EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE

Philippine Judges Association vs. Prado

[GR 105371, 11 November 1993]
En Banc, Cruz (J): 12 concur, 1 on leave

Facts: The Philippine Judges Association (duly represented by its President, Bernardo P.
Abesamis, Vice-President for Legal Affairs Mariano M. Umali, Director for Pasig, Makati and
Pasay, Metro Manila Alfredo C.Flores, and Chairman of the Committee on Legal Aid, Jesus G.
Bersamira, Presiding Judges of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 85, Quezon City and Branches
160, 167 and 166, Pasig, Metro Manila, respectively); the National Confederation of the Judges
Association of the Philippines (composed of the Metropolitan Trial Court Judges Association
represented by its President, Reinato Quilala of the Municipal Trial Circuit Court, Manila); and
the Municipal Judges League of the Philippines (represented by its President, Tomas G.
Talavera); by themselves and in behalf of all the Judges of the Regional Trial and Shari'a
Courts, Metropolitan Trial Courts and Municipal Courts throughout the Country, filed the petition
assailing the constitutionality of Republic Act 7354 (An Act Creating the Philippine Postal
Corporation, Defining its Power, Functions and Responsibilities, Providing for Regulation of the
Industry and for Other Purposes Connected Therewith), as implemented by the Philippine
Postal Corporation through its Circular 92-28, on the grounds that: (1) its title embraces more
than one subject and does not express its purposes; (2) it did not pass the required readings in
both Houses of Congress and printed copies of the bill in its final form were not distributed
among the members before its passage; and (3) it is discriminatory and encroaches on the
independence of the Judiciary; contending that their official functions as judges will be
prejudiced by the withdrawal of franking privilege. The National Land Registration Authority
(NLRA) has taken common cause with them insofar as its own activities, such as the sending of
requisite notices in registration cases, affect judicial proceedings. On its motion, it has been
allowed to intervene.
Issue: Whether the withdrawal of the franking privilege of the Judiciary violates the equal
protection clause of the Constitution.
Held: The equal protection of the laws is embraced in the concept of due process, as every
unfair
discrimination offends the requirements of justice and fair play. It has nonetheless been
embodied in a separate clause in Article III Sec. 1, of the Constitution to provide for a more
specific guaranty against any form of undue favoritism or hostility from the government.
Arbitrariness in general may be challenged on the basis of the due process clause. But if the
particular act assailed partakes of an unwarranted partiality or prejudice, the sharper weapon to
cut it down is the equal protection clause. Equal protection simply requires that all persons or
things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities
imposed. Similar subjects, in other words, should not be treated differently, so as to give undue
favor to some and unjustly discriminate against others. The equal protection clause does not
require the universal application of the laws on all persons or things without distinction. What the
clause requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. By
classification is meant the grouping of persons or things similar to each other in certain
particulars and different from all others in these same particulars. The withdrawal of franking

EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE

privilege from the Judiciary would further deepen the problem in the delay in the administration
of justice. The Court are dependent on the postal service for communicating with lawyers and
litigants as part of the judicial process. It should not be hard to imagine the increased difficulties
of our courts if they have to affix a purchased stamp to every process they send in the discharge
of their judicial functions, considering that the Judiciary has the lowest appropriation in the
national budget compared to the Legislative and Executive Departments (.84% of P309 billion
budgeted for 1993). The repealing clause is a discriminatory provision that denied the Judiciary
the equal protection of the laws guaranteed for all persons or things similarly situated. The
distinction made by the law is superficial. It is not based on substantial distinctions that make
real differences between the Judiciary and the grantees of the franking privilege (The President
of the Philippines; the Vice President of the Philippines; Senators and Members of the House of
Representatives; the Commission on Elections; former Presidents of the Philippines; widows of
former Presidents of the Philippines; the National Census and Statistics Office; and the general
public in the filing of complaints against public offices or officers). In lumping the Judiciary with
the other offices (the Office of Adult Education; the Institute of National Language; the
Telecommunications Office; the Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation; the National
Historical Commission; the Armed Forces of the Philippines; the Armed Forces of the
Philippines Ladies Steering Committee; the City and Provincial Prosecutors; the Tanodbayan or
the Office of Special Prosecutor; the Kabataang Barangay; the Commission on the Filipino
Language; the Provincial and City Assessors; and the National Council for the Welfare of
Disabled Persons.) from which the franking privilege has been withdrawn, Section 35 has
placed the courts of justice in a category to which it does not belong. If it recognizes the need of
the President of the Philippines and the members of Congress for the franking privilege, there is
no reason why it should not recognize a similar and in fact greater need on the part of the
Judiciary for such privilege.

EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE

PASEI [Philippine Association of Service Exporters Inc] v.

Drilon
[GR L-81958, 30 June 1988]
En Banc, Sarmiento (J): 12 concur, 2 on leave
Facts: The Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. (PASEI) is a firm "engaged
principally in the recruitment of Filipino workers, male and female, for overseas placement." It
challenged the Constitutional validity of DOLEs Department Order 1 (series of 1988), in the
character of "Guidelines Governing the Temporary Suspension of Deployment of Filipino
Domestic and Household Workers," in a petition for certiorari and prohibition. The measure is
assailed (1) for "discrimination against males or females;" that it "does not apply to all Filipino
workers but only to domestic helpers and females with similar skills;" (2) for being violative of
the right to travel, and (3) for being an invalid exercise of the lawmaking power, police power
being legislative, and not executive, in character. PASEI also invoked Section 3 of Article XIII of
the Constitution providing for worker participation "in policy and decision-making processes
affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law as Department Order No. 1, as
contended, was passed in the absence
of prior consultations. It also claimed that it violated the Charter's non-impairment clause, in
addition to the "great and irreparable injury" that PASEI members face should the Order be
further enforced. On 25 May 1988, the Solicitor General, on behalf of the Secretary of Labor and
Administrator of the POEA, filed a Comment informing the Court that on 8 March 1988, the
Labor Secretary lifted the deployment ban in the states of Iraq, Jordan, Qatar, Canada,
Hongkong, United States, Italy, Norway, Austria, and Switzerland. In submitting the validity of
the challenged "guidelines," the Solicitor General invokes the police power of the Philippine
State.
Issue: Whether Department Order 1 unduly discriminates against women.
Held: Department Order 1 applies only to "female contract workers," but it does not thereby
make an undue discrimination between the sexes. Equality before the law" under the
Constitution does not import a perfect identity of rights among all men and women. It admits of
classifications, provided that (1) such classifications rest on substantial distinctions; (2) they are
germane to the purposes of the law; (3) they are not confined to existing conditions; and (4) they
apply equally to all members of the same class. The classification made the preference for
female workers rests on substantial distinctions. The sordid tales of maltreatment suffered by
migrant Filipina workers, even rape and various forms of torture, confirmed by testimonies of
returning workers, are compelling motives for urgent Government action. As precisely the
caretaker of Constitutional rights, the Court is called upon to protect victims of exploitation. In
fulfilling that duty, the Court sustains the Government's efforts. There is no evidence that, except
perhaps for isolated instances, Filipino men abroad have been afflicted with an identical
predicament. Discrimination in this case is justified. Further, the impugned guidelines are
applicable to all female domestic overseas workers, not all Filipina workers. Had the ban been
given universal applicability, then it would have been unreasonable and arbitrary, due to the fact

EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE

that not all of them are similarly circumstanced. What the Constitution prohibits is the singling
out of a select person or group of persons within an existing class, to the prejudice of such a
person or group or resulting in an unfair advantage to another person or group of persons.
Where the classification is based on such distinctions that make a real difference as infancy,
sex, and stage of civilization of minority groups, the better rule is to recognize its validity only if
the young, the women, and the cultural minorities are singled out for favorable treatment.

EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE

Lacson v. Executive Secretary

[GR 128096, 20 January 1999]
En Banc, Martinez (J): 14 concur
Facts: On 18 May 1995, 11 persons believed to be members of the Kuratong Baleleng gang
were slain along Commonwealth Avenue in Quezon City by elements of the Anti-Bank Robbery
and Intelligence Task Group (ABRITG) headed by PNP Chief Superintendent Jewel Canson.
The ABRITG was composed of police officers from the Traffic Management Command (TMC)
led by Senior Superintendent Francisco Zubia, Jr.; PACC Task Force Habagat (PACC-TFH)
headed by Chief Superintendent Panfilo M. Lacson; Central Police District Command (CPDC)
led by Chief Superintendent Ricardo de Leon; and the Criminal Investigation Command (CIC)
headed by Chief Superintendent Romeo Acop. Acting on a media expose of SPO2 Eduardo
delos Reyes, a member of the CIC, alleged that what actually transpired was a summary
execution and not a shoot-out between the Kuratong Baleleng gang members and the ABRITG.
Ombudsman Aniano Desierto formed a panel of investigators headed by the Deputy
Ombudsman for Military Affairs, Bienvenido Blancaflor, to investigate the incident. This panel
later absolved from any criminal liability all the PNP officers and personnel allegedly involved in
the 18 May 1995 incident, with a finding that the said incident was a legitimate police operation.
However, a review board led by Overall Deputy Ombudsman Francisco Villa modified the
Blancaflor panel's finding and recommended the indictment for multiple murder against 26
accused, including Lacson, Zubia, and Acop. This recommendation was approved by the
Ombudsman, except for the withdrawal of the charges against Chief Supt. Ricardo de Leon. On
2 November 1995, Lacson was among those charged as principal in 11 informations for murder
before the Sandiganbayan's Second Division, while Acop and Zubia were among those charged
in the same informations as accessories after-the-fact. Upon motion by all the accused in the 11
informations, the Sandiganbayan allowed them to file a motion for reconsideration of the
Ombudsman's action. After conducting a reinvestigation, the Ombudsman filed on 1 March
1996, 11 amended informations before the Sandiganbayan, wherein Lacson was charged only
as an accessory, together with Acop and Zubia and others. One of the accused was dropped
from the case. On 5-6 March 1996, all the accused filed separate motions questioning the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, asserting that under the amended informations, the cases fall
within the jurisdiction of the RTC pursuant to Section 2 (paragraphs a and c) of Republic Act
(RA) 7975. They contend that the said law limited the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to cases
where one or more of the " principal accused" are government officials with Salary Grade (SG)
27 or higher, or PNP officials with the rank of Chief Superintendent (Brigadier General) or
higher. The highest ranking principal accused in the amended informations has the rank of only
a Chief Inspector, and none has the equivalent of at least SG 27. On 8 May 1996, a resolution
penned by Justice Demetriou, with Justices Lagman and de Leon concurring, and Justices
Balajadia and Garchitorena dissenting, the Sandiganbayan admitted the amended information
and ordered the cases transferred to the Quezon City RTC which has original and exclusive
jurisdiction under Republic Act, as none of the principal accused has the rank of Chief
Superintendent or higher. On 17 May 1996, the Office of the Special Prosecutor moved for a
reconsideration, insisting that the cases should remain with the Sandiganbayan. While motions

EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE

for reconsideration were pending resolution, and even before the issue of jurisdiction cropped
up with the filing of the amended informations on 1 March 1996, HB 2299 and HB 1094
(sponsored by Representatives Edcel C. Lagman and Neptali M. Gonzales II, respectively), as
well as SB 844 (sponsored by Senator Neptali Gonzales), were introduced in Congress,
defining/expanding the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan by deleting the word "principal" from the phrase "principal accused" in
Section 2 (paragraphs a and c) of RA 7975. These bills were consolidated and later approved
into law as RA 8249 by the President of the Philippines on 5 February 1997. On 5 March 1997,
the Sandiganbayan promulgated a Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration of the
Special Prosecutor, ruling that it "stands pat in its resolution dated 8 May 1996. On the same
day, the Sandiganbayan issued an Addendum to its 5 March 1997 Resolution granting the
Special Prosecutors motion for reconsideration in light of the enactment of RA 8249, admitting
the amended information, and retaining jurisdiction to try and decide the cases. Lacson, thus,
questions the constitutionality of Section 4 of RA 8249, including Section 7 thereof which
provides that the said law "shall apply to all cases pending in any court over which trial has not
begun as of the approval hereof."
Issue: Whether Lacson and his co-accused were placed under a different category from those
situated similarly to them, in light of the amendments under Republic Act 8249.
Held: The classification between those pending cases involving the concerned public officials
whose trial has not yet commenced and whose cases could have been affected by the
amendments of the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction under RA 8249, as against those cases where
trial had already started as of the approval of the law, rests on substantial distinction that makes
real differences. In the first instance, evidence against them were not yet presented, whereas in
the latter the parties had already submitted their respective proofs, examined witnesses and
presented documents. Since it is within the power of Congress to define the jurisdiction of courts
subject to the constitutional limitations, it can be reasonably anticipated that an alteration of that
jurisdiction would necessarily affect pending cases, which is why it has to provide for a remedy
in the form of a transitory provision. Sections 4 and 7 does not place Lacson and intervenors
under a different category from those similarly situated as them. Precisely, paragraph a of
Section 4 provides that it shall apply to "all cases involving" certain public officials and, under
the transitory provision in Section 7, to "all cases pending in any court." However, to fall under
the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the following requisites must concur: (1)
the offense committed is a violation of (a) R.A. 3019, as amended (the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act), (b) R.A. 1379 (the law on ill-gotten wealth), (c) Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII,
Book II of the Revised Penal Code (the law on bribery), (d) Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14, and
14-A, issued in 1986 (sequestration cases), or (e) other offenses or felonies whether simple or
complexed with other crimes; (2) the offender committing the offenses in items (a), (b), (c) and
(e) is a public official or employee holding any of the positions enumerated in paragraph a of
Section 4; and (3) the offense committed is in relation to the office. Specifically, an offense is
said to have been committed in relation to the office if it (the offense) is "intimately connected"
with the office of the offender and perpetrated while he was in the performance of his official
functions. This intimate relation between the offense charged and the discharge of official duties
"must be alleged in the information. Herein, the amended informations are wanting of specific
factual averments to show the intimate relation/connection between the offense charged and the
discharge of official function of the offenders. Mere allegation in the amended information that

EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE

the offense was committed by the accused public officer "in relation to his office" is not
sufficient. That phrase is merely a conclusion of law, not a factual averment that would show the
close intimacy between the offense charged and the discharge of the accused's official duties.
For failure to show in the amended informations that the charge of murder was intimately
connected with the discharge of official functions of the accused PNP officers, the offense
charged in the subject criminal cases is plain murder and, therefore, within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the RTC, not the Sandiganbayan.

EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE

International School Alliance of Educators (ISAE) vs.

Quisumbing
[GR 128845, 1 June 2000]
First Division, Kapunan (J): 2 concur, 1 on official leave, 1 on leave
Facts: The International School, Inc., pursuant to Presidential Decree 732, is a domestic
educational institution established primarily for dependents of foreign diplomatic personnel and
other temporary residents. To enable the School to continue carrying out its educational
program and improve its standard of instruction, Section 2(c) of the same decree authorizes the
School to employ its own teaching and management personnel selected by it either locally or
abroad, from Philippine or other nationalities, such personnel being exempt from otherwise
applicable laws and regulations attending their employment, except laws that have been or will
be enacted for the protection of employees. Accordingly, the School hires both foreign and local
teachers as members of its faculty, classifying the same into two: (1) foreign-hires and (2) localhires. The School employs four tests to determine whether a faculty member should be
classified as a foreign-hire or a local hire, i.e. (a) What is one's domicile? (b) Where is one's
home economy? (c) To which country does one owe economic allegiance? (d) Was the
individual hired abroad specifically to work in the School and was the School responsible for
bringing that individual to the Philippines? The School grants foreign-hires certain benefits not
accorded local-hires. These include housing, transportation, shipping costs, taxes, and home
leave travel allowance. Foreign-hires are also paid a salary rate 25% more than local-hires. The
School justifies the difference on two "significant economic disadvantages" foreign-hires have to
endure, namely: (a) the "dislocation factor" and (b) limited tenure. The compensation scheme is
simply the School's adaptive measure to remain competitive on an international level in terms of
attracting competent
professionals in the field of international education. The compensation package given to localhires has been shown to apply to all, regardless of race. There are foreigners who have been
hired locally and who are paid equally as Filipino local hires. When negotiations for a new
collective bargaining agreement were held on June 1995, the International School Alliance of
Educators (ISAE), "a legitimate labor union and the collective bargaining representative of all
faculty members" of the School, contested the difference in salary rates between foreign and
local-hires. This issue, as well as the question of whether foreign-hires should be included in the
appropriate bargaining unit, eventually caused a deadlock between the parties. On 7 September
1995, ISAE filed a notice of strike. The failure of the National Conciliation and Mediation Board
to bring the parties to a compromise prompted the Department of Labor and Employment
(DOLE) to assume jurisdiction over the dispute. On 10 June 1996, the DOLE Acting Secretary,
Crescenciano B. Trajano, issued an Order resolving the parity and representation issues in
favor of the School. Then DOLE Secretary Leonardo A. Quisumbing subsequently denied
ISAE's motion for reconsideration in an Order dated 19 March 1997. ISAE sought relief from the
Supreme Court.

EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE

Issue: Whether the School unduly discriminated against the local-hires.
Held: That public policy abhors inequality and discrimination is beyond contention. Our
Constitution and laws reflect the policy against these evils. The Constitution in the Article on
Social Justice and Human Rights exhorts Congress to "give highest priority to the enactment of
measures that protect and enhance the right of all people to human dignity, reduce social,
economic, and political inequalities." The very broad Article 19 of the Civil Code requires every
person, "in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, [to] act with justice,
give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith. International law, which springs
from general principles of law, likewise proscribes discrimination. The Universal Declaration of
Human
Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, the International
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the Convention against
Discrimination in Education, the Convention (No. 111) Concerning Discrimination in Respect of
Employment and Occupation 16 all embody the general principle against discrimination, the
very antithesis of fairness and justice. The Philippines, through its Constitution, has incorporated
this principle as part of its national laws. In the workplace, where the relations between capital
and labor are often skewed in favor of capital, inequality and discrimination by the employer are
all the more reprehensible. If an employer accords employees the same position and rank, the
presumption is that these employees perform equal work. This presumption is borne by logic
and human experience. If the employer pays one employee less than the rest, it is not for that
employee to explain why he receives less or why the others receive more. That would be adding
insult to injury. The employer has discriminated against that employee; it is for the employer to
explain why the employee is treated unfairly. Herein, the International School has failed to
discharge this burden. There is no evidence here that foreign-hires perform 25% more efficiently
or effectively than the local-hires. Both groups have similar functions and responsibilities, which
they perform under similar working conditions. The School cannot invoke the need to entice
foreign-hires to leave their domicile to rationalize the distinction in salary rates without violating
the principle of equal work for equal pay. The point-of-hire classification employed by
respondent School to justify the distinction in the salary rates of foreign-hires and local hires to
be an invalid
classification. There is no reasonable distinction between the services rendered by foreign-hires
and local- hires. The practice of the School of according higher salaries to foreign-hires
contravenes public policy.

EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE

Himagan vs People of the Philippines & Judge Hilario

Mapayo
Equal Protection Suspension of PNP Members Charged with Grave Felonies
FACTS: Himagan is a policeman assigned in Camp Catititgan, Davao City. He was charged for
the murder of Benjamin Machitar Jr and for the attempted murder of Benjamins younger
brother, Barnabe. Pursuant to Sec 47 of RA 6975, Himagan was placed into suspension
pending the murder case. The law provides that Upon the filing of a complaint or information
sufficient in form and substance against a member of the PNP for grave felonies where the
penalty imposed by law is six (6) years and one (1) day or more, the court shall immediately
suspend the accused from office until the case is terminated. Such case shall be subject to
continuous trial and shall be terminated within ninety (90) days from arraignment of the
accused. Himagan assailed the suspension averring that Sec 42 of PD 807 of the Civil Service
Decree, that his suspension should be limited to ninety (90) days. He claims that an imposition
of preventive suspension of over 90 days is contrary to the Civil Service Law and would be a
violation of his constitutional right to equal protection of laws.
ISSUE: Whether or not Sec 47, RA 6975 violates equal protection guaranteed by the
Constitution.
HELD: The language of the first sentence of Sec 47 of RA 6975 is clear, plain and free from
ambiguity. It gives no other meaning than that the suspension from office of the member of the
PNP charged with grave offense where the penalty is six years and one day or more shall last
until the termination of the case. The suspension cannot be lifted before the termination of the
case. The second sentence of the same Section providing that the trial must be terminated
within ninety (90) days from arraignment does not qualify or limit the first sentence. The two can
stand independently of each other. The first refers to the period of suspension. The second
deals with the time from within which the trial should be finished.
The reason why members of the PNP are treated differently from the other classes of persons
charged criminally or administratively insofar as the application of the rule on preventive
suspension is concerned is that policemen carry weapons and the badge of the law which can
be used to harass or intimidate witnesses against them, as succinctly brought out in the
legislative discussions.
If a suspended policeman criminally charged with a serious offense is reinstated to his post
while his case is pending, his victim and the witnesses against him are obviously exposed to

EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE

constant threat and thus easily cowed to silence by the mere fact that the accused is in uniform
and armed. the imposition of preventive suspension for over 90 days under Sec 47 of RA 6975
does not violate the suspended policemans constitutional right to equal protection of the laws.
Suppose the trial is not terminated within ninety days from arraignment, should the suspension
of accused be lifted?
The answer is certainly no. While the law uses the mandatory word shall before the phrase be
terminated within ninety (90) days, there is nothing in RA 6975 that suggests that the
preventive suspension of the accused will be lifted if the trial is not terminated within that period.
Nonetheless, the Judge who fails to decide the case within the period without justifiable reason
may be subject to administrative sanctions and, in appropriate cases where the facts so
warrant, to criminal or civil liability. If the trial is unreasonably delayed without fault of the
accused such that he is deprived of his right to a speedy trial, he is not without a remedy. He
may ask for the dismissal of the case. Should the court refuse to dismiss the case, the accused
can compel its dismissal by certiorari, prohibition or mandamus, or secure his liberty by habeas
corpus.

EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE

RODOLFO S. BELTRAN vs. SECRETARY OF HEALTH

GR Nos. 133640, 133661 and 139147, 25 November 2005,
En Banc (Azcuna, J.)
FACTS: The promotion of public health is a fundamental obligation of the State. The health of
the people is a primordial governmental concern. The National Blood Services Act was enacted
in the exercise of the States police power in order to promote and preserve public health and
safety. What may be regarded as a denial of the equal protection of the laws is a question not
always easily determined. No rule that will cover every case can be formulated. Class
legislation, discriminating against some and favoring others is prohibited but classification on a
reasonable basis and not made arbitrarily or capriciously is permitted.
Republic Act No. 7719 or the National Blood Services Act of 1994 was enacted into law on April
2, 1994. The Act seeks to provide an adequate supply of safe blood by promoting voluntary
blood donation and by regulating blood banks in the country. It was approved by then President
Fidel V. Ramos on May 15, 1994 and was subsequently published in the Official Gazette on
August 18, 1994. The law took effect on August 23, 1994. On April 28, 1995, Administrative
Order No. 9, Series of 1995, constituting the Implementing Rules and Regulations of said law
was promulgated by respondent Secretary of the Department of Health (DOH).
Section 7 of R.A. 7719 provides, Phase-out of Commercial Blood Banks All commercial blood
banks shall be phased-out over a period of two (2) years after the effectivity of this Act,
extendable to a maximum period of two (2) years by the Secretary. Section 23. Process of
Phasing Out. -- The Department shall effect the phasing-out of all commercial blood banks over
a period of two (2) years, extendible for a maximum period of two (2) years after the effectivity of
R.A. 7719. The decision to extend shall be based on the result of a careful study and review of
the blood supply and demand and public safety.
Years prior to the passage of the National Blood Services Act of 1994, petitioners have already
been operating commercial blood banks under Republic Act No. 1517, entitled An Act
Regulating the Collection, Processing and Sale of Human Blood, and the Establishment and
Operation of Blood Banks and Blood Processing Laboratories. The law, which was enacted on
June 16, 1956, allowed the establishment and operation by licensed physicians of blood banks
and blood processing laboratories.

EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE

On May 20, 1998, prior to the expiration of the licenses granted to petitioners, they filed a
petition for certiorari with application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction or
temporary restraining order under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assailing the constitutionality
and validity of the aforementioned Act and its Implementing Rules and Regulations.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Section 7 of RA 7719 constitutes undue delegation of legislative powers
2. Whether or not Section 7 of RA 7719 and its implementing rules violate the equal protection
clause
3. Whether or not RA 7719 is a valid exercise of police power
HELD: Petition granted. The assailed law and its implementing rules are constitutional and
valid.
Republic Act No. 7719 or the National Blood Services Act of 1994 is complete in itself. It is clear
from the provisions of the Act that the Legislature intended primarily to safeguard the health of
the people and has mandated several measures to attain this objective. One of these is the
phase out of commercial blood banks in the country. The law has sufficiently provided a definite
standard for the guidance of the Secretary of Health in carrying out its provisions, that is, the
promotion of public health by providing a safe and adequate supply of blood through voluntary
blood donation. By its provisions, it has conferred the power and authority to the Secretary of
Health as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. Congress may
validly delegate to administrative agencies the authority to promulgate rules and regulations to
implement a given legislation and effectuate its policies. The Secretary of Health has been
given, under Republic Act No. 7719, broad powers to execute the provisions of said Act. In this
regard, the Secretary did not go beyond the powers granted to him by the Act when said phaseout period was extended in accordance with the Act as laid out in Section 2. What may be
regarded as a denial of the equal protection of the laws is a question not always easily
determined. No rule that will cover every case can be formulated. Class legislation,
discriminating against some and favoring others is prohibited but classification on a reasonable
basis and not made arbitrarily or capriciously is permitted. The classification, however, to be
reasonable: (a) must be based on substantial distinctions which make real differences; (b) must
be germane to the purpose of the law; (c) must not be limited to existing conditions only; and,
(d) must apply equally to each member of the class.
Republic Act No. 7719 or The National Blood Services Act of 1994, was enacted for the
promotion of public health and welfare. Based on the foregoing, the Legislature never intended
for the law to create a situation in which unjustifiable discrimination and inequality shall be
allowed. To effectuate its policy, a classification was made between nonprofit blood
banks/centers and commercial blood banks. We deem the classification to be valid and
reasonable for the following reasons: First, it was based on substantial distinctions. The former
operates for purely humanitarian reasons and as a medical service while the latter is motivated
by profit. Also, while the former wholly encourages voluntary blood donation, the latter treats
blood as a sale of commodity. Second, the classification, and the consequent phase out of
commercial blood banks is germane to the purpose of the law, that is, to provide the nation with
an adequate supply of safe blood by promoting voluntary blood donation and treating blood
transfusion as a humanitarian or medical service rather than a commodity. This necessarily

EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE

involves the phase out of commercial blood banks based on the fact that they operate as a
business enterprise, and they source their blood supply from paid blood donors who are
considered unsafe compared to voluntary blood donors as shown by the USAID-sponsored
study on the Philippine blood banking system. Third, the Legislature intended for the general
application of the law. Its enactment was not solely to address the peculiar circumstances of the
situation nor was it intended to apply only to the existing conditions. Lastly, the law applies
equally to all commercial blood banks without
exception.
The promotion of public health is a fundamental obligation of the State. The health of the people
is a primordial governmental concern. Basically, the National Blood Services Act was enacted in
the exercise of the States police power in order to promote and preserve public health and
safety.
Based on the grounds raised by petitioners to challenge the constitutionality of the
National Blood Services Act of 1994 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations, the Court
finds that petitioners have failed to overcome the presumption of constitutionality of the law. As
to whether the Act constitutes a wise legislation, considering the issues being raised by
petitioners, is for Congress to determine.

EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE

ANG LADLAD VS. COMELEC

Facts:
Petitioner is a national organization which represents the lesbians, gays, bisexuals, and transgenders. It filed a petition for accreditation as a party-list organization to public respondent.
However, due to moral grounds, the latter denied the said petition. To buttress their denial,
COMELEC cited certain biblical and quranic passages in their decision. It also stated that since
their ways are immoral and contrary to public policy, they are considered nuissance. In fact,
their acts are even punishable under the Revised Penal Code in its Article 201.
A motion for reconsideration being denied, Petitioner filed this instant Petition on Certiorari
under Rule 65 of the ROC.
Ang Ladlad argued that the denial of accreditation, insofar as it justified the exclusion by using
religious dogma, violated the constitutional guarantees against the establishment of religion.
Petitioner also claimed that the Assailed Resolutions contravened its constitutional rights to
privacy, freedom of speech and assembly, and equal protection of laws, as well as constituted
violations of the Philippines international obligations against discrimination based on sexual
orientation.
In its Comment, the COMELEC reiterated that petitioner does not have a concrete and genuine
national political agenda to benefit the nation and that the petition was validly dismissed on
moral grounds. It also argued for the first time that the LGBT sector is not among the sectors
enumerated by the Constitution and RA 7941, and that petitioner made untruthful statements in
its petition when it alleged its national existence contrary to actual verification reports by
COMELECs field personnel.
Issue:
WON Respondent violated the Non-establishment clause of the Constitution;
WON Respondent erred in denying Petitioners application on moral and legal grounds.
Held:

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Respondent mistakenly opines that our ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani stands for the proposition
that only those sectors specifically enumerated in the law or related to said sectors (labor,
peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women,
youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals) may be registered under the party-list
system. As we explicitly ruled in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on
Elections, the enumeration of marginalized and under-represented sectors is not exclusive.
The crucial element is not whether a sector is specifically enumerated, but whether a particular
organization complies with the requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941.
Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that [n]o law shall be made respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. At bottom, what our nonestablishment clause calls for is government neutrality in religious matters. Clearly,
governmental reliance on religious justification is inconsistent with this policy of neutrality. We
thus find that it was grave violation of the non-establishment clause for the COMELEC to utilize
the Bible and the Koran to justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad. Be it noted that government
action must have a secular purpose.
Respondent has failed to explain what societal ills are sought to be prevented, or why special
protection is required for the youth. Neither has the COMELEC condescended to justify its
position that petitioners admission into the party-list system would be so harmful as to
irreparably damage the moral fabric of society.
We also find the COMELECs reference to purported violations of our penal and civil laws flimsy,
at best; disingenuous, at worst. Article 694 of the Civil Code defines a nuisance as any act,
omission, establishment, condition of property, or anything else which shocks, defies, or
disregards decency or morality, the remedies for which are a prosecution under the Revised
Penal Code or any local ordinance, a civil action, or abatement without judicial proceedings. A
violation of Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code, on the other hand, requires proof beyond
reasonable doubt to support a criminal conviction. It hardly needs to be emphasized that mere
allegation of violation of laws is not proof, and a mere blanket invocation of public morals cannot
replace the institution of civil or criminal proceedings and a judicial determination of liability or
culpability.
As such, we hold that moral disapproval, without more, is not a sufficient governmental interest
to justify exclusion of homosexuals from participation in the party-list system. The denial of Ang
Ladlads registration on purely moral grounds amounts more to a statement of dislike and
disapproval of homosexuals, rather than a tool to further any substantial public interest.

EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE

BIRAOGO VS. TRUTH COMMISSION

FACTS:
Pres. Aquino signed E. O. No. 1 establishing Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 (PTC) dated
July 30, 2010.
PTC is a mere ad hoc body formed under the Office of the President with the primary task to
investigate reports of graft and corruption committed by third-level public officers and
employees, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories during the previous administration,
and to submit its finding and recommendations to the President, Congress and the
Ombudsman. PTC has all the powers of an investigative body. But it is not a quasi-judicial body
as it cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle, or render awards in disputes between
contending parties. All it can do is gather, collect and assess evidence of graft and corruption
and make recommendations. It may have subpoena powers but it has no power to cite people in
contempt, much less order their arrest. Although it is a fact-finding body, it cannot determine
from such facts if probable cause exists as to warrant the filing of an information in our courts of
law.
Petitioners asked the Court to declare it unconstitutional and to enjoin the PTC from performing
its functions. They argued that:
(a) E.O. No. 1 violates separation of powers as it arrogates the power of the Congress to create
a public office and appropriate funds for its operation.
(b) The provision of Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987 cannot
legitimize E.O. No. 1 because the delegated authority of the President to structurally reorganize
the Office of the President to achieve economy, simplicity and efficiency does not include the
power to create an entirely new public office which was hitherto inexistent like the Truth
Commission.

EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE

(c) E.O. No. 1 illegally amended the Constitution and statutes when it vested the Truth
Commission with quasi-judicial powers duplicating, if not superseding, those of the Office of the
Ombudsman created under the 1987 Constitution and the DOJ created under the Administrative
Code of 1987.
(d) E.O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause as it selectively targets for investigation and
prosecution officials and personnel of the previous administration as if corruption is their
peculiar species even as it excludes those of the other administrations, past and present, who
may be indictable.
Respondents, through OSG, questioned the legal standing of petitioners and argued that:
1] E.O. No. 1 does not arrogate the powers of Congress because the Presidents executive
power and power of control necessarily include the inherent power to conduct investigations to
ensure that laws are faithfully executed and that, in any event, the Constitution, Revised
Administrative Code of 1987, PD No. 141616 (as amended), R.A. No. 9970 and settled
jurisprudence, authorize the President to create or form such bodies.
2] E.O. No. 1 does not usurp the power of Congress to appropriate funds because there is no
appropriation but a mere allocation of funds already appropriated by Congress.
3] The Truth Commission does not duplicate or supersede the functions of the Ombudsman and
the DOJ, because it is a fact-finding body and not a quasi-judicial body and its functions do not
duplicate, supplant or erode the latters jurisdiction.
4] The Truth Commission does not violate the equal protection clause because it was validly
created for laudable purposes.
ISSUES:
1. WON the petitioners have legal standing to file the petitions and question E. O. No. 1;
2. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the principle of separation of powers by usurping the powers of
Congress to create and to appropriate funds for public offices, agencies and commissions;
3. WON E. O. No. 1 supplants the powers of the Ombudsman and the DOJ;
4. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause.
RULING:
The power of judicial review is subject to limitations, to wit: (1) there must be an actual case or
controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act must
have the standing to question the validity of the subject act or issuance; otherwise stated, he
must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will
sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be
raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota
of the case.
1. The petition primarily invokes usurpation of the power of the Congress as a body to which
they belong as members. To the extent the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of

EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE

each member thereof, since his office confers a right to participate in the exercise of the powers
of that institution.
Legislators have a legal standing to see to it that the prerogative, powers and privileges vested
by the Constitution in their office remain inviolate. Thus, they are allowed to question the validity
of any official action which, to their mind, infringes on their prerogatives as legislators.
With regard to Biraogo, he has not shown that he sustained, or is in danger of sustaining, any
personal and direct injury attributable to the implementation of E. O. No. 1.
Locus standi is a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question. In private suits,
standing is governed by the real-parties-in interest rule. It provides that every action must be
prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest. Real-party-in interest is the
party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the
avails of the suit.
Difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public suits. Here, the plaintiff who asserts a
public right in assailing an allegedly illegal official action, does so as a representative of the
general public. He has to show that he is entitled to seek judicial protection. He has to make out
a sufficient interest in the vindication of the public order and the securing of relief as a citizen
or taxpayer.
The person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest
in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result. The Court,
however, finds reason in Biraogos assertion that the petition covers matters of transcendental
importance to justify the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court. There are constitutional issues in
the petition which deserve the attention of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and
weight as precedents
The Executive is given much leeway in ensuring that our laws are faithfully executed. The
powers of the President are not limited to those specific powers under the Constitution. One of
the recognized powers of the President granted pursuant to this constitutionally-mandated duty
is the power to create ad hoc committees. This flows from the obvious need to ascertain facts
and determine if laws have been faithfully executed. The purpose of allowing ad hoc
investigating bodies to exist is to allow an inquiry into matters which the President is entitled to
know so that he can be properly advised and guided in the performance of his duties relative to
the execution and enforcement of the laws of the land.
2. There will be no appropriation but only an allotment or allocations of existing funds already
appropriated. There is no usurpation on the part of the Executive of the power of Congress to
appropriate funds. There is no need to specify the amount to be earmarked for the operation of
the commission because, whatever funds the Congress has provided for the Office of the
President will be the very source of the funds for the commission. The amount that would be
allocated to the PTC shall be subject to existing auditing rules and regulations so there is no
impropriety in the funding.

EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE

3. PTC will not supplant the Ombudsman or the DOJ or erode their respective powers. If at all,
the investigative function of the commission will complement those of the two offices. The
function of determining probable cause for the filing of the appropriate complaints before the
courts remains to be with the DOJ and the Ombudsman. PTCs power to investigate is limited to
obtaining facts so that it can advise and guide the President in the performance of his duties
relative to the execution and enforcement of the laws of the land.
4. Court finds difficulty in upholding the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1 in view of its
apparent transgression of the equal protection clause enshrined in Section 1, Article III (Bill of
Rights) of the 1987 Constitution.
Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike,
both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. It requires public bodies and institutions
to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner. The purpose of the equal protection
clause is to secure every person within a states jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary
discrimination, whether occasioned by the express terms of a statue or by its improper
execution through the states duly constituted authorities.
There must be equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. Equal
protection clause permits classification. Such classification, however, to be valid must pass the
test of reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial
distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing conditions
only; and (4) It applies equally to all members of the same class.
The classification will be regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are not similarly
treated, both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed.
Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative of the equal protection clause. The
clear mandate of truth commission is to investigate and find out the truth concerning the
reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous administration only. The intent to
single out the previous administration is plain, patent and manifest.
Arroyo administration is but just a member of a class, that is, a class of past administrations. It is
not a class of its own. Not to include past administrations similarly situated constitutes
arbitrariness which the equal protection clause cannot sanction. Such discriminating
differentiation clearly reverberates to label the commission as a vehicle for vindictiveness and
selective retribution. Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification.
The PTC must not exclude the other past administrations. The PTC must, at least, have the
authority to investigate all past administrations.
The Constitution is the fundamental and paramount law of the nation to which all other laws
must conform and in accordance with which all private rights determined and all public authority
administered. Laws that do not conform to the Constitution should be stricken down for being
unconstitutional.

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WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. Executive Order No. 1 is hereby declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it is violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution.