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STATE OF OKLAHOMA
STATE OF OKLAHOMA,
Plaintiff,
vs.
DEFENDANT,
Defendant.
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CF-
name
the
defendant
language of the statute for over eighty years. Either no one was being prosecuted
for falsely impersonating another for nearly a century, or most accepted the fact
that the language of the statute was clear. In 1992, the Oklahoma Court of
Criminal Appeals addressed the language of the statute in Friday v. State, 1992
OK CR 39, 833 P.2d 1257. In that case, David Friday was arrested In Tulsa; he
gave the name Jerome Johnson to police but refused to give any additional
information, such as his social security number. Somehow the police figured out
that he was lying, but it was never established that Jerome Johnson was a real
person, dead or alive. Mr. Friday was on probation at the time of his arrest, and his
probation was revoked based on the offense of false personation. On appeal, Mr.
Friday contended that the State failed to prove that Appellant did any overt act in
the assumed name that would have subjected the person falsely accused to any of
the conditions set forth under Subdivision 4 or that Appellant did any overt act
where by any benefit accrued to him or any other person.
Finding the case to be one of first impression, the Court of Criminal
Appeals framed the issue as whether the mere giving of a false name constitutes
false personation. Finding that the gist of the offense is the actual harm to the
person impersonated and/or the benefit accruing to the impersonator by
impersonating the actual person, this Court concluded that, under the facts of
Friday, the State had failed to prove an essential element of the offense.
A mere four years later, the Court of Criminal Appeals took a second look
at the language of the false personation statute in Barkus v. State, 1996 OK CR 45,
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926 P.2d 312. In Friday, the court had decided that 21 O.S.2001, 1531 required
the State to prove that a defendant not only falsely impersonated another person,
but also performed an additional overt act whereby any benefit might accrue
to the party personating, or to any other person 1 The Barkus court found this
conclusion unjustified, overruled Friday, but only to the extent that the holding is
inconsistent with our decision today. The actual holding of Barkus is as follows:
We find that this statute should be interpreted as
requiring proof of the following elements and acts to
establish that a person has committed the crime of
False Impersonation: first, the assumption by one
person of another persons character; second, the
intentional personation of that character; and third,
such person either (i) does any act whereby, if it were
done by the person falsely personated, he might
become liable to any suit or prosecution, or to pay any
sum of money, or to incur any charge, forfeiture, or
penalty; or (ii) accrues any benefit as a result of the
personation. (Emphasis added.)
Since Barkus, the Tulsa County District Attorneys Office has taken the
position that by overruling Friday, Barkus stands for the proposition that the State
need no longer establish that a defendant falsely impersonate another actual
person. As long as some benefit might accrue to the accused, merely giving a
fictitious name satisfies the requirements of the statute and subjects the accused to
a ten-year prison sentence. This interpretation is unjustified.
Courts in other jurisdictions, with statutes containing similar language, have come to the
same conclusion. See State v. Donlay, 853 P.2d 689 (Kan. 1993)(charge of aggravated
false impersonation dismissed because, although the defendant gave a false name to law
enforcement when he received a speeding ticket, that is all he did. He was guilty of no
other act in furtherance of the prosecution for speeding; he did not even show up for
court).
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meaning. Simply put, if the Oklahoma Legislature had wanted to make it easier for
the State to prosecute a defendant for false personation, it most certainly could
have made its intent clear by only requiring the use of a false of fictitious name.
See People v. Jones, 841 P.2d 372 (Colo.App. 1992)(a person is guilty of criminal
impersonation in Colorado if he knowingly assumes a false or fictitious identity
or capacity with intent to unlawfully gain a benefit for himself).
In the absence of any more recent published authority in Oklahoma, it is
necessary to look to other jurisdictions for guidance. In Lee v. Superior Court, 22
Cal.4th 41, 989 P.2d 1277 (Cal. 2000), Randolph Lee received a traffic citation
which he signed in the name of his deceased brother, Edward Watson. He was
attempting to avoid arrest for an outstanding warrant. A few weeks later, he was
stopped again; he claimed to not have any identification. He told the police about
the prior incident where he had been stopped and received a ticket. The officers
were a little more suspicious this time, and found a document in his car suggesting
that his name was Randolph Lee. The officers took him to the police station and
eventually discovered that his true name was, in fact, Randolph Lee and not
Edward Watson. He was arrested for false personation. The California statute
appears to use virtually the same language as does the Oklahoma statute,
prohibiting the false personation of another. Specifically, Wests Ann.Cal.Penal
Code 529 states in part:
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I do hereby certify that on the ____ day of________________, 2007, I
caused to be delivered a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing
document to the District Attorneys Office for Tulsa County.
_________________________________
Assistant Public Defender
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