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Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-22456

September 27, 1967

FRANCISCO SALUNGA, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS; SAN MIGUEL BREWERY, INC. and MIGUEL NOEL; NATIONAL
BREWERY & ALLIED INDUSTRIES LABOR UNION OF THE PHILIPPINES (NABAILUP-PAFLU); JOHN DE
CATILLO and CIPRIANO CID, respondents.
C. Magat & Associates for petitioner.
Cipriano Cid & Associates and Ponce Enrile, S. Reyna, Montecillo & Belo for respondents.

CONCEPCION, C.J.:
Appeal by petitioner Francisco Salunga from a resolution of the Court of Industrial Relations, sitting en banc,
dismissing unfair labor practice charges against the National Brewery and Allied Industries Labor Union of the
Philippines (PAFLU) hereinafter referred to as the Union John de Castillo, Cipriano Cid, San Miguel
Brewery, Inc. hereinafter referred to as the Company and Miguel Noel.
Petitioner had, since 1948, been an employee of the Company, which, on October 2, 1959, entered with the
Union, of which respondent John de Castillo is the president, into a collective bargaining agreement, effective
up to June 30, 1962. Section 3 thereof reads:
The company agrees to require as a condition of employment of those workers covered by this
agreement who either are members of the UNION on the date of the signing of this agreement, or
may join the UNION during the effectivity of this agreement, that they shall not voluntarily resign
from the UNION earlier than thirty (30) days before the expiry date of this agreement as provided
in Article XIII hereof, provided, however, that nothing herein contained shall be construed to require
the company to enforce any sanction whatsoever against any employee or worker who fails to
retain his membership in the UNION as hereinbefore stated, for any cause other than voluntary
resignation or non-payment of regular union dues on the part of said employee or worker. (Exh. 4A-Union.) .
Petitioner was a member of the Union since 1953. For reasons later to be stated, on August 18, 1961, he
tendered his resignation from the Union, which accepted it on August 26, 1961, and transmitted it to the
Company on August 29, 1961, with a request for the immediate implementation of said section 3. The
Company having informed him that his aforementioned resignation would result in the termination of his
employment, in view of said section, petitioner wrote to the Union, on August 31, 1961, a letter withdrawing or
revoking his resignation and advising the Union to continue deducting his monthly union dues. He, moreover,
furnished a copy of this communication to the Company. The latter, in turn, notified the Union of the receipt of
said copy and that "in view thereof, we shall not take any action on this case and shall consider Mr. Francisco
Salunga still a member of your union and continue deducting his union dues." On September 8, 1961, the
Union told the Company that petitioner's membership could not be reinstated and insisted on his separation

from the service, conformably with the stipulation above-quoted. The Company replied, on September 12,
1961, stating:
. . . We asked Mr. Salunga if he realized that by resigning from the Union he would in effect be
forfeiting his position in the company. When he answered in the negative, we showed him a copy
of our Collective Bargaining Agreement and called his attention to Sec. 3, Art. II thereof. He then
told us that he did not realize that he would be losing his job if he were to resign from the Union.
We did not at any time ask or urge him to withdraw his resignation; neither are we now asking or
insisting that you readmit him into your membership. We thought that informing him of the
consequences of his resignation from the Union, was the only humane thing to do under the
circumstances.
Nevertheless, if notwithstanding our foregoing clarification you still consider him as having actually
resigned from your organization, and you insist that we dismiss him from the service in accordance
with Sec. 3, Article II of our agreement, we will have no alternative but to do so. (Exh. E)
In a letter to the Company, dated September 20, 1961, the Union reiterated its request for implementation of
said section 3, for which reason, on September 22, 1961, the Company notified petitioner that, in view of said
letter and the aforementioned section, "we regret we have to terminate your employment for cause. You are,
therefore, hereby notified of your dismissal from the service effective as of the close of business hours,
September 30, 1961."
Meanwhile, petitioner had sought the intervention of PAFLU's National President, respondent Cipriano Cid, to
which the Union was affiliated, for a review of the latter's action. The PAFLU gave due course to petitioner's
request for review and asked the Company, on September 29, 1961, to defer his dismissal, for at least two (2)
weeks, so that its (PAFLU's) Executive Board could act on his appeal. On October 6, 1961, respondent Cid
advised petitioner that the PAFLU had found no ground to review the action taken by the Union and that, on
the expiration of the 15-day grace granted to him by the Company, the decision thereof to terminate his
services would take effect.
Thereupon, or on October 11, 1961, petitioner notified the PAFLU that he was appealing to its supreme
authority the PAFLU National Convention and requested that action on his case be deferred until such
time as the Convention shall have acted on his appeal. A letter of the same date and tenor was sent, also, by
the petitioner to the Union. Furthermore, he asked the Company to maintain the status quo, in the meantime.
This notwithstanding, at the close of the business hours, on October 15, 1961, petitioner was discharged from
the employment of the Company, through its assistant-secretary and vice-president, herein respondent Miguel
Noel.
At petitioner's behest, on or about December 7, 1961, a prosecutor of the Court of Industrial Relations
commenced, therefore, the present proceedings, for unfair labor practice, against the Union, its president,
respondent John de Castillo, respondent Cipriano Cid, as PAFLU president, the Company, and its
aforementioned Vice-President Miguel Noel. In due course, thereafter, the trial Judge rendered a decision the
dispositive part of which reads:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the San Miguel Brewery, Inc. and Miguel Noel and National
Brewery & Allied Industrial Labor Union of the Philippines (PAFLU), John de Castillo, and Cipriano
Cid, are hereby declared guilty of unfair labor practices as charged, and ordered to cease and
desist from further committing such unfair labor practice acts complained of; and as affirmative
reliefs:
(a) The National Brewery & Allied Industries Labor Union of the Philippines (PAFLU), John de
Castillo and Cipriano Cid, their officers and agents, are hereby directed to readmit and to continue

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the membership of Francisco Salunga in the membership rolls of the union after paying all union
dues, with all the rights and privileges being enjoyed by bonafide members;
(b) The San Miguel Brewery, Inc., and Miguel Noel, their officers and agents are hereby directed to
immediately reinstate Francisco Salunga to his former or substantially equivalent position with onehalf back wages, without prejudice, however, to his seniority and/or other rights and privileges; and
(c) Respondents Union and Company, their respective officers and agents, are likewise directed to
post two copies of this decision in conspicuous places in their respective offices or plants for a
period of one month, furnishing this Court with certificate of compliance after the expiration of said
period.
On motion for reconsideration of the respondents, this decision was reversed by the Court of Industrial
Relations sitting en banc with two (2) judges concurring in the result and the trial judge dissenting which
dismissed the case. Hence, this appeal by the petitioner.
The appeal is well taken, for, although petitioner had resigned from the Union and the latter had accepted the
resignation, the former had, soon later upon learning that his withdrawal from the Union would result in his
separation from the Company, owing to the closed-shop provision above referred to revoked or withdrawn
said resignation, and the Union refused to consent thereto without any just cause therefor. The Union had not
only acted arbitrarily in not allowing petitioner to continue his membership. The trial Judge found said refusal
of the Union officers to be due to his critical attitude towards certain measures taken or sanctioned by them.
As set forth in the decision of the trial Judge:
. . . Prior to August, 1961, he had been criticizing and objecting to what he believed were illegal or
irregular disbursements of union funds, i.e., allowing Florencio Tirad, a union official, to receive six
months advanced salaries when Tirad went to the United States, which objection he openly
manifested in a meeting of the board of directors and stewards, but instead of receiving favorable
response, he (Salunga) was twitted and felt insulted by the laughter of those present that he would
be the next man to be sent to America; second, granting Ricardo Garcia, union secretary, two
months advanced salaries when preparing for the bar examinations, which objection he broached
to union officer Efren Meneses; third, the union's additional monthly expense for the salary of a
counsel when the PAFLU, their mother union is well staffed with a number of lawyers who could
attend to and handle their cases and other legal matters, and to which mother union the
NABAILUP has been paying a monthly assessment of more than P1,000.00; and fourth, giving
salary to Charles Mitschek who was dismissed by the company but denying the same privilege to
other similarly situated member-employees. Salunga was later removed by the union from his
position as steward without his knowledge. It also appears that the power of attorney executed in
his favor by co-worker Alejandro Miranda for the collection of Miranda's indebtedness of P60.00 to
him (the latter has certain amount in possession of the Union) was not honored by the
union.1awphl.nt
xxx

xxx

xxx

The record is clear that feeling dejected by the inaction of the union officials on his grievances and
objections to what he believed were illegal disbursements of union funds, coupled with the fact that
he was later removed from his position as a union steward without his knowledge, as well as the
fact that the union did not honor the power of attorney executed in his favor by Alejandro Miranda,
a co-worker, for the collection of Miranda's indebtedness of P60.00 to him, he submitted his letter
of resignation from the union on August 18, 1961. It must be stated here that no evidence was
adduced by the respondent union to overcome complainant's testimonies about his objections to

the disbursements of union funds but only tried to elicit from him, on cross examination, that the
funds of the union are only disbursed upon authority of the Executive Board of the union. . . .
It should be noted that the Court of Industrial Relations en banc did not reverse these findings of fact or even
question the accuracy thereof. What is more, the officers of the Union have, in effect, confirmed the fact that
their refusal to allow the withdrawal of petitioner's resignation had been due to his aforementioned criticisms.
Indeed said officers tried to justify themselves by characterizing said criticisms as acts of disloyalty to the
Union, which, of course, is not true, not only because the criticism assailed, not the Union, but certain acts of
its officers, and, indirectly, the officers themselves, but also because the constitution and by-laws of the Union
explicitly recognize the right of its members to give their views on "all transactions made by the Union." As a
consequence, the resolution appealed from cannot be affirmed without, in effect, nullifying said right which,
independently of the constitution and by-laws of the Union, is part and parcel of the freedom of speech
guaranteed in the Constitution of our Republic, as a condition sine qua non to the sound growth and
development of labor organizations and democratic institutions.
Although, generally, a state may not compel ordinary voluntary associations to admit thereto any given
individual, because membership therein may be accorded or withheld as a matter of privilege, 1 the rule is
qualified in respect of labor unions holding a monopoly in the supply of labor, either in a given locality, or as
regards a particular employer with which it has a closed-shop agreement. 2 The reason is that
. . . The closed shop and the union shop cause the admission requirements of trade union to
becomeaffected with the public interest. Likewise, a closed shop, a union shop, or maintenance of
membership clauses cause the administration of discipline by unions to be affected with the public
interest.3
Consequently, it is well settled that such unions are not entitled to arbitrarily exclude qualified applicants for
membership, and a closed-shop provision would not justify the employer in discharging, or a union in insisting
upon the discharge of, an employee whom the union thus refuses to admit to membership, without any
reasonable ground therefor.4 Needless to say, if said unions may be compelled to admit new members, who
have the requisite qualifications, with more reason may the law and the courts exercise the coercive power
when the employee involved is a long standing union member, who, owing to provocations of union officers,
was impelled to tender his resignation, which he forthwith withdrew or revoked. Surely, he may, at least, invoke
the rights of those who seek admission for the first time, and can not arbitrarily he denied readmission.
We cannot agree, however, with the finding of the trial Judge to the effect that the Company was guilty of
unfair labor practice. The Company was reluctant if not unwilling to discharge the petitioner. When the
Union first informed the Company of petitioner's resignation and urged implementation of section 3 of the
bargaining contract, the Company advised petitioner of the provision thereof, thereby intimating that he had to
withdraw his resignation in order to keep his employment. Besides, the Company notified the Union that it (the
Company) would not take any action on the case and would consider the petitioner, "still a member" of the
Union. When the latter, thereafter, insisted on petitioner's discharge, the Company still demurred and
explained it was not taking sides and that its stand was prompted merely by "humane" considerations,
springing from the belief that petitioner had resigned from the Union without realizing its effect upon his
employment. And, as the Union reiterated its demand, the Company notified petitioner that it had no other
alternative but to terminate his employment, and dismissed him from the service, although with "regret".
Under these circumstances, the Company was not "unfair" to the petitioner. On the contrary, it did not merely
show a commendable understanding of and sympathy for his plight. It even tried to help him, although to such
extent only as was consistent with its obligation to refrain from interfering in purely internal affairs of the Union.
At the same time, the Company could not safely inquire into the motives of the Union officers, in refusing to
allow the petitioner to withdraw his resignation. Inasmuch as the true motives were not manifest, without such
inquiry, and petitioner had concededly tendered his resignation of his own free will, the arbitrary nature of the
decision of said officers was not such as to be apparent and to justify the company in regarding said decision

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unreasonable. Upon the other hand, the Company can not be blamed for assuming the contrary, for petitioner
had appealed to the National Officers of the PAFLU and the latter had sustained the Union. The Company was
justified in presuming that the PAFLU had inquired into all relevant circumstances, including the motives of the
Union Officers.
In finding, this notwithstanding, that the Company is guilty of unfair labor practice, the trial Judge seemed to
have been unduly influenced by the fact that the former had dismissed the petitioner despite his announced
intention to appeal from the decision of the Union and that of the Officers of PAFLU to its "Supreme authority",
namely, the PAFLU's "National Convention". In other words, said Judge felt that the Company should have
waited for the action of the national convention before issuing the notice of dismissal.
There is no evidence, however, that petitioner had really brought this matter to said "Convention". Much less is
there any proof that the latter had sustained him and reversed the PAFLU officers and the Union. Thus, the
record does not show that petitioner was prejudiced by the Company's failure to maintain the status quo, after
the Union had been sustained by said officers. In fact, petitioner did not even try to establish that he had
submitted to the Company as he has not introduced in the lower court satisfactory proof that an appeal
had really been taken by him to the aforementioned Convention. In short, it was error to hold the Company
guilty of unfair labor practice.
Just the same, having been denied readmission into the Union and having been dismissed from the service
owing to an unfair labor practice on the part of the Union, petitioner is entitled to reinstatement as member of
the Union and to his former or substantially equivalent position in the Company, without prejudice to his
seniority and/or rights and privileges, and with back pay, which back pay shall be borne exclusively by the
Union. In the exercise of its sound judgment and discretion, the lower court may, however, take such
measures as it may deem best, including the power to authorize the Company to make deductions, for
petitioner's benefit, from the sums due to the Union, by way of check off or otherwise, with a view to executing
this decision, and, at the same time, effectuating the purposes of the Industrial Peace Act.
With this modification, the aforementioned decision of the trial Judge is hereby affirmed in all other respects,
and the appealed resolution of the Court of Industrial Relations en banc is reversed, with costs against
respondents, except the Company.
Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, Angeles and Fernando, JJ., concur.
Bengzon, J.P., J., is on leave.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-24993

December 18, 1968

UNITED RESTAUROR'S EMPLOYEES & LABOR UNION-PAFLU, petitioner,

vs.
HON. GUILLERMO E. TORRES, as Presiding Judge of Branch VIII, Court of First Instance of Rizal, 7th
Judicial District, and the DELTA DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondents.
Leonardo C. Fernandez for petitioner.
Ponce Enrile Siguion Reyna, Montecillo and Belo for respondent Delta Development Corporation.

SANCHEZ, J.:
Certiorari to annul the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the Court of First Instance of Rizal ordering
United Restauror's Employees & Labor Union-PAFLU (Union, for short), its attorneys, representatives, agents
and any person assisting it to "REFRAIN from picketing on the property of plaintiff Delta Development
Corporation within the Makati Commercial Center."
The case arose from a verified complaint for injunction with prayer for preliminary injunction filed by Delta
Development Corporation (Delta), against the Union on January 16, 1965. 1 It is there averred that: Delta is the
owner of the Makati Commercial Center situated at Makati, Rizal. It is in the business of leasing portions
thereof. The center has its own thoroughfares, pedestrian lanes, parking areas for the benefit of customers
and clients of its lessees. On the other hand, the Union is an association of some employees of Sulo
Restaurant, a lessee of Delta. On January 8, 1965, the Union sought permission from Delta to conduct
picketing activities "on the private property of plaintiff surrounding Sulo Restaurant." On January 11, Delta
denied the request because it "may be held liable for any incident that may happen in the picket lines, since
the picketing would be conducted on the private property owned by plaintiff." Despite the denial, the Union
picketed on Delta's property surrounding Sulo Restaurant on January 16 and continued to conduct said
activity. Such act of the Union is violative of the property rights of, and would cause great and irreparable injury
to, Delta. No employer-employee relationship exists between Delta and the Union members. Delta then
prayed that a writ of preliminary injunction issue and that, after hearing, such injunction be made permanent.
As aforesaid, respondent judge issued a writ of preliminary injunction. The Union's move to reconsider was
denied on January 26, 1965.
On January 19, 1965, the Union filed a motion to dismiss on the ground, inter alia, that the court had no
jurisdiction to try the case.
Without awaiting resolution of its motion to dismiss the Union commenced in this Court the present original
petition for certiorari on September 18, 1965, claiming that respondent judge acted without or in excess of his
jurisdiction in issuing the injunctive writ "as no restraining order could be validly issued against the right to
picket as part of freedom of speech"; that respondent judge issued the questioned writ "without the benefit of a
previous hearing"; that it was issued in violation of Section 9(d) of Republic Act 875; that jurisdiction over the
case rests with the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) "for the same involves acts of unfair labor practice under
Sec. 4(a) of Republic Act 875 in connection with Sec. 5(a) thereof"; and that there is no appeal nor any plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
On September 29, 1965, this Court issued a writ of preliminary injunction upon the Union's P1,000.00-bond.
On October 12, 1965, Delta answered. It alleged, amongst others, that respondent judge validly issued the
injunctive writ in question because the same "never enjoined petitioner from picketing against the Sulo-D & E,
Inc. but only from doing their picketing on the private property of respondent who is not in any way privy to the
relationship between Sulo-D & E, Inc. and petitioner"; that Republic Act 875 is not applicable to the case
involving as it does an action to protect Delta's property rights; that it has no labor relation or dispute of any
kind with the Union; and that the injunctive writ was issued after due hearing on January 19, 1965. Delta asked
that the present petition be denied.
After the submission of the parties' memoranda in lieu of oral argument, Delta moved to dismiss the
proceeding at bar on the ground that it has become moot and academic. It averred that the Union lost in the
consent election conducted by the Department of Labor on October 4, 1965 in CIR Cases 1455-MC and 1464MC, and thereby also lost its right to picket; and that in said election cases, a rival union Sulo Employees
Labor Union (SELU, for short) was certified by CIR as the exclusive bargaining representative of all the
employees of Sulo Restaurant pursuant to CIR's order of December 23, 1965.

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The Union opposed. It argued that the picketing was conducted on or about January 16, 1965, that is, around
8 months before the consent election on October 4, 1965; and that the issues that triggered the Union's labor
strike of January 16, 1965 are entirely distinct and foreign to the issues in Cases 1455-MC and 1464-MC.

the labor union that was eventually certified are hidebound to the results thereof. Logic is with this view. By
their very act of participating in the election, they are deemed to have acquiesced to whatever is the
consequence of the election. As to those who did not participate in the election, the accepted theory is that
they "are presumed to assent to the expressed will of the majority of those voting." 6

The petition must be dismissed. Really, the case before us has become moot and academic.
When the Union struck and picketed on January 16, 1965, it might have been true that the Union commanded
a majority of Sulo's employees. Without need of certification, it could, under such circumstances, conclude a
collective bargaining agreement with Sulo. 2 But it is not disputed that on October 4, 1965, i.e., shortly after this
case was filed on September 18, 1965, a consent election was held. Not controverted, too, is the fact that, in
that consent election, SELU defeated the Union, petitioner herein. Because of this, SELU was certified to the
Sulo management as the "collective bargaining representative of the employees ... for collective bargaining
purposes as regards wages, hours of work, rates of pay and/or such other terms and conditions of
employment allowed them by law."3
The consent election, it should be noted, was ordered by CIR pursuant to the Union's petition for direct
certification docketed as Case 1455-MC and a similar petition for certification filed by SELU docketed as Case
1464-MC. Verily, the Union can no longer demand collective bargaining. For, it became the minority union. As
matters stand, said right properly belongs to SELU, which commands the majority. By law, the right to be the
exclusive representative of all the employees in an appropriate collective bargaining unit is vested in the labor
union "designated or selected" for such purpose "by the majority of the employees" in the unit
concerned.4 SELU has the right as well as the obligation to hear, voice out and seek remedies for the
grievances of all Sulo employees, including employees who are members of petitioner Union, regarding the
"rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employment."

Adherence to the methods laid down by statute for the settlement of industrial strife is one way of achieving
industrial peace; one such method is certification election. 7 It is the intent and purpose of the law that this
procedure, when adopted and availed of by parties to labor controversies, should end industrial disputes, not
continue them.8 Pertinent is the following observation to which we fully concur: "Before an election is held by
the Board9 to determine which of two rival unions represents a majority of the employees, one of the unions
may call a strike and demand that the employer bargain with it. A labor dispute will then exist. Nothing in the
statute makes it illegal for a minority to strike and thereby seek to obtain sufficient strength so as to become
the sole bargaining agent. But after the Board certifies the bargaining representative, a strike by a minority
union to compel an employer to bargain with it is unlawful. No labor dispute can exist between a minority
union and an employer in such a case."10
Upon the law then, the Union's right to strike and consequently to picket ceased by its defeat in the consent
election. That election occurred during the pendency before this Court of this original petition for certiorari
lodged by the Union the thrust of which is to challenge the power of the Court of First Instance to enjoin its
picketing activities. The Union may not continue to picket. The object of the case before us is lost.
WE, ACCORDINGLY, vote to dismiss the petition for certiorari as moot and academic, and to dissolve the writ
of preliminary injunction we heretofore issued herein, for being functus oficio.
No costs. So ordered.

Indeed, petitioner Union's concerted activities designed to be recognized as the exclusive bargaining agent of
Sulo employees must come to a halt. 5 Collective bargaining cannot be the appropriate objective of petitioning
Union's continuation of their concerted activities. The record before us does not reveal any other legitimate
purpose. To allow said Union to continue picketing for the purpose of drawing the employer to the collective
bargaining table would obviously be to disregard the results of the consent election. To further permit the
Union's picketing activities would be to flaunt at the will of the majority.
The outcome of a consent election cannot be rendered meaningless by a minority group of employees who
had themselves invoked the procedure to settle the dispute. Those who voted in the consent election against

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro and Capistrano, JJ., concur.
Fernando, J., concurs in the, result.