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*
FRANKLIN BAKER COMPANY OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
us. HONORABLE CRESENCIO B. TRAJANO, DIRECTOR OF
BUREAU OF LABOR RELATIONS, FRANKLIN BAKER
BROTHERHOOD ASSOCIATION (TECHNICAL AND OFFICE
EMPLOYEES)-ASSOCIATION OF TRADE UNIONS (ATU),
respondents.
Labor; Employer-employee relationship; Managerial employee,
defined.A managerial employee is defined as one who is vested
with powers or prerogatives to lay down and execute management
policies and/or to hire, transfer, suspend, lay-off, recall, discharge,
assign or discipline employees, or to effectively recommend such
managerial actions. (Reynolds Phil. Corp. v. Eslava, 137 SCRA 259
[1985]), citing Section 212 (K), Labor Code.
Same; Same; Same; Test of supervisory or managerial status
depends on whether a person possesses authority to act in the interest
of his employer and whether such authority is not merely routinary or
clerical in nature but requires use of independent judgment.The test
of supervisory or managerial status depends on whether a person
possesses authority to act in the interest of his employer in the matter
specified in Article 212 (k) of the Labor Code and Section 1 (m) of its
Implementing Rules and whether such authority is not merely
routinary or clerical in nature, but requires the use of independent
judgment. Thus, where such recommendatory powers as in the case at
bar, are subject to evaluation, review and final action by the
department heads and other higher executives of the company, the
same, although present, are not effective and not an exercise of
independent judgment as required by law (National Warehousing
Corp. v. CIR, 7 SCRA 602-603 [1963]).
Same; Same; Same; Employees in case at bar are not managerial
employees because they do not participate in policy making but are
given ready policies to execute and standard practices to observe.
Further-more, in line with the ruling of this Court, subject employees
are not managerial employees because as borne by the records, they do
not participate in policy making but are given ready policies to execute
and standard practices to observe, thus having little freedom of action
that Franklin Baker Company of the Phils. Davao Plant, had in its
employ approximately ninety (90) regular technical and office
employees, which group is separate and distinct from the regular rank
and file employees and is excluded from the coverage of existing
Collective Bargaining Agreement.
Petitioner company did not object to the holding of such an election
but manifested that out of the ninety (90) employees sought to be
represented by the respondent union, seventy four (74) are managerial
employees while two (2) others are confidential employees, hence,
must be excluded from the certification election and from the
bargaining unit that may result from such election (Rollo, p. 3).
Hearings were held and thereafter, the parties agreed to file their
respective memoranda. Likewise, petitioner filed a reply to private
respondents Memorandum (Rollo, p. 4).
Subsequently, on September 17, 1984, Med-Arbiter Conchita J.
Martinez issued an order, the dispositve part of which reads:
Accordingly, the petition is hereby granted and a certification election
among the office and technical employees of Franklin Baker Company
of the Philippines, Davao Plant is ordered within twenty (20) days
from receipt hereof. The choices shall be the following:
1. Franklin Baker Brotherhood Association-ATU
2. No Union
The representation officer assigned shall call the parties for a preelection conference at least five (5) days before the date of the election
to thresh out the mechanics of the election, the finalization of the list
of voters, the posting of notices and other relevant matters.
The companys latest payroll shall be the basis for determining the
office and technical workers qualified to vote.
SO ORDERED. (Rollo, pp. 47-48).
From the aforequoted order petitioner Company appealed to the
Bureau of Labor Relations, docketed as BLR Case No. A-228-84,
praying that the appealed order be set aside and another be issued
declaring the seventy four (74) inspectors> foremen and supervisors as
managerial employees.
During the pendency of the appeal, sixty one (61) of the employees
involved, filed a Motion to Withdraw the petition for certification
election praying therein for their exclusion from the Bargaining Unit
and for a categorical declaration that they are managerial employees,
as they are performing managerial functions (Rollo, p. 4).
On April 7, 1986, public respondent Bureau of Labor Relations
Cresencio B. Trajano issued a Resolution affirming the order dated
September 17, 1984, the dispositive part of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the appealed Order dated September 17, 1985 is
hereby affirmed and the appeal dismissed for lack of merit. Let the
certification election among the office and technical employees of
Franklin Baker Company of the Philippines proceed without delay.
The latest payrolls of the company shall be used as basis of
determining the list of eligible voters. (Rollo, p. 77).
Petitioner company sought the reconsideration of the aforequoted
resolution but its motion was denied by Director Cresencio B. Trajano
in his order dated June 6, 1986, the dispositive part of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the appeal of respondent company is, dismissed for
lack of merit and the Bureaus Resolution dated April 1986 affirmed in
toto.
Let, therefore, the pertinent papers of this case be immediately
forwarded to the Office of origin for the conduct of the certification
election. (Rollo, p. 90).
Hence, this petition.
In the resolution of July 30, 1986, the Second Division of this Court
without giving due course to the petition required the respondents to
file their comment (Rollo, p. 91). On August 28, 1986, public
respondent filed its comment (Rollo, pp. 99 to 102). Likewise private
respondent filed its comment on September 5, 1986 (Rollo, pp. 104 to
107).
employees in the present case they are not precluded from joining and
they should join the petitioner.
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 122226. March 25, 1998]
UNITED PEPSI-COLA SUPERVISORY UNION
(UPSU), petitioner, vs. HON. BIENVENIDO E. LAGUESMA and
PEPSI-COLA PRODUCTS, PHILIPPINES, INC. respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
Petitioner is a union of supervisory employees. It appears that on
March 20, 1995 the union filed a petition for certification election on
behalf of the route managers at Pepsi-Cola Products Philippines,
Inc. However, its petition was denied by the med-arbiter and, on
appeal, by the Secretary of Labor and Employment, on the ground that
the route managers are managerial employees and, therefore, ineligible
for union membership under the first sentence of Art. 245 of the Labor
Code, which provides:
Ineligibility of managerial employees to join any labor organization;
right of supervisory employees. Managerial employees are not
eligible to join, assist or form any labor organization. Supervisory
employees shall not be eligible for membership in a labor organization
of the rank-and-file employees but may join, assist or form separate
labor organizations of their own.
Petitioner brought this suit challenging the validity of the order dated
August 31, 1995, as reiterated in the order dated September 22, 1995,
of the Secretary of Labor and Employment. Its petition was dismissed
by the Third Division for lack of showing that respondent committed
grave abuse of discretion. But petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration, pressing for resolution its contention that the first
sentence of Art. 245 of the Labor Code, so far as it declares managerial
employees to be ineligible to form, assist or join unions, contravenes
Art. III 8 of the Constitution which provides:
The right of the people, including those employed in the public and
private sectors, to form unions, associations, or societies for the
purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged.
For this reason, the petition was referred to the Court en banc.
The Issues in this Case
Two question are presented by the petition: (1) whether the route
managers at Pepsi-Cola Products Philippines, Inc. are managerial
holding it was not, this Court made it clear that it was referring to
labor relations proceedings of a non-adversary character, thus:
The requirement of a clearance to terminate employment was a
creation of the Department of labor to carry out the Labor Code
provisions on security of tenure and termination of employment. The
proceeding subsequent to the filing of an application for clearance to
terminate employment was outlined in Book V, Rule XIV of the Rules
and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code. The fact that said rule
allowed a procedure for the approval of the clearance with or without
the opposition of the employee concerned (Secs. 7 & 8), demonstrates
the non-litigious and summary nature of the proceeding. The
clearance requirement was therefore necessary only as an expeditious
shield against arbitrary dismissal without the knowledge and
supervision of the Department of Labor. Hence, a duly approved
clearance implied that the dismissal was legal or for cause (Sec. 2).
[7]
v. National Labor Relations Commission, 177 SCRA 93, 100
(1989).7
But the doctrine of res judicata certainly applies to adversary
administrative proceedings. As early as 1956, in Brillantes v. Castro,
[8]
8 we sustained the dismissal of an action by a trial court on the basis
of a prior administrative determination of the same case by the Wage
Administration Service, applying the principle of res
judicata. Recently, in Abad v. NLRC[9]9 we applied the related
doctrine of stare decisis in holding that the prior determination that
certain jobs at the Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Co. were project
employments was binding in another case involving another group of
employees of the same company. Indeed, in Nasipit Lumber Co., this
Court clarified toward the end of its opinion that "the doctrine of res
judicata applies . . . to judicial or quasi judicial proceedings and not to
the exercise of administrative powers."[10]v. National Labor Relations
Commission, supra note 7.10 Now proceedings for certification
election, such as those involved in Case No. OS-M-A-10-318-91 and
Case No. OS-A-3-71-92, are quasi judicial in nature and, therefore,
decisions rendered in such proceedings can attain finality.[11]v. B.F.
Goodrich (Marikina Factory) Confidential and Salaries Employees
Union-NATU, 49 SCRA 532 (1973).11
Thus, we have in this case an expert's view that the employees
concerned are managerial employees within the purview of Art. 212
which provides:
(m)
"managerial employee" is one who is vested with powers or
prerogatives to lay down and execute management policies and/or to
hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, discharge, assign or discipline
employees. Supervisory employees are those who, in the interest of
the employer, effectively recommend such managerial actions if the
exercise of such authority is not merely routinary or clerical in nature
but requires the use of independent judgment. All employees not
falling within any of the above definitions are considered rank-and-file
employees for purposes of this Book.
At the very least, the principle of finality of administrative
determination compels respect for the finding of the Secretary of
Labor that route managers are managerial employees as defined by law
in the absence of anything to show that such determination is without
substantial evidence to support it. Nonetheless, the Court, concerned
that employees who are otherwise supervisors may wittingly or
unwittingly be classified as managerial personnel and thus denied the
right of self- organization, has decided to review the record of this
case.
DOLE's Finding that Route Managers are Managerial Employees Supported by Substantial Evidence in the Record
The Court now finds that the job evaluation made by the Secretary of
Labor is indeed supported by substantial evidence. The nature of the
job of route managers is given in a four-page pamphlet, prepared by
the company, called "Route Manager Position Description," the
pertinent parts of which read:
A. BASIC PURPOSE
A Manager achieves objectives through others.
As a Route Manager, your purpose is to meet the sales plan; and you
achieve this objective through the skillful MANAGEMENT OF
YOUR JOB AND THE MANAGEMENT OF YOUR PEOPLE.
These then are your functions as Pepsi-Cola Route Manager. Within
these functions - managing your job and managing your people - you
are accountable to your District Manager for the execution and
completion of various tasks and activities which will make it possible
for you to achieve your sales objectives.
B. PRINCIPAL ACCOUNTABILITIES
1.0 MANAGING YOUR JOB
The Route Manager is accountable for the following:
1.1 SALES DEVELOPMENT
1.1.1 Achieve the sales plan.
Before the promulgation of the Labor Code in 1974, the field of labor
relations was governed by the Industrial Peace Act (R.A. No. 875).
In accordance with the general definition above, this law defined
"supervisor" as follows:
SECTION 2. . . .
(k) "Supervisor" means any person having authority in the interest of
an employer, to hire, transfer, suspend, lay-off, recall, discharge,
assign, recommend, or discipline other employees, or responsibly to
direct them, and to adjust their grievances, or effectively to
recommend such acts, if, in connection with the foregoing, the
exercise of such authority is not of a merely routinary or clerical nature
but requires the use of independent judgment.[16]16
The right of supervisors to form their own organizations was affirmed:
SEC. 3. Employees' Right to Self-Organization. -- Employees shall
have the right to self-organization and to form, join or assist labor
organizations of their own choosing for the purpose of collective
bargaining through representatives of their own choosing and to
engage in concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining
and other mutual aid and protection. Individuals employed as
supervisors shall not be eligible for membership in a labor
organization of employees under their supervision but may form
separate organizations of their own.[17]
For its part, the Supreme Court upheld in several of its decisions the
right of supervisors to organize for purposes of labor relations.
[18]
v. Filoil Supervisory and Confidential Employees Association, 6
SCRA 522 (1972); Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawa sa Manila
Railroad Co. v. CIR, 106 Phil 607 (1959).18
Although it had a definition of the term "supervisor," the Industrial
Peace Act did not define the term "manager." But, using the
commonly-understood concept of "manager," as above stated, it is
apparent that the law used the term "supervisors" to refer to the subgroup of "managerial employees" known as front-line managers. The
Thus, the dictum in the Caltex case which allowed at least for the
theoretical unionization of top and middle managers by assimilating
them with the supervisory group under the broad phrase "managerial
personnel," provided the lynchpin for later laws denying the right of
self-organization not only to top and middle management employees
but to front line managers or supervisors as well. Following the Caltex
case, the Labor Code, promulgated in 1974 under martial law, dropped
the distinction between the first and second sub-groups of managerial
employees. Instead of treating the terms "supervisor" and "manager"
separately, the law lumped them together and called them "managerial
employees," as follows:
ART. 212. Definitions . . . .
(k) "Managerial Employee" is one who is vested with powers or
prerogatives to lay down and execute management policies and/or to
hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, discharge, assign or discipline
employees, or to effectively recommend such managerial actions. All
employees not falling within this definition are considered rank and
file employees for purposes of this Book.[22]22
The definition shows that it is actually a combination of the commonly
understood definitions of both groups of managerial employees,
grammatically joined by the phrase "and/or."
This general definition was perhaps legally necessary at that time for
two reasons. First, the 1974 Code denied supervisors their right to selforganize as theretofore guaranteed to them by the Industrial Peace
Act. Second, it stood the dictum in the Caltex case on its head by
prohibiting all types of managers from forming unions. The explicit
general prohibition was contained in the then Art. 246 of the Labor
Code.
The practical effect of this synthesis of legal concepts was made
apparent in the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code which
ART. 245. Security guards and other personnel employed for the
protection and security of the person, properties and premises of the
employers shall not be eligible for membership in a labor organization.
ART. 246. Managerial employees are not eligible to join, assist, and
form any labor organization.[28]28
Implications of the Lerum Proposal
452
G.R. No. 96189. July 14, 1992.*
UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. PURA
FERRER-CALLEJA, Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations,
Department of Labor and Employment, and THE ALL U.P.
WORKERS UNION, represented by its President, Rosario del
Rosario, respondents.
Labor Laws; Labor Organization; Professors, associate professors and
assistant professors cannot be considered as exercising such
managerial or highly confidential functions as would justify their
being categorized as high-level employees of the University of the
Philippines.As regards the first issue, the Court is satisfied that it
has been correctly resolved by the respondent Director of Bureau
Relations. In light of Executive Order No. 180 and its implementing
rules, as well as the Universitys charter and relevant regulations, the
professors, associate professors and assistant professors (hereafter
simply referred to as professors) cannot be considered as exercising
such managerial or highly confidential functions as would justify their
being categorized as high-level employees of the institution.
Same; Same; Same; It is the University Academic Personnel
Committee composed of deans, the assistant for academic affairs and
the chief of personnel which formulates the policies, rules and
standards respecting selection, compensation and promotion of
members of the academic staff.From the foregoing, it is evident that
it is the University Academic Personnel Committee, composed of
deans, the assistant for academic affairs and the chief of personnel,
which formulates the policies, rules and standards respecting selection,
compensation and promotion of members of the academic staff. The
departmental and college academic personnel committees functions
are purely recommendatory in nature, subject to review and evaluation
by the University Academic Personnel Board.
Same; Same; Same; Membership in the University Council can not
elevate the professors to the status of high-level employees.Neither
can membership in the University Council elevate the professors to the
status of high-level employees.
_________________
*SECOND DIVISION.
Our labor laws do not however provide the criteria for determining the
proper collective bargaining unit. Section 12 of the old law, Republic
Act No. 875 otherwise known as the Industrial Peace Act, simply reads
as follows:29
Section12. Exclusive Collective Bargaining Representation for Labor
Organizations.The labor organization designated or selected for the
purpose of collective bargaining by the majority of the employees in
an appropriate collective bargaining unit shall be the exclusive
representative of all the employees in such unit for the purpose of
collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of
employment, or other conditions of employment; Provided, That any
individual employee or group of employees shall have the right at any
time to present grievances to their employer.
Although said Section 12 of the Industrial Peace Act was subsequently
incorporated into the Labor Code with minor changes, no guidelines
were included in said Code for determination of an appropriate
bargaining unit in a given case.30 Thus, apart from the single
descriptive word appropriate, no specific guide for determining the
proper collective bargaining unit can be found in the statutes.
Even Executive Order No. 180 already adverted to is not much help.
All it says, in its Section 9, is that (t)he appropriate organizational
unit shall be the employer unit consisting of rank-and-file employees,
unless circumstances otherwise require. Case law fortunately
furnishes some guidelines.
When first confronted with the task of determining the proper
collective bargaining unit in a particular controversy, the Court had
perforce to rely on American jurisprudence. In Democratic Labor
Association vs. Cebu Stevedoring Company, Inc., decided on February
28, 1958,31 the Court observed that the issue of how to determine the
proper collective bargaining unit and what unit would be appropriate
to be the collective bargaining agency x x x is novel in this
jurisdiction; however, American precedents on the matter abound xx
(to which resort may be had) considering that our present Magna Carta
has been patterned after the American law on the subject. Said the
Court:
x x x Under these precedents, there are various factors which must be
satisfied and considered in determining the proper constituency of a
bargaining unit. No one particular factor is itself decisive of the
determination. The weight accorded to any particular factor varies in
seem obvious that teachers would find very little in common with the
University clerks and other non-academic employees as regards
responsibilities and functions, working conditions, compensation rates,
social life and interests, skills and intellectual pursuits, cultural
activities, etc. On the contrary, the dichotomy of interests, the
dissimilarity in the nature of the work and duties as well as in the
compensation and working conditions of the academic and nonacademic personnel dictate the separation of these two categories of
employees for purposes of collective bargaining. The formation of two
separate bargaining units, the first consisting of the rank-and-file nonacademic personnel, and the second, of the rank-and-file academic
employees, is the set-up that will best assure to all the employees the
exercise of their collective bargaining rights. These special
circumstances, i.e., the dichotomy of interests and concerns as well as
the dissimilarity in the nature and conditions of work, wages and
compensation between the academic and non-academic personnel,
bring the case at bar within the exception contemplated in Section 9 of
Executive Order No. 180. It was grave abuse of discretion on the part
of the Labor Relations Director to have ruled otherwise, ignoring plain
and patent realities.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Order of October 30, 1990 is hereby
AFFIRMED in so far as it declares the professors, associate professors
and assistant professors of the University of the Philippines as rankand-file employees. The Order of August 7, 1990 is MODIFIED in the
sense that the non-academic rank-and-file employees of the University
of the Philippines shall constitute a bargaining unit to the exclusion of
the academic employees of the institution.i.e, full professors,
associate professors, assistant professors, instructors, and the research,
extension and professorial staff, who may, if so minded, organize
themselves into a separate collective bargaining unit; and that,
therefore, only said non-academic rank-and-file personnel of the
University of the Philippines in Diliman, Manila, Los Baos and the
Visayas are to participate in the certification election.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla, Regalado and Nocon, JJ., concur.
Paras, J., Retired.
Order affirmed.
Note.Employees enjoy the right to self-organization and to form and
join labor organizations of their own choosing for the purpose of
appropriate for bargaining purposes. This being the case, the mere
allegation of respondent-appellee that there are about 42 supervisory
employees in the proposed bargaining unit should have not caused the
dismissal of the instant petition. Said issue could very well be taken
cared of during the pre-election conference where inclusion/exclusion
proceedings will be conducted to determine the list of eligible voters.7
Not satisfied with the decision of the Office of the Secretary of Labor,
petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of
March 3, 1993, reiterating its claim that as of the date of filing of
petition for certification election, respondent TMPCLU had not yet
acquired the status of a legitimate labor organization as required by the
Labor Code, and that the proposed bargaining unit was inappropriate.
Acting on petitioners motion for reconsideration, the public
respondent, on July 13, 1994 set aside its earlier resolution and
remanded the case to the Med-Arbiter concluding that the issues raised
by petitioner both on appeal and in its motion for reconsideration were
factual issues requiring further hearing and production of evidence.8
The Order stated:
We carefully re-examined the records vis-a-vis the arguments raised by
the movant, and we note that movant correctly pointed out that
petitioner submitted a copy of its certificate of registration for the first
time on appeal and that in its petition, petitioner alleges that it is an
independent organization which is in the process of registration.
Movant strongly argues that the foregoing only confirms what it has
been pointing out all along, that at the time the petition was filed
petitioner is (sic) not yet the holder of a registration certificate; that
what was actually issued on 24 November 1992 or two (2) days before
the filing of the petition was an official receipt of payment for the
application fee; and, that the date appearing in the Registration
certificate which is November 24, 1992 is not the date when petitioner
was actually registered, but the date when the registration certificate
was prepared by the processor. Movant also ratiocinates that if indeed
petitioner has been in possession of the registration certificate at the
time this petition was filed on November 26, 1992, it would have
attached the same to the petition.
The foregoing issues are factual ones, the resolution of which is crucial
to the petition. For if indeed it is true that at the time of filing of the
petition, the said registration certificate has not been approved yet,
then, petitioner lacks the legal personality to file the petition and the
dismissal order is proper. Sadly, we can not resolve the said questions
by merely perusing the records. Further hearing and introduction of
evidence are required. Thus, there is a need to remand the case to the
Med-Arbiter solely for the purpose.
WHEREFORE, the motion is hereby granted and our Resolution is
hereby set aside. Let the case be remanded to the Med-Arbiter for the
purpose aforestated.
SO ORDERED.9
Pursuant to the Order, quoted above, Med-Arbiter Brigida C. Fodrigon
submitted her findings on September 28, 1994, stating the
following:10
[T]he controvertible fact is that petitioner could not have been issued
its Certificate of Registration on November 24, 1992 when it applied
for registration only on November 23, 1992 as shown by the official
receipt of payment of filing fee. As Enrique Nalus, Chief LEO, this
office, would attest in his letter dated September 8, 1994 addressed to
Mr. Porfirio T. Reyes, Industrial Relations Officer of Respondent
company, in response to a query posed by the latter, It is unlikely that
an application for registration is approved on the date that it is filed or
the day thereafter as the processing course has to pass through routing,
screening, and assignment, evaluation, review and initialing, and
approval/disapproval procedure, among others, so that a 30-day period
is provided for under the Labor Code for this purpose, let alone
opposition thereto by interested parties which must be also given due
course.
Another evidence which petitioner presented . . . is the Union
Registration 1992 Logbook of IRD . . . and the entry date November
25, 1992 as allegedly the date of the release of the registration
certificate . . . On the other hand, respondent company presented . . . a
certified true copy of an entry on page 265 of the Union Registration
Logbook showing the pertinent facts about petitioner but which do not
show the petitioners registration was issued on or before November
26, 1992.11
Further citing other pieces of evidence presented before her, the MedArbiter concluded that respondent TMPCLU could not have
acquire[d] legal personality at the time of the filing of (its)
petition.12
On April 20, 1996, the public respondent issued a new Resolution,
directing the conduct of a certification election among the regular
Five positions, the union could not, prior to purging itself of its
supervisory employee members, attain the status of a legitimate labor
organization. Not being one, it cannot possess the requisite personality
to file a petition for certification election.
The foregoing discussion, therefore, renders entirely irrelevant, the
technical issue raised as to whether or not respondent union was in
possession of the status of a legitimate labor organization at the time of
filing, when, as petitioner vigorously claims, the former was still at the
stage of processing of its application for recognition as a legitimate
labor organization. The unions composition being in violation of the
Labor Codes prohibition of unions composed of supervisory and rankand-file employees, it could not possess the requisite personality to file
for recognition as a legitimate labor organization. In any case, the
factual issue, albeit ignored by the public respondents assailed
Resolution, was adequately threshed out in the Med-Arbiters
September 28, 1994 Order.
The holding of a certification election is based on clear statutory
policy which cannot be circumvented.23 Its rules, strictly construed by
this Court, are designed to eliminate fraud and manipulation. As we
emphasized in Progressive Development Corporation v. Secretary,
Department of Labor and Employment,24 the Courts conclusion
should not be interpreted as impairing any unions right to be certified
as the employees bargaining agent in the petitioners establishment.
Workers of an appropriate bargaining unit must be allowed to freely
express their choice in an election where everything is open to sound
judgment and the possibility for fraud and misrepresentation is
absent.25
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolution
dated April 20, 1995 and Order dated July 14, 1995 of respondent
Secretary of Labor are hereby SET ASIDE. The Order dated
September 28, 1994 of the Med-Arbiter is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla (Chairman), Bellosillo, Vitug and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ.,
concur.
Petition granted.
Note.What the law prohibits is a union, whose membership
comprises of supervisors merging with rank-and-file employees
because this is where the conflict of interest may arise on the areas of
Act No. 875 (the Industrial Peace Act) on the right of a supervisor's
union to affiliate. The private respondent asserts that the legislature
must have noted the Adamson ruling then prevailing when it conceived
the reinstatement in the present Labor Code of a similar provision on
the right of supervisors to organize.
Under the Industrial Peace Act of 1953, employees were classified into
three groups, namely: (1) managerial employees; (2) supervisors; and
(3) rank-and file employees. Supervisors, who were considered
employees in relation to their employer could join a union but not a
union of rank-and-file employees.
With the enactment in 1974 of the Labor Code (Pres Decree No. 442),
employees were classified into managerial and rank-and-file
employees. Neither the category of supervisors nor their right to
organize under the old statute were recognized. So that, in Bulletin
Publishing Corporation v. Sanchez (144 SCRA 628 [1986]), the Court
interpreted the superseding labor law to have removed from
supervisors the right to unionize among themselves. The Court ruled:
In the light of the factual background of this case, We are constrained
to hold that the supervisory employees of petitioner firm may not,
under the law, form a supervisors union, separate and distinct from the
existing bargaining unit (BEU), composed of the rank-and-file
employees of the Bulletin Publishing Corporation. It is evident that
most of the private respondents are considered managerial employees.
Also, it is distinctly stated in Section 11, Rule II, of the Omnibus Rules
Implementing the Labor Code, that supervisory unions are presently
no longer recognized nor allowed to exist and operate as such. (pp.
633, 634)
In Section 11, Rule II, Book V of the Omnibus Rules implementing
Pres. Decree No. 442, the supervisory unions existing since the
effectivity of the New Code in January 1, 1975 ceased to operate as
such and the members who did not qualify as managerial employees
under this definition in Article 212 (k) therein became eligible to form,
to join or assist a rank-and-file union.
A revision of the Labor Code undertaken by the bicameral Congress
brought about the enactment of Rep. Act No. 6715 in March 1989 in
which employees were reclassified into three groups, namely: (1) the
managerial employees; (2) supervisors; and (3) the rank and file
employees. Under the present law, the category of supervisory
employees is once again recognized. Hence, Art. 212 (m) states:
Finally, the respondent contends that the law prohibits the employer
from interfering with the employees' right to self-organization.
There is no question about this intendment of the law. There is,
however, in the present case, no violation of such a guarantee to the
employee. Supervisors are not prohibited from forming their own
union. What the law prohibits is their membership in a labor
organization of rank-and-file employees (Art. 245, Labor Code) or
their joining a national federation of rank-and-file employees that
includes the very local union which they are not allowed to directly
join.
In a motion dated November 15, 1991 it appears that the petitioner has
knuckled under to the respondents' pressures and agreed to let the
national federation KAMPIL-KATIPUNAN represent its supervisors
in negotiating a collective bargaining agreement. Against the advise of
its own counsel and on the basis of alleged "industrial peace", the
petitioner expressed a loss of interest in pursuing this action. The
petitioner is, of course, free to grant whatever concessions it wishes to
give to its employees unilaterally or through negotiations but we
cannot allow the resulting validation of an erroneous ruling and policy
of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) to remain on the
basis of the petitioner's loss of interest. The December 14, 1990 order
and the November 21, 1990 resolution of DOLE are contrary to law
and must be declared as such.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The private
respondent is disqualified from affiliating with a national federation of
labor organizations which includes the petitioner's rank-and-file
employees.
SO ORDERED.
Feliciano, Bidin, Davide, Jr. and Romero, JJ., concur.
Republic
SUPREME
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
of
the
Philippines
COURT
Separate Opinions
PADILLA, J., concurring and dissenting:
I concur in the majority opinion's conclusion that respondent Bank's
Branch Managers/OICs, Cashiers and Controllers, being confidential
employees of the Bank, are disqualified from joining or assisting
petitioner labor union or joining, assisting or forming any other labor
organization, including a supervisor's union.
However, I dissent from its conclusion that respondent Bank's
Department Managers and Department Assistant Managers are not
disqualified from joining a labor union including a supervisors' union.
My years of experience in the banking industry (perhaps irrelevant to
this case) have shown that positions of such Department Heads
(Managers) are as confidential, if not more, than the position of
Branch Managers. In fact, most of such Department Heads are VicePresidents of the Bank, which underscores their status both as
managerial employees and confidential personnel of the Bank. It
would be incongruous for a Department Manager who, as already
stated, is usually a Vice-President, to be a member of the same labor
organization as his messenger or supervisory account executives. It
would be even more untenable and dangerous for a Department
Manager who usually is a Vice-President, being a member of a labor
union, to be designated a union representative for purposes of
collective bargaining with the management of which he is a part. I
think the public respondent is correct in disqualifying from
membership in a labor union of supervisors, those who are Department
Managers and Assistant Managers.
I, therefore, vote for the affirmance in toto of public respondent's
decision of 23 March 1990 and order of 20 April 1990.
# Separate Opinions
On the same date, the Union filed a motion for a cease and desist order
to enjoin Metrolab from implementing the mass layoff, alleging that
such act violated the prohibition against committing acts that would
exacerbate the dispute as specifically directed in the assumption order.
[2]
On the other hand, Metrolab contended that the layoff was temporary
and in the exercise of its management prerogative. It maintained that
the company would suffer a yearly gross revenue loss of
approximately sixty-six (66) million pesos due to the withdrawal of its
principals in the Toll and Contract Manufacturing
Department. Metrolab further asserted that with the automation of the
manufacture of its product Eskinol, the number of workers required
its production is significantly reduced.[3]
Thereafter, on various dates, Metrolab recalled some of the laid off
workers on a temporary basis due to availability of work in the
production lines.
On 14 April 1992, Acting Labor Secretary Nieves Confesor issued a
resolution declaring the layoff of Metrolabs 94 rank and file workers
illegal and ordered their reinstatement with full backwages. The
dispositive portion reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Unions motion for reconsideration is granted in
part, and our order of 28 December 1991 is affirmed subject to the
modifications in allowances and in the close shop provision. The
layoff of the 94 employees at MII is hereby declared illegal for the
failure of the latter to comply with our injunction against committing
any act which may exacerbate the dispute and with the 30-day notice
requirement. Accordingly, MII is hereby ordered to reinstate the 94
employees, except those who have already been recalled, to their
former positions or substantially equivalent, positions with full
backwages from the date they were illegally laid off on 27 January
1992 until actually reinstated without loss of seniority rights and other
benefits. Issues relative to the CBA agreed upon by the parties and not
embodied in our earlier order are hereby ordered adopted for
incorporation in the CBA. Further, the dispositions and directives
contained in all previous orders and resolutions relative to the instant
dispute, insofar as not inconsistent herein, are reiterated. Finally, the
parties are enjoined to cease and desist from committing any act which
may tend to circumvent this resolution.
SO RESOLVED.[4]
law, taking into account its special character and the particular
circumstances in the case at bench.
As aptly declared by public respondent Secretary of Labor in its
assailed resolution:
xxx
xxx
xxx.
MII is right to the extent that as a rule, we may not interfere with the
legitimate exercise of management prerogatives such as layoffs. But it
may nevertheless be appropriate to mention here that one of the
substantive evils which Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code seeks to curb
is the exacerbation of a labor dispute to the further detriment of the
national interest. When a labor dispute has in fact occurred and a
general injunction has been issued restraining the commission of
disruptive acts, management prerogatives must always be exercised
consistently with the statutory objective.[11]
xxx
xxx
xxx.
Metrolab insists that the subject layoffs did not exacerbate their
dispute with the Union since no untoward incident occurred after the
layoffs were implemented. There were no work disruptions or
stoppages and no mass actions were threatened or undertaken. Instead,
petitioner asserts, the affected employees calmly accepted their fate
as this was a matter which they had been previously advised would be
inevitable.[12]
After a judicious review of the record, we find no compelling reason to
overturn the findings of the Secretary of Labor.
We reaffirm the doctrine that considering their expertise in their
respective fields, factual findings of administrative agencies supported
by substantial evidence are accorded great respect and binds this
Court.[13]
The Secretary of Labor ruled, thus:
xxx
xxx
xxx.
Any act committed during the pendency of the dispute that tends to
give rise to further contentious issues or increase the tensions between
the parties should be considered an act of exacerbation. One must
look at the act itself, not on speculative reactions. A misplaced
recourse is not needed to prove that a dispute has been
exacerbated. For instance, the Union could not be expected to file
another notice of strike. For this would depart from its theory of the
case that the layoff is subsumed under the instant dispute, for which a
notice of strike had already been filed. On the other hand, to expect
tanggapin ang mga bagay na ito subalit kailangan nating gawin dahil
hindi kaya ng kumpanya ang magbayad ng suweldo kung ang
empleyado ay walang trabaho. Kung tayo ay patuloy na magbabayad
ng suweldo, mas hihina ang ating kumpanya at mas marami ang
maaring maapektuhan.
Sa pagpapatupad ng lay-off susundin natin ang LAST IN-FIRST
OUT policy. Ang mga empleyadong may pinakamaikling serbisyo sa
kumpanya ang unang maaapektuhan. Ito ay batay na rin sa nakasaad
sa ating CBA na ang mga huling pumasok sa kumpanya ang unang
masasama sa lay-off kapag nagkaroon ng ganitong mga kalagayan.
Ang mga empleyado na kasama sa lay-off ay nakalista sa sulat na
ito. Ang umpisa ng lay-off ay sa Lunes, Enero 27. Hindi na muna sila
papasok sa kumpanya. Makukuha nila ang suweldo nila sa Enero 30,
1992.
Hindi po natin matitiyak kung gaano katagal ang lay-off ngunit ang
aming tingin ay matatagalan bago magkaroon ng dagdag na
trabaho. Dahil dito, sinimulan na namin ang isang Redundancy
Program sa mga supervisors. Nabawasan ang mga puwesto para sa
kanila, kaya sila ay mawawalan ng trabaho at bibigyan na ng
redundancy pay.[16] (Italics ours.)
xxx
xxx
xxx.
We agree with the ruling of the Secretary of Labor, thus:
xxx
xxx
xxx.
. . .MII insists that the layoff in question is temporary not permanent. It
then cites International Hardware, Inc. vs. NLRC, 176 SCRA 256, in
which the Supreme Court held that the 30-day notice required under
Article 283 of the Labor Code need not be complied with if the
employer has no intention to permanently severe (sic) the employment
relationship.
We are not convinced by this argument. International
Hardware involves a case where there had been a reduction of
workload. Precisely to avoid laying off the employees, the employer
therein opted to give them work on a rotating basis. Though on a
limited scale, work was available. This was the Supreme Courts basis
for holding that there was no intention to permanently severe (sic) the
employment relationship.
Here, there is no circumstance at all from which we can infer an
intention from MII not to sever the employment relationship
permanently. If there was such an intention, MII could have made it
very clear in the notices of layoff. But as it were, the notices are
couched in a language so uncertain that the only conclusion possible is
the permanent termination, not the continuation, of the employment
relationship.
MII also seeks to excuse itself from compliance with the 30-day notice
with a tautology. While insisting that there is really no best time to
announce a bad news, (sic) it also claims that it broke the bad news
only on 27 January 1992 because had it complied with the 30-day
notice, it could have broken the bad news on 02 January 1992, the first
working day of the year. If there is really no best time to announce a
bad news (sic), it wouldnt have mattered if the same was announced
at the first working day of the year. That way, MII could have at least
complied with the requirement of the law.[17]
The second issue raised by petitioner merits our consideration.
In the assailed Omnibus Resolution, Labor Secretary Confesor
clarified the CBA provisions on closed-shop and the scope of the
bargaining unit in this wise:
xxx
xxx
xxx.
Appropriateness of the bargaining unit.
xxx
xxx
xxx.
Exclusions. In our 14 April 1992 resolution, we ruled on the issue of
exclusion as follows:
These aside, we reconsider our denial of the modifications which the
Union proposes to introduce on the close shop provision. While we
note that the provision as presently worded has served the relationship
of the parties well under previous CBAs, the shift in constitutional
policy toward expanding the right of all workers to self-organization
should now be formally recognized by the parties, subject to the
following exclusions only:
1.
Managerial employees; and
2. The executive secretaries of the President, Executive Vice-President,
Vice-President, Vice President for Sales, Personnel Manager, and
Director for Corporate Planning who may have access to vital labor
relations information or who may otherwise act in a confidential
capacity to persons who determine or formulate management policies.
The provisions of Article I (b) and Attachment I of the 1988-1990
CBA shall thus be modified consistently with the foregoing.
Article I (b) of the 1988-1990 CBA provides:
Union, the latter might not be assured of their loyalty to the Union in
view of evident conflict of interests. The Union can also become
company-dominated with the presence of managerial employees in
Union membership.
In Golden Farms, Inc. vs. Ferrer-Calleja, this Court explicitly made
this rationale applicable to confidential employees:
This rationale holds true also for confidential employees such as
accounting personnel, radio and telegraph operators, who having
access to confidential information, may become the source of undue
advantage. Said employee(s) may act as a spy or spies of either party
to a collective bargaining agreement. This is specially true in the
present case where the petitioning Union is already the bargaining
agent of the rank-and-file employees in the establishment. To allow
the confidential employees to join the existing Union of the rank-andfile would be in violation of the terms of the Collective Bargaining
Agreement wherein this kind of employees by the nature of their
functions/positions are expressly excluded.
xxx
xxx
xxx.
Similarly, in National Association of Trade Union - Republic Planters
Bank Supervisors Chapter v. Torres[22] we declared:
xxx
xxx
xxx.
. . . As regards the other claim of respondent Bank that Branch
Managers/OICs, Cashiers and Controllers are confidential employees,
having control, custody and/ or access to confidential matters, e.g., the
branchs cash position, statements of financial condition, vault
combination, cash codes for telegraphic transfers, demand drafts and
other negotiable instruments, pursuant to Sec. 1166.4 of the Central
Bank Manual regarding joint custody, this claim is not even disputed
by petitioner. A confidential employee is one entrusted with
confidence on delicate matters, or with the custody, handling, or care
and protection of the employers property. While Art. 245 of the
Labor Code singles out managerial employees as ineligible to join,
assist or form any labor organization, under the doctrine of necessary,
implication, confidential employees are similarly disqualified. . . .
xxx
xxx
xxx.
. . .(I)n the collective bargaining process, managerial employees are
supposed to be on the side of the employer, to act as its
representatives, and to see to it that its interest are well protected. The
employer is not assured of such protection if these employees
Union, the latter might not be assured of their loyalty to the Union in
view of evident conflict of interest. The Union can also become
company-dominated with the presence of managerial employees in
Union membership. The same rationale was applied to confidential
employees in Golden Farms, Inc. v. Ferrer-Calleja[10] and in the more
recent case of Philips Industrial Development, Inc. v.
NLRC[11] which held that confidential employees, by the very nature
of their functions, assist and act in a confidential capacity to, or have
access to confidential matters of, persons who exercise managerial
functions in the field of labor relations. Therefore, the rationale
behind the ineligibility of managerial employees to form, assist or join
a labor union was held equally applicable to them.[12]
An important element of the confidential employee rule is the
employees need to use labor relations information. Thus, in
determining the confidentiality of certain employees, a key questions
frequently considered is the employees necessary access to
confidential labor relations information.[13]
It is the contention of respondent corporation that Supervisory
employees 3 and 4 and the exempt employees come within the
meaning of the term confidential employees primarily because they
answered in the affirmative when asked Do you handle confidential
data or documents? in the Position Questionnaires submitted by the
Union.[14] In the same questionnaire, however, it was also stated that
the confidential information handled by questioned employees relate to
product formulation, product standards and product specification
which by no means relate to labor relations.[15]
Granting arguendo that an employee has access to confidential labor
relations information but such is merely incidental to his duties and
knowledge thereof is not necessary in the performance of such duties,
said access does not render the employee a confidential employee.
[16]
If access to confidential labor relations information is to be a
factor in the determination of an employees confidential status, such
information must relate to the employers labor relations
policies. Thus, an employee of a labor union, or of a management
association, must have access to confidential labor information with
respect to his employer, the union, or the association, to be regarded a
confidential employee, and knowledge of labor relations information
pertaining to the companies with which the union deals, or which the
association represents, will not clause an employee to be excluded
classifiable under the confidential type, this Court rules that they may
appropriately form a bargaining unit for purposes of collective
bargaining. Furthermore, even assuming that they are confidential
employees, jurisprudence has established that there is no legal
prohibition against confidential employees who are not performing
managerial functions to form and join a union.[23]
In this connection, the issue of whether the employees of San Miguel
Corporation Magnolia Poultry Products Plants of Cabuyao, San
Fernando, and Otis constitute a single bargaining unit needs to be
threshed out.
It is the contention of the petitioner union that the creation of three (3)
separate bargaining units, one each for Cabuyao Otis and San
Fernando as ruled by the respondent Undersecretary, is contrary to the
one-company, one-union policy. It adds that Supervisors level 1 to 4
and exempt employees of the three plants have a similarity or a
community of interests.
This Court finds the contention of the petitioner meritorious.
An appropriate bargaining unit may be defined as a group of
employees of a given employer, comprised of all or less than all of the
entire body of employees, which the collective interest of all the
employees, consistent with equity to the employer, indicate to be best
suited to serve the reciprocal rights and duties of the parties under the
collective bargaining provisions of the law.[24]
A unit to be appropriate must effect a grouping of employees who have
substantial, mutual interests in wages, hours, working conditions and
other subjects of collective bargaining.[25]
It is readily seen that the employees in the instant case have
community or mutuality of interest, which is the standard in
determining the proper constituency of a collective bargaining unit.
[26]
It is undisputed that they all belong to the Magnolia Poultry
Division of San Miguel Corporation. This means that, although they
belong to three different plants, they perform work of the same nature,
receive the same wages and compensation, and most importantly,
share a common stake in concerted activities.
In light of these considerations, the Solicitor General has opined that
separate bargaining units in the three different plants of the division
will fragmentize the employees of the said division, thus greatly
diminishing their bargaining leverage. Any concerted activity held
against the private respondent for a labor grievance in one bargaining
unit will, in all probability, not create much impact on the operations
of the private respondent. The two other plants still in operation can
well step up their production and make up for the slack caused by the
bargaining unit engaged in the concerted activity. This situation will
clearly frustrate the provisions of the Labor Code and the Mandate of
the Constitution.[27]
The fact that the three plants are located in three different places,
namely, in Cabuyao, Laguna, in Otis, Pandacan, Metro Manila, and in
San Fernando, Pampanga is immaterial. Geographical location can be
completely disregarded if the communal or mutual interests of the
employees are not sacrificed as demonstrated in UP v. Calleja-Ferrer
where all non-academic rank and file employees of the University of
the Philippines inDiliman, Quezon City, Padre Faura, Manila, Los
Baos, Laguna and the Visayas were allowed to participate in a
certification election. We rule that the distance among the three plants
is not productive of insurmountable difficulties in the administration of
union affairs. Neither are there regional differences that are likely to
impede the operations of a single bargaining representative.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Order of March 11, 1993 is hereby SET
ASIDE and the Order of the Med-Arbiter on December 19, 1990 is
REINSTATED under which a certification election among the
supervisors (level 1 to 4) and exempt employees of the San Miguel
Corporation Magnolia Poultry Products Plants of Cabuyao, San
Fernando, and Otis as one bargaining unit is ordered conducted.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado, (Chairman), Puno, Mendoza, and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.
deals with other banks and, in the absence of the regular Manager,
manages the entire office or branch and approves disbursements of
funds for expenses; and
"(3) the Accountant, who heads the Accounting Department, is also
one of the authorized signatories of petitioner and, in the absence of
the Manager or Cashier, acts as substitute approving officer and
assumes the management of the entire office. She handles the financial
reports and reviews the debit/credit tickets submitted by the other
departments."15crlwvirtualibrry
Petitioner's explanation, however, does not state who among the
employees has access to information specifically relating to its labor
relations policies. Even Cashier Patricia Maluya, who serves as the
secretary of the bank's Board of Directors may not be so classified.
True, the board of directors is responsible for corporate policies, the
exercise of corporate powers, and the general management of the
business and affairs of the corporation. As secretary of the bank's
governing body, Patricia Maluya serves the bank's management, but
could not be deemed to have access to confidential information
specifically relating to SRBI's labor relations policies, absent a clear
showing on this matter. Thus, while petitioner's explanation confirms
the regular duties of the concerned employees, it shows nothing about
any duties specifically connected to labor relations.
As to the second issue. One of the rights of a legitimate labor
organization under Article 242(b) of the Labor Code is the right to be
certified as the exclusive representative of all employees in an
appropriate bargaining unit for purposes of collective bargaining.
Having complied with the requirements of Art. 234, it is our view that
respondent union is a legitimate labor union. Article 257 of the Labor
Code mandates that a certification election shall automatically be
conducted by the Med-Arbiter upon the filing of a petition by a
legitimate labor organization.16 Nothing is said therein that prohibits
such automatic conduct of the certification election if the management
appeals on the issue of the validity of the union's registration. On this
score, petitioner's appeal was correctly dismissed.
Petitioner argues that giving due course to respondent union's petition
for certification election would violate the separation of unions
doctrine.17 Note that the petition was filed by APSOTEU- TUCP, a
legitimate labor organization. It was not, filed by ALU. Nor was it
filed by TUCP, which is a national labor federation of with which
Republic
SUPREME
Manila
EN BANC
of
the
Philippines
COURT
employees were recognized, the managerial and rank and file. This
explains the absence of evidence on job descriptions on who would be
classified managerial employees. It is perhaps also for this reason why
the Secretary of Labor limited his classification of the Meralco
employees belonging to Pay Grades VII and up, to only two groups,
the managerial and rank and file.
However, pursuant to the Department of Labor's goal of
strenghthening the constitutional right of workers to self-organization,
RA 6715 was subsequently passed which reorganized the employeeranks by including a third group, or the supervisory employees, and
laying down the distinction between supervisory employees and those
of managerial ranks in Art. 212, renumbered par. [m], depending on
whether the employee concerned has the power to lay down and
execute management policies, in the case of managerial employees, or
merely to recommend them, in case of supervisory employees.
In this petition, MERALCO has admitted that the employees
belonging to Pay Grades VII and up are supervisory (p. 10, Rollo). The
records also show that STEAM-PCWF had "renounced its
representation of the employees in Patrol Division, Treasury Security
Service Section and rank and file employees in Pay Grades I-VI" (p.
6, Rollo); while FLAMES, on the other hand, had limited its
representation to employees belonging to Pay Grades VIIXIV,generally accepted as supervisory employees, as follows:
It must be emphasized that private respondent First Line Association
of Meralco Supervisory Employees seeks to represent only the
Supervisory Employees with Pay Grades VII to XIV.
Supervisory Employees with Pay Grades VII to XIV are not
managerial employees. In fact the petition itself of petitioner Manila
Electric Company on page 9, paragraph 3 of the petition stated as
follows, to wit:
There was no need for petitioner to prove that these employees are not
rank-and-file. As adverted to above, the private respondents admit that
these are not the rank-and-file but the supervisory employees, whom
they seek to represent. What needs to be established is the rank where
supervisory ends and managerial begins.
and First Line Association of Meralco Supervisory Employees herein
states that Pay Grades VII to XIV are not managerial employees. In
fact, although employees with Pay Grade XV carry the Rank of
Department Managers, these employees only enjoys (sic) the Rank
(c) description of the bargaining unit which shall be the employer unit
unless circumstances otherwise require; and provided further, that the
appropriate bargaining unit of the rank-and-file employees shall not
include supervisory employees and/or security guards;
xxx xxx xxx
(emphasis ours)
Both rules, barring security guards from joining a rank and file
organization, appear to have been carried over from the old rules
which implemented then Art. 245 of the Labor Code, and which
provided thus:
Art. 245. Ineligibility of security personnel to join any labor
organization.Security guards and other personnel employed for the
protection and security of the person, properties and premises of the
employer shall not be eligible for membership in any labor
organization.
On December 24, 1986, Pres. Corazon C. Aquino issued E.O. No. 111
which eliminated the above-cited provision on the disqualification of
security guards. What was retained was the disqualification of
managerial employees, renumbered as Art. 245 (previously Art. 246),
as follows:
Art. 245. Ineligibility of managerial employees to joint any labor
organization.Managerial employees are not eligible to join, assist or
form any labor organization.
With the elimination, security guards were thus free to join a rank and
file organization.
On March 2, 1989, the present Congress passed RA 6715. 2 Section 18
thereof amended Art. 245, to read as follows:
Art. 245. Ineligibility of managerial employees to join any labor
organization; right of supervisory employees.Managerial employees
are not eligible to join, assist or form any labor
organization.Supervisory employees shall not be eligible for
membership in a labor organization of the rank-and-file employees but
may join, assist, or form separate labor organizations of their own.
(emphasis ours)
As will be noted, the second sentence of Art. 245 embodies an
amendment disqualifying supervisory employeesfrom membership in a
labor organization of the rank-and-file employees. It does not include
security guards in the disqualification.
Footnotes
1 This CBA expired on November 30, 1989. There is an on-going
CBA negotiation with National Capitol Region, Dole, per Comment of
FLAMES, dated March 6, 1990, p. 248, Rollo.
2 Published in two newspapers, the law took effect on March 21, 1989.
Republic
of
the
Philippines
SUPREME
COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 79025. December 29, 1989.
BENGUET ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC., petitioner,
vs.
HON. PURA FERRER-CALLEJA, Director of the Bureau of
Labor Relations, and BENECO EMPLOYEES LABOR
UNION, respondents.
E.L. Gayo & Associates for petitioner.
CORTES, J.:
On June 21, 1985 Beneco Worker's Labor Union-Association of
Democratic Labor Organizations (hereinafter referred to as BWLUADLO) filed a petition for direct certification as the sole and exclusive
bargaining representative of all the rank and file employees of Benguet
Electric Cooperative, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as BENECO) at
Alapang, La Trinidad, Benguet alleging, inter alia, that BENECO has
in its employ two hundred and fourteen (214) rank and file employees;
that one hundred and ninety-eight (198) or 92.5% of these employees
have supported the filing of the petition; that no certification election
has been conducted for the last 12 months; that there is no existing
collective bargaining representative of the rank and file employees
sought to represented by BWLU- ADLO; and, that there is no
collective bargaining agreement in the cooperative.
An opposition to the petition was filed by the Beneco Employees
Labor Union (hereinafter referred to as BELU) contending that it was
certified as the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of the
subject workers pursuant to an order issued by the med-arbiter on
October 20,1980; that pending resolution by the National Labor
Relations Commission are two cases it filed against BENECO
involving bargaining deadlock and unfair labor practice; and, that the
pendency of these cases bars any representation question.
BENECO, on the other hand, filed a motion to dismiss the petition
claiming that it is a non-profit electric cooperative engaged in
providing electric services to its members and patron-consumers in the
City of Baguio and Benguet Province; and, that the employees sought
to be represented by BWLU-ADLO are not eligible to form, join or
assist labor organizations of their own choosing because they are
members and joint owners of the cooperative.
On September 2, 1985 the med-arbiter issued an order giving due
course to the petition for certification election. However, the medarbiter limited the election among the rank and file employees of
petitioner who are non-members thereof and without any involvement
in the actual ownership of the cooperative. Based on the evidence
during the hearing the med-arbiter found that there are thirty-seven
(37) employees who are not members and without any involvement in
the actual ownership of the cooperative. The dispositive portion of the
med-arbiter's order is as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, a certification election should be
as it is hereby ordered to be conducted at the premises of Benguet,
Electric Cooperative, Inc., at Alapang, La Trinidad, Benguet within
twenty (20) days from receipt hereof among all the rank and file
employees (non-members/consumers and without any involvement in
the actual ownership of the cooperative) with the following choices:
1. BENECO WORKERS LABOR UNION-ADLO
2. BENECO EMPLOYEES LABOR UNION
3. NO UNION
The payroll for the month of June 1985 shall be the basis in
determining the qualified voters who may participate in the
certification election to be conducted.
SO ORDERED. [Rollo, pp. 22-23.]
BELU and BENECO appealed from this order but the same was
dismissed for lack of merit on March 25,1986. Whereupon BENECO
filed with this Court a petition for certiorari with prayer for
preliminary injunction and /or restraining order, docketed as G.R. No.
74209, which the Supreme Court dismissed for lack of merit in a
minute resolution dated April 28, 1986.
The ordered certification election was held on October 1, 1986. Prior
to the conduct thereof BENECO's counsel verbally manifested that
"the cooperative is protesting that employees who are membersconsumers are being allowed to vote when . . . they are not eligible to
be members of any labor union for purposes of collective bargaining;
much less, to vote in this certification election." [Rollo, p. 28].
Petitioner submitted a certification showing that only four (4)
employees are not members of BENECO and insisted that only these
employees are eligible to vote in the certification election. Canvass of
the votes showed that BELU garnered forty-nine (49) of the eightythree (83) "valid" votes cast.
Thereafter BENECO formalized its verbal manifestation by filing a
Protest. Finding, among others, that the issue as to whether or not
member-consumers who are employees of BENECO could form, assist
or join a labor union has been answered in the affirmative by the
Supreme Court in G.R. No. 74209, the med-arbiter dismissed the
protest on February 17, 1987. On June 23, 1987, Bureau of Labor
Relations (BLR) director Pura Ferrer-Calleja affirmed the medarbiter's order and certified BELU as the sole and exclusive bargaining
agent of all the rank and file employees of BENECO.
Alleging that the BLR director committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction BENECO filed the instant
petition for certiorari. In his Comment the Solicitor General agreed
with BENECO's stance and prayed that the petition be given due
course. In view of this respondent director herself was required by the
Court to file a Comment. On April 19, 1989 the Court gave due course
to the petition and required the parties to submit their respective
memoranda.
The main issue in this case is whether or not respondent director
committed grave abuse of discretion in certifying respondent BELU as
the sole and exclusive bargaining representtative of the rank and file
employees of BENECO.
Under Article 256 of the Labor Code [Pres. Decree 442] to have a
valid certification election, "at least a majority of all eligible voters in
the unit must have cast their votes. The labor union receiving the
majority of the valid votes cast shall be certified as the exclusive
bargaining agent of all workers in the unit." Petitioner BENECO
asserts that the certification election held on October 1, 1986 was null
and void since members-employees of petitioner cooperative who are
not eligible to form and join a labor union for purposes of collective
bargaining were allowed to vote therein.
Respondent director and private respondent BELU on the other hand
submit that members of a cooperative who are also rank and file
employees are eligible to form, assist or join a labor union [Comment
of Respondent Director, p. 4; Rollo, p. 125; Comment of BELU, pp. 910; Rollo pp. 99-100].
who are members thereof should not be deprived of their right to selforganization.
The above contentions are untenable. Contrary to respondents' claim,
the fact that the members-employees of petitioner do not participate in
the actual management of the cooperative does not make them eligible
to form, assist or join a labor organization for the purpose of collective
bargaining with petitioner. The Court's ruling in the Davao City case
that members of cooperative cannot join a labor union for purposes of
collective bargaining was based on the fact that as members of the
cooperative they are co-owners thereof. As such, they cannot invoke
the right to collective bargaining for "certainly an owner cannot
bargain with himself or his co-owners." [Cooperative Rural Bank of
Davao City, Inc. v. Ferrer-Calleja, et al., supra]. It is the fact of
ownership of the cooperative, and not involvement in the management
thereof, which disqualifies a member from joining any labor
organization within the cooperative. Thus, irrespective of the degree of
their participation in the actual management of the cooperative, all
members thereof cannot form, assist or join a labor organization for
the purpose of collective bargaining.
Respondent union further claims that if nominal ownership in a
cooperative is "enough to take away the constitutional protections
afforded to labor, then there would be no hindrance for employers to
grant, on a scheme of generous profit sharing, stock bonuses to their
employees and thereafter claim that since their employees are not
stockholders [of the corporation], albeit in a minimal and involuntary
manner, they are now also co-owners and thus disqualified to form
unions." To allow this, BELU argues, would be "to allow the
floodgates of destruction to be opened upon the rights of labor which
the Constitution endeavors to protect and which welfare it promises to
promote." [Comment of BELU, p. 10; Rollo, p. 100].
The above contention of respondent union is based on the erroneous
presumption that membership in a cooperative is the same as
ownership of stocks in ordinary corporations. While cooperatives may
exercise some of the rights and privileges given to ordinary
corporations provided under existing laws, such cooperatives enjoy
other privileges not granted to the latter [See Sections 4, 5, 6, and 8,
Pres. Decree No. 175; Cooperative Rural Bank of Davao City v.
Ferrer-Calleja, supra]. Similarly, members of cooperatives have rights
and obligations different from those of stockholders of ordinary
Republic
of
the
Philippines
SUPREME
COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-25246 September 12, 1974
BENJAMIN
VICTORIANO, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ELIZALDE ROPE WORKERS' UNION and ELIZALDE ROPE
FACTORY, INC., defendants, ELIZALDE ROPE WORKERS'
UNION, defendant-appellant.
Salonga, Ordonez, Yap, Sicat & Associates for plaintiff-appellee.
Cipriano Cid & Associates for defendant-appellant.
ZALDIVAR, J.:p
Appeal to this Court on purely questions of law from the decision of
the Court of First Instance of Manila in its Civil Case No. 58894.
The undisputed facts that spawned the instant case follow:
Benjamin Victoriano (hereinafter referred to as Appellee), a member of
the religious sect known as the "Iglesia ni Cristo", had been in the
employ of the Elizalde Rope Factory, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as
Company) since 1958. As such employee, he was a member of the
Elizalde Rope Workers' Union (hereinafter referred to as Union) which
had with the Company a collective bargaining agreement containing a
closed shop provision which reads as follows:
Membership in the Union shall be required as a condition of
employment for all permanent employees workers covered by this
Agreement.
The collective bargaining agreement expired on March 3, 1964 but
was renewed the following day, March 4, 1964.
Under Section 4(a), paragraph 4, of Republic Act No. 875, prior to its
amendment by Republic Act No. 3350, the employer was not
precluded "from making an agreement with a labor organization to
require as a condition of employment membership therein, if such
labor organization is the representative of the employees." On June 18,
1961, however, Republic Act No. 3350 was enacted, introducing an
amendment to paragraph (4) subsection (a) of section 4 of Republic
Act No. 875, as follows: ... "but such agreement shall not cover
religious sect from joining any labor union if such sect prohibits
affiliations of their members thereto" 5 ; and, consequently, deprives
said members of their constitutional right to form or join lawful
associations or organizations guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, and thus
becomes obnoxious to Article III, Section 1 (6) of the 1935
Constitution. 6
Secondly, the Union contended that Republic Act No. 3350 is
unconstitutional for impairing the obligation of contracts in that, while
the Union is obliged to comply with its collective bargaining
agreement containing a "closed shop provision," the Act relieves the
employer from its reciprocal obligation of cooperating in the
maintenance of union membership as a condition of employment; and
that said Act, furthermore, impairs the Union's rights as it deprives the
union of dues from members who, under the Act, are relieved from the
obligation to continue as such members. 7
Thirdly, the Union contended that Republic Act No. 3350
discriminatorily favors those religious sects which ban their members
from joining labor unions, in violation of Article Ill, Section 1 (7) of
the 1935 Constitution; and while said Act unduly protects certain
religious sects, it leaves no rights or protection to labor organizations. 8
Fourthly, Republic Act No. 3350, asserted the Union, violates the
constitutional provision that "no religious test shall be required for the
exercise of a civil right," in that the laborer's exercise of his civil right
to join associations for purposes not contrary to law has to be
determined under the Act by his affiliation with a religious sect; that
conversely, if a worker has to sever his religious connection with a sect
that prohibits membership in a labor organization in order to be able to
join a labor organization, said Act would violate religious freedom. 9
Fifthly, the Union contended that Republic Act No. 3350, violates the
"equal protection of laws" clause of the Constitution, it being a
discriminately legislation, inasmuch as by exempting from the
operation of closed shop agreement the members of the "Iglesia ni
Cristo", it has granted said members undue advantages over their
fellow workers, for while the Act exempts them from union obligation
and liability, it nevertheless entitles them at the same time to the
enjoyment of all concessions, benefits and other emoluments that the
union might secure from the employer. 10
Sixthly, the Union contended that Republic Act No. 3350 violates the
constitutional provision regarding the promotion of social justice. 11
as what both the Constitution and the Industrial Peace Act have
recognized, and guaranteed to the employee, is the "right" to join
associations of his choice, it would be absurd to say that the law also
imposes, in the same breath, upon the employee the duty to join
associations. The law does not enjoin an employee to sign up with any
association.
The right to refrain from joining labor organizations recognized by
Section 3 of the Industrial Peace Act is, however, limited. The legal
protection granted to such right to refrain from joining is withdrawn by
operation of law, where a labor union and an employer have agreed on
a closed shop, by virtue of which the employer may employ only
member of the collective bargaining union, and the employees must
continue to be members of the union for the duration of the contract in
order to keep their jobs. Thus Section 4 (a) (4) of the Industrial Peace
Act, before its amendment by Republic Act No. 3350, provides that
although it would be an unfair labor practice for an employer "to
discriminate in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or
condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in
any labor organization" the employer is, however, not precluded "from
making an agreement with a labor organization to require as a
condition of employment membership therein, if such labor
organization is the representative of the employees". By virtue,
therefore, of a closed shop agreement, before the enactment of
Republic Act No. 3350, if any person, regardless of his religious
beliefs, wishes to be employed or to keep his employment, he must
become a member of the collective bargaining union. Hence, the right
of said employee not to join the labor union is curtailed and
withdrawn.
To that all-embracing coverage of the closed shop arrangement,
Republic Act No. 3350 introduced an exception, when it added to
Section 4 (a) (4) of the Industrial Peace Act the following proviso: "but
such agreement shall not cover members of any religious sects which
prohibit affiliation of their members in any such labor organization".
Republic Act No. 3350 merely excludes ipso jure from the application
and coverage of the closed shop agreement the employees belonging to
any religious sects which prohibit affiliation of their members with any
labor organization. What the exception provides, therefore, is that
members of said religious sects cannot be compelled or coerced to join
labor unions even when said unions have closed shop agreements with
Code. As to the lamented silence of the Act regarding the rights and
protection of labor unions, suffice it to say, first, that the validity of a
statute is determined by its provisions, not by its silence 46 ; and,
second, the fact that the law may work hardship does not render it
unconstitutional. 47
It would not be amiss to state, regarding this matter, that to compel
persons to join and remain members of a union to keep their jobs in
violation of their religious scrupples, would hurt, rather than help,
labor unions, Congress has seen it fit to exempt religious objectors lest
their resistance spread to other workers, for religious objections have
contagious potentialities more than political and philosophic
objections.
Furthermore, let it be noted that coerced unity and loyalty even to the
country, and a fortiori to a labor union assuming that such unity and
loyalty can be attained through coercion is not a goal that is
constitutionally obtainable at the expense of religious liberty. 48 A
desirable end cannot be promoted by prohibited means.
4. Appellants' fourth contention, that Republic Act No. 3350 violates
the constitutional prohibition against requiring a religious test for the
exercise of a civil right or a political right, is not well taken. The Act
does not require as a qualification, or condition, for joining any lawful
association membership in any particular religion or in any religious
sect; neither does the Act require affiliation with a religious sect that
prohibits its members from joining a labor union as a condition or
qualification for withdrawing from a labor union. Joining or
withdrawing from a labor union requires a positive act. Republic Act
No. 3350 only exempts members with such religious affiliation from
the coverage of closed shop agreements. So, under this Act, a religious
objector is not required to do a positive act to exercise the right to
join or to resign from the union. He is exempted ipso jure without need
of any positive act on his part. A conscientious religious objector need
not perform a positive act or exercise the right of resigning from the
labor union he is exempted from the coverage of any closed shop
agreement that a labor union may have entered into. How then can
there be a religious test required for the exercise of a right when no
right need be exercised?
We have said that it was within the police power of the State to enact
Republic Act No. 3350, and that its purpose was legal and in
consonance with the Constitution. It is never an illegal evasion of a
the law that its object is for the benefit of the public and the means by
which the benefit is to be obtained are of public character, the law will
be upheld even though incidental advantage may occur to individuals
beyond those enjoyed by the general public. 62
6. Appellant's further contention that Republic Act No. 3350 violates
the constitutional provision on social justice is also baseless. Social
justice is intended to promote the welfare of all the people. 63 Republic
Act No. 3350 promotes that welfare insofar as it looks after the
welfare of those who, because of their religious belief, cannot join
labor unions; the Act prevents their being deprived of work and of the
means of livelihood. In determining whether any particular measure is
for public advantage, it is not necessary that the entire state be directly
benefited it is sufficient that a portion of the state be benefited
thereby.
Social justice also means the adoption by the Government of measures
calculated to insure economic stability of all component elements of
society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and social
equilibrium in the inter-relations of the members of the
community. 64 Republic Act No. 3350 insures economic stability to the
members of a religious sect, like the Iglesia ni Cristo, who are also
component elements of society, for it insures security in their
employment, notwithstanding their failure to join a labor union having
a closed shop agreement with the employer. The Act also advances the
proper economic and social equilibrium between labor unions and
employees who cannot join labor unions, for it exempts the latter from
the compelling necessity of joining labor unions that have closed shop
agreements and equalizes, in so far as opportunity to work is
concerned, those whose religion prohibits membership in labor unions
with those whose religion does not prohibit said membership. Social
justice does not imply social equality, because social inequality will
always exist as long as social relations depend on personal or
subjective proclivities. Social justice does not require legal equality
because legal equality, being a relative term, is necessarily premised
on differentiations based on personal or natural conditions. 65 Social
justice guarantees equality of opportunity 66 , and this is precisely what
Republic Act No. 3350 proposes to accomplish it gives laborers,
irrespective of their religious scrupples, equal opportunity for work.
7. As its last ground, appellant contends that the amendment
introduced by Republic Act No. 3350 is not called for in other
words, the Act is not proper, necessary or desirable. Anent this matter,
it has been held that a statute which is not necessary is not, for that
reason, unconstitutional; that in determining the constitutional validity
of legislation, the courts are unconcerned with issues as to the
necessity for the enactment of the legislation in question. 67 Courts do
inquire into the wisdom of laws. 68 Moreover, legislatures, being
chosen by the people, are presumed to understand and correctly
appreciate the needs of the people, and it may change the laws
accordingly. 69 The fear is entertained by appellant that unless the Act
is declared unconstitutional, employers will prefer employing
members of religious sects that prohibit their members from joining
labor unions, and thus be a fatal blow to unionism. We do not agree.
The threat to unionism will depend on the number of employees who
are members of the religious sects that control the demands of the
labor market. But there is really no occasion now to go further and
anticipate problems We cannot judge with the material now before Us.
At any rate, the validity of a statute is to be determined from its
general purpose and its efficacy to accomplish the end desired, not
from its effects on a particular case. 70 The essential basis for the
exercise of power, and not a mere incidental result arising from its
exertion, is the criterion by which the validity of a statute is to be
measured. 71
II. We now pass on the second assignment of error, in support of which
the Union argued that the decision of the trial court ordering the Union
to pay P500 for attorney's fees directly contravenes Section 24 of
Republic Act No. 875, for the instant action involves an industrial
dispute wherein the Union was a party, and said Union merely acted in
the exercise of its rights under the union shop provision of its existing
collective bargaining contract with the Company; that said order also
contravenes Article 2208 of the Civil Code; that, furthermore,
Appellee was never actually dismissed by the defendant Company and
did not therefore suffer any damage at all . 72
In refuting appellant Union's arguments, Appellee claimed that in the
instant case there was really no industrial dispute involved in the
attempt to compel Appellee to maintain its membership in the union
under pain of dismissal, and that the Union, by its act, inflicted
intentional harm on Appellee; that since Appellee was compelled to
institute an action to protect his right to work, appellant could legally
be ordered to pay attorney's fees under Articles 1704 and 2208 of the
Civil Code. 73
The second paragraph of Section 24 of Republic Act No. 875 which is
relied upon by appellant provides that:
No suit, action or other proceedings shall be maintainable in any court
against a labor organization or any officer or member thereof for any
act done by or on behalf of such organization in furtherance of an
industrial dispute to which it is a party, on the ground only that such
act induces some other person to break a contract of employment or
that it is in restraint of trade or interferes with the trade, business or
employment of some other person or with the right of some other
person to dispose of his capital or labor. (Emphasis supplied)
That there was a labor dispute in the instant case cannot be disputed
for appellant sought the discharge of respondent by virtue of the closed
shop agreement and under Section 2 (j) of Republic Act No. 875 a
question involving tenure of employment is included in the term "labor
dispute". 74 The discharge or the act of seeking it is the labor dispute
itself. It being the labor dispute itself, that very same act of the Union
in asking the employer to dismiss Appellee cannot be "an act
done ... in furtherance of an industrial dispute". The mere fact that
appellant is a labor union does not necessarily mean that all its acts are
in furtherance of an industrial dispute. 75 Appellant Union, therefore,
cannot invoke in its favor Section 24 of Republic Act No. 875. This
case is not intertwined with any unfair labor practice case existing at
the time when Appellee filed his complaint before the lower court.
Neither does Article 2208 of the Civil Code, invoked by the Union,
serve as its shield. The article provides that attorney's fees and
expenses of litigation may be awarded "when the defendant's act or
omission has compelled the plaintiff ... to incur expenses to protect his
interest"; and "in any other case where the court deems it just and
equitable that attorney's fees and expenses of litigation should be
recovered". In the instant case, it cannot be gainsaid that appellant
Union's act in demanding Appellee's dismissal caused Appellee to
incur expenses to prevent his being dismissed from his job. Costs
according to Section 1, Rule 142, of the Rules of Court, shall be
allowed as a matter of course to the prevailing party.
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is dismissed, and the decision, dated
August 26, 1965, of the Court of First Instance of Manila, in its Civil
Separate Opinions
FERNANDO, J, concurring:
The decision arrived at unanimously by this Court that Republic Act
No. 3350 is free from the constitutional infirmities imputed to it was
demonstrated in a manner wellnigh conclusive in the learned,
scholarly, and comprehensive opinion so typical of the efforts of
the ponente, Justice Zaldivar. Like the rest of my brethren, I concur
fully. Considering moreover, the detailed attention paid to each and
every objection raised as to its validity and the clarity and
persuasiveness with which it was shown to be devoid of support in
authoritative doctrines, it would appear that the last word has been
written on this particular subject. Nonetheless, I deem it proper to
submit this brief expression of my views on the transcendent character
of religious freedom 1 and its primacy even as against the claims of
protection to labor, 2 also one of the fundamental principles of the
Constitution.
1. Religious freedom is identified with the liberty every individual
possesses to worship or not a Supreme Being, and if a devotee of any
sect, to act in accordance with its creed. Thus is constitutionally
safeguarded, according to Justice Laurel, that "profession of faith to an
active power that binds and elevates man to his Creator ...." 3 The
choice of what a man wishes to believe in is his and his alone. That is a
domain left untouched, where intrusion is not allowed, a citadel to
which the law is denied entry, whatever be his thoughts or hopes. In
that sphere, what he wills reigns supreme. The doctrine to which he
pays fealty may for some be unsupported by evidence, devoid of
rational foundation. No matter. There is no requirement as to its
conformity to what has found acceptance. It suffices that for him such
a concept holds undisputed sway. That is a recognition of man's
freedom. That for him is one of the ways of self- realization. It would
be to disregard the dignity that attaches to every human being to
test of its substance is the right to differ as to things that touch the
heart of the existing order." 9
There is moreover this ringing affirmation by Chief Justice Hughes of
the primacy of religious freedom in the forum of conscience even as
against the command of the State itself: "Much has been said of the
paramount duty to the state, a duty to be recognized, it is urged, even
though it conflicts with convictions of duty to God. Undoubtedly that
duty to the state exists within the domain of power, for government
may enforce obedience to laws regardless of scruples. When one's
belief collides with the power of the state, the latter is supreme within
its sphere and submission or punishment follows. But, in the forum of
conscience, duty to a moral power higher than the state has always
been maintained. The reservation of that supreme obligation, as a
matter of principle, would unquestionably be made by many of our
conscientious and law-abiding citizens. The essence of religion is
belief in a relation to God involving duties superior to those arising
from any human relation." 10 The American Chief Justice spoke in
dissent, it is true, but with him in agreement were three of the foremost
jurists who ever sat in that Tribunal, Justices Holmes, Brandeis, and
Stone.
2. As I view Justice Zaldivar's opinion in that light, my concurrence, as
set forth earlier, is wholehearted and entire. With such a cardinal
postulate as the basis of our polity, it has a message that cannot be
misread. Thus is intoned with a reverberating clang, to paraphrase
Cardozo, a fundamental principle that drowns all weaker sounds. The
labored effort to cast doubt on the validity of the statutory provision in
question is far from persuasive. It is attended by futility. It is not for
this Court, as I conceive of the judicial function, to restrict the scope of
a preferred freedom.
3. There is, however, the question of whether such an exception
possesses an implication that lessens the effectiveness of state efforts
to protect labor, likewise, as noted, constitutionally ordained. Such a
view, on the surface, may not be lacking in plausibility, but upon closer
analysis, it cannot stand scrutiny. Thought must be given to the
freedom of association, likewise an aspect of intellectual liberty. For
the late Professor Howe a constitutionalist and in his lifetime the
biographer of the great Holmes, it even partakes of the political theory
of pluralistic sovereignty. So great is the respect for the autonomy
accorded voluntary societies. 11 Such a right implies at the very least
that one can determine for himself whether or not he should join or
refrain from joining a labor organization, an institutional device for
promoting the welfare of the working man. A closed shop, on the other
hand, is inherently coercive. That is why, as is unmistakably reflected
in our decisions, the latest of which is Guijarno v. Court of Industrial
Relations, 12 it is far from being a favorite of the law. For a statutory
provision then to further curtail its operation, is precisely to follow the
dictates of sound public policy.
The exhaustive and well-researched opinion of Justice Zaldivar thus is
in the mainstream of constitutional tradition. That, for me, is the
channel to follow.
Separate Opinions
FERNANDO, J, concurring:
The decision arrived at unanimously by this Court that Republic Act
No. 3350 is free from the constitutional infirmities imputed to it was
demonstrated in a manner wellnigh conclusive in the learned,
scholarly, and comprehensive opinion so typical of the efforts of
the ponente, Justice Zaldivar. Like the rest of my brethren, I concur
fully. Considering moreover, the detailed attention paid to each and
every objection raised as to its validity and the clarity and
persuasiveness with which it was shown to be devoid of support in
authoritative doctrines, it would appear that the last word has been
written on this particular subject. Nonetheless, I deem it proper to
submit this brief expression of my views on the transcendent character
of religious freedom 1 and its primacy even as against the claims of
protection to labor, 2 also one of the fundamental principles of the
Constitution.
1. Religious freedom is identified with the liberty every individual
possesses to worship or not a Supreme Being, and if a devotee of any
sect, to act in accordance with its creed. Thus is constitutionally
safeguarded, according to Justice Laurel, that "profession of faith to an
active power that binds and elevates man to his Creator ...." 3 The
choice of what a man wishes to believe in is his and his alone. That is a
domain left untouched, where intrusion is not allowed, a citadel to
which the law is denied entry, whatever be his thoughts or hopes. In
that sphere, what he wills reigns supreme. The doctrine to which he
pays fealty may for some be unsupported by evidence, devoid of
Republic
of
the
Philippines
SUPREME
COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 82914 June 20, 1988
KAPATIRAN SA MEAT AND CANNING DIVISION (TUPAS
Local
Chapter
No.
1027), petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE BLR DIRECTOR PURA FERRER
CALLEJA, MEAT AND CANNING DIVISION UNIVERSAL
ROBINA CORPORATION and MEAT AND CANNING
DIVISION NEW EMPLOYEES AND WORKERS UNITED
LABOR ORGANIZATION, respondents.
Alar, Comia, Manalo and Associates for petitioner.
Danilo Bolos for respondent Robina Corporation.
RESOLUTION
GRIO-AQUINO, J.:
The petitioner, Kapatiran sa Meat and Canning Division TUPAS Local
Chapter No. 1027) hereinafter referred to as "TUPAS," seeks a review
of the resolution dated January 27, 1988 (Annex D) of public
respondent Pura Ferrer-Calleja, Director of the Bureau of Labor
Relations, dismissing its appeal from the Order dated November 17,
1987 (Annex C) of the Med-Arbiter Rasidali C. Abdullah ordering a
certification election to be conducted among the regular daily paid
rank and file employees/workers of Universal Robina CorporationMeat and Canning Division to determine which of the contending
unions:
a) Kapatiran sa Meat and Canning Division TUPAS Local Chapter No.
1027 (or "TUPAS" for brevity);
b) Meat and Canning Division New Employees and Workers United
Labor Organization (or "NEW ULO" for brevity);
c) No union.
shall be the bargaining unit of the daily wage rank and file employees
in the Meat and Canning Division of the company.
From 1984 to 1987 TUPAS was the sole and exclusive collective
bargaining representative of the workers in the Meat and Canning
Republic
SUPREME
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
of
the
Philippines
COURT
Republic
SUPREME
Manila
EN BANC
of
the
Philippines
COURT
Exemption from Civil Service. The district and its employees, being
engaged in a proprietary function, are hereby exempt from the
provisions of the Civil Service Law. Collective Bargaining shall be
available only to personnel below supervisory levels:Provided,
however, That the total of all salaries, wages emoluments, benefits or
other compensation paid to all employees in any month shall not
exceed fifty percent (50%) of average net monthy revenue. Said net
revenue representing income from water sales and sewerage service
charges, less pro-rata share of debt service and expenses for fuel or
energy for pumping during the preceding fiscal year.
The Labor Arbiter failed to take into accout the provisions of
Presidential Decree No. 1479, which went into effect on 11 June 1978,
P.D. No. 1479, wiped away Section 25 of PD 198 quoted above, and
Section 26 of PD 198 was renumbered as Section 25 in the following
manner:
Section 26 of the same decree PD 198 is hereby amended to read as
Section 25 as follows:
Section 25. Authorization. The district may exercise all the powers
which are expressly granted by this Title or which are necessarily
implied from or incidental to the powers and purposes herein stated.
For the purpose of carrying out the objectives of this Act, a district is
hereby granted the power of eminent domain, the exercise thereof
shall, however, be subject to review by the Administration.
Thus, Section 25 of PD 198 exempting the employees of water
districts from the application of the Civil Service Law was removed
from the statute books:
xxx xxx xxx
We grant the petition for the following reasons:
1. Section 25 of PD No. 198 was repealed by Section 3 of PD No.
1479; Section 26 of PD No. 198 was amended ro read as Sec. 25 by
Sec. 4 of PD No. 1479. The amendatory decree took effect on June 11,
1978.
xxx xxx xxx
3. The BWD is a corporation created pursuant to a special law PD
No. 198, as amended. As such its officers and employees are part of
the Civil Service (Sec. 1, Art. XII-B, [1973] Constitution; PD No.
868).
Ascertained from a consideration of the whole statute, PD 198 is a
special law applicable only to the different water districts created
Separate Opinions
BIDIN, J., dissenting:
I regret I have to register my dissent in this case. I agree with the main
ponencia that P.D. 198, as amended, authorizes the different local
legislative bodies (Sanggunian) to form and create their respective
water districts through a Resolution which they will pass subject to the
guidelines, rules and regulations therein laid down. The issue,
therefore, to be resolved is whether the local water districts so created
are government-owned or controlled corporations with original
charters embraced by the Civil Service as contemplated by Art. IX-B,
Sec. 2[1] of the 1987 Constitution.
P.D. 198 is a general legislation which authorizes the formation of
water districts. However, the operative act which creates a water
district is not said decree but the resolution of the Sanggunian
concerned forming and maintaining a local water district. Thus,
Section 2 of P.D. 198, among others, provides:
Sec. 2. Declaration of Policy . . . To encourage the formulation of
such local water districts and the transfer thereto of existing water
supply and waste water disposal facilities, this Decree provides by
general act the authority for the formation thereof, on a local option
basis. . . . (Emphasis supplied)
Implementing the above policy, Title II of P.D. 198 provides:
TITLE
II.
LOCAL
WATER
DISTRICT
LAW
CHAPTER I. Title
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 124540. November 14, 1997]
MERLINDA JACINTO, ADELINA AGUSTIN, SUSAN
AGUSTIN, EVELYN ATIENZA, NIDA BALANE, ANICIA
CARLOS, CELEDONIA CARLOS, LIWANAG CASTILLO,
JOSEFINA DE GUZMAN, MINERVA GARCIA, MARIA
GATDULA, ALICIA GUNDA, AURORA LOPEZ,
CARMENCITA MANANSALA, ERLINDA MARTINEZ,
LOLITA NAVARRETE, GUADALUPE PANERGO, MARIA
PULGA, PAZ SERRA and VIRGINIA ZAMORA, petitioners,
vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS; THE CIVIL SERVICE
COMMISSION; and THE SECRETARY OF EDUCATION,
CULTURE AND SPORTS, respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
While we recognize and appreciate the toil and hardship of our public
schoolteachers in fulfilling the states responsibility of educating our
children, and realize their inadequately addressed plight as compared
to other professionals, we have the equal task of promoting the larger
public interest which withholds from them and other similarly situated
government workers the right to engage in mass actions resulting in
work stoppages for any purpose. Although the Constitution vests in
them the right to organize, to assemble peaceably and to petition the
government for a redress of grievances, there is no like express
provision granting them the right to strike. Rather, the constitutional
grant of the right to strike is restrained by the proviso that its exercise
shall be done in accordance with law.
The Case
Before us is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
seeking to set aside the November 27, 1995 Decision[1] of the Court of
Appeals[2] in CA-G.R. SP No. 37596, which found no grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the Civil Service Commission (CSC) in
issuing its resolutions[3] disposing of the separate appeals and motions
for reconsideration of herein petitioners. The dispositive portions of
most of the CSC resolutions, with the exception of the name of the
appellant concerned, uniformly read:
4[13] and 8[14] of the Bill of Rights, Section 2(5)[15] of Article IX, and
Section 3[16] of Article XIII. Jurisprudence abounds with hallowed
pronouncements defending and promoting the peoples exercise of
these rights. As early as the onset of this century, this Court, in U.S.
vs. Apurado,[17] already upheld the right to assembly and petition and
even went as far as to acknowledge:
It is rather to be expected that more or less disorder will mark the
public assembly of the people to protest against grievances whether
real or imaginary, because on such occasions feeling is always
wrought to a high pitch of excitement, and the greater the grievance
and the more intense the feeling, the less perfect, as a rule, will be the
disciplinary control of the leaders over their irresponsible
followers. But if the prosecution be permitted to seize upon every
instance of such disorderly conduct by individual members of a crowd
as an excuse to characterize the assembly as a seditious and
tumultuous rising against the authorities, then the right to assemble
and to petition for redress of grievances would become a delusion and
a snare and the attempt to exercise it on the most righteous occasion
and in the most peaceable manner would expose all those who took
part therein to the severest and most unmerited punishment, if the
purposes which they sought to attain did not happen to be pleasing to
the prosecuting authorities. If instances of disorderly conduct occur on
such occasions, the guilty individuals should be sought out and
punished therefor, but the utmost discretion must be exercised in
drawing the line between disorderlyand seditious conduct and between
an essentially peaceable assembly and a tumultuous uprising.[18]
Primicias vs. Fugoso[19] further sustained the supremacy of the
freedoms of speech and of assembly over comfort and convenience in
the use of streets or parks. Although the Court opined that the exercise
of the rights of free speech and of peaceful assembly to petition the
government for redress of grievances is not absolute for it may be so
regulated that it shall not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others
having equal rights, nor injurious to the rights of the community or
society, regulation was limited to the mayors reasonable discretion in
issuing a permit to determine or specify only the streets or public
places to be used for the purpose and to provide adequate and proper
policing to minimize the risk of disorder. Quoting Justice Brandeis in
his concurring opinion in Whitney vs. California, the Court said:[20]
tenet as a coveted boon -- at once the shield and armor of the dignity
and worth of the human personality, the all-consuming ideal of our
enlightened civilization -- becomes [o]ur duty, if freedom and social
justice have any meaning at all for him who toils so that capital can
produce economic goods that can generate happiness for all. To regard
the demonstration against police officers, not against the employer, as
evidence of bad faith in collective bargaining and hence a violation of
the collective bargaining agreement and a cause for the dismissal from
employment of the demonstrating employees, stretches unduly the
compass of the collective bargaining agreement, is a potent means of
inhibiting speech and therefore inflicts a moral as well as mortal
wound on the constitutional guarantees of free expression, of peaceful
assembly and of petition.[25]
Specifically, the right of civil servants to organize themselves was
positively recognized in Association of Court of Appeals Employees
(ACAE) vs. Ferrer-Calleja.[26] But, as in the exercise of the rights of
free expression and of assembly, there are standards for allowable
limitations such as the legitimacy of the purposes of the association,
[27]
the overriding considerations of national security and the
preservation of democratic institutions.[28]
As regards the right to strike, the Constitution itself qualifies its
exercise with the proviso in accordance with law. This is a clear
manifestation that the state may, by law, regulate the use of this right,
or even deny certain sectors such right. Executive Order 180[29] which
provides guidelines for the exercise of the right of government workers
to organize, for instance, implicitly endorsed an earlier CSC circular
which enjoins under pain of administrative sanctions, all government
officers and employees from staging strikes, demonstrations, mass
leaves, walkouts and other forms of mass action which will result in
temporary stoppage or disruption of public service,[30] by stating that
the Civil Service law and rules governing concerted activities and
strikes in the government service shall be observed.[31]
It is also settled in jurisprudence that, in general, workers in the public
sector do not enjoy the right to strike. Alliance of Government
Workers vs. Minister of Labor and Employment[32]rationalized the
proscription thus:
The general rule in the past and up to the present is that the terms
and conditions of employment in the Government, including any
political subdivision or instrumentality thereof are governed by
establish that they have a right to strike. Rather, they tenaciously insist
that their absences during certain dates in September 1990 were a valid
exercise of their constitutional right to engage in peaceful assembly to
petition the government for a redress of grievances. They claim that
their gathering was not a strike; therefore, their participation therein
did not constitute any offense. MPSTA vs. Laguio[36] and ACT vs.
Cario,[37] in which this Court declared that these mass actions were
to all intents and purposes a strike; they constituted a concerted and
unauthorized stoppage of, or absence from, work which it was the
teachers duty to perform, undertaken for essentially economic
reasons, should not principally resolve the present case, as the
underlying facts are allegedly not identical.
Strike, as defined by law, means any temporary stoppage of work by
the concerted action of employees as a result of an industrial or labor
dispute.[38] A labor dispute includes any controversy or matter
concerning terms and conditions of employment; or the association or
representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing
or arranging the terms and conditions of employment, regardless of
whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employers
and employees.[39] With these premises, we now evaluate the
circumstances of the instant petition.
It cannot be denied that the mass action or assembly staged by the
petitioners resulted in the non-holding of classes in several public
schools during the corresponding period. Petitioners do not dispute
that the grievances for which they sought redress concerned the
alleged failure of public authorities -- essentially, their employers -to fully and justly implement certain laws and measures intended to
benefit them materially, such as:
1. Immediate release of P680 million Secondary Education Fund
(SEF) fringe benefits of teachers under Section 17 of Republic Act
6758.
2. Clothing allowance at P500 to P1,000 per teachers [sic] under the
General Appropriations Act of 1990
3. DMB Circular 904
4. Increase in minimum wage to P5,000 for teachers.[40]
And probably to clothe their action with permissible character,[41] they
also raised national issues such as the removal of the U.S. bases and
the repudiation of foreign debt. In Balingasan vs. Court of Appeals,
[42]
however, this Court said that the fact that the conventional term
salaries because they had given ground for their suspension. This
means that being found liable for a lesser offense is not equivalent to
exoneration from the original complaint against the concerned public
officer or employee. Balingasan referred to the earlier case of Yacia
vs. City of Baguio,[64] in which this Court denied the claim of an
employee for backwages for the period during which he was not
allowed to work because of the execution of the CSC decision
dismissing him for dishonesty, even though, on appeal, his penalty was
reduced to a fine equivalent to six months pay.
Based on the above premises, petitioners demand for backwages
cannot be granted, for they had given cause for their suspension -their unjustified abandonment of classes to the prejudice of their
students. Although they were eventually found guilty only of conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service, and not grave misconduct
or other offense warranting their dismissal from the service, they were
not fully innocent of the charges against them.
We find the case of Petitioner Jacinto different, however. The Civil
Service Commission found her culpable only of violation of
reasonable office rules and regulations, for not having asked
permission from school authorities to leave the school premises and
seek medical attention and for not filing an application for sick leave
for approval by the school authorities. There was no proof that she
joined the mass actions which caused prejudice to the school
system. In Balingasan, this Court, after finding that Rodolfo Mariano
was not involved in the mass actions but was absent because he
attended the wake and burial of his grandmother in Ilocos Sur without
however the benefit of an approved leave of absence, held that [t]o
deny petitioner Mariano his back wages during his suspension would
be tantamount to punishing him after his exoneration from the charges
which caused his dismissal from the service, i.e.participation in the
unlawful mass actions. Therefore, in line with Balingasan, we
likewise grant back salaries to Petitioner Jacinto who did not join the
illegal activity.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is
hereby DENIED and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is
hereby AFFIRMED with the modification that Petitioner Merlinda
Jacinto is granted backwages, without deduction or qualification, from
the time she was suspended until her actual reinstatement, the total of
Republic
of
the
Philippines
SUPREME COURT
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 132088
June 28, 2000
EVERDINA ACOSTA, NOEMI ACOSTA, ELVIRA AMPARADO,
REBECCA AQUINO, ROBERTO ARCAYA, EVA ARCEO,
JULIET ARELLANO, ANITA ASCANO, GRACE AUSTRA,
LUISA AVILES, SUSIE AW, VICTORIA BADILLO, SUSAN
BALDEMOR, ELISA BASA, NORY BATUIGAS, TERESITA
BAUTISTA, SEGUNDINA BERMAS, FERMINER BOCO,
EVELYN BULAONG, SYLVA BULARIO, GILDA BOLOSAN,
JOSIE BUNGAY, ARCELI CABUSE, TERESA CACHO,
ROSSANA CAJANDINEZ, NELY CALPITO, OLIVIA
CARDINES, THELMA CARINO, CORAZON CARRACEDO,
ELENITA CASAUAY, MARIETA CAULI, MARILOU CAYTON,
VIRGINIA CHIAPOCO, ALLEN CIPRIANO, MELINDA B.
CONTRERAS, ZENAIDA CORPORAL, PRISCILLA CORPUZ,
LUZ COSIO, EMILIA CRUZ, CRISTINA DELA CRUZ,
ROSALINA DELA CRUZ, GRACE CUNANAN, EVELYN DE
CASTRO, HAYDEE DE VALLE, CECILIA DEL ROSARIO,
GULLERMINA DE LA CRUZ, FRANCIS DINGIL, BELLA DY,
CORAZON ESTEBAL, LUZ FAJARDO, TERESA FRAGO,
VIRGINIA GACHO, SABINO GALES, MYRNA GALLEGO,
MARILYN GARNA, NATIVIDAD GAVILAN, LOLITA GAVINO,
MARILOU GO, LETICIA GOMEZ, OLYMPIO GONZAGA,
RUTH GONZALES, REMEDIOS HAVOC, GREGORIA
HERNANDEZ, OSCAR HIDALGO, BIBIANO HUGO, RITA
HUERTA, LOURDES HULIPAS, ROMEO IDOS, ERLINDA
ISLA, LITA ITALIA, MATIAS JABONETE, DIANA JIMENEZ,
DOMINADOR LABACLADO, ALMA LAGUIAN, MELCY
LALU, REBECCA LAMALINAO, MARITA LAMSEN,
LOURDES ESTER LAREDO, TERESITA LATION, ROSALINA
LEDESMA, NORMA LECCIONES, NORMA LEYTE, CECILIA
LINCOPINES, OFELIA LIZARDO, VENILLA LOCSIN,
ADELINA LORENZO, SATURNINA LORENZO, ALEJANDRA
MABAET, JULIETA MADRID,
ERLINA MAGPAYO,
ROLANDO MAGSINO, ERLINDA MAILIG, FLORENDA
MALAPAYA,
CORAZON
MALLEN,
ESMERALDA
MANALANG, MERLE MANALO, ERLINDA MANEGA,
SHIRLEY MANGAHAS, ELFRIDA MARQUEZ, EFIGENIA
MENEZ, NILDA NAVA, MERLY NERY, ROSAMINDA OBEN,
MELISSA OLAQUERRA, ENRIQUETA OLIVAR, DOLORES
ORDINARIO, ESTRELLA ORTEGA, ROSE ORPRECIO,
AURORA OSTACO, ELVIRA PAMPANGA, NORMA PAQUIZ,
EVANGELINE PARDO, GLORIA PARMA, ERLINDA
PASTRANA, LERMA QUIRIT, MECELIN QUILANDRA,
MEWLIN QUILLANORA, NATIVIDAD RAGUD, ERLINDA
RANTE, EUFEMIA RAMIREZ, JUDITHA RANESES,
ULDARICO REJABA, MELINA REJUSO, FELISA RENIDO,
MILGROS REY, REDENTOR REYES, RESALINA SAGUN,
ZENAIDA SALAZAR, FE SALIMA, SHIRLEY SARAGON,
PURIFICACION SARI, ELVIRA SATUMBAGA, MARIBEY
SEALMOY, EDITHA SINJAY, TITA SILVINO, AURORA
TOLENTINO, ESPERANZA URBIZTONDO, SATURNINO
YODICO, RODOLFO MARIANO, ALICIA MARINAY, SUSAN
MATANGA, PATRIA MATIAS, LOUELITA MAYUNA, LOLITA
MERCADO, EUGENIA MILLA, CRESENCIA MIRADOR,
ERMA
MORAL,
RAQUEL
MORALES,
DOLORES
LAGRADA, petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and THE CIVIL SERVICE
COMMISSION and THE SECRETARY OF EDUCATION,
CULTURE AND SPORTS, respondents.
DE LEON. JR., J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to set aside
the Decision 1 dated August 29, 1997 and Resolution2 dated January 7,
1998 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 39878, affirming the
Resolutions3of respondent Civil Service Commission (CSC) finding
petitioners guilty of conduct prejudicial to the service and imposing a
penalty of six-(6) months suspension without pay.
Petitioners are teachers from different public schools in Metro Manila.
On various dates in September and October 1990, petitioners did not
report for work and instead, participated in mass actions by public
school teachers at the Liwasang Bonifacio for the purpose of
petitioning the government for redress of their grievances.
Petitioners do not deny their absence from work nor the fact that said
absences were due to their participation in the mass actions at the
Liwasang Bonifacio. However, they contend that their participation in
the mass actions was an exercise of their constitutional rights to
peaceably assemble and petition the government for redress of
grievances. Petitioner likewise maintain that they never went on strike
because they never sought to secure changes or modification of the
terms and conditions of their employment.
Petitioners' contentions are without merit. The character and legality of
the mass actions which they participated in have been passed upon by
this Court as early as 1990 in Manila Public School
Teachers' Association (MPSTA) v. Laguio, Jr.6 wherein we ruled that
"these 'mass actions' were to all intents and purposes a strike; they
constituted a concerted and unauthorized stoppage of, or absence from,
work which it was the teachers' sworn duty to perform, undertaken for
essentially
economic
reasons."7 In Bangalisan
v. Court
of
8
Appeals, we added that:
It is an undisputed fact that there was a work stoppage and that
petitioners' purpose was to realize their demands by withholding their
services. The fact that the conventional term "strike" was not used by
the striking employees to describe their common course of action is
inconsequential, since the substance of the situation, and not its
appearance, will be deemed to be controlling.
The ability to strike is not essential to the right of association. In the
absence of statute, public employees for not have the right to engaged
in concerted work stoppages for any purpose.
Further, herein petitioners, except Mariano, are being penalized not
because they exercised their right of peaceable assembly and petition
for redress of grievances but because of their successive unauthorized
and unilateral absences which produced adverse effects upon their
students for whose education they are responsible. The actuations of
petitioners definitely constituted conduct prejudicial to the best interest
of the service, punishable under the Civil Service law, rules and
regulations.1wphi1.nt
As aptly stated by the Solicitor General, "It is not the exercise by the
petitioners of their constitutional right to peaceable assemble that was
punished, but the manner in which they exercised such right which
resulted in the temporary stoppage or disruption of public service and
classes in various public schools in Metro Manila. For, indeed, there
are efficient and non-disruptive avenues, other than the mass actions in
question, whereby petitioners could petition the government for
redress of grievances.
It bears stressing that suspension of public services, however
temporary, will inevitably derail services to the public, which is one of
the reasons why the right to strike is denied government employees. It
may be conceded that the petitioners had valid grievances and noble
intentions in staging the "mass action," but that will not justify their
absences to the prejudice of innocent school children. Their righteous
indignation does not legalize an illegal work stoppage.9
In Jacinto v. Court of Appeals, 10 De La Cruz v. Court of
Appeals, 11 and Alipat v. Court of Appeals, 12 we upheld our rulings in
MPSTA and Bangalisan. Considering the factual circumstances of this
case and the doctrine of stare decisis to which we consistently adhere,
we find no compelling reason to deviate from our earlier rulings in
these related cases.
Anent the second issue, petitioners invoke our statement in Bangalisan
that payment of salaries corresponding to the period when an
employee is not allowed to work may be decreed if he is found
innocent of the charges which caused his suspension and if his
suspension is unjustified. Petitioners cite CSC Resolution No. 93-162
and contend that the determination of the CSC therein that not
an iota of evidence was given to substantiate the conclusion that they
participated in a "teacher's strike" amounted to a finding that they were
innocent of the charges filed against them.
As a general proposition, a public official is not entitled to any
compensation if he has not rendered any service. 1While there
recognized instances when backwages may be awarded to a suspended
or dismissed public official who is later ordered reinstated, as pointed
by petitioners in citing Bangalisan, the factual circumstances of the
case at bar impel us to rule otherwise.
Petitioners' reliance on CSC Resolution No. 93-162 is misplaced. Said
CSC resolution disposed of the appeals of Fely Ilarina, Adelaida Dela
Cruz, Alicia Galvo, Nenita Albios and Nerissa Abellanda. Petitioners
were never parties to their appeals and, therefore, cannot cite CSC
Resolution No. 93-162 in support of their contention. Petitioner also
overlook the fact that although no evidence was presented to prove
that Ilarina, et al. participated in the mass actions, the CSC explained
that the deficiency was cured by their admissions during the hearings
Republic
of
the
Philippines
SUPREME
COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 58768-70 December 29, 1989
LIBERTY FLOUR
MILLS
EMPLOYEES, ANTONIO
EVARISTO
and
POLICARPIO
BIASCAN, petitioners,
vs.
LIBERTY FLOUR MILLS, INC. PHILIPPINE LABOR
ALLIANCE COUNCIL (PLAC) and NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION, (NLRC), respondents.
Julius A. Magno for petitioners.
De Leon, Diokno & Associates for respondent Liberty Flour Mills,
Inc.
CRUZ, J.:
In this petition for certiorari, the resolution of the public respondent
dated August 3, 1978, is faulted for: (a) affirming the decision of the
labor arbiter dismissing the employees' claim for emergency allowance
for lack of jurisdiction; and (b) modifying the said decision by
disallowing the award of back wages to petitioners Policarpio Biascan
and Antonio Evaristo.
The basic facts are as follows:
On February 6, 1974, respondent Philippine Labor Alliance Council
(PLAC) and respondent Liberty Flour Mills, Inc. entered into a threeyear collective bargaining agreement effective January 1, 1974,
providing for a daily wage increase of P2.00 for 1974, Pl.00 for 1975
and another Pl.00 for 1976. The agreement contained a compliance
clause, which will be explained later in this opinion. Additionally, the
parties agreed to establish a union shop by imposing "membership in
good standing for the duration of the CBA as a condition for continued
employment" of workers. 1
On October 18, 1974, PLAC filed a complaint against the respondent
company for non-payment of the emergency cost of living allowance
under P.D. No. 525. 2 A similar complaint was filed on March 4, 1975,
this time by the petitioners, who apparently were already veering away
from PLAC. 3
(b) they are given in response to the appeal of the President in his
speech on 4 January 1974, or to countervail the quantum jump in the
cost of living as a result of the energy crisis starting in November
1973, or pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 390; Provided, That the
payment is retroactive to 18 February 1974 or earlier.
The allowances and other benefits may be granted unilaterally by the
employer or through collective bargaining, and may be paid at the
same time as the regular wages of the employees.
Allowances and other benefits which are not given in substantial
compliance with the LOI as interpreted herein shall not be treated by
the Department of Labor as emergency allowances in the
contemplation of the LOI unless otherwise shown by sufficient proof.
Thus, without such proof, escalation clauses in collective bargaining
agreements concluded before the appeal of the President providing for
automatic or periodic wage increases shall not be considered
allowances for purposes of the LOI. (Emphasis supplied.)
The "immediately preceding section" referred to above states:
SEC. 5. Determination of Amount of Allowances. In determining
the amount of allowances that should be given by employers to meet
the recommended minimum standards, the LOI has classified
employers into three general categories. As an implementation policy,
the Department of Labor shall consider as sufficient compliance with
the scales of allowances recommended by the LOI if the following
monthly allowances are given by employers:
(a) P50.00 or higher where the authorized capital stock of the
corporation, or the total assets in the case of other undertakings,
exceeds P 1 million;
(b) P 30.00 or higher where the authorized capital stock of the
corporation, or the total assets in the case of other undertakings, is not
less than P100,000.00 but not more than P1million; and
(c) P15.00 or higher where the authorized capital stock or total assets,
as the case may be, is less than P100,000.00.
It is not denied that the company falls under paragraph (a), as it has a
capitalization of more than P l million, 10and so must pay a minimum
allowance of P50.00 a month. This amount is clearly covered by the
increases prescribed in the CBA, which required a monthly increase
(on the basis of 30 days) of P60.00 for 1974, to be increased by P30.00
in 1975 (to P90.00) and another P 30.00 in 1976 (to P120.00). The first
increase in 1974 was already above the minimum allowance of P50.00,
which was exceeded even more with the increases of Pl.00 for each of
the next two years.
Even if the basis used were 26 days a month (excluding Sundays), the
conclusion would remain unchanged as the raise in wage would be
P52.00 for 1974, which amount was increased to P78.00 in 1975 and
to P104.00 in 1976.
But the petitioners contend that the wage increases were the result of
negotiation undertaken long before the promulgation of P.D. No. 525
and so should not be considered part of the emergency allowance
decreed. In support of this contention, they cite Section 15 of the Rules
implementing P.D. No. 525, providing as follows:
Nothing herein shall prevent the employer and his employees, from
entering into any agreement with terms more favorable to the
employees than those provided herein, or be construed to sanction the
diminution of any benefits granted to the employees under existing
laws, agreements, and voluntary practice.
Obviously, this section should not be read in isolation but must be
related to the other sections above-quoted, to give effect to the intent
and spirit of the decree. The meaning of the section simply is that any
benefit over and above the prescribed allowances may still be agreed
upon by the employees and the employer or, if already granted, may
no longer be withdrawn or diminished.
The petitioners also maintain that the above-quoted Section 2 of CBA
is invalid because it constitutes a waiver by the laborers of future
benefits that may be granted them by law. They contend this cannot be
done because it is contrary to public policy.
While the principle is correct, the application is not, for there are no
benefits being waived under the provision. The benefits are already
included in the wage increases. It is the law itself that considers these
increases, under the conditions prescribed in LOI No. 174, as
equivalent to, or in lieu of, the emergency allowance granted by P.D.
No. 525.
In fact, the company agreed to grant the emergency allowance even
before the obligation was imposed by the government. What the
petitioners claim they are being made to waive is the additional P50.00
allowance but the truth is that they are not entitled to this because they
are already enjoying the stipulated increases. There is no waiver of
these increases.
dismissed only on May 20, 1975, more than a month after the said
certification.
The correct view is that expressed by Commissioner Cecilio P. Seno in
his concurring and dissenting opinion, 14viz.:
I cannot however subscribe to the majority view that the 'dismissal of
complainants Biascan and Evaristo, ... was, to say the least, a
premature action on the part of the respondents because at the time
they were expelled by PLAC the contract containing the union security
clause upon which the action was based was yet to be certified and the
representation status of the contracting union was still in question.
Evidence on record show that after the cancellation of the registration
certificate of the Federation of Democratic Labor Unions, no other
union contested the exclusive representation of the Philippine Labor
Alliance Council (PLAC), consequently, there was no more legal
impediment that stood on the way as to the validity and enforceability
of the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement entered into
by and between respondent corporation and respondent union. The
certification of the collective bargaining agreement by the Bureau of
Labor Relations is not required to put a stamp of validity to such
contract. Once it is duly entered into and signed by the parties, a
collective bargaining agreement becomes effective as between the
parties regardless of whether or not the same has been certified by the
BLR.
To be fair, it must be mentioned that in the certification election held at
the Liberty Flour Mills, Inc. on December 27, 1976, the Ilaw at Buklod
ng Manggagawa, with which the union organized by Biascan and
Evaristo was affiliated, won overwhelmingly with 441 votes as against
the 5 votes cast for PLAC. 15 However, this does not excuse the fact
that the two disaffiliated from PLAC as early as March 1975 and thus
rendered themselves subject to dismissal under the union shop clause
in the CBA.
The petitioners say that the reinstatement issue of Evaristo and Biascan
has become academic because the former has been readmitted and the
latter has chosen to await the resolution of this case. However, they
still insist on the payment of their back wages on the ground that their
dismissal was illegal. This claim must be denied for the reasons
already given. The union shop clause was validly enforced against
them and justified the termination of their services.
Republic
of
the
Philippines
SUPREME
COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-25246 September 12, 1974
BENJAMIN
VICTORIANO, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ELIZALDE ROPE WORKERS' UNION and ELIZALDE ROPE
FACTORY, INC., defendants, ELIZALDE ROPE WORKERS'
UNION, defendant-appellant.
Salonga, Ordonez, Yap, Sicat & Associates for plaintiff-appellee.
Cipriano Cid & Associates for defendant-appellant.
ZALDIVAR, J.:p
Appeal to this Court on purely questions of law from the decision of
the Court of First Instance of Manila in its Civil Case No. 58894.
The undisputed facts that spawned the instant case follow:
Benjamin Victoriano (hereinafter referred to as Appellee), a member of
the religious sect known as the "Iglesia ni Cristo", had been in the
employ of the Elizalde Rope Factory, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as
Company) since 1958. As such employee, he was a member of the
Elizalde Rope Workers' Union (hereinafter referred to as Union) which
had with the Company a collective bargaining agreement containing a
closed shop provision which reads as follows:
Membership in the Union shall be required as a condition of
employment for all permanent employees workers covered by this
Agreement.
The collective bargaining agreement expired on March 3, 1964 but
was renewed the following day, March 4, 1964.
Under Section 4(a), paragraph 4, of Republic Act No. 875, prior to its
amendment by Republic Act No. 3350, the employer was not
precluded "from making an agreement with a labor organization to
require as a condition of employment membership therein, if such
labor organization is the representative of the employees." On June 18,
1961, however, Republic Act No. 3350 was enacted, introducing an
amendment to paragraph (4) subsection (a) of section 4 of Republic
Act No. 875, as follows: ... "but such agreement shall not cover
religious sect from joining any labor union if such sect prohibits
affiliations of their members thereto" 5 ; and, consequently, deprives
said members of their constitutional right to form or join lawful
associations or organizations guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, and thus
becomes obnoxious to Article III, Section 1 (6) of the 1935
Constitution. 6
Secondly, the Union contended that Republic Act No. 3350 is
unconstitutional for impairing the obligation of contracts in that, while
the Union is obliged to comply with its collective bargaining
agreement containing a "closed shop provision," the Act relieves the
employer from its reciprocal obligation of cooperating in the
maintenance of union membership as a condition of employment; and
that said Act, furthermore, impairs the Union's rights as it deprives the
union of dues from members who, under the Act, are relieved from the
obligation to continue as such members. 7
Thirdly, the Union contended that Republic Act No. 3350
discriminatorily favors those religious sects which ban their members
from joining labor unions, in violation of Article Ill, Section 1 (7) of
the 1935 Constitution; and while said Act unduly protects certain
religious sects, it leaves no rights or protection to labor organizations. 8
Fourthly, Republic Act No. 3350, asserted the Union, violates the
constitutional provision that "no religious test shall be required for the
exercise of a civil right," in that the laborer's exercise of his civil right
to join associations for purposes not contrary to law has to be
determined under the Act by his affiliation with a religious sect; that
conversely, if a worker has to sever his religious connection with a sect
that prohibits membership in a labor organization in order to be able to
join a labor organization, said Act would violate religious freedom. 9
Fifthly, the Union contended that Republic Act No. 3350, violates the
"equal protection of laws" clause of the Constitution, it being a
discriminately legislation, inasmuch as by exempting from the
operation of closed shop agreement the members of the "Iglesia ni
Cristo", it has granted said members undue advantages over their
fellow workers, for while the Act exempts them from union obligation
and liability, it nevertheless entitles them at the same time to the
enjoyment of all concessions, benefits and other emoluments that the
union might secure from the employer. 10
Sixthly, the Union contended that Republic Act No. 3350 violates the
constitutional provision regarding the promotion of social justice. 11
as what both the Constitution and the Industrial Peace Act have
recognized, and guaranteed to the employee, is the "right" to join
associations of his choice, it would be absurd to say that the law also
imposes, in the same breath, upon the employee the duty to join
associations. The law does not enjoin an employee to sign up with any
association.
The right to refrain from joining labor organizations recognized by
Section 3 of the Industrial Peace Act is, however, limited. The legal
protection granted to such right to refrain from joining is withdrawn by
operation of law, where a labor union and an employer have agreed on
a closed shop, by virtue of which the employer may employ only
member of the collective bargaining union, and the employees must
continue to be members of the union for the duration of the contract in
order to keep their jobs. Thus Section 4 (a) (4) of the Industrial Peace
Act, before its amendment by Republic Act No. 3350, provides that
although it would be an unfair labor practice for an employer "to
discriminate in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or
condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in
any labor organization" the employer is, however, not precluded "from
making an agreement with a labor organization to require as a
condition of employment membership therein, if such labor
organization is the representative of the employees". By virtue,
therefore, of a closed shop agreement, before the enactment of
Republic Act No. 3350, if any person, regardless of his religious
beliefs, wishes to be employed or to keep his employment, he must
become a member of the collective bargaining union. Hence, the right
of said employee not to join the labor union is curtailed and
withdrawn.
To that all-embracing coverage of the closed shop arrangement,
Republic Act No. 3350 introduced an exception, when it added to
Section 4 (a) (4) of the Industrial Peace Act the following proviso: "but
such agreement shall not cover members of any religious sects which
prohibit affiliation of their members in any such labor organization".
Republic Act No. 3350 merely excludes ipso jure from the application
and coverage of the closed shop agreement the employees belonging to
any religious sects which prohibit affiliation of their members with any
labor organization. What the exception provides, therefore, is that
members of said religious sects cannot be compelled or coerced to join
labor unions even when said unions have closed shop agreements with
Code. As to the lamented silence of the Act regarding the rights and
protection of labor unions, suffice it to say, first, that the validity of a
statute is determined by its provisions, not by its silence 46 ; and,
second, the fact that the law may work hardship does not render it
unconstitutional. 47
It would not be amiss to state, regarding this matter, that to compel
persons to join and remain members of a union to keep their jobs in
violation of their religious scrupples, would hurt, rather than help,
labor unions, Congress has seen it fit to exempt religious objectors lest
their resistance spread to other workers, for religious objections have
contagious potentialities more than political and philosophic
objections.
Furthermore, let it be noted that coerced unity and loyalty even to the
country, and a fortiori to a labor union assuming that such unity and
loyalty can be attained through coercion is not a goal that is
constitutionally obtainable at the expense of religious liberty. 48 A
desirable end cannot be promoted by prohibited means.
4. Appellants' fourth contention, that Republic Act No. 3350 violates
the constitutional prohibition against requiring a religious test for the
exercise of a civil right or a political right, is not well taken. The Act
does not require as a qualification, or condition, for joining any lawful
association membership in any particular religion or in any religious
sect; neither does the Act require affiliation with a religious sect that
prohibits its members from joining a labor union as a condition or
qualification for withdrawing from a labor union. Joining or
withdrawing from a labor union requires a positive act. Republic Act
No. 3350 only exempts members with such religious affiliation from
the coverage of closed shop agreements. So, under this Act, a religious
objector is not required to do a positive act to exercise the right to
join or to resign from the union. He is exempted ipso jure without need
of any positive act on his part. A conscientious religious objector need
not perform a positive act or exercise the right of resigning from the
labor union he is exempted from the coverage of any closed shop
agreement that a labor union may have entered into. How then can
there be a religious test required for the exercise of a right when no
right need be exercised?
We have said that it was within the police power of the State to enact
Republic Act No. 3350, and that its purpose was legal and in
consonance with the Constitution. It is never an illegal evasion of a
the law that its object is for the benefit of the public and the means by
which the benefit is to be obtained are of public character, the law will
be upheld even though incidental advantage may occur to individuals
beyond those enjoyed by the general public. 62
6. Appellant's further contention that Republic Act No. 3350 violates
the constitutional provision on social justice is also baseless. Social
justice is intended to promote the welfare of all the people. 63 Republic
Act No. 3350 promotes that welfare insofar as it looks after the
welfare of those who, because of their religious belief, cannot join
labor unions; the Act prevents their being deprived of work and of the
means of livelihood. In determining whether any particular measure is
for public advantage, it is not necessary that the entire state be directly
benefited it is sufficient that a portion of the state be benefited
thereby.
Social justice also means the adoption by the Government of measures
calculated to insure economic stability of all component elements of
society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and social
equilibrium in the inter-relations of the members of the
community. 64 Republic Act No. 3350 insures economic stability to the
members of a religious sect, like the Iglesia ni Cristo, who are also
component elements of society, for it insures security in their
employment, notwithstanding their failure to join a labor union having
a closed shop agreement with the employer. The Act also advances the
proper economic and social equilibrium between labor unions and
employees who cannot join labor unions, for it exempts the latter from
the compelling necessity of joining labor unions that have closed shop
agreements and equalizes, in so far as opportunity to work is
concerned, those whose religion prohibits membership in labor unions
with those whose religion does not prohibit said membership. Social
justice does not imply social equality, because social inequality will
always exist as long as social relations depend on personal or
subjective proclivities. Social justice does not require legal equality
because legal equality, being a relative term, is necessarily premised
on differentiations based on personal or natural conditions. 65 Social
justice guarantees equality of opportunity 66 , and this is precisely what
Republic Act No. 3350 proposes to accomplish it gives laborers,
irrespective of their religious scrupples, equal opportunity for work.
7. As its last ground, appellant contends that the amendment
introduced by Republic Act No. 3350 is not called for in other
words, the Act is not proper, necessary or desirable. Anent this matter,
it has been held that a statute which is not necessary is not, for that
reason, unconstitutional; that in determining the constitutional validity
of legislation, the courts are unconcerned with issues as to the
necessity for the enactment of the legislation in question. 67 Courts do
inquire into the wisdom of laws. 68 Moreover, legislatures, being
chosen by the people, are presumed to understand and correctly
appreciate the needs of the people, and it may change the laws
accordingly. 69 The fear is entertained by appellant that unless the Act
is declared unconstitutional, employers will prefer employing
members of religious sects that prohibit their members from joining
labor unions, and thus be a fatal blow to unionism. We do not agree.
The threat to unionism will depend on the number of employees who
are members of the religious sects that control the demands of the
labor market. But there is really no occasion now to go further and
anticipate problems We cannot judge with the material now before Us.
At any rate, the validity of a statute is to be determined from its
general purpose and its efficacy to accomplish the end desired, not
from its effects on a particular case. 70 The essential basis for the
exercise of power, and not a mere incidental result arising from its
exertion, is the criterion by which the validity of a statute is to be
measured. 71
II. We now pass on the second assignment of error, in support of which
the Union argued that the decision of the trial court ordering the Union
to pay P500 for attorney's fees directly contravenes Section 24 of
Republic Act No. 875, for the instant action involves an industrial
dispute wherein the Union was a party, and said Union merely acted in
the exercise of its rights under the union shop provision of its existing
collective bargaining contract with the Company; that said order also
contravenes Article 2208 of the Civil Code; that, furthermore,
Appellee was never actually dismissed by the defendant Company and
did not therefore suffer any damage at all . 72
In refuting appellant Union's arguments, Appellee claimed that in the
instant case there was really no industrial dispute involved in the
attempt to compel Appellee to maintain its membership in the union
under pain of dismissal, and that the Union, by its act, inflicted
intentional harm on Appellee; that since Appellee was compelled to
institute an action to protect his right to work, appellant could legally
be ordered to pay attorney's fees under Articles 1704 and 2208 of the
Civil Code. 73
The second paragraph of Section 24 of Republic Act No. 875 which is
relied upon by appellant provides that:
No suit, action or other proceedings shall be maintainable in any court
against a labor organization or any officer or member thereof for any
act done by or on behalf of such organization in furtherance of an
industrial dispute to which it is a party, on the ground only that such
act induces some other person to break a contract of employment or
that it is in restraint of trade or interferes with the trade, business or
employment of some other person or with the right of some other
person to dispose of his capital or labor. (Emphasis supplied)
That there was a labor dispute in the instant case cannot be disputed
for appellant sought the discharge of respondent by virtue of the closed
shop agreement and under Section 2 (j) of Republic Act No. 875 a
question involving tenure of employment is included in the term "labor
dispute". 74 The discharge or the act of seeking it is the labor dispute
itself. It being the labor dispute itself, that very same act of the Union
in asking the employer to dismiss Appellee cannot be "an act
done ... in furtherance of an industrial dispute". The mere fact that
appellant is a labor union does not necessarily mean that all its acts are
in furtherance of an industrial dispute. 75 Appellant Union, therefore,
cannot invoke in its favor Section 24 of Republic Act No. 875. This
case is not intertwined with any unfair labor practice case existing at
the time when Appellee filed his complaint before the lower court.
Neither does Article 2208 of the Civil Code, invoked by the Union,
serve as its shield. The article provides that attorney's fees and
expenses of litigation may be awarded "when the defendant's act or
omission has compelled the plaintiff ... to incur expenses to protect his
interest"; and "in any other case where the court deems it just and
equitable that attorney's fees and expenses of litigation should be
recovered". In the instant case, it cannot be gainsaid that appellant
Union's act in demanding Appellee's dismissal caused Appellee to
incur expenses to prevent his being dismissed from his job. Costs
according to Section 1, Rule 142, of the Rules of Court, shall be
allowed as a matter of course to the prevailing party.
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is dismissed, and the decision, dated
August 26, 1965, of the Court of First Instance of Manila, in its Civil
Separate Opinions
FERNANDO, J, concurring:
The decision arrived at unanimously by this Court that Republic Act
No. 3350 is free from the constitutional infirmities imputed to it was
demonstrated in a manner wellnigh conclusive in the learned,
scholarly, and comprehensive opinion so typical of the efforts of
the ponente, Justice Zaldivar. Like the rest of my brethren, I concur
fully. Considering moreover, the detailed attention paid to each and
every objection raised as to its validity and the clarity and
persuasiveness with which it was shown to be devoid of support in
authoritative doctrines, it would appear that the last word has been
written on this particular subject. Nonetheless, I deem it proper to
submit this brief expression of my views on the transcendent character
of religious freedom 1 and its primacy even as against the claims of
protection to labor, 2 also one of the fundamental principles of the
Constitution.
1. Religious freedom is identified with the liberty every individual
possesses to worship or not a Supreme Being, and if a devotee of any
sect, to act in accordance with its creed. Thus is constitutionally
safeguarded, according to Justice Laurel, that "profession of faith to an
active power that binds and elevates man to his Creator ...." 3 The
choice of what a man wishes to believe in is his and his alone. That is a
domain left untouched, where intrusion is not allowed, a citadel to
which the law is denied entry, whatever be his thoughts or hopes. In
that sphere, what he wills reigns supreme. The doctrine to which he
pays fealty may for some be unsupported by evidence, devoid of
rational foundation. No matter. There is no requirement as to its
conformity to what has found acceptance. It suffices that for him such
a concept holds undisputed sway. That is a recognition of man's
freedom. That for him is one of the ways of self- realization. It would
be to disregard the dignity that attaches to every human being to
test of its substance is the right to differ as to things that touch the
heart of the existing order." 9
There is moreover this ringing affirmation by Chief Justice Hughes of
the primacy of religious freedom in the forum of conscience even as
against the command of the State itself: "Much has been said of the
paramount duty to the state, a duty to be recognized, it is urged, even
though it conflicts with convictions of duty to God. Undoubtedly that
duty to the state exists within the domain of power, for government
may enforce obedience to laws regardless of scruples. When one's
belief collides with the power of the state, the latter is supreme within
its sphere and submission or punishment follows. But, in the forum of
conscience, duty to a moral power higher than the state has always
been maintained. The reservation of that supreme obligation, as a
matter of principle, would unquestionably be made by many of our
conscientious and law-abiding citizens. The essence of religion is
belief in a relation to God involving duties superior to those arising
from any human relation." 10 The American Chief Justice spoke in
dissent, it is true, but with him in agreement were three of the foremost
jurists who ever sat in that Tribunal, Justices Holmes, Brandeis, and
Stone.
2. As I view Justice Zaldivar's opinion in that light, my concurrence, as
set forth earlier, is wholehearted and entire. With such a cardinal
postulate as the basis of our polity, it has a message that cannot be
misread. Thus is intoned with a reverberating clang, to paraphrase
Cardozo, a fundamental principle that drowns all weaker sounds. The
labored effort to cast doubt on the validity of the statutory provision in
question is far from persuasive. It is attended by futility. It is not for
this Court, as I conceive of the judicial function, to restrict the scope of
a preferred freedom.
3. There is, however, the question of whether such an exception
possesses an implication that lessens the effectiveness of state efforts
to protect labor, likewise, as noted, constitutionally ordained. Such a
view, on the surface, may not be lacking in plausibility, but upon closer
analysis, it cannot stand scrutiny. Thought must be given to the
freedom of association, likewise an aspect of intellectual liberty. For
the late Professor Howe a constitutionalist and in his lifetime the
biographer of the great Holmes, it even partakes of the political theory
of pluralistic sovereignty. So great is the respect for the autonomy
accorded voluntary societies. 11 Such a right implies at the very least
that one can determine for himself whether or not he should join or
refrain from joining a labor organization, an institutional device for
promoting the welfare of the working man. A closed shop, on the other
hand, is inherently coercive. That is why, as is unmistakably reflected
in our decisions, the latest of which is Guijarno v. Court of Industrial
Relations, 12 it is far from being a favorite of the law. For a statutory
provision then to further curtail its operation, is precisely to follow the
dictates of sound public policy.
The exhaustive and well-researched opinion of Justice Zaldivar thus is
in the mainstream of constitutional tradition. That, for me, is the
channel to follow.
Separate Opinions
FERNANDO, J, concurring:
The decision arrived at unanimously by this Court that Republic Act
No. 3350 is free from the constitutional infirmities imputed to it was
demonstrated in a manner wellnigh conclusive in the learned,
scholarly, and comprehensive opinion so typical of the efforts of
the ponente, Justice Zaldivar. Like the rest of my brethren, I concur
fully. Considering moreover, the detailed attention paid to each and
every objection raised as to its validity and the clarity and
persuasiveness with which it was shown to be devoid of support in
authoritative doctrines, it would appear that the last word has been
written on this particular subject. Nonetheless, I deem it proper to
submit this brief expression of my views on the transcendent character
of religious freedom 1 and its primacy even as against the claims of
protection to labor, 2 also one of the fundamental principles of the
Constitution.
1. Religious freedom is identified with the liberty every individual
possesses to worship or not a Supreme Being, and if a devotee of any
sect, to act in accordance with its creed. Thus is constitutionally
safeguarded, according to Justice Laurel, that "profession of faith to an
active power that binds and elevates man to his Creator ...." 3 The
choice of what a man wishes to believe in is his and his alone. That is a
domain left untouched, where intrusion is not allowed, a citadel to
which the law is denied entry, whatever be his thoughts or hopes. In
that sphere, what he wills reigns supreme. The doctrine to which he
pays fealty may for some be unsupported by evidence, devoid of
Republic
of
the
Philippines
SUPREME
COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-20764
November 29, 1965
SANTOS
JUAT, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, BULAKLAK
PUBLICATIONS and JUAN EVANGELISTA, respondents.
Vicente
T.
Ocampo
for
petitioner.
Mariano B. Tuason for respondent Court of Industrial Relations.
Rufo B. Albor for other respondents.
ZALDIVAR, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari to review the decision dated August 15,
1962 and the resolution en banc dated October 30, 1962, of the Court
of Industrial Relations in its Case No. 2889-ULP.
After investigating charges of unfair labor practice filed by petitioner
Santos Juat before the Court of Industrial Relations against
respondents Bulaklak Publications and its Executive Officer, Acting
Prosecutor Alberto Cruz of the Court of Industrial Relations filed a
complaint, docketed as Case No. 2889-ULP, charging Bulaklak
Publications and/or Juan N. Evangelista of unfair labor practice within
the meaning of Section 4 (a) subsections 1, 4 and 5 of Republic Act
875, alleging, among others, that complainant Santos Juat was an
employee of the respondent company since August 1953; that on or
about July 15, 1960, and on several occasions thereafter, complainant
Santos Juat was asked by his respondent employer to join the
Busocope Labor Union, but he refused to do so; that respondent
employer suspended him without justifiable cause; that two separate
cases were filed by complainant against the respondents one on
March 13, 1961 for unfair labor practice, and another on March 18,
1961 for payment of wages for overtime work and work on Sundays
and holidays, the filing of which cases had come to the knowledge of
the respondents; that on March 15, 1961, respondent employer
dismissed him from the service without justifiable cause and that from
the time of his dismissal up to the filing of the complaint he had not
found any substantial employment for himself.
By-Laws and all members who become members after that date shall,
as a condition of employment, maintain their membership in the Union
for the duration of this Agreement. All employees and/or workers who
on January 1, 1961 are not yet members of the Union shall, as a
condition of maintaining their employment, become members of such
union."
It is clear that it was by virtue of the above-mentioned closed shop
provision of the collective bargaining agreement between the
Busocope Labor Union and the Bulaklak Publications that the
management of the latter required Santos Juat to become a member of
the former. In requiring Santos Juat to become a member of said
Union, it was only obeying the law between the parties, which is their
collective bargaining agreement.
Because of the refusal of Santos Juat to become a member of said
Union, Mr. Juan N. Evangelists, the executive officer of respondent
company, suspended him for 15 days. After the expiration of the
suspension of Santos Juat, Mr. Evangelista addressed a letter to the
former, ordering him to report back for duty, and in spite of said letter,
Santos Juat did not report for work, consequently, Santos Juat was
dropped from the service of the company. Juat could afford not to
report for duty because he has his own business by the name of JUAT
PRINTING PRESS CO., INC. The refusal of Santos Juat to become a
member of the Busocope Labor Union as well as his refusal to report
for work when ordered by his superior officer, shows the lack of
respect on the part of Santos Juat toward his superior officer. With
such attitude, the continuation in the service of the company of Santos
Juat is indeed inimical to the interest of his employer.
The charge of complainant to the effect that on March 13, 1961, he
filed a petition with this Court against respondent company which was
docketed as Case No. 1462-V is of no moment, because according to
the decision of the Supreme Court in Case G.R. No. L-11745, Royal
Interocean Lines, et al. vs. Hon. Court of Industrial Relations, et al.,
Promulgated October 31, 1960, it was held that an employee's having
filed charges or having given testimony or being about to give
testimony has no relation to union activities. With respect to Case No.
2789-ULP, Mr. Evangelista stated that he did not know anything about
its having been filed in Court.
It is now contended by the petitioner before this Court that:
Republic
of
the
Philippines
SUPREME
COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-27079 August 31, 1977
MANILA
CORDAGE
COMPANY, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS AND MANILA
CORDAGE WORKERS UNION, respondents.
G.R. No. L-27080 August 31, 1977
MANCO LABOR UNION (NLU), petitioner,
vs.
MANILA CORDAGE WORKERS UNION and THE COURT OF
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, respondents.
G.R. No. L-27080 August 31, 1977
MANCI
LABOR
UNION
(NLU), petitioner,
vs.
MANILA CORDAGE WORKERS UNION and THE COURT OF
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, respondents.
Sycip, Salazar, Luna & Associates for petitioner Manila Cordage
Company.
Eulogio R. Lerum for petitioner Manco Labor Union (NLU)
B. C. Pineda & Associates for private respondent.
FERNANDEZ, J.:
These are petitions to review the decision dated May 4, 1966 1 and the
resolution dated October 19, 1966 2 of the respondent Court of
Industrial Relations (CIR) in Case No. 2728-ULP entitled "Manila
Cordage Workers Union, complainant, vs. Manila Cordage Company
and Manco Labor Union, respondents."
The dispositive part of the decision reads:
FOREGOING PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Court finds
substantial evidence to sustain the charge of unfair labor practice
against respondent Manila Cordage Company in violation of Section
4(a), paragraphs 1, 2 and 4 of the Industrial Peace Act, and against
respondent Manco Labor Union in violation of Section 4(b),
certiorari and in the resolution of this Court dated January 23, 1967, in
G.R. No. L-27079 (Manila Cordage Company vs. The Court of
Industrial Relations, et al.), the same was given due course by this
Court.
That since the issues to be brought by the herein petitioner in this case
are similar to the issues raised in the petition for certiorari in G.R. No.
L-27079, in order to avoid a multiplicity of cases, it is desirable that
the present case be consolidated with the said case;
That in order to avoid repetitions and a voluminous record, herein
petitioner is adopting the petition for review filed in G.R. No. LZ7079 as its own in the present case, and by reference, is made a part
hereof;
That this motion is timely because copy of the resolution of the Court
of Industrial Relations in this case was received on January 6, 1967,
notice of appeal and a petition for extension for 15 days was filed with
this Court on January 16, 1967, which was granted, and today is the
last day for the filing of our petition for review in this case.
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court:
1. That the present case be consolidated with G.R. No. L- 27079,
entitled "Manila Cordage Company vs. The Court of Industrial
Relations and Manila Cordage Workers Union;
2. That herein petitioner be allowed to adopt the petition for review in
G.R. No. L-27079 as its own, and by reference made a part hereof;
3. That upon notice in accordance with the Rules of this Court, herein
petitioner will deposit the amount of P80.40 in payment of costs.
4. That in case this motion will be denied, that herein petitioner be
given five (15) days from notice to file its own petition for review.
Manila, January 31, 1967.
EULOGIO R. LERUM
Attorney for Petitioner
Manco Labor Union (NLU)
3199 Magsaysay Blvd., Manila
The Court issued on February 15, 1967 the following resolution:
Considering the motion of attorney for petitioner in L-27080 (Manco
Labor Union [NLU] vs. Manila Cordage Workers Union, et al.)
praying (a) that this case be consolidated with L-27079 (Manila
cordage Company vs. The Court of Industrial Relations, et al. (b) that
petitioner be allowed to adopt the petition for review in aforesaid case
L-27079 as its own, and by reference made a part thereof; (c) that upon
because as found out by the Court below, the said provision was
explained to the members before and after the same was signed.
3. Petitioner Manco Labor Union (NLU) could not be held guilty of
discriminating against Rabago, Nisperos and Trajano because of heir
union activities, The record shows that besides these three, Vicente
Untalan Ruperto Balsams and 40 others resigned. In the case of
Untalan and Balsamo after the Manila Cordage Co. had dismissed
them on request of the petitioning Union, this Union was also the one
who asked for their reinstatement when they withdrew their
resignation from the union, In the case of the other 40 members who
resigned (Exhs. 'A', A-l to 'A-49') when they withdrew their
resignations, the Manco Labor Union did not do anything to them,
although it had full knowledge that they have joined the rival union.
WHEREFORE, considering that Silvino Rabago, Natalio Nisperos and
Ricardo Traiano had violated the Collective Bargaining Agreement
whereas the action of the petitioner was one in good faith in what it
believes to be its right under said contract, we respectfully pray of this
Honorable Court that the decision appealed from be set aside and case
No. 2728-ULP of the Court of Industrial Relations be ordered
dismissed.
Manila, October 24, 1967.
EULOGIO R. LERUM
Attorney for the Petitioner
3199 Magsaysay Blvd., Manila
The petitioner, Manila Cordage Company, is a corporation duly
organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines.
The petitioner, Manco Labor Union, is a legitimate labor organization.
The respondent, Manila Cordage Workers Union, is also a legitimate
labor organization. Said respondent union is composed of employees
of the petitioner company.
Sometime in 1957, the Manila Cordage Company and the Manco
Labor Union, then acting as the exclusive bargaining representative of
the former's employees, entered into a collective bargaining agreement
which contained, among others, the following stipulations:
WHEREAS, the parties hereto decided to enter into an agreement
relating to the terms and conditions of employment, with reference to
those members to whom the provisions of this agreement applies.
xxx xxx xxx
Both parties agree that all employees of the COMPANY who are
already members of the UNION at the time of the signing of this
AGREEMENT shall continue to remain members of the UNION for
the duration of this AGREEMENT. 4
The foregoing stipulations were also embodied in the collective
bargaining agreement entered into between the Manila Cordage
Company and the Manco Labor Union in 1959.
When the collective bargaining agreements were entered into, the
employees. Silvino Rabago, Ricardo Trajano and Natalio Nisperos
were already members of Manco Labor Union.
Shortly after 1959, some employees of Manila Cordage Company
formed the Manila Cordage Workers Union. The usual campaign for
membership of the new union took place. Some employees who were
members of the Manco Labor Union resigned from said union and
joined the Manila Cordage Workers Union. At the instance of the
Manco Labor Union, the Manila Cordage Company dismissed those
who resigned from the Manco Labor Union, among them, Silvino
Rabago, Vicente Untalan, Ruperto Balsamo, Natalio Nisperos, Ricardo
Traiano, Roque Ruby and Salvador de Leon. It is alleged that the
Manco Labor Union held meetings wherein the members were
informed that under the above-quoted stipulations of the collective
bargaining agreement, continued membership in the Manco Labor
Union was a condition precedent to employment in the Manila
Cordage Company. As a consequence, some of those who resigned
from the Manco Labor Union withdrew their resignations and were reemployed by the Manila Cordage Company.
At the behest of the Manila Cordage Workers Union, an acting
prosecutor of the Court of Industrial Relations filed a complaint dated
March 28, 1961 for unfair labor practice against Manila Cordage
Company and the Manco Labor Union in behalf of the Manila
Cordage Workers Union and its members namely, Silvino Rabago,
Vicente Untalan Ruperto Balsams rid Natalio Nisperos The complaint
was docketed as Case No. Z728-ULP of the Court of Industrial
Relations. 5
The acting prosecutor of the Court of Industrial Relations filed an
amended complaint in Case No. 2728-ULP dated July 14, 1961 adding
as complainants Ricardo Trajano and Salvador de Leon. 6
It was alleged in the amended complaint that the Manco Labor Union,
through its President, for no other valid cause except for the
the Presiding Judge voted for the modification of the decision dated
May 4, 1966 by eliminating therefrom the award of back wages. He
concurred in the reinstatement of complainants Nisperos Trajano and
Rabago. 11
The petitioner Manila Cordage Company assigns the following errors:
I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT, UNDER
THE MAINTENANCE-OF-MEMBERSHIP' CLAUSE IN THE
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE
PETITIONER ('COMPANY') AND MANCO LABOR UNION
MANCO EMPLOYEES OF THE COMPANY WHO ARE ALREADY
MEMBERS OF MANCO WHEN SAID AGREEMENT TOOK
EFFECT WERE REQUIRED TO REMAIN SUCH MEMBERS AS A
CONDITION OF CONTINUED EMPLOYMENT IN THE
COMPANY.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT
INDIVIDUALS, WHOSE EMPLOYMENT HAS CEASED DUE TO
ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES AND WHO HAVE NOT
SOUGHT OTHER SUBSTANTIALLY EQUIVALENT AND
REGULAR EMPLOYMENT, CEASE TO BE 'EMPLOYEES'
WITHIN THE MEANING OF SECTION 2 (d) OF REPUBLIC ACT
NO. 875, AS AMENDED, AND HENCE, ARE NOT ENTITLED TO
PROTECTION AND RELIEF UNDER This ACT.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT
INDIVIDUALS DISMISSED PURSUANT TO A UNION
SECURITY CLAUSE ARE NOT ENTITLED TO BACK WAGES,
WHEN THEIR EMPLOYER EFFECTED THEIR DISMISSAL IN
GOOD FAITH AND IN AN HONEST BELIEF THAT THE CLAUSE
AUTHORIZED SUCH DISMISSAL.
IV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DISMISSING THE
COMPLAINT. 12
Anent the first error assigned, the petitioner avers:
It should be emphasized strongly that this is virtually a case of first
impression in this jurisdiction, We are not aware of any decision of this
Tribunal squarely determinative of the principal issue in this petition.
For this reason, it should be appropriate to consider American