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Paper Presented at the 31st Annual Meeting of the Semiotic Society of America, 2006
Many Peircean semioticians prefer the name semeiotic, and dismiss the more common term
semiotics. The validity of this choice and the accompanying criticism of the word semiotics is
debatable (see Deely 2003). Also, contrary to an oft-repeated claim, Peirce uses semiotics at
least once in his writings. Here, I opt for semiotics, as there is no need to distinguish Peirces
theory from other semiotic points of view in this context. Semeiotic can be useful as a marker of
an explicitly Peircean approach, to clearly indicate its divergence from the semiological tradition
stemming from Ferdinand de Saussure.
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his logic in the broad sense have typically focused on the sub-disciplines he
branded grammar and critic, with comparably little attention paid to his third
semiotic study, that is, to the line of inquiry he identified as rhetoric or
methodeutic.
This emphasis is partly understandable in view of the fact that Peirces
writings on explicitly rhetorical issues tend to be sparse and mostly
programmatic. Yet, the usual reaction to his proposal has been a rather halfhearted acknowledgment, if not outright neglect; the centre of the Peircean
semioticians interest has primarily been grammar, as displayed by the attention
to formal relations and the taxonomy of signs. This focus is unquestionably easily
defended; there is no denying that Peirce himself finds the organization of sign
types to be one of the major tasks of semiotics. Nor do I mean to claim that there
would not have been an impressive amount of work, classifiable as semiotic
rhetoric in Peirces sense, done after his death. Furthermore, if I am not
mistaken, it is possible to discern a growing, explicit interest in Peircean rhetoric
at the moment. I have in mind recent efforts by Vincent Colapietro (2006), James
Liszka (1996; 2000), and Lucia Santaella (1999), for instance. But in spite of all
this, it would be an exaggeration to proclaim the existence of a current rhetorical
trend within Peircean semiotics.
In this article, I aim to make a couple of small contributions to the
discussion of Peirces rhetoric. Mainly, I wish to argue that we should take
Peirces elevation of rhetoric to the status of the highest branch of logic very
seriously indeed, not least because it may have significant consequences for his
semiotic project and its future viability. I wish to review the relationship between
grammar and rhetoric, and argue that certain changes in Peirces later semiotics
(which Colapietro [2006] has recently dubbed Peirces rhetorical turn) calls for
a reconsideration of the hierarchical outlook that straightforwardly prioritises
grammar over rhetoric.
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Conceptions of Rhetoric
Before considering the role of rhetoric in Peircean semiotics, it is useful to
consider how Peirce presents it as a part of the hierarchy of sciences. As so many
questions regarding Peirces semiotic project, his division of semiotics into three
branches involves many complex questions. Here, matters can be simplified by
focusing on two different conceptions of the field of the philosophical study of
signs, connected with his early and late semiotic phases.
The first recorded appearance of the term semiotic in Peirces writings
merely states that logic is a species of symbolistic, which in its turn is a branch
of semiotic, the general science of representations. For the young Peirce, logic
is not a synonym for the doctrine of signs, but rather the branch of the semiotics
of symbols that examines the relations of symbolic representations to their
objects (1865b: W 1:303). He does not pay much attention to the other parts of
semiotics. We are told that there is a science of copies and a science of signs,3
which accompany the science of symbols, and that symbolistic is divided into
grammar, rhetoric, and logic (see fig. 1); but only the logical part of semiotics is
described in any detail.
By signs, Peirce in this context means the kind of representations later named indices.
Copy is an early name for icon.
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Peirce now argues that as long as every logical relation is a semiotic relation
(which he naturally holds it to be), then the deeper comprehension of logic
requires an understanding of all forms of signs and their functions. Consequently,
he urges logicians to widen the scope of their research. Peirce even asserts that
the broader investigation is part of the duties of the logician (1909a: MS 640.10).
Logic (Semiotic)
Grammar (Syntax)
Critic (Logic in
Rhetoric / Methodeutic
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There are many motives behind this expansion, some explicitly states while
others are not, but for our purposes here three reasons are particularly striking.
Firstly, it is clear that Peirces mature conception of logic as semiotics entails that
grammar, critic, and rhetoric are not to be restricted to the study of symbols
that is, to habitual or conventional signs. They are to be concerned iconic and
indexical representations as well (1909b: SS 118). Secondly, the logician should
not restrict him- or herself to the representation of objects, as the young Peirce
proposed. In fact, logic traditionally deals with such things as definition and
signification, which are more matters of the interpretant than the object in
Peirces view (1909b: SS 118). As we have seen, already in his early studies,
Peirce suggests that rhetoric is particularly focused on the interpretant; in the
later phase, the realisation that many of the tasks of the logician are more
matters of sign-interpretant relations than of sign-object relations become a
reason to expand the scope of logic to include rhetoric. Finally, in an almost
pragmatic spirit Peirce states that the extension is needed for linguistic and
rhetorical applications (1904a: MS 693.188-190). This indicates that one reason
for facilitating productive connections between logic and other pursuits. Perhaps
it is not so odd, after all, that Peirce, the staunch defender of an unpsychological
conception of logic, suggests that the borderline between logic and psychology
need not be so strictly drawn when we come to rhetoric, the third branch (c.
1902: CP 2.107).
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dual position of the rhetorical domain as the starting point as well as the
concluding field of semiotic studies.
In his later writings, Peirce first employs the term rhetoric, and defines it
as the study of the necessary conditions of the transmission of meaning by signs
from mind to mind, and from one state of mind to another (c. 1896: CP 1.444).
The task of rhetoric is to ascertain the laws by which in every scientific
intelligence one sign gives birth to another, and especially one thought brings
forth another (c. 1897b: CP 2.229). As such, the emphasis of rhetoric would
naturally be on interpretation and other semiotic effects. This conception does
not seem to differ radically from that presented in Peirces early writings, apart
from the significant divergence in scope noted above.
However, approximately in 1902, the focus of the third sub-discipline of
semiotics begins to turn toward methodological matters, something that is
reflected in Peirces new preferred name, methodeutic (see Peirce 1906: CP
4.9). The occurrence of this shift can be seen quite concretely in Minute Logic,
where the two terms still co-exist, albeit somewhat uneasily.4 About a year later,
the matter appears settled. From there on, the third sub-discipline is
predominantly defined in terms of the principles of the production of valuable
courses of research and exposition (1903a: EP 2:272).
Thus, it would appear that Peirce has replaced rhetoric with the betterdefined methodeutic, at the same time restricting its scope to the study of
effective methods. Some scholars have drawn this very conclusion; for instance,
according to Santaella (1999: 380), the third branch of semiotics develops from a
narrow to a broad sense. However, at roughly the same time as this
transformation takes place, Peirce also continues to write on rhetoric, and even
proposes a quite intricate scheme of various rhetorical studies in Ideas, Stray or
Stolen, about Scientific Writing (1904b). In this context, Peirce defines the third
branch of semiotics as the science of the essential conditions under which a sign
In one variant of the text, Peirce explicitly states that he prefers "Speculative Rhetoric" over
"Methodeutic" or "Methodology"; but in other drafts, methodeutic is used.
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Admittedly, Peirce sometimes describes the third logical science in such terms, but it might be
more appropriate to use theoretical or even speculative rather than formal to avoid
confusions. Moreover, it is advisable not to read conditions in a strong transcendental sense.
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may limit the broader appeal and possibly even hamper the future usefulness of
Peirces semiotics.
The alternative path which may be viewed as a rhetorical approach into
the Peircean science of signs is to place the emphasis on those parts of Peirces
semiotics in which he not only suggests that the theory is an abstraction from
actual practices, but also derives central conceptions, such as object and
interpretant, from ordinary sign use, such as communication (e.g., Peirce 1907;
cf. Bergman 2003; 2004; 2005).
In his criticism of the Hegelians, Peirce maintains that philosophers must
not begin by talking of pure ideas, vagabond thoughts that tramp the public
roads without any human habituation, but must begin with men and their
conversation (c. 1900: CP 8.112). The point here is not that we should restrict
ourselves to signs in our minds in a nominalistic spirit, nor make a sop to
Cerberus, but rather that it is healthy to acknowledge that what we know of
signs and how they work in the world is based on what we know of the ways of
such signs that we are most familiar with and signs in communication seem to
be pre-eminently important in this regard. As Peirce puts the matter, we ought
not to think that what are signs to us are the only signs; but we have to judge
signs in general by these (c. 1903: NEM 4:297).
This suggestion may raise an eyebrow or two. A formalistic semiotician,
who embraces Peirces un-psychologistic programme, might find this contention
perilous; almost inevitably, it will lead to an anthropomorphic conception of
semiotics. That is, the properties of certain human signs are taken to be
characteristics of all signs, without any logical guarantee of the validity of the
generalisation. Adherents of biosemiotics (or more radical variants of universal
semiotics) may be equally appalled by this unexpected emphasis on the human
sphere. At the other end of the scale, humanistic thinkers could fault Peirce for
expanding the boundaries of semiotics beyond its proper human habitat, that is,
for not being anthropocentric enough.
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REFERENCES
Bergman, M. 2003. Peirces Derivations of the Interpretant, Semiotica 144.1/4,
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Bergman, M. 2004. Fields of Signification: Explorations in Charles S. Peirces
Theory of Signs. Philosophical Studies from the University of Helsinki 6.
Vantaa: Dark Oy.
Bergman, M. 2005 C. S. Peirces Dialogical Conception of Sign Processes,
Studies in Philosophy and Education 24, 213-233.
Carnap, R. 1946. Introduction to Semantics. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press.
Colapietro, V. 2006. Peirces Rhetorical Turn. Paper presented in the research
seminar of the Department of Philosophy of the University of Helsinki, May
2006. Available at
http://www.helsinki.fi/science/commens/papers/rhetoricalturn.pdf.
Deely, J. 2003. On the Word Semiotics, Formation and Origins, Semiotica
146.1/4, 1-50.
Liszka, J. J. 1996. A General Introduction to the Semeiotic of Charles sanders
Peirce. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Liszka, J. J. 2000 Peirces New Rhetoric, Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce
Society XXXVI.4, 439-476.
Morris, C. W. 1938. Foundations of Semiotic. Chicago: The University of Chicago
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Peirce, C. S. 1865a. On the Logic of Science (Harvard Lectures) , in Writings of
Charles S. Peirce, vol. 1, ed. the Peirce Edition Project (Bloomington:
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