Political Law Part V: Article VI The

Legislative Department
MAY 9
Posted by Magz
POLITICAL LAW PART V
ARTICLE VI THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
1. Section 1. The legislative power shall be vested in the
Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate
and a House of Representatives, except to the extent
reserved to the people by the provision on initiative and
referendum.
a. Define legislative power
Basic concepts of the grant of legislative power:
1. it cannot pass irrepealable laws
2. principle of separation of powers
3. non-delegability of legislative powers
- reason for principle that the legislature cannot pass
irrepeablable laws
- Separation of Powers
Read:
a. ANGARA VS. ELECTORAL COMMISSION, 63 Phil. 139
b. PLANAS VS. GIL, 67 Phil. 62
c. LUZON STEVEDORING VS. SSS, 34 SCRA 178
d. GARCIA VS. MACARAIG, 39 SCRA 106
e. Bondoc vs. HRET, Sept. 26, 1991
f. DEFENSOR SANTIAGO VS. COMELEC, 270 SCRA 106
b. Nature of legislative power
c. What are the limitations to the grant of legislative powers to
the legislature?

d. Explain the doctrine of non-delegation power.

e. Permissive delegation of legislative power.
1) Sec. 23 (2) of Article VI (Emergency powers to the
President in case of war or other national emergency, for a
limited period and subject to such restrictions as Congress
may provide, to exercise powers necessary and proper to
carry out a declared national policy. Unless sooner
withdrawn by Resolution of Congress, such powers shall
cease upon the next adjournment thereof.
2) Sec. 28 (2) of Article VI. The Congress may by law,
authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and
subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may
impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage
and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the
framework of the national development program of the
government.
Other exceptions: traditional
3. Delegation to local governments
The reason behind this delegation is because the local
government is deemed to know better the needs of the people
therein.
a. See Section 5 of Article X
b. Read:
aa. RUBI VS. PROVINCIAL BOARD, 39 Phil. 660
bb. PEOPLE VS. VERA, 65 Phil 56
A law delegating to the local government units the power to fund
the salary of probation officers in their area is unconstitutional for
violation of the equal protection of the laws. In areas where there
is a probation officer because the local government unit
appropriated an amount for his salaries, convicts may avail of
probation while in places where no funds were set aside for
probation officers, convicts therein could not apply for probation.
a.

Reason for the delegation

4) Delegation of Rule-making power to administrative bodies

5) Delegation to the People (Section 2, Art. XVII of the
Constitution and Section 32, Article VIThe Congress
shall, as early as possible, provide for a system of
initiative and referendum, and the exceptions therefrom,
whereby the people can directly propose and enact laws
or approve or reject any act or law or part thereof passed
by the Congress of local legislative body after the
registration of a petition thereof signed by at least 10% of
the total number of registered voters, of which every
legislative district must be represented by at least 3% of
the registered voters thereof.
f. Delegation of rule-making power to administrative bodies.
1) What is the completeness test? The sufficiency of standard
test?
Read: 1. PELAEZ VS. AUDITOR GENERAL, 15 SCRA 569
During the period from September 4 to October 29, 1964 the
President of the Philippines, purporting to act pursuant to Section
68 of the Revised Administrative Code, issued Executive Orders
Nos. 93 to 121, 124 and 126 to 129; creating thirty-three (33)
municipalities.
The third paragraph of Section 3 of Republic Act No. 2370, reads:
Barrios shall not be created or their boundaries altered nor their
names changed except under the provisions of this Act or by Act
of Congress.
Pursuant to the first two (2) paragraphs of the same Section 3:
All barrios existing at the time of the passage of this Act shall
come under the provisions hereof.
Upon petition of a majority of the voters in the areas affected, a
new barrio may be created or the name of an existing one may be
changed by the provincial board of the province, upon
recommendation of the council of the municipality or

municipalities in which the proposed barrio is stipulated. The

recommendation of the municipal council shall be embodied in a
resolution approved by at least two-thirds of the entire
membership of the said council: Provided, however, That no new
barrio may be created if its population is less than five hundred
persons.
Hence, since January 1, 1960, when Republic Act No. 2370
became effective, barrios may not be created or their boundaries
altered nor their names changed except by Act of Congress or of
the corresponding provincial board upon petition of a majority of
the voters in the areas affected and the recommendation of the
council of the municipality or municipalities in which the proposed
barrio is situated. Petitioner argues, accordingly: If the
President, under this new law, cannot even create a barrio, can he
create a municipality which is composed of several barrios, since
barrios are units of municipalities?
Moreover, section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code, upon
which the disputed executive orders are based, provides:
The (Governor-General) President of the Philippines may by
executive order define the boundary, or boundaries, of any
province, subprovince, municipality, [township] municipal district,
or other political subdivision, and increase or diminish the
territory comprised therein, may divide any province into one or
more subprovinces, separate any political division other than a
province, into such portions as may be required, merge any of
such subdivisions or portions with another, name any new
subdivision so created, and may change the seat of government
within any subdivision to such place therein as the public welfare
may require: Provided, That the authorization of the (Philippine
Legislature) Congress of the Philippines shall first be obtained
whenever the boundary of any province or subprovince is to be
defined or any province is to be divided into one or more
subprovinces. When action by the (Governor-General) President of
the Philippines in accordance herewith makes necessary a change
of the territory under the jurisdiction of any administrative officer
or any judicial officer, the (Governor-General) President of the
Philippines, with the recommendation and advice of the head of

the Department having executive control of such officer, shall

redistrict the territory of the several officers affected and assign
such officers to the new districts so formed.
Respondent alleges that the power of the President to create
municipalities under this section does not amount to an undue
delegation of legislative power, relying upon Municipality of
Cardona vs. Municipality of Binagonan (36 Phil. 547), which, he
claims, has settled it. Such claim is untenable, for said case
involved, not the creation of a new municipality, but a mere
transfer of territory from an already existing municipality
(Cardona) to another municipality (Binagonan), likewise, existing
at the time of and prior to said transfer (See Govt of the P.I. ex
rel. Municipality of Cardona vs. Municipality, of Binagonan [34
Phil. 518, 519-5201) in consequence of the fixing and definition,
pursuant to Act No. 1748, of the common boundaries of two
municipalities.
It is obvious, however, that, whereas the power to fix such
common boundary, in order to avoid or settle conflicts of
jurisdiction between adjoining municipalities, may partake of an
administrative nature involving, as it does, the adoption of means
and ways to carry into effect the law creating said municipalities
the authority to create municipal corporations is essentially
legislative in nature.
Although 1a Congress may delegate to another branch of the
Government the power to fill in the details in the execution,
enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall
a violation of the principle of separation of powers, that said law:
(a) be complete in itself it must set forth therein the policy to be
executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate and
(b) fix a standard the limits of which are sufficiently determinate
or determinable to which the delegate must conform in the
performance of his functions.
Indeed, without a statutory declaration of policy, the delegate
would in effect, make or formulate such policy, which is the
essence of every law; and, without the aforementioned standard,

there would be no means to determine, with reasonable certainty,

whether the delegate has acted within or beyond the scope of his
authority. Hence, he could thereby arrogate upon himself the
power, not only to make the law, but, also and this is worse to
unmake it, by adopting measures inconsistent with the end
sought to be attained by the Act of Congress, thus nullifying the
principle of separation of powers and the system of checks and
balances, and, consequently, undermining the very foundation of
our Republican system.
Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not meet
these well settled requirements for a valid delegation of the
power to fix the details in the enforcement of a law. It does not
enunciate any policy to be carried out or implemented by the
President. Neither does it give a standard sufficiently precise to
avoid the evil effects above referred to. In this connection, we do
not overlook the fact that, under the last clause of the first
sentence of Section 68, the President:
... may change the seat of the government within any subdivision
to such place therein as the public welfare may require.
At any rate, the conclusion would be the same, insofar as the case
at bar is concerned, even if we assumed that the phrase "as the
public welfare may require," in said Section 68, qualifies all other
clauses thereof. It is true that in Calalang vs. Williams (70 Phil.
726) and People vs. Rosenthal (68 Phil. 328), this Court had
upheld "public welfare" and "public interest," respectively, as
sufficient standards for a valid delegation of the authority to
execute the law. But, the doctrine laid down in these cases as all
judicial pronouncements must be construed in relation to the
specific facts and issues involved therein, outside of which they
do not constitute precedents and have no binding effect. The law
construed in the Calalang case conferred upon the Director of
Public Works, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works
and Communications, the power to issue rules and regulations to
promote safe transit upon national roads and streets. Upon the
other hand, the Rosenthal case referred to the authority of the
Insular Treasurer, under Act No. 2581, to issue and cancel
certificates or permits for the sale of speculative securities. Both

cases involved grants to administrative officers of powers related

to the exercise of their administrative functions, calling for the
determination of questions of fact.
2
TUPAS VS. OPLE, 137 SCRA 108 (Most representative)
1.
US VS. ANG TANG HO, 43 Phil. 1
At its special session of 1919, the Philippine Legislature passed
Act No. 2868, entitled "An Act penalizing the monopoly and
holding of, and speculation in, palay, rice, and corn under
extraordinary circumstances, regulating the distribution and sale
thereof, and authorizing the Governor-General, with the consent
of the Council of State, to issue the necessary rules and
regulations therefor, and making an appropriation for this
purpose," the material provisions of which are as follows:
Section 1. The Governor-General is hereby authorized, whenever,
for any cause, conditions arise resulting in an extraordinary rise in
the price of palay, rice or corn, to issue and promulgate, with the
consent of the Council of State, temporary rules and emergency
measures for carrying out the purpose of this Act, to wit:
(a) To prevent the monopoly and hoarding of, and speculation in,
palay, rice or corn.
August 1, 1919, the Governor-General issued a proclamation
fixing the price at which rice should be sold.
August 8, 1919, a complaint was filed against the defendant, Ang
Tang Ho, charging him with the sale of rice at an excessive price
as follows:
The undersigned accuses Ang Tang Ho of a violation of Executive
Order No. 53 of the Governor-General of the Philippines, dated the
1st of August, 1919, in relation with the provisions of sections 1, 2
and 4 of Act No. 2868, committed as follows:
That on or about the 6th day of August, 1919, in the city of
Manila, Philippine Islands, the said Ang Tang Ho, voluntarily,
illegally and criminally sold to Pedro Trinidad, one ganta of rice at
the price of eighty centavos (P.80), which is a price greater than
that fixed by Executive Order No. 53 of the Governor-General of

the Philippines, dated the 1st of August, 1919, under the authority
of section 1 of Act No. 2868. Contrary to law.
Upon this charge, he was tried, found guilty and sentenced to five
months' imprisonment and to pay a fine of P500, from which he
appealed to this court, claiming that the lower court erred in
finding Executive Order No. 53 of 1919, to be of any force and
effect, in finding the accused guilty of the offense charged, and in
imposing the sentence.
The official records show that the Act was to take effect on its
approval; that it was approved July 30, 1919; that the GovernorGeneral issued his proclamation on the 1st of August, 1919; and
that the law was first published on the 13th of August, 1919; and
that the proclamation itself was first published on the 20th of
August, 1919.
The question here involves an analysis and construction of Act No.
2868, in so far as it authorizes the Governor-General to fix the
price at which rice should be sold. It will be noted that section 1
authorizes the Governor-General, with the consent of the Council
of State, for any cause resulting in an extraordinary rise in the
price of palay, rice or corn, to issue and promulgate temporary
rules and emergency measures for carrying out the purposes of
the Act. By its very terms, the promulgation of temporary rules
and emergency measures is left to the discretion of the GovernorGeneral. The Legislature does not undertake to specify or define
under what conditions or for what reasons the Governor-General
shall issue the proclamation, but says that it may be issued "for
any cause," and leaves the question as to what is "any cause" to
the discretion of the Governor-General. The Act also says: "For
any cause, conditions arise resulting in an extraordinary rise in
the price of palay, rice or corn." The Legislature does not specify
or define what is "an extraordinary rise." That is also left to the
discretion of the Governor-General. The Act also says that the
Governor-General, "with the consent of the Council of State," is
authorized to issue and promulgate "temporary rules and
emergency measures for carrying out the purposes of this Act." It
does not specify or define what is a temporary rule or an
emergency measure, or how long such temporary rules or

emergency measures shall remain in force and effect, or when

they shall take effect. That is to say, the Legislature itself has not
in any manner specified or defined any basis for the order, but
has left it to the sole judgement and discretion of the GovernorGeneral to say what is or what is not "a cause," and what is or
what is not "an extraordinary rise in the price of rice," and as to
what is a temporary rule or an emergency measure for the
carrying out the purposes of the Act. Under this state of facts, if
the law is valid and the Governor-General issues a proclamation
fixing the minimum price at which rice should be sold, any dealer
who, with or without notice, sells rice at a higher price, is a
criminal. There may not have been any cause, and the price may
not have been extraordinary, and there may not have been an
emergency, but, if the Governor-General found the existence of
such facts and issued a proclamation, and rice is sold at any
higher price, the seller commits a crime.
By the organic law of the Philippine Islands and the Constitution of
the United States all powers are vested in the Legislative,
Executive and Judiciary. It is the duty of the Legislature to make
the law; of the Executive to execute the law; and of the Judiciary
to construe the law. The Legislature has no authority to execute or
construe the law, the Executive has no authority to make or
construe the law, and the Judiciary has no power to make or
execute the law. Subject to the Constitution only, the power of
each branch is supreme within its own jurisdiction, and it is for the
Judiciary only to say when any Act of the Legislature is or is not
constitutional. Assuming, without deciding, that the Legislature
itself has the power to fix the price at which rice is to be sold, can
it delegate that power to another, and, if so, was that power
legally delegated by Act No. 2868? In other words, does the Act
delegate legislative power to the Governor-General? By the
Organic Law, all Legislative power is vested in the Legislature,
and the power conferred upon the Legislature to make laws
cannot be delegated to the Governor-General, or any one else.
The Legislature cannot delegate the legislative power to enact
any law. If Act no 2868 is a law unto itself and within itself, and it
does nothing more than to authorize the Governor-General to
make rules and regulations to carry the law into effect, then the
Legislature itself created the law. There is no delegation of power

and it is valid. On the other hand, if the Act within itself does not
define crime, and is not a law, and some legislative act remains to
be done to make it a law or a crime, the doing of which is vested
in the Governor-General, then the Act is a delegation of legislative
power, is unconstitutional and void.
The act, in our judgment, wholly fails to provide definitely and
clearly what the standard policy should contain, so that it could
be put in use as a uniform policy required to take the place of all
others, without the determination of the insurance commissioner
in respect to maters involving the exercise of a legislative
discretion that could not be delegated, and without which the act
could not possibly be put in use as an act in conformity to which
all fire insurance policies were required to be issued.
The result of all the cases on this subject is that a law must be
complete, in all its terms and provisions, when it leaves the
legislative branch of the government, and nothing must be left to
the judgement of the electors or other appointee or delegate of
the legislature, so that, in form and substance, it is a law in all
its details in presenti, but which may be left to take effect in
futuro, if necessary, upon the ascertainment of any prescribed
fact or event.
4. TIO VS. VIDEOGRAM REGULATORY BOARD, 151
SCRA 208
5. FREE TELEPHONE WORKERS UNION, 108 SCRA
757 (Affecting National interest)
6. PHILCOMSAT VS. ALCUAZ, December 18, 1989
Fundamental is the rule that delegation of legislative power may
be sustained only upon the ground that some standard for its
exercise is provided and that the legislature in making the
delegation has prescribed the manner of the exercise of the
delegated power. Therefore, when the administrative agency
concerned, respondent NTC in this case, establishes a rate, its act
must both be non- confiscatory and must have been established
in the manner prescribed by the legislature; otherwise, in the
absence of a fixed standard, the delegation of power becomes
unconstitutional. In case of a delegation of rate-fixing power, the
only standard which the legislature is required to prescribe for the
guidance of the administrative authority is that the rate be
reasonable and just. However, it has been held that even in the

absence of an express requirement as to reasonableness, this

standard may be implied.
It becomes important then to ascertain the nature of the power
delegated to respondent NTC and the manner required by the
statute for the lawful exercise thereof.
Pursuant to Executive Orders Nos. 546 and 196, respondent NTC
is empowered, among others, to determine and prescribe rates
pertinent to the operation of public service communications which
necessarily include the power to promulgate rules and regulations
in connection therewith. And, under Section 15(g) of Executive
Order No. 546, respondent NTC should be guided by the
requirements of public safety, public interest and reasonable
feasibility of maintaining effective competition of private entities
in communications and broadcasting facilities. Likewise, in Section
6(d) thereof, which provides for the creation of the Ministry of
Transportation and Communications with control and supervision
over respondent NTC, it is specifically provided that the national
economic viability of the entire network or components of the
communications systems contemplated therein should be
maintained at reasonable rates.
II.
On another tack, petitioner submits that the questioned
order violates procedural due process because it was issued motu
proprio, without notice to petitioner and without the benefit of a
hearing. Petitioner laments that said order was based merely on
an "initial evaluation," which is a unilateral evaluation, but had
petitioner been given an opportunity to present its side before the
order in question was issued, the confiscatory nature of the rate
reduction and the consequent deterioration of the public service
could have been shown and demonstrated to respondents.
Petitioner argues that the function involved in the rate fixingpower of NTC is adjudicatory and hence quasi-judicial, not quasilegislative; thus, notice and hearing are necessary and the
absence thereof results in a violation of due process.
Respondents admit that the application of a policy like the fixing
of rates as exercised by administrative bodies is quasi-judicial
rather than quasi-legislative: that where the function of the

administrative agency is legislative, notice and hearing are not

required, but where an order applies to a named person, as in the
instant case, the function involved is adjudicatory. Nonetheless,
they insist that under the facts obtaining the order in question
need not be preceded by a hearing, not because it was issued
pursuant to respondent NTC's legislative function but because the
assailed order is merely interlocutory, it being an incident in the
ongoing proceedings on petitioner's application for a certificate of
public convenience; and that petitioner is not the only primary
source of data or information since respondent is currently
engaged in a continuing review of the rates charged.
We find merit in petitioner's contention.
In Vigan Electric Light Co., Inc. vs. Public Service Commission, we
made a categorical classification as to when the rate-filing power
of administrative bodies is quasi-judicial and when it is legislative,
thus:
Moreover, although the rule-making power and even the power to
fix rates- when such rules and/or rates are meant to apply to all
enterprises of a given kind throughout the Philippines-may
partake of a legislative character, such is not the nature of the
order complained of. Indeed, the same applies exclusively to
petitioner herein. What is more, it is predicated upon the finding
of fact-based upon a report submitted by the General Auditing
Office-that petitioner is making a profit of more than 12% of its
invested capital, which is denied by petitioner. Obviously, the
latter is entitled to cross-examine the maker of said report, and to
introduce evidence to disprove the contents thereof and/or
explain or complement the same, as well as to refute the
conclusion drawn therefrom by the respondent. In other words, in
making said finding of fact, respondent performed a function
partaking of a quasi-judicial character, the valid exercise of which
demands previous notice and hearing.
This rule was further explained in the subsequent case of The
Central Bank of the Philippines vs. Cloribel, et al. to wit:
It is also clear from the authorities that where the function of the
administrative body is legislative, notice of hearing is not required

by due process of law (See Oppenheimer, Administrative Law, 2

Md. L.R. 185, 204, supra, where it is said: 'If the nature of the
administrative agency is essentially legislative, the requirements
of notice and hearing are not necessary. The validity of a rule of
future action which affects a group, if vested rights of liberty or
property are not involved, is not determined according to the
same rules which apply in the case of the direct application of a
policy to a specific individual) ... It is said in 73 C.J.S. Public
Administrative Bodies and Procedure, sec. 130, pages 452 and
453: 'Aside from statute, the necessity of notice and hearing in an
administrative proceeding depends on the character of the
proceeding and the circumstances involved. In so far as
generalization is possible in view of the great variety of
administrative proceedings, it may be stated as a general rule
that notice and hearing are not essential to the validity of
administrative action where the administrative body acts in the
exercise of executive, administrative, or legislative functions; but
where a public administrative body acts in a judicial or quasijudicial matter, and its acts are particular and immediate rather
than general and prospective, the person whose rights or property
may be affected by the action is entitled to notice and hearing.
The order in question which was issued by respondent Alcuaz no
doubt contains all the attributes of a quasi-judicial adjudication.
Foremost is the fact that said order pertains exclusively to
petitioner and to no other. Further, it is premised on a finding of
fact, although patently superficial, that there is merit in a
reduction of some of the rates charged- based on an initial
evaluation of petitioner's financial statements-without affording
petitioner the benefit of an explanation as to what particular
aspect or aspects of the financial statements warranted a
corresponding rate reduction. No rationalization was offered nor
were the attending contingencies, if any, discussed, which
prompted respondents to impose as much as a fifteen percent
(15%) rate reduction. It is not far-fetched to assume that
petitioner could be in a better position to rationalize its rates visa-vis the viability of its business requirements. The rates it
charges result from an exhaustive and detailed study it conducts
of the multi-faceted intricacies attendant to a public service
undertaking of such nature and magnitude. We are, therefore,

inclined to lend greater credence to petitioner's ratiocination that

an immediate reduction in its rates would adversely affect its
operations and the quality of its service to the public considering
the maintenance requirements, the projects it still has to
undertake and the financial outlay involved. Notably, petitioner
was not even afforded the opportunity to cross-examine the
inspector who issued the report on which respondent NTC based
its questioned order.
At any rate, there remains the categorical admission made by
respondent NTC that the questioned order was issued pursuant to
its quasi-judicial functions. It, however, insists that notice and
hearing are not necessary since the assailed order is merely
incidental to the entire proceedings and, therefore, temporary in
nature. This postulate is bereft of merit.
g. May rules and regulations promulgated by administrative
bodies/agencies have the force of law? penal law? In order to be
considered as one with the force and effect of a penal law, what
conditions must concur? See U.S. vs. GRIMMAUD, 220 U.S. 506
(1911) or the 1987 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION - a reviewer Primer by FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, 1987 edition.
5. PEO. VS. ROSENTHAL, 68 Phil. 328
6. US VS. BARRIAS, 11 Phil. 327
7. VILLEGAS VS. HIU CHIONG TSAI PAO HO, 86 SCRA
270
h. Delegation to the people. See Section 2(1) of Art. XVII.
i. Classify the membership of the legislative department.
Differentiate their qualifications, elections/selections and as to the
participation of the Commission on Appointments in order to
validate their membership.
j. Manner of election and selection
1) Read again TUPAS VS. OPLE, 137 SCRA 108
2.
Sections 2. The Senate shall be composed of
twenty-four Senators who shall be elected at large by the
qualified voters of the Philippines, as may be provided for
by law.

3.
Section 3. No person shall be a Senator unless he
is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, and, on the day
of the election, is at least 35 years of age, able to read
and write, a registered voter, and a resident of the
Philippines for not less than 2 years immediately
preceding the day of the election.
4.
Section 4. The term of office of the Senators shall
be six years and shall commence, unless otherwise
provided by law, at noon on the 30th day of June next
following their election.
No Senator shall serve for more than two consecutive terms.
Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall
not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his
service for the full term for which he was elected.
Qualifications, term of office, etc., of a senator or member of the
House of Representatives.
2.
Sections 5. [1] The House of representatives shall
be composed of not more than 250 members, unless
otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from
legislative districts apportioned among the provinces,
cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance
with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on
the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those
who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a partylist system of registered national, regional and sectoral
parties or organizations.
[2] The party-list representatives shall constitute 20% of
the total number of representatives including those under
the party-list. For three (3) consecutive terms after the
ratification of this Constitution, of the seats allocated to
party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by
law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant,
urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women
youth, and such other sectors, as may be provided by law,
except the religious sector.
[3] Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as
practicable, contiguous, compact and adjacent territory.

Each city with a population of at least one hundred fifty

thousand, or each province, shall have at least one
representative.
[4] Within 3 years following the return of every
census, the Congress shall make a reapportionment of
legislative districts based on standards provided in this
section
Section 6. No person shall be a member of the House of
Representatives unless he is a natural born citizen of the
Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at least 25
years of age, able to read and write, and except the partylist representatives, a registered voter in the district in
which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a
period of not less than 1 year immediately preceding the
day of the election.
Read:
1.
ANTONIO BENGSON III VS. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and TEODORO CRUZ, 357 SCRA 545
Rep. Act No. 2630
Sec. 1. Any person who had lost his Philippine Citizenship by
rendering service to, or accepting commission in, the Armed
Forces of the United States, or after separation from the Armed
Forces of the United states, acquired US citizenship, MAY
REACQUIRE PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP BY TAKING AN OATH OF
ALLEGIANCE TO THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES AND
REGISTERING THE SAME WITH THE LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRY IN THE
PLACE WHERE HE RESIDES OR LAST RESIDED IN THE PHILIPPINES.
The said Oath of allegiance shall contain a renunciation of any
other citizenship.
2.

Section 2, Article IV, 1987 Philippine Constitution

Section 2. Natural born citizens are those citizens of the

Philippines from birth without having to perform an act to acquire
or perfect their Philippine citizenship. Those who elect Philippine
Citizenship in accordance with par. 3* , Section 1 shall be deemed
natural born citizens.

OCAMPO VS. HOUSE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and MARIO

CRESPO, a.k.a. MARK JIMENEZ, June 15, 2004
Who takes the place of the winning candidate as a Member of the
House of Representatives who was disqualified after he was
proclaimed as such?
Facts:
The petitioner and Mark Jimenez were candidates for
Congressman of the 6th District of manila for the May 14, 2001
elections. Mark Jimenez won over the petitioner with 32,097 votes
as against petitioners 31,329 votes.
3.
Petitioner filed an electoral protest before the HRET
based on the following grounds: 1] misreading of ballots; 2]
falsification of election returns; 3]substitution of election returns;
4] use of marked, spurious fake and stray ballots; and 5] presence
of ballots written by one or two persons.
4.
On March 6, 2003, the HRET issued its Decision in the
case of ABANTE, ET AL. VS. MARI CRESPO, a.k.a. MARK JIMENEZ,
et al., declaring Mark Jimenez ineligible for the Office of
Representative of Sixth District of Manila for lack of residence in
the District. Mark Jimenez filed a Motion for Reconsideration which
was denied.
As a result of said disqualification of Jimenez, the petitioner
claimed that all the votes cast for the former should not be
counted and since he garnered the second highest number of
votes, he should be declared winner in the May 14, 2001 elections
and be proclaimed the duly elected Congressman of the
6th District of manila.
Issues:
Are the votes of Mark Jimenez stray votes and should not be
counted?
Whether the petitioner as second places should be proclaimed
winner since the winner was disqualified?
Held:

1.
There must be a final judgment disqualifying a candidate
in order that the votes of a disqualified candidate can be
considered stray. This final judgment must be rendered BEFORE
THE ELECTION. This was the ruling in the case of CODILLA VS. DE
VENECIA. Hence, when a candidate has not been disqualified by
final judgment during the election day he was voted for, the votes
cast in his favor cannot be declared stray. To do so would amount
to disenfranchising the electorate in whom sovereignty resides.
The reason behind this is that the people voted for him bona fide
and in the honest belief that the candidate was then qualified to
be the person to whom they would entrust the exercise of the
powers of government.
2.
The subsequent disqualification of a candidate who
obtained the highest number of votes does not entitle the second
placer to be declared the winner. The said principle was laid down
as early as 1912 and reiterated in the cases of LABO VS.
COMELEC, ABELLA VS. COMELEC and DOMINO VS. COMELEC.
Section 7. The members of the House of Representatives
shall be elected for a term of 3 years which shall begin,
unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the 30th day
of June next following their election.
No member of the House of Representative shall
serve for a period of more than 3 consecutive terms.
Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time
shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity
of his service for the full term for which he was elected.
Section 8. Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular
election of the Senators and the Members of the House of
Representatives shall be held on the second Monday of
May.
a. On the manner of nomination and appointment of
representatives to the Hose of Representatives.
Read: 1. Exec. Order No. 198, June 18, 1987
2.. DELES VS. COMMISSION ON
APPOINTMENTS,
September 4, 1989

Sectoral

b. On gerrymandering
Read: CENIZA vs. COMELEC, 95 SCRA 763
4. Section 9. In case of vacancy in the Senate or in the House of
Representatives, a special election may be called to fill such
vacancy in the manner prescribed by law, but the Senator or
Member of the House of representatives thus elected shall serve
only the unexpired term.
Read: 1. LOZADA vs. COMELEC, 120 SCRA 337
COMELEC cannot call a special election (for the legislative
districts whose Congressmen resigned or died while in office)
without a law passed by Congress appropriating funds for the said
purpose.
2. RA 6645-RE: Filling up of Congress Vacancy, December
28, 1987
5. Section 10. The salaries of Senators and Members of the
House of Representatives shall be determined by law. No increase
in said compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of
the full term of all the members of the Senate and the House of
representatives approving such increase.
a. How much is the present salary of the members of Congress?
P204,000.00 [P17,000.00 per month] as per Section 17, Art. XVIII
of the Constitution. The Presidents salary is P300,000.00 per
annum, while the VP, Speaker, Senate President and Chief Justice
is P240,000.00 per annum. The Chairman of the Constitutional
Commissions salary is P204,000.00 and the members,
P180,000.00 per annum.
b. Read:
1.
Section 17, Article 18) (P300,000.00 for the President;
P240,000.00 for VP, Senate President; Speaker; Chief Justice;
P204,000.00 for Senators, Representatives, Chairmen of CC;
P180,000.00 for members of the Constitutional Commissions)
2.
PHILCONSA VS. JIMENEZ, 15 SCRA 479;
3.
LIGOT VS. MATHAY, 56 SCRA 823
6. Section 11. A Senator or Member of the House of
representatives shall, in all offenses punishable by not more than

6 years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the

Congress is in session. No member shall be questioned nor be
held liable in any other place for any debate in the Congress or in
any committee thereof.
a. Privilege from arrest
Read:

Martinez vs. Morfe, MARTINEZ VS. MORFE, 44 SCRA 22

b. Freedom of Speech and debate

Read:
1) OSMENA VS. PENDATUN, 109 Phil. 863
2) JIMENEZ VS. CABANGBANG, 17 SCRA 876
7. Section 12. All members of the Senate and the House
of Representatives shall, upon assumption of office, make
a full disclosure of their financial and business interests.
They shall notify the House concerned of a potential
conflict of interest that may arise from the filing of a
proposed legislation of which they are authors.
8. Section 13. No Senator or Member of the House of
Representatives may hold any other office or employment
in the government, or any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned and
controlled corporations or their subsidiaries, during his
term without forfeiting his seat. Neither shall he be
appointed to any office which may have been created or
the emoluments thereof increased during the term for
which he was elected.
Read:
1)
ADAZA vs. PACANA, 135 SCRA 431
After taking his oath as a member of the Batasang Pambansa
(Congress) , he is deemed to have resigned his position as
Governor of Negros Oriental because as a legislator, he is not
allowed to hold any other office in the government.
2)
PUNZALAN vs. MENDOZA, 140 SCRA 153
A provincial governor who took his oath as a member of the
Batasang Pambansa as appointed member for being a member

of the Cabinet is allowed to return to his former position as

Governor if he resigns from the Batasan. This is so because he
was just an appointed member as distinguished from the Adaza
Case. (Note: It appears that an appointed member of the Batasan
is placed in a better position than the elected members)
3) Compare with Section 10, Art. VIII of the 1973 Constitution
9. Section 14. No Senator or Member of the House of
Representatives may personally appear as counsel before
any court of justice or before the Electoral Tribunals, or
quasi-judicial bodies and other administrative bodies.
Neither shall he, directly or indirectly, be interested
financially in any contract with, or any franchise or special
privilege granted by the Government, or any subdivision,
agency or instrumentality thereof, including any
government owned or controlled corporation, or its
subsidiary, during his term of office. He shall not intervene
in any matter before any office of the government for his
pecuniary benefit or where he may be called upon to act
on account of his office.
Read:
1) VILLEGAS vs. LEGASPI, 113 SCRA 39
2) PUYAT vs. DE GUZMAN, 113 SCRA 31
What could not be done directly could not likewise be done
indirectly. So a member of Congress who is a stockholder of the
corporation involved in a case is not allowed to appear under the
guise that he is appearing as such, not as counsel for the
corporation.
10.
Sections 15. The Congress shall convene once
every year on the 4th Monday of July for its regular season,
unless a different date is fixed by law, and shall continue
to be in session for such number of days as it may
determine until 30 days before the opening of its next
regular session, exclusive of Saturdays, Sundays, and

legal holidays. The President may call a special session at

any time.
Section 16. [1] The Senate shall elect its President
and the House of Representatives, its Speaker, by a
majority vote of all its respective members.
Each house shall choose such other officers as it
may deem necessary.
[2] A majority of each house shall constitute a
quorum to do business, but a smaller number may adjourn
from day to day and may compel the attendance of absent
members in such manner, and under such penalties, as
such House may provide.
[3] Each House may determine the rules of its
proceedings, punish its members for disorderly behavior,
and with the concurrence of 2/3 of all its members,
suspend or expel a Member. A penalty of suspension,
when imposed, shall mot exceed sixty days.
NOTE: In the cases of:
1.

MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO VS. SANDIGANBAYAN; and

2.

REP. PAREDES VS. SANDIGANBAYAN,

-the Supreme Court held that a member of Congress may also be

suspended by the Sandiganbayan in accordance with Section 13
of RA 3019. This preventive suspension applies to all public
officials, including members of Congress. Otherwise, the same will
be considered class legislation if Senators and Congressmen who
commit the same is exempt from the preventive suspension
imposed therein.
Other than the foregoing, a member of Congress can be
suspended by the Congress itself.
[4] Each House shall keep a journal of its proceedings, and from
time to time publish the same, excepting such parts as may, in its
judgment, affect national security; and the yeas and nays on any
question shall, at the request of one fifth of the members present,
be entered in the journal.
Each House shall also keep a record of its proceedings.

[Neither House during the sessions of the Congress, shall without

the consent of the other, adjourn for more than three days, nor to
any place than that which the 2 Houses shall be sitting.
Read:
1) AVELINO vs. CUENCO, 83 Phil. 17, Read also the motion for
reconsideration dated March 14, 1949
2) Disciplinary measures on erring members
Read: OSMENA vs. PENDATUN, 109 Phil. 863
3) Dual purpose for keeping a journal
4) Journal entry and enrolled bill theories; which is conclusive
over the other?
Read:
U.S. vs. PONS, 34 Phil. 729
The journal prevails over extraneous evidence like accounts of
newspaper journalists and reporters as to what the proceedings
all about.
b. MABANAG vs. LOPEZ VITO, 78 Phil. 1
CASCO PHIL. VS. GIMENEZ, 7 SCRA 347
The enrolled bill prevails over the journal. If the enrolled bill
provides that it is urea formaldehyde is the one exempt from tax,
and not urea and formaldehyde which appears in the journal
which was really approved, the former prevails and only CURATIVE
LEGISLATION COULD CHANGE THE SAME, NOT JUDICIAL
LEGISLATION.
d. MORALES vs. SUBIDO, 27 Phil. 131
e. ASTORGA vs. VILLEGAS, 56 SCRA 714
(NOTE: The journal prevails over the enrolled bill on all matters
required to be entered in the journals, like yeas and nays on the
final reading of a bill or on any question at the request of 1/5 of
the members present. )
5) Differentiate a "regular" from a "special" session.

11. Section 17. The Senate and the House of

Representatives shall each have an Electoral tribunal
which shall be the sole judge of all election contests
relating to election, returns, and qualifications of their
respective members. Each Electoral tribunal shall be
composed of 9 members, 3 of whom shall be justices of
the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief justice,
and the remaining six shall be members of the Senate or
House of Representatives as the case may be, who shall
be chosen on the basis of proportional representation
from the political parties and the parties or organizations
registered under the party-list system represented
therein. The senior justice in the Electoral tribunal shall be
its Chairman.
See Sec. 2 (2) of Art. IX-C and last par. Sec. 4, Art. VII
Read:
1) LAZATIN VS. COMELEC, G.R. No. 80007, January 25, 1988
2) FIRDAUSI ABBAS, ET AL. VS. THE SENATE ELECTORAL
TRIBUNAL,October 27, 1988
3)ENRILE VS. COMELEC & SANCHEZ; ENRILE VS. COMELEC &
RAZUL AND SANCHEZ VS. COMELEC, Aug. 12, 1987, 153 SCRA 57
4. BONDOC VS. HRET, supra
11.
Section 18. There shall be a Commission on
Appointments consisting of the Senate President, as exoficio chairman, 12 senators and 12 members of the House
of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be
chosen on the basis of proportional representation from
the political parties and the parties or organizations
registered under the party-list system represented
therein. The chairman of the commission shall not vote,
except in case of a tie. The commission shall act on all
appointments submitted to it within 30 session days of the
Congress from their submission. The Commission shall
rule by a majority of all the members.
Read:

1.
RAUL DAZA VS. LUIS SINGSON, December 21,
1989
If the changes in the political party affiliations of the members of
Congress is substantial so as to dramatically decrease the
membership of one party while reducing the other, the number of
representatives of the different parties in the Commission on
Appointments may also be changed in proportion to their actual
memberships. (NOTE: In Cunanan vs. Tan, the membership of the
Senators was only temporary so as not to result in the change
of membership in the Commission on Appointments)
2.
GUINGONA VS. GONZALES, October 20, 1992
Since 12 Senators are members of the Commission on
Appointments, in addition to the Senate President as the head
thereof, every two (2) Senators are entitled to one (1)
representative in the Commission. Parties, however, are not
allowed to round off their members, I.e., 7 Senators are entitled
to 3 representatives in the Commission on Appointments, not 4
since 7/2 is only 3.5.
Further, there is nothing in the Constitution which requires
that there must be 24 members of the Commission. If the
different parties do not coalesce, then the possibility that the
total number of Senators in the CA is less than 12 is indeed a
reality. (Example: Lakas---13 Senators; LDP---11 Senators. In this
case, Lakas is entitled to 6 members in the CA (13/2= 6.5) while
LBP would have 5 members (11/2= 5.5)
3. GUINGONA S. GONZALES, March 1, 1993 (Resolution of
the Motion for Reconsideration of the October 20, 1992 Decision)
To be discussed later together with Sec. 16, Art. VII.
12-a. Section 19. The electoral tribunals and the
Commission on Appointments shall be constituted within
30 days after the Senate and the House of
Representatives shall have been organized with the
election of the President and the Speaker. The
Commission on Appointments shall meet only while the
Congress is in session, at the call of its Chairman or a
majority of all its members, to discharge such powers and
functions as are herein conferred upon it.

13. Sec. 20. The records and books of accounts of the

Congress shall be preserved and be open to the public in
accordance with law, and such books shall be audited by
the Commission on Audit which shall publish annually an
itemized list of amounts paid to and expenses incurred for
each member.
14. Section 21. The Senate or the House of
Representatives or any of its respective committees may
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with
its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of
persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be
respected.
Read:
1) ARNAULT vs. NAZARENO, 87 Phil. 29
A witness who refuses to answer a query by the Committee may
be detained during the term of the members imposing said
penalty but the detention should not be too long as to violate the
witness right to due process of law.
Power of Congress to conduct investigation in aid of legislation;
question hour
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by SENATE
PRESIDENT FRANKLIN DRILON, ET AL., VS. EXEC. SEC.
EDUARDO ERMITA, ET AL., G.R. No. 16977, April 20, 2006
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
The Facts:
In the exercise of its legislative power, the Senate of the
Philippines, through its various Senate Committees, conducts
inquiries or investigations in aid of legislation which call for,inter
alia, the attendance of officials and employees of the executive
department, bureaus, and offices including those employed in
Government Owned and Controlled Corporations, the Armed
Forces of the Philippines (AFP), and the Philippine National Police
(PNP).
On September 21 to 23, 2005, the Committee of the Senate as a
whole issued invitations to various officials of the Executive
Department for them to appear on September 29, 2005 as
resource speakers in a public hearing on the railway project of the

North Luzon Railways Corporation with the China National

Machinery and Equipment Group (hereinafter North Rail Project).
The public hearing was sparked by a privilege speech of Senator
Juan Ponce Enrile urging the Senate to investigate the alleged
overpricing and other unlawful provisions of the contract covering
the North Rail Project.
The Senate Committee on National Defense and Security likewise
issued invitations dated September 22, 2005 to the following
officials of the AFP: the Commanding General of the Philippine
Army, Lt. Gen. Hermogenes C. Esperon; Inspector General of the
AFP Vice Admiral Mateo M. Mayuga; Deputy Chief of Staff for
Intelligence of the AFP Rear Admiral Tirso R. Danga; Chief of the
Intelligence Service of the AFP Brig. Gen. Marlu Q. Quevedo;
Assistant Superintendent of the Philippine Military Academy (PMA)
Brig. Gen. Francisco V. Gudani; and Assistant Commandant, Corps
of Cadets of the PMA, Col. Alexander F. Balutan, for them to
attend as resource persons in a public hearing scheduled on
September 28, 2005 on the following: (1) Privilege Speech of
Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel Jr., delivered on June 6, 2005 entitled
Bunye has Provided Smoking Gun or has Opened a Can of Worms
that Show Massive Electoral Fraud in the Presidential Election of
May 2005; (2) Privilege Speech of Senator Jinggoy E. Estrada
delivered on July 26, 2005 entitled The Philippines as the WireTapping Capital of the World; (3) Privilege Speech of Senator
Rodolfo Biazon delivered on August 1, 2005 entitled Clear and
Present Danger; (4) Senate Resolution No. 285 filed by Senator
Maria Ana Consuelo Madrigal Resolution Directing the
Committee on National Defense and Security to Conduct an
Inquiry, in Aid of Legislation, and in the National Interest, on the
Role of the Military in the So-called Gloriagate Scandal; and (5)
Senate Resolution No. 295 filed by Senator Biazon Resolution
Directing the Committee on National Defense and Security to
Conduct an Inquiry, in Aid of Legislation, on the Wire-Tapping of
the President of the Philippines.
Also invited to the above-said hearing scheduled on September
28 2005 was the AFP Chief of Staff, General Generoso S. Senga
who, by letter dated September 27, 2005, requested for its
postponement due to a pressing operational situation that

demands [his] utmost personal attention while some of the

invited AFP officers are currently attending to other urgent
operational matters.
On September 28, 2005, Senate President Franklin M. Drilon
received from Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita a
letter[1] dated September 27, 2005 respectfully request[ing] for
the postponement of the hearing [regarding the NorthRail project]
to which various officials of the Executive Department have been
invited in order to afford said officials ample time and
opportunity to study and prepare for the various issues so that
they may better enlighten the Senate Committee on its
investigation.
Senate President Drilon, however, wrote[2] Executive Secretary
Ermita that the Senators are unable to accede to [his request]
as it was sent belatedly and [a]ll preparations and
arrangements as well as notices to all resource persons were
completed [the previous] week.
Senate President Drilon likewise received on September 28, 2005
a letter from the President of the North Luzon Railways
Corporation Jose L. Cortes, Jr. requesting that the hearing on the
NorthRail project be postponed or cancelled until a copy of the
report of the UP Law Center on the contract agreements relative
to the project had been secured.
On September 28, 2005, the President of the Philippines issued
E.O. 464, Ensuring Observance of the Principle of Separation of
Powers, Adherence to the Rule on Executive Privilege and Respect
for the Rights of Public Officials Appearing in Legislative Inquiries
in Aid of Legislation Under the Constitution, and For Other
Purposes, which, pursuant to Section 6 thereof, took effect
immediately. The salient provisions of the Order are as follows:
SECTION 1. Appearance by Heads of Departments Before
Congress. In accordance with Article VI, Section 22 of the
Constitution and to implement the Constitutional provisions on
the separation of powers between co-equal branches of the
government, all heads of departments of the Executive Branch of

the government shall secure the consent of the President prior to

appearing before either House of Congress.
When the security of the State or the public interest so requires
and the President so states in writing, the appearance shall only
be conducted in executive session.
SECTION. 2. Nature, Scope and Coverage of Executive
Privilege.
(a) Nature and Scope. The rule of confidentiality based on
executive privilege is fundamental to the operation of government
and rooted in the separation of powers under the Constitution
(Almonte vs. Vasquez, G.R. No. 95367, 23 May 1995). Further,
Republic Act No. 6713 or the Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees provides that Public
Officials and Employees shall not use or divulge confidential or
classified information officially known to them by reason of their
office and not made available to the public to prejudice the public
interest.
Executive privilege covers all confidential or classified information
between the President and the public officers covered by this
executive order, including:
1.
Conversations and correspondence between the
President and the public official covered by this executive order
(Almonte vs. Vasquez G.R. No. 95367, 23 May 1995; Chavez v.
Public Estates Authority, G.R. No. 133250, 9 July 2002);
2.
Military, diplomatic and other national security matters
which in the interest of national security should not be divulged
(Almonte vs. Vasquez, G.R. No. 95367, 23 May 1995;Chavez v.
Presidential Commission on Good Government, G.R. No. 130716,
9 December 1998).
3.
Information between inter-government agencies prior to
the conclusion of treaties and executive agreements (Chavez v.
Presidential Commission on Good Government, G.R. No. 130716,
9 December 1998);
4.
Discussion in close-door Cabinet meetings (Chavez v.
Presidential Commission on Good Government, G.R. No. 130716,
9 December 1998);

5.
Matters affecting national security and public order
(Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, G.R. No. 133250, 9 July 2002).
(b) Who are covered. The following are covered by this
executive order:
1.
Senior officials of executive departments who in the
judgment of the department heads are covered by the executive
privilege;
2.
Generals and flag officers of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines and such other officers who in the judgment of the
Chief of Staff are covered by the executive privilege;
3.
Philippine National Police (PNP) officers with rank of chief
superintendent or higher and such other officers who in the
judgment of the Chief of the PNP are covered by the executive
privilege;
4.
Senior national security officials who in the judgment of
the National Security Adviserare covered by the executive
privilege; and
5.
Such other officers as may be determined by the
President.
SECTION 3. Appearance of Other Public Officials Before
Congress. All public officials enumerated in Section 2 (b) hereof
shall secure prior consent of the President prior to appearing
before either House of Congress to ensure the observance of the
principle of separation of powers, adherence to the rule on
executive privilege and respect for the rights of public officials
appearing in inquiries in aid of legislation. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
A transparent government is one of the hallmarks of a truly
republican state. Even in the early history of republican thought,
however, it has been recognized that the head of government
may keep certain information confidential in pursuit of the public
interest. Explaining the reason for vesting executive power in
only one magistrate, a distinguished delegate to the U.S.
Constitutional Convention said: Decision, activity, secrecy, and
dispatch will generally characterize the proceedings of one man,
in a much more eminent degree than the proceedings of any
greater number; and in proportion as the number is increased,
these qualities will be diminished.

Considering that no member of the executive department would

want to appear in the above Senate investigations in aid of
legislation by virtue of Proc. No. 464, the petitioners filed the
present petitions to declare the same unconstitutional because
the President abused her powers in issuing Executive Order No.
464.
I S S U E S:
1. Whether E.O. 464 contravenes the power of inquiry vested in
Congress;
2. Whether E.O. 464 violates the right of the people to information
on matters of public concern; and
3. Whether respondents have committed grave abuse of
discretion when they implemented E.O. 464 prior to its publication
in a newspaper of general circulation.
H E L D:
Before proceeding to resolve the issue of the constitutionality of
E.O. 464, ascertainment of whether the requisites for a valid
exercise of the Courts power of judicial review are present is in
order.
Like almost all powers conferred by the Constitution, the power of
judicial review is subject to limitations, to wit: (1) there must be
an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial
power; (2) the person challenging the act must have standing to
challenge the validity of the subject act or issuance; otherwise
stated, he must have a personal and substantial interest in the
case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a
result of its enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality
must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the issue of
constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.[3]
Invoking this Courts ruling in National Economic Protectionism
Association v. Ongpin[4] andValmonte v. Philippine Charity
Sweepstakes Office,[5] respondents assert that to be considered
a proper party, one must have a personal and substantial interest

in the case, such that he has sustained or will sustain direct injury
due to the enforcement of E.O. 464.[6]
The Supreme Court, however, held that when suing as a citizen,
the interest of the petitioner in assailing the constitutionality of
laws, presidential decrees, orders, and other regulations, must be
direct and personal. In Franciso v. House of Representatives,
[7] this Court held that when the proceeding involves the
assertion of a public right, the mere fact that he is a citizen
satisfies the requirement of personal interest.
I
The Congress power of inquiry is expressly recognized in
Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution which reads:
SECTION 21.
The Senate or the House of Representatives or
any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of
procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such
inquiries shall be respected. (Underscoring supplied)
The 1935 Constitution did not contain a similar provision.
Nonetheless, in Arnault v. Nazareno,[8] a case decided in 1950
under that Constitution, the Court already recognized that the
power of inquiry is inherent in the power to legislate.
Arnault involved a Senate investigation of the reportedly
anomalous purchase of the Buenavista and Tambobong Estates by
the Rural Progress Administration. Arnault, who was considered a
leading witness in the controversy, was called to testify thereon
by the Senate. On account of his refusal to answer the questions
of the senators on an important point, he was, by resolution of the
Senate, detained for contempt. Upholding the Senates power to
punish Arnault for contempt, this Court held:
Although there is no provision in the Constitution expressly
investing either House of Congress with power to make
investigations and exact testimony to the end that it may exercise
its legislative functions advisedly and effectively, such power is so
far incidental to the legislative function as to be implied. In other
words, the power of inquiry with process to enforce it is an
essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. A
legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the
absence of information respecting the conditions which the

legislation is intended to affect or change; and where the

legislative body does not itself possess the requisite information
which is not infrequently true recourse must be had to others
who do possess it. Experience has shown that mere requests for
such information are often unavailing, and also that information
which is volunteered is not always accurate or complete; so some
means of compulsion is essential to obtain what is needed.
[9] . . . (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
That this power of inquiry is broad enough to cover officials of the
executive branch may be deduced from the same case. The
power of inquiry, the Court therein ruled, is co-extensive with the
power to legislate.[10] The matters which may be a proper
subject of legislation and those which may be a proper subject of
investigation are one. It follows that the operation of
government, being a legitimate subject for legislation, is a proper
subject for investigation.
Since Congress has authority to inquire into the operations of the
executive branch, it would be incongruous to hold that the power
of inquiry does not extend to executive officials who are the most
familiar with and informed on executive operations.
As discussed in Arnault, the power of inquiry, with process to
enforce it, is grounded on the necessity of information in the
legislative process. If the information possessed by executive
officials on the operation of their offices is necessary for wise
legislation on that subject, by parity of reasoning, Congress has
the right to that information and the power to compel the
disclosure thereof.
For one, as noted in Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee,
[11] the inquiry itself might not properly be in aid of legislation,
and thus beyond the constitutional power of Congress. Such
inquiry could not usurp judicial functions. Parenthetically, one
possible way for Congress to avoid such a result as occurred
in Bengzon is to indicate in its invitations to the public officials
concerned, or to any person for that matter, the possible needed
statute which prompted the need for the inquiry. Given such
statement in its invitations, along with the usual indication of the
subject of inquiry and the questions relative to and in furtherance

thereof, there would be less room for speculation on the part of

the person invited on whether the inquiry is in aid of legislation.
Section 21, Article VI likewise establishes crucial safeguards that
proscribe the legislative power of inquiry. The provision requires
that the inquiry be done in accordance with the Senate or Houses
duly published rules of procedure, necessarily implying the
constitutional infirmity of an inquiry conducted without duly
published rules of procedure. Section 21 also mandates that the
rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries be
respected, an imposition that obligates Congress to adhere to the
guarantees in the Bill of Rights.
A distinction was thus made between inquiries in aid of legislation
and the question hour. While attendance was meant to be
discretionary in the question hour, it was compulsory in inquiries
in aid of legislation.
Sections 21 and 22, therefore, while closely related and
complementary to each other, should not be considered as
pertaining to the same power of Congress. One specifically
relates to the power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation, the
aim of which is to elicit information that may be used for
legislation, while the other pertains to the power to conduct a
question hour, the objective of which is to obtain information in
pursuit of Congress oversight function.
When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how department
heads are implementing the statutes which it has issued, its right
to such information is not as imperative as that of the President to
whom, as Chief Executive, such department heads must give a
report of their performance as a matter of duty. In such
instances, Section 22, in keeping with the separation of powers,
states that Congress may only request their appearance.
Nonetheless, when the inquiry in which Congress requires their
appearance is in aid of legislation under Section 21, the
appearance is mandatory for the same reasons stated in Arnault.
[12]
In fine, the oversight function of Congress may be facilitated by
compulsory process only to the extent that it is performed in

pursuit of legislation. This is consistent with the intent discerned

from the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission.
Ultimately, the power of Congress to compel the appearance of
executive officials under Section 21 and the lack of it under
Section 22 find their basis in the principle of separation of
powers. While the executive branch is a co-equal branch of the
legislature, it cannot frustrate the power of Congress to legislate
by refusing to comply with its demands for information.
When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for
department heads to exempt themselves therefrom is by a valid
claim of privilege. They are not exempt by the mere fact that
they are department heads. Only one executive official may be
exempted from this power the President on whom executive
power is vested, hence, beyond the reach of Congress except
through the power of impeachment.
Section 1, in view of its specific reference to Section 22 of Article
VI of the Constitution and the absence of any reference to
inquiries in aid of legislation, must be construed as limited in its
application to appearances of department heads in the question
hour is therefore CONSTITUTIONAL.
It is different insofar as Sections 2 and 3 are concerned. Section 3
of E.O. 464 requires all the public officials enumerated in Section
2(b) to secure the consent of the President prior to appearing
before either house of Congress. The enumeration is broad. It
covers all senior officials of executive departments, all officers of
the AFP and the PNP, and all senior national security
officials who, in the judgment of the heads of offices designated in
the same section(i.e. department heads, Chief of Staff of the AFP,
Chief of the PNP, and the National Security Adviser), are covered
by the executive privilege.
The enumeration also includes such other officers as may be
determined by the President. Given the title of Section 2
Nature, Scope and Coverage of Executive Privilege , it is
evident that under the rule of ejusdem generis, the determination
by the President under this provision is intended to be based on a
similar finding of coverage under executive privilege.
While there is no Philippine case that directly addresses the issue
of whether executive privilege may be invoked against Congress,

it is gathered from Chavez v. PEA that certain information in the

possession of the executive may validly be claimed as privileged
even against Congress. Thus, the case holds:
There is no claim by PEA that the information demanded by
petitioner is privileged information rooted in the separation of
powers. The information does not cover Presidential
conversations, correspondences, or discussions during closeddoor Cabinet meetings which,like internal-deliberations of the
Supreme Court and other collegiate courts, or executive sessions
of either house of Congress, are recognized as confidential. This
kind of informationcannot be pried open by a co-equal branch of
government. A frank exchange of exploratory ideas and
assessments, free from the glare of publicity and pressure by
interested parties, is essential to protect the independence of
decision-making of those tasked to exercise Presidential,
Legislative and Judicial power. This is not the situation in the
instant case.[13](Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The claim of privilege under Section 3 of E.O. 464 in relation to
Section 2(b) is thus invalid per se. It is not asserted. It is merely
implied. Instead of providing precise and certain reasons for the
claim, it merely invokes E.O. 464, coupled with an announcement
that the President has not given her consent. It is woefully
insufficient for Congress to determine whether the withholding of
information is justified under the circumstances of each case. It
severely frustrates the power of inquiry of Congress.
In fine, Section 3 and Section 2(b) of E.O. 464 must be
invalidated.
2
E.O 464 likewise violates the constitutional provision on the right
to information on matters of public concern. There are clear
distinctions between the right of Congress to information which
underlies the power of inquiry and the right of the people to
information on matters of public concern. For one, the demand of
a citizen for the production of documents pursuant to his right to
information does not have the same obligatory force as
a subpoena duces tecumissued by Congress. Neither does the
right to information grant a citizen the power to exact testimony

from government officials. These powers belong only to Congress

and not to an individual citizen.
To the extent that investigations in aid of legislation are generally
conducted in public, however, any executive issuance tending to
unduly limit disclosures of information in such investigations
necessarily deprives the people of information which, being
presumed to be in aid of legislation, is presumed to be a matter of
public concern. The citizens are thereby denied access to
information which they can use in formulating their own opinions
on the matter before Congress opinions which they can then
communicate to their representatives and other government
officials through the various legal means allowed by their freedom
of expression. Thus holds Valmonte v. Belmonte
It is in the interest of the State that the channels for free political
discussion be maintained to the end that the government may
perceive and be responsive to the peoples will. Yet, this open
dialogue can be effective only to the extent that the citizenry is
informed and thus able to formulate its will intelligently. Only
when the participants in the discussion are aware of the issues
and have access to information relating thereto can such bear
fruit.[14] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The impairment of the right of the people to information as a
consequence of E.O. 464 is, therefore, in the sense explained
above, just as direct as its violation of the legislatures power of
inquiry.
3
The implementation of Proc. 464 before it was published in
the Official Gazette as illegal.
Due process thus requires that
the people should have been apprised of this issuance before it
was implemented. This is clear from the doctrine laid down in the
case of TANADA VS. TUVERA.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTLY GRANTED.
Sections
2(b) and 3 of Executive Order No. 464 (series of 2005), Ensuring
Observance of the Principle of Separation of Powers, Adherence to
the Rule on Executive Privilege and Respect for the Rights of
Public Officials Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in Aid of

Legislation Under the Constitution, and For Other Purposes, are

declared VOID.
Bengzon, Jr. vs. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, Nov. 20, 1991
This is a petition for prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order and/or injunctive relief, to enjoin the
respondent Senate Blue Ribbon committee from requiring the
petitioners to testify and produce evidence at its inquiry into the
alleged sale of the equity of Benjamin Kokoy Romualdez to the
Lopa Group in thirty-six (36) or thirty-nine (39) corporations.
Coming to the specific issues raised in this case, petitioners
contend that (1) the Senate Blue Ribbon Committees inquiry has
no valid legislative purpose, i.e., it is not done in aid of legislation;
(2) the sale or disposition of hte Romualdez corporations is a
purely private transaction which is beyond the power of the
Senate Blue Ribbon Committee to inquire into; and (3) the inquiry
violates their right to due process.
The 1987 Constitution expressly recognizes the power of both
houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation.
1Thus, Section 21, Article VI thereof provides:
The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its
respective committee may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in
accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights
of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be
respected.
The power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid
of legislation is not, therefore, absolute or unlimited. Its exercise
is circumscribed by the afore-quoted provision of the Constitution.
Thus, as provided therein, the investigation must be in aid of
legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of
procedure and that the rights of persons appearing in or
affected by such inquiries shall be respected. It follows then that
the rights of persons under the Bill of Rights must be respected,
including the right to due process and the right not to be
compelled to testify against ones self.

The power to conduct formal inquiries or investigations in

specifically provided for in Sec. 1 of the Senate Rules of Procedure
Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation. Such inquiries may refer
to the implementation or re-examination of any law or in
connection with any proposed legislation or the formulation of
future legislation. They may also extend to any and all matters
vested by the Constitution in Congress and/or in the Seante alone.
As held in Jean L. Arnault vs. Leon Nazareno, et al., 16 the inquiry,
to be within the jurisdiction of the legislative body making it, must
be material or necessary to the exercise of a power in it vested by
the Constitution, such as to legislate or to expel a member.
Under Sec. 4 of the aforementioned Rules, the Senate may refer
to any committee or committees any speech or resolution filed by
any Senator which in its judgment requires an appropriate inquiry
in aid of legislation. In order therefore to ascertain the character
or nature of an inquiry, resort must be had to the speech or
resolution under which such an inquiry is proposed to be made.
A perusal of the speech of Senator Enrile reveals that he (Senator
Enrile) made a statement which was published in various
newspapers on 2 September 1988 accusing Mr. Ricardo Baby
Lopa of having taken over the FMMC Group of Companies. As a
consequence thereof, Mr. Lopa wrote a letter to Senator Enrile on
4 September 1988 categorically denying that he had taken over
the FMMC Group of Companies; that former PCGG Chairman
Ramon Diaz himself categorically stated in a telecast interview by
Mr. Luis Beltran on Channel 7 on 31 August 1988 that there has
been no takeover by him (Lopa); and that theses repeated
allegations of a takeover on his (Lopas) part of FMMC are
baseless as they are malicious.
The Lopa reply prompted Senator Enrile, during the session of the
Senate on 13 September 1988, to avail of the privilege hour, 17
so that he could repond to the said Lopa letter, and also to
vindicate his reputation as a Member of the Senate of the
Philippines, considering the claim of Mr. Lopa that his (Enriles)
charges that he (Lopa) had taken over the FMMC Group of

Companies are baseless and malicious. Thus, in his speech,

18 Senator Enrile said, among others, as follows:
It appeals, therefore, that the contemplated inquiry by respondent
Committee is not really in aid of legislation because it is not
related to a purpose within the jurisdiction of Congress, since the
aim of the investigation is to find out whether or not the relatives
of the President or Mr. Ricardo Lopa had violated Section 5 RA No.
3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, a matter that
appears more within the province of the courts rather than of the
legislature. Besides, the Court may take judicial notice that Mr.
Ricardo Lopa died during the pendency of this case. In John T.
Watkins vs. United States, 20 it was held :
The power of congress to conduct investigations in inherent in
the legislative process. That power is broad. it encompasses
inquiries concerning the administration of existing laws as well as
proposed, or possibly needed statutes. It includes surveys of
defects in our social, economic, or political system for the purpose
of enabling Congress to remedy them. It comprehends probes into
departments of the Federal Government to expose corruption,
inefficiency or waste. But broad as is this power of inquiry, it is
not unlimited. There is no general authority to expose the private
affairs of individuals without justification in terms of the functions
of congress. This was freely conceded by Solicitor General in his
argument in this case. Nor is the Congress a law enforcement or
trial agency. These are functions of the executive and judicial
departments of government. No inquiry is an end in itself; it must
be related to and in furtherance of a legitimate task of Congress.
Investigations conducted solely for the personal aggrandizement
of the investigators or to punish those investigated are
indefensible. (emphasis supplied)
Broad as it is, the power is not, however, without
limitations. Since congress may only investigate into those
areas in which it may potentially legislate or appropriate,
it cannot inquire into matters which are within the
exclusive province of one of the other branches of the
government. Lacking the judicial power given to the
Judiciary, it cannot inquire into mattes that are exclusively

the concern of the Judiciary. Neither can it supplant the

Executive in what exclusively belongs to the Executive.
Moreover, this right of the accused is extended to respondents in
administrative investigations but only if they partake of the nature
of a criminal proceeding or analogous to a criminal proceeding. In
Galman vs. Pamaran, 26 the Court reiterated the doctrine in Cabal
vs. Kapuanan (6 SCRA 1059) to illustrate the right of witnesses to
invoke the right against self-incrimination not only in criminal
proceedings but also in all other types of suit
We do not here modify these doctrines. If we presently rule that
petitioners may not be compelled by the respondent Committee
to appear, testify and produce evidence before it, it is only
because we hold that the questioned inquiry is not in aid of
legislation and, if pursued, would be violative of the principle of
separation of powers between the legislative and the judicial
departments of government, ordained by the Constitution.
Investigation in aid of legislation; Executive Privilege
ROMULO L. NERI VS. SENATE COMMITTEE ON
ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS AND
INVESTIGATIONS, SENATE COMMITTEE ON TRADE AND
COMMERCE, AND SENATE COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL
DEFENSE AND SECURITY, G.R. No. 180643, March 25, 2008
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. (En Banc)
THE FACTS:
On April 21, 2007, the Department of Transportation and
Communication (DOTC) entered into a contract with Zhong Xing
Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE) for the supply of equipment
and services for the National Broadband Network (NBN) Project in
the amount of U.S. $ 329,481,290 (approximately P16 Billion
Pesos). The Project was to be financed by the Peoples Republic of
China. In connection with this NBN Project, various Resolutions
were introduced in the Senat
At the same time, the investigation was claimed to be relevant to
the consideration of three (3) pending bills in the Senate.
Respondent Committees initiated the investigation by sending
invitations to certain personalities and cabinet officials involved

in the NBN Project. Petitioner was among those invited. He was

summoned to appear and testify on September 18, 20, and 26
and October 25, 2007. However, he attended only the
September 26 hearing, claiming he was out of town during the
other dates.
In the September 18, 2007 hearing, businessman Jose de Venecia
III testified that several high executive officials and power brokers
were using their influence to push the approval of the NBN Project
by the NEDA. It appeared that the Project was initially approved
as a Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) project but, on March 29, 2007,
the NEDA acquiesced to convert it into a government-togovernment project, to be financed through a loan from the
Chinese Government.
On September 26, 2007, petitioner testified before respondent
Committees for eleven (11) hours. He disclosed that then
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Chairman Benjamin Abalos
offered him P200 Million in exchange for his approval of the NBN
Project. He further narrated that he informed President Arroyo
about the bribery attempt and that she instructed him not to
accept the bribe. However, when probed further on what they
discussed about the NBN Project, petitioner refused to answer,
invoking executive privilege. In particular, he refused to answer
the questions on (a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up
the NBN Project,[15][6] (b) whether or not she directed him to
prioritize it,[16][7] and (c) whether or not she directed him to
approve.[17][8]
Unrelenting, respondent Committees issued a Subpoena Ad
Testificandum to petitioner, requiring him to appear and testify
on November 20, 2007.
However, in the Letter dated November 15, 2007, Executive
Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita requested respondent Committees to
dispense with petitioners testimony on the ground of executive
privilege. The pertinent portion of the letter reads:
With reference to the subpoena ad testificandum issued to
Secretary Romulo Neri to appear and testify again on 20
November 2007 before the Joint Committees you chair, it will be
recalled that Sec. Neri had already testified and exhaustively

discussed the ZTE / NBN project, including his conversation with

the President thereon last 26 September 2007.
Asked to elaborate further on his conversation with the President,
Sec. Neri asked for time to consult with his superiors in line with
the ruling of the Supreme Court in Senate v. Ermita, 488 SCRA 1
(2006).
Specifically, Sec. Neri sought guidance on the possible invocation
of executive privilege on the following questions, to wit:
a)
Whether the President followed up the (NBN)
project?
b)
Were you dictated to prioritize the ZTE?
c)
Whether the President said to go ahead and
approve the project after being told about the alleged
bribe?
Following the ruling in Senate v. Ermita, the foregoing questions
fall under conversations and correspondence between the
President and public officials which are considered executive
privilege (Almonte v. Vasquez, G.R. 95637, 23 May 1995; Chavez
v. PEA, G.R. 133250, July 9, 2002).
The context in which executive privilege is being invoked is that
the information sought to be disclosed might impair our
diplomatic as well as economic relations with the Peoples
Republic of China.
In light of the above considerations, this Office is constrained to
invoke the settled doctrine of executive privilege as refined
in Senate v. Ermita, and has advised Secretary Neri accordingly.
On November 20, 2007, petitioner did not appear before
respondent Committees. Thus, on November 22, 2007, the latter
issued the show cause Letter requiring him to explain why he
should not be cited in contempt. The Letter reads:
Since you have failed to appear in the said hearing, the
Committees on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations
(Blue Ribbon), Trade and Commerce and National Defense and
Security require you to show cause why you should not be cited in
contempt under Section 6, Article 6 of the Rules of the Committee
on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations (Blue
Ribbon).

The Senate expects your explanation on or before 2 December

2007.
On November 29, 2007, petitioner replied to respondent
Committees, manifesting that it was not his intention to ignore
the Senate hearing and that he thought the only remaining
questions were those he claimed to be covered by executive
privilege, thus:
It was not my intention to snub the last Senate hearing. In fact, I
have cooperated with the task of the Senate in its inquiry in aid of
legislation as shown by my almost 11 hours stay during the
hearing on 26 September 2007. During said hearing, I answered
all the questions that were asked of me, save for those which I
thought was covered by executive privilege, and which was
confirmed by the Executive Secretary in his Letter 15 November
2007. In good faith, after that exhaustive testimony, I thought
that what remained were only the three questions, where the
Executive Secretary claimed executive privilege. Hence, his
request that my presence be dispensed with.
In addition, petitioner submitted a letter prepared by his counsel,
Atty. Antonio R. Bautista, stating, among others that: (1) his
(petitioner) non-appearance was upon the order of the President;
and (2) his conversation with President Arroyo dealt with delicate
and sensitive national security and diplomatic matters relating to
the impact of the bribery scandal involving high government
officials and the possible loss of confidence of foreign investors
and lenders in the Philippines. The letter ended with a reiteration
of petitioners request that he be furnished in advance as to
what else he needs to clarify so that he may adequately prepare
for the hearing.
On December 7, 2007, petitioner filed with this Court the present
petition for certiorariassailing the show cause Letter dated
November 22, 2007.
Respondent Committees found petitioners explanations
unsatisfactory. Without responding to his request for advance
notice of the matters that he should still clarify, they issued
theOrder dated January 30, 2008, citing him in contempt of
respondent Committees and ordering his arrest and detention at

the Office of the Senate Sergeant-At-Arms until such time that he

would appear and give his testimony. The said Order states:
ORDER
For failure to appear and testify in the Committees hearing on
Tuesday, September 18, 2007; Thursday, September 20, 2007;
Thursday, October 25, 2007; and Tuesday, November 20, 2007,
despite personal notice and Subpoenas Ad Testificandum sent to
and received by him, which thereby delays, impedes and
obstructs, as it has in fact delayed, impeded and obstructed the
inquiry into the subject reported irregularities, AND for failure to
explain satisfactorily why he should not be cited for contempt
(Neri letter of 29 November 2007), herein attached) ROMULO L.
NERI is hereby cited in contempt of this (sic) Committees
and ordered arrested and detained in the Office of the
Senate Sergeant-At-Arms until such time that he will
appear and give his testimony.
The Sergeant-At-Arms is hereby directed to carry out and
implement this Order and make a return hereof within twenty four
(24) hours from its enforcement.
On the same date, petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the
above Order.[18][9] He insisted that he has not shown any
contemptible conduct worthy of contempt and arrest. He
emphasized his willingness to testify on new matters, however,
respondent Committees did not respond to his request for
advance notice of questions. He also mentioned the petition
for certiorari he filed on December 7, 2007. According to him, this
should restrain respondent Committees from enforcing the show
cause Letter through the issuance of declaration of contempt
and arrest.
In view of respondent Committees issuance of the
contempt Order, petitioner filed on February 1, 2008
a Supplemental Petition for Certiorari (With Urgent Application
for TRO/Preliminary Injunction), seeking to restrain the
implementation of the said contemptOrder.
On February 5, 2008, the Court issued a Status Quo Ante
Order
(a) enjoining respondent Committees from
implementing their contempt Order, (b) requiring the parties to
observe the status quo prevailing prior to the issuance of the

assailed order, and (c) requiring respondent Committees to file

their comment.
Petitioner contends that respondent Committees show
cause Letter and contempt Order were issued with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. He stresses that his conversations with President
Arroyo are candid discussions meant to explore options in
making policy decisions. According to him, these discussions
dwelt on the impact of the bribery scandal involving high
government officials on the countrys diplomatic relations
and economic and military affairs and the possible loss of
confidence of foreign investors and lenders in the
Philippines. He also emphasizes that his claim of executive
privilege is upon the order of the President and within the
parameters laid down inSenate v. Ermita[19][10] and United
States v. Reynolds.[20][11] Lastly, he argues that he is precluded
from disclosing communications made to him in official
confidence under Section 7[21][12] of Republic Act No. 6713,
otherwise known as Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for
Public Officials and Employees, and Section 24[22][13] (e) of Rule
130 of the Rules of Court.
Respondent Committees assert the contrary. They argue
that
(1) petitioners testimony is material and pertinent in
the investigation conducted in aid of legislation; (2)there is no
valid justification for petitioner to claim executive
privilege; (3) there is no abuse of their authority to order
petitioners arrest; and (4) petitioner has not come to court with
clean hands.
I S S U E S:
1.
What communications between the President and
petitioner Neri are covered by the principle of executive
privilege?
1.a Did Executive Secretary Ermita correctly invoke the principle
of executive privilege, by order of the President, to
cover
(i) conversations of the President in the
exercise of her executive and policy decision-making
and (ii) information, which might impair our diplomatic as well as
economic relations with the Peoples Republic of China?

1.b. Did petitioner Neri correctly invoke executive privilege to

avoid testifying on his conversations with the President on the
NBN contract on his assertions that the said conversations dealt
with delicate and sensitive national security and
diplomatic matters relating to the impact of bribery
scandal involving high government officials and the
possible loss of confidence of foreign investors and
lenders in the Philippines x x x within the principles laid
down in Senate v. Ermita (488 SCRA 1 [2006])?
1.c Will the claim of executive privilege in this case violate the
following provisions of the Constitution:
Sec. 28, Art. II (Full public disclosure of all transactions
involving
public interest)
Sec. 7, Art. III (The right of the people to information on matters
of public concern
Sec. 1, Art. XI (Public office is a public trust)
Sec. 17, Art. VII (The President shall ensure that the laws be
faithfully executed)
and the due process clause and the principle of separation of
powers?
2.
What is the proper procedure to be followed in invoking
executive privilege?
3.
Did the Senate Committees gravely abuse their
discretion in ordering the arrest of petitioner for non-compliance
with the subpoena?
H E L D:
At the core of this controversy are the two (2) crucial queries, to
wit:
First, are the communications elicited by the subject three (3)
questions covered by executive privilege?
And second, did respondent Committees commit grave abuse of
discretion in issuing the contempt Order?
There is merit in the petition.
At the outset, a glimpse at the landmark case of Senate v.
Ermita[23][18] becomes imperative. Senate draws in bold strokes

the distinction between the legislative and oversight powers of

the Congress, as embodied under Sections 21 and 22,
respectively, of Article VI of the Constitution, to wit:
SECTION 21. The Senate or the House of Representatives or any
of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of
procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such
inquiries shall be respected.
SECTION 22. The heads of department may upon their own
initiative, with the consent of the President, or upon the request of
either House, or as the rules of each House shall provide, appear
before and be heard by such House on any matter pertaining to
their departments. Written questions shall be submitted to the
President of the Senate or the Speaker of the House of
Representatives at least three days before their scheduled
appearance. Interpellations shall not be limited to written
questions, but may cover matters related thereto. When the
security of the state or the public interest so requires and the
President so states in writing, the appearance shall be conducted
in executive session.
Senate cautions that while the above provisions are closely
related and complementary to each other, they should not be
considered as pertaining to the same power of Congress. Section
21 relates to the power to conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation. Its aim is to elicit information that may be used for
legislation. On the other hand, Section 22 pertains to the power to
conduct a question hour, the objective of which is to obtain
information in pursuit of Congress oversight function. [24][19]
Simply stated, while both powers allow Congress or any of its
committees to conduct inquiry, their objectives are different.
This distinction gives birth to another distinction with regard to
the use of compulsory process. Unlike in Section 21,
Congress cannot compel the appearance of executive officials
under Section 22. The Courts pronouncement in Senate v.
Ermita[25][20] is clear:
When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how department
heads are implementing the statutes which it has issued, its right
to such information is not as imperative as that of the President to
whom, as Chief Executive, such department heads must give a

report of their performance as a matter of duty. In such instances,

Section 22, in keeping with the separation of powers, states that
Congress may only request their appearance. Nonetheless, when
the inquiry in which Congress requires their appearance is in aid
of legislation under Section 21, the appearance is mandatory for
the same reasons stated in Arnault.
I
The Communications Elicited by the Three (3) Questions
are Covered by Executive Privilege
We start with the basic premises where the parties have
conceded.
The power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is
broad. This is based on the proposition that a legislative body
cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information
respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to
affect or change.[26][21] Inevitably, adjunct thereto is the
compulsory process to enforce it. But, the power, broad as it is,
has limitations. To be valid, it is imperative that it is done in
accordance with the Senate or House duly published rules of
procedure and that the rights of the persons appearing in or
affected by such inquiries be respected.
The power extends even to executive officials and the only way
for them to be exempted is through a valid claim of executive
privilege.[27][22] This directs us to the consideration of the
question is there a recognized claim of executive privilege
despite the revocation of E.O. 464?
AThere is a Recognized Claim
of Executive Privilege Despite the
Revocation of E.O. 464
At this juncture, it must be stressed that the revocation of E.O.
464 does not in any way diminish our concept of executive
privilege. This is because this concept has Constitutional
underpinnings. Unlike the United States which has further
accorded the concept with statutory status by enacting
the Freedom of Information Act[28][23] and the Federal Advisory
Committee Act,[29][24] the Philippines has retained its
constitutional origination, occasionally interpreted only by this
Court in various cases. The most recent of these is the case

of Senate v. Ermita where this Court declared unconstitutional

substantial portions of E.O. 464. In this regard, it is worthy to
note that Executive Ermitas Letter dated November 15, 2007
limits its bases for the claim of executive privilege to Senate v.
Ermita, Almonte v. Vasquez,[30][25] and Chavez v. PEA.[31][26]
There was never a mention of E.O. 464.
While these cases, especially Senate v. Ermita,[32][27] have
comprehensively discussed the concept of executive privilege, we
deem it imperative to explore it once more in view of the clamor
for this Court to clearly define the communications covered by
executive privilege.
The Nixon and post-Watergate cases established the broad
contours of the presidential communications privilege.[33][28]
In United States v. Nixon,[34][29] the U.S. Court recognized a great
public interest in preserving the confidentiality of
conversations that take place in the Presidents
performance of his official duties. It thus considered
presidential communications as presumptively privileged.
Apparently, the presumption is founded on the Presidents
generalized interest in confidentiality. The privilege is said
to be necessary to guarantee the candor of presidential advisors
and to provide the President and
those who assist
him with freedom to explore alternatives in the process
of shaping policies and making decisions and to do so in a
way many would be unwilling to express except privately.
In In Re: Sealed Case,[35][30] the U.S. Court of Appeals delved
deeper. It ruled that there are two (2) kinds of executive
privilege; one is the presidential communications
privilege and, the other is the deliberative process privilege.
The former pertains to communications, documents or other
materials that reflect presidential decision-making and
deliberations and that the President believes should
remain confidential. The latter includes advisory opinions,
recommendations and deliberations comprising part of a
process by which governmental decisions and policies are
formulated.
Accordingly, they are characterized by marked
distinctions. Presidential communications privilege applies
to decision-making of the President while, the deliberative

process privilege, to decision-making of executive

officials. The first is rooted in the constitutional principle of
separation of power and the Presidents unique constitutional
role;
the second on common law privilege. Unlike
the deliberative process privilege, thepresidential
communications privilege applies to documents in their
entirety, and covers final and post-decisional materials as
well as pre-deliberative ones[36][31] As a consequence,
congressional or judicial negation of the presidential
communications privilege is always subject to greater scrutiny
than denial of the deliberative process privilege.
Turning on who are the officials covered by the presidential
communications privilege, In Re: Sealed Case confines the
privilege only to White House Staff that has operational
proximity to direct presidential decision-making. Thus, the
privilege is meant to encompass only those functions that form
the core of presidential authority, involving what the court
characterized as quintessential and non-delegable Presidential
power, such as commander-in-chief power, appointment and
removal power, the power to grant pardons and reprieves, the
sole-authority to receive ambassadors and other public officers,
the power to negotiate treaties, etc. [37][32]
Majority of the above jurisprudence have found their way in our
jurisdiction. In Chavez v. PCGG[38][38], this Court held that there is
a governmental privilege against public disclosure with respect
to state secrets regarding military, diplomatic and other security
matters. InChavez v. PEA,[39][39] there is also a recognition of the
confidentiality of Presidential conversations, correspondences,
and discussions in closed-door Cabinet meetings. In Senate v.
Ermita, the concept of presidential communications
privilege is fully discussed.
As may be gleaned from the above discussion, the claim of
executive privilege is highly recognized in cases where the
subject of inquiry relates to a power textually committed by the
Constitution to the President, such as the area of military and
foreign relations. Under our Constitution, the President is the
repository of the commander-in-chief,[40][40] appointing,[41]
[41]
pardoning,[42][42] and diplomatic[43][43] powers. Consistent with

the doctrine of separation of powers, the information relating to

these powers may enjoy greater confidentiality than others.
The above cases, especially, Nixon, In Re Sealed Case and Judicial
Watch, somehow provide the elements of presidential
communications privilege, to wit:
1)
The protected communication must relate to a
quintessential and non-delegable presidential power.
2)
The communication must be authored or solicited
and received by a close advisor of the President or the President
himself. The judicial test is that an advisor must be in
operational proximity with the President.
3)
The presidential communications
privilege remains a qualified privilege that may be overcome by
a showing of adequate need, such that the information sought
likely contains important evidence and by the unavailability of
the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating
authority.[44][44]
In the case at bar, Executive Secretary Ermita premised his claim
of executive privilege on the ground that the communications
elicited by the three (3) questions fall under conversation and
correspondence between the President and public officials
necessary in her executive and policy decision-making process
and, that the information sought to be disclosed might impair our
diplomatic as well as economic relations with the Peoples
Republic of China. Simply put, the bases are presidential
communications privilege and executive privilege on matters
relating to diplomacy or foreign relations.
Using the above elements, we are convinced that, indeed, the
communications elicited by the three (3) questions are covered by
the presidential communications privilege. First, the
communications relate to a quintessential and non-delegable
power of the President, i.e. the power to enter into an executive
agreement with other countries. This authority of the President to
enter into executive agreements without the concurrence of the
Legislature has traditionally been recognized in Philippine
jurisprudence.[45][45] Second, the communications are received
by a close advisor of the President. Under the operational
proximity test, petitioner can be considered a close advisor,
being a member of President Arroyos cabinet. And third, there is

no adequate showing of a compelling need that would justify the

limitation of the privilege and of the unavailability of the
information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.
The third element deserves a lengthy discussion.
United States v. Nixon held that a claim of executive privilege is
subject to balancing against other interest. In other words,
confidentiality in executive privilege is not absolutelyprotected
by the Constitution. The U.S. Court held:
[N]either the doctrine of separation of powers, nor the need for
confidentiality of high-level communications, without more, can
sustain an absolute, unqualified Presidential privilege of immunity
from judicial process under all circumstances.
The foregoing is consistent with the earlier case of Nixon v. Sirica,
[46][46]
where it was held that presidential communications are
presumptively privileged and that the presumption can be
overcome only by mere showing of public need by the branch
seeking access to conversations. The courts are enjoined to
resolve the competing interests of the political branches of the
government in the manner that preserves the essential functions
of each Branch.[47][47] Here, the record is bereft of any categorical
explanation from respondent Committees to show a compelling or
citical need for the answers to the three (3) questions in the
enactment of a law. Instead, the questions veer more towards the
exercise of the legislative oversight function under Section 22 of
Article VI rather than Section 21 of the same Article. Senate v.
Ermita ruled that the the oversight function of Congress
may be facilitated by compulsory process only to the
extent that it is performed in pursuit of legislation. It is
conceded that it is difficult to draw the line between an inquiry in
aid of legislation and an inquiry in the exercise of oversight
function of Congress. In this regard, much will depend on the
content of the questions and the manner the inquiry is conducted.
Respondent Committees argue that a claim of executive privilege
does not guard against a possible disclosure of a crime or
wrongdoing. We see no dispute on this. It is settled inUnited
States v. Nixon[48][48] that demonstrated, specific need for

evidence in pending criminal trial outweighs the Presidents

generalized interest in confidentiality. However, the present
cases distinction with the Nixon case is very evident. In Nixon,
there is a pending criminal proceeding where the information
is requested and it is the demands of due process of law and the
fair administration of
criminal justice that the information be
disclosed. This is the reason why the U.S. Court was quick to
limit the scope of its decision. It stressed that it is not
concerned here with the balance between the Presidents
generalized interest in confidentiality x x x and
congressional demands for information. Unlike in Nixon,
the information here is elicited, not in a criminal proceeding, but
in a legislative inquiry. In this regard, Senate v. Ermita stressed
that the validity of the claim of executive privilege depends not
only on the ground invoked but, also, on theprocedural
setting or the context in which the claim is made. Furthermore,
in Nixon, the President did not interpose any claim of need to
protect military, diplomatic or sensitive national security secrets.
In the present case, Executive Secretary Ermita categorically
claims executive privilege on the grounds of presidential
communications privilege in relation to her executive and
policy decision-making process and diplomatic secrets.
Respondent Committees further contend that the grant of
petitioners claim of executive privilege violates the constitutional
provisions on the right of the people to information on matters of
public concern.[49][50] We might have agreed with such contention
if petitioner did not appear before them at all. But petitioner
made himself available to them during the September 26 hearing,
where he was questioned for eleven (11) hours. Not only that, he
expressly manifested his willingness to answer more questions
from the Senators, with the exception only of those covered by his
claim of executive privilege.
The right to public information, like any other right, is subject to
limitation. Section 7 of Article III provides:
The right of the people to information on matters of public
concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to
documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or
decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis

for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to

such limitations as may be provided by law.
The provision itself expressly provides the limitation, i.e. as
may be provided by law. Some of these laws are Section
7
of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6713,[50][51] Article 229[51]
[52]
of the
Revised Penal Code, Section 3 (k)[52]
[53]
of R.A. No. 3019, and
Section 24(e)
[53][54]
of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. These are in addition to
what our body of jurisprudence classifies as confidential [54][55] and
what our Constitution considers as belonging to the larger
concept of executive privilege. Clearly, there is a recognized
public interest in the confidentiality of certain information. We find
the information subject of this case belonging to such kind.
More than anything else, though, the right of Congress or any of
its Committees to obtain information in aid of legislation cannot
be equated with the peoples right to public information. The
former cannot claim that every legislative inquiry is an exercise
of the peoples right to information. The distinction between such
rights is laid down in Senate v. Ermita:
There are, it bears noting, clear distinctions between the right of
Congress to information which underlies the power of inquiry and
the right of people to information on matters of public concern.
For one, the demand of a citizen for the production of documents
pursuant to his right to information does not have the same
obligatory force as a subpoena duces tecumissued by Congress.
Neither does the right to information grant a citizen the power to
exact testimony from government officials. These powers belong
only to Congress, not to an individual citizen.
Thus, while Congress is composed of representatives
elected by the people, it does not follow, except in a
highly qualified sense, that in every exercise of its power
of inquiry, the people are exercising their right to
information.
The members of respondent Committees should not invoke as
justification in their exercise of power a right properly belonging
to the people in general. This is because when they discharge
their power, they do so as public officials and members of
Congress. Be that as it may, the right to information must be
balanced with and should give way, in appropriate cases, to

constitutional precepts particularly those pertaining to delicate

interplay of executive-legislative powers and privileges which is
the subject of careful review by numerous decided cases.
BThe Claim of Executive Privilege is Properly
Invoked
We now proceed to the issue whether the claim is properly
invoked by the President.Jurisprudence teaches that for the
claim to be properly invoked, there must be a formal claim of
privilege, lodged by the head of the department which has control
over the matter.[55][56]A formal and proper claim of executive
privilege requires a precise and certain reason for preserving
their confidentiality.[56][57]
The Letter dated November 17, 2007 of Executive Secretary
Ermita satisfies the requirement. It serves as the formal claim of
privilege. There, he expressly states that this Office is
constrained to invoke the settled doctrine of executive
privilege as refined in Senate v. Ermita, and has advised
Secretary Neri accordingly. Obviously, he is referring to the
Office of the President. That is more than enough compliance.
In Senate v. Ermita, a less categorical letter was even adjudged
to be sufficient.
With regard to the existence of precise and certain reason,
we find the grounds relied upon by Executive Secretary Ermita
specific enough so as not to leave respondent Committees in
the dark on how the requested information could be classified as
privileged. The case of Senate v. Ermita only requires that an
allegation be made whether the information demanded involves
military or diplomatic secrets, closed-door Cabinet meetings, etc.
The particular ground must only be specified. The enumeration is
not even intended to be comprehensive.[57][58] The following
statement of grounds satisfies the requirement:
The context in which executive privilege is being invoked is that
the information sought to be disclosed might impair our
diplomatic as well as economic relations with the Peoples
Republic of China. Given the confidential nature in which these
information were conveyed to the President, he cannot provide
the Committee any further details of these conversations, without
disclosing the very thing the privilege is designed to protect.

At any rate, as held further in Senate v. Ermita, [58][59] the

Congress must not require the executive to state the reasons for
the claim with such particularity as to compel disclosure of the
information which the privilege is meant to protect. This is a
matter of respect to a coordinate and co-equal department.
II
Respondent Committees Committed Grave Abuse of
Discretion in Issuing the Contempt Order
It must be reiterated that when respondent Committees issued
the show cause Letter dated November 22, 2007, petitioner
replied immediately, manifesting that it was not his intention to
ignore the Senate hearing and that he thought the only
remaining questions were the three (3) questions he claimed to
be covered by executive privilege. In addition thereto, he
submitted Atty. Bautistas letter, stating that his non-appearance
was upon the order of the President and specifying the reasons
why his conversations with President Arroyo are covered by
executive privilege. Both correspondences include an
expression of his willingness to testify again, provided he
be furnished in advance copies of the questions. Without
responding to his request for advance list of questions,
respondent Committees issued theOrder dated January 30, 2008,
citing him in contempt of respondent Committees and ordering
his arrest and detention at the Office of the Senate Sergeant-AtArms until such time that he would appear and give his
testimony. Thereupon, petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration, informing respondent Committees that he had
filed the present petition forcertiorari.
Respondent Committees committed grave abuse of discretion in
issuing the contempt Orderin view of five (5) reasons:
First, there being a legitimate claim of executive privilege, the
issuance of the contempt Order suffers from constitutional
infirmity.
Second, respondent Committees did not comply with the
requirement laid down in Senate v. Ermita that the invitations
should contain the possible needed statute which prompted the
need for the inquiry, along with the usual indication of the
subject of inquiry and thequestions relative to and in furtherance
thereof. Compliance with this requirement is imperative, both

under Sections 21 and 22 of Article VI of the Constitution. This

must be so to ensure that the rights of both persons appearing
in or affected by such inquiry are respected as mandated by
said Section 21 and by virtue of the express language of Section
22. Unfortunately, despite petitioners repeated demands,
respondent Committees did not send him an advance list of
questions.
Third, a reading of the transcript of respondent Committees
January 30, 2008 proceeding reveals that only a minority of the
members of the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee was present
during the deliberation. [59][61] Section 18 of the Rules of Procedure
Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation provides that:
The Committee, by a vote of majority of all its members, may
punish for contempt any witness before it who disobeys any order
of the Committee or refuses to be sworn or to testify or to answer
proper questions by the Committee or any of its members.
Clearly, the needed vote is a majority of all the members
of the Committee. Apparently, members who did not actually
participate in the deliberation were made to sign the contempt
Order. Thus, there is a cloud of doubt as to the validity of the
contempt Order dated January 30, 2008.
Fourth, we find merit in the argument of the OSG that
respondent Committees likewise violated Section 21 of Article VI
of the Constitution, requiring that the inquiry be in accordance
with the duly published rules of procedure. We quote the
OSGs explanation:
The phrase duly published rules of procedure requires the
Senate of every Congress to publish its rules of procedure
governing inquiries in aid of legislation because every Senate is
distinct from the one before it or after it. Since Senatorial
elections are held every three (3) years for one-half of the
Senates membership, the composition of the Senate also
changes by the end of each term. Each Senate may thus enact a
different set of rules as it may deem fit.Not having published
its Rules of Procedure, the subject hearings in aid of
legislation conducted by the 14th Senate, are therefore,
procedurally infirm.
And fifth, respondent Committees issuance of the contempt
Order is arbitrary and precipitate. It must be pointed out that

respondent Committees did not first pass upon the claim of

executive privilege and inform petitioner of their ruling. Instead,
they curtly dismissed his explanation as unsatisfactory and
simultaneously issued the Order citing him in contempt and
ordering his immediate arrest and detention.
A fact worth highlighting is that petitioner is not an unwilling
witness. He manifested several times his readiness to testify
before respondent Committees. He refused to answer the three
(3) questions because he was ordered by the President to claim
executive privilege. It behooves respondent Committees to first
rule on the claim of executive privilege and inform petitioner of
their finding thereon, instead of peremptorily dismissing his
explanation as unsatisfactory. Undoubtedly, respondent
Committees actions constitute grave abuse of discretion for
being arbitrary and for denying petitioner due process of law.
The same quality afflicted their conduct when
they (a) disregarded petitioners motion for reconsideration
alleging that he had filed the present petition before this Court
and (b)ignored petitioners repeated request for an advance list
of questions, if there be any aside from the three (3) questions as
to which he claimed to be covered by executive privilege.
Even the courts are repeatedly advised to exercise the power of
contempt judiciously and sparingly with utmost self-restraint with
the end in view of utilizing the same for correction and
preservation of the dignity of the court, not for retaliation or
vindication.[60][63] Respondent Committees should have exercised
the same restraint, after all petitioner is not even an ordinary
witness. He holds a high position in a co-equal branch of
government.
In this regard, it is important to mention that many incidents of
judicial review could have been avoided if powers are discharged
with circumspection and deference. Concomitant with the
doctrine of separation of powers is the mandate to observe
respect to a co-equal branch of the government.
In this present crusade to search for truth, we should turn to
the fundamental constitutional principles which underlie our
tripartite system of government, where the Legislature enacts
the law, the Judiciary interprets it and the Executive

implements it. They are considered separate, co-equal,

coordinate and supreme within their respective spheres but,
imbued with a system of checks and balances to prevent
unwarranted exercise of power. The Courts mandate is to
preserve these constitutional principles at all times to keep the
political branches of government within constitutional bounds in
the exercise of their respective powers and prerogatives, even if
it be in the search for truth. This is the only way we can
preserve the stability of our democratic institutions and uphold
the Rule of Law.
The respondents-Committees were therefore stopped from calling
the petitioner and ask the three(3) questions mentioned above in
connection with his conversations with the President being
covered by the executive privilege rule.
Power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation; Right
to Privacy; Public disclosure of government transactions; right to
information on matters of public concern; right against selfincrimination;
CAMILO L. SABIO vs. GORDON, G.R. No. 174340, October
17, 2006, 504 SCRA 704
Sandoval-Gutierrez, J.
The Facts:
On February 20, 2006, Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago
introduced Philippine Senate Resolution No. 455 (Senate Res. No.
455),[61][4] directing an inquiry in aid of legislation on the
anomalous losses incurred by the Philippines Overseas
Telecommunications Corporation (POTC), Philippine
Communications Satellite Corporation (PHILCOMSAT), and
PHILCOMSAT Holdings Corporation (PHC) due to the alleged
improprieties in their operations by their respective Board of
Directors.
On May 8, 2006, Chief of Staff Rio C. Inocencio, under the
authority of Senator Richard J. Gordon, wrote Chairman Camilo L.
Sabio of the PCGG, one of the herein petitioners, inviting him to
be one of the resource persons in the public meeting jointly
conducted by theCommittee on Government Corporations and
Public Enterprises and Committee on Public Services. The

purpose of the public meeting was to deliberate on Senate Res.

No. 455.[62][6]
On May 9, 2006, Chairman Sabio declined the invitation because
of prior commitment.[63][7] At the same time, he invoked
Section 4(b) of
E.O. No. 1 earlier quoted.
Unconvinced with the above Compliance and Explanation,
the Committee on Government Corporations and Public
Enterprises and the Committee on Public Services issued an
Order[64][13] directing Major General Jose Balajadia (Ret.), Senate
Sergeant-At-Arms, to place Chairman Sabio and his
Commissioners under arrest for contempt of the Senate. The
Order bears the approval of Senate President Villar and
the majority of the Committees members.
On September 12, 2006, at around 10:45 a.m., Major General
Balajadia arrested Chairman Sabio in his office at IRC Building, No.
82 EDSA, Mandaluyong City and brought him to the Senate
premises where he was detained.
Hence, this petition.
I S S U E:
Crucial to the resolution of the present petitions is the
fundamental issue of whether Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 is
repealed by the 1987 Constitution. On this lone issue hinges
the merit of the contention of Chairman Sabio and his
Commissioners that their refusal to appear before respondent
Senate Committees is justified.
Ranged against it is Article VI, Section 21 of the 1987
Constitution granting respondent Senate Committees the power
of legislative inquiry. It reads:
The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its
respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of
procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected
by such inquiries shall be respected.
On the other arm of the scale is Section 4(b) of E.O. No.1 limiting
such power of legislative inquiry by exempting all PCGG members
or staff from testifying in any judicial, legislative or administrative

proceeding, thus: No member or staff of the Commission

shall be required to testify or produce evidence in any
judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding
concerning matters within its official cognizance.
The Congress power of inquiry has been recognized in foreign
jurisdictions long before it reached our shores through McGrain v.
Daugherty,[65][15] cited in Arnault v. Nazareno.[66][16] In those
earlier days, American courts considered the power of inquiry
as inherent in the power to legislate.
In Arnault, the Supreme Court adhered to a similar
theory. Citing McGrain, it recognized that the power of inquiry is
an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative
function, thus:
Although there is no provision in the Constitution expressly
investing either House of Congress with power to make
investigations and exact testimony to the end that it may exercise
its legislative functions advisedly and effectively, such power is so
far incidental to the legislative function as to be implied. In other
words, the power of inquiry with process to enforce it is
an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative
function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or
effectively in the absence of information respecting the
conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or
change; and where the legislation body does not itself
possess the requisite information which is not
infrequently true recourse must be had to others who
possess it.
Dispelling any doubt as to the Philippine Congress power of
inquiry, provisions on such power made their maiden appearance
in Article VIII, Section 12 of the 1973 Constitution. [67][18] Then
came the 1987 Constitution incorporating the present Article VI,
Section 12. What was therefore implicit under the 1935
Constitution, as influenced by American jurisprudence,
became explicit under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions.[68][19]
Notably, the 1987 Constitution recognizes the power of
investigation, not just of Congress, but also of any of its
committee. This is significant because it constitutes a direct
conferral of investigatory power upon the committees and it
means that the mechanisms which the Houses can take in order

to effectively perform its investigative function are also available

to the committees.[69][20]
It can be said that the Congress power of inquiry has gained
more solid existence and expansive construal. The Courts high
regard to such power is rendered more evident inSenate v.
Ermita,[70][21] where it categorically ruled that the power of
inquiry is broad enough to cover officials of the executive
branch. Verily, the Court reinforced the doctrine
in Arnault that the operation of government, being a
legitimate subject for legislation, is a proper subject for
investigation and that the power of inquiry is coextensive with the power to legislate.
Considering these jurisprudential instructions, Section 4(b) is
directly repugnant with Article VI, Section 21. Section
4(b) exempts the PCGG members and staff from the
Congress power of inquiry. This cannot be countenanced.
Nowhere in the Constitution is any provision granting such
exemption. The Congress power of inquiry, being broad,
encompasses everything that concerns the administration of
existing laws as well as proposed or possibly needed statutes. [71]
[22]
It even extends to government agencies created by
Congress and officers whose positions are within the
power of Congress to regulate or even abolish.[72][23] PCGG
belongs to this class.
Certainly, a mere provision of law cannot pose a limitation to the
broad power of Congress, in the absence of any constitutional
basis.
Furthermore, Section 4(b) is also inconsistent with Article XI,
Section 1 of the Constitution stating that: Public office is a public
trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be
accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility,
integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice,
and lead modest lives.
The provision presupposes that since an incumbent of a public
office is invested with certain powers and charged with certain
duties pertinent to sovereignty, the powers so delegated to the
officer are held in trust for the people and are to be
exercised in behalf of the government or of all citizens

who may need the intervention of the officers. Such trust

extends to all matters within the range of duties
pertaining to the office. In other words, public officers are
but the servants of the people, and not their rulers. [73][24]
Section 4(b), being in the nature of an immunity, is inconsistent
with the principle of public accountability. It places the
PCGG members and staff beyond the reach of courts, Congress
and other administrative bodies. Instead of encouraging
public accountability, the same provision only
institutionalizes irresponsibility and non-accountability.
In Presidential Commission on Good Government v. Pea, [74]
[25]
Justice Florentino P. Feliciano characterized as obiter the
portion of the majority opinion barring, on the basis of Sections
4(a) and (b) of E.O. No. 1, a civil case for damages filed against
the PCGG and its Commissioners.
He eloquently opined:
The above underscored portions are, it is respectfully submitted,
clearly obiter. It is important to make clear that the Court is
not here interpreting, much less upholding as valid and
constitutional, the literal terms of Section 4 (a), (b) of
Executive Order No.1. If Section 4 (a) were given its literal
import as immunizing the PCGG or any member thereof from civil
liability for anything done or omitted in the discharge of the task
contemplated by this Order, the constitutionality of Section 4 (a)
would, in my submission, be open to most serious doubt. For so
viewed, Section 4 (a) would institutionalize the irresponsibility and
non-accountability of members and staff of the PCGG, a notion
that is clearly repugnant to both the 1973 and 1987 Constitution
and a privileged status not claimed by any other official of the
Republic under the 1987 Constitution. x x x.
x x

x x

It would seem constitutionally offensive to suppose that a

member or staff member of the PCGG could not be
required to testify before the Sandiganbayan or that such
members were exempted from complying with orders of
this Court.

Chavez v. Sandiganbayan[75][26] reiterates the same view. Indeed,

Section 4(b) has been frowned upon by this Court even before the
filing of the present petitions.
2)
NEGROS ORIENTAL II ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE VS.
SANGGUNIANG PANGLUNGSOD OF DUMAGUETE CITY, G.R. No.
72492, Nov. 5, 1987, 155 SCRA 421
Petitioners contend that the respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod
of Dumaguete is bereft of the power to compel the attendance
and testimony of witnesses, nor the power to order the arrest of
witnesses who fail to obey its subpoena. It is further argued that
assuming the power to compel the attendance and testimony of
witnesses to be lodged in said body, it cannot be exercised in the
investigation of matters affecting the terms and conditions of the
franchise granted to NORECO II which are beyond the jurisdiction
of the Sangguniang Panlungsod.
Respondents, for their part, claim that inherent in the legislative
functions performed by the respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod
is the power to conduct investigations in aid of legislation and
with it, the power to punish for contempt in inquiries on matters
within its jurisdiction (Rollo, p. 46). It is also the position of the
respondents that the contempt power, if not expressly granted, is
necessarily implied from the powers granted the Sangguniang
Panlungsod (Rollo, pp. 48-49). Furthermore, the respondents
assert that an inquiry into the installation or use of inefficient
power lines and its effect on the power consumption cost on the
part of Dumaguete residents is well-within the jurisdiction of the
Sangguniang Panlungsod and its committees.
1.
A line should be drawn between the powers of Congress as
the repository of the legislative power under the Constitution, and
those that may be exercised by the legislative bodies of local
government unit, e.g. the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Dumaguete
which, as mere creatures of law, possess delegated legislative
power. While the Constitution does not expressly vest Congress
with the power to punish non-members for legislative contempt,
the power has nevertheless been invoked by the legislative body
as a means of preserving its authority and dignity (Arnault v.

Nazareno, 87 Phil. 29 [1950]); Amault v. Balagtas, 97 Phil. 358

[1955]), in the same way that courts wield an inherent power to
enforce their authority, preserve their integrity, maintain their
dignity, and ensure the effectiveness of the administration of
justice. (Commissioner v. Cloribel, 127 Phil. 716, 723 [1967]; In
re Kelly 35 Phil. 944 950 [1916], and other cases). The exercise by
Congress of this awesome power was questioned for the first time
in the leading case of Arnault v. Nazareno, (87 Phil. 29 [1950])
where this Court held that the legislative body indeed possessed
the contempt power.
But no person can be punished for contumacy as a witness before
either House, unless his testimony is required in a matter into
which that House has jurisdiction to inquire. (Kilbourn vs.
Thompson, 26, L.ed., 377.)
The principle that Congress or any of its bodies has the power to
punish recalcitrant witnesses is founded upon reason and policy.
Said power must be considered implied or incidental to the
exercise of legislative power. How could a legislative body obtain
the knowledge and information on which to base intended
legislation if it cannot require and compel the disclosure of such
knowledge and information, if it is impotent to punish a defiance
of its power and authority? When the framers of the Constitution
adopted the principle of separation of powers, making each
branch supreme within the real of its respective authority, it must
have intended each departments authority to be full and
complete, independently of the others authority or power. And
how could the authority and power become complete if for every
act of refusal every act of defiance, every act of contumacy
against it, the legislative body must resort to the judicial
department for the appropriate remedy, because it is impotent by
itself to punish or deal therewith, with the affronts committed
against its authority or dignity. . . (Arnault v. Balagtas, L-6749, July
30, 1955; 97 Phil. 358, 370 [1955]).
The aforequoted pronouncements in the two Arnault cases, supra,
broke ground in what was then an unexplored area of
jurisprudence, and succeeded in supplying the raison d etre of
this power of Congress even in the absence of express

constitutional grant. Whether or not the reasons for upholding the

existence of said power in Congress may be applied mutatis
mutandis to a questioned exercise of the power of contempt by
the respondent committee of a city council is the threshold issue
in the present controversy.
3.
The exercise by the legislature of the contempt power is a
matter of self-preservation as that branch of the government
vested with the legislative power, independently of the judicial
branch, asserts its authority and punishes contempts thereof. The
contempt power of the legislature is, therefore, sui generis, and
local legislative bodies cannot correctly claim to possess it for the
same reasons that the national legislature does. The power
attaches not to the discharge of legislative functions per se but to
the character of the legislature as one of the three independent
and coordinate branches of government. The same thing cannot
be said of local legislative bodies which are creations of law.
4.
To begin with, there is no express provision either in the
1973 Constitution or in the Local Government Code (Batas
Pambansa Blg. 337) granting local legislative bodies, the power to
subpoena witnesses and the power to punish non-members for
contempt. Absent a constitutional or legal provision for the
exercise of these powers, the only possible justification for the
issuance of a subpoena and for the punishment of non-members
for contumacious behaviour would be for said power to be
deemed implied in the statutory grant of delegated legislative
power. But, the contempt power and the subpoena power partake
of a judicial nature. They cannot be implied in the grant of
legislative power. Neither can they exist as mere incidents of the
performance of legislative functions. To allow local legislative
bodies or administrative agencies to exercise these powers
without express statutory basis would run afoul of the doctrine of
separation of powers.
These cannot be presumed to exist in favor of the latter and must
be considered as an exception to Sec. 4 of B.P. 337 which provides
for liberal rules of interpretation in favor of local autonomy. Since
the existence of the contempt power in conjunction with the
subpoena power in any government body inevitably poses a
potential derogation of individual rights, i.e. compulsion of

testimony and punishment for refusal to testify, the law cannot be

liberally construed to have impliedly granted such powers to local
legislative bodies. It cannot be lightly presumed that the
sovereign people, the ultimate source of all government powers,
have reposed these powers in all government agencies. The
intention of the sovereign people, through their representatives in
the legislature, to share these unique and awesome powers with
the local legislative bodies must therefore clearly appear in
pertinent legislation.
There being no provision in the Local Government Code explicitly
granting local legislative bodies, the power to issue compulsory
process and the power to punish for contempt, the Sanggunian
Panlungsod of Dumaguete is devoid of power to punish the
petitioners Torres and Umbac for contempt. The Ad-Hoc
Committee of said legislative body has even less basis to claim
that it can exercise these powers.
11.
Sections 22. The heads of departments may upon their
own initiative, with the consent of the President, or upon the
request of either House, as the Rules of each House shall provide,
appear before and be heard by such House on any matter
pertaining to their departments. Written questions shall be
submitted to the President of the Senate or the Speaker of the HR
at least 3 days before their scheduled appearance. Interpellations
shall not be limited to written questions, but may not cover
matter matters related thereto. When the security of the State or
the public interest so requires and the President so states in
writing, the appearance shall be conducted in executive session.
12.
Section 23 [1] The Congress, by a vote of 2/3 of
both Houses in a joint session assembled, voting
separately, shall have the sole power to declare the
existence of a state of war.
[2] In times of war or other national emergency, the
Congress may, by law, authorize the President, for a
limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may
prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper to
carry out a declared national policy. Unless sooner
withdrawn by a resolution of the Congress, such powers
shall cease upon the next adjournment thereof.

a. Note the limitations and restrictions for the delegation.

b. Note also that it could be withdrawn by mere resolution.
c. What is referred to by the phrase next adjournment?
d. Read:
1) ARANETA VS. DINGLASAN, 84 Phil. 369
the first emergency powers cases
2) RODRIGUEZ VS. GELLA, 92 Phil. 603
the second emergency powers cases.
3) Republic Act No. 6826, Dec.20, 1989 which grants
emergency powers to President Aquino.
13.
Sections 24. All appropriations, revenue or tariff bills, bills
authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local application,
and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of
representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with
amendments.
NOTE: In Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance, the Supreme Court
held that the E-VAT Law is constitutional even if the same was the
VERSION which came from the Senate, not from the House of
Representatives. This is so because the Senate is allowed to
propose amendments to bills which must exclusively originate
from the House of Representatives.
14.
Section 25 [1] The Congress may not increase the
appropriation recommended by the President for the
operation of the government as specified in the budget.
The form, content, and manner of preparation of the
budget shall be prescribed by law.
[2 No provision or enactment shall be embraced in the
general appropriations bill unless it relates specifically to
some particular appropriation therein. Any provision or
enactment shall be limited in its operation to the
appropriation to which it relates.
[3] The procedure in approving appropriations for
the Congress shall strictly follow the procedure for
approving appropriations for other departments and
agencies.

[4] A special appropriations bill shall specify the

purpose for which it is intended, and shall be supported
by funds actually available as certified by the national
treasurer, or to be raised by a corresponding revenue
proposal therein.
[5] No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer
of appropriations; however, the President, the President
of the Senate, the Speaker of the house of
Representatives, the Chief justice of the Supreme Court,
and the heads of the constitutional commissions may, by
law, be authorized to augment any item in the general
appropriations law for their respective offices from
savings in other items of their respective appropriations.
[6] Discretionary funds appropriated for particular
officials shall be disbursed only for the purposes to be
supported by appropriate vouchers and subject to such
guidelines as may be prescribed by law.
[7] If, by the end of any fiscal year, the Congress
shall have failed to pass the general appropriations bill for
the ensuing fiscal year, the general appropriations law for
the preceding year shall be deemed reenacted and shall
remain in force and effect until the general
appropriations bill is passed by the Congress.
Read: DEMETRIA vs. ALBA, 148 SCRA 208
17.
Section 26. [1] Every bill passed by the Congress
shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed
in the title thereof.
[2] No bill shall be passed unless it has passed 3
readings on separate days, and printed copies thereof in
its final form have been distributed to its members 3 days
before its passage, except when the President certifies as
to its necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a
public calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of the
bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the vote
thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter, and the
yeas and nays entered in the Journal.
Read:
1) TIO VS. VIDEOGRAM REGULATORY BOARD, 151 SCRA 208

2) DE LA CRUZ VS. PARAS, 123 SCRA 569

3) INSULAR LUMBER VS. CTA, 104 SCRA 710
4)
LIDASAN VS. COMELEC, 21 SCRA 496
The case questions the law entitled An Act Creating the
Municipality of Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del Sur, but
which includes barrios located in another province Cotabato to
be spared from attack planted upon the constitutional mandate
that No bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more
than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill?
Doubtless, as the statute stands, twelve barrios in two
municipalities in the province of Cotabato are transferred to the
province of Lanao del Sur. This brought about a change in the
boundaries of the two provinces.
Apprised of this development, on September 7, 1967, the Office of
the President, through the Assistant Executive Secretary,
recommended to Comelec that the operation of the statute be
suspended until clarified by correcting legislation.
Comelec, by resolution of September 20, 1967, stood by its own
interpretation, declared that the statute should be implemented
unless declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court.
It may be well to state, right at the outset, that the constitutional
provision contains dual limitations upon legislative power. First.
Congress is to refrain from conglomeration, under one statute, of
heterogeneous subjects. Second. The title of the bill is to be
couched in a language sufficient to notify the legislators and the
public and those concerned of the import of the single subject
thereof.
Of relevance here is the second directive. The subject of the
statute must be expressed in the title of the bill. This
constitutional requirement breathes the spirit of command.
Compliance is imperative, given the fact that the Constitution
does not exact of Congress the obligation to read during its
deliberations the entire text of the bill. In fact, in the case of
House Bill 1247, which became Republic Act 4790, only its title
was read from its introduction to its final approval in the House of

Representatives where the bill, being of local application,

originated.
Of course, the Constitution does not require Congress to employ
in the title of an enactment, language of such precision as to
mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute
details therein. It suffices if the title should serve the purpose of
the constitutional demand that it inform the legislators, the
persons interested in the subject of the bill, and the public, of the
nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law and its
operation. And this, to lead them to inquire into the body of the
bill, study and discuss the same, take appropriate action thereon,
and, thus, prevent surprise or fraud upon the legislators.
The test of the sufficiency of a title is whether or not it is
misleading; and, which technical accuracy is not essential, and
the subject need not be stated in express terms where it is clearly
inferable from the details set forth, a title which is so uncertain
that the average person reading it would not be informed of the
purpose of the enactment or put on inquiry as to its contents, or
which is misleading, either in referring to or indicating one subject
where another or different one is really embraced in the act, or in
omitting any expression or indication of the real subject or scope
of the act, is bad.
In determining sufficiency of particular title its substance rather
than its form should be considered, and the purpose of the
constitutional requirement, of giving notice to all persons
interested, should be kept in mind by the court.
With the foregoing principles at hand, we take a hard look at the
disputed statute. The title An Act Creating the Municipality of
Dianaton, in the Province of Lanao del Sur 8 projects the
impression that solely the province of Lanao del Sur is affected by
the creation of Dianaton. Not the slightest intimation is there that
communities in the adjacent province of Cotabato are
incorporated in this new Lanao del Sur town. The phrase in the
Province of Lanao del Sur, read without subtlety or contortion,
makes the title misleading, deceptive. For, the known fact is that
the legislation has a two-pronged purpose combined in one

statute: (1) it creates the municipality of Dianaton purportedly

from twenty-one barrios in the towns of Butig and Balabagan,
both in the province of Lanao del Sur; and (2) it also dismembers
two municipalities in Cotabato, a province different from Lanao
del Sur.
The baneful effect of the defective title here presented is not so
difficult to perceive. Such title did not inform the members of
Congress as to the full impact of the law; it did not apprise the
people in the towns of Buldon and Parang in Cotabato and in the
province of Cotabato itself that part of their territory is being
taken away from their towns and province and added to the
adjacent Province of Lanao del Sur; it kept the public in the dark
as to what towns and provinces were actually affected by the bill.
These are the pressures which heavily weigh against the
constitutionality of Republic Act 4790.
5) ALALAYAN VS. NAPOCOR, 24 SCRA 172
6)
CORDERO VS. CABATUANDO, 6 SCRA 418
7)
TATAD VS. SECRETARY OF ENERGY, November 5, 1997,
281 SCRA 333
18.
Section 27. [1] Every bill passed by Congress shall,
before it becomes a law, be presented to the President. If
he approves the same, he shall sign it, otherwise, he shall
veto it and return the same with his objections to the
House where it originated, which shall enter the
objections at large in its journal and proceed to reconsider
it. If, after such consideration , 2/3 of all the members of
such House shall agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent,
together with the objections , to the other House by which
it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by 2/3 of
all the members of that House, it shall become a law. In all
such cases, the votes of each house shall be determined
by yeas or nays, and the names of the members voting for
or against shall be entered in its journal. The President
shall communicate his veto of any bill to the House where
it originated within 30 days after the date of receipt
thereof; otherwise, it shall become a law as if he signed it.
[2] The President shall have the power to veto any
particular item or items in an appropriation, revenue or

tariff bill, but the veto shall not affect the item or items to
which he does not object.
1)

Read:

a. BENGZON VS. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, 62 Phil. 912

b. BOLINAO ELECTRONICS VS. VALENCIA, 11 SCRA 486
c. NEPTALI GONZALES VS. MACARAIG, November 19, 1990
Section 55 of the Appropriations Act of 1989 (Section 55 [FY '89]
hereinafter), which was vetoed by the President, reads:
SEC. 55.
Prohibition Against the Restoration or Increase of
Recommended Appropriations Disapproved and /or Reduced by
Congress: No item of appropriation recommended by the
President in the Budget submitted to Congress pursuant to Article
VII, Section 22 of the Constitution which has been disapproved or
reduced in this Act shall be restored or increased by the use of
appropriations authorized for other purposes by augmentation. An
item of appropriation for any purpose recommended by the
President in the Budget shall be deemed to have been
disapproved by Congress if no corresponding appropriation for the
specific purpose is provided in this Act.
We quote below the reason for the Presidential veto:
The provision violates Section 25 (5) of Article VI of the
Constitution. If allowed, this Section would nullify not only
the constitutional and statutory authority of the
President, but also that of the President of the Senate,
the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court, and Heads of Constitutional
Commissions, to augment any item in the general
appropriations law for their respective offices from
savings in other items of their respective appropriation. A
careful review of the legislative action on the budget as
submitted shows that in almost all cases, the budgets of
agencies as recommended by the President, as well as
those of the Senate, the House of Representatives, and
the Constitutional Commissions, have been reduced. An
unwanted consequence of this provision is the inability of

the President, the President of the Senate, Speaker of the

House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court, and the heads of Constitutional
Commissions to augment any item of appropriation of
their respective offices from savings in other items of their
respective appropriations even in cases of calamity or in
the event of urgent need to accelerate the implementation
of essential public services and infrastructure projects.
I am vetoing this provision for the reason that it violates
Section 25 (5) of Article VI of the Constitution in relation
to Sections 44 and 45 of P.D. No. 1177 as amended by R.A.
No. 6670 which authorizes the President to use savings to
augment any item of appropriations in the Executive
Branch of the Government.
The fundamental issue raised is whether or not the veto by the
President of Section 55 of the 1989 Appropriations Bill (Section 55
FY89), and subsequently of its counterpart Section 16 of the
1990 Appropriations Bill (Section 16 FY90), is unconstitutional
and without effect.
The focal issue for resolution is whether or not the President
exceeded the item veto power accorded by the Constitution. Or
differently put, has the President the power to veto provisions of
an Appropriations Bill?
Petitioners contend that Section 55 FY 89) and Section 16
(FY90) are provisions and not items and are, therefore,
outside the scope of the item veto power of the President.
The veto power of the President is expressed in Article VI,
Section 27 of the 1987 Constitution reading, in full, as
follows:
Sec. 27.
(2)
The President shall have the power to veto any particular
item or items in an appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill, but the
veto shall not affect the item or items to which he does not
object.

Paragraph (1) refers to the general veto power of the

President and if exercised would result in the veto of the
entire bill, as a general rule. Paragraph (2) is what is
referred to as the item veto power or the line-veto power.
It allows the exercise of the veto over a particular item or
items in an appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill. As
specified, the President may not veto less than all of an
item of an Appropriations Bill. In other words, the power
given the Executive to disapprove any item or items in an
Appropriations Bill does not grant the authority to veto a
part of an item and to approve the remaining portion of
the same item.
It is to be noted that the counterpart provision in the 1987
Constitution (Article VI, Section 27 [2], supra), is a verbatim
reproduction except for the public official concerned. In other
words, also eliminated has been any reference to the veto of a
provision. The vital question is: should this exclusion be
interpreted to mean as a disallowance of the power to veto a
provision, as petitioners urge?
The terms item and provision in budgetary legislation and
practice are concededly different. An item in a bill refers to the
particulars, the details, the distinct and severable parts . . . of the
bill (Bengzon, supra, at 916). It is an indivisible sum of money
dedicated to a stated purpose (Commonwealth v. Dodson, 11 S.E.,
2d 120, 124, 125, etc., 176 Va. 281). The United States Supreme
Court, in the case of Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice (299 U.S.
410, 414, 57 S.Ct 252, 81 L. Ed., 312) declared that an item of
an appropriation bill obviously means an item which in itself is a
specific appropriation of money, not some general provision of
law, which happens to be put into an appropriation bill.
It is our considered opinion that, notwithstanding the
elimination in Article VI, Section 27 (2) of the 1987
Constitution of any reference to the veto of a provision,
the extent of the Presidents veto power as previously
defined by the 1935 Constitution has not changed. This is
because the eliminated proviso merely pronounces the
basic principle that a distinct and severable part of a bill

may be the subject of a separate veto (Bengzon v.

Secretary of Justice, 62 Phil., 912, 916 (1926); 2 BERNAS,
Joaquin, S.J., The Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines, 1st ed., 154-155, [1988]).
The restrictive interpretation urged by petitioners that the
President may not veto a provision without vetoing the entire bill
not only disregards the basic principle that a distinct and
severable part of a bill may be the subject of a separate veto but
also overlooks the Constitutional mandate that any provision in
the general appropriations bill shall relate specifically to some
particular appropriation therein and that any such provision shall
be limited in its operation to the appropriation to which it relates
(1987 Constitution, Article VI, Section 25 [2]). In other words, in
the true sense of the term, a provision in an Appropriations Bill is
limited in its operation to some particular appropriation to which it
relates, and does not relate to the entire bill.
But even assuming arguendo that provisions are beyond
the executive power to veto, we are of the opinion that
Section 55 (FY 89) and Section 16 (FY 90) are not
provisions in the budgetary sense of the term. Article VI,
Section 25 (2) of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Sec. 25
(2)
No provision or enactment shall be embraced in
the general appropriations bill unless it relates specifically to
some particular appropriation therein. Any such provision or
enactment shall be limited in its operation to the appropriation to
which it relates.
Explicit is the requirement that a provision in the Appropriations
Bill should relate specifically to some particular appropriation
therein. The challenged provisions fall short of this requirement.
Firstly, the vetoed provisions do not relate to any particular or
distinctive appropriation. They apply generally to all items
disapproved or reduced by Congress in the Appropriations Bill.
Secondly, the disapproved or reduced items are nowhere to be
found on the face of the Bill. To discover them, resort will have to
be made to the original recommendations made by the President
and to the source indicated by petitioners themselves, i.e., the

Legislative Budget Research and Monitoring Office (Annex B-1

and B-2, Petition). Thirdly, the vetoed Sections are more of an
expression of Congressional policy in respect of augmentation
from savings rather than a budgetary appropriation.
Consequently, Section 55 (FY 89) and Section 16 (FY 90)
although labelled as provisions, are actually inappropriate
provisions that should be treated as items for the purpose of the
Presidents veto power. (Henry v. Edwards [1977] 346 S Rep. 2d,
157-158).
Just as the President may not use his item-veto to usurp
constitutional powers conferred on the legislature, neither can the
legislature deprive the Governor of the constitutional powers
conferred on him as chief executive officer of the state by
including in a general appropriation bill matters more properly
enacted in separate legislation. The Governors constitutional
power to veto bills of general legislation cannot be abridged by
the careful placement of such measures in a general
appropriation bill, thereby forcing the Governor to choose
between approving unacceptable substantive legislation or
vetoing items of expenditure essential to the operation of
government. The legislature cannot by location ot a bill give it
immunity from executive veto. Nor it circumvent the Governors
veto power over substantive legislation by artfully drafting
general law measures so that they appear to be true conditions or
limitations on an item of appropriation. Otherwise, the legislature
would be permitted to impair the constitutional responsibilities
and functions of a co-equal branch of government in
contravention of the separation of powers doctrine We are no
more willing to allow the legislature to use its appropriation power
to infringe on the Governors constitutional right to veto matters
of substantive legislation than we are to allow the Governor to
encroach on the constitutional powers of the legislature. In order
to avoid this result, we hold that, when the legislature inserts
inappropriate provisions in a general appropriation bill, such
provisions must be treated as items for purposes of the
Governors item veto power over general appropriation bills.
Petitioners maintain, however, that Congress is free to
impose conditions in an Appropriations Bill and where

conditions are attached, the veto power does not carry

with it the power to strike them out, citing Commonwealth
v. Dodson (11 SE 2d 130, supra) and Bolinao Electronics
Corporation v. Valencia (No. L-20740, June 30, 1964, 11
SCRA 486). In other words, their theory is that Section 55
(FY89) and Section 16 (FY90) are such
conditions/restrictions and thus beyond the veto power.
There can be no denying that inherent in the power of
appropriation is the power to specify how money shall be spent;
and that in addition to distinct items of appropriation, the
Legislature may include in Appropriation Bills qualifications,
conditions, limitations or restrictions on expenditure of funds.
Settled also is the rule that the Executive is not allowed to veto a
condition or proviso of an appropriation while allowing the
appropriation itself to stand (Fairfield v. Foster, supra, at 320).
That was also the ruling in Bolinao, supra, which held that the
veto of a condition in an Appropriations Bill which did not include
a veto of the items to which the condition related was deemed
invalid and without effect whatsoever.
The Power of augmentation and The Validity of the Veto
The President promptly vetoed Section 55 (FY89) and Section 16
(FY90) because they nullify the authority of the Chief Executive
and heads of different branches of government to augment any
item in the General Appropriations Law for their respective offices
from savings in other items of their respective appropriations, as
guaranteed by Article VI, Section 25 (5) of the Constitution. Said
provision reads:
Sec. 25.
(5)
No law shall be passed authorizing any
transfer of appropriations; however, the President, the
President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court,
and the heads of Constitutional Commissions may, by law,
be authorized to augment any item in the general
appropriations law for their respective offices from
savings in other items of their respective appropriations.
(Emphasis ours).

If, indeed, the Legislature believed that the exercise

of the veto powers by the Executive were
unconstitutional, the remedy laid down by the
Constitution is crystal clear. A Presidential veto may be
overriden by the votes of two-thirds of members of
Congress (1987 Constitution, Article VI, Section 27[l],
supra). But Congress made no attempt to override the
Presidential veto. Petitioners argument that the veto is
ineffectual so that there is nothing to override (citing
Bolinao) has lost force and effect with the executive veto
having been herein upheld.
b.
BENGZON VS. DRILON, April 15, 1992
In the case at bar, the veto of these specific provisions in the
General Appropriations Act is tantamount to dictating to the
Judiciary how its funds should be utilized, which is clearly
repugnant to fiscal autonomy. The freedom of the Chief Justice to
make adjustments in the utilization of the funds appropriated for
the expenditures of the judiciary, including the use of any savings
from any particular item to cover deficits or shortages in other
items of the Judiciary is withheld. Pursuant to the Constitutional
mandate, the Judiciary must enjoy freedom in the disposition of
the funds allocated to it in the appropriations law. It knows its
priorities just as it is aware of the fiscal restraints. The Chief
Justice must be given a free hand on how to augment
appropriations where augmentation is needed.
Furthermore, in the case of Gonzales v. Macaraig (191 SCRA 452
[1990]), the Court upheld the authority of the President and other
key officials to augment any item or any appropriation from
savings in the interest of expediency and efficiency. The Court
stated that:
There should be no question, therefore, that statutory authority
has, in fact, been granted. And once given, the heads of the
different branches of the Government and those of the
Constitutional Commissions are afforded considerable flexibility in
the use of public funds and resources (Demetria v. Alba, supra).
The doctrine of separation of powers is in no way endangered

because the transfer is made within a department (or branch of

government) and not from one department (branch) to another.
The Constitution, particularly Article VI, Section 25(5) also
provides:
Sec. 25.
(5) No law shall be passed authorizing any
transfer of appropriations; however, the President, the
President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court,
and the heads of Constitutional Commissions may, by law,
be authorized to augment any item in the general
appropriations law for their respective offices from
savings in other items of their respective appropriations.
In the instant case, the vetoed provisions which relate to the use
of savings for augmenting items for the payment of the pension
differentials, among others, are clearly in consonance with the
abovestated pronouncements of the Court. The veto impairs the
power of the Chief Justice to augment other items in the
Judiciarys appropriation, in contravention of the constitutional
provision on fiscal autonomy.
III
Finally, it can not be denied that the retired Justices have a vested
right to the accrued pensions due them pursuant to RA 1797.
The right to a public pension is of statutory origin and statutes
dealing with pensions have been enacted by practically all the
states in the United States (State ex rel. Murray v, Riley, 44 Del
505, 62 A2d 236), and presumably in most countries of the world.
Statutory provisions for the support of Judges or Justices on
retirement are founded on services rendered to the state. Where
a judge has complied with the statutory prerequisite for
retirement with pay, his right to retire and draw salary becomes
vested and may not, thereafter, be revoked or impaired. (Gay v.
Whitehurst, 44 So ad 430)
Thus, in the Philippines, a number of retirement laws have been
enacted, the purpose of which is to entice competent men and

women to enter the government service and to permit them to

retire therefrom with relative security, not only those who have
retained their vigor but, more so, those who have been
incapacitated by illness or accident. (In re: Amount of the Monthly
Pension of Judges and Justices Starting From the Sixth Year of their
Retirement and After the Expiration of the Initial Five-year Period
of Retirement, (190 SCRA 315 [1990]).
As early as 1953, Rep. Act No. 910 was enacted to grant pensions
to retired Justices of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals.
This was amended by RA 1797 which provided for an automatic
adjustment of the pension rates. Through the years, laws were
enacted and jurisprudence expounded to afford retirees better
benefits.
P.D. No. 1438, for one, was promulgated on June 10, 1978
amending RA 910 providing that the lump sum of 5 years gratuity
to which the retired Justices of the Supreme Court and Court of
Appeals were entitled was to be computed on the basis of the
highest monthly aggregate of transportation, living and
representation allowances each Justice was receiving on the date
of his resignation. The Supreme Court in a resolution dated
October 4, 1990, stated that this law on gratuities covers the
monthly pensions of retired Judges and Justices which should
include the highest monthly aggregate of transportation, living
and representation allowances the retiree was receiving on the
date of retirement. (In Re: Amount of the Monthly Pension of
Judges and Justices, supra).
The rationale behind the veto which implies that Justices and
Constitutional officers are unduly favored is, again, a
misimpression.
Immediately, we can state that retired Armed Forces officers and
enlisted men number in the tens of thousands while retired
Justices are so few they can be immediately identified. Justices
retire at age 70 while military men retire at a much younger age
some retired Generals left the military at age 50 or earlier. Yet the
benefits in Rep. Act No. 1797 are made to apply equally to both
groups. Any ideas arising from an alleged violation of the equal

protection clause should first be directed to retirees in the military

or civil service where the reason for the retirement provision is
not based on indubitable and constitutionally sanctioned grounds,
not to a handful of retired Justices whose retirement pensions are
founded on constitutional reasons.
The provisions regarding retirement pensions of justices arise
from the package of protections given by the Constitution to
guarantee and preserve the independence of the Judiciary.
The Constitution expressly vests the power of judicial review in
this Court. Any institution given the power to declare, in proper
cases, that act of both the President and Congress are
unconstitutional needs a high degree of independence in the
exercise of its functions. Our jurisdiction may not be reduced by
Congress. Neither may it be increased without our advice and
concurrence. Justices may not be removed until they reach age 70
except through impeachment. All courts and court personnel are
under the administrative supervision of the Supreme Court. The
President may not appoint any Judge or Justice unless he or she
has been nominated by the Judicial and Bar Council which, in turn,
is under the Supreme Courts supervision. Our salaries may not
be decreased during our continuance in office. We cannot be
designated to any agency performing administrative or quasijudicial functions. We are specifically given fiscal autonomy. The
Judiciary is not only independent of, but also co-equal and
coordinate with the Executive and Legislative Departments.
(Article VIII and section 30, Article VI, Constitution).
Any argument which seeks to remove special privileges given by
law to former Justices of this Court and the ground that there
should be no grant of distinct privileges or preferential
treatment to retired Justices ignores these provisions of the
Constitution and, in effect, asks that these Constitutional
provisions on special protections for the Judiciary be repealed. The
integrity of our entire constitutional system is premised to a large
extent on the independence of the Judiciary. All these provisions
are intended to preserve that independence. So are the laws on
retirement benefits of Justices.

One last point.

The Office of the Solicitor General argues that:
. . . Moreover, by granting these benefits to retired Justices
implies that public funds, raised from taxes on other citizens, will
be paid off to select individuals who are already leading private
lives and have ceased performing public service. Said the United
States Supreme Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Miller: To lay
with one hand the power of the government on the property of
the citizen, and with the other to bestow upon favored
individuals . . . is nonetheless a robbery because it is done under
the forms of law . . . (Law Association V. Topeka, 20 Wall. 655)
(Comment, p. 16)
The above arguments are not only specious, impolite and
offensive; they certainly are unbecoming of an office whose top
officials are supposed to be, under their charter, learned in the
law.
Chief Justice Cesar Bengzon and Chief Justice Querube Makalintal,
Justices J.B.L. Reyes, Cecilia Muoz Palma, Efren Plana, Vicente
Abad Santos, and, in fact, all retired Justices of the Supreme Court
and the Court of Appeals may no longer be in the active service.
Still, the Solicitor General and all lawyers under him who
represent the government before the two courts and whose
predecessors themselves appeared before these retirees, should
show some continuing esteem and good manners toward these
Justices who are now in the evening of their years.
All that the retirees ask is to be given the benefits granted by law.
To characterize them as engaging in robbery is intemperate,
abrasive, and disrespectful more so because the argument is
unfounded.
If the Comment is characteristic of OSG pleadings today, then we
are sorry to state that the then quality of research in that
institution has severely deteriorated.
In the first place, the citation of the case is, wrong. The title is not
LAW Association v. Topeka but Citizens Savings and Loan

Association of Cleveland, Ohio v. Topeka City (20 Wall. 655; 87

U.S. 729; 22 Law. Ed. 455 [1874]. Second, the case involved the
validity of a statute authorizing cities and counties to issue bonds
for the purpose of building bridges, waterpower, and other public
works to aid private railroads improve their services. The law was
declared void on the ground that the right of a municipality to
impose a tax cannot be used for private interests.
The case was decided in 1874. The world has turned over more
than 40,000 times since that ancient period. Public use is now
equated with public interest. Public money may now be used for
slum clearance, low-cost housing, squatter resettlement, urban
and agrarian reform where only private persons are the
immediate beneficiaries. What was robbery in 1874 is now
called social justice. There is nothing about retirement benefits
in the cited case. Obviously, the OSG lawyers cited from an old
textbook or encyclopedia which could not even spell loan
correctly. Good lawyers are expected to go to primary sources and
to use only relevant citations.
The Court has been deluged with letters and petitions by former
colleagues in the Judiciary requesting adjustments in their
pensions just so they would be able to cope with the everyday
living expenses not to mention the high cost of medical bills that
old age entails. As Justice Cruz aptly stated in Teodoro J. Santiago
v. COA, (G.R. No. 92284, July 12, 1991);
Retirement laws should be interpreted liberally in favor of the
retiree because their intention is to provide for his sustenance,
and hopefully even comfort, when he no longer has the stamina
to continue earning his livelihood. After devoting the best years of
his life to the public service, he deserves the appreciation of a
grateful government as best concretely expressed in a generous
retirement gratuity commensurate with the value and length of
his services. That generosity is the least he should expect now
that his work is done and his youth is gone. Even as he feels the
weariness in his bones and glimpses the approach of the
lengthening shadows, he should be able to luxuriate in the
thought that he did his task well, and was rewarded for it.

For as long as these retired Justices are entitled under laws which
continue to be effective, the government can not deprive them of
their vested right to the payment of their pensions.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The questioned
veto is SET ASIDE as illegal and unconstitutional. The vetoed
provisions of the 1992 Appropriations Act are declared valid and
subsisting. The respondents are ordered to automatically and
regularly release pursuant to the grant of fiscal autonomy the
funds appropriated for the subject pensions as well as the other
appropriations for the Judiciary. The resolution in Administrative
Matter No. 91-8-225-CA dated November 28, 1991 is likewise
ordered to be implemented as promulgated.
2) What is a pocket veto?
3) What are the three ways by which a bill becomes a law?
3.
PHILCONSA VS. ENRIQUEZ, 235 SCRA 506
What is the so-called executive impoundment?
It means that although an item of appropriation is not vetoed by
the President, he however refuses for whatever reason, to spend
funds made possible by Congress. It is the failure to spend or
obligate budget authority of any type. Proponents of
impoundment have invoked at least three (3) principal sources of
authority of the President. [1] authority to impound given to him
by Congress, either expressly or impliedly; [2] the executive
power drawn from his power as Commander-in-chief; and [3] the
Faithful execution clause of the Constitution.
Note that in this case the SC held that the Countryside
Development Fund (CDF) of Congressmen and Senators is
CONSTITUTIONAL because the same is set aside for
infrastructure, purchase of ambulances and computers and other
priority projects and activities, and credit facilities to qualified
beneficiaries as proposed and identified by said Senators and
Congressmen.

19.
Section 28. [1] The rule of taxation shall be
uniform and equitable. The Congress shall evolve a
progressive system of taxation.
[2] The Congress, may by law, authorize the
President to fix within specified limits, and subject to such
limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates,
import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues,
and other duties or imposts within the framework of the
national development program of the government.
[3] Charitable institutions, churches and parsonages
or convents appurtenant thereto, mosques, non-profit
cemeteries, and all lands, buildings, and improvements,
actually, directly, and exclusively used for religious,
charitable, or educational purposes shall be exempt from
taxation.
[4] No law granting any tax exemption shall be
passed without the concurrence of a majority of all the
members of the Congress.
Section 29. (1) No money shall be paid out of the treasury
except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.
No public money or property shall be appropriated, applied, paid
or employeddirectly or indirectly for the benefit, use, or support
of any sect, denomination, or system of religionexcept when
such preacher, priest is assigned to the AFP, or to any penal
institution, or government orphanage or leprosarium.
All money collected on any tax for a special purpose shall be
treated as a special fund and paid out for such purpose only. If the
purpose for which a special fund was created has been fulfilled or
abandoned, the balance, if any, shall be transferred to the general
funds of the Government.
Read:
1. Garcia vs. Executive Sec., 211 SCRA 219
1-a) PEPSI COLA VS. THE CITY OF BUTUAN, 24 SCRA 789
2) PROVINCE OF ABRA VS. HERNANDO, 107 SCRA 104
3) APOSTOLIC PREFECT OF BAGUIO VS. TREASURER, 71 Phil.
547

4) PASCUAL VS. SECRETARY OF PUBLIC WORKS, 110 Phil. 331

4)

AGLIPAY VS. RUIZ, 64 Phil. 201

5)
1987

MANUEL ALBA VS. PEREZ, G.R. No. 65917, Sept. 24,

Respondent Dr. Francisco A. Perez was named outstanding Health

Worker for 1980 by the Ministry of Health on January 22, 1981.
Being such an awardee, Dr. Perez was granted by the Ministry of
Health a two-step salary increase in accordance with the merit
increase program as enunciated in Letter of Instructions (LOI) No.
562. Thereafter, the Ministry of Health requested the
Sangguniang Panglunsod of San Pablo City, which is paying Dr.
Perez salary in full to appropriate the amount corresponding to
the merit increase in its current budget. For lack of legal basis, the
Bureau of Local Government opposed the proposed merit increase
because the provisions of LOI No. 562 apply only to
officials/employees in the national government, and
consequently, awardee Dr. Perez was not entitled thereto, since
he is an employee of the local government as provided for in the
charter of San Pablo City. This prompted Dr. Perez to request the
Ministry of Health to make the corresponding allocation to issue a
notice of salary adjustment effective January 1, 1981. The
Minister of Justice, upon a query made by the Ministry of Health,
in his Opinion No. 177, Series of 1981, dated November 20, 1981,
acknowledged that the merit increase program applies only to the
officials/employees of the national government but declared Dr.
Perez as one such official or employee and concluded that the
Ministry of Health should pay the merit increase to him. Relying
on such opinion, the Ministry of Health issued to respondent Dr.
Perez on December 1, 1981 a notice of salary adjustment which
release of the amount was denied by the Office of the Budget and
Management which insisted that the awardee is an employee of
the local or city government who is not covered by the merit
increase program. Dr. Perez made his appeal therefrom to the
Ministry of Health who forwarded it, recommending favorable
action thereon to the Office of the President of the Philippines.
The latter referred the appeal to the Minister of the Budget who
affirmed his earlier decision of disallowing the merit increase and

reiterating the same reasons. A petition for mandamus to compel

the Office of the Budget and Management to pay the merit
increase was filed by Dr. Perez before the lower court which
granted the aforementioned favorable decision, subject matter of
the present petition for review on certiorari before Us by
petitioners arguing that:
1.
The position of private respondent as the City Health Officer
of San Pablo City is embraced in Sec. 7 of Pres. Decree (P.D.) No.
1136 which states among other things that the salary plan
provided for in Sec. 8 of the same decree shall cover the City
Officer, among other officials, whose salary shall be paid out of
city funds and therefore a local government employee whose
position does not appear in the list of national government
employees defined under another law (P.D. 985).
2.
The constitution provides that no money shag be paid out
of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by
law. Since there is no such appropriation, the Minister of the
Budget cannot be compelled to release the amount for the
payment of the merit salary increase because such allocation
entails the exercise of judgment and discretion of the Minister of
the Budget which cannot be controlled by mandamus.
3.
The decision declaring respondent Dr. Perez as an
employee of the national government would have far reaching
effects such that all other city health officers and local officials
similarly situated would also be so entitled to an personal benefits
given to national employee. Dr. Perezs exemplary
accomplishment which merited for him the grant to a two-step
increase must yield to the overriding economic consideration of
availability of funds which the government must set aside for the
purpose.
We do not agree with the arguments set down by petitioners.
Private respondent invites Our attention to the City Charter of San
Pablo City (CA #5201, Sec. 87, May 7, 1940) more specifically,
Art. IV thereof, which provides that the position of a City Health
Officer is not included among the heads of the regular
departments of the city but included among the national officials

performing municipal functions under the direct control of the

Health Minister and not the city mayor as provided for in Art. XIV
of the same charter. Such principle is reiterated in the
Decentralization Act of 1967 which shows that the appointing
authority is the Health Minister and not the local officials.
Petitioner Minister of the Budget admitted thru the testimony of
its representative, Alice S. Torres, chief of the Compensation and
Position Classification and a specialist thereon that the City Health
Officer is under the administrative and technical supervision of
the Ministry of Health (p. 69, tsn, June 16, 1983, p. 72, Rollo). Be it
noted that, Section 7 of PD 1136 relied upon by petitioners
provides that the basic salary of the City Health Officer is paid
from city funds. However, the last paragraph of the same Sec. 7,
excludes the city health officer from the classification of local
government official as can be gathered from the phrase
except those occupied by (a) officials whose compensation is
fixed in the constitution, Presidential Decrees and other laws and
(b) officials and employees who are under the direct supervision
and control of the National Government or its agencies and who
are paid wholly or partially from national funds.
Provincial and city health officers are all considered national
government officials irrespective of the source of funds of their
salary because the preservation of health is a national service.
Also their positions are partially funded by the national
government. Some are receiving one-half of their salary from the
national funds and the other one-half from local funds.
We cannot likewise ignore the opinions of the Ministry of Justice
cited by private respondent to wit: 1) Opinion No. 26, Series of
1976 which categorically rules that Officials and employees of
provincial and city health offices render service as officials and
employees of the Bureau of Health (Ministry of Health) and they
are for that reason not local but national officials under the direct
supervision and control of the Ministry of Health; 2) Opinion No.
177, Series of 1981, which is specific and definitive that the
private respondent is a national government employee and the
Ministry of Health should pay the merit increase awarded to him.
In this 1981 opinion, it was explained in detail how the said funds
corresponding to his merit increase could be legally disbursed

contrary to the unfounded speculations expressed by the

petitioners.
Lastly, there is no basis in petitioners allegations that they
cannot be compelled by mandamus as the appropriation is not
authorized by law and it is discretionary on the part of the
Ministry of the Budget whether or not to allocate. Respondent Dr.
Perez has been proven to be a national government official, hence
covered by the merit promotion plan of the government more
particularly the Health Ministry wherein private respondent is its
lone beneficiary for the year 1980 in Region IV. It thus becomes
the ministerial duty of the Budget Minister to approve the request
for allotment. Having failed to do so, he could be compelled by
mandamus.
20.
Section 30. No law shall be passed increasing the
appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as provided in
the Constitution without its advice and concurrence.
TERESITA FABIAN VS. HONORABLE ANIANO DESIERTO, G.R.
No. 129742, September 16, 1998)
Regalado, J.
Section 27 of RA 6770 or the Ombudsman Act of 1989 provides:
In all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives or
decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to the
Supreme Court by filing a petition for Certiorari within 10 days
from receipt of the written notice of the order, directive or
decision or denial of the Motion for Reconsideration in accordance
with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
Issue:
Is Section 27 of RA 6770 constitutional?
Held:
Section 27 of RA 6770 is unconstitutional since it increases the
appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court without its advice and
consent as provided under Section 30, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution. As explained in FIRST LEPANTO CERAMICS INC. VS.
CA, 237 SCRA 519, the aforesaid constitutional provision was
intended to give the Supreme Court a measure of control over

cases placed under its appellate jurisdiction. Otherwise, the

enactment of legislation enlarging its appellate jurisdiction would
unnecessarily burden the Court.
Appeal of cases decided by the Office of the Ombudsman covered
by Section 27 of RA 6770 shall be filed with the Court of Appeals.
Read:
1987

MANUEL ALBA VS. PEREZ, G.R. No. 65917, Sept. 24,

21.
Sections 32. The Congress, shall, as early as possible,
provide for a system of initiative and referendum, and the
exceptions therefrom, whereby the people can directly propose
and enact laws or approve or reject any law or part thereof
passed by the Congress or local legislative body after the
registration of a petition therefore signed by at least 10% of the
total number of registered voters, of which every legislative
district must be represented by at least 3% of the registered
voters thereof.
Read again RA 6735 & SANTIAGO VS. COMELEC & PIRMA
Reference:
Political Law Reviewer by Atty. Larry D. Gacayan
College of Law, University of the Cordilleras
Baguio City
* Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers who
elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority.
[1]
Annex B, id. at 52.
[2]
Annex C, id. at 53.
[3]
Francisco v. House of Representatives, G.R. No. 160261,
November 10, 2003, 415 SCRA 44, 133.
[4]
G.R. No. 67752, April 10, 1989, 171 SCRA 657.
[5]
G.R. No. 78716, September 22, 1987 (res).
[6]
Rollo (G.R. No. 169777), p. 117.
[7]
Supra note 39 at 136.
[8]
87 Phil. 29 (1950).
[9]
Supra at 45, citing McGrain v. Daugherty 273 US 135, 47 S.
Ct. 319, 71 L.Ed. 580, 50 A.L.R. 1 (1927).
[10] Id. at 46.
[11] G.R. 89914, Nov. 20, 1991, 203 SCRA 767.

[12] Supra.
[13] Supra note 82 at 189.
[14] G.R. No. 74930, February 13, 1989, 170 SCRA 256.
[15][6]
Transcript of the September 26, 2007 Hearing of the
respondent Committees, pp.91-92.
[16][7]
Id., pp. 114-115.
[17][8]
Id., pp. 276-277.
[18][9]
See Letter dated January 30, 2008.
[19][10] 488 SCRA 1 (2006).
[20][11] 345 U.S. 1 (1953).
[21][12]
Section 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions.
In addition to acts and omissions of public officials and employees
now prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws, the following
shall constitute prohibited acts and transactions of any public
official and employee and are hereby declared to be unlawful: x x
x
(c) Disclosure and/or misuse of confidential information. Public officials and employees shall not use or divulge,
confidential or classified information officially known to them by
reason of their office and not made available to the public, either:
(1) To further their private interests, or give undue advantage to
anyone; or
(2) To prejudice the public interest.
[22][13] SEC. 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged
communication. The following persons cannot testify as to
matters learned in confidence in the following cases. (e) A public
officer cannot be examined during his term of office or afterwards,
as to communications made to him in official confidence, when
the court finds that the public interest would suffer by disclosure.
[23][18]
Supra.
[24][19]
Ibid.
[25][20]
Ibid.
[26][21]
Arnault v. Nazareno, 87 Phil 32 (1950)
[27][22]
Senate v. Ermita, p. 58.
[28][23] 5 U.S. C. 552
[29][24]
51 U.S. C. app.
[30][25] 433 Phil. 506 (2002).

[31][26]
G.R. No. 130716, December 9, 1998, (360 SCRA
132 ).
[32][27] Supra.
[33][28]
CRS Report for Congress, Presidential Claims of
Executive Privilege: History, Law, Practice and Recent
Developments at p. 2.
[34][29]
418 U.S. 683.
[35][30] In Re: Sealed Case No. 96-3124, June 17, 1997.
[36][31]
Id.
[37][32]
CRS Report for Congress, Presidential Claims of
Executive Privilege: History, Law, Practice and Recent
Developments at pp. 18-19.
[38][38] 360 Phil. 133 (1998).
[39][39]
Supra.
[40][40]
Section 18, Article VII.
[41][41]
Section 16, Article VII.
[42][42]
Section 19, Article VII.
[43][43]
Section 20 and 21, Article VII.
[44][44] CRS Report for Congress, Presidential Claims of
Executive Privilege: History, Law Practice and Recent
Developments, supra..
[45][45] Bernas, S.J., The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of
the Philippines, A Commentary, 2003 Ed. p. 903.
[46][46] 159 U.S. App. DC. 58, 487 F. 2d 700 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
[47][47] U.S. v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974)
[48][48]
Supra.
[49][50] Citing Section 7, Article 3 of the Constitution.
[50][51] Section 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. In
addition to acts and omissions of public officials and employees
now prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws, the following
shall constitute prohibited acts and transactions of any public
official and employee and are hereby declared to be unlawful: x x
x
( c) Disclosure and/or misuse of confidential
information. Public officials and employees shall not use
or divulge, confidential or classified information officially
known to them by reason of their office and not made
available to the public, either:

(1) To further their private interests, or give undue

advantage to anyone; or
(2) To prejudice the public interest.
[51][52] Article 229. Revelation of secrets by an officer.
Any public officer who shall reveal any secret known to him by
reason of his official capacity, or shall wrongfully deliver papers or
copies of papers of which he may have charge and which should
not be published, shall suffer the penalties of prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods, perpetual
special disqualification and a fine not exceeding 2,000 pesos if
the revelation of such secrets or the delivery of such papers shall
have caused serious damage to the public interest; otherwise, the
penalties of prision correccional in its minimum period, temporary
special disqualification and a fine not exceeding 500 pesos shall
be imposed.
[52][53] Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers.
In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already
penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt
practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be
unlawful:
(k) Divulging valuable information of a confidential character,
acquired by his office or by him on account of his official position
to unauthorized persons, or releasing such information in advance
of its authorized release date.
[53][54]
Sec. 24. Disqualification by reason of
privileged communications. The following persons cannot
testify as to matters learned in confidence in the following case: x
xx
(a) A public officer cannot be examined during his term of office
or afterwards, as to communications made to him in official
confidence, when the court finds that the public interest would
suffer by the disclosure.
[54][55] In Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, supra., the
Supreme Court recognized matters which the Court has long
considered as confidential such as information on military and
diplomatic secrets, information affecting national security, and
information on investigations of crimes by law enforcement
agencies before the prosecution of the accused. It also stated
that presidential conversations, correspondences, or discussions

during close-door cabinet meetings which, like internal

deliberations of the Supreme Court or other collegiate courts, or
executive sessions of either House of Congress, are recognized as
confidential. Such information cannot be pried-open by a coequal branch of government.