B.

SUBSTANTIVE
I. SINGLE OFFENSE

after he had been convicted by the court a

quo can no longer assail its judgment by
raising the issue.

RULE 110 SEC 13

Duplicity of the offense: A complaint of
information must charge only one offense,
except when the law prescribes a single
punishment for various offenses.
PP VS FERNANDEZ
FACTS:
That on or about 13th of January 1982 the
two accused Conrado and Fernandez,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have
sexual intercourse with Rebecca Soriano, a
virgin and 15 y/o by means of force and
intimidation.
During the said date, after the victim had
just finished taking a bath and still naked,
the 2 accused entered the bathroom.
Conrado held her hands behind her while
Fernandez
sexually
abused
her.
Immediately after Fernando was finished
sexually abusing her, conrado in turn went
on top of her and succeeded in having
sexual congress against her will. After
which Fernando got a handful of mud near
the bathroom and placed it on her vagina.
There upon she reported the incident to
Amelita Malong her employers wife.
The victim filed a complaint against the
accused and the TC found them guilty for
two crimes of rape.
ISSUE:
WON THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN
CONVICTING THE ACCUSED0APPELANTS
FOR 2 CRIMES OF RAPE = NO
RATIO:
The rule invoked in SEC 13 Rule 110 of the
ROC which states that there should be only
one offense charged in a criminal
complaint or information, the purpose of
which is to afford the defendant a
necessary knowledge of the charge so that
he may not be confused in his defense.
But it is likewise a rule that if ever a
duplicity of offense is committed, the same
is a ground for a motion to quash the
complaint; and the failure of the accused
to interpose the objection constitute a
waiver. In the case at bar, the accused

PEOPLE VS LOPEZ

II. CAUSE OF ACTION

RULE 110 SEC 9
Cause of the accusation. The acts or
omissions complained of as constituting the
offense and the qualifying and aggravating
circumstances must be stated in ordinary
and concise language and not necessarily in
the language used in the statute but in terms
sufficient to enable a person of common
understanding to know what offense is being
charged as well as its qualifying and
aggravating circumstances and for the court
to pronounce judgment.
UU VS CHAN TOCO
FACTS:
BALITAAN VS CFI BATANGAS
FACTS
- Luz Balitaan owns a baby dresses
mending shop. Rita de los Reyes is the
manager of her business.
- Luz, thru Special Counsel Aguila, filed
with the MTC of Bauan, Batangas an
Information charging Rita of the crime of
estafa. The information contains that Rita
misappropriated P127.58, through grave
abuse of confidence, despite of repeated
demands of Luz. (See original for exact
wording of Information.)
- During trial at the MTC, Luz testified that
Rita delivered the baby dresses to Uniware,
and for this she (Rita) obtained 3 checks
totaling P1,632.97. A cash voucher
evidencing the receipt of said amount
was entered into evidence. The lawyer for
the defense moved:
(1) to strike the testimonies with regard to
the voucher evidence on the ground that
said testimonies are at variance with the
allegations in the information, that there is
no
allegation
in
the
information

whatsoever regarding these checks and

this cash voucher; and
(2) in the nature of an objection to any
other
question or questions regarding these
checks that were allegedly received by the
herein
accused
from
the
Uniware
Incorporated because there is no allegation
in the information. The court overruled
such objections as the lawyer of the
complainant told the judge that the
evidence was presented to prove that the
P127.58 was
misappropriated from the P1,632.97. The
testimony thus continued. [It turns out that
Rita told Luz that P127.58 was due a Cesar
Dalangin for some of the dresses he made.
Luz then instructed Rita to encash the
checks and pay Cesar. Rita gave Luz the
encashed amount minus the P127.58.
Three weeks
later, when she noticed that many baby
dresses were lost, she verified the receipts
of the payments. Cesar said he did not
make the baby dresses Rita said he did,
and he didnt receive the amount (he
didnt even
know Rita). Luz then demanded from Rita
the said amount; but Rita kept the money.]
- The defense then filed a petition for
certiorari in the CFI of Batangas against
the MTC judge for denying the motions to
strike out the testimonies relating to the
evidence. CFI granted the petition and
ordered the testimonies stricken out of the
record.
ISSUE
WON the testimonies are at variance with
the allegations in the information.
HELD
NO
- It is fundamental that every element of
which the offense is composed must be
alleged in the complaint or information.
What
facts
and
circumstances
are
necessary
to
be
stated
must
be
determined by reference to the definitions
and the essentials of the specific crimes.
The main purpose of requiring the various
elements of a crime to be set out in an
information is to enable the accused to
suitably prepare his defense. He is

presumed to have no independent

knowledge of the facts that
constitute the offense.
- Inasmuch as the crime of estafa through
misappropriation or with grave abuse of
confidence is charged, the information
must contain these elements:
(a) that personal property is received in
trust, on commission, for administration or
under any other circumstance involving the
duty to make delivery of or to return the
same, even though the obligation is
guaranteed by a bond;
(b) that there is conversion or diversion of
such property by the person who has so
received it;
(c) that such conversion, diversion or
denial is to the injury of another and
(d) that there be demand for the return of
the property.
- The position of the defense is that the
testimonies tend to prove another kind of
estafa --- using false pretenses or
fraudulent acts (Art 315 par 2a RPC)--- and
not thru abuse of confidence (Art 315 par
1b
RPC). The elements of these two are
different. Under par 2a, demand is not
necessary
and
deceit
or
false
representation must be shown. But this
doesnt mean that proof of deceit is not
allowed for par 1b.
Abuse of confidence and deceit may coexist. Even if deceit may be present, the
abuse of confidence will characterize the
estafa as the deceit will be merely
incidental or, is absorbed by abuse of
confidence.
- As long as there is a relation of trust and
confidence between the complainant and
the accused and even though such
relationship has been induced by the
accused thru false representations and
pretense and which is continued by active
deceit without truthfully disclosing the
facts to the complainant, the estafa
committed is by abuse of confidence
although deceit
co-exists in its commission.
- The presence of deceit would not change
the whole theory of the prosecution that
estafa with abuse of confidence was

committed.
Dispositive CFI decision to strike
testimonies is reversed and set aside.

out

MATILDE v JABSON
68 SCRA 456
ANTONIO; December 29, 1975.
NATURE
Certiorari to nullify the judgment of
respondent Court
of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XXVI, in
Criminal
Cases Nos. 9552, 9553 and 9554, imposing
upon the
accused Crisanto Matilde, Jr. y Cruz, for the
crime of
simple theft, the penalty prescribed in
Presidential
Decree No. 133 (which imposes a heavier
penalty)
instead of that imposed by Article 309,
paragraph 3,
of the Revised Penal Code.
FACTS
- An Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Rizal filed
three
informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 9552,
9553 and
9554 against Crisanto Matilde, Jr. y Cruz,
Patricio
Guiruela y Luna, Ricardo Abener y San
Pascual,
Edgardo Cape y Atienza, Servando Calpo y
Caballero,
and Ireneo Belver y Bale.
In three criminal cases, respondent court
imposed
upon petitioner, for the crime of simple
theft, the
penalty prescribed in Presidential Decree
No. 133,
instead of that imposed by Article 309,
paragraph 3,
of the Revised Penal Code. The information
charged
that petitioner and his co-accused, being
then
laborers, conspired and confederated with,
and
mutually aided one another, with intent of
gain and

without knowledge and consent of their

employer, in
stealing the articles mentioned therein
belonging to
their employer. Although the preamble of
said
informations stated that petitioner was
charged with
the crime of simple theft "in relation to
Presidential
Decree No. 133," nowhere was it alleged in
the body
of said information that the articles stolen
were
materials or products which petitioner was
"working
on, or using or producing" as employee or
laborer of
the complainant, as provided for in
Presidential
Decree No. 133. Except for the dates of
commission
and the amounts involved, the aforesaid
three (3)
informations uniformly stated that said
accused were
charged with the crime of qualified theft, in
relation
to Presidential Decree No. 133, committed
as follows:
"That on or about the 14th day of
November, 1973
in the Municipality of Pasig, Province of
Rizal,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this
Honorable
Court,
the
above-named
accused, being
then laborers working at the Markes AgroChemical
Enterprises, conspiring and confederating
together
with one Renato Matuto y Ann, who is still
at large,
all of them mutually helping and aiding
one
another, with intent of gain, grave abuse of
confidence, and without the knowledge
and
consent of the said firm, its President and
General
Manager, Marciano K. Espiritu, did then

and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take,
steal and
carry away the following, to wit: . . ."
- When the informations were amended
from
Qualified Theft to Simple theft and deleting
from the
body of Information the phrase Grave
abuse of
confidence, Matilde pleaded GUILTY but
the Court
imposed the penalty under PD 133 and not
those by
Article 309 (3) of the RPC. From this
decision, Matilde
sought from the Court a quo a
reconsideration
contending that in the absence of any
allegation in
the
body
of
information
alleging
specifically all the
elements of the offense defined and
penalized under
PD. 133, he cannot be conviceted and
penalized
under the aforesaid decree.
ISSUE
WON the information that the accused
is charged
with the crime of simple theft in
relation to PD 133
suffices
HELD
NO
- The Supreme Court granted the writ of
certiorari
and set aside the judgment, and directed
that
another one be rendered. It held that since
the
objective of Presidential Decree No. 133 is
to place a
strong
deterrent
on
workers
from
sabotaging the
productive efforts of the industry where
they are
employed, it is essential, to qualify the
offense and to
justify the imposition of the heavier
penalty
prescribed by said Decree, that the

information
should aver that the articles stolen were
materials or
products which the accused was "working
on or using
or producing," and that a statement in the
preamble
of the information that the accused is
charged with
the crime of simple theft "in relation to
Presidential
Decree No. 133," does not suffice for the
purpose
envisioned by the constitutional guarantee
that the
accused should be informed of the nature
and cause
of the accusation against him. The
Supreme Court
said that the appropriate penalty is that
under Article
309 (3) of the RPC-prision correccional in
its
minimum and medium periods if value of
property
stolen is more than 200 pesos but does not
exceed
6,000 pesos. But with the mitigating plea
of guilty,
penalty is in its minimum period.
People v. Moroy Gallo
November 16, 1999
Moroy Gallo was convicted by the trial
court of murder. He questions the
testimony of the witness, Amelita Elarmo
because of her relationship with the
deceased.
Held:
The Supreme Court repeated the wellsettled doctrine that mere relationship of a
witness to the victim does not render her
testimony less worthy of credit, especially
where there is no showing of improper
motive. The Court also upheld the claim of
conspiracy. To establish conspiracy it is not
essential that there be previous agreement
to commit the crime; it is sufficient that
there be a common purpose and design,
concerted action and concurrence of the
interest and the minds of the parties meet

understandingly so as to bring about a

deliberate agreement to commit the
offense charged, notwithstanding the
absence of a formal agreement. The
Supreme Court also upheld the trial courts
appreciation of the qualifying circumstance
of abuse of superior strength. The armed
assailants used their greater number and
superior power to overwhelm the unarmed
victim.
In addition, since the murder was
committed prior to the effectivity of RA
7659, the applicable provision is Art. 248
of the Revised Penal Code, which penalizes
murder with reclusion temporal in its
maximum period to death. The imposable

penalty which has three periods, namely,

minimum (reclusion temporal), medium
(reclusion
perpetua)
and
maximum
(death), makes Art. 64 of the Revised Penal
Code applicable. In this case the
prosecution was able to establish the
qualifying aggravating circumstances of
abuse of superior strength. In the absence
of any other generic aggravating and
mitigating circumstance, the imposable
penalty is reclusion perpetua, the medium
period of the penalty pursuant to Art. 64 of
the Penal Code.