Melvin Hurst

Dr. Symonds
Senior Seminar in European History
Term Paper
Drag Me to Hell: The Expeditious Deterioration of Britain and Germanys Relationship
Part I
Britain and Germany. Two states whose fates have been intertwined throughout history,
culminating into a swift march to a precipice breached within the volatility of a 20th century rife
with internal and external conflict for both. World War I was certainly close to the beginning of
the volatile phase of the relationship between the two nations, but it was certainly not the
establishment of the relationship as a whole. Contrarily, it was instead merely the inception of a
new chapter in the enduring saga of British-German relations. The chasm that evolved between
the two states within this new chapter was indicative of the clashing visions intended for the
increasing modernity of Europe. The simplest way to understand this rift between two
historically entwined nations is to first understand the volatile global landscape that preordained
this almost fantastical break-up. To tear apart these naturally enmeshed nations, an improbable
set of circumstances would have to arise, and from those anomalous conditions, Britain and
Germany, nay, Europe, grander still, the world, would be irrevocably altered.
As David Burg and Edward Purcell argue, this new Germany founded only a generation
earlier wished to earn the historical European powers (Britain included) respect, to become a key
player in global international relations, and to assure its enduring national security by securing its
empire within Old Europe (1). For Britain, their vision centered around the perpetuation of the
Old Europe as Britain had been dominant throughout the 19th century and still possessed

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tremendous power both within Europe and overseas within their still potent empire (Burg,
Purcell 1-2). This proved to be an unbreachable chasm for the two states as new and old
philosophies regarding the European state of affairs led to the beginning of this rift that would
span two world wars. But to argue that this was merely the consequence of a clash in converse
ideologies would be to oversimplify a conflict that was wrought for a multiplicity of reasons.
The inception of the war itself however, was a singular event, the assassination of Franz
Ferdinand, Archduke of the Austro-Hungarian Empire by a Serbian nationalist (Manchester).
This solitary act of violence put into motion a series of events, which would shortly lead to
World War I. These cleavages within Europe, between Old and New had led to commitments
being made over the 19th century over whom would support whom when a conflict did arise
within the continent (Manchester). With these declarations made, nations were faced with an
untenable situation as their previous commitments caused them to take sides when Austria
attacked Serbia shortly thereafter the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand (Manchester). This
caused Russia, bound by their commitment to Serbia, to mobilize their armies against Austria;
which in turn caused Austrias ally, Germany, to declare war on Russia (Manchester). France,
contrarily, was bound by treaty to Russia (and still smarting over their defeat in the FrancoPrussian War), and thus declared war on Germany (Manchester). On August 4th, 1914, Great
Britain, bound not by treaty, but by their alliance with France as well as their concern for
Belgium, declared war on Germany (Manchester).
Shortly thereafter, the Japanese followed Britains suit and declared war against
Germany, and eventually the Italians and Americans would become entangled in this quickly allencompassing conflict. But Britain and Germany as foes was particularly striking. Their histories
had been intertwined in a sense, their fates leading up to and culminating with World War I

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strikingly divergent. But, this divergence was inevitable in that the German Empires creation in
1871 posed a direct threat to Europes status quo, a status quo that greatly benefited Britains
interests. In 1871, after successful wars against France, Austria, and Denmark, the previously
fractious German states became united under Prussian leadership due largely to self-preservation
and military obligation (Lerman 20-21). This revolution from above based on military
conquest face many questions as to how this new Germany would function within Europe, and
what would become of German Identity (Lerman 20-21). Katharine Lerman argues that the
creation of the German Empire in 1871 began the rapid materialization of a distinctive German
national identity within the context of empire (21). This new Germany made quick decisions as
to who would be included and excluded within the new empire: Germany severed ties with
Austrian Germans living in the Hapsburg Empire while Polish citizens living within Eastern
Prussian Provinces as well as inhabitants of two conquered French territories, Alsace and
Lorraine, became subjects of the Germany Empire, an oddly cobbled together bunch to be sure
(Lerman 21-22).
Otto Von Bismarck became the face of this German unification in the empires inception
as he became chancellor of the German Empire in 1871, later known as founder of the Reich
(Lerman 22-24). Bismarcks empire yielded a great deal of power from its establishment, after
years of traditionally being bullied by Europes established hierarchy, the German Empire was
second only to Britain in industrial development, boldly beginning as a semi-hegemony and
seen as a threat to the aforementioned status quo of traditional hierarchy (Lerman 23-24). In its
inception, Von Bismarck promised a Germany that was not a threat to Greater Europes peace
and tranquility; however by 1890, German foreign policy had taken a far more expansionist
idealism (Lerman 24). None of the great powers intervened to stop the creation of the German

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Empire however, because the empire had been wrought out of the Franco-Prussian War, a war
which each great power had its own reasons for staying out of. Britains reasoning for avoiding
the conflict was Bismarcks publishing of Napoleon IIIs plans to occupy Belgium, a distasteful
notion to the British (Lerman 24). Furthermore, Britain considered the possibility of the creation
the unified German state to be a boon for the British, in that a second-tier state could help
counterbalance the Continental dominance of France and Austria (Lerman 24-25). The soon to be
prince of the German Empire was even married to eldest daughter of Queen Victoria, all but
assuring a peaceful and prosperous relationship between the two nations (Lerman 24).
However, Britains assumptions soon turned out to be fallacious, as Germany quickly
grew out of the little brother role that the Crown had envisioned for it. But it is easy to
understand how Britain could come to such a self-serving conclusion as to what role Germany
would have in the start of the 20th century. Their empire was vast, and the population of Great
Britain was growing and diversifying rapidly, giving a cosmopolitan feel to many of the nations
urban centers (Simmonds 7-8). The national standard of living was rising yearly, and the
Edwardian class structure was eroding as Britain became more and more economically
heterogeneous (Simmonds 7). As Britain began to see this newly empowered Germany however,
they were fearful, as Germany was becoming immeasurably more powerful than France,
particularly in regards to military strength (Bond 2-3). Furthermore, Britains eastern ally Russia,
whom they had figured would keep Germany in check if they did ever outgrow their presumed
little brother role, had been torn apart by revolution in 1905 (Bond 3). However, Britain did
have treaties with France, Japan, and newly revolutionized Russia, and there was some security
in that, and as late as July 29th, King George V was informed that British involvement in the war
was seen as unlikely, as a limited advance of Germany through southern Belgium would not

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necessarily be a precursor to war (Bond 3-4). But this possibility of peace was short-lived as the
British viewed Germanys demand of unimpeded passage through all of Belgium on August 3rd
as a hostile action, and on August 4th, war was declared against Germany (Bond 4). It is
important to note however, that Britain was already facing calls for action against Germany, and
the idea of a German-controlled Belgium and France terrified them, and thus in hindsight seems
relatively unlikely that Britain would have been able to or would have wanted to stay out of a
conflict with would have such a great effect on the framework of 20th century Europe (Bond 4-5).
As August began, many Brits saw the war as necessary, although they may not have
embraced it as heartily as some historical accounts suggest (Simmonds 35-36). This sense of
inevitability of the British citizenry helped state decision-making shortly thereafter as July 31st
saw the London Stock Market implode as the British government was forced to close the markets
in order to prevent total collapse (Simmonds 36-37). This collapse coupled with Germanys
growing demands, led to war as an inevitable machination of the state as the growing
international crisis had finally hit home for Britain. Fear of national food shortage and rampant
unemployment followed the war declaration, as Britain sought to prevent any international food
supplies from reaching German ports, going so far as to compel all British ships carrying food to
enemy countries to unload their cargo at British ports regardless of where shipments had
originated from (Simmonds 36-41). That declaration, made August 12th, set into motion the
British attempt to starve the German populace out of war, most of whom had nothing to do
directly with the war, a morally ambiguous act to be sure (Simmonds 39-40).
This was indeed a far cry from the Britain of the last two hundred years, as the monarch
of the British state had been German since 1714 (when George I was installed as King) (The
British Monarchy). In fact, the first member of this royal line not to speak English with a

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German accent was George V, who acceded to the throne in 1910, shortly prior to war breaking
out against his ancestors homeland (The British Monarchy). Of the House of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha
(based on his German monarchical lineage), George V took the drastic measure of changing his
familys name to Windsor in 1917 due to widespread anti-German sentiment among the citizenry
(The British Monarchy). Ironically, besides George V who changed the name, only one British
monarch ruled under the House of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha, Edward VII, with the rest of the German
rulers presiding over the House of Hanover from the aforementioned 1714 to 1901, until Edward
VII ascended to the throne due to his marriage to Queen Victoria of the House of Hanover,
himself being of the House of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha (The British Monarchy). Of course, ones
lineage does not necessarily affect ones decisions during war; the American Revolution is
certainly testament to that. But the voracity of the British state to disavow their inherent German
ancestry coupled with the unbridled hatred of Germans by the British commoners seems
disconnected from the affronts that Germany had actually committed against Britain.
Britain was initially flummoxed as to how to portray the war to its people in 1914, as the
use of propaganda was a largely foreign concept to the liberal British state (Simmonds 227-228).
However, Britains leaders were soon presented with the opportunity to define the war in a way
that made themselves look like pacifists and the Germans look like conniving expansionists bent
on world domination (Simmonds 227-228). This opportunity came in the form of Germany
marching on Belgium in late August, as early British attempts to define the war had come in the
form of attempting to evoke the nationalistic ideals of patriotism and duty within its citizenry
(Simmonds 228-231). These early endeavors were noble, yet undefined gesticulations;
conversely the invasion of Belgium gave Britain a very specific purpose for having involved
itself in the war; as Alan G.V. Simmonds writes, Britain was simply a peace-loving nation

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stirred to action by threat of brute force and to protect her national honor. At least that was the
tagline the British government could now claim as reasoning for their entry into the increasingly
murky bowels of war. From there, overwhelming national support of the war was all but assured
as many British intellectuals came out in favor the war shortly thereafter, the most notable
exception being George Bernard Shaw who voiced his concerns in a pamphlet entitled Common
Sense About War, published in November of 1914 (Simmonds 228). The Church endured its own
ethical struggle with the conflict, as the Church of Englands official view was one of
ambivalence, as the Church struggled with idea of killing of other Christians, but also with the
idea of being seen as un-loyal to the state (Simmonds 229-230). Some ministers faced no such
ethical quandary however, and actively recruited from the pulpit, although it is unclear how
successful they actually were in their war-mongering homilies, even with a large churchgoing
populace within Britain (around 90%) (Simmonds 229-230).
As effectual or ineffectual as Church leaders and British intellectuals thoughts on the war
were their writings and words were largely informal and sought to appeal to audiences who saw
them as figureheads, intellectuals, and leaders individually (one could argue that the church
could have made the case for collective action, but their official ambivalence prevented them
from having a more substantiated effect on war propaganda). Conversely, the British government
sought to formalize propaganda through the War Office (Simmonds 230). Refined by the Caxton
Advertising Agency, early British propaganda ranged from What the Army Offers, to the more
appeal of Your King and Country Need You (Simmonds 230). The war seemingly became less
about volunteering for ones self-interest but instead for King and Country against an inherently
vile foe in Germany. Thus emerged the Parliamentary Recruiting Committee, whose recruiting
devolved into evermore base emotions-one should feel shame if he isnt serving his country

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during the war (Simmonds 230-231). Posters depicting mothers compelling their sons to war,
blaring GO ITS YOUR DUTY LAD, or even questioning the manliness of those not serving
in the war, If he does not think that you and your country are worth fighting for-do you think he
is worthy of you? were common throughout Britain (Simmonds 231). These debased attempts
to humiliate men into service portrayed the lengths at which Britain would go to impel service;
however, the enemy was certainly not spared from these delightful soliloquies on ideal human
action; Germans were portrayed as beastly Huns who were devoid of humanity and relegated
to infinitely lower intellectual stature than the nation of Shakespeare (Simmonds 234-235).
The irony of course being that many British citizens, including the King, had this impure,
subhuman German blood pumping through their veins at the same time they were devising and
verbalizing this hateful, racist rhetoric. This depiction of what was German by the British
government however was merely the opening salvo in what would be a cultural assault on the
German as an individual and a state.
As the war raged, abhorrence for anything that could be defined as German within
Britain became commonplace as the populace became rabidly nationalistic (Storer 35-36).
Dachshunds were stoned in the streets, German music was banned, and German butchers,
waiters, and brokers lost their jobs in ignominious spectacle (Storer 36). Violence against
German civilians within Britain and even British citizens with supposed German sympathies
became accepted as tales became more and more gruesome (Storer 36). A member of George Vs
cabinet, R.B.S. Haldane lost his cabinet post and was regarded as traitorous within Britain for the
rest of his life for supposedly being a good friend to Wilhelm II and being a student of German
philosophy (Storer 36). Furthermore, British personalities who spoke out against the war or this
seemingly irrational hatred of Germany were met with disdain, distrust, and occasionally prison

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time (Storer 36-37). Ironically, this revulsion of Germany did not extend to the battlefield, as
British soldiers generally had a high regard for the Germans and that they rarely felt a high
degree of personal hostility towards them according to Richard Holmes (Storer 37). They even
viewed sensationalist newspaper stories about German atrocities committed against civilians as
ridiculous and likely invented by Belgian and French civilians to garner sympathy (Storer
37). This disparity between soldiers and citizens feelings about Germany during the war
demonstrate the inherent absurdity of Britains domestic loathing of anything possibly definable
as German, however, this was of no consolation to those being cruelly affected by the actions
of a fanatical citizenry bent on unrepentant cultural genocide within their borders.
As mentioned previously, in 1917, George V changed his familys name due to internal
and external pressure to distance himself from his German heritage (Carter XXI). Prior to his
familial disillusionment however, the King and Queen (Mary), had established an austere
existence within Buckingham Palace (Carter XXI-XXII). Living without heat, alcohol much
lighting, or the rich foods they had come accustomed to given their position, the nobility sought
to align themselves with the common people in a dark time for the conflict-laden nation (Carter
XXI-XXII). Going so far as to take a pledge of abstinence for the duration of the war, the King
seemingly was providing a chaste and frugal example to his subjects (Carter XXI). Their meager
lifestyle was so paltry that George was actually able to give $100,000 back in savings to the
treasury (Carter 381). Somewhat surprisingly however, his citizenry did not look upon the King
with reverence for actions, but instead further doubted his commitment to Britain in the war
(Carter XXI). At a dinner party in July at Buckingham Palace, Lady Maud Warrender (occasional
lady-in-waiting to the queen) let is slip that there were rumors going around London that the
Kings family name made the nobility be thought of as Pro-German (Carter XXI). These rumors

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greatly perturbed the King, as in March his cousin Nicolas II had been removed from his position
as Czar in Russia, and even asked (through the provincial government) if Nicholas could be
offered asylum in Britain, a request that greatly embarrassed the British (Carter XXI-XXIII).
Georges other cousin, Wilhelm II, the German emperor, unsurprisingly faced an even more
troubling tenure than George as his coalition crumbled as his chancellor resigned and Germany
headed towards a seemingly militaristic existence as the German generals began to take charge
of state decision-making, destroying what little autocratic rule the beleaguered nation may have
established under Wilhelms regime (Carter XXII). The three cousins wrote to and about each
other throughout their lives, and provided an enthralling ruling triangle which would reach its
apex of intrigue during World War I as Wilhelm was figuratively deposed by his generals,
Nicolas actually thrown out of power, and George, despite his best efforts ineffectual in a role
constrained by constitutional politics (Carter XXI-XXV).
During this volatile time in Europes history, George decided on the familial name change
to Windsor, a distinctly English-sounding name, which the Royal Family hoped would quash any
gossip about their supposed lack of patriotism (Carter XXIII). Funnily enough, when told about
his cousins name change, Emperor Wilhelm was quite bemused and made one of his only
recorded jokes in the history of his reign; certainly an indication of the intrinsic ridiculousness of
the entirely symbolic gesture to satisfy the masses (Carter XXIII-XXIV).
Furthering the charade of the largely futile gesture was the actual power that George held
in governance of Britain, which was none (Carter 381). Unlike Wilhelm and Nicholas, Georges
role as King of the Empire afforded him little to no say in the actual machinations of governance;
that is to say he was largely a figurehead, and in that sense his symbolic actions, although
possibly encouraging to his subjects, were just that, and of no real consequence to war efforts

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(Carter XXIV). He did seek a larger role, but was flatly rebuffed by the cabinet in December of
1916 (Carter 381-382). He even told his mother that he was quite ready to sacrifice himself in
order to win this war, a far cry from his subjects initial perfidious opinions of him as a monarch
of questionable lineage and loyalty (Carter XXI, 381-383).
His cousin and counterpart in Germany however was allowed a far greater role within
governance throughout the conflict, although it is arguable his power waned as his generals
became more and more domineering over state decisions as the war persisted (Carter XXII).
However, the authority exercised by Wilhelm as Emperor of the Reich within the context of
World War I is intriguing in that Wilhelm had a far more substantiated role within his state than
George did within Britain, and in that, his relationship with the enemy nation actually mattered
to the extent of affecting decisions made regarding Germanys relationship with Britain in ways a
largely ceremonial figure such as George could not. In the prelude to international discord, the
German emperor had a dialogue with the British, a dialogue which was irrevocably damaged
when Britain became wildly fearful of the acceleration of Germanys building of warships in
1909 (Seligmann 186-188). This acceleration played perfectly into this concern that Germany
was rapidly growing out of the little brother role earlier envisioned for it by Britain (Bond 23). The acceleration in fact was a fallacy (although there is some circumstantial evidence to
support an acceleration, historians have generally concluded no such plan existed); Germanys
ministers had tried to assure Britain that there was no such devious plotting at hand, but a
pervasive rumor led the Brits to believe that Germany sought to out-build the British Royal
Navy, at the time the largest and most powerful military force in the world (Seligmann 187-188).
This accusation by the British enraged Wilhelm, and his relationship with the British
government suffered heavily because of it (Seligmann 188-190). After a diplomatic kerfuffle

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with the British Naval attach to Germany, the new attach, Captain Hugh Watson, became the
unlucky sounding board for the emperors discontent with the British government as the last
meeting between the two in October of 1913 led to some rather pointed criticisms from Wilhelm
concerning British leaders; in fact, Watsons official letter to his superiors regarding the meeting
between him and Wilhelm had to be prudently edited as to not be seen as offensive to the nobility
(Seligmann 190-191). These displays of public contempt by Wilhelm for foreign leaders and the
press (particularly for Britain) were not uncommon, even taking opportunities at dinner parties to
voice his grievances to his attaches (Seligmann 190-193). The chancellor of Germany, Otto Von
Bismarck, even once remarked that Wilhelm II had an opinion about everything, but that it was
a different one every day (Afflerbach 195). He was thought of as someone whose convictions
blew in the wind, one day he would want to join Britain in attacking Russia, the next, the exact
opposite (Afflerbach 195-196).
This lack of inherent principle and numerous other character flaws led to the belief of his
perceived lack of authority over the war, as it seemed that the idea of Wilhelm having full control
over the Reich would have led to its untimely demise even quicker (Afflerbach 196-197). Even
the leading specialist on Wilhelm II, John Rohl, concedes that Wilhelm was nothing more than a
shadow emperor during World War I, although he contends he did have significant influence
on the whole history of Imperial Germany (Afflerbach 196-197). However, historian Holger
Afflerbach finds this troubling in the sense that he questions why this influence seemingly ended
during the war; and within that stream of consciousness, if Wilhelm even truly wanted the war,
which could possibly explain his lack of authority within it (197-198). It seems that like with
most matters concerning Wilhelm, the picture could be painted either way, Wilhelm as a peacelover or a warmonger (Afflerbach 198). However, Afflerbach concludes that Wilhelm did not

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want a great war among the European powers; he merely sought to improve Germanys
military stature within Europe (198-199). Indeed he did initially call fro Austria to treat Serbia
harshly; but when large-scale conflict seemingly became imminent, Wilhelm quickly changed his
sympathies and tried to prevent the war, earning him the title of Guillaume le timide by the
Post for his perceived love of peace (Afflerbach 200). Wilhelm was a man ready to
compromise; he declared the Serbian response to Austrias ultimatum sufficient and mused that
he never would have ordered mobilization against Serbia leading his inner circle to furthered
reflections on his seemingly anti-war disposition (Afflerbach 200-201).
All the while, Wilhelms role within the presumed, and soon finalized war was shrinking.
As war waged into the fall of 1914, Wilhelm fumed about not being kept in the loop about the
war, complaining to the head of his Naval Cabinet, which more or less perfectly encapsulates
Wilhelms rule during the war:
The general staff tells me nothing and does not even consult me. If people in
Germany imagine that I command the army, they are much mistaken. I drink tea
and chop wood and chop wood and like to go for walks, and from time to time I
find out what has been done, just as it pleases the gentlemen (Afflerbach 203).
So even in his own words, Wilhelms role was quite limited in scope, making him more or less a
prisoner within a fallaciously supreme position, much like his cousin George. One wonders if
these two had actually possessed hard power during the prelude to and throughout World War I
how different the world would have been, and if there would have even been a war between such
historically close nations as both had as much (if not more) reason to avoid conflict than to
engage in such a globally-altering, incomprehensibly violent power struggle. The subsequent war
forever changed and greatly damaged the two countries relationship as well as literally Germany

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as a community and a home for its citizens. As the war drew to a close, obvious irreparable
damage had been done; it was up to the European powers and America to rebuild both Europe
and Germany after such tragic events. How Britain in particular dealt with this challenge would
greatly affect the course of history, as World War II would present a Germany shaped almost
entirely by Allied action.
In the wake of the war, the Paris Peace Conference was convened for the victors to
impose the terms of unconditional surrender upon Germany. While Woodrow Wilson of the U.S.
drew up plans for his ultimately doomed League of Nations, British Prime Minister Lloyd
George had a far less noble purpose to Britains role in the negotiations: sizable reparations for
Britain in order to make Germany pay for the cost of the war to the empire (Lentin 21-22). In
the spring of 1919, French, American, British, Russian, and Italian leadership began to create a
sizable package to bestow upon Germany for their actions. By May, they presented their
demands, which were made into the Treaty of Versailles (Lentin 22). The treaty confiscated all of
Germanys overseas possessions, a tenth of German domestic territory and population, decimated
their armed forces to almost nothing, and most painfully, saddled Germany with a titanic debt
which would take at least a generation to pay off (Lentin 22). If that wasnt enough, the treaty
imposed clauses of shame, that is, clauses which court-martialed the ex-Kaiser for a supreme
offense against international morality and denounced Germany for complete liability based on
her aggression (Lentin 22). Germany found this reprehensible, but was in no position to
negotiate, and signed this treaty of shame in June 28th in Versailles (Lentin 22-23). Germanys
case was not helped on May 7th when they were offered a chance to review, but not negotiate the
terms of the treaty. Germanys representative, Count Ulrich von Brockdorff-Rantzau did his
country no favors as his defiant speech to the allies further inflamed tensions. As told by British

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Prime Minister Lloyd Georges secretary: At the start, everybody felt a little sympathy with the
Hun, but by the time Brockdorff-Rantzau had finished, most people were almost anxious to
recommence the war (Lentin 24). This lack of tact by Germany infuriated the allies, and
feelings that the new Germany was not so different from the old emerged; however, Count
Brockdorff-Rantzau and the first government of the Weimar Republic resigned six weeks after
the meeting with the allies due to their reservations regarding the treaty, as he described it as a
death sentence for Germany (Lentin 23-24). It was not just Germany who felt this way either;
Wyndham Lewis, a British intellectual who fought in World War I and was not particularly
sympathetic to Germany viewed the treaty as pernicious and felt that in its current form would
ensure another world war in the coming years (Storer 37-40). However, he did in later years view
Adolf Hitler and the Nazi Regime as the answer to preventing the coming war, this turning out to
be a less prescient prediction (Storer 39). Certainly, the treaty would weigh heavily on German
hearts and minds in the days, months, and years following its signing; however at the time no
one (save for Wyndham Lewis and few other perceptive souls) could appreciate what
repercussions the reparations would bring (Storer 37).
At the time, it was certainly a harsh condemnation of Germany; however, Britain wanted
the repercussions of the treaty for Germany to be short-lived at least economically, as Germany
had been Britains chief trading partner prior to the war (Lentin 24). In addition, Britain wanted
Germany to provide a political counter-weight to France; basically, Britain wanted things to
return to exactly how they had been prior to the last five years (Lentin 24). However, the war and
subsequently demanded reparations had fundamentally changed Germany and Europe, and much
to Britains chagrin, Germany couldnt simply go back to the way things were before. A new

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chapter in their relationship began, as the Weimar Republic and Great Britain sought to define
themselves and each other in this alien post-war world.
By the 1920s the democratic Weimar Republic began to be frequented by British visitors,
Berlin in particular becoming a desirable destination for tourism, as it developed into a vital
modern center of European culture, fascinating considering it was viewed as a largely
unremarkable city by British visitors prior to the war (Storer 84-85). This new wave of tourism
was in a sense a microcosm of this new relationship; after war, the two nations sought to once
again become comfortable with each other. However, this rekindled relationship could not
simply overlook their very recent caustic past. Certainly this idea of moving past the events of
World War I was a popularized notion within Europe (a la Germany had been rightfully
punished, now things should go back to normal), however, the treaty of Versailles challenged this
perception, as Britain took control of the Rhineland in Germany on December 1st, 1918 per the
treaty terms (Storer 58).
All of the Allied nations received a part of Germany as their personal territory/economic
supplement (quite simply, their spoils of war), and although other countries occupations of
German regions (namely France, who Britain fought with about treatment of German civilians in
Frances occupation zone) would yield much more controversy through the 1920s, it would be
naive to think that the British occupation did not put some strain on their renewed relationship
(Storer 58-62). However, the Weimar Republic was in crisis from its inception, as it based its
identity heavily on the idea of Berlin as Germany (a notion taken to heart by many British
tourists) (Ziemann 544-545, Storer 84-85). The Republic was an experiment as a overburdened
and abused democracy which was drowned in hyperinflation by 1923 and experienced an
ongoing economic depression endured an increasingly troubled existence throughout the 1920s

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until it ultimately fell to fascism as Hitler became Chancellor of Germany in 1933 and the
Weimar Republic met a swift end (Ziemann 543-545). His appointment marked the beginning of
yet another chapter in the enduring saga of Anglo-German relations. Far from the cosmopolitan
nature of the Weimar Republic, the Third Reich and its inherent militarism changed the nature of
the relationship; although there we no official policy changes, Germany was certainly not even
the same as it was during the Weimar era, and it was drastically disfigured from its pre-World
War I identity (Storer 173-178).
The nature of Germany and Britains relationship understandably became increasingly
dark, as World War II presented this grotesque and wholly unsympathetic Germany to the world,
a Germany that was certainly shaped by British (and other European Powers) actions within
World War I and the interwar period. The relationship was once again irrevocably altered, but
World War II would present a much more black and white existence than World War I as the
popularized notion that World War II was about fascism vs. democracy is still the standard for
U.S. history classes; however, it is natural to wonder to what extent World War I actions,
particularly the Treaty of Versailles, drove Germany down this path to fascism, being bent on
world domination, and ultimately becoming the principal villain in modern world history.
Britain and Germany. Two states whose fates have been intertwined throughout history, states
which would take two very divergent and divisive paths in the 20th century, and emerge in the 21st
as largely equals, the equilibrium of world affairs shifting drastically in the aftermath of World
War II. However, World War I is where this story of friendship, betrayal, reconciliation, and
renewed abhorrence begins, as the Anglo-German relationship reaches its apex of intrigue within
cultures beginning the 20th century as fundamentally homogenous friends.
Part II

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A new Germany within Europe was sure to cause problems on a continent operating on a
largely outdated framework based on empire and historical influence. As Germany sought to
expand its power within the current structure, conflict (although not necessarily militaristic in
scope), was ultimately inevitable. After the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand, Europe was
drawn into a sense of consternation, as what Austria would do in response to this assassination
by a Serbian radical held the answer to this imperative question. In two letters written by Sir
Edward Grey on July 20th, the British parliamentarian expressed a cautious optimism that
Austrian demands of Serbia would be reasonable enough as to not incite conflict, and noted the
possibility of Russia acting as mediator between the two nations (Grey 67-68). However, on July
23rd, that optimism had disappeared as Grey wrote that the Austrian demands would be long and
supposedly include an ultimatum; based on Austrias findings that Serbian governmental
officials were complicit in the assassination of the Archduke (Grey 121). However, Serbian
correspondence later that day indicated that all reasonable demands by Austria would be met,
providing a glimmer of hope on a quickly darkening state of affairs (Grey 87).
More fascinatingly, a day later, British communication with Germany indicated an
unwillingness to engage itself in what it called the Serbian quarrel, however, Grey noted that if
war was to occur, Britain might be drawn into it by development of other issues and that it
sought to prevent any more escalation by Austria, and offered the idea of Germany, France, and
Britain asking Austria and Russia to halt their advancements and give the great powers more
time to find a diplomatic end to the situation (Grey 112). This is particularly intriguing in that
Britain, two weeks before declaring war, considered itself an ally of Germany and was actively
seeking a solution to the conflict by pleading that the cooperation of Germany would be
essential to seeking a peaceful solution to the hostilities at hand (Grey 112). It is certainly

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indicative of their close relationship, and speaks to the idea of World War I being a war largely
based on the domino effect set off by the assassination of Franz Ferdinand, and not a truly
personalized war, at least on the warfront (Storer 37). Simply, it was a war of necessity and
commitment rather than mutual abhorrence or greater ideals (fascism vs. democracy,
communism vs. democracy, and authoritarianism vs. democracy as focal narratives), such as
World War II (and the Iraq War, Vietnam War, Civil War, and American Revolution from an
American perspective) could be argued as.
By July 25th, the situation had grown direr as Austria and Russia had continued their
advancement on Serbia, the only hope of peace resting on the idea of Germany, France, and
Britain banding together as noted on the 24th; however, Germany simultaneously avowed that
their sympathies lying with the Austria-Hungarians and in a letter on July 26th notes that there
had been demonstrations in front of the Austrian Embassy the night before supportive of Austria,
and Sir H. Rumbold (a British diplomat) wrote to Grey, Germany, while not wanting war, they
are nevertheless determined to see Austria-Hungary through illustrating the disparity of where
the two nations loyalties lied (Grey 147). However, on July 27th, it was noted that Russia
expected Britain to take no position in the conflict, and that Russia did not expect a role either so
long as Austria did not attempt to take any Serbian territory, an inherently dubious notion (Grey
177). As night overtook Britain however, news came down that Russia would possibly mobilize
against Germany (as Austria was only partially mobilized at this point), and if it did so Germany
would have to follow suit provided that Russia mobilized in both North and South Germany
(Grey 185). In addition to that seemingly mixed news, word had to Britain come regarding
Austrias feelings about Serbian response to their demands; although meeting almost all of
Austrias demands, Serbias refusal to not carry on their subversive campaign against Austria

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which seemed to Britain to be a reasonable rejection, as Grey noted that even Count Mensdorff
of Austria-Hungary admitted that on paper, the Serbian reply might seem satisfactory which
underscores the idea of Britain as exasperated by Austrias treatment of Serbia (Grey 188). To
Grey, Serbia had already experienced the greatest humiliationI have ever seen a country
undergo as he was exceptionally disillusioned by Austrias ostensibly intractable desire for war
(Grey 188).
By the next day, Lord Granville of Britain declared war as inevitable to the Russian
Ambassador, and pointedly blamed England for the fracas by not standing in solidarity with
France and Russia (Grey 216). This day saw the confluence of powers, as Austria formally
declared war against Serbia, with Serbia assured of Russian support, Austria of German (Grey
221-226, 235). As Britain watched all of these events unfold, private correspondence began
within British governance as to Britains role in the impending conflict, with the general mood
seemingly coalescing around the idea of Serbia as victims of Austrian overzealousness and an
excessively militaristic diplomatic approach (Buchanan 239). On the 30th, Germany and Britains
antecedent union seemed to be stretching thin as Britain exasperatedly rejected the German
Chancellors request the day previously to remain neutral in the conflict (Grey 293, Grey 303).
To Britain, remaining neutral meant allowing Germany to take French colonies, a notion which
was rather unsavory to the British (and was concerning to the extent that Britain had an extensive
collection of colonies throughout Europe) and portended the apex of dissent between Germany
and Britain, as Britain declared they were unable to bargain with Germany at the expense of
France and that they could not entertain the bargainingof the neutrality of Belgium (Grey
303). This inflexible language by Grey marked a stark shift from the more pliable discussions
between the two nations in the prior days, and signaled the metastasizing severity of the

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international discord. The coming days would conform to Greys harsh words to Germany as
Britain, although actively searching for peace; began to come to the realization that military
involvement was seemingly inevitable, particularly after the events of July 31st domestically (the
London Stock Market collapse) (Crowe 369). This seemed to reinforce British sympathies
towards Serbia as victim, as they began to consider Germany as a joint aggressor at the behest of
Austria towards France, a notion that was unacceptable to the British (Crowe 369).
On August 4th, the German ambassador sent an apprehensive communiqu to the British
government, arguing that Germany had no initial intention to violate Belgiums neutrality, being
forced to do so by Frances advances (whom Germany had declared war with the day earlier due
to necessity) (van Jagow 577, 587). This attempt to quell British empathy towards France by
explaining Germanys view to the British was ultimately unsuccessful, but it does provide an
interesting context for how much Germany wanted Britain to remain neutral in the conflict as
Germany made these seemingly desperate overtures while concurrently, Britain was solidifying
its position within the bizarre milieu of wartime Europe. And as August 4th drew to a close,
Britain would declare war against Germany as a telegram from the British Foreign Office to the
German Ambassador to Britain blares the communiqu in bold lettering that as of 11 p.m. that
evening, their two nations will be at war, and passports to return to Germany are enclosed; a
stark, shocking message that sent tremors throughout the continent (Grey 643). I have the honor
to inform your Excellency that in accordance with the terms of the notification made to the
German government today His Majestys Government consider that a state of war exists between
the two countries as of today at 11 oclock P.M. (Grey 643).
Thus, war began that late summers eve as two nations, historically entwined and friends
until days previously, began a struggle that would ultimately span four years, but produced a

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cultural chasm which would last a generation and be the root of the next World War twenty five
years later. In terms of declaring war against Germany on August 4th however, it should be
noted that Britains initial foray into the war was much more dipping a toe in to feel the water
rather than doing a cannonball off the diving board in regards to their involvement in the conflict.
In the days following their war declaration, a small force of British soldiers led by Sir John
French were deployed to France in order to support their ally, and the British navy began a trade
blockade to Germany, hoping to conclude the war by the end of the year by effectively starving
the Germans out and quickly quashing their advancements in Western Europe (UK National
Archives). There was no full-scale mobilization of British forces in 1914; however, British
citizens were quickly developing a distinctly nationalistic anti-German sentiment, and six days
after war was declared, The Defense of the Realm Act became law, and was further expounded
upon in an addendum added to the law on November 27th, 1914 (UK National Archives). The law
enhanced the states power domestically to effectively manage any persons or groups within
Britain who were seen as unpatriotic as both sentencing and court-martialing regulations were
strengthened under the act (UK National Archives).
As Britain ill-conceived notion of the war being over by Christmas came and went, the
New Year brought with it several revelations domestically as The Committee to Investigate
Alleged German Outrages was convened on December 15th, 1914, with their full report on
German misconduct being published in the Spring; and the U.S. began to make overtures to the
British government in regards to United States neutrality and their feelings on Britains role in
the affair thus far (Bryce, Roosevelt). The Bryce Report found that in their invasion Belgium on
August 4th, German soldiers burnt down village neighborhoods, summarily executed Belgian
civilians, and looted the cities they occupied (Bryce). Many houses were destroyed, clergy

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murdered, and civilians either imprisoned or killed during the weeks of the initial German
occupation (Bryce). The chronicles of these atrocities are listed in the report as coming both from
accounts from Belgian citizens and German soldiers diaries, providing a rather indicting onesided account of the German occupation, and certainly further provoking anti-German sentiment
and outrage within the United Kingdom, who largely viewed Belgium as a docile innocent, even
noting in the beginning of the Bryce Report: The Belgian population, never dreaming of an
attack, were startled and stupefied underscoring the perceived naivety and purity of Belgium
within the confluence of conflict (Bryce). The idea of Belgium as an innocent goes back to the
beginning of Britains reasoning to enter the conflict in the first place, as the unimpeded passage
of German forces through Belgium was the principle impasse in the collapse of negotiations
between Germany and Britain prior to their more expansive involvement in World War I (Grey
303).
Belgium as pure was an advantageous storyline for Britain politically because it provided
a great deal of cover for them within the reasoning of their actions throughout the war; Belgium
as victim simultaneously villainized Germany while making Britain its knight in shining armor
for intervening on its behalf against evil Germany. Britains narrative, although an enthralling
concept was slightly erroneous considering that on August 1st, the German Ambassador had been
trying to negotiate the neutrality of Belgium in the conflict if Britain were to remain neutral in
the war, a notion that was rejected by the British as too restrictive (Grey 448). Britain at that
point saw the burgeoning support for war within their populace, and at that point were much
better served diplomatically by embroiling itself in a conflict that it perceived was quite winnable
and would allow it to be hero to France, savior to Belgium, and emerge in an even stronger
diplomatic position within the international community (Grey 448). Thus seemingly, whatever

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overtures Germany made at that point would make little difference as the institutional dynamics
at work domestically and internationally seemed to indicate internal (from the populace) and
external (from France and Serbia) pressure for war with Germany and Austria. In the aftermath
of the failed negotiations and at the beginning of the war, the finger pointing as to whom was to
blame for the violation of the neutrality of Belgium began. Britain clearly saw the German press
as trying to convince their citizens and the internationally community that Belgium neutrality
would have been violated by Britain or France if Germany hadnt invaded first; simply,
Germanys view was that they shouldnt be seen as hostiles considering Britain and France
would have done the same thing soon after, the Germans just beat them to the punch (The
London Times).
Contrarily, Britain was confounded by that explanation and vehemently denied that the
British government had any aspirations to violate Belgian neutrality until Germany did first, and
at that point they had to intercede militarily on Belgiums behalf (The London Times). Britain
even pointed to a statement made by the Belgian Minister of War who declared that there were
no French troops in Belgian territory on August 3rd, and no British troops in Belgian territory on
August 4th (The London Times). This statement in The London Times shows further
entrenchment by both the British and Germans to their positions as to how they perceived
Belgium as a state, or more suitably, a bargaining chip. The support of Britain by Belgium shows
how successful a relationship this dynamic was during World War I as both nations were able to
craft a narrative that was mutually beneficial and concurrently detrimental to Germany. Would
Britain have violated Belgium neutrality if Germany had not struck first? Possibly, in defense of
Belgium, but Germany made the decision a whole lot easier by striking first, and in that,
allowing Britain to manufacture the international narrative by casting Germany as presumably

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the aggressor in the conflict. Simply, its a lot easier to point to the kid in the class whos doing
something wrong already than it is to justify your own actions by arguing that someone else was
going to do anyway if you didnt. Certainly, this continued the trend of anti-German sentiment
within Britain as Germans and Austrians living within Britain were classified as enemy aliens
and either deported, interned, or prohibited from visiting parts of the United Kingdom (UK
National Archives). Furthermore, Britain would have a more pronounced reason for national
outrage as the sinking of Lusitania on May 7th of 1915 would bring anti-German attitudes to a
fever pitch domestically (UK Nationals Archives 2).
As mentioned previously, the beginning of 1915 had two noteworthy domestic
occurrences (in addition to the developments the ongoing war obviously), the inception of The
Bryce Report, and the United States dialogue with Great Britain regarding their role within the
war. Concerning the latter, President Theodore Roosevelts letter to Edward Grey is striking
because at this point in the conflict the United States is presumably neutral but Roosevelts letter
heavily sympathizes with Britain, noting that If England or France had acted toward Belgium as
Germany has acted I should have opposed them, exactly as I now oppose Germany a fascinating
gesticulation considering Americas official diplomatic position regarding the war, a conflict
which they would not officially intervene in until 1917 (Roosevelt). It is important to note
however that Roosevelt was acting in no official capacity within the American government when
writing this letter to Grey, he had served as President from 1901-1909 and was rather unhappy
with the current administration (as a Republican, Wilson being a Democrat, and losing to Wilson
in 1912 as the founding member of the Bull Moose Party). However his letter offers profound
insight into how divided America was about the war, with his other notable lines regarding the
American populaces opinion of the war being mixed, with America initially favoring Germany,

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Roosevelt calling them a mass of uninformed people, and tides of public opinion subsequently
shifting to the Allies after Germanys actions in the Fall of 1914 (Roosevelt). Roosevelt argues
that this pro-German feeling which has since quelled significantly was due to known American
writers reporting on the war from solely a German perspective, causing there to be more public
information available regarding Germanys feelings on the conflict, lending the basis for a very
one-sided portrayal of the war, and thus ingrained German sympathy within the populace
(Roosevelt). Lastly of note is Roosevelts thoughts on President Wilsons feelings on the war,
arguing that Wilson is certainly not desirous of war with anybodyand is very obstinate
(Roosevelt). An interesting perspective, Roosevelts letter lends itself to largely fruitless
speculations regarding revisionist history, as in how the war would have been different if
President Roosevelt would have been in office as opposed to Wilson during the outbreak of war
in Europe; seemingly, the United States would have played a larger role in the conflict earlier, at
least if we are to take Roosevelts letter at face value. However, it is important to note that the
musings of an ex-President is distinctly different from the intensive decision making process a
current President must go through as his words and actions have the innate capacity to effect
millions of lives in profound ways, contrary to a previous officeholder. That being said, World
War I likely would have been substantially different if Roosevelt had been President in 1914.
The sinking of Lusitania in May of 1915 provoked further outrage and Germanophobia
within Britain as a German torpedo sunk the ship, killing 1192 people, 128 of which were
Americans which prompted widespread contempt across the pond as U.S. government harshly
condemned the actions of Germany and demanded accountability for the bombing, with U.S.
Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan noting The Kingdom of Prussias (now Germany)
1828 treaty with the United States (UK National Archives 2, Bryan). Concurrently prompting

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U.S. and British furor, the sinking of the Lusitania combined with German air raids (which killed
more than 2,000 British civilians in the course of the war) obliterated any remnants of the
kinship Britain and Germany had felt for each other before the war; as war raged on, the United
Kingdom intensified its propaganda campaign against Germany, with 2.5 million books,
speeches, pamphlets, and official documents being distributed by the summer of 1915 (UK
National Archives 2). The next two years saw an oscillating conflict that first saw Germany gain
the upper hand as German forces occupied Poland in August of 1915 and the western front was
drawn to a stalemate; 1916 however would bring about the Allies ascendancy as Britain would
introduce conscription as up until that point they had been the only major combatant with a
solely volunteer army in the war, and although at first volunteering for the war was very popular
domestically, as time had passed enthusiasm had waned and enlistment was down, causing the
aforementioned conscription (UK National Archives 2). This was a stark change from earlier
thoughts on conscription as Chancellor Lloyd George wrote in February of 1915 that he saw no
need for conscription at that point; clearly, a year of demoralization on the warfront and
diminishing returns brought about a change of heart for Britain (UK National Archives 2). As
largely a stalemate wore on throughout 1916, 1917 would bring about a new partner for Britain
in the war effort due to German mismanagement of the war; negligence which would ultimately
cost Germany the war (UK National Archives 2).
Two events defined the war in early 1917; firstly, German discussions of unrestrained
submarine warfare, and the Zimmerman Telegram, both of which would incite the United States
to enter the war, and ultimately quash German chances for victory. Germanys desire for
unrestricted sub warfare is intriguing in that they wanted all out war, but very much did not want
to involve America in the conflict going so far as to articulate in discussions between the German

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Chancellor and his generals on January 9th of 1916 that the chancellor endeavored to keep
America out of it although noting that Germany needed to calculate the possibility of
Americas entry into the war against us (German Submarine Warfare). This is particularly
interesting considering that in December of 1916, Germany sought out Britain to negotiate a
peace, a notion that Britains new P.M., Lloyd George soundly rejected, showing the outright
contempt and loathing that had grown between to the two nations through the atrociousness of
war; George instead promised to redouble efforts against Germany (UK National Archives 2).
This likely led to the discussions of unrestricted submarine warfare as at that point in the war any
notions of civility between the two nations were far gone and replaced with an incestuous
revulsion for their ancestry. The latter transcendental event of 1917, the Zimmerman Telegram
led America into the war as the telegram, sent from German Foreign Minister Arthur
Zimmerman on January 16th 1917 to the German Ambassador to Mexico detailed that Germany
planned to begin unrestricted submarine warfare on February 1st, an unpalatable notion for the
United States, but the more troubling component of the telegram was the suggestion that Mexico
invade the United States and reclaim New Mexico, Texas, and Arizona (Zimmerman). President
Wilson received the telegram from British Intelligence on February 26th and was shocked by the
note, with Wilsons biographer later writing that no other event of the warso stunned the
American people; this set it motion Americas entry into the war, and in April of 1917, the
United States declared war against Germany (U.S. State Department). From there, the war would
wind down, as the United States involvement would serve as a major turning point in the
conflict as the burgeoning nation made the war which was seemingly trending towards the Allies
into an inevitable notion; with Lloyd George outlining Britains war aims on January 5th of 1918,
saying that they were not fighting a war of aggression against the German people, a strikingly

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conciliatory tone considering the absolute odious atmosphere that had existed throughout the
war. An even more arresting passage comes later on in his speech as George contended:
The destruction or disruption of Germany or the German people has never been a
war aim with us from the first day of this war to this day. Most reluctantly, and
indeed quite unprepared for the dreadful ordeal, we were forced to join in this war
in self-defense...on which Germany had ruthlessly trampled in her invasion of
Belgium, we had to join or stand aside and see Europe go under and brute force
triumph over public right and international justice. It was only the realization of
that dreadful alternative that forced the British people into the war (George).
Certainly, P.M. Georges words were dissimilar from the nature of British feelings towards
Germany throughout most of the war; with victory generally assured however by 1918, this tone
seemingly sought passivity as the Allies emerged as somber victors of the brutal war. The war
would officially end with the signing of the Treaty of Versailles on June 28th of 1919, but the
damage was done, and despite the seemingly assuaging language of Lloyd George, a deep chasm
would continue between Germany and Britain as the sanctions brought upon by the treaty would
cripple Germany, leading to the formation and rise of the Nazi Party and ultimately World War
II. Only in the later 20th century and early 21st has friendship between the two nations come about
once again. For two deeply entwined nations, World War I was an event of transcendental
enormity, and it is not soon to be forgotten within the annals of history as a conflict that set a
diplomatic and ancestral friendship back a hundred years based on an assassination of an
Austrian by a Serbian.
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