THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff and appellee, vs. ROBERTO ABADA, defendant and appellant.

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Appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo finding defendant guilty of murder and
sentencing him to reclusion perpetua, with legal accessory penalties, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased
Lourdes Lozada in the sum of P6,000.00, and to pay the costs. The prosecution witnesses were: Mateo
Salmorin, who testified that on the night of November 5, 1953, while he was catching crabs below the
embankment of the northern end of the bridge near the provincial jail of Iloilo, he saw a woman being carried
away by the current, and on his way home he saw appellant walking very fast on the bridge; Pablo Elauria,
who testified that on the night in question, while he was fishing under one end of the bridge, he saw
appellant and a woman walking thereon, and that all of a sudden the appellant lifted the woman and threw
her into the water; and Francisco Dariagan, a calesa driver, who testified that appellant and the victim rode in
his calesa on the same night and proceeded to a place on the river bank behind the provincial jail of Iloilo;
that he overheard the woman asking appellant to marry her, but the latter replied he could not because he
was still studying; and that the two passengers dismissed the calesa after paying him. The fact that the said
witnesses did not even bother to report the fateful incident they allegedly knew or saw until after a long time,
is rather contrary to the normal behavior which persons under the same circumstances would display. Their
failure also to ask for immediate help for the pitiful victim is out of the ordinary. On the other hand,
appellant's defense of alibi was testified to by persons of good reputation and unquestioned probity, unbiased
and disinterested. It would be more logical and natural to conclude that the deceased committed suicide. The
motivation for suicide was greater than that for murder.
Decision appealed from is reversed and appellant is acquitted with costs de oficio. Pars C. J., ponente.
[People vs. Abada, 103 Phil. 1119(1958)]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff and appellee, vs. DONATO BASCOS, defendant and
appellant.
1. CRIMINAL LAW; EXEMPTION FROM CRIMINAL LIABILITY; PLEA OF INSANITY.All the authorities are in
harmony with reference to two fundamental propositions: First, that the burden is on the prosecution to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime; and secondly, that the law presumes
every man to be sane.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.The conflict in the decisions arises by reason of the fact that the courts differ in their
opinion as to how much evidence is necessary to overthrow this original presumption of sanity, and as to
what quantum of evidence is sufficient to enable the court to say that the burden of proving the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt has been sufficiently borne.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.When a defendant in criminal cases interposes the defense of mental incapacity, the
burden of establishing that fact rests upon him.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.Article 8, paragraph 1, of the Penal Code, applied to the facts and the defendant acquitted
and ordered confined in an insane asylum.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan. Medina Cue, J.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.
Bengzon & Bengzon for appellant.
Attorney-General Villa-Real for appellee.
MALCOLM, J.:
The accused Donato Bascos was charged in an information filed in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan
with the murder of Victoriano Romero. On arraignment, he entered a plea of not guilty. The proof for the
prosecution established that the accused was the one who had killed Victoriano Romero, while the latter was
sleeping. The defense was that of insanity. Following the conclusion of the trial, the presiding judge rendered
judgment finding the accused guilty of the crime of homicide, and sentencing him to seventeen years, f our
months, and one day of reclusin temporal, with the accessory penalties, to indemnify the heirs of Victoriano
Romero in the sum of P1,000, and to pay the costs, provided, however, that the execution of the sentence
should be suspended in accordance with article 100 of the Penal Code, and the accused placed in a hospital
for the insane, there to remain until such time as his mental condition shall be determined.
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The errors assigned in this court are to the effect that the trial court erred in making application to the
present case of the provisions of article 100 of the Penal Code, and in not making application of article 8 of
the Code. The Attorney-General reaches practically the same conclusion as counsel for the appellant. It is,
therefore, for us to determine if the plea of insanity is sustainable under article 8, paragraph 1, of the Penal
Code, or if the case f alls under article 100 of the Code.
The responsibility of the insane for criminal action has been the subject of discussion for centuries. Some
criminologists, psychiatrists, and lawyers have contended with much earnestness that the defense of insanity
should be done away with completely. Indeed, in at least one State of the American Union, that of the State of
Washington, the Legislature has passed a statute abolishing insanity as a defense.
In the Philippines, among the persons who are exempted from criminal liability by our Penal Code, is the
following:
"An imbecile or lunatic, unless the latter has acted during a lucid interval.
"When the imbecile or lunatic has committed an act which the law defines as a grave felony, the court shall
order his confinement in one of the asylums established for persons thus afflicted, which he shall not be
permitted to leave without first obtaining the permission of the same court." (Art. 8-1.)
Article 100 of the Penal Code applies when the convict shall become insane or an imbecile after final
sentence has been pronounced.
In reference to the burden of proof of insanity in criminal cases, where the defense of insanity is interposed, a
conflict of authority exists. At least, all the authorities are in harmony with ref erence to two fundamental
propositions: First, that the burden is on the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant committed the crime; and secondly, that the law presumes every man to be sane. The conflict in
the decisions arises by reason of the fact that the courts differ in their opinion as to how much evidence is
necessary to overthrow this original presumption of sanity, and as to what quantum of evidence is sufficient
to enable the court to say that the burden of proving the crime beyond a reasonable doubt has been
sufficiently borne. (14 R. C. L., 624.)
The rather strict doctrine "that when a defendant in a criminal case interposes the defense of mental
incapacity, the burden of establishing that fact rests upon him," has been adopted in a series of decisions by
this court. (U. S. vs. Martinez [1916], 34 Phil., 305; U. S. vs. Hontiveros Carmona [1910], 18 Phil., 62.) The trial
judge construed this to mean that the defense must prove that the accused was insane at the very moment
the crime was committed.
Not attempting, therefore, further elucidation of the authorities, we find it more practicable to dispose of this
case on the facts. The wife of the accused and his cousin testified that the accused had been more or less
continuously out of his mind for many years. Doctor Gonzalo Montemayor, assistant district health officer,
who, by order of the judge, examined the accused and conducted an investigation, found that the accused is
a violent maniac, and that from the information he had received from the neighbors of the accused, the latter
had been insane for some time. The physician expressed the opinion that the accused was probably insane
when Victoriano Romero was killed. The official declaration of Doctor Montemayor in his capacity as acting
district health officer was "that this accused, according to a physical examination and investigation, is a
violent maniac, and that this mental state has continued mthrough many years, constituting a danger both
for himself and f or the community." The total lack of motive of Bascos to kill Romero bears out the
assumption that the former was insane.
We are convinced that the accused was a lunatic when he committed the grave felony described in the record
and that consequently he is exempt from criminal liability, and should be confined in an insane asylum.
In conformity with the recommendation of the AttorneyGeneral, judgment is reversed, and the defendant
acquitted, with costs of both instances de officio; but the defendant shall be kept in confinement in the San
Lazaro Hospital, or such other hospital for the insane as the Director of Health may direct, and shall not be
permitted to depart therefrom without the prior approval of the Court of First Instance of the Province of
Pangasinan. So ordered.
Araullo, C. J., Street, Avancea, Villamor, Ostrand, Johns, and Romualdez, JJ., concur.
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Judgment reversed and defendant acquitted, but shall be confined in an insane asylum. [People vs. Bascos,
44 Phil. 204(1922)]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff and appellant, vs. GLORIA NIETO, defendant and appellee.
Appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija dismissing an information for homicide on
the ground of double jeopardy. The pivotal question here is whether the accused could, on her unqualified
plea of guilty to the first information, be rightly held answerable for the offense therein charged. She could,
for the said information avers facts constituting the said offense, with nothing therein to indicate that she, as
the perpetrator thereof, was exempt from criminal liability because of her age, and her plea of guilty to the
information is an unqualified admission of all its material averments. Indeed, even under the view taken by
the trial Judge who acquitted her, that because she was between the ages of 9 and 15although that fact
does not appear in the information to which she pleaded guiltyan allegation that she acted with
discernment must be required. That requirement should be deemed amply met with the allegation in the
information that she, the accused Gloria Nieto, "with the intent to kill, did then and there wilfully, criminally
and feloniously push one Lolita Padilla, a child eight and one-half (8) years of age, into a deep place of the
Pearanda River and as a consequence thereof Lolita Padilla got drowned and died right then and there." This
allegation clearly conveys the idea that she knew what would be the consequence of her unlawful act of
pushing her victim into deep water and that she knew it to be wrong. To require the addition of the ritualistic
phrase "that she acted with discernment" would be superfluous. Assuming that Gloria Nieto was, at the time
of the perpetration of the crime charged, a minor "over nine and under fifteen years old," in the absence of
any showing that she did not act with discernment, she could have been sentenced for homicide or given a
suspended sentence as a delinquent minor if still of the proper ageon her plea of guilty to the first
information. It is, therefore, regrettable that as a result of a mistaken view taken by the trial judge who
acquitted her despite her plea of guilty, there has, in this case, been miscarriage of justice. Still because of
the rule on double jeopardy, the error cannot now be righted.
Order appealed from is affirmed, with costs de oficio. Reyes, J., ponente. [People vs. Nieto, 103 Phil.
1133(1958)]