ETHICS AND THE

ECONOMY
2014-2015
Danielle Zwarthoed (supply teacher for Pr Yannick Vanderborght)
Contact: danielle.zwarthoed@usaintlouis.be / danielle.zwarthoed@uclouvain.be

Course 1: Introduction How issues of justice arise

everywhere just distribution in the classroom
September 18

1. Introduction
Ethics and the Economy VS Ethics and Economics
ECONOMICS: the science that studies economic phenomena
THE ECONOMY: the economic system
It is a course on Ethics and the Economy, not a course on Ethics and Economics. The Word Economics
refers to the discipline, that is, the science that studies economic activity. Therefore the course will NOT
focus on:
-

Normative Economics, as opposed to Positive Economics. Positive Economics study Facts what
is, what can be observed, described, explained. Example: how prices are determined on the market.
Normative Economics deal with Values what ought to be/should be. Normative Economics
(sometimes referred to as Welfare Economics) study various ways to evaluate the way an
economic and social system allocates resources among individuals, by using the formal apparatus
of economics1.
The moral responsibility of economic agents, that is, whether economic agents can/should behave
ethically (for instance, should consumers buy fair trade coffee rather than regular coffee?).

For those who are interested, further references in normative economics : Amartya Sen, On Ethics and
Economics (Oxford, UK; New York, NY, USA: Wiley-Blackwell, 1991); Marc Fleurbaey, Thories
conomiques de la justice (Paris: Economica, 1996); Marc Fleurbaey, Economics and Economic Justice , in
The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, d. par Edward N. Zalta, Summer 2012, 2012,
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2012/entries/economic-justice/; John E Roemer, Theories of Distributive
Justice (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1996).

Ethics and the Economy: a definition

ETHICS: ethics is a reflection on our beliefs about, not what agents do, but about what they ought to do.
Everyone has beliefs about what individuals or groups should do in specific situations. Agents may be
individuals (you or me), but also groups and institution (the State, for example). Our ethical beliefs are
sometimes obvious (ex: we should not torture young children). But sometimes they are just prejudices (ex:
in the past, many people believed that we should grant less rights to women, that women were inferior to
men.). Or sometimes we strongly disagree on what we ought to do in a situation (ex: should we give social
money to the poor without asking them to try to find a job? If we do so, are we rewarding laziness or are
we compensating for a dire economic injustice?). Ethicists, that I, experts in ethics, may help us here.
They can help us to check whether we have the right ethical beliefs. They can help us to understand why
we disagree on certain moral issues. An expert in ethics is someone who has enough knowledge of the
basic ethical theories and who knows how to apply them to practical issues. Everyone has at least some
degree of expertise in ethics!
THE ECONOMY: an economy, or an economic system, is the way the production, exchange and
allocation of valuable goods are organized. Valuable goods might include income, but also health,
education, infrastructures,and perhaps also happiness!
The different types of economies we know:
Capitalism is a specific form of market economy, where the organization of the production is controlled
by those who bring capital 2
According to Milton Friedman, there are only two alternative economic systems3:
1. Socialism : means of production are publicly owned
2. Capitalism : means of production are privately owned
According to James Meade : 5 types of system, whose distinctive features are (i) ownership of means of
production ; (ii) degree to which the State intervenes in the economy4.
1. State socialism (means of production publicly owned, strong intervention of the State
2. Market socialism (market economy, means of production are collectively owned, strong
intervention from the State)
3. Welfare State Capitalism means of production are privately owned, but the State intervenes a lot
to redistribute the financial and human capital5
4. Minimal welfare-state capitalism: the State intervenes less
5. Laisser-faire capitalism: no intervention from the State, private ownership of the means of
production
How the economy is organized depends on
-

Laws

Marc Fleurbaey, Capitalisme ou dmocratie?: Lalternative du XXIe sicle (Paris: Grasset & Fasquelle, 2006),
13. Personal translation.
3
Friedman, Milton (1962). Capitalism and Freedom, University of Chicago Press
4
Meade, James (1964). Efficiency, Equality and the Ownership of Property, George Allen & Unwin, London.
See also Elster & Moene (1989) Alternatives to Capitalism, Cambridge University Press.
5
Note that Meade gathers Market socialism and Welfare-State capitalism under the more general term
Property-Owning Democracy , which describes a society where the property of financial and human capital is
widely distributed in all the population.

Institutions (the State, supranational institutions such as the EU or the UN, firms, the economic
system, associations, families, schools and educational institutions, even churches). An
institution is a stable set of rules and practices organizing collective life.
Particular actions (individual or collective), such as political decisions or personal choices.

The economy may be evaluated from an ethical point of view. We may say, for instance, that a particular
policy is unjust. This is what this course is about: the ethical evaluation of the economy.

2. How issues of justice arise everywhere justice in the

classroom
READING: Whom Must We Treat Equally for Educational Opportunity to be Equal? By Christopher
Jencks, Ethics, Vol. 98, No. 3. (Apr., 1988), pp. 518-533.

2.1. Justice in Education

Education is a valuable good. Ii is valuable for individuals: education gives access to jobs and socioeconomic opportunities; educated individuals can better take care of themselves: they are better informed
citizens, are healthier, tend to have less children; education may also be rewarding in itself (the pleasure to
learn). Education is also valuable for society: educated people are more skilled, therefore more productive
(Human capital approach). Education has a positive impact on population control and longevity. Education
is necessary in democracies, so that citizens understand their rights and political programmes.
Unfortunately, not everyone has access to education. Some data:
-

According to the OCDE, if almost 70% of the 25-34 years old Koreans attain tertiary education,
only 10% of the Brazilians do (Belgium: 45%)6.
According to the World Bank, if the literacy rate is 99-100 % in most developed countries, it is
only 15% in Niger, 32 % in Afghanistan or 37% in Chad. (Note that we estimate that 10% of the
population of Brussels is considered as illiterate. 793 million illiterate people in the world.

Access to education means having the possibility to actually attend school, from the primary to the
tertiary level. But it also means that the schools should have sufficient resources to make sure students
actually learn. Therefore students educational achievements depend on many decisions: how much we do
spend on each student (the sum of public and private spending), teachers salaries, the time students spend
in the classroom, the student-teacher ratio, teachers qualification, how students are sorted in schools and in
the classroom (peer effect may improve educational outcomes). Students who come to school are not
blank pages: they have their own talents, tastes, already developed cognitive and non-cognitive skills.
But they do also have parents (family environment), who themselves might be educated or not. An
educated or even just an encouraging parent may be as much a valuable educational resource as is a
teacher.
Equal Educational Opportunity: what does it mean?
An educational opportunity is the real possibility to have access to educational goods

See OECD (2012), Education at a Glance 2012: OECD Indicators, OECD Publishing. If you want very
comprehensive data on education, this report is really useful.

Real possibility (having the means to achieve something) VS formal possibility (not being
prevented from achieving something)
Educational opportunities include access to schooling, but also getting ones share of the teachers
attention and time!

2.2. What Jencks says in this article

The problem
The question Jencks tries to answer: Everyone agrees equal educational opportunity is desirable. Everyone
agrees equality in educational opportunities requires schools and universities to treat equal equally. Now,
we know educational institutions do not treat all students equally. For example, they do not give all
students the same grade. And we do agree it is better this way. The problem is that many people disagree
on who these equals are, whom schools and universities should treat equally and whom they should not.
How Jencks tries to answer this question: Jencks makes a thought experiment: he elaborates a fictive
example. This very simple example allows him to capture the main features of the philosophical problem
(think of this as a laboratory experiment in ethics). Jencks thought experiment is the following:
-

Suppose a 3rd grade reading class (8 years old children approximatively).

Suppose the teacher, Ms Higgins, wants to realize justice in education. Justice in education
consists in equality of educational opportunities. She wants to know how to distribute educational
resources among children in order to achieve justice.
But the educational resources (her time and her attention) Ms Higgins can distribute are scarce.
She only spends a limited amount of time with children, and she cannot give each child a full day
and all her attention.
Moreover, children are young perhaps we cannot hold them responsible for certain things.

Ms Higgins has at her disposal 5 ethical theories/5 theories of justice in education, and she has to decide
which one is the best.

The theories of justice in education

See the readings.

Why these theories do not help Ms Higgins to make a decision

Democratic Equality
The core idea: Justice is equality.
Why it might be the right theory of justice: in democracies, every citizen should be treated equally.
Therefore, in schools in democracy, every child should be treated equally. We have the moral intuition that
it matters a lot that human beings should be treated equally (they have equal dignity, deserve equal
respect..). See discussion in class.
Why Jencks thinks it does not work: no existing school treats children equally in this sense. We believe
it is not efficient: some children will get to much time and attention, while others will not get enough.
What we may answer to Jencks: Jencks dismisses perhaps democratic equality too quickly. It could be
important, as a matter of self-respect and self-esteem, that children receive their equal share of attention
from the teacher.

Moralistic Justice
The core idea: Justice is a matter of rewarding those who deserve it and punishing those who deserve it.
Remark: we can understand the idea that students should be rewarded for their merit in two ways:
(i)

(ii)

The aristocratic way (not in Jenckss article): students should be rewarded for their natural
abilities, skills, qualities, etc. For instance, an exceptionally gifted student should be rewarded
for this (by giving prizes or good grades to those who have a high IQ for example)
Problem: this means that we do not treat all human beings equally. We punish some people for
being less gifted even through no fault of their own. Moreover, this view assumes that we
should not treat all human beings as equals, which is incompatible with the idea of democratic
equality.
The democratic way (the one Jencks discusses): Ms Higgins should reward students who make
more effort, regardless of their natural abilities, their social backgrounds or of how it will
affect their motivation or the motivation of those who do not do well.

Why it might be the right theory of justice: virtue is valuable. Hard-working students expect being
treated better by the teacher than the students who do not care.
Why Jencks thinks it does not work: FIRST, for moralistic justice to be democratic and not aristocratic,
Ms Higgins must only reward the intention to make efforts, and not the results. The lazy student who is
exceptionally talented should not be rewarded according to moralistic justice, while the slow but hardworking student should be. But we cannot observe intentions. We can only observe achievements. If a
5

talented student does not make any effort but read well anyway, how can Ms Higgins know that? She will
reward a student who does not deserve it, which is unjust. SECOND, we cannot assess 8 years old
childrens responsibility is the same way as we do assess adults responsibility. THIRD, the ability to make
efforts might depend on ones social background. If parents value schooling and education, of if they value
hard work, the child will be more spontaneously a hard-working person too. Thus, by rewarding effort, Ms
Higgins might in fact privilege socially advantaged children.
Note: rewarding students might work as an incentive. If students know they will get more attention from
the teacher, then they will work harder and this will increase the classrooms overall achievements. But this
is not the moralistic theory of justice that justifies that, but the utilitarian one!

Weak Human Justice

The core idea: Justice is a matter of compensating for social and economic inequalities (NOT for natural
ones)
Why it might be the right theory of justice:society is responsible for the fact that some children have less
opportunities to get a good education, because of their social and economic background. Therefore, the
educational system (including Ms Higgins) should neutralize these unjust inequalities.
Why Jencks thinks it does not work the distinction between social and natural factors of educational
inequality is arbitrary. Why should Ms Higgins help the students who perform badly because of economic
disadvantages and not because of genetic disadvantages? Moreover, it is not so sure that children are not
responsible for their failure and success. But how to draw the line between what society is responsible for
and what individuals are responsible for?
2 further remarks: (1) the distinction between social and natural factors is not self-evident. For
example, IQ, which is generally considered as a natural ability, actually depends on economic factors to a
large extent: early childhood malnutrition, lack of stimulations during childhood (with games and
computers, for example), different educational methods, may affect the development of cognitive skills and
therefore the level of IQ. (2) a reason why weak human justice prefers not compensate for genetic
disadvantages is that these are tied to our identity, while social and economic factors are not. If Ms Higgins
specifically targets her actions on genetically disadvantages children, then she might stigmatize them.

Strong Humane Justice

The core idea: Justice is about compensating for economic, social AND natural disadvantages
Why it might be the right theory of justice: children are not responsible for what cause them to do badly.
They are not responsible for their lack of natural talents, for the fact that they parents cannot help them, and
even for the fact that they are less motivated (because it might be the case that the motivation to work also
depends on childrens background, though Jencks is not sure about that).
Why Jencks thinks it does not work: First, it is difficult for the teacher to find ways to offset all these
advantages. Even if Ms Higgins gives all the resources to the worst readers, they will never catch up. This
sounds like a huge waste of resources.
Note: It is worth asking whether giving more time and attention is the right way to compensate for low
educational achievements. We may imagine for example that we could give up low achievers education,
but still give them some money so that they can make a living even without a goo formal education.

Utilitarianism
The core idea: Justice is about increasing happiness. Because happiness depends to some extent on how
wealthy a society is, we should produce more wealth. And the more educated a population is, the wealthier
society is. Therefore Ms Higgins should make sure to produce as much education as possible in the
classroom.
There are two ways of improving childrens educational achievement:
(1) The incentive model:the teacher motivates students by rewarding them with more attention
then students learn better NOTE: the reason why Ms Higgins should reward students according to
moralistic justice is because the reward is due (the teacher has the moral obligation to award
their effort with a prize);
the reason why Ms H. should reward students according to utilitarianism is because the reward is
an instrument to make them work harder (but if it did not work well enough, she would have
NO moral obligation to award them)
(2) The investment model: the teacher invests more time and attention for students who do less well,
because having a portion of the population who is not educated may affect social wealth
Why Jencks thinks utilitarianism does not work:
Ms Higgins has not enough information to make a sound decision. Depending on the facts she knows, she
may end up treating children in very different ways. And if she just decides to minimize the risk of
mistakes, she will just devote equal attention and time to each student democratic equality???
Note: if it is too demanding for an individual to gather all these information, we may ask to a State or an
expert to do that, and then help Ms H in her decisions.

ETHICS AND THE

ECONOMY
2014-2015
Danielle Zwarthoed (supply teacher for Pr Yannick Vanderborght)
Contact: danielle.zwarthoed@usaintlouis.be / danielle.zwarthoed@uclouvain.be

Course 2:Utilitarianism
1. Introduction
Jencks (in the article you read last week) says: Utilitarian theories of resource allocation try to maximize
the average level of well-being in a society rather than trying to ensure just treatment of individuals.
What does it mean? The core intuition (which is not a precise formulation) is that Utilitarianism claims that
a just society is a society where the greatest happiness is achieved.
Why Utilitarianism is an attractive theory of justice:
1) We have a sense that a just society should be a happy society. Happiness is important. Example:
Bhutan has designed and uses a Gross National Happiness Index to assess wealth, instead of the
Gross National Product indicator.
2) Utilitarianism is a secular theory of justice, in the sense that it does not rely on unproven beliefs to
make its point. Utilitarianism does not base its moral principles on ideal entities such as God,
human free will, the tradition, etc. The only thing that matters for Utilitarians is happiness or wellbeing. This sounds reasonable, because, if we can neither observe nor agree on the existence of
God or human free will (some believe in them, others not), everyone can observe the fact that
human beings (and also animals) want to be happy and can agree on that. Therefore, what matters
for a Utilitarian that our political and individual decisions should improve human happiness.
3) Utilitarianism is a consequentialist theory of justice. A consequentialist theory is a theory that
claims that what if of moral importance are the consequences, that is, what are the effects of a
behaviour or a policy. According to consequentialism, all the features of an action that do not have
observable consequences are of no moral importance. Examples: cf. Kymlicka pp 18-19.
4) Moreover, the concept of utility utilitarian philosophers is the same as the concept of utility
economists use. Understanding Utilitarianism may help you to better understand the policy
decisions economists recommend.
Some famous Utilitarian authors: Jeremy Bentham (18th Century), John Stuart Mill (19th century), Henry
Sidgwick (19th Century), Peter Singer (contemporary philosopher, famous for his work and his involvement
in animal ethics).
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2. What is happiness? The concept of utility

Many words are used by utilitarians to describe what matters for them: happiness, well-being, welfare,
utility, preferences, etc.
Beware! For a Utilitarian, Utility does not mean usefulness. It means the effects a state of affairs has
on the level of individual or collective well-being (or welfare)
But how to define utility? How do we know that individuals are happier?

2.1. Utility = pleasure? Welfare hedonism

A first definition of utility could be pleasure, that is, a pleasing or agreeable feeling, a pleasing or
agreeable psychological state.
Hedonism = the doctrine that claims that what is pleasant is good and therefore that we should pursue
pleasure first.

Two implications of this definition:

(i) Experiences will be evaluated according to the quantity of pleasure they provide to us So-called
low pleasures (bowling, commercial music, eating hamburgers) as could be better than the socalled high pleasures (poetry, opera, eating caviar) if they provided more enjoyment to us.
(ii) Every being who is susceptible to have experiences of pleasure and pain is concerned by our moral
theory. For example, Peter Singer argues that, because animals can suffer, we ought to make sure
their happiness is secured. On the other hand, because foetuses have less capacity to feel pain and
pleasure, abortion is allowed (at least until foetuses reach a stage of development such that they
can feel pleasure and pain).

Three difficulties with this definition:

(i)

(ii)

(iii)

A practical difficulty: feeling pleasure is a very personal experience. Some people are more
sensitive than others; some people also express more their feelings than others. It is even more
difficult to assess the degree of pleasure and pain animals have, because we cannot
communicate with them. Therefore, designing a scale of pleasure and pain and assigning a
number to personal experiences is at the risk of being rather arbitrary.
It is too poor: reducing all the worthwhile things in human life to pleasure may induce us to
neglect certain important aspects. Certain experiences are painful: learning, writing a book (or
even reading a difficult one), training for a competition. However, many of us find them
rewarding, because they promote their flourishing. Utility understood as pleasure cannot
account for this.
Alternative: non-hedonistic mental state utility: even if the mental state of the writer is not
pleasing in itself, it is desirable. Understanding utility as a non-hedonistic mental state
accounts for the fact that we value these painful experiences.
It is not authentic: Example: Nozicks experience machine what matters for us is not only
that we feel pleasure. It is that the things we feel truly happen.

2.2. Utility = preference satisfaction?

According to this account of utility, what matters is that, if I prefer a state of affairs A to a state of affairs B,
whatever the reasons I have for that, then it is better for me that A happens rather than B. I may prefer A to
B because it is more pleasing or because it will produce the desired mental state. But I may also prefer A to
B because A has some features that I find valuable. For example, if I strongly believe that famine is wrong,
and if in A there is not famine while there is famine in B, I will prefer A to B.

2 problems: mistaken preferences and adaptive preferences

Mistaken preferences: our preferences are not always sufficiently informed. Therefore satisfying our
preferences does not always increase our well-being The pizza story

Adaptive preferences. Some preferences are not freely formed. They are formed in response to bad
conditions. It has been shown that very poor people do not expect much from life and thus tend to be
satisfied with very small amounts of goods. They adapt their preferences to what is available. Had they
lived in more favourable circumstances, they would have developed other preferences. Therefore, we
cannot say their preferences are their true preferences.

Example: Indian widows during the Great Bengal famine 1:

in Singur, near Calcutta, in 1944 the year after the Great Bengal Famine of 1943 the All-India
Institute of Hygiene and Public Health carried out a health survey which included questions on the
perception of ones own health, in addition to medical examinations by doctors [see Lal and Seal (1949)].
There were many widows and widowers in the population surveyed. In answer to the question as to whether
they were ill or in indifferent health, 48.5 percent of the widowERS (men, that is) confided to being thus
afflicted, while the corresponding proportion of wirdows was merely 2.5 per cent. The contrast is even
more interesting when we look at the response to the question as to whether one was in indifferent health,
leaving out the category of being ill for which some clear-cut medical criteria do exist. 45.6 percent of the
widowers confessed to have the perception of being in indifferent health. In contrast, the proportion of the
widows who had this perception was it is reported- exactly zero!

2.3. Utility = informed preferences satisfaction?

According to this account, what matters is that informed preferences are satisfied. But what counts as an
informed preference?
Brandts proposition2: a good preference is the preference a rational person would have. But what is a
rational person? Brandt relies on findings in contemporary empirical psychology to answer this question.
He suggests that a rational preference is the preference a person would develop after having undertaken a
cognitive psychotherapy. The beliefs and the desires that make us prefer something are sometimes
mistaken. Common sources of mistakes include false beliefs, social conditioning, reasoning errors,
exaggerated desire for something because of early deprivationA cognitive psychotherapy confronts our
preferences with relevant information in order to change them. For this information to be effective in
changing our preferences, it should be repeatedly represented to the person (i), in an ideally vivid way (ii),
and at an appropriate time (iii). Example: should I prefer going to class or staying in bed?
See Kymlicka pp 25-28 for a critical discussion of the informed preference accounts of utility.

3. From individual utility to collective utility: the

maximization of social well-being
Let us assume that we found out a satisfying definition of utility. Utilitarianism does not only say that we
should maximize (that is, making it as high as possible) individual utility, but also collective utility. That is,
for each option we have, for each policy or action we can choose, we:
-

Look at the individual utilities in each option (we look at how the option affects individual levels
of well-being)
Then, we aggregate all these utilities, which means that we put them together and calculate the
collective level of well-being. Two examples of how we can aggregate utilities:
o We may for example attribute a number to each individual degree of pleasure/preference
satisfaction/informed preference satisfaction, and then calculate the sum of these numbers.

Amartya Sen, Commodities and Capabilities (Amsterdam; New York; New York, N.Y., U.S.A.: NorthHolland; Sole distributors for the U.S.A. and Canada, Elsevier Science Pub. Co., 1985), 52 53.
2
Richard B. Brandt, A Theory of the Good and the Right, Revised edition (Amherst, N.Y: Prometheus Books,
1998).

If it is not possible to attribute a number to individual degrees of pleasure, then we might

just look at whether their preferences are satisfied or not, and look at how many
preferences are satisfied. The best choice will be the choice where the majority is satisfied.

Maximizing collective utility is choosing the option that produces the greatest amount of utility, according
to the calculus proposed here.
The Utilitarian course of action is therefore impartial. It does not matter whose utility a
given course of action increases, as long as the collective utility is maximized.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Ms Higginss example (last week reading): Ms Higgins must maximize the well-being of society. Society
includes:
-

The children who read well They will be happier if Ms Higgins gives more attention to them,
but it might not be in their best interest to live with poor uneducated people in the future (poverty
causes criminality, overpopulation, etc).
The children who read poorly They will be happier if Ms Higgins gives more attention to them,
but it might not be in their best interest to live with talented people who did not get the opportunity
to develop their talents (otherwise, these smart people could have created jobs for them, they could
have discovered new technologies or new medicines that would have increased social well-being,
etc)
Other members of the society: they might benefit from a more educated generation (on the
average), but also from an increase of the number of talented people.

In order to maximize social utility, Ms Higgins must predict how much utility will be produced from:
-

Her decision to give her time and attention to the best achievers the INCENTIVE MODEL
Her decision to give her time and attention to those who read poorly the INVESTMENT
MODEL

Two interpretations of utility maximization (Kymlicka, Two

arguments for utility maximization):
(a) Average Utilitarianism (or Equal Consideration of Intereste): Equal consideration of
interests: the utilitarian calculus gives equal weight to each individuals utility Therefore,
maximizing utility is maximizing the average level of well-being in society
(b) Total Utilitarianism (our Teleological Utilitarianism): What matters is that we produce as
much utility as possible, regardless of how high the average level of individual welfare is.
Maximizing utility is maximizing the total well-being in society.
Implications for population policies
-

Average utilitarianism: we should only create people that are able to reach the highest possible
level of well-being This would restrict a lot the freedom to procreate
Total utilitarianism: we should create as much people as possible, because each new human being
adds even a little to the total sum of welfare. Therefore, a situation with a huge but barely happy
population is required.

Both are very counterintuitive.

5

4. The criticisms of Utilitarianism

Here are some of the more compelling criticisms of utilitarianism:

(1)

Utilitarianism is indifferent to the morally significant

relationships with have with others

Because it is impartial and consequentialist, utilitarianism does not take into account the fact that we have
sometimes special relationships with some other people. These relationships create obligations
utilitarianism cannot account for. Utilitarianism does not take seriously:
-

Promises: according to utilitarians, I must respect my promise only insofar as it affects my level of
well-being, the person I made a promise to or the rest of the society. See Kymlicka:

Commitments: according to Utilitarianism, I must respect my commitments only insofar as

violating commitments would affect the collective level of welfare it does not matter whether
you are a parent, a Left-Wing activist, a Christian or an employee at the university of Saint-Louis.

Solution: Rule Utilitarianism (vs Act Utilitarianism): Act Utilitarianism (the version of utilitarianism I have
discussed till now) states that should only evaluate courses of action, regardless of the rules they obey to.
Rule Utilitarianism states that, because abiding some social and moral rules creates more social welfare,
then we should respect these rules in various different situations. Therefore we should (i) choose rules
according to their ability to promote the maximization of welfare and (ii) evaluate the rules that determined
a given course of action. In other words, moral rules are justified by the positive consequences they are
expected to create. But, depending on the social context, intuitively inacceptable rules might produce more
welfare (for instance, racist rules in a racist society)

(2)

Utilitarianism takes into account illegitimate preferences and

external preferences

ILLEGITIMATE PREFERENCES/Utilitarianism aims to satisfy as much preferences as possible,

regardless of the moral value of these preferences. But some preferences are intuitively wrong:
6

EXTERNAL PREFERENCES/ In addition, many people do have anti-egalitarian preferences. Many people
are envious or jealous. They seem to care more about having more than others (or at least as much as them
think of this phenomenon: your neighbour bought a new car, and now you feel compelled to buy a new
car too - ), more than having the sufficient amount of money and resources needed to be happy. If
utilitarianism is to take into account all preferences, this might justify an unequal society.
Solution: laundering preferences? We might either try to exclude obviously antisocial preferences from the
calculus, or to educate people so that they develop more acceptable preferences.

(3)

Utilitarianism in not egalitarian (Kymlicka Inadequate

conception of equality)

Another worry with utilitarianism is that it only considers the collective level of well-being, but not the way
well-being or resources are distributed between individuals.
The Utilitarian response: Decreasing Marginal Utility Law
Intuitive idea: the less I have, the more happiness I will get from a little bit more. If I am very thirsty, I will
get more satisfaction from a glass of water than if I am not thirsty. A beggar will get more satisfaction from
a gift of 10 euros than Warren Buffett. Therefore, in order to produce more satisfaction from a given
amount of wealth, we should allocate this wealth in priority to the most deprived people in our society.
Looking at the figure, we see that taking1000 to R (the rich) to give them to P (the poor) increases total
utility, because: Rs utility loss < Ps utility gain.
However, this response faces some problems.
(1) The adaptive preferences problem (see above): The poor may adapt to their circumstances and
lower their expectations. So they do not claim for the 10 , because they do not perceive they need
it.
(2) The expensive tastes problem: some people, for various reasons, need more expensive goods in
order to reach the same level of well-being. If you were born in a rich family, you might have been
accustomed to living in a 100 square meters house, to drinking champagne every day, etc.
Lowering your standard of living is likely to create a welfare loss much higher than what the
reasoning of Decreasing Marginal Utility suggests.
(3) The inequalities matter as such problem: even if the Decreasing Marginal Utility Law is true,
some philosophers (like Kymlicka) worry about this line of reasoning because they think that what
matters is not that we produce as much collective welfare as we can. It is that we provide equal
consideration and respect to every person, and this equal consideration and respect means that we

ought to give an equal share of wealth to everyone, regardless of her ability to convert this fair
share into well-being.

5. Conclusion: Implementing Utilitarianism

Political Utilitarianism VS Moral Utilitarianism:
-

Political Utilitarianism: institutions should comply with utilitarian principles (Government House
utilitarianism) Only a small elite believes in utilitarian principles and applies them to a society
that behaves differently and acts according to other moral theories or intuitions. Problem very
technocratic and violates the democratic requirement of publicity
Moral Utilitarianism: individuals should comply with utilitarian principles Every citizen tries to
act according to utilitarian rules. Problems (i) pragmatic: how can an individual gather and deal
with all the information needed to maximize welfare (cf Ms Higginss example) ; (ii)
psychologically infeasible: we have special relationships and commitments that prevent us from
being impartial, and these commitments are part of a valuable life.
On moral utilitarianism, cf. Peter Singer:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=onsIdBanynY

ETHICS AND THE

ECONOMY
2014-2015
Danielle Zwarthoed (supply teacher for Pr Yannick Vanderborght)
Contact: danielle.zwarthoed@usaintlouis.be / danielle.zwarthoed@uclouvain.be

Course 3:Liberal Egalitarianism

1. Introduction
Liberalism the liberal insight: individual freedom is of primary moral importance. Liberalism is born in
reaction to religious intolerance (16th and 17th Century), absolutism (17the Century) and mercantilism
(State intervention in the economy in order to increase its power the interests of the king are superior to
anyone elses interests building colonies, protectionist policies).
One of the most important liberal egalitarian philosopher : John Rawls (Theory of Justice, 1971).
Rawls wanted to propose a satisfactory alternative to:
-

Utilitarianism, because he feared utilitarianism did not take the values of freedom and equality
seriously
Intuitionism. Intuitionists say that, in order to know if a decision or a policy is right (morally
correct), we should appeal to our intuitions (our spontaneous beliefs and judgments).Rawls was not
convinced by intuitionism because intuitions sometimes conflict with each other. Rawls wanted to
try to build a coherent theory of justice able to organize and hierarchize these intuitions and the
corresponding principles.

In order to do so, Rawls uses the social contract device. Philosophers who previously used the social
contract are Locke, Hobbes, Rousseau, Kant. The social contract is not a real contract. It is a hypothetical
device. It is used to evaluate current social organizations. Social contract theorists imagine a fictitious
state of nature (which has nothing to do with Prehistory or primitive societies) where individuals would
live out of any kind of society (this, as far as we know, never occurred human beings have always lived in
groups - ). Then the theorist asks: if these hypothetical/imaginary individuals had the choice between
joining together to form a society, which rules would they choose to rule this society? The rules they could
agree on would become the social contract. In the real world, each time we wonder whether a law is just or
right, or how we should organize the economic or political system, social contract theorists try to figure out
what the social contract would require. The social contract device acts as an intuitive test of fairness.
Rawlss core idea is that the first virtue of a society is justice (and not, as utilitarians would argue,
happiness). Rawlss theory seeks to evaluate whether institutions are just, and not (or to a limited extent)
whether individuals behave justly. For short, institutions are rules and practices. Institutions include the
1

political constitution, legal procedures, the system of trials, the institution of property, the regulations of the
economy, the institution of the family, the education system.
In designing his theory of justice, Rawls was concerned with various issues discussions about social and
economic justice face:
Freedom and equality seem to conflict for example, a very strong redistributive policy, or even
the shift from a liberal to a State-regulated economy is perceived as a limitation of freedom.
There is a popular view that justice is desert, and that a just society is meritocratic those who
should have access to the most desirable social positions should be the most talented and the most
hard-working people See discussion on Jencks paper (Course 1): Who are the most deserving
children? The most talented? But talented people do not have to work hard, so are they really
virtuous? The most hard-working? But some sociologists argue that the disposition to work hard
depends on ones background rather than on ones will.
There is also the levelling down problem: if we only cared about equality, then we could render
society more equal by making everyone as poor as the poorest. Equality obtains, but (as far as I
know) no one would desire such a society. We must thus find an principle of distribution of
resources that is egalitarian in spirit, but that takes into account considerations of efficiency (an
efficient distribution being a distribution that creates more social wealth).

2. What is a just society?

According to Rawls, a just society is a society whose institutions are organized in such a way that they
comply with the following principles of justice:
1st principle (principle of liberty): Each person has an equal claim to a fully adequate scheme of equal
basic rights and liberties, which scheme is compatible with the same scheme for all; and in this scheme the
equal political liberties, and only those liberties, are to be guaranteed their fair value.
2nd principle: Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions:
(a) (principle of fair equality of opportunity)They are to be attached to positions and offices open to all
under conditions of fair equality of opportunity; and
(b) (difference principle) they are to be to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged members of
society12.
The first principle has priority over the second (which means that we should first achieve liberties and then
equality), and the principle of fair equality of opp. has priority over the difference principle. All the
principles have priority over economic efficiency.
How does this conception of justice differ from Utilitarianism?
Concern for other values than well-being: freedom (individual liberties should not be sacrificed for
the sake of utility maximization) and equality (how resources are distributed between individuals
matters more than the total amount of well-being this allocation produces).

This is also called the maximin criterion (which means that we maximize the advantages of those who have
the minimum (the least advantaged, or worst-offs)
2
John Rawls, Political Liberalism (Columbia University Press, 1993), pp5 6. The principles are also
formulated in various ways in John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999); John
Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, ed. Erin Kelly (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2001).

Social and economic advantages are not assessed in terms of utilities but in terms of primary
goods. Primary goods are goods that any rational person should desire, because they are the means
we need to achieve various life plans. Natural primary goods (talents, health) are to be
distinguished from social primary goods. The principles of justice are concerned with the
distribution of social primary goods, which include fundamental liberties (see 1st principle),
opportunities for access to social positions (jobs, offices see principle 2a), and finally income
and wealth, powers and prerogatives of offices and positions of responsibility, and the social basis
of self-respect. (these being distributed according to the difference principle). Some philosophes
have argued that the list of primary goods should also include health, education or leisure time.
How does this conception of justice deal with merit and desert? (see Kymlicka pp 57-60)
Remember the example of Ms Higgins. There were two different reasons justifying the claim that she ought
to give more time and attention to the most hard-working pupils:
(1) moralistic justice said she had to reward them for being so virtuous, so hard-working the idea
being that they deserve this reward.
(2) utilitarianism said that she had to act so that pupils work harder the idea being that giving more
time and attention is an incentive for pupils to work more.
Rawls disagrees with (1). Even the view that inequalities that are due to choices (the choice to work hard,
for example) seems attractive, it misses a point. The point is that there are natural inequalities choices
cannot overcome. Our starting points are unequal: some are handicapped, others have very high IQs. On the
other hand, the fact that talented and skilled people exercise their talents and skills for a high income may
benefit the least advantaged. Therefore, although he is not a utilitarian, Rawls agrees with them that we
should incentivize people to work and exercise their talents in order to create more wealth. Not that as
Utilitarians do he thinks that we should maximize collective utility, but because he thinks that creating
more wealth (to be redistributed) will benefit the worst-offs.
How does this conception of justice address the levelling down problem?
The difference principle says that inequalities are acceptable if, in a situation of perfect equality, the least
advantaged group had less than in an unequal situation. How can that be? The idea is that the total amount
of wealth (the size of the cake ) is not given. It may depend on how resources are allocated between
individuals. And a strictly equal distribution might reduce the size of the cake. 2 mechanisms3 :
> The incentive mechanism: giving more (money, advantages) to some will motivate them to work more
and create more wealth (// if Ms Higgins promises to give more time and attention to the most hardworking pupils, this will encourage pupils to work harder).
> The enabling mechanism: it is socially better if we give more to those who will make the best use of the
money. It is not a good idea to give money to poor innovators or unwise investors (// if Ms Higgins gave all
her time and attention to those of the pupils who are not able to benefit from it, this would be a waste it is
better for her to concentrate on those who can improve their learning thanks to her time and attention)

3. Why these principles? How does Rawls justify them?

See Van Parijs, the Difference Principle , in Freeman S. (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Rawls,
Cambridge UP 2003, pp 203-205.

The circumstances of justice

Issues of social and economic justice arise in certain circumstances, characterized by the fact that
individuals have to cooperate together in order to create wealth. The circumstances of justice:
(i)
(ii)

Moderate scarcity of resources (no scarcity: communism)

Conflict of interests, though individuals have a common interest in cooperating together

The Original Position

How do we know that the rules society members may agree on are just rules? When real people do
negotiate on rules, the result reflects power balance rather than an impartial judgment.
We thus need a hypothetical device, inspired by the social contract, in order to determine what just rules
are. Rawls replaces the state of nature by the original position and suggests that the principles of justice
would be the ones people placed in this original position would choose. But which features of the original
position can guarantee that the choice of the principles of justice is truly wise and impartial?
1. The persons placed in the original position would consider themselves as free and equal. They are
rational (they are capable to know what is good for them and how to achieve it) and reasonable
(they are willing to make concessions and to respect agreements). They have a sense of justice:
they can distinguish what is just from what is not.
2. They have a sufficient knowledge of all the important facts needed to choose principles of justice
that are fit to the real world. They have a good knowledge of political systems, of social
organization, of economic laws and of the basic facts of human psychology.
3. But, in order to guarantee impartiality, they do not have access to a certain kind of information.
This is represented by the idea of the veil of ignorance. What the people in the original position do
not know:

Because every partner in the original position fears that (s)he might become the poorest, or the Black in a
racist society, or the woman in a sexist society, then it is rational for her/him to choose the principles of
justice that benefit the most the worst-offs.
The principles of justice are therefore those on which people placed in the original position could agree on.

4. How does a just society look like?

Implementing the principles of justice
Equal basic rights and liberties for all : a just society would be a democratic society. Democratic decisions
would be structured and perhaps constrained by basic liberties (liberty of conscience and freedom of

thought, freedom of association, freedom of movement, freedom of occupation, the right to personal
property4, equal political rights of democratic participation).
Q: has justice priority over democracy?

Fair equality of opportunity: it requires anti-discrimination laws, but also access to education for all.
Difference Principle: How to maximize the social and economic advantages of the least advantaged?
Maximize the income and wealth of the worst-offs: taxation and redistribution.
Maximizing the social basis of self-respect: redistribution, in the form of social welfare, may affect
the least advantageds self-respect Stigmatisation of the unemployed. Solutions
o prevent inequalities rather than cure them, for instance by increasing access to
education and by taxing more inheritance.
o Basic income a basic income is an income unconditionally paid by the State to all
citizens on an individual basis. It is paid to all without work requirement.

What about future generations?

2 problems that the principles of justice do not address
Excessive debt: in order to secure the current worst-offs social and economic advantages, a just
society may adopt deficit-spending policies future generations will have to pay for.
Natural resources depletion and environmental degradation
In order to address these issues, Rawls proposes an additional principle of justice:
The Just Savings Principle, which requires that each generation should save enough capital in order to
secure just institutions for the next generations. Each generation should maintain the gains of culture and
civilization, and maintain intact those just institutions that have been established, but it must also put aside
in each period of time a suitable amount of real capital accumulation. This saving may take various forms
from net investment in machinery and other means of production to investment in learning and education5
Two stages of economic evolution and the saving requirements that follow:
The Accumulation Stage: society is not wealthy enough to secure just institution and the basic
liberties Each generation must accumulate capital and save more for the next generation than
what it received from the preceding one.
The Steady-State Stage: society is wealthy enough to secure just institutions Positive savings
are authorized but not required any more.
How can we justify this decision from the original position? Rawls rejects the suggestion that all
generations should be involved in the original position this would stretch the fantasy too far, as he says - .
So the partners all belong to the same generation, but they do not know which generation. Therefore they
apply to themselves the principle of just savings they would prefer preceding generations applied to
themselves6.
4

Which is different from property of means of production.

Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 252.
6
This is what Rawls proposed in 2001. In Theory of Justice, he made another suggestion. He proposed that the
partners know to what generation they belong. But he suggested that the original position could rely on the
5

Five economic and social systems

Laissez-Faire
Capitalism

Welfare-State
Capitalism

State Socialism
with a
centrally
controlled
economy
Liberal (or
democratic)
socialism
(JUST)

Propertyowning
democracy
(JUST)

Basic liberties
and the fair
equality of
opportunities
Only formal
(because the
minority who
controls capital
also controls the
political life)
Only formal (see
above). Equality
of opportunities is
formal and not
real

Basic political
liberties are not
respected.
Authoritarian
State. Jobs and
offices are
allocated by the
State
Real liberties and
access to
opportunities are
secured by the
State. Democratic
state

Real liberties and

access to
opportunities are
secured by the
State. Democratic
state

Equality and
poverty

Property of the
means of
production

Economic
efficiency

A very low social

minimum

Private,
concentrated in a
few hands

Supposedly high
(focus on growth)

The social
minimum may be
higher than above,
but:
(i)instable (lack of
willingness to pay
taxes)
(ii)problem with
the social basis of
self-respect
An ideal of
equality is
promoted

Private,
concentrated in a
few hands

Supposedly high,
though
redistributive
policies may
affect it

Collective,
managed by the
State. The
economy is
centrally
controlled

Supposedly low.

Wealth should be
well distributed
among the society,
because everyone
has access to the
dividends of the
collectively owned
capital

Collective,
managed by the
State.

Capital and jobs

are really
accessible to all,
so that everyone
can secure a good
income

Private, but
society is
organized in such
a way that
everyone can have
access to it.

Various solutions
to maintain
competition and
secure efficiency.
Example:
managers of Stateowned firms could
compete for
access to more
capital (in order to
invest it) their
wages would also
be calculated so
that they keep
motivated
Market economy
and efficiency

assumption that partners are altruistic towards next generations (in the same way as parents care about their
childrens well-being).

NOTE: includes
also human capital

ETHICS AND THE

ECONOMY
2014-2015
Danielle Zwarthoed (supply teacher for Pr Yannick Vanderborght)
Contact: danielle.zwarthoed@usaintlouis.be / danielle.zwarthoed@uclouvain.be

Course 4 : Libertarianism
Intuition ; Importance of individual freedom and property rights. Individuals should have the right to freely
use themselves and their belongings. Philosophical libertarians tend to be for
- A free market economy and no taxes (or just the necessary taxes needed to finance the propection of private
property (a police and a judiciary system)
NOTE 3 defences of the free market:
> The utilitarian defence: free market create more wealth, are more efficient, and thus contribute to the
maximization of social welfare. But redistribution increases also social welfare, because of decreasing
marginal utility law (see course on Utilitarianism)
> Hayeks defence: capitalism is the road to freedom. The more the State has the power to control the
economy, the more it will try to limit other individual liberties. But some capitalist economies take place in
authoritative states, and some democratic States do also redistribute a lot (Sweden).
> The (right) libertarian defence: Whatever their effects on social welfare are, State interventions in the
economy are inherently wrong, because they violate property rights.
- Libertarians are against any limitation of individual freedom: individuals should have the right to freely
decide how to use their powers and their possessions as they wish. They should have the right to consume
whatever drug they want to, to have sex and to marry with whoever they want to (as long as the other consents
as well, of course) Libertarians are thus not socially conservative (contrary to most right-wing parties).
A key reference: Nozick, R., [1974], Anarchy, State, and Utopia, New York, Basic Books:

1. What matters for libertarians

The State imposes constraints on individuals. The State coerces individual freedom. Libertarians aim
to distinguish legitimate State coercion from illegitimate ones. Legitimate obligations the State
imposes on individuals are the obligations that comply with and secure individual rights. The
libertarian conception of the State is close to the Anarchists ones. They view the State as essentially
coercive.
a minimal State, limited to the narrow functions of protection against force, theft, fraud, enforcement of
contracts, and so on, is justified; any more extensive State will violate persons rights not to be forced to do
certain things, and is unjustified (Nozick, 1974, p ix quoted by Kymlicka p 104) No public health system,
no public education, no publicly subsidized roads, transportation, etc. The minimal State is justified insofar
as it is the only agency capable of protecting property rights.
Libertarians are individualists (as are liberals in general)

Ethical individualism

Individualism Egoism A theory is individualist if it says that individuals have priority over
other entities (groups, communities). An individual is egoist if she places her individual interests before
others interests.
Methodological individualism Ethical individualism A theory (in social sciences) assumes
methodological individualism if claims that all social phenomena can be explained by genuinely individual
behaviours or action [ex: frequent in Economics], instead of, for example, class factors. A theory (in
philosophy or in ethics) assumes ethical individualism if it claims that individual interests (which can be
described in terms of utilities, primary goods, rights, capabilities) have priority over groups interests (for
instance, the rights of a religious community as a whole). One can be a methodological individualist without
being an ethical individualist. And one can be an ethical individualist without being a methodological
individualist.
Libertarians do not care about utilities or primary goods. They care about individual rights. A right
is a capacity to be or to do something that entails obligations from others. A right can be either moral
(recognised by a moral theory or a theory of justice) or positive (implemented through the
legislation).
Ownership : Libertarians formulate individual rights in terms of property rights (self-ownership, property
rights). Consent is crucial whenever one wants to use someone elses possessions (including someone elses
body or capacities).
According to libertarianism, a just society is a society whose institutions are compatible with a system of
individual rights including the following rights: self-ownership, property-ownership and just transfers.

2. Self-ownership
Why are individual rights important ? Libertarians stipulate that individuals ought to be considered as full
owners of themselves in the same way as one can be the full owner of a house, a car, a painting Individuals
should therefore be considered as full owners of their bodies, powers, and skills, labour force, ideas, and so
on.
The most extreme libertarian position on self-ownership stipulates that individuals should possess maximal
self-ownership. For self-ownership to be maximal, 3 conditions should be met1:
(i)
Full control rights over the use of ones person (the person should be able to grant or deny permission
for using her body, her powers, her ideas)
(ii)
Full rights to transfer (give, sell, exchange, rent) these control rights to others (even selling oneself
into slavery).
(iii)

Full payment immunities : the person should not have to pay anything to exercise these rights

Whatever is done to the person (using her labour force, torture), according to the libertarian, what matters
is that the person gives her consent. The nature of the act she consents to does not matter. For instance, torture
is not unjust in itself. Torture is unjust if the person does not consent to being tortured (but one can guess
quite a few people consent to being tortured).
Maximal self-ownership raises a series of issues:
How to make sure consent is fully free? A lack of information, various pressures, may alter consent.
Therefore, when a person consents to an act that obviously harms her (selling herself into slavery,
being tortured), we should question the value of this consent. Cf. Marxist insight on alienation
and false consciousness.
Why a maximal self-ownership? We may just retain conditions (i) and (ii), or limit the right to
transfer the right to control oneself (for example, many libertarians do not think we should have the
right to sell ourselves into slavery).
Self-ownership alone does not have much value. We need external things to subsist. What matters
more is the property of natural resources. How can a libertarian justify the property of things?

3. Initial acquisition
Libertarianism is an entitlement theory. This means that, according to libertarianism, a just distribution is a
distribution where everyone possesses what she is entitled to possess. My title to a good should come from
the fact that someone has willingly transferred this good to me (for example, I bought it to this person). But
this person herself should have acquired this good in a legitimate way. And so on: we must go back down
the historical chain of transfers until we reach the stage where the good was belonging to no one. Compare
with:
-

Utilitarianism: a just distribution is a distribution such that it maximizes collective well-being (or, if
you prefer, that creates the highest possible level of collective utility).

Peter Vallentyne, Left-Libertarianism: A Primer , in Left Libertarianism and Its Critics: The Contemporary
Debate, ed. by Peter Vallentyne et Hillel Steiner (Palgrave Publishers Ltd., 2000).

Liberal Egalitarianism: a just distribution is an egalitarian distribution (with variants: some take into
account incentives or the distinction between choices and circumstances but equality is generally
the default position).

Libertarians do neither care about efficiency, nor about equality. They care about who is entitled to what. In
order to determine whether the actual distribution respects individual rights, they need an account of how
people can come to initially owe things that are in the nature.
Libertarians suggest legitimate initial acquisitions can be derived from self-ownership. The idea is: As long
as a resource is owned by no one, individuals are free to take ownership of them. Why? Agents won
themselves, and therefore their capacities. Through the exercise of their capacities, they create value objects.
They make a farmland out of a forest, a table out of a piece of wood, and so on. Individuals appropriate
objects by incorporating their work into them.
But, if we look at History, initial acquisition was generally made by force (see Kymlicka pp 111-113). Ideally,
we should look at historical events and restore all the resources to their initial owners (or their descendants).
For example, large parts of the United States should be returned to the American Indians. Defenders of private
property tend to avoid looking too deeply into the origin of their property. And, most of the time, it is even
impossible to find out who was the first legitimate owner of a good. Perhaps the libertarians should first
advocate a fully egalitarian redistribution as the most satisfactory alternative to an impossible inquiry on
initial acquisition.

4. Just transfers
According to Libertarianism, there are two ways one can be entitled to possess a good:
(i)

Initial acquisition

(ii)

Just transfers

Transfers include gifts, exchanges, rents, loans. Transfers are just if (a) the thing that is transferred was
legitimately acquired and (b) all the parties whose property rights are involved consent to it.
Libertarianism is an historical theory of justice and cares about entitlements, not about end-states.
The intuitive argument for the libertarian principle of transfers: the case of Wilt Chamberlain (or Zlatan
Ibrahimovic, if you prefer) (see Kymlicka pp 105-107) the whole point of having something is to be allowed
to choose what to do with it.

5.

The Lockean proviso and the initial ownership of the

world : from right- to left-libertarianism

Let us recall the Libertarian account of initial acquisition :

1. Individuals own themselves
2. The world is initially unowned
3. Individuals can acquire unlimited rights over unowned shares of the world.
The distinction between the right and the left versions of libertarianism turn around this unlimited. In
fact, quite a few libertarians agree that we can acquire unlimited rights over unowned things (the first
arrived, first served principle is still endorsed by libertarians like Rothbard and Kirzner).
Background discussion: Locke and the debate about the enclosure of commons
4

In England, in the 17th Century, land that was previously held in common for the use of villagers was started
to be enclosed. Some people appropriated them, invested time and effort in them, transformed them into
fertile farmlands. As a result, they produced more wealth. But the people who did not appropriate the
commons lost access to them and became poorer as a result. Locke tried to justify the enclosure of the
commons, but also to propose a limitation of this right to enclose the commons:
The Lockean Proviso (used by Nozick too): initial acquisition is legitimate if you leave enough and as good
for others, that is: initial acquisition is legitimate if it does not worsen the condition of other individuals
(compared with the situation before the acquisition).
Pb: depending on how we interpret worsen the condition, we may end up with quite different
requirements. Ex: Amy and Ben (see Kymlicka pp 115-117) Amy appropriates a land they
previously both had access to and offers Ben a wage to work on this land. Ben gets a wage from
Amy that is higher than what he earned from the previously commonly owned land. So Amys
appropriation is legitimate, because it does not worsen his condition, at least in terms of welfare
and income. But Ben is less free: he has nothing to say about how the land will be used nor can he
say something about the conditions of his employment.

Here comes Left-Libertarianism

According to Left-Libertarians [LL] (Vallentyne, Steiner, Grunebaum, Tideman), the world is not initially
unowned, but jointly owned by humanity. Therefore, under what conditions is the private acquisition of
natural resources permissible? Various proposals have been made (not that, on most of these accounts, selfownership must always be respected)2:
(1) Individuals can acquire rights over a share of the world if they are authorized by others to do so,
through a collective decision-making process.
! Practical problem:this would mean that we could not do anything (even breath) without always
asking for permission to all human beings (including future (and past?) generations).
Solution: collective authorization is only required to acquire exclusive rights to use a share of the
world. If I wish to use a share of the world (ex: sitting on a bench) without wishing to appropriate it
(taking the bench with me or forbidding others to sit on it) then I do not have to ask others to agree
with my use of this jointly owned share of the world.
! Still, it is not very practical a collective decision procedure at the world level would be very
costly to implement.
(2) Some LL suggest replacing the agreement of others by a compensation. Individuals can acquire
rights over a share of the world if they pay for the competitive value of the rights they claim. Because
there are more than on generations, these rights should be rented rather than purchased to a single
generation. Once the rent is paid and redistributed to other people (including savings for future
generations), the agent fully owns the products of the work she made to transform her share. This
solution amounts to a sort of land value tax, which was advocated for by H. George. Cf. Thomas
Paine, who advocated for a basic income on these grounds: "Men did not make the earth. It is the
value of the improvements only, and not the earth itself, that is individual property. Every proprietor
owes to the community a ground rent for the land which he holds."
! Problem: some people will produce much more wealth with their share than others. This may be
due to their personal efforts and choices to work more. But this might also be due to their natural,
2

See Ibid.

unchosen talents or to luck. The result could be a highly unequal society. Moreover, on may consider
that the benefits of applying individual work and talents to socially owned resources as social assets
rather than individual assets.
(3) Amendment: Individuals can acquire rights over a share of the world if they pay for the competitive
value of the rights they claim PLUS a tax on the benefits/revenues they reap from appropriation. The
appropriate rate of taxation should as high as possible. If incentives are not taken into account,
benefits will be taxed up to 100% (and then redistributed). Note; it is still compatible with full selfownership, because individuals can always choose not to appropriate natural resources (and thus to
avoid paying taxes).
! If LL does not take incentives into account, it is likely that very few people will appropriate things.
Pragmatism recommends a lower taxation rate.
Further question : how should the benefits society gets from individual rents and taxes on benefit from their
work be distributed? Possible responses:
i.
ii.

The social fund is divided equally among citizens (taking into account savings for future
generations).
Other options: dividing the social fund in order to secure equality of well-being or capabilities
(well see what it is next week) rather than equality of resources or income.

6.

Libertarian Politics

The common insight of Right and Left Libertarianism and the true defining feature is the right to selfownership. Individual liberties, the freedom to use ones body and powers as one wishes matter a lot.
Both are, to a certain extent, historical theories of justice. Even the most leftist versions of libertarianism
justify egalitarian distribution by the premise that humans are all equal owners of the world, rather than by
an empirical assessment of economic and social inequalities.
But they differ a lot in their implications. Where RL amounts to a minimal State, a deregulated free market
and almost no taxation (at least, once we have rectified historical injustices in initial acquisition, and this
could change a lot of things!), LL suggests that a social fund should be created and that benefits from ones
work could be taxed up to 100%.

ETHICS AND THE

ECONOMY
2014-2015
Danielle Zwarthoed (supply teacher for Pr Yannick Vanderborght)
Contact: danielle.zwarthoed@usaintlouis.be / danielle.zwarthoed@uclouvain.be

Course C5 (16.10): Marxism, Feminism and the

Capability Approach.
Reading: Nussbaum, Women Capabilities and Social Justice, Journal of Human Development, Vol. 1,
no. 2, 2000.

1. Introduction
Basic Insight: Marxists, Feminists and Capability-Theorists are uncomfortable with Liberal Egalitarianism
(and a fortiori with Libertarianism) for at least three reasons:
Methodology: hypothetical devices, such as the social contract, the original position or the state of
nature, are not realistic enough to determine what principles of justice would really improve the
political and the economic system. (cf. Nussbaum p 236). For example, they set aside important facts
such as
(i)
Absence of full compliance (Rawlss answer: non-ideal theory)
(ii)
Dependency human beings are not fully cooperating members of society, but also
individuals dependant on others or obligated to care for dependent people
Adaptive Preferences and Consent: Utilitarianism, Liberalism and Libertarianism take for granted
that individual preferences or choices are given and do not deserve scrutiny. Political theory is only
a matter of adjusting the social and economic circumstances so that these preferences can be
satisfied. But social and economic circumstances also determine the contents of the preferences
themselves.
The limited scope of justice: Libertarian minimal state doctrine ignores the fact that material
inequalities endanger individual freedom. Liberal Egalitarianism takes this into account (cf. Rawlss
2nd principle); but primary goods only account for the public aspects of inequalities and fails to
discuss private aspects: health, inequalities within associations such as firms, families, and so on.
Public policies should be more ambitious than what Rawls want them to12.

Many liberal egalitarians have taken these criticisms very seriously into account and now incorporate health and
gender issues in their theories.
2
Another family of theory, which is neither of Marxist lineage nor of feminist one, argues that liberals fail to
account for the importance of belonging to a specific community (religious, national) with a shared culture. This

2. Marxism
Marx VS Marxism
Marx: A Philosophy of History, historical materialism (which, roughly, says that historical forms
of social organisation appear once they further the development of human productive power (the
human capabilities to produce good to satisfy human needs) and disappear once they come to block
the development of human productive power) + an economic analysis of capitalism, based on the
labour theory of value 3 + a social ideal, communism (though, despite his endorsement of
communism, Marx refuses to say too much about it we will know what communism is once it will
arise through historical process )
Marxism: A theory of justice, i.e. an account of the main features of a morally desirable economic,
social and political system (ex: G.A. Cohen, J. Roemer).

2.1.

Beyond Theories of Justice?

Two potential defects of theories of justice:

(1) Excessive focus on distributive issues; conditions of production matter too. We should not be
concerned only with the distribution of income, but also with the distribution/ownership of
productive assets transferring ownership of the means of production
Rawlsian answer: property-owning democracy or liberal socialism required on the grounds of
distributive justice itself.
(2) It is possible to outstep circumstances of justice. A really good community does not need justice any
more. Why?
(i)
Scarcity of resources: material scarcity should be eliminated (the capitalist road to
communism). Communism will only be possible in a state of abundance.
Inherent scarcity of certain resources (e.g. environmental issues)
Conflicts can be caused not only by scarcity, but, for example, because of conflicting views of the
good life/good way to organise society (ex: a religious group trying to impose its views to others)
(ii)

Conflicting interests: justice means that individuals conceive themselves as right-bearers.

Rights being claims against others, justice is grounded in egoism and the idea that one
should protect herself against others. This is opposed to the natural sociability of human
beings.
Far too optimistic?
Even if people are genuinely altruist, genuinely motivated by love, justice can also be a standard for
determining what (i) I can claim without taking advantage of others altruism and (ii) I should do for
others without privileging some by accident
See Jencks paper: Ms Higgins is not selfish, but she needs a standard to determine which amount
of time and attention she should give to what children.
CCL: Justice might not be so easily eradicable.

is the communitarian approach (Walzer, Sandel being among its main representatives). They disagree with the
methodology and the scope of liberal egalitarianism for these reasons.
3
Theory that claims that the economic value of a good depends on the amount of labour needed to produce it (this
theory was used by A. Smith, Ricardo and Marx)

2.2. A communist theory of justice

Major point of disagreement with Liberal Egalitarianism: Rawls says that justice can be achieved either by
property-owning democracy (which maintains though disperses private property of the means of production)
or by liberal socialism (with collective property of the means of production). Furthermore, the difference
principle is often understood as assuming that the market mechanism can, under certain conditions, benefits
the worst-offs. Marxists disagree: Justice can only be achieved by abolishing the private property of the
means of production and it is false that the market mechanism can benefit the worst-offs. Why? Because
there is something morally problematic with the wage-labour relationship.

Exploitation
Definition: exploitation is the process through which a capitalist extracts more value from the workers labour
than the value of the wages/ salary he gives to the worker in return for his labour.
The labourer is the only person who creates things that have value. The capitalist, who does not perform
productive labour, appropriates some of the value created by the labourer. Hence the labourer always receives
less (in terms of wages) than the real value of his labour. Therefore, wage-labour relationships are inherently
exploitative.
Why is exploitation unjust?
(1) Because it is forced? But, if there is a Welfare-State, people have the opportunity not to work.
Moreover, it is a strong claim to assert that all paid work is forced.
(2) Because workers are the rightful owners of their labour (//libertarianism)? If Marxists agree with
that, then they should also agree with the claim that compulsory taxation in order to support people
who are neither workers nor capitalists (e.g. children, elderly people, disabled people, housewives)
is also exploitative
(3) Because it demonstrates that people have unequally access to the means of production, and this
results in distributive inequalities. But then, we have to shift to a broader theory of justice in order
to determine peoples fair share.

Alienation
Insight: in capitalist societies, everyone (workers and capitalists) are alienated from their essential human
powers. They cannot fully exercise certain human capacities or functions that are essential to a good life.
And there are ways of producing things (cooperative production) that promote better human flourishing that
other ways (the capitalist way). Cf Criticisms of the division of labour
Labour becomes meaningless and
unpleasant. VS Liberalism, which does not take such a stand on how human beings should utilize their powers
or capacities. If we prohibit alienated labour, then certain life choices (consent to alienated labour to enjoy
more leisure, more consumption, more time to care for relatives) will be discouraged or even prohibited.
+ Saying that unalienated productive labour is the most important good is insensitive to other goods of
importance, such as care or family life.

Needs
Distributive principle in communism: From each according to his ability, to each according to his needs
How should we understand needs? Beyond basic material necessities. A possible answer: the Capability
Approach.

3. Feminism
Very diverse: libertarian feminism, liberal feminism, Marxism feminism. Main insight: theories of justice
should avoid male bias by:
(i)
(ii)

Taking into account womens interests (their interests as human beings and their interests as
women)
Incorporating womens specific perspective and experience in their theorizing about justice

3.1.

Gender equality and gender discrimination

Theories of justice agree that rules should be gender-neutral as far as it is possible. Access to social positions,
jobs and offices should be gender-neutral. Only legitimate instances of differentiated treatments (ex:
pregnancy benefits) are acceptable.
What feminists say: even if the rules are gender-neutral, these positions, jobs and offices, these institutions
have shaped according to mens interests. They are the outcome of centuries of men domination.
Ex: most socially and economically rewarding social positions (ex: political offices, CEO) are shaped in
such a way that it is assumed that the person who occupies these positions is free from childcare
responsibilities (long working hours, no child care on workplace). Even if there is not actual
discrimination, because of the incompatibility between paid work and child rearing, most women are de facto
excluded from these positions.
Can Liberal E. account for this? In the original position, contractors might opt for policies that
eliminate unequal domestic division of labour and sexual objectification4. But this might require
highly intrusive policies.

3.2. Public Sphere and Private Sphere

Can justice principles apply within the family? Should we violate the private sphere?
-

Injustices in the distribution of domestic labour

Injustices in the Recognition of the value of domestic labour domestic labour is unpaid and enjoys
a low status

The liberal response: cultural oppression will disappear once civil freedom and material equality are
achieved. Ex freedom of expression could be conducive to abolish stereotypes.
But the problem of adaptive preferences remains. Solutions: education (schools and social medias ex:
representations of women in movies), quotas

3.3. Justice VS Care

Carol Gilligan studies of womens moral development5: men and women tend to have different kinds of
moral reasoning, womens conception of moral reasoning being characterized as follows:
In this conception, the moral problem arises from conflicting responsibilities rather than from competing
rights, and requires for its resolution a mode of thinking that is contextual and narrative rather than formal
and abstract. This conception of morality as concerned with the activity of care centers moral development

4
5

Susan Moller Okin, Justice, Gender, And The Family, dition : Reprint (New York: Basic Books, 1991).
Carol GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE (Harvard University Press, 1982).

around the understanding of responsibility and relationships, just as the conception of morality as fairness
ties moral development to the understanding of rights and rules. (Gilligan 1982: 19).
Womens ethics of care VS Mens ethics of justice? If this is true, then theories of justice might be victim of
a fundamental male bias. The kind of values they promote would only be the values that characterize male
reasoning.
BUT:
Are justice and care really correlated with gender? Men can also have a sense of care and women a
sense of justice.
Are they just the outcome of gender inequality rather than a truly different voice?
Can a care ethics be applied outside of the private realm?

4. The Capability Approach6

A theory of justice that tries to account for the problems of specific classes of people: the disabled, women,
but also, to some extent, animals7.
Insight: the freedom to do what people have reason to value is of primary moral importance.
What policies should provide to people is evaluated in terms of capabilities. Capabilities are real freedoms
to function. Example: being free to nourish oneself.
Resource: food
A resource-based approach says that what is valuable is food (bread),
incomeProblem: this approach ignores what resources do to people.
Satisfaction: the good taste of food
A preference-based approach (like utilitarianism) says that
what is valuable is pleasure, satisfactionProblem: this approach ignores adaptive preferences.
Suppose a woman who genuinely believes that she does not need a lot of food or that she is not
entitled to a bigger share of food than what she gets and accepts to remain undernourished.
Functioning: eating A functioning-based approach (Marx) says that what is valuable is that people
do actually eat. What is interesting: functionings take into account the individual ability to convert
resources (food) into activities and states (eating, being nourished). And, contrary to satisfaction,
functionings are not subjective but objective
everyone should be able to achieve the same
functionings, that is, human functionings.
Conversion factors vary according to disabilities, metabolism, age, gender, but also social pressure.
Capabilities: being able to eat

What is valuable is to be able to choose to eat (or not). Contrary

to a functioning-based approach, a capability-based approach takes into account the importance of

choice. People must be free not to exercise functionings (ex: they can choose to fast rather than eat)

What are the Central Capabilities?

What should people have reasons to value?

I focus on Nussbaums capability approach. Another version is Amartya Sens approach. Amartya Sens
capability approach is rather different. (i) Sen does not propose to use a capability approach as a theory of justice,
he just wants it to be used in order to compare development policies (ii) Sen refuses to provide a list of capabilities,
he argues that capabilities should be selected through a democratic process. See Thomas Wells, Sens Capability
Approach , Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2012, http://www.iep.utm.edu/sen-cap/.
7
Martha Craven Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice: Disability, Nationality, Species Membership (Harvard University
Press, 2006).

The purpose of the list: It is a partial theory of justice (a just society being a society where each citizen has
access to a specific threshold of each of these capabilities), a political proposal aimed to be implemented in
the form of constitutional principles in each country.
How are these capabilities selected?
(1) Philosophical argument: as Marx said, there are lives that are fully human (worthy of a human being)
and lives that are not worthy of a human being. A life worthy of a human being includes the exercise
of certain functions/functionings, e.g. certain states and activities (beings and doings). These
functions are intuitively identified, then
(2) the list is discussed by people from different cultures, in order to ensure that the list is not
culturally biased.
How to respond to people who argue that it is paternalistic or colonialist to impose the Western
value of gender equality on other cultures? Nussbaums answer (pp 224-227): cutures are not
homogeneous, and cultures evolve too. No culture completely agrees on the way women should be
treated.
Result: overlapping consensus even if people having different views of the good life cannot agree
on everything, they could presumably agree on this list of functionings.
CRITICISM 1 8 : covert reliance on Nussbaums own moral authority. The list has never been actually
discussed at the world level and it is far from certain that everyone would agree on it. And, even if poor
women agreed on it, one may doubt that it was due to Nussbaums status of Western educated woman rather
than because of the list itself. But, rather than being implemented as it is, the list could be a good startingpoint for discussing human rights, the goals of social justice or development policies.
How can the list be implemented?
Everyone should have access to a threshold of every capability.
Trade-offs (implementing a capability at the cost of another one) ought to be avoided.
CRITICISM 2:
If the threshold is low, then the CA loses its radical appeal. If the threshold is high, because resources are
scarce, we might be obligated to do trade-offs. And some capabilities look more important than others (to be
adequately nourished vs to enjoy recreational activities). But Nussbaum offers no guidance for that. Ex:
reproductive health vs move freely from place to place. But this does not apply to fertile capabilities.

Alison M. Jaggar, Reasoning About Well-Being: Nussbaums Methods of Justifying the Capabilities* ,
Journal of Political Philosophy 14, no 3 (2006): 301 22, doi:10.1111/j.1467-9760.2006.00253.x.

ETHICS AND THE

ECONOMY
2014-2015
Danielle Zwarthoed (supply teacher for Pr Yannick Vanderborght)
Contact: danielle.zwarthoed@usaintlouis.be / danielle.zwarthoed@uclouvain.be

Course C6 Social Justice in practice. Should access

to university be free?
Reading: Brighouse, Paying for Higher Education: Are Top-Up Fees Fair? , Revue thique et
conomique / Ethics and Economics;Volume 2, Numro 1, 2004.

1. Theories of domestic justice: a synopsis

Utilitarianism:
A just society is a society whose institutions/where individual actions and/or individual actions maximize
collective well-being, understood as the sum of the levels of individual utilities.

Variants
Hedonic utilitarianism: individual utility measures the degree of pleasure an individual feels
Preference satisfaction utilitarianism: individual utility measures the degree to which a preference is
satisfied
o Actual preference satisfaction
o Informed preference satisfaction
Average utilitarianism: maximizing utility is maximizing the average level of individual utility in
society
Total utilitarianism: Maximizing utility is maximizing the total amount of utility in society
Act Utilitarianism: an institution/action is just if it maximizes collective well-being.
Rule Utilitarianism: an institution/action is just if it is conforms to a rule that maximizes collective
well-being.

Libertarianism:
A just society is a society whose institutions/where individual actions protect and respect the individual right
to self-ownership as well as legitimate individual property rights. Property rights are legitimate if they were
gained either through just (i.e. consented) transfers or through legitimate original appropriation.

Variants
Right Libertarianism: the world is initially unowned:
1

First arrived, first served principle

The Lockean Proviso: initial appropriation is legitimate if it does not worsen the condition
of other individuals (compared with the situation before the acquisition).
Left Libertarianism: the world is initially jointly owned:
o collective permission is required for original appropriation to be legitimate
o compensation is required for original appropriation to be legitimate land tax
o
o

Liberal Egalitarianism (Rawls)

A just society is a society whose institutions/where individual actions1 are conform to the two principles of
justice partners placed behind a veil of ignorance would choose, that is, a principle of equal liberties (each
person has an equal claim to a fully adequate scheme of equal basic rights and liberties) and a principle of
equality which comprises the principle of fair equality of opportunity (positions and offices should be open
to all) and the difference principle (inequalities should be at the greatest benefit of the worst offs).

Variants
Variants concern the distributive principle.
Egalitarian distribution: the distribution of primary goods/resources should equalize the amount of
primary goods/resources each person gets.
The Difference Principle/Maximin: the distribution of primary goods/resources should be at the
greatest benefit of the worst-offs.
o Leximin (more than 2 groups): the distribution of primary goods/resources should be at the
greatest benefit of the first worst-offs. If the first worst-offs are unaffected, it should be at
the greatest benefit of the second worst-offs. Etc.
Sufficientarian distribution: the distribution of primary goods/resources should be such that every
person gets enough to reach a given threshold. Beyond the threshold, inequalities are permissible.

Marxism (as a theory of justice)

A just society is a society whose institutions free individuals from exploitation and/or alienation.

Abolishing exploitation
A just society is a society where no exploitative relationships occur. A relationship between A and B is
exploitative if A extracts more value from the labour/productive activities of B than what B gets from A in
return for her labour/productive activities.

Abolishing alienation
A just society is a society where no alienation occurs. Alienation occurs when: (i) the product of labour is
taken away from the worker (ii) workers do not perceive their work as their own, and work becomes
unpleasant. A society without alienation is a society where human beings can fully exercise their powers or
functionings. In order to fully exercise human powers, workers should be able to collectively control the
productive process.

Rawls himself says that only institutions are required to be just. But other theorists have argued that individuals
should also behave according to the principles of justice. See: G. A. Cohen, If Youre an Egalitarian, How Come
Youre so Rich?, dition : New Ed (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2001).

Feminism
Abolishing Male Domination
Add the following proviso to liberal egalitarian theories of justice: a just society is a society whose institutions
have been reformed so that social and economic positions are no longer shaped to the detriment of womens
interests.

Care Ethics
Justice is not the ultimate criterion to assess institutions and individual actions. A good society seeks to
preserve the existing web of relationships between individuals and where individuals accept their
responsibilities and have a positive concern for others welfare.

2. Free access to university: a pending issue

UK: in 2004 the Higher Education Act triggers a controversy on Top-Up Fees: public universities were
allowed to set their own fees up to 3000 a year; students can take a government-backed tuition fee loan.
2010: after the publication of the Browne report, the Parliament votes for rising the cap to 9000 , despite
student protests2.
United State: the rising student debt. Public universities rely more and more on tuition fees because of
decreasing State support. Some fear there will be an education bubble.
Quebec: Student protests in 2012 (le printemps rable). The provincial government proposed an increase
in fees of $325 (about 230 ) a year over five years starting in September 2012. Fees would have reached
3800 $ in 2016, a 75% increase over five years. Student protests were very important and stopped when the
new government cancelled the hike of tuition fees.
Germany: university fees just abolished. In Germany, higher education institutions have traditionally been
free. However, in 2006 a ruling by the Constitutional Court Stated fees was compatible with the constitutional
commitment to universal education. However, the policy was unpopular and individual states gradually
dropped the ruling.
Belgium: the rise of tuition fees in Flanders: the minerval will cost 890 instead of 620 from 2015-2016.
However, the Flemish Minister for Education promised that students from low-income backgrounds will get
a subsidy adjusted to family income. In Wallonia. the FEF fears that the French-speaking community Minister
for Education opts for a hike after 2015 (the minerval is to be frozen until 2015).

3. Four Models (cf. Brighouse p 2)

Paying for higher education: schooling (tuition fees) + living costs + opportunity costs3 (lost earnings)
1) Wholly State-funded provision
- Schooling: free (or almost) at the point of delivery, entirely paid for by the State. Universities
are selective.

2
3

See http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/education/3013272.stm
The costs you incur by choosing to do one thing (studying) rather than another (a paid job).

Living costs: may be covered by State support (either the same for all students or adjusted to
parental income), parental support, student jobs, loans.
Examples: Germany, Sweden, Norway, Finland, Denmark, France, Spain, Italy, Estonia, Greece,
Argentina
2) Means-tested funded provision
- Schooling:
o Students from high income backgrounds pay entirely for them
o Students from low-income backgrounds get a subsidy to pay for their tuition fees. This
subsidy is adjusted to parental income. Tuition fees may be even free for the poorest
students.
- Living costs: may be covered by State support, parental support (if any), par time jobs, loans.
Examples:the new Flemish proposal, Sciences Po in France
3) Graduate-tax funded provision
- Schooling: university is free at the point of delivery (no tuition fees), but graduates pay a
premium on their income tax returns to reimburse their university and fund the education of the
next generation of students. Contrary to loans reimbursement, graduate tax is conditional on
graduates earning an income.
- Living costs: usually (at least partly) covered by a small grant (also funded by the graduate tax).
Examples:was proposed but not implemented in UK and in Ireland.
4) Unfunded provision
- Schooling and living costs: student pay for everything. They may use parental support, student
jobs and/or loans.
Examples:all private universities, United States (though public universities have separate, lower
tuition rates for residents of the State).

4. Who should pay for Higher Education?

The alleged benefits of higher education:
(i)

(ii)

For the individual:

a. Increased earning power but this depends on what she chooses to study (philosophy VS
engineering)
b. Access to an interesting and rewarding job. Better self-confidence?
c. The enjoyment learning provides
For society:
a. Human capital and economic growth
b. A better educated population is more healthy, has a higher life expectancy, has less children
c. The value of higher education for democracy: university educated people tend to participate
more in civic life. In addition, the complexity of public policy issues often requires
population to have a fair knowledge of economics, political sciences, law, etc, to understand
them.

NB: distinction between two kinds of considerations:

Efficiency secure and increase growth, but avoid excessive public deficit 2 relevant
considerations
(1) The rising costs of higher education in a period of fiscal pressure, given the necessity to fund
other public services: primary and secondary education, health care, etc.
(2) A highly educated people may be a key factor to secure long-term growth
Fairness
(1) Distribute fairly access to higher education
(2) Use higher education as a means to achieve social justice (be it utilitarian, libertarian, liberal
egalitarian or radical-marxist and/or feminist - )
But some theories of justice (utilitarianism, the difference principle) take explicitly efficiency into account.
The question is thus: what model for paying for higher education is the most just?
Some arguments:
WHOLLY STATE FUNDED PROVISION
1. Human beings have the right to be educated as much as they wish/as much as they need. For this
right to be real, education should be free at every level.
2. A better access to higher education has many positive externalities. Graduates
3. Tuition fees may dissuade low-income students from attending universities. Even if they take a loan
and reimburse them later, some suggest that people from low-income background are more averse
to debt. Therefore tuition fees limits access to higher education for students from low-income
backgrounds.
4. If the tax system is sufficiently performant, richer citizens already pay more for higher education
than poorer people, not through fees but through income taxes. Hence university can be free without
favouring rich kids.
5. But if the tax system is not sufficiently performant, free access to university returns to subsidize rich
kidss education, as it is demonstrated that levels of attendance are lower among the poor. Hence
free higher education strengthens social inequalities (cf. Marx).
6. Moreover free access to higher education may have undesirable effects on students choices and
motivation. If university is free, students tend to choose degrees that are easy and not valuable.
Moreover, they tend to work less and be less motivated. (but what about the opportunity costs of
pursuing higher education?)
MEANS-TESTED FUNDED PROVISION
7. If the tax system cannot ensure that richer parents pay more for higher education, a means-tested
funded provision is a good way to make sure that the poor do not indirectly subsidize the rich kids
education.
8. A means-tested funding provision is difficult to implement, given the fact that families are more and
more reconstituted. Moreover, different students may enjoy different degrees of parental support.
9. Means-tested funding provision may stigmatize those who benefit from it.
10. Means-tested provision may be a trap, because poor parents could be discouraged from finding a job
and increase their income, as it would result in them having to pay for their childrens education.
GRADUATE TAX

11. Some students do not get the expected returns from their education and have to reimburse loans
anyway. This is bad for them (they end up over indebted) and for society (the risk of a higher
education bubble). Loans should be income-contingent. Hence a graduate tax is better than loans.
12. Those who pay for higher education should be those who benefitted from it, not the others. This is
what the graduate tax aims to.
13. But if the graduate tax is a percentage of actual earning, and not of potential ones, this means that
those who choose to work after graduation will pay for the education of those who choose leisure or
unpaid activities (like writing poetry). An instance of exploitation?
14. Graduate tax creates a user pays culture, which is harmful for (i) citizens sense of solidarity and
(ii) the willingness of taxpayers to subsidize public services they do not necessarily need.
15. It is impossible to assess the extent to which an individuals income is due to her education. Some
graduates earn a lot not because of their university degree, but because of their parental network or
of their other talents (e.g. Bill Cosby, the actor who holds a doctorate). Is it fair to oblige them to
pay for a non-beneficial education?
UNFUNDED PROVISION
16. A free market can spontaneously achieve the best outcome. Hence State intervention should be
avoided (including public support for higher education institutions).
17. Students who pay the full costs of their tuition fees are more motivated, more hard-working, and
thus will truly benefit from their involvement in higher education. Those who really want to get a
degree can still take a loan.
18. The Matthew effect: For unto every one that hath shall be given, and he shall have abundance;
but from him that hath not shall be taken away even that which he hath (Matthew XXV: 29)
Social transfers have anti-redistributive effects. In the end, they tend to benefit more the more well
offs and less the worse offs. Free higher education is an example of the Matthew effects of direct
transfers from taxpayers to (richer) students. Because, for various reasons (including opportunity
costs and cultural gaps), low-income background young people will not go to the university, public
funding of higher education is not worthy.
19. Even in a socially and economically equal society, free access to higher education would
nevertheless provide an unfair advantage to those who are more intelligent.
20. In a context of increasing mobility, students may well never reimburse their education through taxes
or through the use of their skills (positive externality), since they are likely to move to another
country which did not pay anything for their education.
21. Talent and effort are not correlated with social background. Therefore, if access to higher education
should be open to those who are more talented and more hard-working but who cannot pay for it,
some kind of support is needed for them. In the absence of charity, State support is required.
22. Students who pay themselves for their tuition fees are more likely to behave like consumers. They
want teachers to cater their tastes and interests and are less likely to accept to learn more
intellectually serious subjects.

5. Exercise
Group discussion (between 4 and 10 students)
What is a just model to pay for higher education? Imagine you are a group of ethicists who are to advise the
Minister for Higher Education. What would you advise her/him to do?

1. Determine what model for paying for higher education is just. You may either choose one of the four
models above, or propose a mixture of them.
2. Explain how you will address the issues raised above: the positive externality of education, students
motivation, graduates mobility, economic efficiency, consistency with the existing tax system
(should we reform this too?), the undesirable effects of redistribution, low attendance from
economically disadvantaged students (should we increase their attendance? And, if so, how?).
3. Explain why you choose this model and these solutions. That is, explain what theory of justice you
have in mind, and how it is translated in your concrete solution?

ETHICS AND THE ECONOMY

2014-2015
Contact: danielle.zwarthoed@usaintlouis.be / danielle.zwarthoed@uclouvain.be

Course C7 (30.10): International distributive justice

Cosmopolitanism and Internationalism
Reading: Gilabert, Global Justice, The Encyclopedia of Political Theory, ed. Mark Bevir
(London: Sage, 2010)
3 possible dimensions of justice:
Domestic (Nation-State-wide)
Global/International (World-wide)
Intergenerational (Justice between generations)

Figures on global inequalities

Inequalities at the global scale
"the top 10 per cent of adults own 85 per cent of global household wealth, so that the average
member of this group has 8.5 times the global average holding. []. This compares with the
bottom half of the distribution which collectively owns barely 1 per cent of global wealth. Thus
the top 1 per cent own almost 40 times as much as the bottom 50 per cent. [] The global
wealth Gini is higher still at 0.892. This roughly corresponds to the Gini value that would be
recorded in a 10-person population if one person had $1000 and the remaining 9 people each
had $1. 1
Between-countries inequalities are more important than within-countries inequalities
19th Century: the main income cleavage was the one between social and economic classes, and
not between countries. Franois Bourguignon and Christian Morrisson 2 have reconstructed
worldwide income distributions, every 20 years for the period 1820-1992:

James B. Davies et al., The World Distribution of Household Wealth (UNU-WIDER, 2006).
Franois Bourguignon et Christian Morrisson, Inequality Among World Citizens: 1820-1992 , American
Economic Review 92, no 4 (2002): 727 44, cited by Branco Milanovic, Global Inequality From Class to
Location, from Proletarians to Migrants (The World Bank Development Research Group Poverty and
Inequality Team, 2011), http://wwwwds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/IW3P/IB/2011/09/29/000158349_20110929082257/Re
ndered/PDF/WPS5820.pdf.
2

global inequality, measured by the Gini coefficient3: 53 Gini points in 1850

equal proportion of between-country inequalities (inequalities between the mean
income of different countries) and within-country inequalities (in each individual
country)
25.9 Gini points (49 percent) due to location, and 27.3 Gini points (51
percent) due to class.

Today:
-

the global Gini: 65.4 points The overall inequality is greater today than it was in
1850
56.2 Gini points (85 %) is due to between-countries inequalities of income, and only 9.2
Gini points (15 %) to within-country inequalities of income
Location is the key
factor4.
In other words, if we lined up all individuals from these countries by their per capita income,
Denmarks income distribution would only start at the point at which many African countries

distributions end. The richest Malians are poorer than the poorest Danes.5

This raises (at least) 3 questions:

Should we apply the same principles of justice at the domestic and at the global level?
How should wealth be distributed at the global level, taking into account incentives and
eventually national differences?
If we wanted to be radical, should we rather go for a massive redistribution of wealth at
the global level or other kinds of policies (global tax governance6, open borders7)

A Gini coefficient is a measure of inequalities. It varies between 0 (a fully equal society) and
100 (the most possible unequal society, one individual having all and the others nothing). It is
defined based on the Lorenz curve. The Lorenz curve is a graphic representation of the
distribution of wealth (income, for example) within a society. Each proportion of the population
is associated with a proportion of the total social wealth (e.g. the 10% poorest citizens possess
x % of the social wealth, the 20% poorest citizens possess y %, and so on). In a perfectly
equal society, 10% would possess 10% of the social wealth, etc. Graphically, the curve would
be at 45 degrees (line of equality). The Gini coefficient is the area between the equality line
and the Lorenz curve divided by the whole area below the equality line. See:
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTPOVERTY/EXTPA/0,,conten
tMDK:20238991~menuPK:492138~pagePK:148956~piPK:216618~theSitePK:430367,00.ht
ml
3

Milanovic, Global Inequality from Class to Location, from Proletarians to Migrants .

Ibid.
6
Thomas Rixen, Tax Competition and Inequality: The Case for Global Tax Governance , Global Governance:
A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations 17, no 4 (1 octobre 2011): 447 67,
doi:10.5555/1075-2846-17.4.447.
7
Joseph H. Carens, Aliens and Citizens: The Case for Open Borders , The Review of Politics 49, no 2 (1 avril
1987): 251 73.
5

1.1.

Should international distributive justice be conceived as a

world-wide blow-up of domestic distributive justice?

Those who answer YES: the Humanists or Cosmopolitans

Early Cosmopolitans: the Stoics, Erasmus of Rotterdam, Cloots (18th Century), Kant.
Core claims: (i) There are obligations of justice beyond borders and (ii) These
obligations are the same as domestic (intra-states) obligations.
WHY? All Human beings are morally equals each human being deserves an equal moral
concern, whatever his/her location is. Ex (Gilabert, 5): American Judith and Nicaraguan Maria
place of birth being an unchosen circumstance, inequality between them is unjust.
Those who answer NO: the Associativists
Core claim: Obligations of justice apply only among those who are already engaged in
some sort of association. Regarding those who are not part of this association
Some associativists think those who are in the association have not any moral or
ethical obligation (and, a fortiori, legal) towards those who are not in it.
Some associativists think those who are in the association have some moral
obligations towards those who are not part of it, but (i) they are different in kind
(humanitarian obligations as opposed to justice obligations) and they are generally
conceived as less demanding [e.g. Rawls].
What kinds of associations (Gilabert,5)?
1) Nations
people have obligations of justice to each other only if they share a certain
set of institutions, a language, a common history, a culture.
Ex: France, Tatarstan
2) States people have obligations of justice to each other if they are the members of the
same political community having a common law and the capacity to enforce it.
Ex: United States, France
>>> These associations cannot be global in nature

No global justice?

3) Institutions
people have obligations of justice to each other if there are institutions
that can secure these obligations.
Ex: WTO, IMF
4) Cooperation
people have obligations of justice to each other if they are involved in
mutually beneficial cooperative ties.
Ex: exchanges between economic agents from different countries
5) Interdependence
people have obligations of justice to each other if their respective
decisions have an impact on others.
3

Ex: protectionist agricultural policies in United States impacting Mexican cultivators

>>> These associations can be global in nature
(contrary to the Cosmopolitan view)

Global justice is possible but not necessary

1.2. Three distributive principles for global justice

Assuming either that all human beings are equals and deserve equal consideration with respect
to justice obligations (the humanist view) or that currently all inhabitants of the planets are
already involved in some kind of associations (i.e. according to the Institutionalist,
Cooperativist or Interdependency views), what kind of distribution of global wealth should we
strive for?
NB: HUMANISTS say we have the duty to create new associative frameworks (a Global State?)
to implement a just distribution. ASSOCIATIVISTS say we should, as far as we reasonably
can, implement these principles within already existing frameworks. Note that to reach a given
distribution, an institution (a Global State) taxing and redistributing assets is not the only
possible tool. Other policies could be considered as a means to reach a just distribution (free
markets? Tax governance? Migration policies?)
Basic Sufficientarianism: a distribution is just only if every concerned individual has access
to enough (to a sufficient level) of certain important advantages
Basic needs approaches
against severe poverty.
Is that enough? Demand of justice or humanitarian aim? (Pogge VS Nagel)
Is it a negative duty (we should avoid depriving others from access to the resources
needed to satisfy their basic needs and rectify past violations
very motivating) or a
positive one (we should take action to provide the global poor with this economic and
social minimum easier to identify our duties)? (Pogge VS Rawls)
Egalitaranism: a distribution is just only if every concerned individual has access to an equal
share of certain important advantages (Luck proviso: unless she is responsible for her having a
less than equal share)
While basic Sufficientarianism is often advocated by those who think that intra-states
obligations of justice are different from global obligations of justice, Egalitarianism is
advocated by those who think they should be the same (humanists and some
associativists)
Prioritarianism: a distribution is just only if the least well off of the concerned individuals
have access to the highest possible share of certain important advantages
Example: Beitz argues for a global original position and a global difference principle

Intermediate Inclusion: a distribution is just only if it is such that everyone has access to a
level of important advantage high enough to allow them to escape deprivation and exploitation.
Example of demands: full spectrum of human rights, fair governance of international
institutions, and global labor standards, a more fair distribution of benefits resulting
from international cooperation

1.3. Feasibility issues

Ideal VS Nonideal circumstances: Circumstances are nonideal when people are unable or
unwilling to honor demands of justice. Examples of circumstances like these are the absence of
robust international institutions and the lack of a strong ethos of cosmopolitan solidarity.

2. The Capability Approach [bring the Summary/Syllabus C5

(16 October)]
A theory of justice that tries to account for the problems of specific classes of people: the
disabled, women, but also, to some extent, animals8.
Two key theorists:
Amartya Sen (Indian economist, Nobel Price)
Martha Nussbaum (American philosopher)
Nussbaums project: implement a capability list at the global level.
Insight: the freedom to do what people have reason to value is of primary moral importance.
These freedoms should be described in terms of capabilities/opportunities to exercise human
functionings (//Marx).
What is a capability
RESOURCE
(food)

Individual
conversion
factors
(disabilities,
metabolism,
social
beliefs)

CAPABILITY
(opportunity
to
being
nourished)

Individual
choice
(eating or
fasting)

FUNCTIONING
(being
nourished)

Objective
state/subjective
feeling

SATISFACTION
( taste)

.
Conversion factors vary according to disabilities, metabolism, age, gender, but also social
pressure.
Capabilities: being able to eat

What is valuable is to be able to choose to eat (or not).

Contrary to a functioning-based approach, a capability-based approach takes into

Martha Craven Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice: Disability, Nationality, Species Membership (Harvard University
Press, 2006).

account the importance of choice. People must be free not to exercise functionings (ex:
they can choose to fast rather than eat)

What are the Central Capabilities?

What should people have reasons to value?

The purpose of the list: It is a partial theory of justice (a just society being a society where
each citizen has access to a specific threshold of each of these capabilities), a political proposal
aimed to be implemented in the form of constitutional principles in each country.
How are these capabilities selected?
(1) Philosophical argument: as Marx said, there are lives that are fully human (worthy of a
human being) and lives that are not worthy of a human being. A life worthy of a human
being includes the exercise of certain functions/functionings, e.g. certain states and
activities (beings and doings). These functions are intuitively identified, then
(2) the list is discussed by people from different cultures, in order to ensure that the list
is not culturally biased.
How to respond to people who argue that it is paternalistic or colonialist to impose the
Western value of gender equality on other cultures? Nussbaums answer (pp 224-227):
cultures are not homogeneous, and cultures evolve too. No culture completely agrees
on the way women should be treated.
Result: overlapping consensus even if people having different views of the good life
cannot agree on everything, they could presumably agree on this list of functionings.
CRITICISM 19: covert reliance on Nussbaums own moral authority?
CRITICISM 2:If the threshold is low, then the CA loses its radical appeal. If the threshold is
high, because resources are scarce, we might be forced to do trade-offs. And some capabilities
look more important than others (to be adequately nourished vs to enjoy recreational activities).
But Nussbaum offers no guidance for that. Ex: reproductive health vs move freely from place
to place.

Alison M. Jaggar, Reasoning About Well-Being: Nussbaums Methods of Justifying the Capabilities* ,
Journal of Political Philosophy 14, no 3 (2006): 301 22, doi:10.1111/j.1467-9760.2006.00253.x.

ETHICS AND THE ECONOMY

2014-2015
Contact: danielle.zwarthoed@usaintlouis.be / danielle.zwarthoed@uclouvain.be

Course C7 (30.10): International distributive justice

Cosmopolitanism and Internationalism
Reading: Gilabert, Global Justice, The Encyclopedia of Political Theory, ed. Mark Bevir
(London: Sage, 2010)
3 possible dimensions of justice:
Domestic (Nation-State-wide)
Global/International (World-wide)
Intergenerational (Justice between generations)

Figures on global inequalities

Inequalities at the global scale
"the top 10 per cent of adults own 85 per cent of global household wealth, so that the average
member of this group has 8.5 times the global average holding. []. This compares with the
bottom half of the distribution which collectively owns barely 1 per cent of global wealth. Thus
the top 1 per cent own almost 40 times as much as the bottom 50 per cent. [] The global
wealth Gini is higher still at 0.892. This roughly corresponds to the Gini value that would be
recorded in a 10-person population if one person had $1000 and the remaining 9 people each
had $1. 1
Between-countries inequalities are more important than within-countries inequalities
19th Century: the main income cleavage was the one between social and economic classes, and
not between countries. Franois Bourguignon and Christian Morrisson 2 have reconstructed
worldwide income distributions, every 20 years for the period 1820-1992:

James B. Davies et al., The World Distribution of Household Wealth (UNU-WIDER, 2006).
Franois Bourguignon et Christian Morrisson, Inequality Among World Citizens: 1820-1992 , American
Economic Review 92, no 4 (2002): 727 44, cited by Branco Milanovic, Global Inequality From Class to
Location, from Proletarians to Migrants (The World Bank Development Research Group Poverty and
Inequality Team, 2011), http://wwwwds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/IW3P/IB/2011/09/29/000158349_20110929082257/Re
ndered/PDF/WPS5820.pdf.
2

global inequality, measured by the Gini coefficient3: 53 Gini points in 1850

equal proportion of between-country inequalities (inequalities between the mean
income of different countries) and within-country inequalities (in each individual
country)
25.9 Gini points (49 percent) due to location, and 27.3 Gini points (51
percent) due to class.

Today:
-

the global Gini: 65.4 points The overall inequality is greater today than it was in
1850
56.2 Gini points (85 %) is due to between-countries inequalities of income, and only 9.2
Gini points (15 %) to within-country inequalities of income
Location is the key
factor4.
In other words, if we lined up all individuals from these countries by their per capita income,
Denmarks income distribution would only start at the point at which many African countries

distributions end. The richest Malians are poorer than the poorest Danes.5

This raises (at least) 3 questions:

Should we apply the same principles of justice at the domestic and at the global level?
How should wealth be distributed at the global level, taking into account incentives and
eventually national differences?
If we wanted to be radical, should we rather go for a massive redistribution of wealth at
the global level or other kinds of policies (global tax governance6, open borders7)

A Gini coefficient is a measure of inequalities. It varies between 0 (a fully equal society) and
100 (the most possible unequal society, one individual having all and the others nothing). It is
defined based on the Lorenz curve. The Lorenz curve is a graphic representation of the
distribution of wealth (income, for example) within a society. Each proportion of the population
is associated with a proportion of the total social wealth (e.g. the 10% poorest citizens possess
x % of the social wealth, the 20% poorest citizens possess y %, and so on). In a perfectly
equal society, 10% would possess 10% of the social wealth, etc. Graphically, the curve would
be at 45 degrees (line of equality). The Gini coefficient is the area between the equality line
and the Lorenz curve divided by the whole area below the equality line. See:
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTPOVERTY/EXTPA/0,,conten
tMDK:20238991~menuPK:492138~pagePK:148956~piPK:216618~theSitePK:430367,00.ht
ml
3

Milanovic, Global Inequality from Class to Location, from Proletarians to Migrants .

Ibid.
6
Thomas Rixen, Tax Competition and Inequality: The Case for Global Tax Governance , Global Governance:
A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations 17, no 4 (1 octobre 2011): 447 67,
doi:10.5555/1075-2846-17.4.447.
7
Joseph H. Carens, Aliens and Citizens: The Case for Open Borders , The Review of Politics 49, no 2 (1 avril
1987): 251 73.
5

1.1.

Should international distributive justice be conceived as a

world-wide blow-up of domestic distributive justice?

Those who answer YES: the Humanists or Cosmopolitans

Early Cosmopolitans: the Stoics, Erasmus of Rotterdam, Cloots (18th Century), Kant.
Core claims: (i) There are obligations of justice beyond borders and (ii) These
obligations are the same as domestic (intra-states) obligations.
WHY? All Human beings are morally equals each human being deserves an equal moral
concern, whatever his/her location is. Ex (Gilabert, 5): American Judith and Nicaraguan Maria
place of birth being an unchosen circumstance, inequality between them is unjust.
Those who answer NO: the Associativists
Core claim: Obligations of justice apply only among those who are already engaged in
some sort of association. Regarding those who are not part of this association
Some associativists think those who are in the association have not any moral or
ethical obligation (and, a fortiori, legal) towards those who are not in it.
Some associativists think those who are in the association have some moral
obligations towards those who are not part of it, but (i) they are different in kind
(humanitarian obligations as opposed to justice obligations) and they are generally
conceived as less demanding [e.g. Rawls].
What kinds of associations (Gilabert,5)?
1) Nations
people have obligations of justice to each other only if they share a certain
set of institutions, a language, a common history, a culture.
Ex: France, Tatarstan
2) States people have obligations of justice to each other if they are the members of the
same political community having a common law and the capacity to enforce it.
Ex: United States, France
>>> These associations cannot be global in nature

No global justice?

3) Institutions
people have obligations of justice to each other if there are institutions
that can secure these obligations.
Ex: WTO, IMF
4) Cooperation
people have obligations of justice to each other if they are involved in
mutually beneficial cooperative ties.
Ex: exchanges between economic agents from different countries
5) Interdependence
people have obligations of justice to each other if their respective
decisions have an impact on others.
3

Ex: protectionist agricultural policies in United States impacting Mexican cultivators

>>> These associations can be global in nature
(contrary to the Cosmopolitan view)

Global justice is possible but not necessary

1.2. Three distributive principles for global justice

Assuming either that all human beings are equals and deserve equal consideration with respect
to justice obligations (the humanist view) or that currently all inhabitants of the planets are
already involved in some kind of associations (i.e. according to the Institutionalist,
Cooperativist or Interdependency views), what kind of distribution of global wealth should we
strive for?
NB: HUMANISTS say we have the duty to create new associative frameworks (a Global State?)
to implement a just distribution. ASSOCIATIVISTS say we should, as far as we reasonably
can, implement these principles within already existing frameworks. Note that to reach a given
distribution, an institution (a Global State) taxing and redistributing assets is not the only
possible tool. Other policies could be considered as a means to reach a just distribution (free
markets? Tax governance? Migration policies?)
Basic Sufficientarianism: a distribution is just only if every concerned individual has access
to enough (to a sufficient level) of certain important advantages
Basic needs approaches
against severe poverty.
Is that enough? Demand of justice or humanitarian aim? (Pogge VS Nagel)
Is it a negative duty (we should avoid depriving others from access to the resources
needed to satisfy their basic needs and rectify past violations
very motivating) or a
positive one (we should take action to provide the global poor with this economic and
social minimum easier to identify our duties)? (Pogge VS Rawls)
Egalitaranism: a distribution is just only if every concerned individual has access to an equal
share of certain important advantages (Luck proviso: unless she is responsible for her having a
less than equal share)
While basic Sufficientarianism is often advocated by those who think that intra-states
obligations of justice are different from global obligations of justice, Egalitarianism is
advocated by those who think they should be the same (humanists and some
associativists)
Prioritarianism: a distribution is just only if the least well off of the concerned individuals
have access to the highest possible share of certain important advantages
Example: Beitz argues for a global original position and a global difference principle

Intermediate Inclusion: a distribution is just only if it is such that everyone has access to a
level of important advantage high enough to allow them to escape deprivation and exploitation.
Example of demands: full spectrum of human rights, fair governance of international
institutions, and global labor standards, a more fair distribution of benefits resulting
from international cooperation

1.3. Feasibility issues

Ideal VS Nonideal circumstances: Circumstances are nonideal when people are unable or
unwilling to honor demands of justice. Examples of circumstances like these are the absence of
robust international institutions and the lack of a strong ethos of cosmopolitan solidarity.

2. The Capability Approach [bring the Summary/Syllabus C5

(16 October)]
A theory of justice that tries to account for the problems of specific classes of people: the
disabled, women, but also, to some extent, animals8.
Two key theorists:
Amartya Sen (Indian economist, Nobel Price)
Martha Nussbaum (American philosopher)
Nussbaums project: implement a capability list at the global level.
Insight: the freedom to do what people have reason to value is of primary moral importance.
These freedoms should be described in terms of capabilities/opportunities to exercise human
functionings (//Marx).
What is a capability
RESOURCE
(food)

Individual
conversion
factors
(disabilities,
metabolism,
social
beliefs)

CAPABILITY
(opportunity
to
being
nourished)

Individual
choice
(eating or
fasting)

FUNCTIONING
(being
nourished)

Objective
state/subjective
feeling

SATISFACTION
( taste)

.
Conversion factors vary according to disabilities, metabolism, age, gender, but also social
pressure.
Capabilities: being able to eat

What is valuable is to be able to choose to eat (or not).

Contrary to a functioning-based approach, a capability-based approach takes into

Martha Craven Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice: Disability, Nationality, Species Membership (Harvard University
Press, 2006).

account the importance of choice. People must be free not to exercise functionings (ex:
they can choose to fast rather than eat)

What are the Central Capabilities?

What should people have reasons to value?

The purpose of the list: It is a partial theory of justice (a just society being a society where
each citizen has access to a specific threshold of each of these capabilities), a political proposal
aimed to be implemented in the form of constitutional principles in each country.
How are these capabilities selected?
(1) Philosophical argument: as Marx said, there are lives that are fully human (worthy of a
human being) and lives that are not worthy of a human being. A life worthy of a human
being includes the exercise of certain functions/functionings, e.g. certain states and
activities (beings and doings). These functions are intuitively identified, then
(2) the list is discussed by people from different cultures, in order to ensure that the list
is not culturally biased.
How to respond to people who argue that it is paternalistic or colonialist to impose the
Western value of gender equality on other cultures? Nussbaums answer (pp 224-227):
cultures are not homogeneous, and cultures evolve too. No culture completely agrees
on the way women should be treated.
Result: overlapping consensus even if people having different views of the good life
cannot agree on everything, they could presumably agree on this list of functionings.
CRITICISM 19: covert reliance on Nussbaums own moral authority?
CRITICISM 2:If the threshold is low, then the CA loses its radical appeal. If the threshold is
high, because resources are scarce, we might be forced to do trade-offs. And some capabilities
look more important than others (to be adequately nourished vs to enjoy recreational activities).
But Nussbaum offers no guidance for that. Ex: reproductive health vs move freely from place
to place.

Alison M. Jaggar, Reasoning About Well-Being: Nussbaums Methods of Justifying the Capabilities* ,
Journal of Political Philosophy 14, no 3 (2006): 301 22, doi:10.1111/j.1467-9760.2006.00253.x.

ETHICS AND THE ECONOMY

2014-2015
Contact: danielle.zwarthoed@usaintlouis.be / danielle.zwarthoed@uclouvain.be

Course C9 Intergenerational Justice and

Sustainability
1. Concrete issues of Intergenerational Justice
What is a generation? A generation may refer either to a birth cohort or to an age group.
Birth cohort: the group of people born in a given time span (ex: between 1 January 1985
and 31 December 1985)
-

Age group: the group of people who have the same age, be it at different times (ex: in

2005, the 1975 cohort was 30; in 2015 it will be the 1985 cohort, in 2025 the 1995 cohortbut
at that time all these different cohorts belonged/will belong to the same age group, the 30 years
old people age group).
EXAMPLES OF ISSUES OF JUSTICE BETWEEN GENERATIONS:
Natural resources and environmental protection: tackling climate change, preserving natural
resources (fuels, clean water)
The building and maintenance of social and individual wealth: maintaining our pension
schemes, (or?) investing in human capital and youth employment, limiting public and private
debt.
Preserving institutions and cultural heritage: building and maintaining democratic institutions,
preserving (or not?) linguistic diversity, cultural heritage
Praiseworthy goals but they involve costs. How should we decide for trade-offs between
present and future generations interests? Or between different kinds of savings/investments for
future generations (investing in education vs in pensions? Focus on environmental protection
or on research on new technologies (ex: carbon sinks to replace trees)? Building a dam to reduce
greenhouse gas effects (hydroelectricity is less polluting) or preserving the forests or natural
areas, biodiversity that will be flooded to build up this dam?
Important: intergenerational justice is not only about the environment, and there are some
environmental ethicists who dismiss the intergenerational justice perspective because they think
it is too anthropocentric (i.e. human interests have priority over animals or Natures interests)
1

2. Why intergenerational justice is special

(1)The passing of time
Asymmetry of power the living cannot change past deeds and we have the capacity to shape
future generations circumstances (in a positive as well as in a negative way) and (to the extent
that it matters for intergenerational justice) even their values and preferences (through education
in a broad sense).
Uncertainty though we have the capacity to shape FGs circumstances, we do not know how
they will act with respect to their own descendants. Nor do we know whether they will face
unexpected circumstances: natural hazard, technological improvement, economic crisis, etc.
(2) In the absence of overlap between us and remote generations
Difficult to enforce our obligations to future generations
Difficult to empathize with the suffering of distant future people
the spectacle of IG
injustices has less motivational power than domestic or global injustices
(3)Neither the population size nor the characteristics of its members are given any more (as it
is in intragenerational justice): the existence, number and even the identity of future people
depend on our procreative decisions.
(4) Certain accounts of justice cannot explain why we should comply with intergenerational
rules1. These are mutual advantage theories (discussed Gosseriess text p 64-65), inspired by
17th-century philosopher Thomas Hobbes. These theories are based on the fact that cooperation
with others is the necessary condition for every individual to be able to achieve what she wants.
In order for such a mutually beneficial cooperation to continue, every individual has to agree to
comply with the rules of justice: otherwise, cooperation will stop and this is advantageous for
nobody. The problem is that mutually beneficial cooperation is impossible between members
of different generations. If we have contact with the immediate next generation (our children),
we do not have any kind of contact with the far distant future people (those who will live in 500
years, for example). Because every generation can neither benefit from the savings and
investments it makes for the next generations nor be harmed by these next generations, every
generation has no incentive to comply with intergenerational rules. A typical issue for mutual
advantage theorists is the disposal of nuclear waste: nuclear energy (assuming it is kept and
produced according to the strictest safety rules, which is not really now) is beneficial for the
present generations and for the near future generations (cheap energy, no greenhouse gas). But
no one knows whether, in the future, containers where radioactive nuclear waste is buried will
prevent radioactivity from escaping the containers, hence poisoning people and animals in the
very long term. Therefore, justice between generations is impossible.

Remember also the distinction between cosmopolitanism and associativism. Mutual advantage theories are a kind
of associativism.

Perhaps a better account of justice to future generations should be based on the idea of
impartiality, that is, the idea that every human being deserves equal moral concern, wherever
she happens to be born (global justice) and whenever she happens to be born (intergenerational
justice).

3. How much should we leave for other generations?

Discussion on the sustainability criterion
A tale of unsustainable development: the collapse of Easter Island (one of the hypotheses to
explain it2): a very isolated island (a closed system, as the Earth is), whose brilliant civilization
degenerated because of the unsustainable exploitation of the natural resources (esp. forests
wood being used to build up the famous gigantic statues -) and perhaps of overpopulation,
leaving nothing for the next generations, who lived in extreme poverty in an almost treeless
island when the European arrived in 1722. If indeed there was an injustice involved in the story
of the Easter Island, how should its inhabitants have managed their resources?
Awareness about the effects of relentless economic growth on natural resources and
environment started to grow in the 1970s, after the two oil crises and various environmental
disasters (the Amoco Cadiz oil spill in 1978, the Three Miles Island nuclear disaster in 1979).
In the 1980s the UN commend a report for a programme of international cooperation on the
relations between environment and development to a commission directed by the Norwegian
Gro Harlem Brundtland. The commission produces the report Our Common Future (1987),
which will provide the definition of sustainable development everyone uses today: a sustainable
development is a development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the
ability of future generations to meet their own needs.
However, according to Gosseries, this criterion is not satisfactory. Why?
Comparison with
other theories which aim to answer the following question: How much is it just for a generation
to leave to the next generation?
Capital: understood in a very broad sense (the valuable stuff if you want), including
natural resources, environmental assets, technologies, infrastructures, institutions,
human capital, cultural heritageFor simplicity sake, Gosseries assumes that we could
measure the value of this capital, and that its different dimensions are commensurable
(ex: the value of biodiversity could be compared with the value of technology).
Savings/Dissavings: saving is leaving more to the next generations than what we
received from the preceding one. Dissaving is leaving less.
Obligation/authorization/prohibition

Indirect Reciprocity
The concept of reciprocity comprises two ideas:

This is Jared Diamonds thesis, though it is contested by many anthropologists and archaeologists.

G2 has an obligation to give something to G1 because G1 gave something to G23.

The value of what G2 returns to G1 should be equivalent to the value of what G1
gave to G24. (no net beneficiary)
In the intergenerational realm, reciprocity becomes descending. Because of the passing
of time, G2 cannot always reciprocate its gift to G1. But it can reciprocate it to its
children, G3. Descending reciprocity:
(i)
G2 has an obligation to give something to G3 because G1 gave something to G2.
(ii)
The value of what G2 returns to G3 should be equivalent to the value of what G1
gave to G2.
(i)
(ii)

Ex: I pay for the next generations education because my parents paid for my education.
Why it is appealing: the idea of reciprocity is deeply rooted in our society, many people like it.
It is related to the idea of intergenerational and social solidarity (see Lon Bourgeoiss
solidarism, for instance).
Some limitations:
The justificatory maxim (i) is difficult to defend (more research needed on the question:
does the fact that I receive a gift creates an obligation for me to reciprocate? And, if so
why?)
The first and last generation problem: the first is full contributor, while the last is full
beneficiary.
What happens if G3 is much more populated than G2? Should we assess the value of
the capital on a per capita basis?

Utilitarianism
The utilitarian principle: U-ism says a just society is a society whose institutions/where
individual actions and/or individual actions maximize collective intergenerational well-being,
understood as the sum of the levels of the utilities of all individuals, whatever generation they
belong to.
If:
(i)
(ii)

Individual well-being is correlated to a significant extent to material wealth

(productive) investment creates more wealth than consumption

Then every generation should invest rather than consume in order to maximize the
intergenerational wealth (and thus the intergenerational well-being)
We should consume as
little as possible, especially if the number of generations is infinite. This is counterintuitive,
since it involves the everlasting sacrifice of everyone.

3
4

The justificatory maxim

The substantive maxim

Other factors that may reinforce (or not) the claim that previous generations should sacrifice
themselves for the future: parental altruism (reinforces the ccl: one of the things that makes
parents happy is the well-being of their offspring) decreasing marginal utility (mitigates the
ccl: over a certain level of wealth, future people will not be that happy hence they do not need
so much savings - ) social discount rate (mitigates the ccl: future utilities have less value for
us than present utilities (because of the human tendency to be short-termist)5
Note 1: utilitarianism has also strange implications for population ethics, which is a big area
of concern for intergenerational justice
See course on utilitarianism and the repugnant
conclusion (average utilitarianism VS total utilitarianism).
Note 2: (i) is not necessarily true. Different individuals may need different amounts of wealth
to be happy (cheap vs expensive tastes). So far Utilitarians have taken preferences/utilities for
given. But, in the intergenerational setting, this is not true any more. First, future peoples
preferences are uncertain. Second, and more importantly, the present generation shapes the
next generations preferences (i) by forcing it to adapt its preference to what is available (if a
certain species of bird disappears, our descendants will learn to live without it) (ii) through
education (I may habituate my kids to a high level of consumption or to a very frugal way of
living).

Libertarianism
The principle: A just society is a society whose institutions/where individual actions protect
and respect the individual right to self-ownership as well as legitimate individual property
rights. Property rights are legitimate if they were gained either through just (i.e. consented)
transfers or through legitimate original appropriation.
Problem: what if a generation appropriates all the resources, leaving nothing for its
descendants?
A possible answer: an intergenerational interpretation of the Lockean Proviso: initial
acquisition is legitimate if you leave enough and as good for others, that is: initial
acquisition is legitimate if it does not worsen the condition of other individuals
(compared with the situation before the acquisition). (see C4)
PROBLEM: WE CANNOT COMPARE G2S SITUATION BEFORE AND AFTER G1
APPROPRIATED THE NATURAL RESOURCES, BECAUSE G2 DID NOT EXIST AT
THAT TIME!

This consideration is not very relevant here however. If it is true that, as a matter of fact, individuals have a
tendency to discount the future (for example, students do not come to class because they give more weight to their
immediate desire to sleep more than to their future desire to complete their degree), this does not mean that, as a
matter of principle, societies should discount the future. Discounting the future will not lead to an increase of the
intergenerational well-being (quite the contrary) (unless, as stressed by Note 2, our discounting of the future
changes also future preferences).

Suggestion:
G1 must leave to G2 at least as much as what G2 could have appropriated if G1 had not
contributed by its action to a net improvement or deterioration of what G2 would otherwise
have inherited.
Natural deterioration should not be compensated for, but human deterioration should
A generation can improve the capital it leaves to the next generation, but it has no
obligation to do so, as long as it does not deteriorate it.

Rawlss liberal egalitarianism

The Just Savings Principle, which requires that each generation should save enough capital in
order to secure just institutions for the next generations. Each generation should maintain the
gains of culture and civilization, and maintain intact those just institutions that have been
established, but it must also put aside in each period of time a suitable amount of real capital
accumulation. This saving may take various forms from net investment in machinery and other
means of production to investment in learning and education
Two stages of economic evolution and the saving requirements that follow:
The Accumulation Stage: society is not wealthy enough to secure just institution and the
more for the next generation
than what it received from the preceding one.
The SteadyDissavings under the threshold of wealth needed to secure just institutions is prohibited.
Positive savings are authorized but not required any more.
How can we justify this decision from the original position? Rawls rejects the suggestion that
all generations should be involved in the original position this would stretch the fantasy too
far, as he says - . So the partners all belong to the same generation, but they do not know which
generation. Therefore they apply to themselves the principle of just savings they would prefer
preceding generations applied to themselves.
Problem: why should positive savings be authorized at the steady-state stage? This would
involve the sacrifice of the current poor, whose condition could be improved, for the sake of
future people.

Liberal Egalitarianism revisited

The Accumulation Stage: society is not wealthy enough to secure just institution and the
than what it received from the preceding one.
The SteadyBoth
savings and dissavings are prohibited: each generation should leave exactly the amount
6

of wealth needed to secure just institutions. If there is a surplus, it should be allocated to the
intergenerational worst-offs (who is more likely to belong to the oldest generation).
An anti-growth argument? 4 different arguments against growth (dcroissance6):
> The economic system (i.e. capitalism) which seeks growth at all costs creates many unjust
inequalities
> The State should be neutral and respect every individual view of the good life. Seeking growth
at all costs (especially once a society is wealthy enough to satisfy its members basic needs and
preserve democratic institutions) is only one particular view of the good life (a religion if
you want), and a truly neutral State should not be biased towards this view instead of others
(such as voluntary simplicity, for instance)
> Not only wealth growth does not guarantee happiness, it may even threaten it, by forcing
people into overwork, overconsumption, debt-slavery, and the neglect of worthy social
relationships and relationships with Nature
> Growth is not sustainable, it puts too much pressure on natural resources

Brundtland Sufficientarianism
Remember: Sufficientarianism says a distribution is just only if every individual/generation
has access to enough (to a sufficient level) of certain important advantages.
Problems:
This is a very lax criterion, because a generation does not need a lot to satisfy its basic
needs (eating, drinking)
Perhaps defenders of the Brundtland sufficientarianism
should precise what they mean by needs (basic needs? Nussbaums capabilities?)
Nothing is said about intragenerational inequalities (the current poor) : opting for
sustainable development without correcting the current injustices would result in the
sacrifice of todays worst-offs.

4. What kind of goods should we save for the future? Is it OK

to replace one good by another without asking future
people what they think?
The Substitutability Debate:
Weak Sustainability partisans (ex: Solow): they think a generation is entitled to
deplete all natural goods as long as they can replace them by goods that are equivalent
in value (ex: investments in education, new technologies)
Strong Sustainability partisans: they think no generation is entitled to deplete all
natural goods (but then, how much of them could they deplete?)
6

Cf. Serge Latouche, Le pari de la dcroissance (Paris: Fayard, 2006).

2 different concerns with the Weak Sustainability position:

(1)
It is risky to bet on future, uncertain improvements (cf. precautionary principle in
the EU Law, which addresses this issue)
(2)
Certain goods (environmental goods) are valuable per se and a generation is not
entitled to suppress them
How to assess the value of what a generation leaves to the next one, since the
intergenerational capital contains many different kinds of goods? Can we replace a
good by another? The problem is that we cannot ask future generations what they
think.
o The Intrinsic Value of Nature criterion: natural goods are unique and
irreplaceable: we should avoid touching them as much as possible.
o The Utilitarian criterion: goods are replaceable IF they produce the same level
of utility (if plastic trees and carbon sinks will make our descendants as happy
as real trees, then substitutability is all right).
o The Primary Goods criterion: goods are replaceable IF they can secure the
fundamental primary goods (political and civil freedoms, income and wealth,
the social basis of self-respect). At a first glance, this criterion allows a great
deal of substitutability, but let us not forget that certain religions or conceptions
of the good a liberal wishes to respect require some kind of natural environment
to be preserved.
o The Capability criterion: Nussbaums list includes an Other Species capability
and thus would not authorize total depletion.
o The Open Option criterion (popularized by international lawyer Edith Brown
Weiss): every generation should leave enough options for the following
generation to be able to choose whether it wants to preserve these options or not
(seed banks?).

ETHICS AND THE ECONOMY

2014-2015
Contact: danielle.zwarthoed@usaintlouis.be / danielle.zwarthoed@uclouvain.be

Course C10 Should we consume less?

Intergenerational justice and a case for a frugal
education
Readings:
(1)

Boulanger, Three Strategies for Sustainable Consumption, SAPIENS, 3.2 (2010)

Vol.3 / n2
(2)

Grauerholz, L. and A. Bubriski-McKenzie (2012) Teaching about Consumption The

Not Buying It Project, Teaching Sociology 40(4): 33248.

According to the Global Footprint Network, if all the worlds citizens lived as Euro peans, we
would need more than two and a half planets to provide the necessary resources, absorb our
wastes, and leave some capacity for wild species1.
Overconsumption and intergenerational justice (and global justice):
-

Consumption increases greenhouse gases emissions. Most experts agree human

emissions of greenhouse gases are at least partly responsible for climate change
(Intergovernemental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC, 2007). The worst effects of
climate change will (and already do) affect mainly the poorer countries, though being
caused by the richer. Global warming can provoke a sea level rise, meteorological
hazards, new diseases, the destruction of ecosystems and biodiversity.
Increasing demands on healthcare and pension systems threat to leave our descendants
with an unbearable debt.
Consumption exhausts supplies of fuels and other non-renewable resources. The peak
of oil production will probably be reached before 2020 (Sorrell et al., 2010).

Footprint:
Ecological footprint biocapacity = ecological deficit
Biocapacity = surface*bioproductivity
Ecological footprint = Population*Consumption per head*Resource and waste intensity

Even if some suggest technological changes could compensate for the future depletion of
resources (Sagoff, 1997; Solow, 1991), it would be risky to assume a priori that future
generations will be capable of meeting such challenges.

Strategies to implement intergenerational Justice

REMEMBER:
4 theories of IG justice seem to prohibit dissavings: reciprocity, libertarianism (except the first
arrived first served version), utilitarianism, liberal egalitarianism (Rawls). And Brundtlands
sufficientarianism prohibits dissavings if they destroy the capacity of future people to meet their
needs.
+(some of the) specific obstacles to the implementation of intergenerational justice:
Future people can neither harm us or threat us if we do not fulfil our obligations towards
them
We cannot empathize with their problems and suffering it is difficult to care for them
Relative uncertainty of future circumstances

3 strategies (Boulanger)
Given:
S: sustainability (minimal understanding of intergenerational justice)
WB: well-being (pleasure, preference satisfaction, need satisfaction, capability achievement,
realizing ones life plan)
Se: number of services provided by a given stock of goods (a car, for example)
C: commodity
EF: ecological footprint
S = (WB/Se)*(Se/C)*(C/EF)
(1) The eco-efficiency strategy: produce more commodities (good and services) with less
ecological impact (less raw resources and/or waste and pollution)
Technological improvements and innovation will allow industrials to decrease the
intensity of raw materials in the process of producing and disposing of commodities
The right incentives should be provided to encourage business actors to innovate
advocates of the eco-efficiency strategy vary their position with respect to the role
of the state (remove barriers to market efficiency? Create incentives (taxation) to
encourage the choice of eco-efficiency strategies? Invest also in public research?
Limitations:

(i)
(ii)

Rebound effects (more efficiency

lower costs
increasing of the demand
increase of the ecological footprint
Taxation-redistribution scheme will also end up allocating the resources to material
consumption (although by different individuals)

(2) The de-commodification strategy: provide more services with less commodities
Main target: the institutional context policies ought to increase the influence of
systems and organizations that provide services with less commodities. This means
limiting the market as the main way to get a service, relying more on States (public
libraries, public transportation), communal arrangements and local exchange trading
systems (donneries, repair caf in Belgium), household arrangements.
Contrary to the market system, other modes of provision couple consumption with
other social relationships and practices (friendship, dependency)
More time-consuming
Limitations:
(i)
(ii)

The transition to de-commodification would require strong State interventions (not

a problem for all theories of justice)
Even if more services are provided with less good, this economy might not need the
growing demand for a higher standard of living

(3) The sufficiency strategy: being more satisfied with less services (and commodities),
that is, going for a more frugal way of living (see Voluntary Simplicity activists)
Sufficiency: the author assumes there is a threshold of material consumption over
which well-being stops increasing (idea of having too much)
Targets individual behaviour and choices individuals should learn to make the act
of consumption more mindful (avoid compulsive shopping). +shift from
materialistic values to non-materialistic ones (self-control, spirituality,
sobriety)
The sufficiency strategy is related to education in a broad sense (any process
whose purpose is to shape an individual or a groups beliefs, preferences and
values). Example of educational practices that change consumption choices:
parental values, school curriculum, peer influence, advertising campaigns.

Creating frugal citizens. Justice, education and consumption.

Agenda 21, the UNs action plan for sustainable development, states: Governments and
private sector organizations should promote more positive attitudes towards sustainable

consumption through education, public awareness programmes and other means [ ]

(United Nations Environment Programme, 1992, sec. 4.3.).
But recent attempts to promote more sustainable consumption habits in schools have triggered
controversies:
Germany, the Green Partys proposal to offer vegetarian meals at schools (the Veggie
Thursday)
United States: the Montana School Board has opposed the screening of Annie Leonards
documentary

The

Story

of

Stuff

in

classrooms

(http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9GorqroigqM).
In a society like ours, should schools/parents/other actors teach children/adults to be frugal?
Environmental education
the purpose is to develop a knowledge of and a concern for
nature/Frugal education the purpose is to shape consumption habits

Justice-seeking argument to teach frugality to children and adults

Liberal egalitarian theories of justice require educational policies to encourage citizens
compliance with the principles of distributive intra- and intergenerational justice.
In a society characterized by a consumerist ethos, such compliance requires citizens to develop
frugal habits, so that they will be more willing to leave their fair share to the others.
Therefore, educational policies should aim at cultivating frugal habits among children.
Objection #1: frugal habits do not contribute to the realization of intergenerational justice,
because of the rebound effect (a lower level of consumption in wealthy countries results in
falling prices, which increases consumption in poorer countries).
Response: The rebound effect could be countered by three additional measures: (a) teaching
frugal habits in poor countries too and (b) incentives (environmental taxes) (c) decommodification policies (Boulnager).

Objection #2: frugal education in schools is not permitted by liberal theories of justice, because
teaching a (potentially) controversial conception of the good violates the liberal principle of
neutrality towards controversial conceptions of the good life (religions, but also spiritualties or
specific ways of living such as vegetarianism).
Response: Frugality is not a (potentially) controversial conception of the good. Even if certain
ethical ideals promote frugal conducts, frugality by itself is not tied to a specific ideal. Frugality
is merely the ability the ability to achieve satisfaction by consuming less resource, in the same
way as efficiency is the ability to achieve a goal by using less resource.

Objection #3: the cultivation of frugal habits at an early age is not permitted by liberal standards,
because the decision to behave frugally in order to comply with justice should be left to
autonomous and morally responsible adults.
Response: the cultivation of frugal habits does not undermine adults judgment about what
justice require them to do. Moreover, it renders compliance with justice easier by helping
citizens to overcome the gap between the demands of justice they acknowledge and their
consumption habits.

Happiness-seeking arguments to teach frugality to children and adults

Theories of justice that are concerned with securing or increasing opportunities for happiness
and well-being (utilitarianism, the capability approach, Marxism, but also, to a lesser extent,
liberal egalitarianism) require educational policies to enable future citizens to achieve
happiness.
In our societies (which are characterized by scarcity of resources but also by striking injustices),
frugality is an asset. Why?
(i)

An income-generating education: .In term of the lifelong level of comfort one will
be able to achieve, there is a world of difference between consuming 90% and 110%
of ones income at an early age.(Van Parijs, 2003)

(ii)
(iii)

(iv)
(v)

Frugality increases ones bargaining power: fewer debts, greater capacity to refusing
demeaning or hazardous jobs and wait for better offers.
Frugal people are less vulnerable to the exploitative practices of credit cards
companies and other lenders. In societies where each individual is held accountable
for her spending, and where bankruptcy law does not protect consumers well (see
Sullivan et al., 1999), frugality is an asset.
Avoid experiencing frustration
frugal education could reduce the risks of developing a compulsive shopping
behaviours, which stimulate the dopamine reward system in the very same way as
drugs as nicotine, cocaine or heroin do (Hartston, 2012). Better resistance to
sophisticated advertising techniques, the possibility to buy at any hour, the increased
accessibility to credit.

Therefore, schools/parents should teach frugality to prospective adults.

Objection #1: In a society characterized by a consumerist ethos, frugal children have less
opportunity to live well (as children and as adults) because they will have less prospect to
develop social and affective relationships with peers who do not share their frugal habits.
Response: If, as this paper argues, frugality is taught in schools, frugal habits and values will
become widespread and frugal children will be less countercultural.
5

Objection #2: the early shaping of consumption habits is not permitted by liberal standards,
because it undermines autonomy. Autonomy requires that we allow individuals choosing their
habits and how they will achieve their conceptions of the good by themselves.
Response: the early cultivation of frugal habits does not undermine autonomy if, in addition,
we equip children with the skills needed to reconsider these habits. Moreover, in a consumerist
society, if schools do not undertake the task to teach children frugal habits, they will develop
consumerists ones. And, if autonomy requires the capacity to revise and change the habits one
has acquired in her early life, we should take into account the fact that it is probably easier to
increase ones consumption level than to lower it. Therefore, if children have to acquire
consumption habits anyway, autonomy recommends the frugal ones.

Objection #3: the cultivation of frugal habits among disadvantaged children in unjust societies
reinforces injustices, because it habituates them to have less than their fair shares.
Response: If indeed a more just society is possible, it is not certain than the mere frustration of
a desire for material consumption will be the main driver for change. Other drivers, such as an
accurate perception of social and economic inequalities and the cultivation of political skills
among the disadvantaged, should be considered.
Concrete proposals
(1)Ban advertising (or at least some techniques and/or some targets, like children)? The idea of
freedom of non-reception: http://www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2012/06/26/la-publicite-peutavoir-des-effets-nocifs-sur-la-societe_1724489_3232.html (in French)
(2)The Not Buying It Project try it!
- Pick 3 days between tomorrow and next Thursday (or later if it is not possible this week).
These 3 days must be consecutive.
- During these 3 days, you should not shop, except to purchase the essentials. Defining what is
essential is up to you, but you should have in mind that any purchase ought to be justified
according to this criterion.
- Take personal notes of this experience. Describe (i) what you did (ii) how you defined the
essentials (iii) what you learned about yourself in the process (iv) what you learned about
your social environment in the process. If you want, you can make 5-minutes presentation of
your notes next week.

ETHICS AND THE ECONOMY

2014-2015
Contact: danielle.zwarthoed@usaintlouis.be / danielle.zwarthoed@uclouvain.be

Course C11 Representation of future generations

Readings: Gregory S.Kavka and Virginia Warren (1983) 'Political representation for future
generations', in R.Elliot and A.Gare (eds) Environmental Philosophy.

1. REPRESENTATION OF FUTURE GENERATIONS IN THE

WORLD NOWADAYS
Why the political representation of future generations?
Democratic short-termism. Why?
Opportunity costs of adopting long-termist policies. Present generations do not want to
renounce to immediate consumption of resources (inflated by population growth and
consumerist ethos)
Politicians are concerned with their reelection first, and thus try to promote their present
electors interests in priority.
Powerful interest groups (lobbies, companies, trade unions) push policy-makers to
adopt short-termist policies
Recognized national sovereignty limits the possibility to strike international agreements
on climate change, energy policies. But these issues can hardly be addressed at the
national level.

Two real-world experiments:

(1) In Israel: The Israeli Parliamentary (Knesset) Commission for Future Generations
(2001-2006).It (i) provided opinions on laws concerning the interests of future
generations, and, (ii), advise to Knesset members on issues relevant to future
generations interests and rights. The Commissioner had also the right to be given
enough time to prepare his evaluation and comments
de facto a power to delay the
legislative process.
(2) In Hungary: Ombudsman for Future Generations(2008-2012) replaced by a Deputy of
the general Commissioner for Fundamental Rights: (i) provides an opinion on draft laws
affecting the interests of future generations (ii) monitors the enforcement of the interests
of future generations, may propose to institute proceedings against these violations, or
turn to the Constitutional Court.
1

2. FUTURE GENERATIONS REPRESENTATION - EXERCISE:

(1) Form groups of 4 to 8 students
(2) Develop an argument to answer the following question (Kavka and Warren): should future
(unborn) people be represented in the democratic process? Answer (i) yes or (ii) no
(3) First, justify your answer with an ethical argument: Is it because it is more just (then explain
the conception of intragenerational/intergenerational justice you have in mind) and/or because
it is more democratic (then explain why more democracy implies the representation of people
who do not exist)
(4) If you answer YES:
Explain how it would be done justify each practical proposal you make
> how many representatives?
> would they elected or nominated? If elected, by whom? If not, how would they be selected?
> What powers would they have? (law-making competence, merely advisory role, veto rights,
monitoring tasks)
> What would be the scope of their mandate (only environmental protection? Other options?)
If you answer NO:
First, explain why this solution is unjust and or undemocratic, or why it would fail. Then explain
what alternative policies you would design to secure intergenerational justice and/or democracy
(economic policies? Special commissions, check and balance system? Educational policies?)
(5) Consider all the objections you can think about to your answers.

3. REPRESENTATION OF FUTURE GENERATIONS

CONCLUSIONS
3.1. Two justifications for the representation of future generations
(i)

Justice-seeking argument
Intergenerational Justice requires the present generation to leave future generations
their fair share of resources (cf C9 for the various accounts of what future
generations fair share consists in). But it seems that the current democratic process
is unable to secure our duties of intergenerational justice. Therefore, insofar as it is
an efficient solution to promote intergenerational justice (and insofar as it does not
threaten other important justice goals, such as basic liberties and social and
economic equality), future people should be represented in a way or in another in
the democratic process.

(ii)

Democracy-seeking argument
All-affected interests principle: all those who have interests that will probably be
affected by any possible decision under any possible political agenda should have
the right to participate to the decision-making process. Future generations are
affected by some of our current decisions. Therefore they should be included in the
democratic process, through their representatives.

Note: the justice-seeking argument is more about how to achieve a fair distribution of resources
between generations, while the democracy-seeking argument is more about how to achieve a
fair distribution of power between generations. In practice, both are related.

3.2. (Some of) the objections to the representation of future generations

(i)

OBJECTION: (Kavka and Warren p 24-25) We do not know what future peoples
interests consist in. Then, how could their representatives speak for them?
RESPONSE: It is quite probable that they will at least share our basic human interests
(biological need for food, clean water, fresh air, shelter, peace, perhaps sociability and
affective relationships)
(ii)
OBJECTION: representatives of future people cannot be held accountable, since
future people cannot control them.
RESPONSE: this problem can be addressed to some extent if we make sure that the
representatives have values, interests and objectives that are in line with future peoples
interests. We should base the selection of representative on their demonstrated skills

and moral qualities that allow us to predict that they will act in future peoples best
interest (ex: select individuals belonging to environmental NGO1.
Note:responses (i) and (ii) are perhaps problematic since not everyone agrees with what is in
the best interests of future people (see C9 and debates on substitutability).
(iii)

OBJECTION: representation of future people is useless. Why? If, as it is assumed,

citizens do not already care for future people, they will never accept giving so much
power to representatives that will not serve their short-term interests. And if they do
already care for future people, then no extra representation of their interests is
needed.
RESPONSE: human motivations are perhaps more complex see Ulysses tale we
may want something and its opposite at the same time and need to bind us to do what is
in the best interests of humanity
RESPONSE 2: institutions representing future generations might have an educational
function rather than a political one their purpose is rather to gather and synthetise
relevant information, to induce us to deliberate and think as if future people were there,
rather than to really oppose our interests and theirs.

(iv)

OBJECTION: Why representing future people, and not other vulnerable

constituencies, such as foreigners, children, mentally incompetent adults, animals,
past citizens?
Fallacious objection: including future people in the constituency does not preclude
including other groups we must rather assess the particular reasons why we should
include this or that specific group.
Children: next week
Past generations: we cannot really affect them (that is, they will not experience harm) +
they are indirectly represented by us, insofar as we care about our past
Foreigners: Kavka and Warren argue that foreigners interests can already be taken into
account by current institutions: immigrants citizens vote charities, international
diplomacy (I am not sure this answer is fully satisfactory)
Animals, nature: it has been suggested that participatory methods of democracy could
better take into account animals and natures interests, insofar as there are citizens who
are sympathetic to them who can advance their claims in the public debate2

Andrew Dobson, Representative Democracy and the Environment , in Democracy and the environment:
Problems and prospects, 1996, 124..
2
Robert E. Goodin, Enfranchising the Earth, and Its Alternatives , Political Studies 44, no 5 (1 dcembre 1996):
835 49, doi:10.1111/j.1467-9248.1996.tb00337.x.

ETHICS AND THE ECONOMY

2014-2015
Contact: danielle.zwarthoed@usaintlouis.be / danielle.zwarthoed@uclouvain.be
Course C12: Childrens rights
READING: Pierik, Child Labor Abroad: Five Policy Options, Philosophy & Public Policy Quarterly
24 (3):9-13 (2004)
1.

Introduction: Definitions

What is a right?
Moral (rights children should have, if any) VS legal rights (rights children have under the current
legislation)
What is a child?
International Convention of Childrens Rights (United Nations, 1989): a child = any human being below
the age of 18 (unless under the law applicable to the child, majority is attained earlier.
A specific legal and moral status:
Human beings equal in dignity, etc. But:
Youth cognitive and volitional capacities are not fully developed
Childhood is a temporary state
2. Should children have rights? What justifies the difference between children and adults
rights?
2.1.

Against childrens rights

(i)

The argument of the inflation of rights: ascribing rights to too many groups (children,
minorities, future generations, animals), or ascribing too many rights (right to food, right to
love) devalues rights.

(ii)

Children cannot be right-holders, because right-holders need to have capacities children do

not have (capacity to deliberate, choose, consent)

2 accounts of what a right is:

> The will or choice theory of right: a right protects the capacity of a person to make choices 1
therefore a right-holder must be capable of making choices
therefore individuals who do not have
this capacity (children, future generations) cannot be right-holders
BUT: rights of the future adult - possibility of trusteeship
> The welfare or interest theory of right: a right protects the interests of an individual The condition
of r having a right is to have an interests
As children (but also future generations, animals) have
interests, they have rights2
(iii) ascribing rights to children is inappropriate, because it does not take into account the privileged
character of childhood and of family relationships.
Should the preservation of the family have priority over the rights and interests of its members?
2.2.

Against differentiating childrens and adults right: the liberationist challenge

See John Holt, Escape from Childhood: The Needs and Rights of Children (1974)3
-

Radical liberationists: children should be granted adults rights from birth

Less radical: the age of majority should be lowered

Liberationists challenge the claim that children do not have the necessary cognitive and volitional
capacities to exercise the rights adults already have:
To some extent, children have desires, choose things, have opinions
They say: in fact, the fact that actual children lack such capacities results from the fact that they
have been deprived of such rights.
The capacities associated with choice are not equally possessed by adults either. Hence, instead
of drawing the line between adults and children, we should perhaps draw the line between those
who have the capacities required to exercise a right and those who have not Establish tests?
What are the limits?
Possible objections to liberationism:
(1) Even if children do not have adults rights now, they will enjoy these rights later Age-based
discrimination is less worrying than race-, gender-, religion-based discriminations
(2) The intrinsic good of childhood
(3) Choices made during childhood and youth (education, health) have a stronger impact on ones
later opportunities than choices made at a later stage given what is at stake, paternalism might
be justified.

This account of right is the one most libertarians use.

See Joel Feinberg, The Rights of Animals and Unborn Generations , in Rights, Justice and the Bounds of
Liberty (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1980), 159 84.
3
John Holt, Escape from Childhood: The Needs and Rights of Children (New York: Penguin Books, 1974).
2

Note: difference between the childs right to decide and the childs right to be consulted (concerning her
education or custody, for instance)4. See UN Convention (quoted in Introduction):
1. Parties shall assure to the child who is capable of forming his or her own views the right to express
those views freely in all matters affecting the child, the views of the child being given due weight in
accordance with the age and maturity of the child.
2. For this purpose, the child shall in particular be provided the opportunity to be heard in any judicial
and administrative proceedings affecting the child, either directly, or through a representative or an
appropriate body, in a manner consistent with the procedural rules of national law.
2.3. The childs right to an open future5
Context:US Supreme Court Decision: Wisconsin V. Yoder et. Al, 406 US 205 (1972). Amish parents
withdrawn their children above 14 from public school, arguing that they learned things that may
encourage them to leave the Amish community, threatening the existence of the community itself. They
hence violated Wisconsin Law, according to which school is mandatory until 16. Amish parents went
to the Supreme Court and won. The Supreme Court based its decision on the Free Exercise of Religion
Clause (1st amendment of US constitution).
This decision, and especially Justice Burgers Opinion, which demonstrated little sensitivity to the
Amish childrens interests (as opposed to their parents ones), motivated Feinbergs reflection on the
childs right to an open future.
Feinbergs classification of rights:
A rights: rights only adults should have (right to vote, work, marry, drink alcohol)
A-C rights: rights both adults and children should have (right to health, physical integrity, to
have an opinion)
C rights: rights only children should have:
o Rights derived from the state of dependence and vulnerability of children: right to
shelter, food, protection (note: handicapped adults also hold these rights)
o Anticipatory autonomy rights: these are the rights of the future adult the child will
become. Adults and society should act in such a way that the childs future autonomy
is not violated. The child should be educated in such a way that her future liberties,
political freedom, freedom of religion, freedom of education are not violated.
According to Feinberg, by foreclosing irrevocably many future options (religious or
occupational), the Amish education violated childrens anticipatory autonomy rights (right to
an open future).
Issues Feinbergs view raises:
The value of autonomy in a multicultural society
Whether education should prepare children to be happy or to be autonomous

4
5

Harry Brighouse, How Should Children Be Heard , Arizona Law Review 45 (2003): 691.
Joel Feinberg, The childs right to an open future , in Whose child, 1980, 124 53.

Whether it is better for society that children are autonomous or not.

3. Child Labour: ethical issues in a non-ideal world
Facts: in 2013, the International Labour Office estimates 168 million children (5-17) are involved in the
labour force, and 85 million of them do hazardous jobs.
Western societies consider child labour is a deplorable practice and should be abandoned. According to
our discussion of childrens rights, which types of rights child labour could violate?
A concrete case (Pierik): In 1995 the US Congress considered the Child Labour Deterrence Bill ()
which would forbid the importation of products ade with the involvement of workers under 15. Those in
favour of the bill hoped and expected that such a boycott would result in these children returning to
school. []the Bangladeshi Garment Manufacturers and Export Association perceived the discussions
in the US Congress as a threat t the export of their products. Nervous factory owners, unwilling to risk
access to their most important market, quickly fired about 50 000 children 75% of the total then
employed. The expectation in the US that these children would return to school was not overly optimistic,
it also turned out to be dramatically nave. Development expert Ben White concluded that: Not one of
the dismissed children had gone back to school. Half of them had found occupation (mainly in the
informal sector and street activities, including domestic services, brick-chipping, selling flowers, and
prostitution) but with greatly reduced earnings, while the other half were actively seeking work. The
children still working in the garment factories had better nutrition and better health than those who had
been dismissed.
Boycott and trade sanctions do not seem to be the best strategy against child labour. Pierik proposes thus
5 policy recommendations, taking into account 2 crucial differences between Western countries and
developing countries:
Going to school is not a real alternative for the children involved in the labour force (no
alternative ways to provide for family income, or no accessible schools)
Childhood is understood differently the distinction between childhood and adulthood is less
categorical
Pieriks recommendations:
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
(iv)
(v)

International cooperation a single State or organization cannot achieve much on its own
Base policies on careful analysis and research, not on emotions and good intentions
Adopt a more culturally inclusive conception of childhood
Choose a gradualist approach rather than an abolitionist one distinguish child wok, child
labour, the worst forms of child labour
Opt for economic incentives (monetary awards for school attendance, free school meals)
rather than legal coercion.

ETHICS AND THE ECONOMY/EXAM INSTRUCTIONS AND SAMPLE QUESTION (Obviously, I will not ask
you this question at the exam)
Teacher: Danielle Zwarthoed danielle.zwarthoed@usaintlouis.be
Year: 2014-2015
REMARKS:
-

Closed book exam;

You will not be authorized to use a dictionary at the exam, because it would make you lose
your time;
Do not forget to bring your student ID on the day of the exam

The exam will last 3 hours and consist in two questions requiring you to apply a specific theory of
justice to a concrete policy issue (8 points each) and one (more personal) question of reflection on
the ethical theories discussed in the course (4 points).
Questions of application of a theory of justice to a concrete policy issue
For each of these 8-points questions, I will provide you with an opinion piece, a newspaper article, a
press release or a summary report about a specific issue related to the issues discussed in the course.
(this means you will NOT be tested on bioethics, for example, but you MIGHT BE tested on education
funding, gender division of labour, child labour, children religious education, migration,
sustainability.). I thus assume that, in addition to the information provided by the exam form, you
are also aware of the facts presented in the course.
Each 8-points question will be structured as follows:
According to the theory x (I will tell you which theory you will not be able to choose the theory you
apply to the question) , should institutions/we .?
1) Restate briefly the main principles of the theory you will use in your argument (if appropriate,
specify which version of the theory you intend to use e.g. preference utilitarianism, leftlibertarianism, etc)
2) Propose an answer to the question. Your answer SHOULD BE STRAIGHTFORWARD and could
be formulated in these ways:
a. According to theory x, yes, we should. under any conditions
b. According to theory x, yes, we should.if conditionsand are met
c. According to theory x, no, we should not.unless.
d. According to theory x, no, we should not
VERY IMPORTANT: I DO NOT ASK YOU WHAT YOU THINK ABOUT THIS QUESTION, BUT WHAT YOU
WOULD THINK IF YOU WERE A PARTISAN OF THE THEORY X.
3) Develop a sound and explicit argument for your answer. This is the most important part. I am
not interested in the YES or NO, but in your argument. In your argument, try to formulate
objections and to answer them (like in class discussions).There are 2 types of objections:
Internal objections: these are the objections of someone who otherwise agrees with the
theory of justice you use (theory x), but who disagrees with what you think your theory
entails for the specific question you discuss.
External objections: these are the objections of someone who disagrees with theory x and
therefore with either your answer or the reasons you give for your answer.
1

LENGTH OF THE ANSWER: you will have 35 lines (1,5 page). Try to use it all, but no more. I will not read
what you will write after.
Your grade will depend on:
-

Your ability to demonstrate a good commend of the theory x, and your ability to formulate it
in a precise and relevant way (note: there are summaries of the theories at different places in
the course syllabus)
Your ability to demonstrate a good commend of the empirical issues at stake in the application
question
Your ability to apply the theory x to this specific issue, to justify your answer by using the core
principles of theory x. What you should NOT do is to provide arguments for your answer that
are related to another theory than x, or worse, that are not related to any theory.
Your ability to take into account a variety of objections and to find sound answers to them. You
should especially deal with internal objections (consider external objections only if you cannot
find internal ones).
How precise, clear and analytic your writing is. Imagine someone who does not know anything
about Ethics and the Economy will read and grade you.

Question of reflection
This question will be structured as follows:
According to you, what is the main objection to theory y?
Notes:
Contrary to the preceding questions, you will have the choice between 3 different
theories;
You will have 16 lines to answer (more than half a page);
Your grade will depend on your commend of the theory and the depth of your reflection
on it;
Even if you are asked to provide a major objection to the theory, be fair and do not be
merely dismissive. Your objection is very likely to be much more interesting if you really
considered seriously the theory
You should demonstrate your ability to provide a personal reflection of the ethical theories
discussed in the course. An original answer will surely be a plus.

Sample questions of application of a theory of justice to a policy issue.

Note: for pedagogical purposes, I present 4 different theories of justice applied to the same question,
but in the exam you will be asked to apply one specific theory to one question, and then another theory
to another question.
France 24 - http://www.france24.com/en/20140121-france-lawmakers-approve-reform-parentalleave-fathers-gender-equality-bill/
French fathers to get more time off under parental leave reform
21/01/2014 - French lawmakers voted late on Monday to reform the countrys policy on parental
leave by extending the amount of time fathers can take off work to spend with their children, and
giving greater incentives for them to do so.
Under the reform, families with one child, who are already entitled to six months unpaid parental
leave, will be allowed an additional six months for the second parent. For families with two children,
the maximum parental leave will remain three years, as long as six months of that time is reserved for
the second parent.
If not, then the maximum leave one parent can take from his or her job will be shaved down to twoand-a-half years.
Najat Vallaud-Belkacem, Frances minister of womens rights, said that it was time for the country to
change the way it looks [at parental leave].
As it stands, French mothers take far more time off with their children. Of the 540,000 parents who
take advantage of the countrys generous parental leave policies, only 18,000 are men. VallaudBelkacem hopes that the reform will increase the number of fathers who take a break from their
careers to 100,000 over the next two years.
Not everyone was in favour of the measure. A number of opposition lawmakers from the conservative
UMP party tried, unsuccessfully, to have the measure stricken from the bill, arguing that it was a
government intrusion into couples private lives and freedoms.
The majority of the party, however, said they generally supported the idea of shared parental leave,
despite reservations over how it will be applied.
The reform, which has already been approved by the Senate, is part of a broader bill on gender
equality. Lawmakers will vote Tuesday on a amendment to the countrys abortion legislation, which
would make it easier for women to terminate a pregnancy if she chooses to.
Question:
According to Utilitarianism, should public institutions reserve a significant proportion of parental
leaves for fathers who are willing to take it, the leave being lost otherwise?
1) Restate briefly the main principles of Utilitarianism you will use in your argument
2) Propose an answer to the question.
3) Develop a sound and explicit argument for your answer. In your argument, try to formulate
objections and to answer them.
According to Libertarianism, should public institutions reserve a significant proportion of parental
leaves for fathers who are willing to take it, the leave being lost otherwise?
3

1) Restate briefly the main principles of Utilitarianism you will use in your argument
2) Propose an answer to the question.
3) Develop a sound and explicit argument for your answer. In your argument, try to formulate
objections and to answer them.
According to Marxism, should public institutions reserve a significant proportion of parental leaves
for fathers who are willing to take it, the leave being lost otherwise?
1) Restate briefly the main principles of Utilitarianism you will use in your argument
2) Propose an answer to the question.
3) Develop a sound and explicit argument for your answer. In your argument, try to formulate
objections and to answer them.
According to Liberal Egalitarianism, should public institutions reserve a significant proportion of
parental leaves for fathers who are willing to take it, the leave being lost otherwise?
1) Restate briefly the main principles of Utilitarianism you will use in your argument
2) Propose an answer to the question.
3) Develop a sound and explicit argument for your answer. In your argument, try to formulate
objections and to answer them.