A.C. No.

6707

March 24, 2006

GISELA HUYSSEN, Complainant, vs.ATTY. FRED L.

GUTIERREZ, Respondent.

D E C I S I O N
PER CURIAM:
This treats of a Complaint1 for Disbarment filed by
Gisela Huyssen against respondent Atty. Fred L.
Gutierrez.
Complainant alleged that in 1995, while respondent
was still connected with the Bureau of Immigration
and Deportation (BID), she and her three sons, who
are all American citizens, applied for Philippine Visas
under Section 13[g] of the Immigration Law.
Respondent told complainant that in order that their
visa applications will be favorably acted upon by the
BID they needed to deposit a certain sum of money
for a period of one year which could be withdrawn
after one year. Believing that the deposit was indeed
required by law, complainant deposited with
respondent on six different occasions from April 1995
to April 1996 the total amount of US$20,000.
Respondent prepared receipts/vouchers as proofs
that he received the amounts deposited by the
complainant but refused to give her copies of official
receipts despite her demands. After one year,
complainant demanded from respondent the return of
US$20,000 who assured her that said amount would
be returned. When respondent failed to return the
sum deposited, the World Mission for Jesus (of which
complainant was a member) sent a demand letter to
respondent for the immediate return of the money. In
a letter dated 1 March 1999, respondent promised to
release the amount not later than 9 March 1999.
Failing to comply with his promise, the World Mission
for Jesus sent another demand letter. In response
thereto, respondent sent complainant a letter dated 19
March 1999 explaining the alleged reasons for the
delay in the release of deposited amount. He
enclosed two blank checks postdated to 6 April and
20 April 1999 and authorized complainant to fill in the
amounts. When complainant deposited the postdated
checks on their due dates, the same were dishonored

because respondent had stopped payment on the

same. Thereafter, respondent, in his letter to
complainant dated 25 April 1999, explained the
reasons for stopping payment on the checks, and
gave complainant five postdated checks with the
assurance that said checks would be honored.
Complainant deposited the five postdated checks on
their due dates but they were all dishonored for
having been drawn against insufficient funds or
payment thereon was ordered stopped by respondent.
After respondent made several unfulfilled promises to
return the deposited amount, complainant referred the
matter to a lawyer who sent two demand letters to
respondent. The demand letters remained unheeded.
Thus, a complaint2 for disbarment was filed by
complainant in the Commission on Bar Discipline of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).
On 15 November 2000, Victor C. Fernandez, Director
for Bar Discipline, required 3 respondent to submit his
answer within 15 days from receipt thereof.
In his Counter-Affidavit dated 2 July 2001, 4
respondent denied the allegations in the complaint
claiming that having never physically received the
money mentioned in the complaint, he could not have
appropriated or pocketed the same. He said the
amount was used as payment for services rendered
for obtaining the permanent visas in the Philippines.
Respondent explained thus:
a) Through a close-friend, Jovie Galaraga, a Pastor
and likewise a friend of the complainant, the latter was
introduced to me at my office at the Bureau of
Immigration with a big problem concerning their stay
in the Philippines, herself and three sons, one of
which is already of major age while the two others
were still minors then. Their problem was the fact that
since they have been staying in the Philippines for
almost ten (10) years as holders of missionary visas
(9G) they could no longer extend their said status as
under the law and related polic[i]es of the
government, missionary visa holders could only
remain as such for ten (10) years after which they
could no longer extend their said status and have to
leave the country.
b) Studying their case and being U.S. Citizen (sic), I
advised them that they better secure a permanent

visa under Section 3 of the Philippine Immigration

Law otherwise known as Quota Visa and thereafter,
provided them with list of the requirements in
obtaining the said visa, one of which is that the
applicant must have a $40,000 deposited in the bank.
I also inform that her son Marcus Huyssen, who was
already of major age, has to have the same amount of
show money separate of her money as he would be
issued separate visa, while her two minor children
would be included as her dependents in her said visa
application. I advised them to get a lawyer (sic),
complainant further requested me to refer to her to a
lawyer to work for their application, which I did and
contacted the late Atty. Mendoza, an Immigration
lawyer, to do the job for the complainant and her
family.
c) The application was filed, processed and followedup by the said Atty. Mendoza until the same was
finished and the corresponding permanent visa were
obtained by the complainant and her family. Her son
Marcus Huyssen was given an independent
permanent visa while the other two were made as
dependents of the complainant. In between the
processing of the papers and becoming very close to
the complainant, I became the intermediary between
complainant and their counsel so much that every
amount that the latter would request for whatever
purpose was coursed through me which request were
then transmitted to the complainant and every amount
of money given by the complainant to their counsel
were coursed thru me which is the very reason why
my signature appears in the vouchers attached in the
complaint-affidavit;
d) That as time goes by, I noticed that the amount
appeared to be huge for services of a lawyer that I
myself began to wonder why and, to satisfy my
curiosity, I met Atty. Mendoza and inquired from him
regarding the matter and the following facts were
revealed to me:
1) That what was used by the complainant as her
show money from the bank is not really her money but
money of World Mission for Jesus, which therefore is
a serious violation of the Immigration Law as there
was a misrepresentation. This fact was confirmed
later when the said entity sent their demand letter to
the undersigned affiant and which is attached to the
complaint-affidavit;

2) That worst, the same amount used by the

complainant, was the very same amount used by her
son Marcus Huyssen, in obtaining his separate
permanent visa. These acts of the complainant and
her son could have been a ground for deportation and
likewise constitute criminal offense under the
Immigration Law and the Revised Penal Code. These
could have been the possible reason why complainant
was made to pay for quite huge amount.
e) That after they have secured their visas,
complainant and her family became very close to
undersigned and my family that I was even invited to
their residence several times;
f) However after three years, complainant demanded
the return of their money given and surprisingly they
want to recover the same from me. By twist of fate,
Atty. Mendoza is no longer around, he died sometime
1997;
g) That it is unfortunate that the real facts of the
matter is now being hidden and that the amount of
money is now being sought to be recovered from me;
h) That the fact is I signed the vouchers and being a
lawyer I know the consequences of having signed the
same and therefore I had to answer for it and pay. I
tried to raised the fund needed but up to the present
my standby loan application has not been released
and was informed that the same would only be
forthcoming second week of August. The same should
have been released last March but was aborted due
to prevalent condition. The amount to be paid,
according to the complainant has now become
doubled plus attorneys fees of P200,000.00.
Complainant submitted her evidence on 4 September
2002 and April 2003, and filed her Formal Offer of
Evidence on 25 August 2003.
On several occasions, the complaint was set for
reception of respondents evidence but the scheduled
hearings (11 settings) were all reset at the instance of
the respondent who was allegedly out of the country
to attend to his clients needs. Reception of
respondents evidence was scheduled for the last time
on 28 September 2004 and again respondent failed to
appear, despite due notice and without just cause.

On 5 November 2004, Investigating Commissioner

Milagros V. San Juan submitted her report 5
recommending the disbarment of respondent. She
justified her recommendation in this manner:
At the outset it should be noted that there is no
question that respondent received the amount of
US$20,000 from complainant, as respondent himself
admitted that he signed the vouchers (Annexes A to F
of complainant) showing his receipt of said amount
from complainant. Respondent however claims that
he did not appropriate the same for himself but that he
delivered the said amount to a certain Atty. Mendoza.
This defense raised by respondent is untenable
considering the documentary evidence submitted by
complainant. On record is the 1 March 1999 letter of
respondent addressed to the World Mission for Jesus
(Annex H of Complaint) where he stated thus:
"I really understand your feelings on the delay of the
release of the deposit but I repeat, nobody really
intended that the thing would happen that way. Many
events were the causes of the said delay particularly
the death of then Commissioner L. Verceles, whose
sudden death prevented us the needed papers for the
immediate release. It was only from compiling all on
the first week of January this year, that all the said
papers were recovered, hence, the process of the
release just started though some important papers
were already finished as early as the last quarter of
last year. We are just going through the normal
standard operating procedure and there is no day
since January that I do not make any follow ups on
the progress of the same."
and his letter dated 19 March 1999 (Annex L of
Complaint) where he stated thus:
"I am sending you my personal checks to cover the
refund of the amount deposited by your good self in
connection with the procurement of your permanent
visa and that of your family. It might take some more
time before the Bureau could release the refund as
some other pertinent papers are being still compiled
are being looked at the files of the late Commissioner
Verceles, who approved your visa and who died of
heart attack. Anyway, I am sure that everything would
be fine later as all the documents needed are already
intact. This is just a bureaucratic delay."

From the above letters, respondent makes it appear

that the US$20,000 was officially deposited with the
Bureau of Immigration and Deportation. However, if
this is true, how come only Petty Cash Vouchers were
issued by respondent to complainant to prove his
receipt of the said sum and official receipts therefore
were never issued by the said Bureau? Also, why
would respondent issue his personal checks to cover
the return of the money to complainant if said amount
was really officially deposited with the Bureau of
Immigration? All these actions of respondent point to
the inescapable conclusion that respondent received
the money from complainant and appropriated the
same for his personal use. It should also be noted that
respondent has failed to establish that the "late Atty.
Mendoza" referred to in his Counter-Affidavit really
exists. There is not one correspondence from Atty.
Mendoza regarding the visa application of
complainant and his family, and complainant has also
testified that she never met this Atty. Mendoza
referred to by respondent.
Considering that respondent was able to perpetrate
the fraud by taking advantage of his position with the
Board of Special Inquiry of the Bureau of Immigration
and Deportation, makes it more reprehensible as it
has caused damage to the reputation and integrity of
said office. It is submitted that respondent has
violated Rule 6.02 of Canon 6 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which reads:
"A lawyer in the government service shall not use his
public position to promote or advance his private
interests, nor allow the latter to interfere with his
public duties."
On 4 November 2004, the IBP Board of Governors
approved6 the Investigating Commissioners report
with modification, thus:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it hereby
ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification, the
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein
made part of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and,
finding the recommendation fully supported by the
evidence on record and applicable laws and rules,
and considering respondents violation of Rule 6.02 of
Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
Atty. Fred L. Gutierrez is hereby DISBARRED from

the practice of law and ordered to return the amount

with legal interest from receipt of the money until
payment. This case shall be referred to the Office of
the Ombudsman for prosecution for violation of AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Acts and to the
Department of Justice for appropriate administrative
action.
We agree with the IBP Board of Governors that
respondent should be severely sanctioned.
We begin with the veritable fact that lawyers in
government service in the discharge of their official
task have more restrictions than lawyers in private
practice. Want of moral integrity is to be more
severely condemned in a lawyer who holds a
responsible public office.7
It is undisputed that respondent admitted8 having
received the US$20,000 from complainant as shown
by his signatures in the petty cash vouchers 9 and
receipts10 he prepared, on the false representation
that that it was needed in complainants application for
visa with the BID. Respondent denied he
misappropriated the said amount and interposed the
defense that he delivered it to a certain Atty. Mendoza
who assisted complainant and children in their
application for visa in the BID. 11 Such defense
remains unsubstantiated as he failed to submit
evidence on the matter. While he claims that Atty.
Mendoza already died, he did not present the death
certificate of said Atty. Mendoza. Worse, the action of
respondent in shifting the blame to someone who has
been naturally silenced by fate, is not only impudent
but downright ignominious. When the integrity of a
member of the bar is challenged, it is not enough that
he deny the charges against him; he must meet the
issue and overcome the evidence against him. 12 He
must show proof that he still maintains that degree of
morality and integrity which at all times is expected of
him. In the case at bar, respondent clearly fell short of
his duty. Records show that even though he was
given the opportunity to answer the charges and
controvert the evidence against him in a formal
investigation, he failed, without any plausible reason,
to appear several times whenever the case was set
for reception of his evidence despite due notice.
The defense of denial proferred by respondent is,
thus, not convincing. It is settled that denial is

inherently a weak defense. To be believed, it must be

buttressed by a strong evidence of non-culpability;
otherwise, such denial is purely self-serving and is
with nil evidentiary value.

I have postdated them to enable me to raise some

more pesos to cover the whole amount but dont
worry as the Lord had already provided me the
means.

When respondent issued the postdated checks as his

moral obligation, he indirectly admitted the charge.
Such admissions were also apparent in the following
letters of respondent to complainant:

3) Letter15 dated 25 April 1999 provides:

1) Letter13 dated 01 March 1992, pertinent portion of

which reads:
Be that as it may, may I assure you for the last time
that the said deposit is forthcoming, the latest of which
is 09 March 1999. Should it not be released on said
date, I understand to pay the same to you out of my
personal money on said date. No more reasons and
no more alibis. Send somebody here at the office on
that day and the amount would be given to you wether
(sic) from the Bureau or from my own personal
money.

Anyway, let me apologize for all these troubles. You

are aware that I have done my very best for the early
return of your money but the return is becoming bleak
as I was informed that there are still papers lacking.
When I stopped the payment of the checks I issued, I
was of the impression that everything is fine, but it is
not. I guess it is time for me to accept the fact that I
really have to personally return the money out of my
own. The issue should stop at my end. This is the
truth that I must face. It may hurt me financially but it
would set me free from worries and anxieties.
I have arranged for a loan from money lenders and
was able to secure one last Saturday the releases of
which are on the following:

2) Letter14 dated 19 March 1999, reads in part:

May 4, 1999- 200,000

I am sending you my personal checks to cover the

refund of the amount deposited by your goodself in
connection with the procurement of your permanent
visa and that of your family.

May 11, 1999 -200,000

It might take some more time before the Bureau could

release the refund as some other pertinent papers are
still being compiled and are being looked at the files of
the late Commissioner Verceles, who approved your
visa and who died of heart attack. Anyway, I am sure
that everything would be fine later as all the
documents needed are already intact. This is just a
bureaucratic delay.
x x x x
As you would see, I have to pay you in peso. I have
issued you 2 checks, one dated April 6, 1999 and the
other one dated April 20, 1999. I leave the amount
vacant because I would want you to fill them up on
their due dates the peso equivalent to $10,000
respectively. This is to be sure that the peso
equivalent of your P20,000 would be well exchanged.

May 20, 1999-200,000

June 4, 1999-200,000
I have given my property (lot situated in the province)
as my collateral.
I am therefore putting an end to this trouble. I am
issuing four checks which I assure you will be
sufficiently funded on their due dates by reason of my
aforestated loans. Just bear with me for the last time,
if any of these checks, is returned, dont call me
anymore. Just file the necessary action against me, I
just had to put an end to this matter and look forward.
x x x
4) Letter16 dated 12 May 1999, which reads:
The other day I deposited the amount of P289,000 to
the bank to cover the first check I issued. In fact I

stopped all payments to all other checks that are

becoming due to some of my creditors to give
preference to the check I issued to you.
This morning when I went to the Bank, I learned that
the bank instead of returning the other checks I
requested for stop payment - instead honored them
and mistakenly returned your check. This was a very
big surprise to me and discouragement for I know it
would really upset you.
In view of this I thought of sending you the amount of
P200,000 in cash which I initially plan to withdraw
from the Bank. However, I could not entrust the same
amount to the bearer nor can I bring the same to your
place considering that its quite a big amount. I am just
sending a check for you to immediately deposit today
and I was assured by the bank that it would be
honored this time.
Normally, this is not the actuation of one who is falsely
accused of appropriating the money of another. As
correctly observed by the Investigating Commissioner,
respondent would not have issued his personal
checks if said amount were officially deposited with
the BID. This is an admission of misconduct.
Respondents act of asking money from complainant
in consideration of the latters pending application for
visas is violative of Rule 1.01 17 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which prohibits members
of the Bar from engaging or participating in any
unlawful, dishonest, or deceitful acts. Moreover, said
acts constitute a breach of Rule 6.02 18 of the Code
which bars lawyers in government service from
promoting their private interest. Promotion of private
interest includes soliciting gifts or anything of
monetary value in any transaction requiring the
approval of his office or which may be affected by the
functions of his office.19 Respondents conduct in
office betrays the integrity and good moral character
required from all lawyers, especially from one
occupying a high public office. A lawyer in public office
is expected not only to refrain from any act or
omission which might tend to lessen the trust and
confidence of the citizenry in government; he must
also uphold the dignity of the legal profession at all
times and observe a high standard of honesty and fair
dealing. Otherwise said, a lawyer in government
service is a keeper of the public faith and is burdened

with high degree of social responsibility, perhaps

higher than his brethren in private practice.
In a desperate attempt to put up a smoke or to
camouflage his misdeed, he went on committing
another by issuing several worthless checks, thereby
compounding his case.
In a recent case, we have held that the issuance of
worthless checks constitutes gross misconduct,20 as
the effect "transcends the private interests of the
parties directly involved in the transaction and touches
the interests of the community at large. The mischief it
creates is not only a wrong to the payee or holder, but
also an injury to the public since the circulation of
valueless commercial papers can very well pollute the
channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking
system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and
the public interest. Thus, paraphrasing Blacks
definition, a drawer who issues an unfunded check
deliberately reneges on his private duties he owes his
fellow men or society in a manner contrary to
accepted and customary rule of right and duty, justice,
honesty or good morals."21
Consequently, we have held that the act of a person
in issuing a check knowing at the time of the issuance
that he or she does not have sufficient funds in, or
credit with, the drawee bank for the payment of the
check in full upon its presentment, is also a
manifestation of moral turpitude.22
Respondents acts are more despicable. Not only did
he misappropriate the money of complainant; worse,
he had the gall to prepare receipts with the letterhead
of the BID and issued checks to cover up his
misdeeds. Clearly, he does not deserve to continue,
being a member of the bar.
Time and again, we have declared that the practice of
law is a noble profession. It is a special privilege
bestowed only upon those who are competent
intellectually, academically and morally. A lawyer must
at all times conduct himself, especially in his dealings
with his clients and the public at large, with honesty
and integrity in a manner beyond reproach. He must
faithfully perform his duties to society, to the bar, to
the courts and to his clients. A violation of the high
standards of the legal profession subjects the lawyer
to administrative sanctions which includes suspension

and disbarment.23 More importantly, possession of

good moral character must be continuous as a
requirement to the enjoyment of the privilege of law
practice; otherwise, the loss thereof is a ground for
the revocation of such privilege.24
Indeed, the primary objective of administrative cases
against lawyers is not only to punish and discipline the
erring individual lawyers but also to safeguard the
administration of justice by protecting the courts and
the public from the misconduct of lawyers, and to
remove from the legal profession persons whose utter
disregard of their lawyers oath have proven them
unfit to continue discharging the trust reposed in them
as members of the bar.25 These pronouncement gain
practical significance in the case at bar considering
that respondent was a former member of the Board of
Special Inquiry of the BID. It bears stressing also that
government lawyers who are public servants owe
fidelity to the public service, a public trust. As such,
government lawyers should be more sensitive to their
professional obligations as their disreputable conduct
is more likely to be magnified in the public eye.26
As a lawyer, who was also a public officer, respondent
miserably failed to cope with the strict demands and
high standards of the legal profession.
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court
mandates that a lawyer may be disbarred or
suspended by this Court for any of the following acts:
(1) deceit; (2) malpractice; (3) gross misconduct in
office; (4) grossly immoral conduct; (5) conviction of a
crime involving moral turpitude ; (6) violation of the
lawyers oath; (7) willful disobedience of any lawful
order of a superior court; and (8) willfully appearing as
an attorney for a party without authority to do so.27
In Atty. Vitriolo v. Atty. Dasig, 28 we ordered the
disbarment of a lawyer who, during her tenure as OIC,
Legal Services, Commission on Higher Education,
demanded sums of money as consideration for the
approval of applications and requests awaiting action
by her office. In Lim v. Barcelona, 29 we also disbarred
a senior lawyer of the National Labor Relations
Commission, who was caught by the National Bureau
of Investigation in the act of receiving and counting
money extorted from a certain person.
Respondents acts constitute gross misconduct; and

consistent with the need to maintain the high

standards of the Bar and thus preserve the faith of the
public in the legal profession, respondent deserves
the ultimate penalty of expulsion from the esteemed
brotherhood of lawyers.30
WHEREFORE, Atty. Fred L. Gutierrez is hereby
DISBARRED from the practice of law and ordered to
return the amount he received from the complainant
with legal interest from his receipt of the money until
payment. This case shall be referred to the Office of
the Ombudsman for criminal prosecution for violation
of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Acts and to the
Department of Justice for appropriate administrative
action. Let copies of this Decision be furnished the
Bar Confidant to be spread on the records of the
respondent; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for
distribution to all its chapters; and the Office of the
Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts
throughout the country.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. NOS. 151809-12. April 12, 2005]

PRESIDENTIAL
COMMISSION
ON
GOOD
GOVERNMENT
(PCGG),
Petitioner,
v.
SANDIGANBAYAN (Fifth Division
This case is prima impressiones and it is weighted
with significance for it concerns on one hand, the
efforts of the Bar to upgrade the ethics of lawyers in
government service and on the other, its effect on the
right of government to recruit competent counsel to
defend its interests.
In 1976, General Bank and Trust Company
(GENBANK) encountered financial difficulties.
GENBANK had extended considerable financial
support to Filcapital Development Corporation
causing it to incur daily overdrawings on its current
account with the Central Bank. 1 It was later found by
the Central Bank that GENBANK had approved
various loans to directors, officers, stockholders and
related interests totaling P172.3 million, of which 59%
was classified as doubtful and P0.505 million as
uncollectible.2 As a bailout, the Central Bank
extended emergency loans to GENBANK which
reached a total of P310 million.3 Despite the mega
loans, GENBANK failed to recover from its financial
woes. On March 25, 1977, the Central Bank issued
a resolution declaring GENBANK insolvent and
unable to resume business with safety to its
depositors, creditors and the general public, and
ordering its liquidation.4 A public bidding of
GENBANK's assets was held from March 26 to 28,
1977, wherein the Lucio Tan group submitted the
winning bid.5 Subsequently, former Solicitor General
Estelito P. Mendoza filed a petition with the then
Court of First Instance praying for the assistance
and supervision of the court in GENBANK's liquidation
as mandated by Section 29 of Republic Act No. 265.
In February 1986, the EDSA I revolution toppled the
Marcos government. One of the first acts of President
Corazon C. Aquino was to establish the Presidential
Commission on Good Government (PCGG) to recover
the alleged ill-gotten wealth of former President
Ferdinand Marcos, his family and his cronies.
Pursuant to this mandate, the PCGG, on July 17,
1987, filed with the Sandiganbayan a complaint for
'reversion, reconveyance, restitution, accounting

and damages against respondents Lucio Tan,

Carmen Khao Tan, Florencio T. Santos, Natividad P.
Santos, Domingo Chua, Tan Hui Nee, Mariano Tan
Eng Lian, Estate of Benito Tan Kee Hiong, Florencio
N. Santos, Jr., Harry C. Tan, Tan Eng Chan, Chung
Poe Kee, Mariano Khoo, Manuel Khoo, Miguel Khoo,
Jaime Khoo, Elizabeth Khoo, Celso Ranola, William T.
Wong, Ernesto B. Lim, Benjamin T. Albacita, Willy Co,
Allied Banking Corporation (Allied Bank), Allied
Leasing and Finance Corporation, Asia Brewery, Inc.,
Basic Holdings Corp., Foremost Farms, Inc., Fortune
Tobacco Corporation, Grandspan Development Corp.,
Himmel Industries, Iris Holdings and Development
Corp., Jewel Holdings, Inc., Manufacturing Services
and Trade Corp., Maranaw Hotels and Resort Corp.,
Northern Tobacco Redrying Plant, Progressive Farms,
Inc., Shareholdings, Inc., Sipalay Trading Corp., Virgo
Holdings & Development Corp., (collectively referred
to herein as respondents Tan, et al.), then President
Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos, Panfilo O.
Domingo, Cesar Zalamea, Don Ferry and Gregorio
Licaros. The case was docketed as Civil Case No.
0005 of the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan.6
In connection therewith, the PCGG issued several
writs of sequestration on properties allegedly
acquired by the above-named persons by taking
advantage of their close relationship and influence
with former President Marcos.
Respondents Tan, et al. repaired to this Court and
filed petitions for certiorari, prohibition and injunction
to nullify, among others, the writs of sequestration
issued by the PCGG.7 After the filing of the parties'
comments, this Court referred the cases to the
Sandiganbayan for proper disposition. These cases
were docketed as Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099. In all
these cases, respondents Tan, et al. were
represented by their counsel, former Solicitor General
Estelito P. Mendoza, who has then resumed his
private practice of law.
On February 5, 1991, the PCGG filed motions to
disqualify respondent Mendoza as counsel for
respondents Tan, et al. with the Second Division of
the Sandiganbayan in Civil Case Nos. 00058 and
0096-0099.9 The motions alleged that respondent
Mendoza, as then Solicitor General10 and counsel to
Central Bank, 'actively intervened in the liquidation
of GENBANK, which was subsequently acquired by
respondents Tan, et al. and became Allied Banking
Corporation. Respondent Mendoza allegedly

'intervened in the acquisition of GENBANK by

respondents Tan, et al. when, in his capacity as then
Solicitor General, he advised the Central Bank's
officials on the procedure to bring about GENBANK's
liquidation and appeared as counsel for the Central
Bank in connection with its petition for assistance in
the liquidation of GENBANK which he filed with the
Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of
and was docketed as Special Proceeding No. 107812.
The motions to disqualify invoked Rule 6.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. Rule 6.03
prohibits former government lawyers from
accepting 'engagement or employment in connection
with any matter in which he had intervened while in
said service.
On April 22, 1991 the Second Division of the
Sandiganbayan issued a resolution denying PCGG's
motion to disqualify respondent Mendoza in Civil
Case No. 0005.11 It found that the PCGG failed to
prove the existence of an inconsistency between
respondent Mendoza's former function as Solicitor
General and his present employment as counsel of
the Lucio Tan group. It noted that respondent
Mendoza did not take a position adverse to that taken
on behalf of the Central Bank during his term as
Solicitor General.12 It further ruled that respondent
Mendoza's appearance as counsel for respondents
Tan, et al. was beyond the one-year prohibited period
under Section 7(b) of Republic Act No. 6713 since he
ceased to be Solicitor General in the year 1986. The
said section prohibits a former public official or
employee from practicing his profession in connection
with any matter before the office he used to be with
within one year from his resignation, retirement or
separation from public office.13 The PCGG did not
seek any reconsideration of the ruling.14 rll
It appears that Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099 were
transferred from the Sandiganbayan's Second
Division to the Fifth Division.15 In its resolution dated
July 11, 2001, the Fifth Division of the
Sandiganbayan denied the other PCGG's motion to
disqualify respondent Mendoza.16 It adopted the
resolution of its Second Division dated April 22,
1991, and observed that the arguments were the
same in substance as the motion to disqualify filed in
Civil Case No. 0005. The PCGG sought
reconsideration of the ruling but its motion was denied
in its resolution dated December 5, 2001.17 rll

Hence, the recourse to this Court by the PCGG

assailing the resolutions dated July 11, 2001 and
December 5, 2001 of the Fifth Division of the
Sandiganbayan via a Petition for Certiorari and
prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure.18 The PCGG alleged that the Fifth
Division acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing
the assailed resolutions contending that: 1) Rule 6.03
of the Code of Professional Responsibility prohibits a
former government lawyer from accepting
employment in connection with any matter in which he
intervened; 2) the prohibition in the Rule is not timebound; 3) that Central Bank could not waive the
objection to respondent Mendoza's appearance on
behalf of the PCGG; and 4) the resolution in Civil
Case No. 0005 was interlocutory, thus res judicata
does not apply.19 rll
The petition at bar raises procedural and substantive
issues of law. In view, however, of the import and
impact of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility to the legal profession and the
government, we shall cut our way and forthwith
resolve the substantive issue. I
Substantive Issue
The key issue is whether Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility applies to respondent
Mendoza. Again, the prohibition states: 'A lawyer shall
not, after leaving government service, accept
engagement or employment in connection with any
matter in which he had intervened while in the said
service.
I.A. The history of Rule 6.03
A proper resolution of this case necessitates that we
trace the historical lineage of Rule 6.03 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility.
In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries,
ethical standards for lawyers were pervasive in
England and other parts of Europe. The early
statements of standards did not resemble modern
codes of conduct. They were not detailed or collected
in one source but surprisingly were comprehensive for

their time. The principal thrust of the standards was

directed towards the litigation conduct of lawyers. It
underscored the central duty of truth and fairness in
litigation as superior to any obligation to the client.
The formulations of the litigation duties were at times
intricate, including specific pleading standards, an
obligation to inform the court of falsehoods and a duty
to explore settlement alternatives. Most of the lawyer's
other basic duties -- competency, diligence, loyalty,
confidentiality, reasonable fees and service to the
poor -- originated in the litigation context, but
ultimately had broader application to all aspects of a
lawyer's practice.
The forms of lawyer regulation in colonial and early
post-revolutionary America did not differ markedly
from those in England. The colonies and early states
used oaths, statutes, judicial oversight, and
procedural rules to govern attorney behavior. The
difference from England was in the pervasiveness and
continuity of such regulation. The standards set in
England varied over time, but the variation in early
America was far greater. The American regulation
fluctuated within a single colony and differed from
colony to colony. Many regulations had the effect of
setting some standards of conduct, but the regulation
was sporadic, leaving gaps in the substantive
standards. Only three of the traditional core duties can
be fairly characterized as pervasive in the formal,
positive law of the colonial and post-revolutionary
period: the duties of litigation fairness, competency
and reasonable fees.20 rll
The nineteenth century has been termed the 'dark
ages' of legal ethics in the United States. By midcentury, American legal reformers were filling the void
in two ways. First, David Dudley Field, the drafter of
the highly influential New York 'Field Code, introduced
a new set of uniform standards of conduct for lawyers.
This concise statement of eight statutory duties
became law in several states in the second half of the
nineteenth century. At the same time, legal educators,
such as David Hoffman and George Sharswood, and
many other lawyers were working to flesh out the
broad outline of a lawyer's duties. These reformers
wrote about legal ethics in unprecedented detail and
thus brought a new level of understanding to a
lawyer's duties. A number of mid-nineteenth century
laws and statutes, other than the Field Code,
governed lawyer behavior. A few forms of colonial
regulations - e.g., the 'do no falsehood oath and the

deceit prohibitions -- persisted in some states.

Procedural law continued to directly, or indirectly, limit
an attorney's litigation behavior. The developing law of
agency recognized basic duties of competence,
loyalty and safeguarding of client property. Evidence
law started to recognize with less equivocation the
attorney-client privilege and its underlying theory of
confidentiality. Thus, all of the core duties, with the
likely exception of service to the poor, had some basis
in formal law. Yet, as in the colonial and early postrevolutionary periods, these standards were isolated
and did not provide a comprehensive statement of a
lawyer's duties. The reformers, by contrast, were
more comprehensive in their discussion of a lawyer's
duties, and they actually ushered a new era in
American legal ethics.21 rll
Toward the end of the nineteenth century, a new
form of ethical standards began to guide lawyers in
their practice - the bar association code of legal
ethics. The bar codes were detailed ethical standards
formulated by lawyers for lawyers. They combined the
two primary sources of ethical guidance from the
nineteenth century. Like the academic discourses, the
bar association codes gave detail to the statutory
statements of duty and the oaths of office. Unlike the
academic lectures, however, the bar association
codes retained some of the official imprimatur of the
statutes and oaths. Over time, the bar association
codes became extremely popular that states adopted
them as binding rules of law. Critical to the
development of the new codes was the re-emergence
of bar associations themselves. Local bar
associations formed sporadically during the colonial
period, but they disbanded by the early nineteenth
century. In the late nineteenth century, bar
associations began to form again, picking up where
their colonial predecessors had left off. Many of the
new bar associations, most notably the Alabama State
Bar Association and the American Bar Association,
assumed on the task of drafting substantive standards
of conduct for their members.22 rll
In 1887, Alabama became the first state with a
comprehensive bar association code of ethics. The
1887 Alabama Code of Ethics was the model for
several states' codes, and it was the foundation for
the American Bar Association's (ABA) 1908 Canons of
Ethics.23 rll

In 1917, the Philippine Bar found that the oath and

duties of a lawyer were insufficient to attain the full
measure of public respect to which the legal
profession was entitled. In that year, the Philippine
Bar Association adopted as its own, Canons 1 to 32 of
the ABA Canons of Professional Ethics.24 rll
As early as 1924, some ABA members have
questioned the form and function of the canons.
Among their concerns was the 'revolving door or 'the
process by which lawyers and others temporarily
enter government service from private life and then
leave it for large fees in private practice, where they
can exploit information, contacts, and influence
garnered in government service.25 These concerns
were classified as adverse-interest conflicts' and
'congruent-interest conflicts. 'Adverse-interest
conflicts' exist where the matter in which the former
government lawyer represents a client in private
practice is substantially related to a matter that the
lawyer dealt with while employed by the government
and the interests of the current and former are
adverse.26 On the other hand, 'congruent-interest
representation conflicts' are unique to government
lawyers and apply primarily to former government
lawyers.27 For several years, the ABA attempted to
correct and update the canons through new canons,
individual amendments and interpretative opinions. In
1928, the ABA amended one canon and added
thirteen new canons.28 To deal with problems peculiar
to former government lawyers, Canon 36 was minted
which disqualified them both for 'adverse-interest
conflicts' and 'congruent-interest representation
conflicts.29 The rationale for disqualification is rooted
in a concern that the government lawyer's largely
discretionary actions would be influenced by the
temptation to take action on behalf of the government
client that later could be to the advantage of parties
who might later become private practice clients. 30
Canon 36 provides, viz.:rbl rl l lbrr
36. Retirement from judicial position or public
employment
A lawyer should not accept employment as an
advocate in any matter upon the merits of which he
has previously acted in a judicial capacity.
A lawyer, having once held public office or having

been in the public employ should not, after his

retirement, accept employment in connection with
any matter he has investigated or passed upon
while in such office or employ.
Over the next thirty years, the ABA continued to
amend many of the canons and added Canons 46
and 47 in 1933 and 1937, respectively.31 rll
In 1946, the Philippine Bar Association again
adopted as its own Canons 33 to 47 of the ABA
Canons of Professional Ethics.32 rll
By the middle of the twentieth century, there was
growing consensus that the ABA Canons needed
more meaningful revision. In 1964, the ABA Presidentelect Lewis Powell asked for the creation of a
committee to study the 'adequacy and effectiveness'
of the ABA Canons. The committee recommended
that the canons needed substantial revision, in part
because the ABA Canons failed to distinguish
between 'the inspirational and the proscriptive and
were thus unsuccessful in enforcement. The legal
profession in the United States likewise observed that
Canon 36 of the ABA Canons of Professional Ethics
resulted in unnecessary disqualification of lawyers for
negligible participation in matters during their
employment with the government.
The unfairness of Canon 36 compelled ABA to
replace it in the 1969 ABA Model Code of
Professional Responsibility.33 The basic ethical
principles in the Code of Professional Responsibility
were supplemented by Disciplinary Rules that defined
minimum rules of conduct to which the lawyer must
adhere.34 In the case of Canon 9, DR 9-101(b)35
became the applicable supplementary norm. The
drafting committee reformulated the canons into the
Model Code of Professional Responsibility, and, in
August of 1969, the ABA House of Delegates
approved the Model Code.36 rll
Despite these amendments, legal practitioners
remained unsatisfied with the results and indefinite
standards set forth by DR 9-101(b) and the Model
Code of Professional Responsibility as a whole. Thus,
in August 1983, the ABA adopted new Model
Rules of Professional Responsibility. The Model
Rules used the 'restatement format, where the

conduct standards were set-out in rules, with

comments following each rule. The new format was
intended to give better guidance and clarity for
enforcement 'because the only enforceable standards
were the black letter Rules. The Model Rules
eliminated the broad canons altogether and reduced
the emphasis on narrative discussion, by placing
comments after the rules and limiting comment
discussion to the content of the black letter rules. The
Model Rules made a number of substantive
improvements particularly with regard to conflicts of
interests.37 In particular, the ABA did away with
Canon 9, citing the hopeless dependence of the
concept of impropriety on the subjective views of
anxious clients as well as the norm's indefinite
nature.38 rll
In cadence with these changes, the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP) adopted a proposed Code
of Professional Responsibility in 1980 which it
submitted to this Court for approval. The Code was
drafted to reflect the local customs, traditions, and
practices of the bar and to conform with new realities.
On June 21, 1988, this Court promulgated the
Code of Professional Responsibility.39 Rule 6.03 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility deals
particularly with former government lawyers, and
provides, viz.:rbl rl l lbrr
Rule 6.03 - A lawyer shall not, after leaving
government service, accept engagement or
employment in connection with any matter in which
he had intervened while in said service.
Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
retained the general structure of paragraph 2, Canon
36 of the Canons of Professional Ethics but replaced
the expansive phrase 'investigated and passed
upon with the word 'intervened. It is, therefore,
properly applicable to both 'adverse-interest
conflicts' and 'congruent-interest conflicts.
The case at bar does not involve the 'adverse
interest aspect of Rule 6.03. Respondent Mendoza,
it is conceded, has no adverse interest problem when
he acted as Solicitor General in Sp. Proc. No. 107812
and later as counsel of respondents Tan, et al. in Civil
Case No. 0005 and Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099 before
the Sandiganbayan. Nonetheless, there remains

the issue of whether there exists a 'congruentinterest conflict sufficient to disqualify respondent
Mendoza from representing respondents Tan, et al.
I.B. The 'congruent interest aspect of Rule 6.03
The key to unlock Rule 6.03 lies in comprehending
first, the meaning of 'matter referred to in the rule
and, second, the metes and bounds of the
'intervention made by the former government lawyer
on the 'matter. The American Bar Association in its
Formal Opinion 342, defined 'matter as any discrete,
isolatable act as well as identifiable transaction or
conduct involving a particular situation and specific
party, and not merely an act of drafting, enforcing or
interpreting government or agency procedures,
regulations or laws, or briefing abstract principles of
law.
Firstly, it is critical that we pinpoint the 'matter which
was the subject of intervention by respondent
Mendoza while he was the Solicitor General. The
PCGG relates the following acts of respondent
Mendoza as constituting the 'matter where he
intervened as a Solicitor General, viz:40 rll
The PCGG's Case for Atty. Mendoza's Disqualification
The PCGG imputes grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the Sandiganbayan (Fifth Division) in issuing
the assailed Resolutions dated July 11, 2001 and
December 5, 2001 denying the motion to disqualify
Atty. Mendoza as counsel for respondents Tan, et al.
The PCGG insists that Atty. Mendoza, as then
Solicitor General, actively intervened in the closure of
GENBANK by advising the Central Bank on how to
proceed with the said bank's liquidation and even
filing the petition for its liquidation with the CFI of.
As proof thereof, the PCGG cites the Memorandum
dated March 29, 1977 prepared by certain key
officials of the Central Bank, namely, then Senior
Deputy Governor Amado R. Brinas, then Deputy
Governor Jaime C. Laya, then Deputy Governor and
General Counsel Gabriel C. Singson, then Special
Assistant to the Governor Carlota P. Valenzuela, then
Asistant to the Governor Arnulfo B. Aurellano and then
Director of Department of Commercial and Savings

Bank Antonio T. Castro, Jr., where they averred that

on March 28, 1977, they had a conference with the
Solicitor General (Atty. Mendoza), who advised them
on how to proceed with the liquidation of GENBANK.
The pertinent portion of the said memorandum
states:rbl rl l lbrr
Immediately after said meeting, we had a conference
with the Solicitor General and he advised that the
following procedure should be taken:
1. Management should submit a memorandum to the
Monetary Board reporting that studies and evaluation
had been made since the last examination of the bank
as of August 31, 1976 and it is believed that the bank
can not be reorganized or placed in a condition so
that it may be permitted to resume business with
safety to its depositors and creditors and the general
public.
2. If the said report is confirmed by the Monetary
Board, it shall order the liquidation of the bank and
indicate the manner of its liquidation and approve a
liquidation plan.
3. The Central Bank shall inform the principal
stockholders of Genbank of the foregoing decision to
liquidate the bank and the liquidation plan approved
by the Monetary Board.
4. The Solicitor General shall then file a petition in the
Court of First Instance reciting the proceedings which
had been taken and praying the assistance of the
Court in the liquidation of Genbank.
The PCGG further cites the Minutes No. 13 dated
March 29, 1977 of the Monetary Board where it was
shown that Atty. Mendoza was furnished copies of
pertinent documents relating to GENBANK in order to
aid him in filing with the court the petition for
assistance in the bank's liquidation. The pertinent
portion

of

the

said

minutes
reads:rbl rl l lbrr
The

Board

decided
follows:rbl rl l lbrr

as

E. To authorize Management to furnish the Solicitor

General with a copy of the subject memorandum of
the Director, Department of Commercial and Savings
Bank dated March 29, 1977, together with copies of:
1. Memorandum of the Deputy Governor, Supervision
and Examination Sector, to the Monetary Board,
dated March 25, 1977, containing a report on the
current situation of Genbank;
2. Aide Memoire on the Antecedent Facts Re: General
Bank and Trust Co., dated March 23, 1977;
3. Memorandum of the Director, Department of
Commercial and Savings Bank, to the Monetary
Board, dated March 24, 1977, submitting, pursuant to
Section 29 of R.A. No. 265, as amended by P.D. No.
1007, a repot on the state of insolvency of Genbank,
together with its attachments; and
4. Such other documents as may be necessary or
needed by the Solicitor General for his use in then
CFI-praying the assistance of the Court in the
liquidation of Genbank.
Beyond doubt, therefore, the 'matter or the act of
respondent Mendoza as Solicitor General involved in
the case at bar is 'advising the Central Bank, on how
to proceed with the said bank's liquidation and even
filing the petition for its liquidation with the CFI of. In
fine, the Court should resolve whether his act of
advising the Central Bank on the legal procedure to
liquidate GENBANK is included within the concept of
'matter under Rule 6.03. The procedure of
liquidation is given in black and white in Republic Act
No. 265, section 29, viz:
The provision reads in part:
SEC. 29. Proceedings upon insolvency. - Whenever,
upon examination by the head of the appropriate
supervising or examining department or his examiners
or agents into the condition of any bank or non-bank
financial intermediary performing quasi-banking
functions, it shall be disclosed that the condition of the
same is one of insolvency, or that its continuance in
business would involve probable loss to its depositors

or creditors, it shall be the duty of the department

head concerned forthwith, in writing, to inform the
Monetary Board of the facts, and the Board may, upon
finding the statements of the department head to be
true, forbid the institution to do business in the
Philippines and shall designate an official of the
Central Bank or a person of recognized competence
in banking or finance, as receiver to immediately take
charge of its assets and liabilities, as expeditiously as
possible collect and gather all the assets and
administer the same for the benefit of its creditors,
exercising all the powers necessary for these
purposes including, but not limited to, bringing suits
and foreclosing mortgages in the name of the bank or
non-bank financial intermediary performing quasibanking functions.
If the Monetary Board shall determine and confirm
within the said period that the bank or non-bank
financial intermediary performing quasi-banking
functions is insolvent or cannot resume business with
safety to its depositors, creditors and the general
public, it shall, if the public interest requires, order its
liquidation, indicate the manner of its liquidation and
approve a liquidation plan. The Central Bank shall, by
the Solicitor General, file a petition in the Court of First
Instance reciting the proceedings which have been
taken and praying the assistance of the court in the
liquidation of such institution. The court shall have
jurisdiction in the same proceedings to adjudicate
disputed claims against the bank or non-bank
financial intermediary performing quasi-banking
functions and enforce individual liabilities of the
stockholders and do all that is necessary to preserve
the assets of such institution and to implement the
liquidation plan approved by the Monetary Board. The
Monetary Board shall designate an official of the
Central Bank, or a person of recognized competence
in banking or finance, as liquidator who shall take over
the functions of the receiver previously appointed by
the Monetary Board under this Section. The liquidator
shall, with all convenient speed, convert the assets of
the banking institution or non-bank financial
intermediary performing quasi-banking functions to
money or sell, assign or otherwise dispose of the
same to creditors and other parties for the purpose of
paying the debts of such institution and he may, in the
name of the bank or non-bank financial intermediary
performing quasi-banking functions, institute such
actions as may be necessary in the appropriate court
to collect and recover accounts and assets of such
institution.

The provisions of any law to the contrary

notwithstanding, the actions of the Monetary Board
under this Section and the second paragraph of
Section 34 of this Act shall be final and executory, and
can be set aside by the court only if there is
convincing proof that the action is plainly arbitrary and
made in bad faith. No restraining order or injunction
shall be issued by the court enjoining the Central
Bank from implementing its actions under this Section
and the second paragraph of Section 34 of this Act,
unless there is convincing proof that the action of the
Monetary Board is plainly arbitrary and made in bad
faith and the petitioner or plaintiff files with the clerk or
judge of the court in which the action is pending a
bond executed in favor of the Central Bank, in an
amount to be fixed by the court. The restraining order
or injunction shall be refused or, if granted, shall be
dissolved upon filing by the Central Bank of a bond,
which shall be in the form of cash or Central Bank
cashier(s) check, in an amount twice the amount of
the bond of the petitioner or plaintiff conditioned that it
will pay the damages which the petitioner or plaintiff
may suffer by the refusal or the dissolution of the
injunction. The provisions of Rule 58 of the New Rules
of Court insofar as they are applicable and not
inconsistent with the provisions of this Section shall
govern the issuance and dissolution of the restraining
order or injunction contemplated in this Section.
Insolvency, under this Act, shall be understood to
mean the inability of a bank or non-bank financial
intermediary performing quasi-banking functions to
pay its liabilities as they fall due in the usual and
ordinary course of business. Provided, however, That
this shall not include the inability to pay of an
otherwise non-insolvent bank or non-bank financial
intermediary performing quasi-banking functions
caused by extraordinary demands induced by
financial panic commonly evidenced by a run on the
bank or non-bank financial intermediary performing
quasi-banking functions in the banking or financial
community.
The appointment of a conservator under Section 28-A
of this Act or the appointment of a receiver under this
Section shall be vested exclusively with the Monetary
Board, the provision of any law, general or special, to
the contrary notwithstanding. (As amended by PD
Nos. 72, 1007, 1771 & 1827, Jan. 16, 1981)

We hold that this advice given by respondent

Mendoza on the procedure to liquidate GENBANK is
not the 'matter contemplated by Rule 6.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. ABA Formal
Opinion No. 342 is clear as daylight in stressing
that the 'drafting, enforcing or interpreting
government or agency procedures, regulations or
laws, or briefing abstract principles of law are acts
which do not fall within the scope of the term 'matter
and cannot disqualify.
Secondly, it can even be conceded for the sake of
argument that the above act of respondent Mendoza
falls within the definition of matter per ABA Formal
Opinion No. 342. Be that as it may, the said act of
respondent Mendoza which is the 'matter involved in
Sp. Proc. No. 107812 is entirely different from the
'matter involved in Civil Case No. 0096. Again, the
plain facts speak for themselves. It is given that
respondent Mendoza had nothing to do with the
decision of the Central Bank to liquidate GENBANK. It
is also given that he did not participate in the sale of
GENBANK to Allied Bank. The 'matter where he got
himself involved was in informing Central Bank on
the procedure provided by law to liquidate
GENBANK thru the courts and in filing the necessary
petition in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 in the then Court of
First Instance. The subject 'matter of Sp. Proc. No.
107812, therefore, is not the same nor is related to
but is different from the subject 'matter in Civil
Case No. 0096. Civil Case No. 0096 involves the
sequestration of the stocks owned by respondents
Tan, et al., in Allied Bank on the alleged ground that
they are ill-gotten. The case does not involve the
liquidation of GENBANK. Nor does it involve the sale
of GENBANK to Allied Bank. Whether the shares of
stock of the reorganized Allied Bank are ill-gotten is
far removed from the issue of the dissolution and
liquidation of GENBANK. GENBANK was liquidated
by the Central Bank due, among others, to the alleged
banking malpractices of its owners and officers. In
other words, the legality of the liquidation of
GENBANK is not an issue in the sequestration cases.
Indeed, the jurisdiction of the PCGG does not include
the dissolution and liquidation of banks. It goes
without saying that Code 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility cannot apply to
respondent Mendoza because his alleged
intervention while a Solicitor General in Sp. Proc.
No. 107812 is an intervention on a matter different
from the matter involved in Civil Case No. 0096.

10

Thirdly, we now slide to the metes and bounds of the

'intervention contemplated by Rule 6.03. 'Intervene
means, viz.:rbl rl l lbrr
1: to enter or appear as an irrelevant or extraneous
feature or circumstance. .. 2: to occur, fall, or come in
between points of time or events. .. 3: to come in or
between by way of hindrance or modification:
INTERPOSE. .. 4: to occur or lie between two things
(Paris, where the same city lay on both sides of an
intervening river. ..)41 rll
On the other hand, 'intervention is defined as:
1: the act or fact of intervening: INTERPOSITION; 2:
interference that may affect the interests of others. 42
rll
There are, therefore, two possible interpretations of
the word 'intervene. Under the first interpretation,
'intervene includes participation in a proceeding even
if the intervention is irrelevant or has no effect or little
influence.43 Under the second interpretation,
'intervene only includes an act of a person who has
the power to influence the subject proceedings.44 We
hold that this second meaning is more appropriate to
give to the word 'intervention under Rule 6.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility in light of its
history. The evils sought to be remedied by the Rule
do not exist where the government lawyer does an act
which can be considered as innocuous such as 'x x x
drafting, enforcing or interpreting government or
agency procedures, regulations or laws, or briefing
abstract principles of law.
In fine, the intervention cannot be insubstantial and
insignificant. Originally, Canon 36 provided that a
former government lawyer 'should not, after his
retirement, accept employment in connection with any
matter which he has investigated or passed upon
while in such office or employ. As aforediscussed, the
broad sweep of the phrase 'which he has investigated
or passed upon resulted in unjust disqualification of
former government lawyers. The 1969 Code restricted
its latitude, hence, in DR 9-101(b), the prohibition
extended only to a matter in which the lawyer, while in
the government service, had 'substantial
responsibility. The 1983 Model Rules further
constricted the reach of the rule. MR 1.11(a) provides

that 'a lawyer shall not represent a private client in

connection with a matter in which the lawyer
participated personally and substantially as a
public officer or employee.
It is, however, alleged that the intervention of
respondent Mendoza in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 is
significant and substantial. We disagree. For one, the
petition in the special proceedings is an initiatory
pleading, hence, it has to be signed by respondent
Mendoza as the then sitting Solicitor General. For
another, the record is arid as to the actual
participation of respondent Mendoza in the
subsequent proceedings. Indeed, the case was in
slumberville for a long number of years. None of the
parties pushed for its early termination. Moreover, we
note that the petition filed merely seeks the
assistance of the court in the liquidation of
GENBANK. The principal role of the court in this type
of proceedings is to assist the Central Bank in
determining claims of creditors against the
GENBANK. The role of the court is not strictly as a
court of justice but as an agent to assist the Central
Bank in determining the claims of creditors. In such a
proceeding, the participation of the Office of the
Solicitor General is not that of the usual court litigator
protecting the interest of government.
II
Balancing Policy Considerations
To be sure, Rule 6.03 of our Code of Professional
Responsibility represents a commendable effort on
the part of the IBP to upgrade the ethics of lawyers in
the government service. As aforestressed, it is a takeoff from similar efforts especially by the ABA which
have not been without difficulties. To date, the legal
profession in the United States is still fine tuning its
DR 9-101(b) rule.
In fathoming the depth and breadth of Rule 6.03 of
our Code of Professional Responsibility, the Court
took account of various policy considerations to
assure that its interpretation and application to the
case at bar will achieve its end without necessarily
prejudicing other values of equal importance. Thus,
the rule was not interpreted to cause a chilling effect
on government recruitment of able legal talent. At

present, it is already difficult for government to match

compensation offered by the private sector and it is
unlikely that government will be able to reverse that
situation. The observation is not inaccurate that the
only card that the government may play to recruit
lawyers is have them defer present income in return
for the experience and contacts that can later be
exchanged for higher income in private practice. 45
Rightly, Judge Kaufman warned that the sacrifice of
entering government service would be too great for
most men to endure should ethical rules prevent them
from engaging in the practice of a technical specialty
which they devoted years in acquiring and cause the
firm with which they become associated to be
disqualified.46 Indeed, 'to make government service
more difficult to exit can only make it less appealing to
enter.47 rll
In interpreting Rule 6.03, the Court also cast a harsh
eye on its use as a litigation tactic to harass
opposing counsel as well as deprive his client of
competent legal representation. The danger that the
rule will be misused to bludgeon an opposing counsel
is not a mere guesswork. The Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia has noted 'the tactical use of
motions to disqualify counsel in order to delay
proceedings, deprive the opposing party of counsel of
its choice, and harass and embarrass the opponent,
and observed that the tactic was 'so prevalent in large
civil cases in recent years as to prompt frequent
judicial and academic commentary.48 Even the United
States Supreme Court found no quarrel with the Court
of Appeals' description of disqualification motions as
'a dangerous game.49 In the case at bar, the new
attempt to disqualify respondent Mendoza is difficult
to divine. The disqualification of respondent Mendoza
has long been a dead issue. It was resuscitated after
the lapse of many years and only after PCGG has lost
many legal incidents in the hands of respondent
Mendoza. For a fact, the recycled motion for
disqualification in the case at bar was filed more than
four years after the filing of the petitions for certiorari,
prohibition and injunction with the Supreme Court
which were subsequently remanded to the
Sandiganbayan and docketed as Civil Case Nos.
0096-0099.50 At the very least, the circumstances
under which the motion to disqualify in the case at bar
were refiled put petitioner's motive as highly suspect.
Similarly, the Court in interpreting Rule 6.03 was
not unconcerned with the prejudice to the client

11

which will be caused by its misapplication. It cannot

be doubted that granting a disqualification motion
causes the client to lose not only the law firm of
choice, but probably an individual lawyer in whom the
client has confidence.51 The client with a disqualified
lawyer must start again often without the benefit of the
work done by the latter.52 The effects of this prejudice
to the right to choose an effective counsel cannot be
overstated for it can result in denial of due process.
The Court has to consider also the possible
adverse effect of a truncated reading of the rule
on the official independence of lawyers in the
government service. According to Prof. Morgan: 'An
individual who has the security of knowing he or she
can find private employment upon leaving the
government is free to work vigorously, challenge
official positions when he or she believes them to be
in error, and resist illegal demands by superiors. An
employee who lacks this assurance of private
employment does not enjoy such freedom.53 He adds:
'Any system that affects the right to take a new job
affects the ability to quit the old job and any limit on
the ability to quit inhibits official independence. 54 The
case at bar involves the position of Solicitor
General, the office once occupied by respondent
Mendoza. It cannot be overly stressed that the
position of Solicitor General should be endowed
with a great degree of independence. It is this
independence that allows the Solicitor General to
recommend acquittal of the innocent; it is this
independence that gives him the right to refuse to
defend officials who violate the trust of their office. Any
undue dimunition of the independence of the Solicitor
General will have a corrosive effect on the rule of law.
No less significant a consideration is the
deprivation of the former government lawyer of
the freedom to exercise his profession. Given the
current state of our law, the disqualification of a former
government lawyer may extend to all members of his
law firm.55 Former government lawyers stand in
danger of becoming the lepers of the legal
profession.

gauging public perceptions is a highly speculative

exercise at best56 which can lead to untoward
results.57 No less than Judge Kaufman doubts that the
lessening of restrictions as to former government
attorneys will have any detrimental effect on that free
flow of information between the government-client and
its attorneys which the canons seek to protect.58
Notably, the appearance of impropriety theory has
been rejected in the 1983 ABA Model Rules of
Professional Conduct59 and some courts have
abandoned per se disqualification based on Canons 4
and 9 when an actual conflict of interest exists, and
demand an evaluation of the interests of the
defendant, government, the witnesses in the case,
and the public.60 rll
It is also submitted that the Court should apply Rule
6.03 in all its strictness for it correctly disfavors
lawyers who 'switch sides. It is claimed that
'switching sides' carries the danger that former
government employee may
compromise
confidential official information in the process. But
this concern does not cast a shadow in the case at
bar. As afore-discussed, the act of respondent
Mendoza in informing the Central Bank on the
procedure how to liquidate GENBANK is a different
matter from the subject matter of Civil Case No. 0005
which is about the sequestration of the shares of
respondents Tan, et al., in Allied Bank. Consequently,
the danger that confidential official information might
be divulged is nil, if not inexistent. To be sure, there
are no inconsistent 'sides' to be bothered about in
the case at bar. For there is no question that in
lawyering for respondents Tan, et al., respondent
Mendoza is not working against the interest of Central
Bank. On the contrary, he is indirectly defending the
validity of the action of Central Bank in liquidating
GENBANK and selling it later to Allied Bank. Their
interests coincide instead of colliding. It is for this
reason that Central Bank offered no objection to the
lawyering of respondent Mendoza in Civil Case No.
0005 in defense of respondents Tan, et al. There is
no switching of sides for no two sides are
involved.

company that he or she is currently charged with

prosecuting might be tempted to prosecute less
vigorously.62 In the cautionary words of the
Association of the Bar Committee in 1960: 'The
greatest public risks arising from post employment
conduct may well occur during the period of
employment through the dampening of aggressive
administration of government policies.63 Prof. Morgan,
however, considers this concern as 'probably
excessive.64 He opines 'x x x it is hard to imagine that
a private firm would feel secure hiding someone who
had just been disloyal to his or her last client - the
government. Interviews with lawyers consistently
confirm that law firms want the 'best government
lawyers - the ones who were hardest to beat - not the
least qualified or least vigorous advocates.65 But
again, this particular concern is a non factor in the
case at bar. There is no charge against respondent
Mendoza that he advised Central Bank on how to
liquidate GENBANK with an eye in later defending
respondents Tan, et al. of Allied Bank. Indeed, he
continues defending both the interests of Central
Bank and respondents Tan, et al. in the above cases.
Likewise, the Court is nudged to consider the need to
curtail what is perceived as the 'excessive influence
of former officials' or their 'clout.66 Prof. Morgan
again warns against extending this concern too far.
He explains the rationale for his warning, viz: 'Much of
what appears to be an employee's influence may
actually be the power or authority of his or her
position, power that evaporates quickly upon
departure from government x x x.67 More, he contends
that the concern can be demeaning to those sitting in
government. To quote him further: 'x x x The idea that,
present officials make significant decisions based on
friendship rather than on the merit says more about
the present officials than about their former co-worker
friends. It implies a lack of will or talent, or both, in
federal officials that does not seem justified or
intended, and it ignores the possibility that the officials
will tend to disfavor their friends in order to avoid even
the appearance of favoritism.68
III

It is, however, proffered that the mischief sought to be

remedied by Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility is the possible appearance of
impropriety and loss of public confidence in
government. But as well observed, the accuracy of

It is also urged that the Court should consider that

Rule 6.03 is intended to avoid conflict of loyalties,
i.e., that a government employee might be subject to
a conflict of loyalties while still in government
service.61 The example given by the proponents of this
argument is that a lawyer who plans to work for the

The question of fairness

Mr. Justices Panganiban and Carpio are of the view,

12

among others, that the congruent interest prong of

Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
should be subject to a prescriptive period. Mr. Justice
Tinga opines that the rule cannot apply retroactively to
respondent Mendoza. Obviously, and rightly so, they
are disquieted by the fact that (1) when respondent
Mendoza was the Solicitor General, Rule 6.03 has not
yet adopted by the IBP and approved by this Court,
and (2) the bid to disqualify respondent Mendoza was
made after the lapse of time whose length cannot, by
any standard, qualify as reasonable. At bottom, the
point they make relates to the unfairness of the rule if
applied without any prescriptive period and
retroactively, at that. Their concern is legitimate and
deserves to be initially addressed by the IBP and our
Committee on Revision of the Rules of Court.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition assailing the
resolutions dated July 11, 2001 and December 5,
2001 of the Fifth Division of the Sandiganbayan in
Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099 is denied.
No cost.

A.C. No. 6705

March 31, 2006

13

RUTHIE LIM-SANTIAGO, Complainant, vs.ATTY.

CARLOS B. SAGUCIO, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N

resolved the criminal complaint by recommending the

filing of 651 Informations 10 for violation of Article 288
11
in relation to Article 116 12 of the Labor Code of the
Philippines. 13
Complainant now charges respondent with the
following violations:

CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a disbarment complaint against Atty. Carlos B.
Sagucio for violating Rule 15.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and for defying the
prohibition against private practice of law while
working as government prosecutor.
The Facts
Ruthie Lim-Santiago ("complainant") is the daughter
of Alfonso Lim and Special Administratrix of his estate.
1
Alfonso Lim is a stockholder and the former
President of Taggat Industries, Inc. 2
Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio ("respondent") was the former
Personnel Manager and Retained Counsel of Taggat
Industries, Inc. 3 until his appointment as Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor of Tuguegarao, Cagayan in
1992. 4
Taggat Industries, Inc. ("Taggat") is a domestic
corporation engaged in the operation of timber
concessions from the government. The Presidential
Commission on Good Government sequestered it
sometime in 1986, 5 and its operations ceased in
1997. 6
Sometime in July 1997, 21 employees of Taggat
("Taggat employees") filed a criminal complaint
entitled "Jesus Tagorda, Jr. et al. v. Ruthie LimSantiago," docketed as I.S. No. 97-240 ("criminal
complaint"). 7 Taggat employees alleged that
complainant, who took over the management and
control of Taggat after the death of her father, withheld
payment of their salaries and wages without valid
cause from 1 April 1996 to 15 July 1997. 8
Respondent, as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, was
assigned to conduct the preliminary investigation. 9 He

1. Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional

Responsibility

more than five years. 20 Respondent asserts that he

no longer owed his undivided loyalty to Taggat. 21
Respondent argues that it was his sworn duty to
conduct the necessary preliminary investigation. 22
Respondent contends that complainant failed to
establish lack of impartiality when he performed his
duty. 23 Respondent points out that complainant did
not file a motion to inhibit respondent from hearing the
criminal complaint 24 but instead complainant
voluntarily executed and filed her counter-affidavit
without mental reservation. 25

Complainant contends that respondent is guilty of

representing conflicting interests. Respondent, being
the former Personnel Manager and Retained Counsel
of Taggat, knew the operations of Taggat very well.
Respondent should have inhibited himself from
hearing, investigating and deciding the case filed by
Taggat employees. 14 Furthermore, complainant
claims that respondent instigated the filing of the
cases and even harassed and threatened Taggat
employees to accede and sign an affidavit to support
the complaint. 15

Respondent states that complainants reason in not

filing a motion to inhibit was her impression that
respondent would exonerate her from the charges
filed as gleaned from complainants statement during
the hearing conducted on 12 February 1999:

2. Engaging in the private practice of law while

working as a government prosecutor

A. Because he is supposed to be my fathers friend

and he was working with my Dad and he was
supposed to be trusted by my father. And he came to
me and told me he gonna help me. x x x. 26

Complainant also contends that respondent is guilty of

engaging in the private practice of law while working
as a government prosecutor. Complainant presented
evidence to prove that respondent received P10,000
as retainers fee for the months of January and
February 1995, 16 another P10,000 for the months of
April and May 1995, 17 and P5,000 for the month of
April 1996. 18
Complainant seeks the disbarment of respondent for
violating Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and for defying the prohibition against
private practice of law while working as government
prosecutor.
Respondent refutes complainants allegations and
counters that complainant was merely aggrieved by
the resolution of the criminal complaint which was
adverse and contrary to her expectation. 19
Respondent claims that when the criminal complaint
was filed, respondent had resigned from Taggat for

x x x
Q. (Atty. Dabu). What do you mean you didnt think he
would do it, Madam Witness?

Respondent also asserts that no conflicting interests

exist because he was not representing Taggat
employees or complainant. Respondent claims he
was merely performing his official duty as Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor. 27 Respondent argues that
complainant failed to establish that respondents act
was tainted with personal interest, malice and bad
faith. 28
Respondent denies complainants allegations that he
instigated the filing of the cases, threatened and
harassed Taggat employees. Respondent claims that
this accusation is bereft of proof because complainant
failed to mention the names of the employees or
present them for cross-examination. 29
Respondent does not dispute his receipt, after his
appointment as government prosecutor, of retainer
fees from complainant but claims that it

14

was only on a case-to-case basis and it ceased in

1996. 30 Respondent contends that the fees were paid
for his consultancy services and not for
representation. Respondent submits that consultation
is not the same as representation and that rendering
consultancy services is not prohibited. 31 Respondent,
in his Reply-Memorandum, states:
x x x [I]f ever Taggat paid him certain amounts, these
were paid voluntarily by Taggat without the
respondents asking, intended as token consultancy
fees on a case-to-case basis and not as or for retainer
fees. These payments do not at all show or translate
as a specie of conflict of interest. Moreover, these
consultations had no relation to, or connection with,
the above-mentioned labor complaints filed by former
Taggat employees. 32
Respondent insists that complainants evidence failed
to prove that when the criminal complaint was filed
with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of
Cagayan, respondent was still the retained counsel or
legal consultant. 33
While this disbarment case was pending, the
Resolution and Order issued by respondent to file 651
Informations against complainant was reversed and
set aside by Regional State Prosecutor of Cagayan
Rodolfo B. Cadelina last 4 January 1999. 34 Hence,
the criminal complaint was dismissed. 35
The IBPs Report and Recommendation
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines Investigating
Commissioner Ma. Carmina M. Alejandro-Abbas ("IBP
Commissioner Abbas") heard the case 36 and allowed
the parties to submit their respective memoranda. 37
Due to IBP Commissioner Abbas resignation, the
case was reassigned to Commissioner Dennis A.B.
Funa ("IBP Commissioner Funa"). 38
After the parties filed their memoranda and motion to
resolve the case, the IBP Board of Governors issued
Resolution No. XVI-2004-479 ("IBP Resolution") dated
4 November 2004 adopting with modification 39 IBP
Commissioner Funas Report and Recommendation
("Report") finding respondent guilty of conflict of
interests, failure to safeguard a former clients
interest, and violating the prohibition against the

private practice of law while being a government

prosecutor. The IBP Board of Governors
recommended the imposition of a penalty of three
years suspension from the practice of law. The Report
reads:
Now the issue here is whether being a former lawyer
of Taggat conflicts with his role as Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor in deciding I.S. No. 97-240. A
determination of this issue will require the test of
whether the matter in I.S. No. 97-240 will conflict with
his former position of Personnel Manager and Legal
Counsel of Taggat.
I.S. No. 97-240 was filed for "Violation of Labor Code"
(see Resolution of the Provincial Prosecutors Office,
Annex "B" of Complaint). Herein Complainant, Ruthie
Lim-Santiago, was being accused as having the
"management and control" of Taggat (p. 2, Resolution
of the Prov. Pros. Office, supra).

240 was for "Violation of the Labor Code." Here lies

the conflict. Perhaps it would have been different
had I.S. No. 97-240 not been labor-related, or if
Respondent had not been a Personnel Manager
concurrently as Legal Counsel. But as it is, I.S. No.
97-240 is labor-related and Respondent was a former
Personnel Manager of Taggat.
x x x x
While Respondent ceased his relations with Taggat in
1992 and the unpaid salaries being sought in I.S. No.
97-240 were of the years 1996 and 1997, the
employees and management involved are the very
personalities he dealt with as Personnel Manager
and Legal Counsel of Taggat. Respondent dealt with
these persons in his fiduciary relations with Taggat.
Moreover, he was an employee of the corporation and
part of its management.
x x x x

Clearly, as a former Personnel Manager and Legal

Counsel of Taggat, herein Respondent undoubtedly
handled the personnel and labor concerns of Taggat.
Respondent, undoubtedly dealt with and related with
the employees of Taggat. Therefore, Respondent
undoubtedly dealt with and related with complainants
in I.S. No. 97-240. The issues, therefore, in I.S. No.
97-240, are very much familiar with Respondent.
While the issues of unpaid salaries pertain to the
periods 1996-1997, the mechanics and personalities
in that case are very much familiar with Respondent.
A lawyer owes something to a former client.
Herein Respondent owes to Taggat, a former client,
the duty to "maintain inviolate the clients confidence
or to refrain from doing anything which will injuriously
affect him in any matter in which he previously
represented him" (Natam v. Capule, 91 Phil. 640; p.
231, Agpalo, Legal Ethics, 4th ed.)
Respondent argues that as Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor, he does not represent any client or any
interest except justice. It should not be forgotten,
however, that a lawyer has an immutable duty to a
former client with respect to matters that he
previously handled for that former client. In this case,
matters relating to personnel, labor policies, and labor
relations that he previously handled as Personnel
Manager and Legal Counsel of Taggat. I.S. No. 97-

As to the propriety of receiving "Retainer Fees" or

"consultancy fees" from herein Complainant while
being an Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, and for
rendering legal consultancy work while being an
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, this matter had long
been settled. Government prosecutors are
prohibited to engage in the private practice of law
(see Legal and Judicial Ethics, Ernesto Pineda, 1994
ed., p. 20; People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109;
Aquino v. Blanco 70 Phil. 647). The act of being a
legal consultant is a practice of law. To engage in the
practice of law is to do any of those acts that are
characteristic of the legal profession (In re: David, 93
Phil. 461). It covers any activity, in or out of court,
which required the application of law, legal principles,
practice or procedures and calls for legal knowledge,
training and experience (PLA v. Agrava, 105 Phil. 173;
People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 111; Cayetano v.
Monsod, 201 SCRA 210).
Respondent clearly violated this prohibition.
As for the secondary accusations of harassing certain
employees of Taggat and instigating the filing of
criminal complaints, we find the evidence insufficient.
Accordingly, Respondent should be found guilty of

15

conflict of interest, failure to safeguard a former

clients interest, and violating the prohibition against
the private practice of law while being a government
prosecutor. 40
The IBP Board of Governors forwarded the Report to
the Court as provided under Section 12(b), Rule 139B 41 of the Rules of Court.
The Ruling of the Court
The Court exonerates respondent from the charge of
violation of Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility ("Code"). However, the Court finds
respondent liable for violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1
of the Code of Professional Responsibility against
unlawful conduct. 42 Respondent committed unlawful
conduct when he violated Section 7(b)(2) of the Code
of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials
and Employees or Republic Act No. 6713 ("RA 6713").
Canon 6 provides that the Code "shall apply to
lawyers in government service in the discharge of
their official duties." 43 A government lawyer is thus
bound by the prohibition "not [to] represent conflicting
interests." 44 However, this rule is subject to certain
limitations. The prohibition to represent conflicting
interests does not apply when no conflict of interest
exists, when a written consent of all concerned is
given after a full disclosure of the facts or when no
true attorney-client relationship exists. 45 Moreover,
considering the serious consequence of the
disbarment or suspension of a member of the Bar,
clear preponderant evidence is necessary to justify
the imposition of the administrative penalty. 46
Respondent is also mandated under Rule 1.01 of
Canon 1 not to engage in "unlawful x x x conduct."
Unlawful conduct includes violation of the statutory
prohibition on a government employee to "engage in
the private practice of [his] profession unless
authorized by the Constitution or law, provided, that
such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with
[his] official functions." 47
Complainants evidence failed to substantiate the
claim that respondent represented conflicting interests
In Quiambao v. Bamba, 48 the Court enumerated

various tests to determine conflict of interests. One

test of inconsistency of interests is whether the lawyer
will be asked to use against his former client any
confidential information acquired through their
connection or previous employment. 49 In essence,
what a lawyer owes his former client is to maintain
inviolate the clients confidence or to refrain from
doing anything which will injuriously affect him in any
matter in which he previously represented him. 50
In the present case, we find no conflict of interests
when respondent handled the preliminary
investigation of the criminal complaint filed by Taggat
employees in 1997. The issue in the criminal
complaint pertains to non-payment of wages that
occurred from 1 April 1996 to 15 July 1997. Clearly,
respondent was no longer connected with Taggat
during that period since he resigned sometime in
1992.
In order to charge respondent for representing
conflicting interests, evidence must be presented to
prove that respondent used against Taggat, his former
client, any confidential information acquired through
his previous employment. The only established
participation respondent had with respect to the
criminal complaint is that he was the one who
conducted the preliminary investigation. On that basis
alone, it does not necessarily follow that respondent
used any confidential information from his previous
employment with complainant or Taggat in resolving
the criminal complaint.
The fact alone that respondent was the former
Personnel Manager and Retained Counsel of Taggat
and the case he resolved as government prosecutor
was labor-related is not a sufficient basis to charge
respondent for representing conflicting interests. A
lawyers immutable duty to a former client does not
cover transactions that occurred beyond the lawyers
employment with the client. The intent of the law is to
impose upon the lawyer the duty to protect the clients
interests only on matters that he previously handled
for the former client and not for matters that arose
after the lawyer-client relationship has terminated.
Further, complainant failed to present a single iota of
evidence to prove her allegations. Thus, respondent is
not guilty of violating Rule 15.03 of the Code.

Respondent engaged in the private practice of law

while working as a government prosecutor
The Court has defined the practice of law broadly as
x x x any activity, in or out of court, which requires the
application of law, legal procedure, knowledge,
training and experience. "To engage in the practice of
law is to perform those acts which are characteristics
of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give
notice or render any kind of service, which device or
service requires the use in any degree of legal
knowledge or skill." 51
"Private practice of law" contemplates a succession of
acts of the same nature habitually or customarily
holding ones self to the public as a lawyer. 52
Respondent argues that he only rendered consultancy
services to Taggat intermittently and he was not a
retained counsel of Taggat from 1995 to 1996 as
alleged. This argument is without merit because the
law does not distinguish between consultancy
services and retainer agreement. For as long as
respondent performed acts that are usually rendered
by lawyers with the use of their legal knowledge, the
same falls within the ambit of the term "practice of
law."
Nonetheless, respondent admitted that he rendered
his legal services to complainant while working as a
government prosecutor. Even the receipts he signed
stated that the payments by Taggat were for
"Retainers fee." 53 Thus, as correctly pointed out by
complainant, respondent clearly violated the
prohibition in RA 6713.
However, violations of RA 6713 are not subject to
disciplinary action under the Code of Professional
Responsibility unless the violations also constitute
infractions of specific provisions of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Certainly, the IBP has no
jurisdiction to investigate violations of RA 6713 the
Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public
Officials and Employees unless the acts involved
also transgress provisions of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
Here, respondents violation of RA 6713 also

16

constitutes a violation of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, which

mandates that "[a] lawyer shall not engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct."
Respondents admission that he received from Taggat
fees for legal services while serving as a government
prosecutor is an unlawful conduct, which constitutes a
violation of Rule 1.01.

the Philippines, the Department of Justice, and all

courts in the country for their information and
guidance.
SO ORDERED.

Respondent admitted that complainant also charged

him with unlawful conduct when respondent stated in
his Demurrer to Evidence:
In this instant case, the complainant prays that the
respondent be permanently and indefinitely
suspended or disbarred from the practice of the law
profession and his name removed from the Roll of
Attorneys on the following grounds:
x x x x
d) that respondent manifested gross misconduct and
gross violation of his oath of office and in his dealings
with the public. 54
On the Appropriate Penalty on Respondent
The appropriate penalty on an errant lawyer depends
on the exercise of sound judicial discretion based on
the surrounding facts. 55
Under Civil Service Law and rules, the penalty for
government employees engaging in unauthorized
private practice of profession is suspension for six
months and one day to one year. 56 We find this
penalty appropriate for respondents violation in this
case of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Carlos B.
Sagucio GUILTY of violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly,
we SUSPEND respondent Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio
from the practice of law for SIX MONTHS effective
upon finality of this Decision.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of
the Bar Confidant to be appended to respondents
personal record as an attorney, the Integrated Bar of

17

A.C. No. 7430

February 15, 2012

MARTIN LAHM III and JAMES P. CONCEPCION,

Complainants, vs.LABOR ARBITER JOVENCIO Ll.
MAYOR, JR., Respondent.
R E S O L U T I O N

Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or

Preliminary Injunction Against the Respondents of
David Edward Toze.
Thereafter, the respondent issued an Order dated
September 14, 2006 that directs the parties in the said
case to maintain the status quo ante. The
complainants herein sought the reconsideration of the
Order dated September 14, 200[6] x x x.

Motion for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining

Order and/or Preliminary Injunction Against the
Respondents of David Edward Toze, and that the
counsel for respondents in the illegal dismissal case
have asked for a relatively long period of fifteen days
for a resetting, he (respondent) found merit in issuing
the Order dated September 14, 2006 that requires the
parties to maintain the status quo ante.
x x x

REYES, J.:
x x x x
Before us is a verified complaint 1 filed by Martin Lahm
III and James P. Concepcion (complainants) praying
for the disbarment of Labor Arbiter Jovencio Ll. Mayor,
Jr. (respondent) for alleged gross misconduct and
violation of lawyers oath.
On June 27, 2007, the respondent filed his Comment 2
to the complaint.
In a Resolution3 dated July 18, 2007, the Court
referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation.
The antecedent facts, as summarized in the Report
and Recommendation4 dated September 19, 2008 of
Commissioner Romualdo A. Din, Jr. of the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline, are as follows:
On September 5, 2006 a certain David Edward Toze
filed a complaint for illegal dismissal before the Labor
Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations
Commission against the members of the Board of
Trustees of the International School, Manila. The
same was docketed as NLRC-NCR Case No. 0007381-06 and raffled to the sala of the respondent.
Impleaded as among the party-respondents are the
complainants in the instant case.
On September 7, 2006, David Edward Toze filed a
Verified Motion for the Issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction
Against the Respondents. The said Motion was set for
hearing on September 12, 2006 at 10:00 in the
morning. A day after, on September 8, 2006, the
counsel for the complainants herein entered its
appearance and asked for additional time to oppose
and make a comment to the Verified Motion for the

On account of the Order dated September 14, 2006,

David Edward Toze was immediately reinstated and
assumed his former position as superintendent of the
International School Manila.
The pending incidents with the above-mentioned
illegal dismissal case were not resolved, however, the
scheduled hearing for the issuance of a preliminary
injunction on September 20, 2006 and September 27,
2006 was postponed.
On January 19, 2007, the co-respondents of the
complainants herein in the said illegal dismissal case
filed a motion for an early resolution of their motion to
dismiss the said case, but the respondent instead
issued an Order dated February 6, 2007 requiring the
parties to appear in his Office on February 27, 2007 at
10:00 in the morning in order to thresh out David
Edward Toze claim of moral and exemplary damages.
x x x x
The respondent on the other maintains that the Order
dated September 14, 2006 was issued by him on
account of [the] Verified Motion for the Issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary
Injunction Against the Respondents that was filed by
David Edward Toze, and of the Entry of Appearance
with Motion for Additional Time to File Comment that
was thereafter filed by the counsel for the herein
complainants in the illegal dismissal case pending
before the respondent.
The respondent maintains that in order to prevent
irreparable damage on the person of David Edward
Toze, and on account of the urgency of [the] Verified

The respondent argues that [the] instant case should

be dismissed for being premature since the
aforementioned illegal dismissal case is still pending
before the Labor Arbitration Branch of the National
Labor Relations Commission, that the instant case is
a subterfuge in order to compel the respondent to
inhibit himself in resolving the said illegal dismissal
case because the complainants did not assail the
Order dated September 14, 2006 before the Court of
Appeals under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.5
Based on the foregoing, the Investigating
Commissioner concluded that: (1) the grounds cited
by the respondent to justify his issuance of the status
quo ante order lacks factual basis and is speculative;
(2) the respondent does not have the authority to
issue a temporary restraining order and/or a
preliminary injunction; and (3) the inordinate delay in
the resolution of the motion for reconsideration
directed against the September 14, 2006 Order
showed an orchestrated effort to keep the status quo
ante until the expiration of David Edward Tozes
employment contract.
Accordingly, the Investigating Commissioner
recommended that:
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended that
the respondent be SUSPENDED for a period of six (6)
months with a warning that a repetition of the same or
similar incident will be dealt with more severe penalty.6
On December 11, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors
issued Resolution No. XVIII-2008-6447 which adopted
and approved the recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner. The said resolution
further pointed out that the Board of Governors had
previously recommended the respondents

18

suspension from the practice of law for three years in

Administrative Case (A.C.) No. 7314 entitled "Mary
Ann T. Flores v. Atty. Jovencio Ll. Mayor, Jr.".

administrative charges against the respondent are

intrinsically connected with the discharge of the
respondents quasi-judicial functions.

The respondent sought to reconsider the foregoing

disposition,8 but it was denied by the IBP Board of
Governors in its Resolution No. XIX-2011-476 dated
June 26, 2011.

Nonetheless, it cannot be discounted that the

respondent, as a labor arbiter, is a public officer
entrusted to resolve labor controversies. It is well
settled that the Court may suspend or disbar a lawyer
for any conduct on his part showing his unfitness for
the confidence and trust which characterize the
attorney and client relations, and the practice of law
before the courts, or showing such a lack of personal
honesty or of good moral character as to render him
unworthy of public confidence.11

The case is now before us for confirmation. We agree

with the IBP Board of Governors that the respondent
should be sanctioned.
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides
that a lawyer may be removed or suspended from the
practice of law, inter alia, for gross misconduct and
violation of the lawyers oath. Thus:
Section 27. Attorneys removed or suspended by
Supreme Court on what grounds. A member of the
bar may be removed or suspended from his office as
attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,
malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office,
grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for
any violation of the oath which he is required to take
before the admission to practice, or for a wilful
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court,
or for corruptly or wilful appearing as an attorney for a
party to a case without authority so to do. The practice
of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain,
either personally or through paid agents or brokers,
constitutes malpractice. (emphasis supplied)

Thus, the fact that the charges against the respondent

were based on his acts committed in the discharge of
his functions as a labor arbiter would not hinder this
Court from imposing disciplinary sanctions against
him.
The Code of Professional Responsibility does not
cease to apply to a lawyer simply because he has
joined the government service. In fact, by the express
provision of Canon 6 thereof, the rules governing the
conduct of lawyers "shall apply to lawyers in
government service in the discharge of their official
tasks." Thus, where a lawyers misconduct as a
government official is of such nature as to affect his
qualification as a lawyer or to show moral
delinquency, then he may be disciplined as a member
of the bar on such grounds.12
In Atty. Vitriolo v. Atty. Dasig,13 we stressed that:

A lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any

misconduct showing any fault or deficiency in his
moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor.9
Gross misconduct is any inexcusable, shameful or
flagrant unlawful conduct on the part of a person
concerned with the administration of justice; i.e.,
conduct prejudicial to the rights of the parties or to the
right determination of the cause. The motive behind
this conduct is generally a premeditated, obstinate or
intentional purpose.10
Intrinsically, the instant petition wants this Court to
impose disciplinary sanction against the respondent
as a member of the bar. However, the grounds
asserted by the complainants in support of the

Generally speaking, a lawyer who holds a government

office may not be disciplined as a member of the Bar
for misconduct in the discharge of his duties as a
government official. However, if said misconduct as a
government official also constitutes a violation of his
oath as a lawyer, then he may be disciplined by this
Court as a member of the Bar.
In this case, the record shows that the respondent, on
various occasions, during her tenure as OIC, Legal
Services, CHED, attempted to extort from Betty C.
Mangohon, Rosalie B. Dela Torre, Rocella G. Eje, and
Jacqueline N. Ng sums of money as consideration for
her favorable action on their pending applications or

requests before her office. The evidence remains

unrefuted, given the respondents failure, despite the
opportunities afforded her by this Court and the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline to comment on the
charges. We find that respondents misconduct as a
lawyer of the CHED is of such a character as to affect
her qualification as a member of the Bar, for as a
lawyer, she ought to have known that it was patently
unethical and illegal for her to demand sums of money
as consideration for the approval of applications and
requests awaiting action by her office.
x x x
A member of the Bar who assumes public office does
not shed his professional obligations. Hence, the
Code of Professional Responsibility, promulgated on
June 21, 1988, was not meant to govern the conduct
of private practitioners alone, but of all lawyers
including those in government service. This is clear
from Canon 6 of said Code. Lawyers in government
are public servants who owe the utmost fidelity to the
public service. Thus, they should be more sensitive in
the performance of their professional obligations, as
their conduct is subject to the ever-constant scrutiny
of the public.
For a lawyer in public office is expected not only to
refrain from any act or omission which might tend to
lessen the trust and confidence of the citizenry in
government, she must also uphold the dignity of the
legal profession at all times and observe a high
standard of honesty and fair dealing. Otherwise said,
a lawyer in government service is a keeper of the
public faith and is burdened with high degree of social
responsibility, perhaps higher than her brethren in
private practice.14 (emphasis supplied and citations
omitted)
In Tadlip v. Atty. Borres, Jr.,15 we ruled that an
administrative case against a lawyer for acts
committed in his capacity as provincial adjudicator of
the Department of Agrarian Reform Regional
Arbitration Board may be likened to administrative
cases against judges considering that he is part of the
quasi-judicial system of our government.
This Court made a similar pronouncement in Buehs v.
Bacatan16 where the respondent-lawyer was
suspended from the practice of law for acts he

19

committed in his capacity as an accredited Voluntary

Arbitrator of the National Conciliation and Mediation
Board.
Here, the respondent, being part of the quasi-judicial
system of our government, performs official functions
that are akin to those of judges. Accordingly, the
present controversy may be approximated to
administrative cases of judges whose decisions,
including the manner of rendering the same, were
made subject of administrative cases.
As a matter of public policy, not every error or mistake
of a judge in the performance of his official duties
renders him liable. In the absence of fraud, dishonesty
or corruption, the acts of a judge in his official capacity
do not always constitute misconduct although the
same acts may be erroneous. True, a judge may not
be disciplined for error of judgment absent proof that
such error was made with a conscious and deliberate
intent to cause an injustice.17
While a judge may not always be held liable for
ignorance of the law for every erroneous order that he
renders, it is also axiomatic that when the legal
principle involved is sufficiently basic, lack of
conversance with it constitutes gross ignorance of the
law. Indeed, even though a judge may not always be
subjected to disciplinary action for every erroneous
order or decision he renders, that relative immunity is
not a license to be negligent or abusive and arbitrary
in performing his adjudicatory prerogatives.18
When the law is sufficiently basic, a judge owes it to
his office to know and to simply apply it. Anything less
would be constitutive of gross ignorance of the law.19
In the case at bench, we find the respondent guilty of
gross ignorance of the law.
Acting on the motion for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction,
the respondent issued the September 14, 2006 Order
requiring the parties to maintain the status quo ante
until the said motion had been resolved. It should be
stressed, however, that at the time the said motion
was filed, the 2005 Rules of Procedure of the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) is already in
effect.

Admittedly, under the 1990 Rules of Procedure of the

NLRC, the labor arbiter has, in proper cases, the
authority to issue writs of preliminary injunction and/or
restraining orders. Section 1, Rule XI of the 1990
Rules of Procedure of the NLRC provides that:
Section 1. Injunction in Ordinary Labor Disputes. A
preliminary injunction or restraining order may be
granted by the Commission through its Divisions
pursuant to the provisions of paragraph (e) of Article
218 of the Labor Code, as amended, when it is
established on the basis of the sworn allegations in
the petition that the acts complained of involving or
arising from any labor dispute before the Commission,
which, if not restrained or performed forthwith, may
cause grave or irreparable damage to any party or
render ineffectual any decision in favor of such party.
If necessary, the Commission may require the
petitioner to post a bond and writ of preliminary
injunction or restraining order shall become effective
only upon the approval of the bond which shall
answer for any damage that may be suffered by the
party enjoined, if it is finally determined that the
petitioner is not entitled thereto.
The foregoing ancillary power may be exercised by
the Labor Arbiters only as an incident to the cases
pending before them in order to preserve the rights of
the parties during the pendency of the case, but
excluding labor disputes involving strike or lockout.
(emphasis supplied)
Nevertheless, under the 2005 Rules of Procedure of
the NLRC, the labor arbiters no longer has the
authority to issue writs of preliminary injunction and/or
temporary restraining orders. Under Section 1, Rule X
of the 2005 Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, only the
NLRC, through its Divisions, may issue writs of
preliminary injunction and temporary restraining
orders. Thus:
Section 1. Injunction in Ordinary Labor Disputes. - A
preliminary injunction or restraining order may be
granted by the Commission through its Divisions
pursuant to the provisions of paragraph (e) of Article
218 of the Labor Code, as amended, when it is
established on the basis of the sworn allegations in
the petition that the acts complained of involving or
arising from any labor dispute before the Commission,

which, if not restrained or performed forthwith, may

cause grave or irreparable damage to any party or
render ineffectual any decision in favor of such party.
(emphasis supplied)
The role of the labor arbiters, with regard to the
issuance of writs of preliminary injunctions and/or writ
of preliminary injunction, at present, is limited to
reception of evidence as may be delegated by the
NLRC. Thus, Section 4, Rule X of the 2005 Rules of
Procedure of the NLRC provides that:
Section 4. Reception of Evidence; Delegation. - The
reception of evidence for the application of a writ of
injunction may be delegated by the Commission to
any of its Labor Arbiters who shall conduct such
hearings in such places as he may determine to be
accessible to the parties and their witnesses, and
shall thereafter submit his report and recommendation
to the Commission within fifteen (15) days from such
delegation. (emphasis supplied)
The foregoing rule is clear and leaves no room for
interpretation. However, the respondent, in violation of
the said rule, vehemently insist that he has the
authority to issue writs of preliminary injunction and/or
temporary restraining order. On this point, the
Investigating Commissioner aptly ruled that:
The respondent should, in the first place, not
entertained Edward Tozes Verified Motion for the
Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or
Preliminary Injunction Against the Respondents. He
should have denied it outright on the basis of Section
1, Rule X of the 2005 Revised Rules of Procedure of
the National Labor Relations Commission.
x x x x
The respondent, being a Labor Arbiter of the
Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations
Commission, should have been familiar with Sections
1 and 4 of the 2005 Revised Rules of procedure of the
National Labor Relations Commission. The first,
states that it is the Commission of the [NLRC] that
may grant a preliminary injunction or restraining order.
While the second, states [that] Labor Arbiters [may]
conduct hearings on the application of preliminary
injunction or restraining order only in a delegated

20

capacity.20
What made matters worse is the unnecessary delay
on the part of the respondent in resolving the motion
for reconsideration of the September 14, 2006 Order.
The unfounded insistence of the respondent on his
supposed authority to issue writs of preliminary
injunction and/or temporary restraining order, taken
together with the delay in the resolution of the said
motion for reconsideration, would clearly show that
the respondent deliberately intended to cause
prejudice to the complainants.
On this score, the Investigating Commissioner keenly
observed that:
The Commission is very much disturbed with the
effect of the Order dated September 14, 2006 and the
delay in the resolution of the pending incidents in the
illegal dismissal case before the respondent.
Conspicuously, Section 3 (Term of Contract) of the
Employment Contract between David Edward Toze
and International School Manila provides that David
Edward Toze will render work as a superintendent for
the school years August 2005-July 2006 and August
2006-July 2007.
The Order dated September 14, 2006 in effect
reinstates David Edward Toze as superintendent of
International School of Manila until the resolution of
the formers Verified Motion for the Issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary
Injunction Against the Respondents.
Since the Employment Contract between David
Edward Toze and International School Manila is about
to expire or end on August 2007, prudence dictates
that the respondent expediently resolved [sic] the
merits of David Edward Tozes Verified Motion for the
Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or
Preliminary Injunction Against the Respondents
because any delay in the resolution thereof would
result to undue benefit in favor of David Edward Toze
and unwarranted prejudice to International School
Manila.
x x x x

At the time the respondent inhibited himself from

resolving the illegal dismissal case before him, there
are barely four (4) months left with the Employment
Contract between David Edward Toze and
International School Manila.
From the foregoing, there is an inordinate delay in the
resolution of the reconsideration of the Order dated
September 14, 2006 that does not escape the
attention of this Commission. There appears an
orchestrated effort to delay the resolution of the
reconsideration of the Order dated September 14,
2006 and keep status quo ante until expiration of
David Edward Tozes Employment Contract with
International School Manila come August 2007,
thereby rendering the illegal dismissal case moot and
academic.
x x x x
Furthermore, the procrastination exhibited by the
respondent in the resolution of [the] assailed Order x x
x should not be countenanced, specially, under the
circumstance that is attendant with the term of the
Employment Contract between David Edward Toze
and International School Manila. The respondents
lackadaisical attitude in sitting over the pending
incident before him for more than five (5) months only
to thereafter inhibit himself therefrom, shows the
respondents disregard to settled rules and
jurisprudence.1wphi1 Failure to decide a case or
resolve a motion within the reglementary period
constitutes gross inefficiency and warrants the
imposition of administrative sanction against the
erring magistrate x x x. The respondent, being a
Labor Arbiter, is akin to judges, and enjoined to decide
a case with dispatch. Any delay, no matter how short,
in the disposition of cases undermine the peoples
faith and confidence in the judiciary x x x. 21
Indubitably, the respondent failed to live up to his
duties as a lawyer in consonance with the strictures of
the lawyers oath and the Code of Professional
Responsibility, thereby occasioning sanction from this
Court.
In stubbornly insisting that he has the authority to
issue writs of preliminary injunction and/or temporary
restraining order contrary to the clear import of the
2005 Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, the

respondent violated Canon 1 of the Code of

Professional Responsibility which mandates lawyers
to "obey the laws of the land and promote respect for
law and legal processes".
All told, we find the respondent to have committed
gross ignorance of the law, his acts as a labor arbiter
in the case below being inexcusable thus
unquestionably resulting into prejudice to the rights of
the parties therein.
Having established the foregoing, we now proceed to
determine the appropriate penalty to be imposed.
Under Rule 14022 of the Rules of Court, as amended
by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC, gross ignorance of the law is
a serious charge,23 punishable by a fine of more than
P20,000.00, but not exceeding P40,000.00,
suspension from office without salary and other
benefits for more than three but not exceeding six
months, or dismissal from the service.24
In Tadlip v. Atty. Borres, Jr., the respondent-lawyer
and provincial adjudicator, found guilty of gross
ignorance of the law, was suspended from the
practice of law for six months. Additionally, in parallel
cases,25 a judge found guilty of gross ignorance of the
law was meted the penalty of suspension for six
months.
Here, the IBP Board of Governors recommended that
the respondent be suspended from the practice of law
for six months with a warning that a repetition of the
same or similar incident would be dealt with more
severe penalty. We adopt the foregoing
recommendation.
This Court notes that the IBP Board of Governors had
previously recommended the respondents
suspension from the practice of law for three years in
A.C. No. 7314, entitled "Mary Ann T. Flores v. Atty.
Jovencio Ll. Mayor, Jr.". This case, however, is still
pending.
It cannot be gainsaid that since public office is a
public trust, the ethical conduct demanded upon
lawyers in the government service is more exacting
than the standards for those in private practice.
Lawyers in the government service are subject to

21

constant public scrutiny under norms of public

accountability. They also bear the heavy burden of
having to put aside their private interest in favor of the
interest of the public; their private activities should not
interfere with the discharge of their official functions.26
At this point, the respondent should be reminded of
our exhortation in Republic of the Philippines v. Judge
Caguioa,27 thus:
Ignorance of the law is the mainspring of injustice.
Judges are called upon to exhibit more than just a
cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural
rules. Basic rules should be at the palm of their
hands. Their inexcusable failure to observe basic laws
and rules will render them administratively
liable.1wphi1 Where the law involved is simple and
elementary, lack of conversance with it constitutes

gross ignorance of the law. "Verily, for transgressing

the elementary jurisdictional limits of his court,
respondent should be administratively liable for gross
ignorance of the law."
"When the inefficiency springs from a failure to
consider so basic and elemental a rule, a law or a
principle in the discharge of his functions, a judge is
either too incompetent and undeserving of the
position and title he holds or he is too vicious that the
oversight or omission was deliberately done in bad
faith and in grave abuse of judicial authority." 28
(citations omitted)

SUSPEND respondent from the practice of law for a

period of six (6) months, with a WARNING that
commission of the same or similar offense in the
future will result in the imposition of a more severe
penalty.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the IBP, as
well as the Office of the Bar Confidant and the Court
Administrator who shall circulate it to all courts for
their information and guidance and likewise be
entered in the record of the respondent as attorney.
SO ORDERED.

WHEREFORE, finding respondent Atty. Jovencio Ll.

Mayor, Jr. guilty of gross ignorance of the law in
violation of his lawyers oath and of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, the Court resolved to

22