Case 3:13-cv-01944-CAB-BLM Document 143-1 Filed 04/11/14 Page 1 of 12

CHRISTOPHER J. ZOPATTI, Esq. (SBN 129497)

JOAN E. TRIMBLE, Esq. (SBN 205038)
2 CALLAHAN, THOMPSON, SHERMAN & CAUDILL, LLP
2601 Main Street, Suite 800
3 Irvine, California 92614
Tel:
(619) 222-5700
4 Fax:
(619) 232-2206
czoattictsclaw.com
Email:
5
tnm e ctsc aW.com
1

Attorne),s for Defendant

STEPHEN E. DOYNE, PH.D, and STEPHEN E. DOYNE, A Psychological
7 Corporation

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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CALIFORNIA COALITION FOR

FAMILIES AND CHILDREN, et al.,
Plaintiff,

Case No.: 13cv1944 CAB (BLM)

Judge: Hon. Cathy Ann Bencivengo
Complaint Filed: August 20,2013

vs.

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND

AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF
STEPHEN E. DOYNE'S MOTION
TO DISMISS COMPLAINT OR, IN
THE ALTERNATIVE, FOR MORE
DEFINITE STATEMENT

SAN DIEGO COUNTY BAR

ASSOCIATION, et al.,
Defendants.

Date:
June 6, 2014
2:00 p.m.
Time:
Courtroom: 4C

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- -_ _ __ _ __ __

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------l

rNO ORAL ARGUMENT UNLESS

REQUESTED BY THE COURT.]

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(l3cv1944 CAB (BLM

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT

OF STEPHEN E. DOYNE'S MOTION TO DISMISS

Case 3:13-cv-01944-CAB-BLM Document 143-1 Filed 04/11/14 Page 2 of 12

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(13cv1944 CAB (BLM

- 1SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF OF STEPHEN E. DOYNE'S

IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS

Case 3:13-cv-01944-CAB-BLM Document 143-1 Filed 04/11/14 Page 3 of 12

1.

INTRODUCTION

STEPHEN E. DOYNE, PH.D. and STEPHEN E. DOYNE, A Psychological

Corporation (collectively referred to as Dr. DOYNE) file this supplemental brief

concurrently with a joinder in the defense omnibus motion to dismiss pursuant to the

court's order of February 26, 2014. In addition to the relief sought by way of the

6 joinder in the omnibus motion to dismiss, Dr. DOYNE requests this Court dismiss
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this action pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 12(b)(6) because the

acts alleged against Dr. DOYNE are time barred. The underlying acts began in

2008, the alleged breach by Dr. DOYNE occurred in March 1, 2009 and the SDCBA
incident occurred on April 15, 2010.

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amended complaint fails to set forth grounds for equitable tolling of the statute of

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limitations, and instead sets forth facts that undermine the alleged grounds for

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tolling. The applicable statutes of limitation therefore bar this lawsuit in its entirety.

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Dr. DOYNE also is immune from suit in this matter pursuant to the doctrines of

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domestic relations exception, Rooker-Feldman, and quasi-judicial immunity.

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2.

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[Amended Complaint

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109, 818.] The

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Plaintiffs appear to assert the following categories of causes of action against

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Dr. DOYNE

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California state law claims including assault and battery, breach of contract,

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wrongful inducement to breach of contract, unjust enrichment, interference with

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economic relations, defamation, fraud, Business & Professions Code section

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172000, extortion, bribery, and intentional infliction of emotional distress; (3)

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Violation of 15 U.S.C. section 1125, the Lanham Act; (4) Violation of 18 U.S.C.

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section 1961 et seq., the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act

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("RICO"); and (5) Prospective relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section 2201 and 18

(1) Violation of 42 U.S.C. sections 1983, 1985, and 1986; (2)

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1 As set forth in the omnibus motion to dismiss, plaintiffs' violation ofFRCP Rule 8 makes it difficult to discern which
causes of action are asserted against which parties.

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- 1(l3cv1944 CAB (BLM

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF

STEPHEN E. DOYNE'S MOTION TO DISMISS

Case 3:13-cv-01944-CAB-BLM Document 143-1 Filed 04/11/14 Page 4 of 12

U.S .C. section ISI4(b).

Dr. DOYNE is a psychologist licensed by the state of California who

performs forensic psychology and child custody evaluation/mediation services.

[Amended Complaint

mediator in Mr. STUART's dissolution case. [Request for Judicial Notice ("RJN") ~

1; Amended Complaint

DOYNE and Mr. STUART entered into a written agreement wherein Dr. DOYNE

would provide mediation services related to Mr.

proceedings, and that at some unspecified time prior to March 1,2009, Dr. DOYNE

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47-48.]
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Dr. DOYNE was court appointed to act as

809-814.]

The amended complaint alleges that Dr.

STUART's dissolution

[Amended Complaint

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breached the mediation agreement.

817-819.]

Mr.

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STUART alleges that in September of 2008 Dr. DOYNE agreed to act as a mediator

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in his custody dispute, and that during the course of his services Dr. DOYNE

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reported Mr. STUART to San Diego County Child Protective Services because Mr.

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STUART held his son "upside down over a balcony." [Amended Complaint ~ 817.]

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The amended complaint further alleges Dr. DOYNE made a "false and misleading"

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child abuse report and forced Mr. STUART to pay for unnecessary services.

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[Amended Complaint ~ 817.]

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As a result of the various "breaches" identified in the amended complaint, Mr.

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STUART alleges that "[i]n addition to complaining to and firing DOYNE, Plaintiff

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also filed formal complaints with DOYNE' s landlord, Scripps Memorial Hospital,

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the State of California Board of Psychology" as well as federal law enforcement

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officers. [Amended Complaint

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DOYNE retaliated against Mr. STUART by falsely testifying and reporting facts

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related to Mr. STUART's son, and by demanding to be paid-which Mr. STUART

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alleges constitutes extortion and bribery. [Amended Complaint

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STUART refused to pay Dr. DOYNE further, but claims he was "intimidated,

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terrified, oppressed, and under duress" because Dr. DOYNE remained a witness in

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819.] The amended complaint alleges that Dr.

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821-830.] Mr.

-2(l3cv1944 CAB (BLM

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF

STEPHEN E. DOYNE'S MOTION TO DISMISS

Case 3:13-cv-01944-CAB-BLM Document 143-1 Filed 04/11/14 Page 5 of 12

Mr. STUART's family law matter, thus prohibiting Mr. STUART "from taking

formal action" until August 20, 2013.

argument is contradicted by the pleadings, in that Mr. STUART alleges he filed

complaints against Dr. DOYNE with the Board of Psychology, Scripps Memorial

Hospital, Dr. DOYNE' s landlord, and even federal agents. [Amended Complaint ~

819.]

DOYNE on November 20,2009, in which he both acted as the attorney for CCFC

and was the first signatory. [RJN 3, Exhibits to Amended Complaint, P654-P686.]

Mr. STUART also filed a legal malpractice action against SHARON BLANCHET

[Amended Complaint

828-830.]

This

Mr. STUART also filed an amicus curiae brief in an action against Dr.

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and

ASHWORTH,

BLANCHET,

KRISTENSEN

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(collectively "BLANCHET") on January 15, 2010, which was is based upon the

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BLANCHET firm's representations to Mr. STUART regarding the efficacy of Dr.

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DOYNE's mediation services. [RJN 2, Exhibits to Amended Complaint, P1353-

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P1366.]

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3.

&

KALEMENKARIAN

LEGAL ANALYSIS

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A.

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Plaintiff's complaint was filed on or about August 20, 2013. The amended

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complaint alleges that the underlying acts of Dr. DOYNE were discovered in March

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of 2009, thus each and every one of Plaintiffs' claims against Dr. DOYNE are time

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barred by the respective statutes of limitation regardless of whether the limitations

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period is one year under Code of Civil Procedure section 340.5 or 4 years for a civil

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RICO claim.

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contract, fraud, intentional infliction of emotional distress, extortion, and bribery, all

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stemming from professional services provided by Dr. DOYNE in the context of his

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role as a court appointed mediator. The Supreme Court held in Wilson v. Garcia

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that the appropriate statute of limitations period for 42 U.S.C. section 1983 actions is

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that of the state's statute of limitations for personal injury cases. (Wilson v. Garcia,

Plaintiffs' Claims Are Time Barred

The amended complaint alleges causes of action for breach of

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-3(13cv1944 CAB (BLM

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF

STEPHEN E. DOYNE'S MOTION TO DISMISS

Case 3:13-cv-01944-CAB-BLM Document 143-1 Filed 04/11/14 Page 6 of 12

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471 U.S. 261, 276,105 S. Ct. 1938 (1985).) In California, the statute of limitations

for personal injury causes of action is two years.

Procedure section 335.1.) However, for claims against a health care provider, the

time for commencement of the action begins one year from the discovery of the

claim. (California Code of Civil Procedure section 340.5.) Section 1985 claims are

likewise governed by the state personal injury limitations period. (Taylor v. Regents

ofUniv. 01 Cal. , 993 F.2d 710,711-712 (9th Cir. Cal. 1993).) Section 1986 contains

its own limitations period of one year. (Kennar v. North American Rockwell Corp.,

1974 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5678, 4 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 19, 1974).) Given that the claims

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arising from Dr. DOYNE's professional services accrued in 2009 or 2010, all tort

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claims as well as the sections 1983, 1985, and 1986 causes of action are time barred

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by the one year statute of limitations.

(California Code of Civil

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Although the original complaint was silent regarding allegations of purported

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duress, the amended complaint attempts to assert a claim for equitable tolling of the

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statute of limitations by pleading that plaintiff was subjected to fraud, duress, undue

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influence, and oppression. [Amended complaint

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complaint fails to set forth sufficient allegations to support equitable tolling of the

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limitations period.

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asserting the limitations period has expired, the plaintiff must demonstrate conduct

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on behalf of the defendant that actually and reasonably induced forbearance of filing

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suit. (Lauter v. Anoufrieva (C.D. Cal. 2009) 642 F.Supp.2d 1060, 1101.) In the case

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of Ateeq v. Najar (1993) 15 Cal.AppAth 1351, 1356-57, the court found that the

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doctrine of equitable estoppel applied where a jury found that the defendant

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repeatedly threatened the plaintiff with deportation if he caused any problems with

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the accounting of their financial dealings.

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allegations indicating that Dr. DOYNE in any way attempted to influence Mr.

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STUART from filing actions against him. To the contrary, the amended complaint

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827-830.]

The amended

To demonstrate that a defendant is equitably estopped from

The amended complaint is absent of

-4(l3cvI944 CAB (BLM

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF

STEPHEN E. DOYNE'S MOTION TO DISMISS

Case 3:13-cv-01944-CAB-BLM Document 143-1 Filed 04/11/14 Page 7 of 12

alleges that Mr. STUART filed complaints against Dr. DOYNE with the Board of

Psychology, Scripps Memorial Hospital, and even Dr. DOYNE's landlord.

[Amended Complaint

STUART was not delayed from taking formal action against Dr. DOYNE, as one of

the exhibits to the amended complaint is the November 20, 2009 amicus curiae brief

Mr. STUART prepared on behalf of CCFC in an action against Dr. DOYNE. [RJN

3, Exhibits to Amended Complaint, P654-P686.] Mr. STUART further was not

delayed from filing a legal malpractice action against BLANCHET on January 25,

2010 in which the entirety of the complaint alleges malpractice based upon

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BLANCHET's alleged recommendation that Mr. STUART retain the services of Dr.

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DOYNE. [RJN 3, Exhibits to Amended Complaint, PI353-PI366.] The complaint

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against BLANCHET sets forth various alleged wrongdoings of Dr. DOYNE. Based

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upon the allegations showing that Mr. STUART took formal action against Dr.

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DOYNE, Mr. STUART has failed to demonstrate conduct that actually and

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reasonably delayed him from filing suit and thus this action is time barred ..

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B.

All

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Claims

821-830.]

Al'ising

The amended complaint alleges that Mr.

From

Dr.

DOYNE's

Participation

In

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STUART's Family Law Matter Are Barred By The Domestic

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Relations Exception To Federal Jurisdiction.

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The burden of establishing federal court jurisdiction falls on the party seeking

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to invoke jurisdiction. (Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America (1994) 511

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U.S. 375, 377, 114 S.Ct. 1673, 1675, 128 L.Ed. 2d 291.) In this case, plaintiffs

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cannot meet their burden because the gravamen of this lawsuit seeks to invalidate

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orders of the San Diego Superior court pertaining to the management of family law

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cases. The Ninth Circuit's test for subject matter jurisdiction in domestic relations

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cases was set forth in Buechold v. Ortiz (9th Cir. 1968) 401 F.2d 371, 372, in which

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the court held that family law matters are the province of state courts.

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The Buechold v. Ortiz court notes that state courts have developed

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-5(13cv1944 CAB (BLM))

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF

STEPHEN E. DOYNE'S MOTION TO DISMISS

Case 3:13-cv-01944-CAB-BLM Document 143-1 Filed 04/11/14 Page 8 of 12

methodologies

consideration of criteria such as living standards and wages that are dependent upon

conditions in the area where the parties reside, and thus regulation of domestic

matters should be left to state courts. (Id.) As was the case in Buechold v. Ortiz,

where the party failed to seek relief in the California state courts, there is no

indication in Mr. STUART's complaint as to why he cannot seek relief in the state

court.

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C.

for

determining

child custody

orders,

which involve the

To The Extent That This Action Seeks To Challenge Any Order Of

The Family Law Court It Is Barred By The Rooker-Feldman
Doctrine.

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The Rooker-Feldman doctrine precludes a federal court from having

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jurisdiction over general constitutional challenges if such claims are inextricably

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intertwined with the claims asserted in state court. (Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co.

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(U.S. 1923) 263 U.S. 413, 44 S. Ct. 149, 68 L. Ed. 362, 1923 U.S. LEXIS 2824;

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District of Columbia Court of Appeal v. Feldman (U.S. 1983) 460 U.S. 462, 103 S.

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Ct. 1303, 75 L. Ed. 2d 206.) In Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co. the plaintiffs alleged an

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adverse state court judgment violated the constitution, and sought redress in the

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federal court. (Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co. (U.S. 1923) 263 U.S. 413, 44 S. Ct. 149,

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68 L. Ed. 362.) The Supreme Court held in Rooker that if the state court's ruling

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was wrong, the appropriate action was to pursue an appeal. (Id. at 416.) Similarly,

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the Supreme Court in Feldman that the federal court lacked authority to review a

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final judicial determination of the District of Columbia high court. (Id. at 476.) The

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principals of these holdings have come to be known as the Rooker-Feldman

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doctrine, which applies to cases wherein a losing party in a state case seeks to have a

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federal court reject a judgment of the state court. (Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic

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Indus. Corp., (U.S. 2005) 544 U.S. 280,291,125 S. Ct. 1517, 161 L. Ed. 2d 454

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("Rooker-Feldman doctrine is confined to cases of the kind from which it acquired

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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF

STEPHEN E. DOYNE'S MOTION TO DISMISS

Case 3:13-cv-01944-CAB-BLM Document 143-1 Filed 04/11/14 Page 9 of 12

its name: cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-

court judgments rendered before the federal district court proceedings commenced

and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.").)

Prospective Relief Count 2 asks the court to issue an order finding that

orders of the superior court in family law matters are unconstitutional and thereby

invalid, and as such this case falls squarely within the parameters of the Rooker-

Feldman doctrine. [Amended Complaint ~~ 1198-1203.] As stated in Noel v. Hall

(9

Feldman applies to defeat federal district court subject matter jurisdiction when a

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plaintiff s suit in federal district court is at least in part a forbidden de facto appeal of

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a state court judgment, and an issue in that federal suit is 'inextricably intertwined'

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with an issue resolved by the state court in its judicial decision." (ld. at 1158.) The

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stated purpose of plaintiffs' action is to have this court invalidate state court orders,

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and thus all issues are inextricably intertwined with issues resolved by state courts.

I
~

,...........(

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~
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th

Cir. 2003) 341 F.3d 1148, 1165, "(t)he 'inextricably intertwined' analysis of

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D.

Plaintiff's Claims Are Barred By The Doctrine Of Quasi-Judicial

Immunity.

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Dr. DOYNE was court appointed to act as mediator in Mr. STUART's

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dissolution case, and as such is protected by the doctrine of quasi-judicial immunity.

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[RJN

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recommendations to the court regarding custody and visitation. [RJN ~ 1, Exh. G

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p. 23.] It is clear that Congress did not intend section 1983 to abrogate immunities

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"well grounded in history and reason." (Buckley v. Fitzsimmons (1993) 509 U.S.

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259, 268, 113 S. Ct. 2606, 2612-13, 125 L.Ed. 2d 209.) The United States Supreme

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Court addressed the issue of witness immunity and section 1983 in the case of

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Briscoe v. Lahue (U.S. 1983) 460 U.S. 325, 103 S. Ct. 1108, 75 L. Ed. 2d 96,

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wherein the Court held that section 1983 does not abrogate the immunity provided to

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participants in judicial proceedings. The Supreme Court has recognized that "when

1, Exh. G p. 23.]

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He was appointed for the purpose of making

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-7(13cv1944 CAB (BLM

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF

STEPHEN E. DOYNE'S MOTION TO DISMISS

Case 3:13-cv-01944-CAB-BLM Document 143-1 Filed 04/11/14 Page 10 of 12

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Congress enacted 1983 it was aware of a well-established and well-understood

common-law tradition that extended absolute immunity to individuals performing

functions necessary to the judicial process." (Miller v. Gammie (9 th Cir. 2003) 335

F.3d 889, 895-96, (Abrogated in part on other grounds).) The common law provided

absolute immunity from subsequent damages liability for all persons - governmental

or otherwise - who were integral parts of the judicial process." (Briscoe, supra, 40

U.S. at 335.)

This protection extended to private counsel and witnesses for their

involvement in the "judicial proceeding itself." (Id. at 334.) Non-judicial persons

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who fulfill quasi-judicial functions intimately related to the judicial process have

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absolute immunity for damage claims arising from their performance of the

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delegated functions.

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Absolute immunity may properly be raised in support of a motion to dismiss for

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failure to state a claim. (See Imbler v. Pachtman (1976) 424 U.S. 409, 416; 96 S.Ct.

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984, 988; Mullis v. United States Bankruptcy Court, (9th Cir. 1987) 828 F.2d 1385,

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1387). Further, the absolute immunity of therapists extends beyond the function of

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testifying before the family court and encompasses the provisions of their reports

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and recommendations to the family court. (Myers v. Morris (1987) 810 F.2d 1437,

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1465.) Psychologists who fulfill quasi-judicial functions intimately related to the

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judicial process have absolute immunity for damage claims resulting from their

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performance of the delegated functions. (Kurzawa v. Meuller (6th Cir. 1984) 732

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F.2d 1456, 1548.)

(Myers v. Morris (8 th Cir. 1987) 810 F.2d 1437, 1466-67.)

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In Kurzawa, the defendants included a psychologist who examined the

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plaintiffs' child and made findings used by the state court to determine what

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environment best served the interests of the child. The court found that this function

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of providing information to be analogous to that of a witness and under Briscoe and

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its predecessors entitled the psychologist to immunity from a section 1983 lawsuit.

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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF

STEPHEN E. DOYNE'S MOTION TO DISMISS

Case 3:13-cv-01944-CAB-BLM Document 143-1 Filed 04/11/14 Page 11 of 12

(Id. at 1458) The court noted that psychologists must be able to perform the tasks

necessary to achieve the goal of determining what is best for the child without the

"worry of intimidation and harassment from dissatisfied parents." (Id.)

The functions of a court-appointed 730 expert are "to investigate, to render a

report as may be ordered by the court, and to testify as an expert at the trial of the

action relative to the fact or matter as to which the expert evidence is or may be

required." (California Evidence Code section 730.) Because it is plain from the face

of the Complaint that Dr. DOYNE was engaged in judicial or quasi-judicial acts, and

that he was not acting in the clear absence of all jurisdiction, he is immune from

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damages. (Id. at 1394.)

E.

Dr. DOYNE is Immune from Liability Based Upon Reports of

Suspected Child Abuse

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Dr. DOYNE is legally obligated by California Penal Code section 11166 to

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report suspected child abuse as he is a mandated reported as defined by California

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Penal Code section 11165.7(21). To the extent that the amended complaint alleges

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that Dr. DOYNE was negligent or otherwise culpable in reporting suspected child

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abuse of Mr. STUART's son, Dr. DOYNE is immunized from liability by California

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Penal Code section 11172, which provides that "no mandated reporter shall be

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civilly or criminally liable for any report required or authorized by this article ... "

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To the extent that paragraph 817 of the amended complaint alleges that Dr. DOYNE

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was culpable based upon Dr. DOYNE's report of suspected child abuse, Dr.

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DOYNE is immune from liability.

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F.

Plaintiffs' Complaint Fails To Establish The Elements of A Civil

RICO Claim.

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The elements of a civil Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations

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Act ("RICO") are as follows: "(1) conduct (2) of an enterprise (3) through a pattern

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(4) of racketeering activity (known as predicate acts) (5) causing injury to plaintiffs

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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF

STEPHEN E. DOYNE'S MOTION TO DISMISS

Case 3:13-cv-01944-CAB-BLM Document 143-1 Filed 04/11/14 Page 12 of 12

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business or property." (United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am. v. Bldg. &

Constr. Trades Dep't, 911 F. Supp. 2d 1118, 1124 (E.D. Wash. 2012).) As set forth

in the omnibus motion to dismiss, the amended complaint fails to adequately plead

predicate acts, and it also fails to plead the existence of an enterprise. The Supreme

Court in United States v. Turkette noted that an enterprise is "proved by evidence of

an ongoing organization, formal or informal, and by evidence that the various

associates function as a continuing unit." (United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576,

583 (U.S. 1981).)

sufficient facts demonstrating the existence of a continuing unit separate and apart

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from the ambiguously alleged predicate acts, and thus the elements of a RICO claim

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cannot be met.

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4.

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Here, there is no enterprise.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the motion to dismiss of Dr. DOYNE should

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be granted without leave to amend.

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DATED: April 10,2014

CALLAHAN, THOMPSON, SHERMAN

& CAUDILL, LLP

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By

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CHRIST PHER 1. ZOPAITI

JOAN E. 1RIMBLE

Attorn,~ys for Defendant,

STEPHEN E. DOYNE, PH.I!: and
STEPHEN E. DOYNE, A.P .L.

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The complaint fails to allege

G:\ACE\0130009\Mtns\Mot. to Dismiss - Doyne\Doyne Mot to Dismiss P&A.docx

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- 10 (l3cv1944 CAB (BLM

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF

STEPHEN E. DOYNE'S MOTION TO DISMISS