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Between:
Hull Limited
Plaintiff
And
Vancouver Career College (Burnaby) Inc.
Defendant
Gordon G. Plottel
Kevin A. McLean
March 17,
& March 28, 2014
Vancouver, B.C.
May 2, 2014
Page 2
INTRODUCTION
[1]
Limited judgment against the defendant, Vancouver Career College (Burnaby) Inc.
(VCC), in the amount of $157,273.99.
[2]
[3]
In granting judgment for the plaintiff, the Court made the following findings:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)
(g)
Following release of the Reasons for Judgment and before entry of the
Courts order, counsel for the plaintiff requested leave to make submissions on
special costs. I granted counsels request and have now received written
submissions from the parties.
BCSC 277, this Court, on the summary trial application of the plaintiff, granted Hull
Page 3
The plaintiff seeks special costs on the basis that the defendants conduct
The defendant submits that it is not reprehensible for a party with a weak
case to raise the defences available to it. Counsel for VCC argues that his client
had legitimate grounds to contest both the summary trial application as well as an
earlier, unsuccessful summary trial application heard on August 6, 2013.
[6]
application, Mr. Hull deposed that he had arranged for Hull Limited to make the loan
of $125,000 to LINC. However, some of the documents attached as exhibits to
Mr. Hulls affidavit referred to repayment of the loan to Mr. Hull personally, rather
than to Hull Limited. The defendant argued that the plaintiff had failed to prove
whether the lender was Mr. Hull or Hull Limited, and that the case was not suitable
for disposition by summary trial where there was no evidence of any assignment of
the loan from Mr. Hull to the plaintiff.
[7]
After counsel completed their submissions on August 6, 2013, when the Court
reconvened for delivery of oral Reasons for Judgment, defence counsel produced,
from documents provided to him by his client, a copy of a document dated April 30,
2010, purporting to be an assignment of the loan from Mr. Hull to the plaintiff.
Neither party had previously listed the assignment agreement. The document was
not before the Court as an exhibit to an affidavit. Accordingly, I determined that the
parties should have the opportunity to investigate the circumstances in which that
document came into existence, and its validity. The Court dismissed the plaintiffs
first summary trial application, with liberty to reapply.
during the course of the litigation was reprehensible. The plaintiff submits that the
Page 4
The plaintiff determined that Mr. Hull had in fact made the assignment of the
loan to Hull Limited and amended its Notice of Civil Claim accordingly. Hull Limited
then filed its second application for summary trial on September 30, 2013. The
reasons for which the plaintiff bears no responsibility, the second summary trial
application was adjourned twice, and was not heard until February 12, 2014.
[9]
had received notice in writing of the assignment of the debt to Hull Limited, but
argued that the plaintiffs failure to produce any document or instrument showing that
Mr. Hull had actually loaned $125,000 to LINC precluded the plaintiff from obtaining
judgment by summary trial on the debt. The Court determined that on the summary
trial of a claim in debt where a written loan agreement was not produced, it had to be
satisfied on all of the evidence that it would be able to find the material facts
establishing the debt alleged, that there was reliable supporting evidence for the
loan, and that any conflicts in the evidence could be resolved without crossexamination or a conventional trial.
[10]
In the result, on the whole of the evidence, including Mr. Hulls affidavit
The defendant submits that even if its defence lacked merit, there was no
element of misconduct on its part that should attract an order for special costs.
plaintiff set that application down for hearing on November 21, 2013. However, for
Page 5
DISCUSSION
[12]
Hospitality Inc. v. Woo, 2008 BCSC 615, Vondella Mechanical 2000 Ltd. v. Crerar,
2008 BCSC 789, and Shandro Dixon Edgson v. Kedia, 2008 BCSC 69, each of
which involved a fact-specific application of the principle that something more than
the mere pursuit of a weak case is required to warrant an award for special costs.
[14]
In Genesee Enterprises Ltd. v. Rached, 2001 BCSC 1172 at para. 21, the
court found that the defendants conduct throughout the proceedings showed that
they sought to delay and hinder the plaintiff from recovering on its claim. The Court
held that conduct, together with the defendants improper allegations of fraud,
conspiracy and criminal misconduct, and its improper motive for bringing the
proceedings, cumulatively warranted an order for special costs.
[15]
indifference by not recognizing early on that its claim was manifestly deficient:
Mayer v. Osborne Contracting Ltd., 2011 BCSC 914 at para. 11. In Wood Atkinson
v. Murphy, 2011 BCSC 1766 at para. 21, the Court held that reckless indifference
to the manifest deficiency of a partys claim can warrant special costs, but
emphasized that the determination of whether an award for special costs is
appropriate is case-specific and fact driven.
Page 6
reckless indifference to the merits of a case as a ground for awarding special costs
[10] Most decisions involving special costs awards are not particularly helpful
because they are fact driven. However, Concord Industrial Services Ltd. v.
371773 B.C. Ltd., 2002 BCSC 900, is instructive. Special costs were ordered
where a party displayed reckless indifference by failing to acknowledge
early on that its claim was manifestly deficient. The Court held at para. 27
that the plaintiffs failure to come to terms with that manifest deficiency at an
early stage of the proceedings constituted the sort of reckless indifference to
the legitimate interests of the defendant as is envisioned by the authorities
which cite reprehensible conduct as a basis for awarding special costs.
[11] I also find instructive the comment of Hall J.A. in Catalyst Paper
Corporation v. Companhia de Navegao Norsul, 2009 BCCA 16 at para. 16
concerning the function of costs in the litigation process:
[16] It seems to me that the trend of recent authorities is to the effect
that the costs rules should be utilized to have a winnowing function in
the litigation process. The costs rules require litigants to make careful
assessments of the strength or lack thereof of their cases at
commencement and throughout the course of litigation. The rules
should discourage the continuance of doubtful cases or defences.
This of course imposes burdens on counsel to carefully consider the
strengths and weaknesses of particular fact situations. Such
considerations should, among other things, encourage reasonable
settlements.
[17]
the defendants for a marine oil spill. At paras. 35 and 36, the Court held that the
defendants showed reckless indifference to the merits of their case by adopting an
employees version of events which they must have known to be manifestly
unreliable, and by persisting in denying liability when they had no reasonable basis
for doing so on any version of the events offered by their employee.
[18]
As counsel for the plaintiff submits, although lack of merit alone will not found
an award of special costs, reckless indifference to the merits of a partys case will
support the exercise of the Courts discretion to award special costs.
Page 7
Application of Principles
[19]
Here, the defendant, by its officers and in-house counsel, admitted VCCs
action. Most recently, on December 19, 2012, VCC admitted that it was liable to Hull
Limited for the full amount of the debt.
[20]
Civil Claim approximately two months later, it pleaded multiple defences to the
plaintiffs claim. Those defences included allegations that the Notice of Civil Claim
disclosed no reasonable claim, was frivolous or vexatious and was an abuse of
process of the court. The defendant must have known that pleading had no merit.
The defendant also pleaded that the novation agreement failed to state whether it
was the entire agreement made between the parties, failed to specify the governing
jurisdiction, was made without consideration and was unconscionable. The
defendant alleged that it was denied its right to independent legal advice, and
pleaded duress.
[21]
However, the defendant did not adduce any evidence in support of those
defences.
[22]
registered in Guernsey, in the Channel Islands, had failed to plead the jurisdiction in
which it was incorporated, and that the plaintiff was not a proper legal entity.
[23]
After the plaintiff served its Amended Notice of Civil Claim and its second
summary trial application, it gave VCC notice of its position that the defendant had
raised no substantive defence to the claim, had provided no evidence on the merits,
was improperly using procedural tactics to delay the plaintiff, and that accordingly
the plaintiff intended to claim special costs.
[24]
The defendant filed no evidence on the merits until two days before the
hearing of the second summary trial application. That evidence was a six paragraph
affidavit sworn by Mr. Peter Chung, the defendants Chairman.
liability for the debt on at least four occasions before the plaintiff commenced this
Page 8
for Judgment:
Page 9
[52] Mr. Chung provides no details of the scope or nature of his recent
investigation. The defendant has provided no evidence about what inquiries,
if any, Mr. Chung made of Mr. Kriznic, Mr. Lawrenson, or Mr. Anderson
regarding their various acknowledgments of the debt. None of those
individuals have sworn affidavits controverting their admissions of the debt on
behalf of VCC.
[53] Mr. Lawrenson, the lawyer who took Mr. Chung's affidavit is also the
defendants Vice President and General Counsel who either authored, or was
copied on, four of the e-mails by which VCC acknowledged the debt. Mr.
Chung now says that the defendant cannot find any evidence that Mr. Hull
ever loaned monies to LINC, despite Mr. Lawrenson's advice of August 18,
2011 that VCC had received notice of the assignment of the loan to Hull
Limited and had modified its records to reflect that assignment. Further,
when Mr. Hull made inquiries of the defendant's Chief Financial Officer
respecting the debt, VCC was able to provide Mr. Hull with information
confirming the principal amount, the interest rate and the date when payment
was due.
[26]
It is noteworthy that Mr. Chungs affidavit did not deny the loan, but rather
asserted that the loan had never been accounted for financially by the defendant,
despite VCCs repeated acknowledgments of the debt through its officers and inhouse counsel.
[27]
At para. 6 of his affidavit, Mr. Chung referred to a discussion with Mr. Hull in
November 2008, when VCC acquired LINC. Mr. Chung implied that Mr. Hull
incorrectly referred to himself as the lender in 2008. However, Mr. Hull did not
assign the loan to Hull Limited until April 2010. The defendant must have known
that Mr. Chungs evidence of this conversation with Mr. Hull in 2008 could not
support the allegation of misrepresentation made by VCC in its Amended Response
to Civil Claim.
[28]
After the plaintiff refused the defendants request for an extension of time for
repayment of the loan and commenced these proceedings, the defendant engaged
in conduct calculated to delay the plaintiff from obtaining judgment.
That conduct
of Mr. Hulls shares formed part of the transaction by which VCC acquired
LINC. While Mr. Chung has deposed that VCCs acquisition of LINC
occurred within the space of a week, he has provided no satisfactory
explanation about why he allegedly failed to inform himself about whether Mr.
Hull had made the loan to LINC before he prepared the Novation Agreement.
Page 10
VCC offered no supporting evidence. In addition, on June 25, 2013, the defendant
requested and obtained an adjournment of the plaintiffs first summary trial
application in order to file responsive affidavit materials. Despite its commitment to
affidavit evidence in response to the plaintiffs first summary trial application.
Instead, on July 5, 2013, six months after the plaintiff had commenced this action,
the defendant filed an application for security for costs, returnable on the hearing of
the plaintiffs first summary trial application. Again, the timing of the defendants
application for security for costs suggests that the defendants objective in bringing
that application was only to delay the hearing of the plaintiffs summary trial
application.
[29]
The defendant knew that its officers and in-house counsel had repeatedly
acknowledged and confirmed the debt. The defendant also knew that Mr. Chung
had negotiated terms, which he incorporated into the novation agreement, to extend
the time for repayment of the loan to November 30, 2012. The defendant also knew
that less than two months before the plaintiff commenced this action, VCC by its inhouse counsel had acknowledged that the debt was owed to Hull Limited. In all of
these circumstances, I find that the defendant showed reckless indifference to
manifest deficiencies in its case and persisted in resisting the plaintiffs claim when it
must have known that it had no reasonable basis for doing so.
[30]
Accordingly, the plaintiff is entitled to special costs of the summary trial heard
on February 12, 2014. To be clear, this award of special costs does not include the
costs of preparation for and attendance of the summary trial hearing on August 6,
2013. The plaintiff brought that application on affidavit evidence that was in part
inaccurate, and which it subsequently corrected after the defendant produced the
assignment agreement. Each party bears their own costs of the hearing on August
6, 2013.
PEARLMAN J.
deliver its responsive materials by July 12, 2013, the defendant did not file any