) Causes:
A situation where sufficient financing on affordable terms cannot be obtained to meet
international payment obligations causes problems with BoP. If difficulties persist, it may
lead to a crisis. Domestic currency depreciates rapidly, making international goods and
capital expensive and the economy may reach a situation of a stand still. It may spread to
other countries that are tightly linked with the domestic economy.
Key factors are weak domestic financial systems; large and persistent fiscal deficits; high levels
of external and/or public debt; exchange rates fixed at inappropriate levels; natural disasters; or
armed conflicts or a sudden and strong increase in the price of key commodities such as food and
fuel. Some of these factors will reduce exports or/ and increase imports. Others may reduce the
foreign financing available. Also investors may lose confidence in a country's prospects leading
to massive sales of assets, the so called "capital flight." Crises get complicated by inter- linkages
between various sectors of the economy. An imbalance in even one of the sectors will rapidly
spread to other sectors and will lead to culminating in a widespread economic disruption.
the early 1970s to nearly 25 percent in the early 1980s. India, however, required a higher rate of
investment to attain comparable economic growth than did most other low-income developing
countries, indicating a lower rate of return on investments.
Private savings financed most of India's investment, but by the mid-1980s further growth in
private savings was difficult because they were already at quite a high level. As a result, during
the late 1980s India relied increasingly on borrowing from foreign countries.
2.1)
i)
The Government had a defined objective of attaining self reliance through industrialization, i.e.
Import substitution and export promotion. Basic Industries had to be set up which required
capital goods imports and an enormous amount of funding. The objective of import substitution
was attempted to be realized through various non price, physical interventionist policies like
licensing, quotas, tariffs etc. This actually was only effective in case of substitution of consumer
goods while the capital goods industries were still import intensive. The high degree of
protection to Indian industries actually resulted in shutting off them from competition and thus
poor quality production and inefficiencies were too common. The high cost of production due to
inadequate technical knowhow further aggravated the situation. All this led to an eventual
decline in the exports and a widened trade deficit of the country along with a heavy debt burden.
ii)
External Debt:
India had a very limited resource base due to lower per capita income and savings. The
Government resorted to heavy foreign borrowing for the developmental efforts and also to
correct the BoP situation in the short run. The debt service obligations grew enormously due to
changes in exchange rates and repayments to the IMF along with a loss of credit confidence on
India which led to harder average terms of external debt and fall in concessional aid flow.
iii)
Export promotion:
Indian exports were mainly constituted of primary products, the prices of which fluctuated
heavily with the fluctuations in the global market demand. The earnings from such primary
products were relatively low and the primary product exporting countries were always put in
unfavorable terms of trade. The quality of Indian products was another area of concern due to
which the exports were lagging behind expectations. Further, the licensing and other disruptive
policies were proving cumbersome for exporters and hence dis-incentivised them from export
promotion.
iv)
Exchange Rate:
The instability in exchange rate also posed a great threat to economic stability of India. The
constant devaluations of the rupee increased the amount of external debt. It was also a cause of
concern for the export and import areas, also led to flourishing of hawala trade due to the strict
for-ex controls in the market. The inflation rates remained higher towards the end of the decade
and hence it was imminent on the central bank to change the exchange rates accordingly
Government Deficit:
As its evident from the graph below, the government deficits have shown a steady increase from
the beginning of 1980s and peaks during the 1985-86 period. The further dip in the deficit can be
accounted to the various attempts by the government to monetize the deficit with the help of the
central bank which eventually created a lot of other macroeconomic pressures whose culmination
led to the crisis eventually.
ii)
Current Account:
The graph below shows the position of the current account in the pre crisis period. We can see
that the current account balance declined sharply during the end of the decade. The imports rose
sharply (for e.g.: the petroleum imports rose by nearly 40% from the period 1986-87 to 1989-90)
and the export growth was very disappointing which led to the widening of the trade deficit and
deterioration if current account balances.
The trade deficits were increasing all through the 1980s as shown in the table below. This
indicated the fact that it was highly imperative to resort to some corrective measures failing
which this would affect the BoP and lead to a crisis in the near future.
The capital inflows to India mainly consisted of aid flows, commercial deposits and deposits
from Non resident Indians. The heavy restriction on FDIs in almost all sectors was a main
limiting factor in the economy to attract enough foreign investments for its development projects
in infrastructure sectors. The only ray of hope came from the provision of Institutional investors,
but their investments too were channelized to a few public sector bonds and literally there were
no investments from abroad in Indias attempt to catch up to the mainstream of the world.
The situation worsened when India was gradually losing out its forex reserves (see table) due to
constant devaluations of the rupee against dollar and widening trade deficit. The forex reserves
fell from a comfortable $8151 mm in 1987 to $ 5331mm in 1990 and further to $ 1877mm by
1991.
iv)
External Debt
The external debt of India doubled from 1984-85 ($35 bn) to 1990-91 ($69 bn). It is also evident
from the graph below that the external debt kept on rising from the early 1980s towards the end
of the decade. The investor confidence declined rapidly due to the economic situation of India
and hence it resulted in the outflows being increasingly dependent on short term external debts.
The gulf crisis which occurred in the early 1990 along with the existence of an unstable
government at the centre further aggravated the situation. There was increasingly an adverse
impression globally about Indias creditworthiness.
v)
Exchange Rate
The exchange rates kept on falling owing to the changes in the world market. The world
economy had an increasing effect on Indian currency due to heavy dependence on foreign funds
and capital goods imports. This, as already explained, had many adverse effects including the
multiplying effect on the external debt and trade deficit.
The graphs below show the trends in exchange rates, both real and nominal.
2.
The Soviet Union had been one of the largest export markets for India prior to its breakup in
India. The Soviet breakup therefore negatively affected Indias precarious trade balance, which
slipped further into red.
ii) The Gulf war
Current account deficit averaging 2.2% of the GDP hit hard by the Gulf war .The Gulf war began
in August 1990 with Iraqs Invasion of Kuwait. Both Iraq and Kuwait were among the largest
suppliers of oil to India, especially Iraq with whom India had long term arrangements .Due to the
war many of these long term contracts were hit, which forced the government to buy from the
spot market at high prices resulting in the oil bill ballooning to $2 billion in the latter half of
1990.
iii) Fall in remittances
The Gulf war also caused many Indian workers working in Kuwait and Iraq to return, resulting
in a fall in remittances. This was significant since NRI remittances had been an important source
of inflows to the country throughout the eighties thus reducing the severity of the balance of
payments. The situation was further aggravated further with the government having to airlift
Indian residents in Kuwait.
v)
Political uncertainty
The period between1990-91 was marked with high political uncertainty at the central level with
the country seeing three successive government changes. This reduced the focus of the
government on the looming economic crisis as there was no clear policy to deal with the
unexpected situation. When a stable majority government did was setup in 1991, it was a little
too late as the damage had been done.
Fig1.9: Reserves
It was clear that the crisis had been clearly due to crisis of confidence in the Indian Government
to prevent a default. This is more akin to a sort of speculative attack, in which the foreign
investors fearing devaluation of the currency (the most likely step for the government to prevent
a default) withdraw their deposits from the country. Further, in expectation of devaluation import
receipts are forwarded and export receipts are postponed .This together with the downgrading of
credit risk pushes the country more towards the default, with the Central Bank under more
pressure not to devalue the currency. This situation is pictorially depicted below
4. THE RESPONSE
In June 1991, Foreign exchange reserves fell below $1billion. This was barely enough to cover 2
weeks of imports. Further, the short term debt to foreign currency reserve ratio rose from 2.2 in
March 1990 to 3.8 in March 1991 putting extraordinary pressure on the reserves (It should be
noted that this ratio had increased from 0.9 in 1989 to2.2 in 1990 which was a strong
precursor).These short term debts had higher costs and were subject to greater volatility,
subjecting the reserves to greater risks. However, during this time the government took a number
of steps starting with an agreement with IMF for a withdrawal of $1,025 billion under its
Compensatory and Contingency Financing Facility (CCFF).Withdrawals of $789 million from
the first credit tranche made in Jan, 1991. In May 1991, the government leased 20 tones of
confiscated gold to State bank of India to sell it abroad with an option to repurchase it within 6
months. Further in July 1991, the government allowed the RBI to ship 47 tons of Gold to the
Bank of England and Bank of Japan which allowed RBI to raise $600 million. This pledged gold
was later retrieved in September 1991.
It was against this background that a two-step downward adjustment in the exchange rate of
rupee was effected on July 1 and 3, 1991, which resulted in devaluation of around 18 per cent
against major international currencies. Devaluation at no time was free from controversy. But
given the grim situation that the country faced on the external front, a downward adjustment of
the exchange rate had become inevitable. The extent of devaluation was determined primarily by
the
degree
of
correction
that
was
required
in
the
balance
of
payments.
Another consideration was whether, instead of making a discrete change, small changes in the
exchange rate should be made , as had been policy since 1985 . It was decided that a sharp
discrete change was needed to quell expectations. This two-stage discrete devaluation process in
the exchange rate also intrigued many observers. An explanation for this is that it was done
partly to test the waters and gauge the reaction to the first change before making the next. After
the first announcement, to avoid destabilizing expectations, the required change was completed
in
the
second
round.
The devaluation of the rupee was complemented with changes in the external trade regime.
Perhaps this is what made the devaluation of 1991, different from others. A process of
establishing a more liberalized trade regime was set in motion. A realistic exchange rate provided
the basis for a credible reform process.
5. Post Crisis: Reforms
India adopted a more cautious approach to reforms and liberalization than most of the other
emerging economies. The reforms program was undertaken in the face of a balance of payments
crisis which forced the country to seek IMF financial assistance.
Impacts
i)
The exchange rates of the domestic currency i.e. rupee are determined on the basis of
demand and supply. Free market rates are worked upon by authorized dealers (ADs).
Like any other market prices, the variations between the exchange rates of both types, i.e.
spot and forward can take place within a day or between days or months or on the basis
of terms.
The commercial transactions in Balance of Payments i.e. Current account and capital
account are taken at the free-market driven rates, whether on government account or the
private one.
All inward remittances and export proceeds need to be surrendered with a 156% retention
option in a foreign currency account with Authorized dealers.
The medium of currency exchange i.e. intervention currency continued to be U.S. dollar,
which the Reserve Bank can buy and sell .This route was used to provide temporary
stabilization in the exchange markets.
Depending on the market pressure. The 2 way quotes of the US dollar can vary several
times in a day.
The Reserve Bank will not generally buy or sell any other currency, either spot or
forward; rather will take swap transactions with the Authorized dealers. The swap
involves the Reserve Bank by performing exchange i.e. buying the U.S. Dollar spot and
selling forward simultaneously at one time for delivery in two to six months.
The RBI will be selling US Dollars to Authorized dealers at the market rate, for debt
payments on Government Account and other payments.
For performing trade with Russian Republics, where the invoice is in freely convertible
currency the other one i.e. market related exchange rate isapplicable.
Transactions routed through ACU arrangement (except those that were settled in the
Indian rupee) will be based on Reserve Banks rate for ACU currencies and for the AMU
i.e. Asian Monetary Unit.
6.2)
i)
Effects of Liberalization:
Balance of Payments Surplus:
a. External sector - growth rates moved up to 11 and 20% in the two years ended
March 2001.India successfully withstood the sharp rise in international oil prices
since the closing months of 1999.
b. NRI deposits with the banking system in India on the rise from 13 billion dollars
in 1991-92 to 23.8 billion dollars by March 2001
c. BOP recorded an overall surplus consecutively for five years from 1996-97
d. Indias foreign exchange reserves, 1 billion in 1990 reached $ 40 billion the
average annual addition being 4.5 billion dollars
e. Net inflow on invisible account has continued to be a major support to the balance
of payments. Invisible receipts have shown extreme growth, reaching US $ 23.0
billion in 1997-98. Private transfer receipts increased by 25 per cent per annum
i.e. from U.S. $ 3.9 billion in 1992-93 to U.S. $ 11.9 billion in 1997-98.
f. Capital account in the balance of payments had shown an impressive surplus of
U.S. $ 10.4 billion in 1997-98. Foreign direct investment (FDI), which had
increased by 18.6 per cent in 1997-98, has fallen by 38 per cent in AprilDecember 1998.
g. Portfolio investment continued to decline from U.S. $ 3.3 billion in 1996-97 to
U.S. $ 1.8 billion in 1997-98, to an outflow of $ 0.7 billion in April-December
1998.The reason behind this decline was result of contagion from the East Asian
crisis that has affected all emerging & developed markets.
h. The Resurgent India Bonds (RIB) scheme launched in 1998 was open to both
NRIs/OCBs. Net inflows under NRI deposits declined from U.S. $ 3.3 billion in
1996-97 to U.S. $ 1.1 billion in 1997-98.
i. External Commercial Borrowing (ECB) has been placed at US $ 3.8 billion
compared to U.S. $ 8.7 billion in 1997-98. Disbursements have declined more
sharply from $ 4 billion in April-September 1997-98 to US $ 1.6 billion in the
first half of 1998-99. The reason was the relative unattractiveness of ECB from
the borrowers perspective.
ii)
Import growth in the advanced & developed economies, which were Indias
major trading partners has decelerated from 18.2 per cent in 1995 to 3.7 per cent
in 1996 and to 2.5 per cent in 1997.
6.3)
ii)
iii)
Year: 1995-96: Large demand for borrowing with projects in petroleum, oil
exploration and telecommunications.
h. PMU: Project Management Unit was introduced, as part of the department of Economic
Affairs to monitor, supervise and strengthen various projects.
i. In 1994-95 Government of India has decided not to approach IMF for medium term
funds.
j. Advance release of funds to state governments.
APPENDIX
Figure 1
Figure 2
Figure 3
Figure 4
Figure 5
Figure 6
Figure 7
Summary:
The paper attempts to study and analyze the various causes and factors that prompted the
Balance of Payments crisis that occurred in India in 1991 and to evaluate the various steps taken
by the Government and Central bank to fight the crisis and come out of it successfully.
The paper begins with explaining the Balance of payments as a determinant of the economic
situation in a nation and enumerates the various uses of Balance of payments in various
economic studies. Then the Indian economy in the pre crisis period, i.e. 1980-89 is studied in
detail to understand the underlying causes which culminated during the period and eventually led
to the crisis in 1991. We then move on to the crisis period and indicate the developments like
enormous external debt and depleted for-ex reserves which deteriorated the condition of the
economy in the period. And finally the paper elaborates on the various contingency measures
taken by the government and central bank in order to recover from the crisis. Also, the long term
effects of such policy changes are evaluated.
The paper provides good insights and learning as far as the BOP Trends and crisis is concerned.
References
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1991_India_economic_crisis
www.imf.org/external/np/sta/bop/bop.htm
www.rbi.org.in Press Releases
www.indiastat.com/economy/8/balanceofpayment/.../stats.aspx