Case studies of some concrete

structural failures
R bi Whittle
Robin
Whittl

Design Errors
Design errors alone are seldom the cause of the failure
of a structure.
structure When failure does occur it is usually the
result of errors in at least three different aspects of
construction (e.g. design, detailing, and construction
errors).

Case Study 1
Collapse of a reinforced concrete structure,

This factory building included concrete columns and a

steel truss for the roof.

Concreteguttertofactorybuilding

Guttercollapse

Edge beam and column connection

Edge beam
Concrete gutter

Column

Loadingatfailure

Sand 18.6kN

L4

K4

J4

Crane cage
g and
bricks 6kN

I4

H4

Mechanismoffailure(1)

Piles of sand
and bricks
Steel truss.

Beam and gutter

start to rotate

Cracks start
to open up

Mechanism of failure (2)

Sand and bricks

collect into corner
Steel truss.

Cracks start
to open up

Beam and gutter

continue to rotate
and start to move
out and down.

Th outer
The
t column
l
b
bars
stay attached to the beam
and drag the outer face of
the column away.

The full length links

fail as the column
bars pull out

Mechanismoffailure(3)
Steel truss.

Column outer bars remain

attached to the beam.

The outer links

fail as the column
bars pull out and
down.

Beam and gutter fall,

dragging the outer
column bars with them.
Cracks extends down the
column
l
until
il either
i h the
h
column bars fail or pull
out at a lap.

Reinforcement layout
2T20s
T8 links@130

2T8s

Steel truss.
(stopped off
off at
at beam
beam cage)
cage)
T8 links @ 300 (stopped

T10s@100

T20s
2T16s

T8 links @ 300

Thebeamhadbeendesignedtotakethetorsionfromthegutterloadingbutthejoint
withthecolumnhadnotbeendesignedtotakethetorsion.

Thetoptwolinksinthecolumnhadbeendetailedtoencloseallthecolumn
mainbarsbutthecontractorhadreducedtheirlengthforeaseofconstruction.
Even if these links had been constructed correctly they would have been
Eveniftheselinkshadbeenconstructedcorrectlytheywouldhavebeen
inadequatetosupporttheloading.

Simple model of failure mechanism

cracks form

T1
tension

applied
torque

G tt slab
Gutter
l b
compression

Appliedtorquefromselfweight
plussandandbrickpile=76kNm
p
p
Resistancefromtensilestrength
( y
)
ofconcrete(say2MPa)=74kNm
Appliedloadexceedsresistance

tension
T2

Column

Summary
Two people were killed
Design error. No consideration was given in the
calculations of how forces were transmitted through the
joint between the edge beam and column.
Detailing error. Inadequate connection between beam
and column reinforcement.
Construction error. Column links were excluded for
convenience

Case Study 2
Widespread
p
cracking
g in
post-tensioned/reinforced concrete frame
This structure did not collapse but the cause of the cracking
took a long time to establish and the subsequent litigation
was very costly.
costly
The design was of a five storey car park for which the
construction period was extremely short (8 months)
months). In
consequence the prestressing work was carried out under a
very tight schedule.

The post-tensioned
prestressed beam was
cast in one operation
and fully stressed a few
days later.
Five
Fi
e days
da s after stressing
cracks appeared in
many parts of the
structure.

Problem
Whilst the problem was debated, in order to proceed with
construction
t ti with
ith minimum
i i
delay,
d l
th
the prestressing
t
i was
altered to a two-stage process only 50% applied at first
and the remaining prestress after two weeks
weeks.
After much discussion it was concluded that when earlyy
thermal effects were included with the other shortening
effects, the total shortening of the prestressed beams was
sufficient
ffi i t tto cause th
the cracking.
ki

Temperature Time effect on concrete

As the chemical action
of the cement takes
place the concrete
heats up.
g this p
period the
During
concrete is plastic and
the increase in volume
results in a fatter
rather than a longer
beam.
However when the
cooling phase starts
the concrete has
hardened and is no
longer plastic. The
length shortens.

Summary
The cracking of the parts of the structure resulted in a change in the
programme of work causing extra cost to the Main Contractor.

Although the contract was completed on time the ensuing dispute was
very costly.

When the case came to court it was agreed that it was reasonable
to assume that,
h at that
h time,
i
a normall engineer
i
would
ld not h
have b
been
expected to include early thermal effects in the analysis. The code of
practice stated that unless the lesser section dimension is greater
than 600mm and the cement content is greater than 400kg/m3 there is
no need to consider early thermal effect.

The result of the investigation brought about a change to normal

design procedures. It is now common to consider early thermal
effects in the design of long length continuous reinforced and
prestressed
t
d beams
b
and
d slabs.
l b

Case Study 3

Temperature effects on a
long-span hybrid structure
The ground level of a two storey underground car park slab was
not covered.
covered Ambient temperature changes caused continual
movement.
The structure consisted of 16m spanning hollowcore units bearing
on precast concrete beam nibs.
Movement joints had been shown on the drawings but these did
not function correctly for a variety of reasons
reasons.

Causes of cracking
Hard material can
prevent movement
Movement

Rotation can
cause spalling

Friction can
cause cracking

(a)

Rotation

Rotation

(b)

(c)

The upper surface of the slab was exposed to the weather and in
particular to large variations in temperature
temperature. The latter caused
movement and rotation of the units and their supports. This resulted in
severe cracking of the supporting nibs and in some places cracking at
the end of the hollowcore units.
units Even after repair of the cracks they
reappeared each subsequent year for more than five years.

Possible failure mechanisms for

the hollowcore units Shear tension
crack

Anchorage
slip

Large crack
close to
support

(a)

(b)

H
Hollowcore
ll
units
it are inherently
i h
tl vulnerable
l
bl tto th
the effects
ff t off cracking
ki
close to the support as there is no shear reinforcement and they
rely on the tension strength of the concrete.
Anchorage bond failure can occur when cracks occur close to the
support. This can cause the prestressing strands to slip. The crack
size increases until the unit fails either in anchorage bond (a) or in
shear (b).

Summary
The reoccurrence of cracking of the supporting nibs each year
eventually required a temporary support structure to be built.
Protection from falling concrete was also required.

Concern that the hollowcore slabs might

g eventually
y fail in shear or
anchorage has led to the possibility of a rebuild.

The cost of remedial work and litigation fees have escalated each
year as the decision on what action to take is delayed.

Lesson: It is essential to name a single designer or engineer who

retains overall responsibility for the stability of the structure, the
compatibility of the design, and details of the parts and components,
even where
h
some or allll off the
th d
design
i iincluding
l di d
detailing
t ili off th
those parts
t
and components are not carried out by this engineer.

Case Study 4
Piled raft for tower block
The design of the raft assumed that the walls of the two level
basement car parks would act with the raft over the piles to transmit
the shear and bending forces to the outer piles
piles.
The walls of the basement had almost full height openings, placed
one above the other, and contained only nominal reinforcement.

Original design
The combined strength of
these walls plus the 1.5m
thick slab was quite
inadequate to transmit
the loads.

Core walls

Columns

The mistake was

discovered whilst the
tower block was being
g
constructed.

Possible line of shear failure

Basement car parks

Piled raft

Schematic arrangement of new raft

The remedial work
required a new raft
to be constructed
beneath the existing
one

Existing raft
3.5m

New supplementary
raft to take shear

Piles scabbled to
take new concrete

Remedial work
Placing of concrete for the lower part of the new raft was carried out
conventionally.
IIn order
d tto achieve
hi
good
db
bond
d with
ith th
the existing
i ti raft
ft th
the upper partt off
the new raft was packed with single sized aggregate and then
grouted with a retarded and fluid cement paste.
The grout was introduced under pressure to the back of the pour
through a complicated system of metal pipes, pinned to the
underside of the existing raft
raft. The method produced a wall of grout
that extended from top to bottom of the pour and that flowed forward
towards the peripheral shutters with the top surface behind the
bottom.
bottom
Pipes were so placed to let the air our in front of the grout surface,
grout had arrived, and then to
then to indicate where and when the g
allow grouting to continue from immediately behind the advancing
wall of grout. Grouting was continuous until the work was complete.

Inappropriate Use of
Code of Practice Clauses

Case Study
y5
Ferry Bridge Cooling Tower Collapse
This incident should really be in a chapter of its own as the failure
resulted in a change of philosophy in the design code of practice, CP
114. Although there were some defects in wall thickness, it was
concluded that the main cause of the collapse was because the design
value chosen for the wind load was too small
small. No account had been
taken of the venturi effect of the wind passing through the towers
upwind.
This collapse ensured the early adoption of a limit state code of practice
in the UK resulting in a completely new approach to design. The first
draft of the Unified code appeared in 1968 and in 1972 it was published
as CP110. This was the first comprehensive limit state code of
practice ever published.

InNovember1965,threeoutof
eightcoolingtowerscollapsed
duringahighwind.

Eachtowerwas375feethigh

Thewindloadintheinitialdesign
wasseriouslyunderestimated.
i l
d
ti t d

CP114 PermissibleStressDesign
wasused.

Thiscollapseensuredtheearly
adoptionoflimitstatedesign.

In1968thefirstdraftofthe
unifiedcodeappeared.

In1972thiswaspublishedas
In
1972 this was published as
CP110.

Thewindspeedpassingbetween
theupwindtowersincreased
significantly.Thiscausedahigher
i ifi
l
hi
d hi h
windforceonthedownwindtowers.

Itispossiblethatconsiderationof
the load combinations required for
theloadcombinationsrequiredfor
limitstatedesignmighthavebeen
sufficienttopreventthecollapse.

Load combination

Permissible Stress Design:

((CP114))
G x b/2 W x hw
New Limit State Design:
(CP110)
1 0 (G x b/2) 1.4
1.0
1 4 (W x hw)

hw

Inadequate
q
Assessment of
Critical Force Paths

Case Study 6
Shear wall with holes and corner supports
A multi-storey shear wall required so many openings (windows,
doors etc) that the load path became very complicated
doors,
complicated.
The designer assumed that the load would flow to the corners at
y down the edge
g of the wall.
each floor and then track vertically
Since the wall was built insitu as a homogenous structure, strain
compatibility caused the load to flow back into the full width of wall.
The result was that several storeys of load were supported by a
deep beam at the bottom of the wall, which transferred the load to
its end supports at first floor level.

Deep beam failure

Design

Behaviour

Thedesignassumed
thattheloadfrom
the wall would be
thewallwouldbe
transferredtothe
cornercolumnsat
eachfloorlevel.

Theactualload
transfertothe
corner columns took
cornercolumnstook
placeatthebottom
ofthewall.
Theheightofthe
The
height of the
naturalarchwas
only0.6xtheSpan.

Thetieforcesat
eachfloorlevelwere
small.

Thiscausedlarge
horizontaltieforces
atthebottomofthe
wall.
ll
No
o wall
a

(a)

No wall

(b)

Model of force path

Theassumedforcepath
Th
df
th
downtheedgeswould
not require ties at top and
notrequiretiesattopand
bottom.
Howeverwithoutthese
theactualforcepath
wouldcauselargecracks
ld
l
k
toopenupatthetopand
bottom surfaces
bottomsurfaces

tie
assumed
force path

actual
force path

tie

without tie reinforcement large

cracks form

Case Study 7
Design of boot nibs
The conventional assumption taken for the effective depth and lever
arm for a short cantilever is unsafe for a boot nib.
The design compression zone for such a model would be close to
the bottom face of the beam and likely to fall outside the beam
reinforcement (both the links and main reinforcement).
Strut and tie modelling is helpful to understand why this is so. The
strut must be supported mechanically by the reinforcement of the
supporting beam. The effective lever arm becomes much smaller
and the tension force in the nib top reinforcement much larger than
assumed by the short cantilever approach.

Design of boot nibs

Traditionaldesignofcantileversandnibsassumesaneffectivedepth,dc,betweenthe
outercompressionfaceandthecentroidoftensionreinforcement.Thiscouldcause
thebottomlayerofconcreteinthecoverzonetospalloff.
Thestrutshouldbedesignedtosheditsloadontothecornerbarofthebeam.The
The
strut should be designed to shed its load on to the corner bar of the beam The
verticalcomponentoftheforceisthentakenbythelinkleg.

db
Fc =FEd xac/zb
Forceinlinkleg:
Ft2d =Fc +Fed

Fc

zb

ac
Ft2d

FEd

HEd

Thisisadditiontoany
shear that the link is
shearthatthelinkis
carrying.

Ft1d

zn
dc z c

Poor detailing

Case Study 8

Failureofcellularwallstructure
p
inanoffshoreoilplatform

Sleipner offshore oil platform collapse

Theplatformincludedalargecellular
concretestructurebelowthethree
towers.
Duringconstructiontheplatform
underwentsubmergingfordeck
matingafterwhichtheplanwasto
raiseitagainandtowittoitsfinal
positionintheoilfield.
h l f ld
Itwasduringthesubmersionthatone
ofthetricellsinthecellularstructure
f th t i ll i th
ll l t t
failed.
Thiscauseduncontrollablesinking
This
caused uncontrollable sinking
thatledtoanimplosionofthe
structureandcompletecollapse.

Plan form of the cellular structure

see detail

Tri-cell wall shape

550
800
Water
pressure
58
00

Originaldesignshape
withcylindricalwalls
i h li d i l ll

Actual shape of construction

Actualshapeofconstruction

Thenaturalarchactionprovidedbythegeometrywasnotpresentinthemodifiedform.
Thequadrilateralfiniteelementsfortheanalysisweredistortedintheregionofthetricell
cornersfromtheidealsquareshape.Thisledtoerrorsintheresults.

Tri-cell joint detail

Thecriticalshearsectionwas
reinforcedwithTheadedbars.
f
d
h h d db
Thedesignrequiredthatthe
lengthoftheTheadedbarsto
g
extendacrossthefullwidthof
section.
As
Astheyweredifficulttofix
they were difficult to fix
throughtheouterlayerof
reinforcementitwasdecidedto
reduce their length.
reducetheirlength.
Acrackedformedatacornerof
thecellandspreadtotheendof
the T bar
theTbar.

compression
failure

initial cracking

Waterpressurebecameactivein
thecrack.
Ashearcrackdevelopedintothe
compressionzoneandthisfailed
in a brittle manner.
inabrittlemanner.

'T' headed bar

as required

'T' headed bar

as fixed
water p
pressure

Summary
This catastrophic failure was the result of a number of errors:

The analysis program was set up with a finite element mesh that was
too coarse to provide accurate shear results.

The T headed bars were too short and allowed the shear resistance
t become
to
b
unsafe.
f This
Thi was probably
b bl the
th primary
i
cause off the
th failure.
f il

There was minimal checking of the design and detailing.

In previous designs the geometry of tri-cells had been formed by
intersecting cylinders. The geometry of tri-cells was altered on this
project in order to make the formwork simpler to construct.
construct
Unfortunately the new form did not allow arching action to take place.
The rebuild retained the cylindrical geometry in the tri-cells
tri cells and the
reinforcement was detailed to ensure mechanical linkage. T headed
bars were extended to the outer reinforcement.

Case Study 9
Camden School for Girls
Assembly hallroofcollapse
This disaster could also be called the miracle of the decade. On 13
June, 1973 late in the evening
g the roof of the assembly
y hall crashed to
the ground.
In the words of the caretaker, he heard a loud rumble, went to
investigate by torch light
light, and found the whole roof weighing many
tons had collapsed.
Twenty four hours before this event some five hundred parents had
attended a meeting in the hall, chairs were still laid out.

Camden School for Girls

Edge beam which had
supported the precast
beams

Part of the roof

which had
collapsed on to
the chairs below

Collapsed roof lying on the floor below

Summary

The principal cause of the collapse was inadequate

bearing for beam seatings and deterioration of concrete
att b
beam ends.
d Thi
This was one off the
th first
fi t b
buildings
ildi
ffound
d
to have suffered from the effects of high alumina cement.

This was an example of inadequate design and poor

detailing
g of the end bearing
g nibs built into the supporting
pp
g
beam for the precast beams. The reduction in strength
caused by HAC left no margin for temperature effects.

The combination of these effects was likely to have

triggered the collapse.
collapse

Case Study 10
Ronan Point collapse
Precast concrete panel building
This collapse was a significant event for the industry in
the UK and marked the partial demise of the precast
industry. Large precast panel and frame construction
became much less popular in the following two decades.
Information g
gathered from the incident led to major
j
changes to the UK Building Regulations (1970) and codes
of practice (starting with the precast concrete code,
CP 116, in 1970) with regard to progressive collapse and
robustness. More recently the Eurocodes have included
accidental load and robustness clauses
clauses.

In the early hours of 16 May

1968 a g
gas explosion
p
in a
bathroom on an upper floor
shook the building, resulting in
the
h iinstantaneous collapse
ll
off
part of one wing of the building.
Four people were killed.

The cause of collapse:

The possibility of unusual, and hence non-codified, loads occurring

was not considered in design.
g

The structure was inadequately mechanically tied together.

Comment
Traditional two-storey housing, pre World War 2, would not
have had any engineering input; brick wall thicknesses and
ti b floor
timber
fl
joist
j i t sizes
i
were prescribed
ib d b
by th
the L
London
d Cit
City
Council Building By-laws, and similar regulations outside
London.
London
There had been gas explosions before this incident in
similar types of dwelling
dwelling, but the damage
damage, and any
casualties, had usually been limited to one household, and
the risk was accepted
p
as a fact of life.
There were no precedents for progressive collapse, when
system
y
building
g was introduced.

Poor Construction

Case Study 11
Pipers Row
Car park collapse
The
e ca
car pa
park was
as co
constructed
s uc ed us
using
g the
e lift sslab
ab method.
e od This
s involved
o ed
casting the slabs one on top of another on the ground. Precast columns
were positioned and then the slabs were jacked up the columns until at
the correct level
level. The slabs were then held in place by the use of wedges
wedges.
This form of construction had been used in many places in the UK
during the 1970s and 80s and has been a common form of construction
in the USA. It has provided reasonably robust structures. The very
nature of the construction method focuses attention on the column/slab
j i t In
joint.
I some situations
it ti
th
the structure
t t
has
h relied
li d on th
the momentt
resistance of these joints, i.e. an unbraced frame. In other situations
separate insitu core structures have been built to take the sway forces.

In March 1997 a 120 tonne section of the roof of the car park collapsed
onto the floor below . This occurred at 3am when, fortunately,
y nobodyy
was around. It was immediately clear from the debris that a punching
shear failure had taken place.

Final connection between the slab and the column was made via a steel
collar in the slab and a steel insert in the column into which wedges were
fixed.
The steel collar supported the slab on angles that formed an H in plan.

Summary
The 230mm thick slab was constructed with concrete
of highly variable quality.

Areas of low quality concrete deteriorated probably

through freeze thaw action.

In some places this deterioration had occurred to a

depth of 100mm and this had been repaired.

The repair was poorly bonded to the parent material.

This left a slab which was effectively split into two
layers with the only connection being the longitudinal
steel passing through the repair into the original concrete.
Further deterioration of the original concrete, and in
particular its bond strength to the top steel, reduced what
composite action existed until failure occurred.

Case Study 12
Flat slab construction for a hotel
For a short time in the early 1970s the Government provided loans for
the construction of hotels. In order to be eligible the construction
period had to be very tight.
The workmanship of some of the hotels
hotels, built at this time
time, was shoddy
shoddy.
For one such hotel this was not discovered until twenty years later
j refurbishment was taking
g place
p
when a major

Hotel of the 1970s

This shows the structural layout of a typical floor, flat slab. The depth
of the slab was 250mm. The spans along the building were 7.2m and
across the building were 6.1m and 7.4m.

Problem
The top surface of the slabs was very uneven and did not appear to have
been levelled (by hand or power float). In some places boot marks had
been left.
Cracks (generally not larger than 0.3mm width) had occurred on the upper
surface radiating from the corners of the columns with one or two small
cracks running
g tangentially.
g
y Large
g cracks ((up
p to 1mm width)) had occurred
at some of the construction joints.
The deflection of one of the slab bays of an upper floor was large, over
75mm.
75
An independent adviser decided that:
the punching shear was close to its limit
limit. Additional steel shear heads
were constructed and fitted to all column slab intersections.
the bending strength of the longer spanning bays was at its limit.
After a year of measuring the deflection of one bay of the slab it was
found that no movement had occurred. The reason for such large
deflections was not understood
understood.

A second independent check revealed:

In one of the bays the skirting board between two edge columns had been
made in two equal lengths split in the middle (as shown)
shown). Deflections of
between 15 and 20mm had occurred below each half of the skirting board.
This represented an edge deflection of up to 50mm.

Since the skirting board was attached to the wall it was likely that it was
fitted this way and that much of the deflection had taken place before
construction of the wall.
This was confirmed by finding that the bottom courses of the external wall
had been laid on the sagging shape of the slab and the following courses
adjusted so that they were level at the window sills above the floor.

Summary
The second independent check concluded:
Punching shear capacity: Both BS 8110 and BS EN 1992-1-1)
provide reliable methods for predicting punching shear capacity using
characteristic values for the concrete strength instead of the factored
design values and the as built information concerning the
reinforcement ((i.e. the size,, spacing
p
g and cover to the bars).
) An
assessment of the safety can be made by comparing the worst
credible loads with the resistance.
For thi
F
this situation
it ti the
th calculations
l l ti
showed
h
d th
thatt th
the worstt credible
dibl lloads
d
could be carried with a sufficient safety factor.
Bending capacity: The top cover to the reinforcement near the
column supports was found to be on average 30mm more than
specified.
Once reasonable moment redistribution had been included in the
calculations there was still sufficient overall moment capacity in the
slab without requiring any reduction to the design safety factors.

Conclusion
Although the construction workmanship had been very
poor the structure was not in danger of collapsing.
A great deal of money had been spent unnecessarily.

Case Study 13
Precast concrete tank
A liquid storage tank was constructed with precast wall panels. The
diameter and height of the tank were 12.2m and 7m.
The tank collapsed suddenly within two years of construction.

Liquid storage tank

Anchor unit

.2m
2
1

The vertical panels were held in place by unbonded prestressed tendons

threaded through horizontal PVC ducts, embedded in the concrete and
fully encircling the tank at set levels throughout the height.

Section through precast panel

Interface with
adjacent unit

23mm PVC duct

In order to achieve watertight construction of the edges of the

wall units required to be built with very small tolerances. A rubber
strip was inserted within the joint between each set off adjacent
panels. The water tests showed leaks. Several attempts were
made to seal these before watertightness was achieved.
Plastic sheathing and grease around the tendons was intended to
provide protection from corrosion
corrosion.

Detail at anchorage of tendons

Anchorage cast
into concrete
7-wire greased tendon

Screw in cap
filled with grease

PVC d
ductt castt
into concrete

Sheath
Sheathover
overtendon
tendon
cut
cutback
backfrom
fromend
end

The grease used in this particular type of unbonded tendon (12.5mm

diameter Tyesa
y
7-wire strand)) was found to emulsify
y when in contact
with water. This allowed any water that had penetrated the anchor
zone not only to come into contact with the bare part of the tendons
but also to penetrate into the sheathing.

Summary
The alloy steel of the particular prestressing tendons
used
d iin thi
this structure
t t
h
had
d a microstructure
i
t t
susceptible to stress-corrosion cracking, and the
stress in the tendons was greater than 50% of the
yield strength.
Moisture in contact with the tendons provided a
corrosive environment.
On examination after the collapse
collapse, it was found that
stress-corrosion cracking had taken place in many
parts of the unbonded tendons.

Poor Management

Case Study 14
Placing of precast units
Floor collapse

precast slab jacked

into position

precast slabs

spine
i b
beam

PLACINGOFPRECASTUNITS
The spine beam
beam, carrying
precast planks, lost its bearing
because a labourer, in trying to
wall supporting
pp
g jac
jack o
one
eo
of the
e final
a p
planks
a s into
o
spine beam
position, actually levered out
the wall panel supporting the
end of the spine
p
beam.
This caused the spine beam to
lose its bearing which led to the
collapse of the floor
floor.

wall shifted outwards causing

spine
i b
beam tto fall
f ll off
ff its
it bearing
b i

precastt slab
l b jjacked
k d
into position

Plan
The lacer bars had not been
inserted at the time of erecting
and laying of the floor elements.

lacer bars not in

place
l
att ti
time off jjacking
ki

Section

Summary
This is an example where the management should have had
more control on how the erection and placing of precast units
took place.
More importantly, it should have ensured that the lacer bars
at the ends of the spine beam were in place before the
erection of floor units took place.

Poor Planning

Case Study 15
Power station on the river Thames
The power station was constructed on the north bank of the Thames
in the early 1960s
1960s. Originally it was to be coal fired to produce
1500MW.
The foundations
Th
f
d ti
off th
the power station
t ti sit
it on 20
20,000
000 reinforced
i f
d
concrete piles.

Special on site casting yard

Each pile was 430mm square, 18m long.

Piling rig
Several pile rigs were set up with
diesel driven hammers.
A pile
il was h
hoisted
i t d iinto
t position
iti and
d
then given a tap by the hammer to get
the point of the pile through the top
crust of the marshland.
Then under its own weight the pile
dropped 15m through the mud!
Each pile was then driven into the
gravel to a specified
g
p
set.

Procedure
Piling
g commenced from the edge
g of the
site closest to the river and continued
inland 250m placing piles at 1.5m
centres (on average)
average).
This took about eighteen months.
Excavation for the foundations started
from the same end and commenced
six months after the start of piling.
Concreting of the foundations also
started from the same end of the site.
After a year after the start of piling
piling,
when concreting of the foundations
had reached about a 1/3 of the way
along
l
th
the site,
it it was discovered
di
d that
th t
the tops of the piles that were still
exposed were moving.
Measurements showed that this movement was up to 1.5m !

Remedial work
a) Additional 600 vertical piles to compensate the
reduction in vertical capacity of the existing piles
b) Additional 200 raked piles to compensate the horizontal
force component caused by the bent piles.
The resulting remedial and extra work caused by this
movement was very large. For example the existing piles
no longer followed the plan layout for the eight inlet and
outlet culverts that wound their way through the site
bringing cooling water to the condensers and returning it to
the River Thames.
On site decisions
decisions, making changes to the design
design, had to
be taken each day

Summary
The programme for the contracts on this project did not
foresee the problems caused by progressing the work from
one end of the site to the other.
In previous similar projects there had been a significant
delay between piling and the start of excavation which
allowed enough time for much of the soil pressure to
dissipate.
In order to keep a tight programme one possible solution
might have been to start the piling from both ends of the
site.

Deliberate Malpractice

Case Study 16
Floor with excessive deflection
The building in question was a telephone exchange and had
been built in the mid 1970s, ten years earlier than the
i
investigation.
ti ti
Th
The slab
l b off a ttypical
i l end
db
bay h
had
db
been d
designed
i
d
as single way spanning between two shallow haunched beams.
The span was 9m with a slab only 250mm thick which many
engineers would consider to be too thin.
Ten years after the building had been completed the operators
were complaining that the deflection was still increasing and
causing some of the switch-gear to become faulty. The
designers asked for a second opinion on the design of the slab.
The calculations and drawings were checked and no major flaw
was found. It was just conceivable that creep and shrinkage
effects were still increasing
increasing. A site visit was arranged
arranged.

Typical end bay layout

9m

A
600

250 thick slab

300

Excessive deflection
(still increasing after 10
years)

A
A-A

Summary (1)
The visit to site included the inspection of the slab close to a column.
The screed had been removed to expose the top surface of the
structural
t t l slab.
l b A
As a crude
d check
h k off th
the h
hardness
d
off the
th concrete
t
surface, a penknife was used. Quite unexpectedly the blade of the knife
penetrated into the concrete surface right up to the hilt ! A further
check of the soffit of the slab gave a similar result.
An additional interesting feature of the soffit was the presence of a
number of shallow disc shaped (flying
( flying saucers)
saucers ) pieces of concrete
(150mm diameter) which were separating from the surface. One such
piece came away as it was being examined.
Although the slab had been designed to span one-way, the supporting
beam was sufficiently flexible for the slab to behave more like a flat
slab The flying
slab.
flying saucers
saucers had occurred in the compression areas of the
soffit and were considered to be the effect of spalling.

Summary (2)
It was clear that the slab in question required immediate additional
support and the rest of the building required core testing.
After cores had been taken throughout the building it was discovered
that the concrete cube strength, which should have been 25MPa, was
on average only 5MPa
5MPa.
The sub-contractor had deliberately
y reduced the cement content in
the specified mix. Major remedial work followed.

C
Case
St
Study
d 17
Insitu columns supporting a precast building
This building was constructed with precast elements above ground.
Below ground the foundations, columns and beams were
constructed insitu
insitu.
Construction had reached an advanced stage when cracks
appeared
d iin th
the iinsitu
it columns
l
jjustt b
below
l
th
the connection
ti with
ith th
the
precast columns.

Layout of elements

Precast beams, columns

and slabs

See detail of column

connection
Street level
Existing
retaining
wall

Transfer beams
Insitu beams and columns

Intended construction procedure

Column cast with large
polystyrene box-out

Column reinforced
as normal

Polystyrene totally
removed; CHS 114 dia
dowel cast in with fresh
concrete filling box-out
box out

As constructed
CHS dowel pushed
into polystyrene

Only thin layer of

concrete cast in
top of column

Only top layer of

polystyrene removed
Existing insitu
column

First sign of imminent failure

Load from 7
floors above
Precast column

Grouting tube

Severe cracking of
i it column
insitu
l
wallll

Load from precast unit

supported on thin outer
shell of insitu column

Insitu column

Remedial work
In order to repair the top of the insitu columns the
load from the precast building had to be removed
removed.
This was achieved byy providing
p
g props
p p and jjacks
close to the existing precast columns at each floor
level and creating a new load path to the ground.
This released the load in the insitu columns below, and
allowed the required remedial work to take place
- reconstruction of the top of the insitu columns.

Thank you for your attention