Inherent powers of the High Court under Section 482 are to be sparingly exercised

and only to give effect to any order under Cr. P.C. or to prevent abuse of the process
of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. As pointed out by the
Supreme Court, inherent powers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the High
Court to act according to whim or caprice. The statutory power has to be exercised
sparingly, with circumspection and in the rarest of rare cases. When there is no
provision in the Cr.P.C. for substitution of parties in criminal revision applications and
no provision bars such substitution, the High Court has inherent jurisdiction for ends
of justice to hear parties, specifically when the accused will not be prejudiced in any
way. In a case where there is no known procedure by which any relief can be
granted to the petitioner and invoking the inherent powers will not amount to
overriding any express provisions of law, absence of any specific provision should
not trammel the fountain of justice and stand in the way of the court in granting
relief. There is no dispute about the powers of the High Court under Section 482 to
interfere with the order passed under Section 133, if substantial injustice has been
done, if the Magistrate has taken perverse view of the evidence, where there is no
reasonable evidence, on record to justify the Magistrate's findings or where the
findings arrived at are perverse, where the Magistrate has given a decision
regarding the matter which lies within the congnizance of the civil court. Exercise of
discretionary powers vested in a court is not open to interference at the hands of a
superior court so long as it is exercised reasonably, in good faith and on correct
grounds. Though it cannot be said that High Court can never set aside a conviction
in exercise of its inherent powers, it will do so only in very exceptional cases. Trial
on Sunday and refusal of adjournment to get legal aid--Plea of guilty and conviction.
This power is to be exercised sparingly, while acting under Section 482 specially
when Sessions Judge has declined to intervene High Court should not interfere the
appreciation of evidence. To put restriction on the inherent powers of the High Court
with reference to the restriction imposed on the power of the Magistrate in regard to
appointment of a receiver under Section 146 will not be permissible. Though Section
482 does not prevent passing of an order appointing receiver in an appropriate case
even after termination of the proceeding at the hand of the Magistrate, the same
would not be. This power is to be exercised sparingly while acting under Section 482
specially when Sessions Judge has declined to intervene High Court should not
interfere the appreciation of evidence. To put restriction on the inherent powers of
the High Court with reference to the restriction imposed on the power of the
Magistrate in regard to appointment of a receiver under Section 146 will not be
permissible. Though Section 482 does not prevent passing of an order appointing
receiver in an appropriate case even after termination of the proceeding at the hand
of the Magistrate, the same would not be done in a case where possession has
already been delivered to a party pursuant to the final order of a Magistrate. Such
an order would be illegal though it would not be without jurisdiction. Inherent
powers of the High Court should be exercised sparingly with circumspection and in
rare cases and that too to correct patent illegalities. It was never contemplated by

the Legislature that the High Court should exercise its inherent power of making
pronouncements upon question of law in order to guide a Magistrate in conducting a
preliminary enquiry. Where it cannot be said that there is any legal bar for the
Magistrate to have instituted the proceeding, nor can it be said that the evidence is
either non-existent or is contra-indicative for the impugned orders, and the utmost
that can be inferred is that the Magistrate took a wrong decision, it will not prompt
the High Court to invoke inherent powers under Section 482. An application under
Section 482 will not lie on the ground that the court has decided a point of law in an
incorrect manner resulting in gross injustice. Where in amending case the
prosecution applied to the High Court to give direction to the Magistrate to cut short
the preliminary enquiry by dispensing with certain witnesses, such directions if
given would be mere obiter dictum and the High Court had no jurisdiction under
Section 482 to give such directions. Where in a case under Sections 63, Copyrights
Act and 78 and 79, Trade and Merchandise Act and Sections 482/34, I.P.C. charges
were framed on the basis of seizure of duplicate and fake goods, court finding that
prima facie case was made out, had refused to quash proceedings. Where the
accused in a case under Section 302, I.P.C. absconded on the date of
pronouncement of judgment and instead approached High Court under Section 482,
Cr. P.C. which in turn stayed proceedings, Apex Court had set aside such order with
the remark that High Court had prevented flow of justice. In proceedings under
Section 482, Cr. P.C. High Court should not sift evidence for recording a finding.