PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS BEFORE ADMINISTRATIVE BODIES

Atty. Romeo Erece VS. Macalingay et al

G.R. No. 166809, April 22, 2008
Puno, C.J.,
Facts:
Petitioner Atty. Erece was the Regional Director of Commission on Human Rights
Region 1. On October 2, 1998 respondent employees filed an Affidavit-Complaint dated
against petitioner alleging that he would always deny them the use of the office vehicle assigned
him. That petitioner receives Representation and Transportation Allowance even if he was using
the said vehicle, and that he certified that he did not use any government vehicle, when in fact
he did, in order to collect transportation allowance.
The CSC found petitioner guilty of dishonesty and conduct prejudicial to the best interest
of the service and penalizing him with dismissal from the service.
Petitioner filed a petition for review of the CSC Resolution with the CA. However, CA
upheld the CSC Resolution
Atty. Erece contends that he was denied due process as he was not afforded the right to
cross-examine his accusers and their witnesses. He stated that at his instance, in order to prevent
delay in the disposition of the case, he was allowed to present evidence first to support the
allegations in his Counter-Affidavit. After he rested his case, respondents did not present their
evidence, but moved to submit their position paper and formal offer of evidence, which motion
was granted by the CSC over his objection. Macalingay et al then submitted their Position Paper
and Formal Offer of Exhibits. Atty. Erece submits that although he was allowed to present
evidence first, it should not be construed as a waiver of his right to cross-examine the
complainants. Although the order of presentation of evidence was not in conformity with the
procedure, still Atty. Erece should not be deemed to have lost his right to cross-examine his
accusers and their witnesses. This may be allowed only if he expressly waived said right.

Issue: WON Atty. Erece had been denied due process.

Held: The Court ruled that petitioner was not denied due process when he failed to crossexamine the complainants and their witnesses since he was given the opportunity to be heard
and present his evidence. In administrative proceedings, the essence of due process is simply
the opportunity to explain ones side.

The Court reiterated its ruling in Velez v. De Vera that:

Due process of law in administrative cases is not identical with
judicial process for a trial in court is not always essential to due
process.
While a day in court is a matter of right in judicial
proceedings, it is otherwise in administrative proceedings since they
rest upon different principles. The due process clause guarantees no
particular form of procedure and its requirements are not technical.
Thus, in certain proceedings of administrative character, the right to a
notice or hearing are not essential to due process of law. The
constitutional requirement of due process is met by a fair hearing
before a regularly established administrative agency or tribunal. It is
not essential that hearings be had before the making of a
determination if thereafter, there is available trial and tribunal before
which all objections and defenses to the making of such determination
may be raised and considered. One adequate hearing is all that due
process requires. . . .
The right to cross-examine is not an indispensable aspect of due
process. Nor is an actual hearing always essential. . . .

Thus, the decision of the CA was AFFIRMED.

Republic Act 6688 (General Appropriations Act of 1989)
Sec. 28. Representation and Transportation Allowances. ... The transportation allowance
herein authorized shall not be granted to officials who are assigned a government
vehicle or use government motor transportation, except as may be approved by the
President of the Philippines. Unless otherwise provided by law, no amount appropriated
in this Act shall be used to pay for representation and/or transportation allowances,
whether commutable or reimbursable, which exceed the rates authorized under this
Section. Previous administrative authorization not consistent with the rates and
conditions herein specified shall no longer be valid and payment shall not be allowed.

Datu Pax Mangudadatu vs. HRET and Angelo Montilla

G.R. No. 179813, December 18, 2008
Leonardo-De Castro, J.
Facts: Petitioner Datu Pax Pakung Mangudadatu and Respondent Angelo Montilla were
congressional candidates during the May 14, 2007 national elections. Petitioner won by 17,451
votes.
On May 31, 2007, respondent filed with the HRET a Petition of Protest (Ad Cautelam)
contesting the results of the elections and the proclamation of petitioner.
On June 14, 2007, the Secretary of the HRET caused the service of summons upon
petitioner through registered mail at his residence in Sultan Kudarat. He was required to file an
answer to the protest within 10 days from receipt.
The summons was received by a certain Aileen Baldenas. 43 days past and no answer
was received from Datu Pax as he was unaware of the summons. HRET then considered such
inaction as a general denial to the protest.
Datu Pax later learned about the protest against him and he coordinated with his lawyers
to appear on behalf of him and to present the answer as well as to file counter protest. He
alleged that he does not know of a Baldenas nor was she a part of the household. He further
claimed that she was not authorized to receive any important documents addressed to him. And
assuming that he had authorized her, the summons received by her was never brought to his
attention. HRET denied his motion and had proceeded to the recount as prayed for by Montilla.

Issue: WON Datu Pax was denied due process by reason that he did not receive the summons
personally.

Held: The Court ruled in favor of Datu Pax. The summons to Datu Pax should not have been
delivered via registered mail as the same is susceptible to fraud. The HRET should have made
use of its own servers to make sure that the summons is personally received by Datu Pax. The
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure (which is in one way or the other adopted by the 2004 HRET
rules on summons) provides that:

SEC. 6. Service in person on defendant. Whenever practicable, the summons shall be

served handling a copy thereof to the defendant in person, or, if he refuses to receive
and sign for it, by tendering it to him.
SEC. 7. Substituted service. If, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be served
within a reasonable time as provided in the preceding section, service may be effected (a)
by leaving copies of the summons at the defendants residence with some person of
suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving copies at
defendants office or regular place of business with some competent person in
charge thereof.
Indeed, if in ordinary civil cases (which involve only private and proprietary interests)
personal service of summons is preferred and service by registered mail is not allowed on
jurisdictional and due process grounds, with more reason should election cases (which involve
public interest and the will of the electorate) strictly follow the hierarchy of modes of service of
summons under the Rules of Court.
The Court found that the HRET committed grave abuse of discretion in considering
petitioner to have entered a general denial of the allegations in respondents petition of protest
and in denying his motion to reconsider as well as his motion to admit answer with counterprotest.

Contention of the Petitioner: Petitioner contended that the HRET never acquired jurisdiction
over his person because of the absence of a valid service of summons. He argued that a
substitute service of summons is made only "when the defendant cannot be served personally at
a reasonable time after efforts to locate him have failed." In his case, since the process servers
return failed to show on its face the impossibility of personal service, then the substituted
service was improper and invalid.

Contention of Respondent: Respondent countered that the HRET did not commit grave abuse
of discretion in issuing Resolution Nos. 07-179 dated August 16, 2007 and 07-300 dated
September 19, 2007. He argued that Rule 22 of the 2004 HRET Rules merely states that "the
Secretary of the Tribunal shall issue the corresponding summons to the protestee or respondent,
as the case may be." He posited then that the intent of the HRET in not expressly specifying
personal service of summons on the protestee or respondent was to give it a reasonable
discretion or leeway in serving the summons by other means such as registered mail. Thus,
service of summons on petitioner through registered mail did not violate Rule 22 of the 2004
HRET Rules. Further, respondent claimed that Rule 14, Sections 6 and 7 of the Rules of Court

were inconsistent with Rule 22 of the 2004 HRET Rules and therefore should not be given
suppletory application to HRET proceedings.