Hasegawa v.

Kitamura (2007)
Petitioner: KAZUHIRO HASEGAWA and NIPPON ENGINEERING
CONSULTANTS CO., LTD.,
Respondent: MINORU KITAMURA
Ponencia: NACHURA, J.
DOCTRINE: Jurisdiction over the subject matter in a judicial proceeding is
conferred by the sovereign authority which establishes and organizes the
court. It is given only by law and in the manner prescribed by law. It is further
determined by the allegations of the complaint irrespective of whether the
plaintiff is entitled to all or some of the claims asserted therein.
FACTS:
1. Petitioner Nippon Engineering Consultants Co., Ltd. (Nippon), a
Japanese consultancy firm, entered into an Independent Contractor
Agreement (ICA) with respondent Kitamura, a Japanese national
residing in the Philippines. The agreement provides that respondent
was to extend professional services to Nippon for a year starting
on April 1, 1999.
2. Nippon then assigned respondent to work as the project manager of
the Southern Tagalog Access Road (STAR) Project in
the Philippines.
3. When the STAR Project was near completion, the DPWH engaged
the consultancy services of Nippon for supervision of the BongabonBaler Road Improvement project (BBRI) to which Kitamura was
named as project manager.
4. Hasegawa, Nippons GM for its international division, informed
Kitamura that the company had no plans of renewing the latters ICA
hence his services will only be until the substantial completion of the
STAR project.
5. Respondent, through his lawyer, requested a negotiation conference
and demanded that he be assigned to the BBRI project.
a. Nippon insisted that respondents contract was for a fixed
term that had already expired, and refused to negotiate for
the renewal of the ICA.
6. Respondent consequently initiated Civil Case No. 00-0264 for
specific performance and damages with
the Regional Trial Court of Lipa City.
7. Nippon contended that the RTC lacked jurisdiction because the ICA
was perfected in Japan and executed by and between Japanese
nationals hence it moved to dismiss the complaint.
8. RTC denied the motion to dismiss and motion for reconsideration
hence Nippon filed two petitions for certiorari before the CA. The first
was dismissed due to lack of statement of material dates and for
insufficient verification and certification against forum shopping.

Nippon however filed the second petition within the reglementary

period fixing the defects and with the same issues.
9. CA eventually affirmed the ruling of the RTC.
ISSUES:
1. WON the dismissal of the first petition for certiorari before the CA
barred the filing of a second petition of the same nature.
2. WON Hasegawa was authorized to verify and certify the petition for
certiorari filed before the CA.
3. Whether the subject matter jurisdiction of Philippine courts in civil
cases for specific performance and damages involving contracts
executed outside the country by foreign nationals may be assailed
on the principles of lex loci celebrationis, lex contractus, the state of
the most significant relationship rule, or forum non conveniens.
PROVISION:
RULING + RATIO:
1. No
When the CA dismissed the first petition for certiorari, it was
a dismissal without prejudice.
The dismissal being without prejudice, petitioners can re-file
the petition, or file a second petition attaching thereto the
appropriate verification and certificationas they, in fact
didand stating therein the material dates, within the
prescribed period in Section 4, Rule 65 of the said Rules.
Because the said dismissal is without prejudice and has
no res judicata effect, and even if petitioners still indicated in
the verification and certification of the
second certiorari petition that the first had already been
dismissed on procedural grounds, petitioners are no longer
required by the Rules to indicate in their certification of nonforum shopping in the instant petition for review of the
second certiorari petition, the status of the aforesaid first
petition before the CA.
2. No
Respondent contends that Hasegawa, Nippons GM, was
only authorized to verify and certify the first petition for
certiorari and not the instant petition.
The court affirmed such fact however the Court has liberally
applied the rules. Given that petitioners herein sufficiently
explained their misgivings on this point and appended to
their Reply an updated Authorization for Hasegawa to act on
behalf of the company in the instant petition, the Court finds
the same as sufficient compliance with the Rules.
However, Hasegawa was truly not authorized to verify and
certify the petition because the authorizations for both

petitions were issued only by Nippon's president and chief

executive officer, not by the company's board of directors.
We have ruled that corporate powers are exercised by the
board of directors; thus, no person, not even its officers, can
bind the corporation, in the absence of authority from the
board.

3. No

Asserting that the RTC of Lipa City is an inconvenient forum,

petitioners question its jurisdiction to hear and resolve the
civil case for specific performance and damages filed by the
respondent. Thus, petitioners posit that local courts have no
substantial relationship to the parties following the [state of
the] most significant relationship rule in Private International
Law.
To elucidate, in the judicial resolution of conflicts problems,
three consecutive phases are involved: jurisdiction, choice
of law, and recognition and enforcement of judgments.
Analytically, jurisdiction and choice of law are two distinct
concepts. Jurisdiction considers whether it is fair to cause a
defendant to travel to this state; choice of law asks the
further question whether the application of a substantive law
which will determine the merits of the case is fair to both
parties.
In this case, only the first phase is at issuejurisdiction,
particularly jurisdiction over the subject matter.
Jurisdiction over the subject matter in a judicial proceeding is
conferred by the sovereign authority which establishes and
organizes the court. It is given only by law and in the manner
prescribed by law. It is further determined by the allegations
of the complaint irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled
to all or some of the claims asserted therein. To succeed in
its motion for the dismissal of an action for lack of jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the claim, the movant must show
that the court or tribunal cannot act on the matter submitted
to it because no law grants it the power to adjudicate the
claims.
What the petitioners raise as grounds to question subject
matter jurisdiction are the principles of lex loci
celebrationis and lex contractus, and the state of the most
significant relationship rule.
i. Lex loci celebrationis law of the place of ceremony
or law of the place where the contract is made
ii. Lex contractus law of the place where a contract is
to be executed or performed.

iii. State of the most significant relationship rule to

ascertain which state law to apply, the court should
determine which state has the most substantial
connection to the occurrence and the parties
Since these three principles in conflict of laws make
reference to the law applicable to a dispute, they are rules
proper for the second phase, the choice of law.
Necessarily, as the only issue in this case is that of
jurisdiction, choice-of-law rules are not only inapplicable but
also not yet called for.
Furthermore, the invocation of the choice of law rules was
premature because the petitioners failed to point out any
laws in conflict between Japanese laws and ours. Also, the
laws in Japan were not pleaded and proved.

DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review

on certiorari is DENIED.

Digest Author: Bugsy

Petitioner: Venancio Figueroa y Cervantes

Respondent: People of the Philippines
Ponencia: Nachura, J.

DOCTRINE: The lack of jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any stage of

the proceedings, even on appeal.

FACTS:
10. An information for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide was
filed against FIGUEROA before the RTC of Bulacan.
11. The trial court convicted FIGUEROA as charged.
12. An appeal was filed before the CA questioning, among others, for the
first time, the trial court's jurisdiction
13. The CA considered FIGUEROA to have actively participated in the
trial and to have belatedly attacked the jurisdiction of the RTC; thus,
he was already estopped by laches.
14. Dissatisfied, FIGUEROA filed the instant petition for review on
certiorari.

ISSUES:
WON the RTC has jurisdiction over the case
WON raising the issue of jurisdiction may be barred by laches
PROVISION:
RULING + RATIO:
NO
As the imposable penalty for the crime charged herein is prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods or imprisonment for
2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 6 years, jurisdiction to hear and try
the same is conferred on the Municipal Trial Courts, not the RTC.
NO

GENERAL RULE: The lack of jurisdiction of a court may be raised at

any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal.
o Jurisdiction is conferred by law, and does not depend
upon the will of the parties. The lack of it affects the very
authority to take cognizance of and to render judgment on
the action.
SIBONGHANOY RULING (Exception): Lack of jurisdiction having
been raised for the first time in a motion to dismiss filed almost 15
years after the questioned ruling has been rendered, such a plea
may no longer be raised for being barred by laches.

Therefore, estoppel by laches may be invoked to bar the

issue of lack of jurisdiction only in cases in which the
factual milieu is analogous to Tijam v. Sibonghanoy
The Court frowns upon the undesirable practice of a party
participating in the proceedings and submitting his case for decision
and then accepting judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it for
lack of jurisdiction, when adverse.
Delay alone, though unreasonable, will not sustain the defense of
"estoppel by laches" unless it further appears that the party, knowing
his rights, has not sought to enforce them until the condition of the
party pleading laches has in good faith become so changed that he
cannot be restored to his former state, if the rights be then enforced,
due to loss of evidence, change of title, intervention of equities, and
other causes
In the case at hand, petitioner is in no way estopped by laches in
assailing the jurisdiction of the RTC, considering that he raised the
lack thereof in his appeal before the CA. Also, that no considerable
period had yet elapsed for laches to attach.
o

FIGUEROA v. PEOPLE (2008)

DISPOSITION: GRANTED. Criminal case is hereby dismissed without

prejudice.

Ruby Shelter Builders and Realty Development

Corporation v. Formaran III (2009)
Petitioner: Ruby Shelter Builders and Realty Development Corporation
Respondent: Hon. Pablo C. Formaran, Romeo Y. Tan, Roberto L. Obiedo
and Atty. Tomas A. Reyes
Ponencia: CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
DOCTRINE: The court acquires jurisdiction only upon the payment of the
prescribed docket fee. Hence, payment of docket fees is not only mandatory,
but also jurisdictional.
The determination of whether an action is not capable of pecuniary
estimation must be done on a case-to-case basis, depending on the facts
and circumstances of each.
FACTS:
15. Petitioner obtained a loan from respondents Tan and Obiedo
secured by REM over 5 parcels of land.
16. Petitioner was unable to pay the loan.
17. Both parties entered into a Memorandum of Agreement (MoA),
pursuant to which petitioner executed Deeds of Sale over the
mortgaged parcels of land in favor of said respondents (dacion en
pago arrangement).
a. The MoA also provided petitioner a right to redeem the
properties.
b. Failure, however, to redeem the properties over the period
stipulated would entitle respondents to have the properties
registered in the Registry of Deeds for the issuance of TCTs
under their name.
c. The Deeds of Sale were notarized by Atty. Reyes on the
same day of execution.
18. Petitioner failed to redeem the properties and as consequence,
respondents had the parcels of land registered under their name and
new TCTs issued.
19. Petitioner filed before the RTC against respondents Tan, Obiedo and
Atty. Reyes for declaration of nullity of deeds of sale and for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and TRO.
20. Petitioner paid docket fees based on the fact that the action was one
incapable of pecuniary estimation.
21. Respondents contend that petitioner failed to pay the correct docket
fees since the action was actually a real action (docket fees should
be based on value of the property involved)
ISSUES:
4. Whether or not petitioner paid the correct amount as docket fee.
PROVISION:

RULING + RATIO:
4. No
Premise: The court acquires jurisdiction only upon the
payment of the prescribed docket fee. Hence, payment of
docket fees is not only mandatory, but also jurisdictional.
To resolve the issue, it is necessary to determine the true
nature of the Complaint.
i. The nature of an action is determined by the
allegations in the body of the pleading or
Complaint itself, rather than by tis title or
heading.
ii. HOWEVER, the Court finds it necessary, in
ascertaining the true nature of the case, to take
into account facts and circumstances beyond
the Complaint which petitioner failed to disclose.
Petitioner failed to disclose that the property was already in
the name of the respondents and that the latter were already
in possession of the property.
Hence, the true nature of the action is a real action involving
the recovery of the ownership and possession of the
property.
i. The docket fee should therefore be based on the
value of the property and not on a fixed rate
prescribed for actions incapable of pecuniary
estimation.
Case-to-case basis determination: The determination of
whether an action is not capable of pecuniary estimation
must be done on a case-to-case basis, depending on the
facts and circumstances of each. (p. 160 of Riano)
DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review
is DENIED.

In this case, the Information failed to allege that the City

of Manila was the place where the articles were printed
and first published, or that petitioner was a resident of
Manila at the time of publication.
i. The fact that Smart file was in general circulation in
Manila does not necessarily establish that it was
publish and first printed in Manila.

Illustration: Granting this petition would allow a resident of

Aparri to file a criminal case for libel against a reporter or
editor in Jolo, simply because Inquirer or Phil. Star are in
general circulation in Jolo. Such a consequence is what the
law seeks to avoid.

Chavez v. CA (2007)
Petitioner: Francisco Chavez and People of the Philippines
Respondent: Court of Appeals, Rafael Baskias, Ricardo Manapat
Ponencia: Tinga, J.
DOCTRINE: Since the place of printing and first publication or the place of
residence at the time are matters dealing with the fundamental issue of the
courts jurisdiction, Article 360 of the RPC mandates that either one of these
statements must be alleged in the information itself. The absence of both
from the very face of the information renders the latter fatally defective.
FACTS:
22. An Information for libel was filed before the RTC of Manila against
respondents Baskias (editor-in-chief) and Manapat (author), with
petitioner Chavez as complainant.
23. The Information stated that the libelous articles were caused to be
published in Smart File, a magazine of general circulation in Manila
24. The RTC denied respondents motion to quash the information. The
CA granted it.
25. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
5. WON the Information sufficiently vest jurisdiction in the RTC of
Manila
PROVISION:
RULING + RATIO:
5. NO
Art.360 of the RPC provides for the rules on venue for libel
cases:
i. The criminal and civil action for libel shall be filed
with the court of the province or city where the
libelous article is printed and first published, or
where any of the offended parties actually resides at
the time of the commission of the offense.

If the Information for libel does not establish with

particularity any of these two venue requirements, the
trial court would have no jurisdiction to hear the criminal
case.
i. Note that jurisdiction of a court over a criminal case
is determined by the allegations in the complaint or
information.

DISPOSITION: Petition DENIED.

Springfield Development v. RTC Judge

Petition: Petition for Review on Certiorari
Petitioners: Springfield Development Corp and Heirs of Petra
Capistrano Piit
Respondents: Judgeof RTC Misamis Oriental, Cagayan de Oro,
DARAB, DAR Region X Director, et. al.
Ponente: Austria-Martinez, J.

DOCTRINE: Given that DARAB decisions are appealable to the CA,

the inevitable conclusion is that the DARAB is a co-equal body with
the RTC and its decisions are beyond the RTC's control.
FACTS:
1. Petra Piit previously owned a land in Cagayan de Oro, part
thereof was acquired by Springfield Dev. and developed it into
a subdivision.
2. In 1990, the Department of Agrarian Reform issued a Notice of
Coverage declaring such property under the coverage of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL).
3. The heirs of Piit opposed. The Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board took cognizance of the case.
4. In its decision, DARAB, through the Provincial Adjudicator,
declared the property as a residential land and not suitable for
agriculture.
5. The DAR Regional Director appealed but the Provincial
Adjudicator disallowed such appeal for being frivolous. The
decision became final and executory.
6. The DAR Regional Director then filed a petition for relief from
judgment of the DARAB decision. DARAB then granted the
petition and upheld the Notice of Coverage. It also ordered the
heirs of Piit and Springfield to pay the farmer-beneficiaries P12
Million.

7. Springfield and the heirs of Piit then filed with the RTC a
petition to annul such DARAB decision. The farmerbeneficiaries opposed claiming that the case should be
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction of the RTC.
8. RTC dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction arguing that the
action for annulment was actually an action for certiorari in a
different color. Thus, it does not have jurisdiction over the
case. Petitioners then filed an action for certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus with the CA claiming that RTC exercised
grave abuse of discretion. CA dismissed the case stating that
RTC was correct.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over
DARAB decisions.
2. Whether or not the Supreme Court may pass upon the validity
of the DARAB decision.
PROVISION:
1997 Rules of Procedure
RULE 43 Appeals from the Court of Tax Appeals and Quasi-Judicial
Agencies to the Court of Appeals
Section 1. Scope. - This Rule shall apply to appeals from judgments
or final orders of the Court of Tax Appeals and from awards,
judgments, final orders or resolutions of or authorized by any quasijudicial agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions. Among
these agencies are the Department of Agrarian Reform and
voluntary arbitrators authorized by law.
RATIO + RULING:
1. No. RTC does not have jurisdiction over DARAB decisions
as they are co-equal bodies.
The rule is that where legislation provides for an appeal from
decisions of certain administrative bodies to the CA, it means that
such bodies are co-equal with the RTC, in terms of rank and stature,
and logically, beyond the control of the latter.

Given that DARAB decisions are appealable to the CA, the inevitable
conclusion is that the DARAB is a co-equal body with the RTC and its
decisions are beyond the RTC's control.
2. No. The Supreme Court is not a trier of facts.
As it is not a trier of facts, the Court cannot entertain cases involving
factual issues. The question of whether the DARAB Decision is null
and void and enforceable against petitioners for having been rendered
without affording petitioners due process is a factual question which
requires a review of the records of this case for it to be judiciously
resolved.

STA. ANA v. CARPO (2008)

Petitioner: OTILIA STA. ANA
Respondent: SPOUSES LEON G. CARPO and AURORA CARPO
Ponencia: NACHURA, J.
Petition: Review on Certiorari
DOCTRINE: (Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction)
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction precludes the courts from resolving a
controversy over which jurisdiction has initially been lodged in an
administrative body of special competence.
Agrarian disputes, as defined by law and settled in jurisprudence, are within
the primary and exclusive original jurisdiction of the PARAD and the
DARAB, while issues of retention and non-coverage of a land under
agrarian reform, among others, are within the domain of the DAR
Secretary.
FACTS:
26. Respondent Leon Carpo (Leon) and his brother Francisco G. Carpo
are the registered co-owners of a parcel of land designated as Lot
No. 2175 of the Santa Rosa Estate Subdivision, situated at Sta.
Rosa, Laguna
27. 3.5 hectares of the land was tenanted by petitioner Otilia Sta. Ana
and her husband Marciano. (The portion was devoted to rice and
corn production and was first tenanted by Domingo and Adoracion.
After Domingos death, Adoracion transferred her rights in favor of
petitioner Otilia Sta. Ana by executing a notarized Pinanumpaang
Salaysay with the conformity of Leon, and for a consideration of
P72,500.00).
28. The parties had a harmonious tenancy relationship until respondents
filed a Complaint for Ejectment due to Non-Payment of Lease
Rentals.
29. Respondents:
- Alleged that it was their agreement with petitioner and Marciano
to increase the existing rentals from 36 cavans to 45 cavans
- If respondents wanted to repossess the property, they only had
to pay the petitioner the amount of P72,500.00, the same
amount paid by the latter to Adoracion
- They further averred that despite repeated demands, petitioner
refused to pay the actual rentals from July 1985 to September
1989, in violation of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 817
- That the subject land had been declared, upon the
recommendation of the Human Settlements Committee, suitable
for commercial and industrial purposes, per Zoning Ordinance of
1981 of the Municipality of Sta. Rosa, Laguna.

30. Petitioners Answer:

- They denied that there was an agreement to increase the
existing rental which was already fixed at 36 cavans of palay,
once or twice a year depending on the availability of irrigation
water
- that neither was there an agreement as to the future surrender of
the land in favor of the respondents
- that they did not refuse to pay the rentals because they even
sent verbal and written notices to the respondents, advising them
to accept the same; and that in view of the latters failure to
respond, petitioner and Marciano were compelled to sell the
harvest and to deposit the proceeds thereof in Savings Account
No. 9166 with the Universal Savings Bank at Sta. Rosa, Laguna
under the names of Leon and Marciano.
31. PARADs (Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator) RULING: in favor
of respondents
- That petitioner and Marciano deliberately defaulted in the
payment of the rentals due the respondents.
- The PARAD found that the deposit made with Republic Planters
Bank was actually in the names of petitioner and Marciano,
hence, personal to them and that it was only during the hearing
that petitioner and Marciano deposited the amount of P40,000.00
with the Universal Savings Bank for the unpaid rentals regarding
such as late payments.
- It also ruled that the subject land is not covered by P.D. No. 27,
R.A. No. 6657, and E.O. No. 228, not on the basis of the
allegation in the complaint, but on the respondents' right of
retention.
32. DARABs (Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board)
RULING: in favor of petitioner
- Respondents failed to show by substantial evidence that the
petitioners deliberately failed or refused to pay their lease
rentals. It has been held that the mere failure of a tenant to pay
the landowners share does not necessarily give the latter the
right to eject the former when there is lack of deliberate intent on
the part of the tenant to pay
33. CA upheld the ruling of PARAD
- petitioner and Marciano failed to pay the rentals and that there
was no valid tender of payment.
- that this failure to pay was tainted with bad faith and deliberate
intent
- held that the subject land was not covered by P.D. 27, Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 6657 and Executive Order (E.O.) No. 228, since

the same had become a residential, commercial and industrial

land
PROVISION:
Section 3, Rule II of the 2003 DARAB Rules of Procedure
Agrarian Law Implementation Cases. The Adjudicator or the Board shall
have no jurisdiction over matters involving the administrative implementation
of RA No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law (CARL) of 1988 and other agrarian laws as enunciated by pertinent
rules and administrative orders, which shall be under the exclusive
prerogative of and cognizable by the Office of the Secretary of the DAR in
accordance with his issuances
ISSUE:
1. W/N the Honorable Court Of Appeals seriously

erred in
arrogating upon itself what is otherwise DARs power to
determine whether the subject agricultural land has become
residential/industrial/commercial.
2. W/N the petitioner, as an agricultural tenant, failed to pay her
lease rentals when the same fell due as to warrant her
dispossession of the subject land.

RULING + RATIO:
6. YES.
The rulings violated the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.
a. PARAD acted without jurisdiction when it held that the
subject land was no longer covered by our agrarian laws
because of the retention rights of the respondents.
b. The CA likewise acted without jurisdiction when it ruled that
the land had become non-agricultural based on a zoning
ordinance of 1981 on the strength of a mere vicinity map.
For agrarian reform cases, jurisdiction is vested in DAR; more
specifically, in DARAB. EO 229 vested the DAR with (1) quasijudicial powers to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform
matters; and (2) jurisdiction over all matters involving the
implementation of agrarian reform, except those falling under the
exclusive original jurisdiction of the DA and DENR.
Agrarian disputes, as defined by law and settled in
jurisprudence, are within the primary and exclusive original
jurisdiction of the PARAD and the DARAB, while issues of
retention and non-coverage of a land under agrarian reform,
among others, are within the domain of the DAR Secretary.
Verily, there is an established tenancy relationship between
petitioner and respondents in this case. Therefore, an action for
Ejectment for Non-Payment of lease rentals is clearly an
agrarian dispute, cognizable at the initial stage by the PARAD

and thereafter by the DARAB. But issues with respect to the

retention rights of the respondents as landowners and the
exclusion/exemption of the subject land from the coverage of
agrarian reform are issues not cognizable by the PARAD and the
DARAB, but by the DAR Secretary because, the same are
Agrarian Law Implementation (ALI) Cases.
Courts of justice have no power to decide a question not in
issue. A judgment that goes beyond the issues, and purports to
adjudicate something on which the parties were not heard, is
extra-judicial, irregular and invalid. This norm applies not only
to courts of justice, but also to quasi-judicial bodies such as the
PARAD.

7. NO. Respondents failed to show the existence of a lawful cause for

the ejectment of petitioner as lessee. There was no deliberate and
willful refusal to pay lease rentals.
SC agrees with the findings of the DARAB that it was not the
fault of petitioner that the lease rentals did not reach the
respondents because the latter chose to ignore the notices
sent to them. The factual circumstances negate the PARAD
findings of Marcianos and petitioner's deliberate and willful
intent not to pay lease rentals. Good faith was clearly
demonstrated by Marciano and petitioner when, because
respondents refused to accept the proffered payment, they
even went to the point of seeking government intervention in
order to address their problems with respondents.

DISPOSITION: the instant Petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of

the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 60640 is hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board (DARAB) dated June 24, 1998 in DARAB Case No. 2203
is REINSTATED without prejudice to the rights of respondent-spouses Leon
and Aurora Carpo to seek recourse from the Office of the Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR) Secretary on the other issues they raised. No costs.

Digest Author: Alyssa Rodriguez

Garcillano v House of Representatives (2008)

Petitioner: VIRGILIO O. GARCILLANO
Respondent: THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEES ON PUBLIC
INFORMATION, PUBLIC ORDER AND SAFETY, NATIONAL DEFENSE AND
SECURITY, INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY, and
SUFFRAGE AND ELECTORAL REFORMS
Ponencia: Nachura, J.

DOCTRINE on locus standi: A party will be allowed to litigate only when

(1) he can show that he has personally suffered some actual or
threatened injury because of the allegedly illegal conduct of the
government;
(2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and
(3) the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action.21
FACTS:
1. A wiretapped conversation purportedly between then President
Gloria Arroyo and Commissioner Garcillano, a high-ranking official of
the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) surfaced. The tapes,
notoriously referred to as the "Hello Garci" tapes, allegedly contained
the Presidents instructions to Garcillano to manipulate in her favor
results of the 2004 presidential elections.
2. It was Senator Chiz Escuderos Tale of Two Tapes speech that
then set in motion a congressional investigation. After prolonged and
impassioned debates by the committee members on the admissibility
and authenticity of the recordings, the tapes were eventually played
in the chambers of the House.
3. Petitioner Garcillano filed with this Court a Petition for Prohibition
and Injunction, with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and/or
Writ of Preliminary Injunction4docketed as G.R. No. 17033 praying
that the respondent House Committees be restrained from using the
illegally obtained tape recordings.
4. Without finality, the debates on the Garci Tapes abruptly stopped.
More than two years after, it was Senator Panfilo Lacsion who
revived the discussions in his privileged speech, The Lighthouse
That Brought Darkness
5. Retired justices of the Court of Appeals, Ranada and Agcaoili, filed
before this Court a Petition for Prohibition with Prayer for the
Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of
Preliminary Injunction,10 docketed as G.R. No. 179275, seeking to
bar the Senate from conducting its scheduled legislative inquiry
arguing that the intended legislative inquiry violates R.A. No. 4200
and Section 3, Article III of the Constitution.

6. The court then resolved to consolidate G.R. Nos. 170338 (filed by

Garcilliano) and 179275 (filed by Ranada, Agcaoili, et al).
ISSUES:
1st Case: W/N the Court may issue an injunctive
2nd Case: W/N the Senate can be allowed to continue with the conduct of the
questioned legislative inquiry without the duly published rules of procedure.
PROVISION:
1987 Constitution, Article III, Section 3. (1) The privacy of communication and
correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful order of the court, or when
public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law.
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
Article VI, Section 21. The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its
respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with
its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in, or affected
by, such inquiries shall be respected.

RULING + RATIO:
First Case: NO. While Garcillano has legal standing under the direct injury
test as he stands to be substantially and personally affected by the outcome
of this petition still, the petition must be dismissed for being moot and
academic. The court notes that the recordings were already played in the
House and heard by its members.
Second Case: ,NO. First of all it is important to stress out that the petitioners
in the second case have legal standing, as recently the Court has relaxed the
application of the direct injury test This Court has repeatedly and
consistently refused to wield procedural barriers as impediments to its
addressing and resolving serious legal questions that greatly impact on
public interest, in keeping with the Courts duty under the 1987 Constitution
to determine whether or not other branches of government have kept
themselves within the limits of the Constitution and the laws, and that they
have not abused the discretion given to them.
On the merits of this case, the Senate CANNOT be allowed to continue with
the conduct of the questioned legislative inquiry without the duly published
rules of procedure as to do so would be in clear derogation of the
constitutional requirement. Respondents justify their non-observance of the
constitutionally mandated publication by arguing that the rules have never
been amended since 1995 but the organic law instructs, without more, that
the Senate or its committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation only
in accordance with duly published rules of procedure, and does not
make any distinction whether or not these rules have undergone
amendments or revision.
DISPOSITION: First petition, dismissed. Second petition, granted.

LAZATIN v DESIERTO (2009)

Petition: Certiorari
Petitioners: Carmelo F. Lazatin, Marino A. Morales, Teodoro L. David, Angelito A.
Pelayo
Respondent: Omb. Aniano A. Desierto, Sandiganbayan Third Division,
Ponencia: Peralta, J.
DOCTRINE:
It is a fundamental aphorism in law that a review of facts and evidence is not the
province of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari, which is extra ordinem - beyond
the ambit of appeal. In certiorari proceedings, judicial review does not go as far as
to examine and assess the evidence of the parties and to weigh the probative value
thereof (First Corporation v. Former Sixth Division of the Court of Appeals)
FACTS:
1.
2.

3.

4.
5.
6.

7.

Subject of Certiorari: Ombudsmans disapproval of Special Prosecutors

recommendation of dismissal of cases against petitioners
The Ombudsmans Fact-Finding and Intelligence Bureau filed a complaint
against the Lazatin, et. al., for illegal use of public funds, in particular,
Congressman Lazatins Countrywide Devt Fundyou know, the pork barrel.
Another Ombudsman department, the Evaluation and preliminary Investigation
Bureau, recommended filing Malversation and Violation of RA 3019 charges
against Lazatin, et. al., in the Sandiganbayan.
Lazatin and the others moved for reinvestigationgranted.
The Office of the Special Prosecutor recommended dismissal of the case for
lack/insufficiency of evidence.
Ombudsman ordered the Office of Legal Affairs to review the OSP Resolution.
OLA recommended disapproving the OSP Resolutionwhich the Ombudsman
did. That led to the certiorari being filed with the Supreme Court.
PETITIONERS ARGUMENT: The Ombudsman has no power to prosecute cases.
This power belongs to the OSP. The Constitution provides that the OSP is a
separate office. The Ombudsman has no power over the OSP. Therefore,
RA6770 (Ombudsman Act) is unconstitutional for placing the OSP under the
Ombudsman. And the Ombudsman cannot disapprove the OSPs
recommendation to dismiss the cases against Lazatin, etc. Further, the
Ombudsmans resolution was based on misapprehended facts, speculatons,
surmises, and conjectures.

ISSUES:

1.

2.

W/N the Ombudsman acted with grave abuse of discretion/acted in excess

of jurisdiction
a. Threshold question: is RA6770 unconstitutional?
W/N the Ombudsmans Resolution disapproving the OSP is based on a
misapprehension of facts, speculations, surmises, and conjectures (Rule
65-related)

HELD/RATIO:
1.

2.

NO, because the Ombudsman has the power to prosecute. Because the
question of the Ombudsmans jurisdiction IS LONG SETTLED by Acop v.
Ombudsman (1995), which affirmed both the Ombudsman exercising
prosecutorial powers, and placing the OSP under its office.
a. Court noted: if you ask the Court to abandon stare decisis, it
must be based only on strong and compelling reasons.
NO, but this is only because Lazatin, et. al. CANNOT USE CERTIORARI
PROCEEDINGS TO CORRECT ERRORS OF JUDGMENT.
a. What Lazatin is actually arguing is that the Ombudsman
committed an error of judgment in resolving that there was
enough evidence to support probable cause against Lazatin.
i. An Error of Judgment is one which a court may make in
the exercise of its jurisdiction, such as an error in
evaluation of evidence.
b. See the doctrine above. Certiorari proceedings DO NOT INCLUDE
CORRECTING ERRORS OF JUDGMENT.
c. Moreover, Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest
Loans v. Desierto emphasized that the Supreme Court does not
interfere with the Ombudsmans exercise of his investigatory and
prosecutorial powers, as long as his rulings are supported by
substantial evidence.
d. What does it take to overturn the Ombudsmans resolution?
Grave abuse of discretion: a capricious and whimsical exercise
of judgment tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. The Ombudsman's
exercise of power must have been done in an arbitrary or despotic
manner which must be so patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty
enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. Which standard
Lazatins arguments and presented facts did not meet. Therefore:

DISPOSITION: DISMISSED FOR LACK OF MERIT.

Digest Author: Dompor

Ferdinand Cruz vs. Judge Mijares (2008)

Petition: Certiorari, Prohibition, Mandamus
Petitioner: Ferdinand A. Cruz
Respondent: Judge Priscilla Mijares, Benjamin Mina Jr.
Ponencia: Nachura
DOCTRINE:
A becoming regard of the judicial hierarchy indicates that petitions for the
issuance of extraordinary writs against the RTC should be filed with the Court
of Appeals. Only in exceptional cases and for compelling reasons may the
SC take cognizance of petitions filed directly before it.
FACTS:
1. Ferdinand Cruz sought permission to enter his appearance for and on his
behalf before the RTC Pasay City as plaintiff in a civil case for abatement
of nuisance
th
a. Cruz is a 4 year law student
b. Section 34, Rule 138 on non-lawyers appearing before any court
and conducting their litigation personally
2. During pre-trial, Judge Mijares required Cruz to secure written
permission from the Court Administrator in order for the latter to
represent himself.
3. Atty. Cabrera, counsel for defendant, filed a motion to dismiss instead of
a pre-trial brief. Cruz vehemently objected.
4. Judge Mijares then proceeded to hear the pending motion to dismiss and
calendared the next hearing
5. Cruz then filed a motion to inhibit praying for Mijares voluntary inhibition
alleging expected partiality based on the Judges remarks during pretrial. In an order, Judge Mijares denied the motion saying that the uttering
of said remarks is not enough to warrant voluntary inhibition
6. In another order, the motion was denied with finality. In the same order,
the trial court held that Cruzs failure to submit the promised documents
and jurisprudence, and his failure to satisfy requirements and conditions
under Rule 138-A, his appearance was denied. Cruz filed a motion for
reconsideration, but the same was denied.
7. Thus, Ferdinand Cruz directly filed with the court the instant petition

ISSUES:
1. W/N the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus
may issue (are cognizable)
2. W/N the respondent court acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it denied the
appearance of the petitioner as party litigant and when the judge
refused to inhibit herself from the case
PROVISION:
Rule 138
Section 34, Rule 138-A
Rule 65
RULING + RATIO:
1. YES
- SC jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, and
mandamus is not exclusive and is in fact concurrent with the CA
- This concurrence, however, is not to be construed as an
absolute, unrestrained freedom to choose the court where the
application will be directed
- Judicial hierarchy
o Issuance of extraordinary writs against RTC should be
coursed through CA
- Only in exceptional cases and for compelling reasons may the
SC take cognizance of petitions filed directly before it
- However, that this case requires an interpretation of the Law
Student Practice Rule, the SC takes cognizance of the petition
herein
o Petitioner Cruz is warned not to continue the practice of
filing directly before the SC petitions under Rule 65 when
the issue raised can be resolved with dispatch by the CA
2. YES (partially)
a. Although Rule 138-A provides that the law student must be
enrolled in a recognized law schools clinical legal education
program and under the direct supervision and control of a
member of the bar duly accredited by the law school, Rule
138 provides that in any other court other than the justice of
the peace, a party may conduct his litigation personally
b. The litigant may pursue litigation personally or with the aid of
an attorney
c. Litigant runs the risk though of falling into the snares and
hazards of his own ignorance
d. Trial court erred in applying Rule 138-A when the basis of
petitioner was Rule 138

e. Party litigant in a civil case, who insists that he can, without

lawyers assistance, effectively undertake the pursuit of his
claim, may be given the chance to do so
i. The concerns espoused in the Constitution
concerning criminal cases and the right to counsel/to
be heard by counsel does not obtain in a civil cae
f. Bar Matter 730 further clarified this matter
g. However, RTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion
when Judge Mijares refused to inhibit herself from the case
i. The grounds for bias and prejudice were not well
established
DISPOSITION: Petition partially granted.

Digest Author: Ann Catherine Co

FIRST LEPANTO CERAMICS v CA (1994)

Petitioner: First Lepanto Ceramics, Inc.
Respondent: Court of Appeals, MARIWASA Manufacturing
Ponencia: Nocon, J.
DOCTRINE: Appeals from decisions of the BOI, which by statute was

previously allowed to be filed directly with the Supreme Court, should

now be brought to the Court of Appeals.

FACTS:
34. The Board of Investment (BOI) granted First Lepanto Ceramics,
Inc.'s application to amend its BOI certificate of registration by
changing the scope of its registered product from "glazed floor tiles"
to "ceramic tiles
35. Oppositor Mariwasa filed a motion for reconsideration of the said BOI
decision while oppositor Fil-Hispano Ceramics, Inc. did not move to
reconsider the same
36. Soon rebuffed in its bid for reconsideration, Mariwasa filed a petition
for review with the Court of Appeals pursuant to Circular 1-91
37. CA temporarily restrained the BOI from implementing its decision.
This temporary restraining order lapsed twenty (20) days after its
issuance, without respondent court issuing any preliminary
injunction.
38. First Lepanto filed a "Motion to Dismiss Petition and to Lift
Restraining Order" on the ground that respondent court has no
appellate jurisdiction over the case, the same being exclusively
vested with the Supreme Court pursuant to Article 82 of the Omnibus
Investments Code of 1987.
39. CA denied petitioner's motion to dismiss
40. Upon receipt of a copy of the resolution, First Lepanto decided not to
file any motion for reconsideration as the question involved is
essentially legal in nature and immediately filed a petition for
certiorari and prohibition before the Supreme Court
41. First Lepanto argued that the CA has no jurisdiction to entertain
Mariwasa's appeal from the BOI's decision. They contended that
Circular No. 191 (a rule of procedure) couldnt be deemed to have
superseded Art 82 of EO 226 (a legislation).
ISSUES: W/N the CA has jurisdiction over the case
RULING + RATIO:
YES.
The argument that Article 82 of E.O. 226 cannot be validly repealed
by Circular 1-91 because the former grants a substantive right which,

under the Constitution cannot be modified, diminished or increased

by this Court in the exercise of its rule-making powers is not entirely
defensible as it seems.
Respondent correctly argued that Article 82 of E.O. 226 grants the
right of appeal from decisions or final orders of the BOI and in
granting such right, it also provided where and in what manner such
appeal can be brought.
The Supreme Court has the power to regulate, by virtue of its
constitutional rule-making powers, procedural aspects such as
the court and the manner an appeal can be brought.
In other words, the right to appeal from decisions or final orders of
the BOI under E.O. 226 remains and continues to be respected.
Circular 1-91 simply transferred the venue of appeals from decisions
of this agency to respondent Court of Appeals and provided a
different period of appeal.
Circular 1-91 effectively repealed or superseded Article 82 of
E.O. 226. Appeals from decisions of the BOI, which by statute

was previously allowed to be filed directly with the Supreme

Court, should now be brought to the Court of Appeals.
DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing reasons, the instant
petition for certiorari and prohibition with application for temporary restraining
order and preliminary injunction is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The
Temporary Restraining Order issued on July 19, 1993 is hereby LIFTED

Ampong vs. CSC (2008)

Petition: Certiorari
Petitioner: Sarah Ampong (now Sarah Navarra)
Respondent: CSC
Ponente: Reyes
DOCTRINE: (Jurisdiction of SC of its employees)
As granted by the Constitution, the SC has exclusive administrative
supervision of its employees, and it therefore is the only one who can
investigate a case against any of their employees. This supervision applies
even if such acts were committed prior to working in the judiciary.
FACTS:
8. On Nov. 10, 1991, a certain Evelyn Junio-Decir took the Professional
Board Examination for Teachers (PBET) in Kapitan Tomas Monteverde
Elementary School, and later on passed with a rating of 74.12%.
9. At this time, Sarah Ampong was still a public school teacher under the
supervision of DECS. She only started working in the Judiciary on Aug.
3, 1993.
10. On July 5, 1994, however, when a person claiming to be Evelyn JunioDecir went to the Civil Service Regional Office (CSRO) No. XI of Davao
City to claim her PBET Certificate of Elegibility, it was confirmed that
such person did not resemble in any way the person in the photo taken
of the examiner under the name of Evelyn Junio-Decir.
11. A prima facie case for dishonesty and grave misconduct was filed
against Sarah Ampong and Evelyn Decir.
12. In Decirs sworn statement on November 3, 1994, she denied the
accusation that she approached her husbands first cousins wife, Sarah
Ampong (now Navarra), and made her take the exam in her stead.
13. Petitioner Ampong, however, saying that she wanted things to be over
with, voluntarily appeared before the CSRO on Feb. 2, 1995, and
admitted to the wrongdoing. She was reminded of her right to counsel
and waived it such right.
14. CSC found Ampong guilty, and sanctioned her with the penalty of
dismissal and accessory penalties. Ampong moved for reconsideration
RAISING FOR THE FIRST TIME the issue on jurisdiction being solely
under the Supreme Court, but such reconsideration was denied.

15. She elevated the case to the CA on appeal under Rule 43 (Appeals from
CTA and Quasi-Judicial Bodies to the CA), but such petition was also
denied for lack of merit.

ISSUES:
3. WoN Supreme Court has jurisdiction to discipline its
employees, notwithstanding that the acts to be disciplined
happened prior to being an employee of the judiciary.
4. WoN petitioner is estopped from raising the defense of lack of
jurisdiction after she has voluntarily appeared and admitted to the
acts before the CSRO.
PROVISION:
Section 6. Article VIII. 1987 Constitution. The Supreme Court shall
have administrative supervision over all courts and the personnel
thereof.
RULING + RATIO:
3. Yes.
Citing the cases of CSC vs. Sta. Ana, and Bartolata vs. Julaton,
the Supreme Court held that the proper procedure should have
been to file a case with the Office of the Court Administrator,
since only the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to supervise and
discipline its employees.
On the matter of the act committed being one prior to working for
the judiciary, the Supreme Court held that it irrelevant whether
such act was committed before or after since allowing another
branch of government to acquire jurisdiction would be to violate
the principle of separation of powers.
4. Yes.
a. However, since it was Ampong herself who appeared
voluntarily to the CSRO and waived her right to counsel and
admitted to the charges, she is estopped from later on
raising the defense of lack of jurisdiction.
DISPOSITION: Petition denied for lack of merit. Hindi naming
papayagan ang pandaraya sapagkat inaasahan ng Hudikatura ang
pinakamabuti sa lahat nitong kawani.

Petitioner: CGP TRANSPORTATION AND SERVICES CORPORATION

Respondent: PCI LEASING AND FINANCE, INCORPORATED
Ponencia: CHICI-NAZARIO, J.

PCI filed an incorrect mode of appeal in the form of a special civil

action for certiorari as there were questions of fact that were
assigned as errors in the issue.

In an appeal by certiorari under rule 45, only questions of law may be

raised. The resolution of factual issues is the function of lower courts.

DOCTRINE: An appeal for certiorari made with questions of fact may be

referred by the SC to the CA for resolution of factual issues.

Section 15 of the ROC provides: Questions that may be raised on

appeal xxx he may include in his assignment of errors any question
of law or fact that has been raised nthe court below and which is
within the issues framed by the parties.

Under section 5 (f) of rule 56 of the RoC, an improper appeal MAYbe dismissed on the ground of erroneous choice or mode of appeal.

Section 5. Grounds for dismissal of appeal. The appeal MAY be

dismissed motu proprio or on motion of the respondent on the
following grounds: xxx (f) error in the choice or mode of appea.

However, under paragraph 2 section 6 of the same rule, it

states: Section 6. Disposition of improper appeal xxx An appeal by
certiorari taken to the SC from the RTC submitting issues of fact may
be referred to the CA for decision or appropriate action.

The SCs discretion to refer the CA is by reason of the term

MAY- in both sections.

It must also be born in mind that procedural rules are intended to

ensure proper administration of law and justice. Rules of procedure
ought not to be applied ina very rigid, technical sense as they are
adopted to help, and not override substantial justice.

FIGUEROA v. PEOPLE (2008)

FACTS:
42. CGP obtained two loans from PCI. Collective sum of which was
around 16,000,000 pesos. The loans were secured by real estate
mortgages over two parcels of land.
43. CGP failed to pay its indebtedness to PCI prompting PCI to foreclose
the real properties subject to the REM. PCI was the highest bidder of
both the subject real properties.
44. CGP failed to redeem the properties. PCI insisted that actual
possession be turned over to it. CGP refused to do so.
45. PCI filed a petition for an ex-parte issuance of a writ of possession at
the RTC of Muntinlupa City.
46. RTC rules in favor of PCI. It eventually overturns its decision and
rules in favor of CGP instead claiming that the case involved issues
which required both parties to be present.
47. This prompts to PCI file a petition to the SC for certiorari. The SC
refers the case to the CA as it involved factual issues.
48. The CA rendered a decision finding that the RTC judge had gravely
abused his discretion in suspending the proceedings relating to the
writ of possession asked by PCI. Thus prompting CGP to file a
petition for review on Certiorari under rule 45 of the ROC.
ISSUES:
WON the referral court of appeals gravely erred in giving due course
to the petition for certiorari of PCI there being already a final finding
by the SC and that the said petition by PCI raised questions of facts
not propert for petition for certiorari.
RULING + RATIO:
NO

DISPOSITION: Petition by CGP denied

Digest Author: Kai Kapunan

RPC VS. CA (2002)

Petitioner: Radio Communications of the Philippines, Inc.
Respondent: Court of Appeals and Manuel Dulawon
Ponencia: Ynares-Santiago, J.
DOCTRINE: RTCs shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil
actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary
estimation. Actions for specific performance, such as the complaint for
breach of contract of lease, are incapable of pecuniary estimation; hence fall
under RTCs jurisdiction.
FACTS:
1. In 1997, Manuel Dulawon filed with the RTC of Tabuk, Kalinga, a
complaint for breach of contract of lease with damages against Radio
Communications of the Philippines, Inc. (RCPI). Said lease contract
was effective for 3 years with advance payment; but the latter was
not given in lump sum but on installment. One check that was given
was stale. In addition, RCPI failed to pay rentals due for the months
of January to March 1997.
2. RCPI filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction
contending that it is the Municipal Trial Court which has jurisdiction
as the complaint is basically one for collection of unpaid rentals in the
sum of P84,000, which does not exceed the jurisdictional amount of
P100,000 for RTCs. But the trial court denied the motion to dismiss;
hence, RCPI went to the Court of Appeals on a petition for certiorari.
In 1998, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition.
ISSUE: WON the RTC has jurisdiction over the complaint filed by Dulawon?
PROVISION: Section 19 of RA 7691; Administrative Circular No. 09-94
RULING + RATIO: YES
Under Section 19 of RA 7691, RTCs shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction on the following cases, among others:
(1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is
incapable of pecuniary estimation;
(8) In all other cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest,
damages of whatever kind, attorneys fees, litigation expenses, and
costs or the value of the property in controversy exceeds P100,000
or, in such other cases in Metro Manila, where the demand,
exclusive of the abovementioned items exceeds P200,000.

Also, under item no. 2 of the Administrative Circular No. 09-94, the exclusion
of the term damages of whatever kind in determining the jurisdictional
amount under R.A. No. 7691, applies to cases where the damages are
merely incidental to or a consequence of the main cause of action. However,
in cases where the claim for damages is the main cause of action, or one of
the causes of action, the amount of such claim shall be considered in
determining the jurisdiction of the court.
In Russell, et al., v. Vestil, et al., the Court held that in determining whether
an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary
estimation, the nature of the principal action or remedy sought must
first be ascertained. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money,
the claim is capable of pecuniary estimation, and jurisdiction over the
action will depend on the amount of the claim. But if the issue is other
than the right to recover a sum of money, where the money claim is purely
incidental to, the action is one where the subject of the litigation may not be
estimated in terms of money, which is cognizable exclusively by RTCs.
Jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and is
determined by the allegations in the complaint and the character of the relief
sought, irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to all or some of the
claims asserted therein. In the case at bar, the allegations in the complaint
plainly show that private respondents cause of action is breach of
contract.
It is settled that a breach of contract is a cause of action either for
specific performance or rescission of contracts. Actions for specific
performance are incapable of pecuniary estimation; hence fall under
RTCs jurisdiction. The complaint filed was aimed to enforce their lease
contract which would incidentally entitle him to monetary awards if the court
should find that the subject contract of lease was breached. The prayer,
therefore, for the payment of unpaid rentals in the amount of P84,000 plus
damages is merely incidental to the main action for specific performance.
Clearly, the action for specific performance case, irrespective of the amount
of rentals and damages sought to be recovered, is incapable of pecuniary
estimation, hence cognizable exclusively by the Regional Trial Court. The
trial court, therefore, did not err in denying petitioners motion to dismiss.
DISPOSITION:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the petition is DENIED and the
assailed decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 45987 is
AFFIRMED.

Digest Author: Coco Navarro

ENCARNACION v AMIGO (2006)

Petitioner: Victoriano Encarnacion
Respondent: Nieves Amigo
Ponencia: Ynares-Santiago
DOCTRINE: 1. The length of time of an owners dispossession of

property determines the proper action to be filed for the recovery of

possession of property.
2. If lower court tries a case on merits but without jurisdiction over the
subject matter, RTC may no longer dismiss the case if it has original
jurisdiction/if it is the proper court to try the case. It shall decide the
case based on evidence presented in the lower court without
prejudice to amended pleadings and additional evidence in the
interest of justice.
FACTS:
1. Lot 2121 in Isabela was originally owned by Valiente who
subsequently sold it to Mallapitan, who later sold it to Victoriano
Magpantay. Upon his death, his widow Anita Magpantayexecuted a
waiver of right in favor of her son-in law, Petitioner Encarnacion.
Encarnacion caused his lots to be divided in two and these titles
were issued on July 1996.
2. Respondent Amigo allegedly entered and took possession of the
property without permission while it was still owned by the late
Victoriano Magpantay. His occupation continued until after titles
were issued to Petitioner Encarnacion.
3. In February 2001, Petitioner Encarnacion, through counsel, sent a
demand letter for Respondent Amigo to vacate the premises. After
refusal to vacate, Petitioner Encarnacion filed a complaint for
ejectment.
4. MTC ruled in favor of Petitioner but RTC dismissed the case due to
lack of jurisdiction of the MTC (hence it acquired no appellate
jurisdiction). Hence this petition.

ISSUES: Whether the CA erred in holding that the proper action in this case
was accion publiciana and not unlawful detainer (accion interdictal)?
RULING + RATIO:
NO.
The material element that determines the proper action to file for recovery of
possession of property in this case is the length of time of dispossession.
Under the Rules of Court, the summary remedies of unlawful detainer and
forcible entry are available within one year from such unlawful deprivation or
withholding of possession. If dispossession has not lasted for more than a
year, an ejectment proceeding is proper and the MTC/inferior courts has
jurisdiction. However, if dispossession lasts for more than one year, the
proper action to be filed is accion publiciana which should be brought
directly to the RTC.
In this case, Petitioner Encarnacion became owner as early as 1995 but he
only sent a demand letter & filed for an ejectment case in 2001. While it is
true that the filing of the ejectment case fell within the requisite of one year
within sending a demand letter, it is equally true that he has already been
deprived of property for about 6 years. The length of time of dispossession
made his cause of action beyond the ambit of accion interdictal and
effectively made it one for accion publiciana.
However, the RTC should have not dismissed the case.
[Rule 40 of the Rules of Court provides]
SECTION 8. Appeal from orders dismissing case without trial; lack of
jurisdiction.If an appeal is taken from an order of the lower court dismissing
the case without a trial on the merits, the Regional Trial Court may affirm or
reverse it, as the case may be. In case of affirmance and the ground of
dismissal is lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, the Regional Trial
Court, if it has jurisdiction thereover, shall try the case on the merits as
if the case was originally filed with it.
In case of reversal, the case shall be remanded for further proceedings.
DISPOSITION: Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals
ordering the remand of Civil Case No. Br. 20-1194 to the Regional Trial Court
of Cauayan, Isabela, Branch 20, for further proceedings, is AFFIRMED

Digest Author: Czar Paguio

PLANTERS PRODUCTS vs FERTIPHIL (2004)

Petitioner: Planters Products, Inc.
Respondent: Fertiphil Corporation
Ponencia: Puno, J.
DOCTRINE: As a general rule, rules of procedure apply to actions pending
and undetermined at the time of their passage, hence, retrospective in
nature. However, the general rule is not without an exception. Retrospective
application is allowed if no vested rights are impaired.
FACTS:
1.) Planters Products, Inc. (PPI) and Fertiphil Corporation are domestic
corporations engaged in the importation and distribution of fertilizers,
pesticides and agricultural chemicals.
2.) President Marcos issued Letter of Instruction No. 1465 which mandated
domestic corporations engaged in the fertilizer business, such as Fertiphil, to
pay P10.00 for every bag of fertilizer sold in the country to the Fertilizer and
Pesticide Authority (FPA) which in turn would remit the amount to PPI for its
rehabilitation.
3.) After the EDSA revolution, the imposition of P10.00 per bag sold was
voluntarily stopped. Fertiphil then demanded from PPI the refund of
P6,698,144.00 but PPI refused. Hence, Fertiphil filed a collection and
damage suit against FPA and PPI before the Regional Trial Court of Makati
City, contending that the LOI was void and unconstitutional for being a
glaring example of crony capitalism as it favored PPI only. PPI filed its
answer but for failure to attend the pre-trial conference, it was declared in
default and Fertiphil was allowed to present evidence ex-parte.
4.) RTC decided in favor of Fertiphil- declaring the LOI void and
unconstitutional and ordering PPI to return the amount. PPI appealed in
1992. In 2001, Fertiphil moved to dismiss the appeal citing as grounds the
non-payment of the appellate docket fee and alleged failure to prosecute the
appeal within a reasonable time.
The trial court denied the motion in an Order in 2001 ruling that the
payment of the appellate docket fee within the period for taking an
appeal is a new requirement under the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
which was not yet applicable when PPI filed its appeal in 1992.
6.) Fertiphil filed a special civil action for certiorari with the Court of Appeals
imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court.

The CA granted the petition and ruled that although PPI filed its
appeal in 1992, the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure should
nevertheless be followed since it applies to actions pending and
undetermined at the time of its passage. Due to PPIs failure to pay
the appellate docket fee for three (3) years from the time the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure took effect until Fertiphil moved to dismiss
the appeal in 2001, the trial courts decision became final and
executory.
Hence, this petition by PPI.
ISSUES: W/N the 1997 Rules of Procedure would have a retroactive
application to PPIs appeal
RULING + RATIO:
As a general rule, rules of procedure apply to actions pending and
undetermined at the time of their passage, hence, retrospective in nature.
However, the general rule is not without an exception. Retrospective
application is allowed if no vested rights are impaired.
In 1992, all that the rules required for the perfection of its appeal was the
filing of a notice of appeal with the court which rendered the judgment or
order appealed from, within fifteen (15) days from notice thereof. PPI
complied with this requirement when it filed a notice of appeal with the RTC,
after receiving a copy of its Order and PPIs appeal was therefore already
perfected at that time.Thus, the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which required
that appellate docket and other lawful fees should be paid within the same
period for taking an appeal, cannot affect PPIs appeal which was already
perfected in 1992. It cannot also be considered a ground for dismissal
thereof since PPIs period for taking an appeal, likewise the period for
payment of the appellate docket fee, has long lapsed in 1992.
While the right to appeal is statutory, the mode or manner by which this right
may be exercised is a question of procedure which may be altered and
modified only when vested rights are not impaired. Thus, failure to pay the
appellate docket fee when the 1997 Rules of Procedure took effect cannot
operate to deprive PPI of its right, already perfected in 1992.
The failure to pay the appellate docket fee does not automatically result in
the dismissal of an appeal, dismissal being discretionary on the part of the
appellate court. And in determining whether or not to dismiss an appeal on
such ground, courts have always been guided by the peculiar legal and
equitable circumstances attendant to each case.
DISPOSITION: Petition is granted.

Badillo v. Court of Appeals

Petitioner: Oscar Badillo
Respondent: Pedro Del Rosario and Court of Appeals
Ponencia: Carpio

5. The CA likewise dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction.

The CA ruled that since the complaint was to enforce the
statutory and contractual obligation of del Rosario, the agency
who has jurisdiction is the HLURB.

DOCTRINE:
ISSUE:
When an administrative agency is conferred quasi-judicial
functions, all controversies relating to the subject matter
pertaining to its specializations are deemed to be included
within its jurisdictions. Split jurisdiction is not favored.

1. W/N the RTC or the CA has jurisdiction over the case?

2. Whether a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is the
proper remedy for the petitioners?

FACTS:
1. Petitioners in this case were alleged registered owners of a
road lot known as Apollo Street. However the it is indicated in
the TCT that the lot is registered in the name of respondent
Pedro Del Rosario. In the TCT it was indicated that it the lot
shall not be closed or disposed without court approval.
2. The petitioners then allege that the respondents violated the
TCT by selling a portion of the property to the co-respondents
in this case Conejero, without court approval. Subsequently
the sold lot covered by TCT No. 35101 ended up with
Goldkey. Petitioner then prays that the sale made in favor of
Conejero and Goldkey be declared void.
3. Goldkey then argues that the HLURB and not the RTC or the
Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over the case involved.
Furthermore Goldkey argues that the petitioners are using the
present case to substitute for an already lost appeal of a
previous case, where the building officials of Quezon City
declared the property a residential and not a road lot.
4. The RTC dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. It pointed
out how the building official had already rendered a decision
on the matter and that the petitioners should have appealed it
directly to the secretary of public works. The RTC also argued
that the HLURB had also approved the building for
development into a town house thus removing the case from
the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts.

Provision:
PD 957, EO 648, EO 90
RULING + RATIO:
1. No the RTC and the CA have no jurisdiction over the case
as the HLURB is the sole regulatory body for housing and
land development.
The HLURBs jurisdiction to hear and decide cases is
determined by the nature of the cause of action, the subject
matter or property involved, and the parties. The case at hand
is a case for specific performance of the respondents statutory
and contractual rights, which falls squarely under the HLURBs
jurisdiction.
The SC referred to Pena v. GSIS in ruling that when an
administrative agency is conferred quasi-judicial functions, all
controversies relating to the subject matter pertaining to its
specializations are deemed to be included within its
jurisdictions. Split jurisdiction is not favored.

2. No, Rule 65 is not a remedy for a lost appeal.

Petitioners should have directly taken the appeal to the SC by
filing a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. The

special civil action for certiorari a limited form of review and is

a remedy of last recourse. In this case the petitioners chose
the wrong mode of appeal.

DISPOSITION: Petition Denied

Digest Author: Logronio, Angelo J.

FORT BONIFACIO v. DOMINGO (2009)

Petitioner: FORT BONIFACIO DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
Respondent: MANUEL N. DOMINGO
Ponencia: Chico-Nazario J.
DOCTRINES:
The Construction Industry Arbitration Commission shall have original
and exclusive jurisdiction over disputes arising from or connected
with contracts entered into by parties involved in construction in the
Philippines
Jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter is determined by the
allegations of the complaint, irrespective of whether or not the
plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted
therein.
FACTS:
1. Petitioner Fort Boni entered into a Trade Contract with right to retain
5% of the contract price to ensure performance with LMM
Construction for the Bonifacio Ridge Condominium.
2. Due to problems in the work of LMM, Fort Boni replaced LMM with
another contractor. However, Fort Boni was still liable to pay LMM for
works already performed.
3. Fort Boni received a Notice of Garnishment in favor of Asia-Con
Builders and against the receivables of LLM; it issued by the CIAC.
4. LMM assigned its receivables from Fort Boni to Respondent
Domingo to settle its obligations to the latter.
5. Fort Boni informed Domingo of the retention money; that such was
not yet due and demandable and may be ascertained only after
completion by the new contractor. Also, it informed Domingo that part
of the receivables was being garnished by other creditors.
6. Unsatisfied, Domingo sent a letter asserting over a portion of the
retention money assigned to him and maintaining that such amount
can no longer be garnished to satisfy obligations of LMM
construction to other persons since it already ceased to be the
property of LMM.
7. Fort Boni denied Domingos claim on the retention money claiming
that there was no more left of the retention money after completion
and satisfaction of garnishment orders.
8. Domingo filed for collection against LMM and Fort Boni in the RTC of
Pasay City.
9. Fort Boni filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter arguing that since Domingo
merely stepped into the shoes of LMM construction, it was the CIAC
and not the regular courts that had jurisdiction over the dispute as
provided in the Trade Contract.

ISSUE: W/N the CIAC has jurisdiction over the case

RULING + RATIO:
NO, the CIAC has no jurisdiction over the case.
According to E.O. No. 1008, the Construction Industry Arbitration
Commission (CIAC) shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction
over disputes arising from or connected with contracts entered
into by parties involved in construction in the Philippines.
Jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter is determined by
the allegations of the complaint, irrespective of whether or not the
plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted
therein.
o What the allegations in the complaint are pointing out is
clear. LMM had an outstanding obligation to Respondent
Domingo; that in payment of said amount, LMM assigned to
Domingo its receivables from Fort Boni which was properly
made known to Fort Boni.
o It can be seen that Domingos claim is not construction
related at all. Fort Bonis insistence on the application of the
arbitration clause under the Trade Contract which says that
disputes arising therefrom should be brought before the
CIAC is anchored on an erroneous premise that respondent
is seeking to enforce a right under the same.
o The right to the receivables of LMM from Fort Boni under the
trade Contract is not being disputed therein. What Domingo
is demanding is that a portion of such receivables should
have been paid to him first before the other creditors of
LMM, which, clearly, does not require the CIACs
expertise and technical knowledge of construction.
o The adjudication of this case necessarily involves
application of pertinent laws and jurisprudence to matters
such as obligations and contracts, and if appropriate, even
preference of credits, a task more suited for a trial court to
carry out after a full-blown trial, than an arbitration body
specifically devoted to construction contracts.
DISPOSITION: Petition is DENIED.

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. BELISTA

(2009)
Petitioner: Land Bank of the Philippines
Respondent: Rene Ralla Belista
Ponencia: Peralta, J.

ISSUES:
6. WoN it is necessary in cases involving claims for just compensation
under RA No. 6657 that the decision of the Adjudicator must first be
appealed to the DARAB before a resort to the RTC may be had
PROVISION:

Section 50. Quasi-judicial Powers of the DAR. The DAR is hereby vested
with primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters
and shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving the
implementation of agrarian reform, except those falling under the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture (DA) and the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) x x x

Section 57. Special Jurisdiction. The Special Agrarian Court shall have
original and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of
just compensation to landowners, and the prosecution of all criminal
offenses under this Act. x x x

DOCTRINE: Determination of just compensation cases are an exception to

DARs exclusive original jurisdiction, for such cases fall within the jurisdiction
of the RTC sitting as a Special Agrarian Court.
FACTS:
49. Spouses Pablo Ralla and Carmen Ralla donated 8 parcels of land in
Albay, to their daughter Rene Ralla Belista.
50. These lands were placed by the Department of Agrarian Reform
(DAR) under the coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program (CARP). Because of this, Rene Belista sought payment of
just compensation.
51. The lands were assessed as follows:
a. P227,582.58 by DAR
b. P317,259.31 by LBP
52. Belista found these grossly underestimated and filed a Petition for
Valuation and Payment of Just Compensation before the DARAB.
The DARAB-Regional Adjudicator for Region V (RARAD-V) issued a
decision in favor of Belista, the amount of the just compensation
amounting to P2,896,408.91.
53. Upon filing of motions for reconsideration by both parties, the amount
was reduced to P2,540,211.58.
54. LBP then filed an original Petition for Determination of Just
Compensation at the same sala of the RTC. However, the court
dismissed this motu propio for failure to exhaust administrative
remedies and/or comply with Sections 5, 6, and 7, Rule XIX, 2003
DARAB Rules of Procedure.
55. LBPs Motion for Reconsideration was denied, and so the case was
elevated before the CA. The CA dismissed the petition and ruled
that:
a. LBPs filing of the case before the RTC violated the doctrine
of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies.
b. Since the case was filed in the RTC on October 28, 2003,
when the DARAB Rules were already in effect, then such
rules should govern
56. LBPs Motion for Reconsideration being denied again, this present
petition then was filed before the Court.

RULING + RATIO:
8. No. A resort to the RTC may be effected even without appealing
the decision to the DARAB
Section 50 of RA 5567 states that DAR has
i. primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate
agrarian reform matters
ii. exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters
involving implementation of agrarian reforms
EXCEPT those under the jurisdiction of the DA and
the DENR.
Section 57 further provides an exception to DARs exclusive
original jurisdiction, which includes
i. petitions for the determination of just
compensation to landowners
ii. prosecution of all criminal offenses under RA 6657.
Those falling under Section 57 are within the jurisdiction of
the RTC sitting as a Special Agrarian Court.
Such ruling is supported by the following jurisprudence:
o In Land Bank v. Wycoco, the court upheld the RTCs
jurisdiction over the petition of just compensation,
even where no summary administrative proceedings
were held before the DARAB.
o In Land Bank v. Natividad, the Court ruled that while
the DAR may determine in a preliminary manner the
just compensation for lands under the agrarian
reform program, such determination is subject to
challenge before the courts. The determination of
just compensation is essentially a judicial function.

In Land Bank v. Celada, the Court stated that the

valuation of property or determination of just
compensation in eminent domain proceedings is
essentially a judicial function which is vested with the
courts and NOT with administrative agencies.
The RTC erred in dismissing the case, relying on Sections 5,
6, and 7(see below) of Article XIX of the 2003 DARAB Rules
of Procedure. These rules essentially provide that an appeal
must be filed with the Adjudicator if they wish to contest the
decision of the DARAB (Section 5), and it is only when this
appeal is complied with that an original action may be filed
with the SAC (Section 7)
However, the above-mentioned rules could not change the
clear import of Section 57 of RA 6657, that the original and
exclusive jurisdiction to determine just compensation is in the
RTC.
Section 57 authorizes direct resort to the SAC in cases
involving petitioners for determination of just compensation.
o

DISPOSITION: Petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. The RTC is

directed to hear without delay the petition for determination of just
compensation.

For reference:
Section 5. Appeal. A party who disagrees with the resolution of the Adjudicator may
bring the matter to the Board by filing with the Adjudicator concerned a Notice of
Appeal within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the resolution. The filing of a Motion for
Reconsideration of said resolution shall interrupt the period herein fixed. If the motion
is denied, the aggrieved party may file the appeal within the remaining period, but in
no case shall it be less than five (5) days.
Section 6. When Resolution Deemed Final. Failure on the part of the aggrieved party
to contest the resolution of the Adjudicator within the aforecited reglementary period
provided shall be deemed a concurrence by such party with the land valuation, hence
said valuation shall become final and executory.
Section 7. Filing of Original Action with the Special Agrarian Court for Final
Determination. The party who disagrees with the decision of the Board may contest
the same by filing an original action with the Special Agrarian Court (SAC) having
jurisdiction over the subject property within fifteen (15) days from his receipt of the
Board's decision.

pure questions of law, therefore, Pateros resorted to a wrong mode

of appeal.

Municipality of Pateros v CA (2009)

Petition: Appeal
Petitioner: MUNICIPALITY OF PATEROS
Respondent: THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THE
MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI, THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, and THE
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES
Ponente: NACHURA, J.
DOCTRINE:
Issues which deal with the jurisdiction of a court over the subject
matter of a case are pure questions of law, and should be done through
certiorari and not an ordinary appeal.
FACTS:
1. Case concerns portions of Fort Bonifacio that are situated in Makati
and in Pateros. Proclamation No. 2475, issued by Marcos, dictated
that these portions (Barangays Cembo, South Cembo, West Rembo,
East Rembo, Comembo, Pembo, and Pitogo) were in Makati.
2. Pateros filed a claim to RTC Pasig, which was denied, as the
property was in Makati and thus the case should be filed in Makati.
Pateros then filed to Makati RTC.
3. Pateros claimed that, based on historical and official records, it had
an original area 1,038 hectares. However, when a cadastral mapping
was conducted by the Bureau of Lands in 1978, Pateros was
reduced to 166 hectares, allegedly due to the Proclamation.
4. The RTC dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. RTC held that
the Proclamation specifically declared that the subject property is
within the territorial jurisdiction of Makati and, inasmuch as the
Proclamation was not declared unconstitutional, the same is a valid
and subsisting law.
5. Pateros appealed to CA. The CA denied their appeal, because only
a question of law was raised, and thus the proper method was
certiorari directly to the SC, and not an ordinary appeal to CA. Thus,
this case.
6. Pateros argument was that their appeal to the CA involved mixed
questions of fact and law, because Pateros sought the determination
of its territorial boundaries and the nullification of Proclamation No.
2475. Respondent Makatis argument was that the sole issue in
Pateros' appeal before the CA is jurisdiction and as the question of
jurisdiction is a question of law and as the CA lacks jurisdiction over

ISSUE:
1. WoN the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing
the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
2. WoN the RTC has jurisdiction to entertain the boundary dispute
between Pateros and Makati.
RULING + RATIO:
5. NO.
a. The jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter of the
action is a matter of law; it is conferred by the Constitution or
by law. Consequently, issues which deal with the jurisdiction
of a court over the subject matter of a case are pure
questions of law.
b. Thus, being a pure question of law, the proper remedy is
certiorari,and not an ordinary appeal to the CA.
c. HOWEVER, the rules of procedure are intended to promote
rather than frustrate the ends of justice, and thus the
procedural guidelines were loosened in this case to prevent
a commission of a grave injustice. Which leads to..
6. YES, but ONLY AFTER failure to settle problems in the manner
prescribed by the LGC.
a. Sec 118 of the LGC states:
i. (d) Boundary disputes involving a component city or
municipality on the one hand and a highly urbanized
city on the other, or two (2) or more highly urbanized
cities, shall be jointly referred for settlement to the
respective sanggunians of the parties.
ii. (e) In the event the sanggunian fails to effect an
amicable settlement within sixty (60) days from the
date the dispute was referred thereto, it shall issue a
certification to that effect. Thereafter, the dispute shall
be formally tried by the sanggunian concerned which
shall decide the issue within sixty (60) days from the
date of the certification referred to above

The parties failed to even try to settle amicably using the

parameters of the LGC. It is only after failure to settle using
these steps when appeal to the RTC is allowed (Sec 1119,
LGC)
PETITION: DENIED
b.

parties are hereby DIRECTED to comply with Section 118(d) and (e) of the
Local Government Code, and Rule III of the Rules and Regulations
Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991 without prejudice to
judicial recourse, as provided in the Local Government Code.

Tri-Corp v. Court of Appeals (2009)

Petition: Certiorari
Petitioner: Tri-Corp
Respondents: Court of Appeals and Greystone
Ponente: Quisimbing
DOCTRINE: Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) has
the technical expertise to resolve the technical issue of an alleged
unsound real estate business practice.
FACTS:
16. Greystone Corp. executed in favor of Tri-Corp. Land and
Development, Inc. a Contract to Sell whereby Tri-Corp is to pay
P13,500,000 (exclusive of interests) in installments of a unit of
Casa Madeira (a residential condo project at Fatima St., San
Miguel Village, Makati City.
17. Such unit is to be used as a family residence of Tri-Corps
officers and stockholders.
18. However when Tri-Corp applied for membership with the San
Miguel Village Homeowners Assoc. (SMVHA), it was denied
and was not given gate passes for its vehicles due to the reason
that the construction of the Casa Madeira condo project was in
violation of village restrictions inscribed at the back of the
TCTs covering the lots on which the condo was constructed.
19. SMVHA filed a case against Greystone for its violation and prayed
for the cancellation of the CCTs of the condo before the Housing
and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB). Tri-Corp filed a
Complaint-in-Intervention in said case for suspension of payments
until the issue shall have been resolved.
20. Tri-Corp filed a petition against Greystone before the HLURB for
Suspension and Cancellation of Cetificate of Registration and
License to Sell of Greystone.
21. Greystone filed an ejectment suit against Tri-Corp in MTC.

22. Tri-Corp also filed before the RTC, sitting as a Land Registration
Court, a Petition for Correction of Error/Misrepresentation in
the Master Deed with prayer for TRO.
23. RTC dismissed the case for reason that it has no jurisdiction to
try and decide the case the same being within the exclusive
jurisdiction of HLURB.
24. Tri-Corp appealed to the CA. CA dismissed for being out of time
and without merit, hence this petition.
ISSUE:
WoN the CA acted with grave abuse of discretion in
denying Tri-Corps motion for reconsideration for beibng filed
out of time, in declaring Tri-Corp as not a party in interest and
in affirming the RTCs Order dismissing the case for lack
of jurisdiction?
RULING + RATIO:
NO. The CA did not act with grave abuse of discretion.
- Tri-Corp argues that the CA overlooked the fact that the case is
one for cancellation of inscriptions and cancellation of the CCT,
which is within the ambit of the Register of Deeds to perform,
and the case is not a simple buyer-seller of condo
relationship but one which seeks the alteration of
annotations and cancellation of titles within the jurisdiction
of the RTC as a Land Registration Court.
- Section 1 of PD 1344 (Empowering the NHA to issue Writ of
Execution in the Enforcement of its Decisions Under the PD
957) provides that the NHA shall have the exclusive
jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of the following nature:
A. Unsound real estate business practices;
B. Claims involving refund and any other claims filed
by subdivision lot or condominium unit buyer against
the project owner, developer, dealer, broker or
salesman; and
C. Cases involving specific performance of contractual
and statutory obligations filed by buyers of subdivision
lot or condominium unit against the owner, developer,
dealer, or salesman.
- Tri-Corps chief quest is the cancellation of Entry No.
31976 from TCTs Nos. 205827 and 205828, and the
cancellation of the CCT of the unit sold to it, and it alludes to

Greystones use of different descriptions of the

condominium project in order to circumvent existing laws,
rules and regulations on registration of real estate projects in
its petition. Under these circumstances, Tri-Corp is alluding to
steps allegedly taken by Greystone in consummating an
alleged unsound real estate business practice. The
HLURB has the technical expertise to resolve this technical
issue. Jurisdiction therefore properly pertains to the HLURB.

DISPOSITION: Petition denied for lack of merit.

Respondent's Arguments

Dazon v. Yap (2010)

Petition: Certiorari
Petitioner: MA. LUISA G. DAZON.
Defendant: KENNETH Y. YAP AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
Ponente: Del Castillo
DOCTRINE:
Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all
criminal cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal or
body, except those now falling under the exclusive and concurrent
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan which shall hereafter be exclusively taken
cognizance of by the latter.
FACTS:

1. Ma. Luisa G. Dazon for the purchased condominium Unit No. C2.

3.
4.

5.

6.

108 from Primetown. She made a downpayment and several

installment payments, totaling P1,114,274.30.
Primetown, however, failed to finish the condominium project.
Thus, Dazon demanded for a refund of her payments pursuant to
Section 23 of PD No. 957 aka "The Subdivision and Condominium
Buyers' Protective Decree".
Primetown failed to refund petitioner's payments.
Thus, Dazon filed a criminal complaint with the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Lapu-Lapu City against Kenneth Yap as president of
Primetown for violation of Section 23 in relation to Section 39 of PD
957.
Yap filed a Petition for Review with the Department of Justice.
DOJ rendered a Resolution ordering the trial prosecutor to cause the
withdrawal of the Information. Hence, the prosecutor filed a Motion to
Withdraw Information with the RTC.
RTC granted the Motion to Withdraw Information

ISSUE:
Whether or not a regional trial court has jurisdiction over a
criminal action arising from violation of PD 957
Petitioner's Arguments
Jurisdiction is conferred by law and that there is no law expressly vesting
on the HLUKB exclusive jurisdiction over criminal actions arising from
violations of PD 957.

- no error of law involved in this case and that petitioner failed to give due
regard to the hierarchy of courts by filing the present petition directly with the
Supreme Court instead of with the Court of Appeals.
-the real issue is not of jurisdiction but the existence of probable cause.
-The Secretary of Justice, according to respondent, found no probable cause
to warrant the filing of the Information, hence its directive to cause the
withdrawal of the Information.
RULING + RATIO: YES
Jurisdiction is" conferred by law and determined by the material
averments in the complaint as well as the character of the relief sought.
Administrative agencies being tribunals of limited jurisdiction can only
wield such powers as are specifically granted to them by their enabling
statutes.
PD 957 makes the following specific grant of powers to the NHA
(now HLURB) for the imposition of administrative fines, and it also
mentions penalties for criminal cases.
Having limited, under Section 38 of PD 957, the grant of power to the
former NHA, now HLURB, over the imposition of fines to those which
do not exceed ten thousand pesos, it is clear that the power in
relation to criminal liability mentioned in the immediately succeeding
provision, to impose, upon conviction, fines above ten thousand
pesos and/or imprisonment, was not conferred on it. Section 39,
unlike Section 38, conspicuously does not state that it is the MIA that
may impose the punishment specified therein.
Not having been specifically conferred with power to hear and decide
cases which are criminal in nature, as well as to impose penalties
therefor, HLURB has no jurisdiction over criminal actions arising from
violations of PD 957.
On the other hand, BP Big. 129 states:
Sec. 20. Jurisdiction in Criminal Cases. - Regional Trial Courts shall
exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all criminal cases not within the
exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal or body, except those now
falling under the exclusive and concurrent jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
which shall hereafter be exclusively taken cognizance of by the latter.
Based on the above-quoted provision, it is the RTC that has jurisdiction over
criminal cases arising from violations of PD 957.

DISPOSITION: Petition granted.

FELIPE N. MADRIAN v. FRANCISCA R.

MADRIAN (2007)
Petitioner:
Respondent:
Ponente:

Felipe Madrian (Father)

Francisca Madrian (Mother)

Corona, J.

questioned the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals on the ground that

Sec. 5 of R.A. 8369 (Family Courts Act) granted EXCLUSIVE
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION to hear and decide Petitions for the
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus over to the Family Courts;
61. Mother countered that it was he who was a drunkard and a drug
addict and was constantly committing violence against them, which
led her to leave their conjugal home;

DOCTRINE: Family Courts exclusive jurisdiction over writs of Habeas

Corpus in relation to custody of minors
[F]amily courts are vested with original exclusive jurisdiction in
custody cases, not in habeas corpus cases. Writs of habeas corpus which
may be issued exclusively by family courts under Section 5(b) of RA 8369
pertain to the ancillary remedy that may be availed of in conjunction with a
petition for custody of minors under Rule 99 of the Rules of Court. In other
words, the issuance of the writ is merely ancillary to the custody case
pending before the family court. The writ must be issued by the same court to
avoid splitting of jurisdiction, conflicting decisions, interference by a co-equal
court and judicial instability.

ISSUES:

FACTS:

WON the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue the Writ.

62. Court of Appeals ruled in Oct. 21, 2002 that Art. 213 of the Family
Code vests custodial rights to the Mother over Phillip and Francis
Angelo as they were then 6 and 4 yrs. old respectively, while custody
over Ronnick (then 8 yrs. old) should be determined by a proper
Family Court;
63. After denial of his Motion for Reconsideration, Father instituted the
instant Petition for Review on Certiorari (under rule 45) assailing the
jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals.

57. Felipe & Francisca (Father and Mother respectively) got married
in July 7, 1993 and had 4 children, namely: Ronnick (born 1994),
Phillip (1996), Francis Angelo (1998) and Krizia Ann (2000). They
resided in San Agustin Village, Moonwalk, Paraaque;

PROVISION:

58. A quarrel between the spouses ensued sometime in May 18, 2002
which led to their separation in fact; Father took custody of the three
(3) sons while Mother retained their only daughter;

Section 5. Jurisdiction of Family Courts The Family Courts shall have

exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide the following cases:

Sec. 5, RA 8369 (Family Courts Act);

Sec. 20, A.M. 03-03-04-SC (Rule on Custody of Minors
and Writ of Habeas Corpus in Relation to Custody of
Minors)

xxx
59. Mother took steps for the reconciliation of the family, but to no avail.
Thereafter, she sought help from the Lupong Tagapamayapa of their
barangay, but the same also failed. Thus, she filed a Petition for the
issuance of a Writ of Habeas Corpus before the Court of Appeals
against the Father for the latter to produce the bodies of her sons ad
explain why they should not be returned to her custody;
60. In another failed attempt at a compromise, Father alleged in his
Memoradum that the Mother was unfit to take care of the children for
being a drunkard and a neglectful mother. Further, he alleged that it
was the Mother who left them with their daughter, leading him to
reside in Laguna and work as a tricycle driver therein. Also, he
presented evidence that the sons were properly enrolled in Dila
Elementary School, thereby negating the Mothers claim that the
Fathers abandonment disrupted the childrens schooling. Lastly, he

b) Petitions for guardianship, custody of children, HABEAS

CORPUS IN RELATION TO THE LATTER; x x x
Section 20. Petition for writ of Habeas Corpus A verified petition for a
writ of habeas corpus involving custody of minors shall be filed with
the Family Court. The writ shall be enforceable within its judicial
region to which the Family Court belongs.
xxx
The petition may likewise be filed with the Supreme Court, Court
of Appeals, or with any of its members, and if so granted, the
writ shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines. The writ

may be returnable to a Family Court or to any regular court within the

region where the petitioner resides or where the minor may be found
for hearing and decision on the merits. x x x
(emphasis supplied)
RULING + RATIO:
Yes. SC and CA have concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus
involving custody of minors.
Although the Family Courts Act grant exclusive original jurisdiction
over the issuance of writs of habeas corpus, the same pertains to an
ancillary remedy in relation to custody of children. As presently
worded, it does not divest the Supreme Court and the Court of
Appeals jurisdiction over petitions for the same writ, thus:

custody of their children. Individuals who do not

know the whereabouts of minors they are looking for
would be helpless since they cannot seek redress
from family courts whose writs are enforceable only
in their respective territorial jurisdictions. Thus, if a
minor is being transferred from one place to
another, which seems to be the case here, the
petitioner in a habeas corpus case will be left
without legal remedy. This lack of recourse
could not have been the intention of the
lawmakers when they passed [RA 8369].
(emphasis supplied)
DISPOSITION: Petition for review on Certiorari is DENIED.

x x x a careful reading of Section 5(b) of RA 8369

reveals that family courts are vested with original
exclusive jurisdiction in custody cases, not
in habeas
corpus cases.
Writs
of habeas
corpus which may be issued exclusively by family
courts under Section 5(b) of RA 8369 pertain to
the ancillary remedy that may be availed of in
conjunction with a petition for custody of minors
under Rule 99 of the Rules of Court. In other words,
the issuance of the writ is merely ancillary to the
custody case pending before the family court. The
writ must be issued by the same court to avoid
splitting of jurisdiction, conflicting decisions,
interference by a co-equal court and judicial
instability.
(emphasis supplied)

Further, the Court ruled that to grant exclusive jurisdiction over the
said writs to the Family Courts would leave an iniquitous situation
where the party who does not know the whereabouts of the children
can no longer file for the said petition because the children are being
moved from a judicial region to another, thereby confusing the party
as to which Family Court possesses jurisdiction over them. Thus:
[The reasoning that by giving family courts exclusive
jurisdiction
over habeas
corpus cases,
the
lawmakers intended them to be the sole courts
which can issue writs of habeas corpus] will result in
an iniquitous situation, leaving individuals like
[respondent] without legal recourse in obtaining

Digest Author: Mae Bulang

Yu v. Yu (2006)
Petitioner: ERIC JONATHAN YU
Respondent: CAROLINE T. YU
Ponencia: CARPIO MORALES, J.:
DOCTRINE: The issue on the
custody of the spouses common children is deemed pleaded in the
declaration of nullity case.

FACTS:
Eric Jonathan Yu filed a petition for habeas corpus before the Court of
Appeals alleging that his estranged wife Caroline Tanchay-Yu unlawfully
withheld from him the custody of their minor child Bianca, which included a
prayer for the award to him of the sole custody of Bianca.
Caroline filed a petition against petitioner before the Pasig RTC for
declaration of nullity of marriage and dissolution of the absolute community of
property, which included a prayer for the award to her of the sole custody of
Bianca and for the fixing of schedule of petitioners visiting rights.
Both filed a Joint Motion to Approve Interim Visitation Agreement which
was approved. Petitioner then filed an Opposition with Motion to Cite
Respondent for Contempt of Court in light of her filing of the petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage before the Pasig RTC which, so he
contended, constituted forum shopping.
The appellate court ordered respondent and her counsel to make the
necessary amendment in her petition for declaration of nullity of marriage
before the Pasig City RTC in so far as the custody aspect is concerned,
under pain of contempt. She, however, filed a Motion to Dismiss her petition,
without prejudice, on the ground that since she started residing and
conducting business at her new address at Pasay City, constraints on
resources and her very busy schedule rendered her unable to devote the
necessary time and attention to the petition which was later granted.
Petitioner filed his own petition for declaration of nullity of marriage and
dissolution of the absolute community of property before the Pasig RTC with
prayer for the award to him of the sole custody of Bianca, subject to the final
resolution by the appellate court of his petition for habeas corpus.
The appellate court eventually dismissed the habeas corpus.

In the meantime, respondent filed before the Pasay RTC a petition for
habeas corpus, which she denominated as Amended Petition, praying for
the award of the sole custody to her of Bianca. Petitioner filed before the
Pasig RTC in his petition for declaration of nullity of marriage an urgent
motion praying for the custody of Bianca for the duration of the case.
Acting on respondents petition, Branch 113 of the Pasay RTC issued
a Writ of Habeas Corpus, a Hold Departure Order and Summons addressed
to petitioner, drawing petitioner to file a motion to dismiss the petition on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction, failure to state a cause of action, forum
shopping and litis pendentia, he citing the pending petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage which he filed before the Pasig RTC.
The Pasay RTC, in the meantime issued an Order declaring that
pending the disposition of respondents petition, Bianca should stay with
petitioner from Sunday afternoon to Saturday morning and with the company
of her mother from Saturday 1:00 in the afternoon up to Sunday 1:00 in the
afternoon. To this Order, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration,
arguing that the Pasay RTC did not have jurisdiction to issue the same.
ISSUES:
Whether the question of custody over Bianca should be litigated before
the Pasay RTC or before the Pasig RTC. (Pasig RTC)
PROVISION:
Family Code Art. 50
The final judgment in such cases [for the annulment or declaration of nullity
of marriage] shall provide for the liquidation, partition and distribution of the
properties of the spouses, the custody and support of the common
children, and the delivery of their presumptive legitimes, unless such other
matters had been adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings.
RULING + RATIO:

Pasig RTC -- Judgment on the issue of custody in the nullity of

marriage case before the Pasig RTC, regardless of which party
would prevail, would constitute res judicata on the habeas corpus
case before the Pasay RTC since the former has jurisdiction over the
parties and the subject matter.
There is identity in the causes of action inPasig and Pasay because
there is identity in the facts and evidence essential to the resolution
of the identical issue raised in both actions.

By petitioners filing of the case for declaration of nullity of marriage

before thePasig RTC he automatically submitted the issue of the
custody of Bianca as an incident thereof.
It is the court who will determine the custody of common children
over the case of declaration of nullity - Pasig RTC.

DISPOSITION:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The August 10, 2004 decision of
the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and another is
entered DISMISSING Pasay City Regional Trial Court Sp. Proc. No. 030048-CFM and ordering Branch 69 of Pasig City Regional Trial Court to
continue, with dispatch, the proceedings in JDRC No. 6190.

Spouses Fajardo v. Flores (2010)

Petition: Petition for review of decision of CA
Petitioners: Spouses Jesus Fajardo and Emer Fajardo
Respondents: Anita Flores, assisted by husband, Bienvenido Flores
Ponencia: Nachura

DOCTRINE:
The existence of a prior agricultural tenancy relationship will divest the
MTC of its jurisdiction. An administrative body of special competence
has jurisdiction over it.

FACTS:
25. Delos Reyes owned a parcel of land with an area of 25,513 sq m.
in Hacienda Buenavista, Bulacan. He allowed Jesus Fajardo to
cultivate the land. The net harvests were divided equally between
the two until it was converted into a leasehold tenancy.
26. Rent was provisionally fixed at 27.42 cavans/year, as fixed by
DAR.1
27. Fajardo was allowed to erect a house for his family on the stony
part of the land (subject of controversy) from the time he cultivated
the land.
28. Delos Reyes died. The land was inherited by his daughter, Anita
Flores.
29. Flores and Fajardo had 2 agreements: 1) Kasunduan ng
paghahati ng lupa at pagtatalaga ng daan ukol sa magkabilang
panig and 2) Kasunduan sa hatian ng lupa; they agreed that an
area of 10,923 sq m shall be allotted to Fajardo.
30. There was a conflict in the interpretation as to who owns or has a
better right to the stony part of the land. The case was referred to
the DAR and they were advised to ventilate their claims with the
DARAB.2
31. Flores filed a complaint for ejectment against Fajardo with the
MTC Bulacan. She alleges that the stony part is not devoted to
agriculture, that she owns it, and Fajardo built a house by mere
tolerance only.

1
2

Department of Agrarian Reform

Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board

32. Fajardo filed a Motion to Dismiss saying that it was an agricultural

land and MTC had no jurisdiction over the case since it was
already referred to the DARAB.
33. MTC says that what was divided was only the portion being tilled,
excluding the stony part. Thus, it had jurisdiction over it.
34. RTC affirmed MTC and then reversed its decision ruling that the
issue was agrarian and thus ordered its dismissal for lack of
jurisdiction.
35. CA reinstated the MTC decision ruling that the stony part was
residential and that when they divided the land, the
leasehold/tenancy relationship between them was severed so
there was no more agrarian dispute.
ISSUE:
5. WoN MTC has jurisdiction over the case
RULING + RATIO:
7. NO.
The stony part is the subject of the unlawful detainer case.
However, to determine who has the better right, the issue
as to whom the stony part was allotted has to be
determined. Thus it is not simply an unlawful detainer
case, but one incapable of pecuniary estimation, definitely
beyond the competence of the MTC.
Fajardo being an agricultural lessee, he has a right to a
home lot and a right to its exclusive possession. It is
therefore an agrarian dispute falling under CARL.3
o Agrarian dispute any controversy relation to
tenancy over lands devoted to agriculture
o The division of the land did not end the tenancy
relationship. There still exists an agrarian dispute
since it involved the home of Fajardo, which is an
incident arising from the landlord-tenant relationship
The Court of Agrarian Relations has jurisdiction of
agrarian disputes. This jurisdiction does not require the
continuance of the relationship of landlord and tenant at
the time of dispute. What matters is that the dispute
springs or originates from the relationship of landlord and
tenant.
o Thus cognizable by the DAR, through the DARAB
Case was already referred to DARAB. Doctrine of
primary jurisdiction precludes courts from resolving a
3

Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law RA 6657

case over which jurisdiction has initially been lodged with

an administrative body of special competence.
DISPOSITION: Case dismissed for lack of jurisdiction of MTC over
the case.

Vda De Barrera et al v. Heirs of Vicente Legaspi

Petition: Petition for review
Petitioner: FERNANDA GEONZON VDA. DE BARRERA AND JOHNNY
OCO, JR.,
Respondent: HEIRS OF VICENTE LEGASPI, REPRESENTED BY PEDRO
LEGASPI,
Ponencia: Carpio Morales, J.
DOCTRINE:
FACTS:
1. October 1996, Oco, an officer connected with PNP, forced his way
into the .9 hectare farmland of Legaspi in Misamis Occidental. Oco
used a tractor to destroy the planted crops, took possession of the
land and tended it.
2. Feb 1997, Legaspi filed a complaint against petitioners.
a. Regional Trial Court of Tangub City for Reconveyance of
Possession with Preliminary Mandatory Injunction and
Damages.
3. Oco claimed that the land forms part of a three-hectare property
described in OCT No. P-447 issued on February 10, 1956 in the
name of Andrea Lacson who sold a 2-hectare portion thereof to
Eleuterio Geonzon who, in turn, sold 1.1148 thereof to his sister
Fernanda Geonzon vda. de Barrera.
4. Legaspi claims that the land was occupied, possessed and cultivated
by Vicente Legaspi and his wife Lorenza since 1935.
5. In 1976 a subdivision survey was conducted and it was discovered
that the land formed part of the titled property of Lacson but no
action was filed and thus their ownership was undisturbed.
6. Oco raised the issue of ownership as a special affirmative defense.
However, they questioned the jurisdiction of the RTC over the
subject matter of the complaint, the assessed value of the land being
only P11,160, as reflected in Tax Declaration.
7. RTC in favor of Legaspi
8. CA affirmed
ISSUES:
1. W/N the court has jurisdiction?
PROVISIONS:

Section 33 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129, (the Judiciary Reorganization Act

of 1980), as amended by Republic Act No. 7691 provides for the jurisdiction
of metropolitan trial courts, municipal trial courts and municipal circuit trial
courts, to wit:
(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or
possession of, real property, or any interest therein where the assessed
value of the property or interest therein does not exceed Twenty thousand
pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed
value does not exceed Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of
interest, damages of whatever kind, attorneys fees, litigation expenses and
costs: Provided, That in cases of land not declared for taxation purposes,
the value of such property shall be determined by the assessed value of the
adjacent lots.
RULING + RATIO:
1. NO the RTC has no Jurisdiction
a. Before the amendments of RA 7691, accion publiciana was
to be brought before the RTC.
b. After RA 7691 jurisdiction of the first level courts has been
expanded to include real actions where the assessed value
does not exceed P20,000, P50,000 where the action is
filed in Metro Manila.
c. Accordingly, the jurisdictional element is the assessed value
of the property.
i. Assessed value is understood to be the worth or
value of property established by taxing authorities on
the basis of which the tax rate is applied.
Commonly, however, it does not represent the true
or market value of the property.
d. The land has an assessed value of P11,160 as reflected in
Tax Dec. The case, therefore, falls within the exclusive
original jurisdiction of the municipal trial court.
e. It was error then for the RTC to take cognizance of the
complaint based on the allegation that the present
estimated value [of the land is] P50,000, which allegation is,
oddly, handwritten on the printed pleading.
f. The estimated value, commonly referred to as fair market
value, is entirely different from the assessed value of the
property.
g. Lack of jurisdiction is one of those excepted grounds where
the court may dismiss a claim or a case at any time when it
appears from the pleadings or the evidence on record that
any of those grounds exists, even if they were not raised in
the answer or in a motion to dismiss. That the issue of lack
of jurisdiction was raised by petitioners only in their

Memorandum filed before the trial court did not thus render
them in estoppel.
DISPOSITION: Petition Granted . CA and RTC reversed.

OUANO v. PGTT
Petition: Petition for certiorari
Petitioner: Jovenal Ouano
Respondent: PGTT International Investment Corporation, Hon.
Judge Ramon G. Codilla, Jr.
Ponente: Sandoval-Gutierrez, J.

observation of plaintiffs (PGTTs) counsel as to the issue on damages

is likewise sustained considering that, being a corporation, it may
have incurred damages in the form of unrealized profits. Hence, this
petition.
ISSUES:
W/N the RTC has jurisdiction over the matter
PROVISION:

RULING + RATIO:

DOCTRINE:

*Recourse should have been made to CA and not SC but they

decided to resolve the controversy only in this instance.

Jurisdiction over the subject matter of the claim is determined by

the assessed value, not the market value

NO, the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying Ouano's

motion to dismiss.

FACTS:
1. PGTT filed with the RTC, Branch 20 of Cebu City a complaint
against Ouano for Recovery of Ownership and Possession of Real
Property and Damages. This was because PGTT found out that
Ouano uprooted concrete monuments of the 10 lots PGTT owned in
Sunnymeade Crescent Subdivision and planted corn thereon. Ouano
refused claiming he is the owner of such lots.
2. Ouano filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that it is the MTC
and not the RTC which has jurisdiction over the matter considering
that the assessed value is only P2,910 as indicated in the latest tax
declaration. PGTT contends that RTC has jurisdiction given that the
market value of the lots if P49,760 and that it is also a case for
damages exceeding P100,000 giving the RTC jurisdiction over such.
3. RTC denied Ouano's motion to dismiss stating that 10 parcels of
land being valuated at P2,000 is unrealistic and there must have been
a discrepancy.
4. A motion for reconsideration was likewise denied: it is of judicial
knowledge that the real properties situated in Cebu City command a
higher valuation than those indicated in the tax declaration. The

Since the action involves ownership and possession of real

property, the jurisdiction over the subject matter of the claim is
determined by the assessed value, not the market
value, thereof, pursuant to Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as
amended by R.A. 7691.
For MeTC, MTC, and MCTC, they have exclusive original
jurisdiction for civil actions which involve title to, or possession
of, real property or any interest where assessed value of
property or interest does not exceed P20,000; for civil actions
in Metro Manila assessed value shall not exceed P50,000
exclusive of interest, damages of all kind, attorney's fees and
litigation expenses and costs. Provided that in cases of land
not declared for taxation purposes, the value of such property
shall be determined by the assessed value of the adjacent
lots. (Section 33 of BP 129)
For RTC to have exclusive original jurisdiction the assessed
value should exceed P20,000, and for Metro Manila it should
exceed P50,000 (Section 19 of BP129)
The finding of respondent judge that the value of the lots is
higher than that indicated in the tax declaration and that,
therefore, the RTC has jurisdiction over the case is highly
speculative. It is elementary that the tax declaration indicating
the assessed value of the property enjoys the presumption of

regularity as it has been issued by the proper government

agency.
The fact that the sought damages exceed P100,000 will still
not make jurisdiction fall with the RTC, this is because Section
33 and 19 explicitly excludes "interest, damages of whatever
kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs."
The said damages are merely incidental to, or a consequence
of, the main cause of action for recovery of ownership and
possession of real property. In this connection, this Court
issued Administrative Circular No. 09-94 setting the guidelines
in the implementation of R.A. 7691. Paragraph 2 states:
2. The exclusion of the term damages of whatever kind in
determining the jurisdictional amount under Section 19 (8) and
Section 33 (1) of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended by R.A. 7691,
applies to cases where the damages are merely incidental to
or a consequence of the main cause of action. However, in
cases where the claim for damages is the main cause of
action, or one of the causes of action, the amount of such
claim shall be considered in determining the jurisdiction of the
court."

The Court finds that in issuing the assailed orders denying

petitioners motion to dismiss, thus taking cognizance of the
case, the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion.

DISPOSITION:
Petition GRANTED, and the complaint is DISMISSED.

70. The CA reversed the decision and ordered Leo Wee to vacate the
subject property and return it to the respondents.

WEE v. DE CASTRO (2008)

Petitioner: Leo Wee
Respondent: George de Castro (on his behalf and as attorney-in-fact of
Annie de Castro and Felomina Uban) and Martiniana de Castro
Ponencia: Chico-Nazario
Digest by: Veron
DOCTRINE: Jurisdiction Barangay Lupon (Barangay Conciliation)
The barangay justice system was established primarily as a means of easing
up the congestion of cases in the judicial courts. PD 1508 requires the
parties to undergo a conciliation process before the Lupon Chairman or the
Pangkat ng Tagapagkasundo as a precondition to filing a complaint in court,
subject to certain exceptions. This has been declared compulsory in nature.
FACTS:
64. Respondents De Castro allege that they are the registered owners of
a two-storey building in Alaminos, Pangasinan, which they rented out
to petitioner Leo Wee at a rate of P9,000/month.
65. The P9,000 monthly rate was increased to P15,000. However, Leo
Wee failed or refused to pay the increase when his rent became due
on October 1, 2001.
66. The rental dispute was brought to the Lupon Tagapagpamayapa, but
failed to reach an amicable settlement regarding the increase, thus,
the Barangay Lupon issued a Certification to file action in court on
January 18, 2002.
67. On June 10, 2002, George de Castro (respondent) sent a demand
letter to Leo Wee, demanding that he vacate and turn over the
subject property, but petitioner refused. Thus, the complaint for
unlawful detainer was filed before the MTC.
a. The certification referred to the issue of rental increase, and
does not contain the subsequent issue of ejectment.
Petitioner claims that because of this, MTC does not have
jurisdiction over the ejectment suit.
68. Petitioner Leo Wee however, countered that there was no agreement
between them to increase the monthly rentals, the demand for the
increase was exorbitant, and that respondents failed to comply with
the jurisdictional requirement of conciliation prior to the filing of the
Civil Case.
69. The RTC, declared that respondents failure to refer the matter to the
Barangay court for conciliation process barred the ejectment case,
because conciliation before the Lupon is a condition sine qua non in
the filing of ejectment suits.

ISSUES:
WON the Certification dated January 18, 2002 issued by the Barangay
Lupon stating that no settlement was reached by the parties on the
matter of rental increase sufficient to comply with the prior conciliation
requirement under the Katarungang Pambarangay Law to authorize
respondents to institute the ejectment suit against petitioner;
PROVISION:
Section 412. Conciliation No complaint, petition, action,
proceeding involving any matter within the authority of the Lupon
shall be filed or instituted directly in court or any other government
office for adjudication, unless there has been a confrontation
between the parties before the Lupon Chairman or the Pangkat, and
that no conciliation or settlement has been reached as certified by
the Lupon Secretary or Pangkat Secretary as attested to by the
Lupon or Pangkat chairman, or unless settlement has been
repudiated by the parties.
RULING + RATIO:
Yes.
The barangay justice system was established primarily to ease up
the congestion of cases in judicial courts. This is accomplished
through a proceeding before the barangay courts which is essentially
arbitration in character, and is compulsory. It would be in keeping
with the philosophy of PD 1508 (Katarungang Pambarangay Law),
which would be better served if an out-of-court settlement of the case
is reached voluntarily by the parties.
Section 6 of PD 1508 requires the parties to undergo a conciliation
process before the Lupon Chairman or the Pangkat ng
Tagapagkasundo as a precondition to filing a complaint in court
subject to certain exceptions.
PD 1508 is now incorporated in RA 7610 (Local Government Code),
which provides several provisions making conciliation a precondition
to the filing of complaints in court.
While it is true that the Certification refers only to rental increase and
not the ejectment, the submission of the same for conciliation before
the Barangay Lupon constituted sufficient compliance with the
provisions of the Katarungang Pambarangay Law.
Given the circumstances of the case at bar, the conciliation
proceedings for the amount of monthly rental should logically include
also the possession of the property subject of the rental, the lease
agreement and the violation of the terms.

DISPOSITION: Petition dismissed.

EXTRAS:
- The rentals were on a month-to-month basis. Respondents have
every right to demand ejectment of Leo Wee at the end of each
month, the contract having expired by operation of law, as per Art.
1687 of the Civil Code.
- George de Castro filed the suit; petitioner is claiming that he cannot
maintain an action for ejectment without joining all his co-owners. Art.
487 of the Civil Code provides that Any one of the co-owners may
bring an action in ejectment, which covers all kinds of action for
recovery of possession. Moreover, an SPA was executed by the coowners to George De Castro to initiate the ejectment proceedings.
- On the issue of George de Castros lack of authority to sign the
Verification and Certificate of Non-Forum Shopping, its not a
violation of the requirement that parties must personally sign the
same, as an attorney-in-fact may sign on the others behalf.