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wrong.
In addition, actions that sustain us as biological organisms are also morally right. By extension,
actions that harm us as biological organism are wrong. As he observes:
Temperance is about the natural concupiscences of food, drink and sexual matters, which
are indeed ordained to the common good of nature, just as other matters of law are
ordained to the moral common good. (Q93, art. 3)
Aquinas and many NL theorists assume that we are created in God's image. We must remember
that they assume also that God is maximally (or all?)good, maximally powerfull, and all?knowing.
These assumptions have profound implications. Most fundamentally, God never creates anything
bad, and never aims at anything bad. At most, God allows for bad things to happen and only if
there is a sufficient reason for it. (Notice what we earlier said about the argument from evil and
the superfluous evil.)
SUPLEMENTARY PRINCIPLES: Can we ever take a life of a person. Traditional versions of
(NLT) tried to solve the problem by the means of one of the folowing principles:
The Principle of Forfeiture (PF): If X threatens an innocent human life (i.e., violates the
principle concerning the protection of life), X forfeits his (her) right to life. Thus, killing in
necessary self?defense is morally permissible.
Many contemporary proponents of NLT reject (PF). They think that this principle cannot be
reconcile with the doctrine of the sacnctity of human life. Notice, just like it is not in God's nature
to directly bring about something bad (for God is all good), it is not in our nature (essence) to aim
at anything bad. At most, we can allow that bad things happen and only if there is a sufficient
reason for that. This is known as
The Principle of Double Effect (PDE): A person may lawfully perform an action from
which two effects will follow, one bad, and the other good when four conditions obtain:
1. The act itself must be morally good or at least indifferent.
2. The agent may not positively will the bad effect but may merely permit it. If he could
attain the good effect without the bad effect, he should do so.
3. The good effect must flow from the action at least as immediately (in the order of
causality, though not necessarily in the order of time) as the bad effect.
4. The good effect must be sufficiently desirable to compensate for the allowing of the bad
effect. [Adopted from the New Catholic Encyclopedia]