NENA A.

CARIO,
Petitioner,

G.R. No. 166036

Present:

- versus -

PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,

CARPIO,
CORONA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and
BERSAMIN, JJ.

ESTRELLA M. ESPINOZA,
represented by her attorney-in-fact
MANUEL P. MEJIA, JR.,
Promulgated:
Respondent.
June 19, 2009
x--------------------------------------------------x

R E S O LUTIO N
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before the Court is a petition for review assailing the 30 October 2003 [1] and
2 November 2004[2] Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
73034.
The Antecedent Facts
The case originated from an action for Legal Redemption and Damages with
Writ of Preliminary Injunction filed by Estrella M. Espinoza (respondent),
represented by her attorney-in-fact Manuel P. Mejia, Jr., against Nena A. Cario
(petitioner) and Modesto Penullar (Penullar).
Respondent was the co-owner, to the extent of 2/4 share, of a parcel of land,
known as Lot 422 of the Mangaldan Cadastre, located in Poblacion, Mangaldan,

Pangasinan. Penullar was the owner of 1/4 share of the land. However, the land
remained undivided.
In 1988, respondent heard a rumor that Penullar was selling his share of the
land. She inquired from both Penullar and petitioner if the rumor was true but they
both denied it. On 25 July 1989, respondent learned that Penullar executed a deed
of absolute sale in favor of petitioner.
Penullar alleged that he informed respondent of his intention to sell the
land. Petitioner also claimed that the land was first offered to respondent but she
was not interested in buying it.
The Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City, Branch 44 (trial court) ruled in
favor of respondent. The trial court ruled that respondent was not notified of the
sale of Penullars share of the land. The trial court found that upon learning of the
sale, respondent promptly filed the complaint and deposited the amount of
redemption price. The dispositive portion of the trial courts Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered in favor of Estrella Mejia
Espinoza and against defendants Nena Cario and Modesto Penullar, as
follows:
1.
The defendants are ordered to allow the plaintiff to redeem
the share/interest [that] defendant Modesto Penullar has over the land
in question, Lot 422 of the Mangaldan Cadastre;
2.
The defendants are ordered to execute the corresponding
deed of redemption in favor of the plaintiff; and
3.
The defendants are ordered jointly and severally to pay
attorneys fee in the amount of P15,000.00 plus P500.00 for each day of
hearing and actual litigation expenses ofP5,000.00 plus costs of this suit.
The writ of preliminary injunction which the Court issued on
November 22, 1996 enjoining the defendants and/or their agents or any
other person acting in their [behalf] from continuing with the
construction going on in the premises in question, is hereby made
permanent.

Furnish copies of this Decision to Atty. Pedro M. Surdilla and

Atty. Fernando P. Cabrera.
SO ORDERED.[3]

Petitioner appealed from the trial courts Decision.

In its 30 October 2003 Resolution, the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal
for petitioners failure to file the appellants brief. The Court of Appeals deemed
that petitioner abandoned the appeal.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 2 November 2004
Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied the motion.
Hence, the petition before this Court.
The Issue
The sole issue in this case is whether the Court of Appeals committed a
reversible error in dismissing the appeal for failure of petitioner to file the
appellants brief.
The Ruling of this Court
The petition has no merit.
Petitioner alleges that the failure to file appellants brief was not deliberate
but was due to an exceptional reason, the illness of her counsel, which was
supported by a medical certificate. Petitioner alleges that Section 1, Rule 50 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is merely directory and it is not the ministerial duty
of the Court to dismiss the appeal. Petitioner alleges that the appellants brief was
submitted prior to the issuance of the 30 October 2003 Resolution and hence, there
was substantial compliance with the Rules.
Section 1(e), Rule 50 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states:

SECTION 1. Grounds for dismissal of appeal. - An appeal may be

dismissed by the Court of Appeals, on its own motion or on that of the
appellee, on the following grounds:
xxxx
(e) Failure of the appellant to serve and file the required number
of copies of his brief or memorandum within the time provided by these
Rules;

In its Order dated 16 January 2003, the Court of Appeals granted petitioner
another extension of forty five (45) days from January 15, 2003 or until March 1,
2003 within which to file brief with stern warning that no further extension shall be
entertained.[4] The Judicial Records Division submitted a report dated 8
September 2003 that no appellants brief was filed within the extended period
granted by the Court.
In a Manifestation with Motion[5] dated 11 September 2003, respondents
counsel prayed that for failure to file the brief within the extended period,
petitioner be deemed to have waived the right to submit the appellants brief. It
was only on 15 October 2003, after receipt of respondents Manifestation and
Motion, that petitioners counsel filed the Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Admit
Appellants Brief and the appellants brief.
The general rule is that a client is bound by the acts, even mistakes, of his
counsel in the realm of procedural technique.[6] There are exceptions to this rule,
such as when the reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives the client of due
process of law, or when the application of the general rule results in the outright
deprivation of ones property through a technicality. [7] However, in this case, we
find no reason to exempt petitioner from the general rule.
Petitioners counsel alleges that the cause of the delay in filing the appellants
brief was his sickness. In his Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Admit Appellants Brief,
petitioners counsel claimed that he suffered an attack of acute hypertension
necessitating a day of close observation in a clinic for possible confinement, and

close medical attention for about a month. [8] Petitioners counsel further claimed
that by reason of said illness and upon strict advice of his attending physician to
refrain from indulging in stressful activities, [he] was forced to lay aside all his
pending assignments for about a month.[9] However, the Urgent Ex-Parte Motion
to Admit Appellants Brief shows that the hypertension attack happened on 8
February 2003. The appellants brief was belatedly submitted only on 15 October
2003. The Court further notes that the medical certificate [10] was issued only on 13
October 2003.
We find that petitioners reason did not fully justify the failure to comply
with the Rules. Petitioners counsel did not act for seven months from the
expiration of the time given him by the Court of Appeals within which to file the
appellants brief. We cannot deem petitioners belated submission of the
appellants brief, which was made only after respondents Manifestation and
Motion to the Court of Appeals, as substantial compliance with the Rules.
Rules of procedure must be used to facilitate, not to frustrate, justice.
However, the right to appeal is not a natural right but is a statutory privilege,
and it may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions
of the law.[12]
[11]

WHEREFORE,
we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the
30
October 2003 and 2 November 2004 Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CV No. 73034.
SO ORDERED

ERWIN H. REYES,

G.R. No. 180551

Petit

ioner,

Present:
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
Chairperson,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
- versus -

CORONA,*
CHICO-NAZARIO, and
PERALTA, JJ.

NATIONAL
LABOR
RELATIONS
COMMISSION,
COCACOLA
BOTTLERS
PHILS. and/or ROTAIDA
TAGUIBAO,

Promulgated:

February 10, 2009

Respond
ents.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Before this Court is a Special Civil Action for Certiorari under

Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court filed by petitioner Erwin H.
Reyes, seeking to reverse and set aside the Resolutions dated 10
November 2006[1] and 9 November 2007[2] of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 96343. In its assailed Resolutions, the appellate
court dismissed petitioners Petition for Certiorari therein for
failure to give an explanation why copy of the said Petition was
not personally served upon the counsel of the respondents.

The present Petition arose from a Complaint for illegal

dismissal with claims for moral and exemplary damages and
attorneys fees filed by petitioner against respondents Coca Cola
Bottlers Philippines (CCBP) and Rotaida Taguibao (Taguibao)
before the Labor Arbiter on 14 June 2004.

Respondent CCBP is a corporation engaged in the business

of production and distribution of carbonated drinks, and Taguibao
is its Human Resource Manager.

In his Complaint, petitioner alleged that he was first

employed by respondent CCBP, through Interserve Manpower
Agency (Interserve), as a Leadman in February 1988. Petitioner
was initially assigned to the Mendiola Sales Office of respondent
CCBP. Petitioners employment contract was renewed every five
months and he was assigned a different task every time. Such an
arrangement continued until petitioner was directly hired by
respondent CCBP as a Route Salesman on 15 September
2000. Exactly one year from the time of petitioners employment
as a Route Salesman, respondent CCBP, thru Taguibao,

terminated his services on 15 September 2001. Since he already

acquired the status of a regular employee, petitioner asserted
that his dismissal from employment without the benefit of due
process was unlawful.

In opposing the Complaint, respondent CCBP refuted

petitioners
allegation
that
he
was
a
regular
employee. Petitioners employment was for a fixed period of
three months, which was subsequently extended [3] with
petitioners consent. Petitioner was employed pursuant to the
mini-bodega project of respondent CCBP wherein respondent
CCBP sought to extend its market to areas that cannot be
serviced by its regular salesmen. After the viability of this
marketing scheme was found to be unsuccessful, respondent
CCBP was constrained to discontinue petitioners fixed-term
employment. In addition, respondent Taguibao had no liability for
terminating petitioners employment when it was not effected in
bad faith.

On 30 April 2005, the Labor Arbiter promulgated his

Decision,[4] favoring petitioner, since there was insufficient
evidence to sustain the averment of respondents CCBP and
Taguibao that petitioners employment was for a fixed
period. The Labor Arbiter noted that respondents CCBP and
Taguibao failed to present a copy of petitioners purported
Contract of Employment. The only evidence adduced by
respondents CCBP and Taguibao to buttress their contention of
petitioners fixed-period employment was the Affidavit of
respondent Taguibao herself, which could not be afforded any
evidentiary weight in the absence of independent corroborating
evidence. The Labor Arbiter thus decreed:

WHEREFORE, all the foregoing premises being

considered, judgment is hereby rendered ordering [herein
respondents CCBP and Taguibao] as follows:

(1) To reinstate [herein petitioner] to his former

position as route salesman, or to any substantially
equivalent position with all the rights, privileges, and
benefits appertaining thereto including seniority rights;

(2) To pay [petitioner] his full backwages which as of

August 30, 2005 already amount to P565,500.00 subject
to re-computation to include salary increases granted
during the intervening period and during the pendency of
the instant case, as well as benefits and privileges due a
regular employee; and

(3) To pay [petitioner] the award of attorneys fees

equivalent to 10% of the total judgment sum.

In compliance with the directive of the Labor Arbiter,

respondents CCBP and Taguibao immediately reinstated petitioner
to his former position as Route Salesman on 1 March 2006.
[5]
However, respondents CCBP and Taguibao, by filing a
Memorandum of Appeal before the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) and posting the corresponding Supersedeas
Bond, sought the stay of the execution of the monetary awards
made by the Labor Arbiter in his Decision. Respondents CCBP and
Taguibao asserted in their appeal that petitioner was merely
employed for a particular project which turned out to be not
viable. Petitioner was subsequently terminated from work on

account of the expiration of his employment contract. Petitioners

claim of illegal dismissal was, therefore, tenuous.

On 31
May
2006,
the
NLRC
promulgated
its
[6]
Decision dismissing the appeal of respondents CCBP and
Taguibao and affirming with modification the 30 April
2005Decision of the Labor Arbiter. The NLRC reduced the amount
of backwages awarded to petitioner underscoring the latters
unexplained delay (more than three years) in filing his Complaint
for illegal dismissal. Instead, the NLRC reckoned the computation
of backwages only from the time petitioner filed his Complaint for
illegal dismissal before the Labor Arbiter. [7] The NLRC further
modified the Labor Arbiters Decision by deleting the order
reinstating petitioner to his former position in view of the
confidential nature of the latters employment as a salesman,
which exposed him to voluminous financial transactions involving
the property of respondent CCBP. The NLRC likewise deleted the
Labor Arbiters award for attorneys fees. The fallo of the NLRC
Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the decision dated 30 April 2005 is

MODIFIED. The order reinstating [herein petitioner] is
deleted. [Respondents CCBP and Taguibao] are hereby
ordered to pay [petitioner] the following:

1.

Backwages:
24 October 2004 to 30 April 2005
Salary P13,000 x 6.2 months = P 80,200.00
13th month pay P 80,600
12

6,716.67
P87,316.67

2.

Separation Pay
1 September 2000 to 30 April 2005
P13,000 x 5 years

= P 65,000.00
P152,

316.

67

The award of 10% attorneys fees is deleted.

All the parties, namely petitioner and respondents CCBP and

Taguibao, moved for the reconsideration of the foregoing NLRC
Decision. Petitioner, on one hand, maintained that the reckoning
point for the computation of his backwages must be from the time
his employment was unlawfully terminated, and not from the
institution of his Complaint for illegal dismissal. Respondents
CCBP and Taguibao, on the other hand, reiterated their previous
position that petitioners employment was terminated only after
the expiration of the fixed period for the same; and prayed that
the NLRC vacate its previous finding of illegal dismissal.

In a Resolution dated 13 July 2006, the NLRC denied

the Motions for Reconsideration of all the parties for lack of a valid
reason to disturb its earlier disposition.

From the 13 July 2006 Resolution of the NLRC, only petitioner

elevated his case before the Court of Appeals by filing a Petition
for Certiorari, which was docketed as CA-G.R. S.P. No.

96343. Petitioner averred in his Petition that the NLRC abused its
discretion in ignoring the established facts and legal principles
when it modified the award for his backwages and deleted the
order for his reinstatement.

The Court of Appeals, however, in its Resolution dated 10

November 2006, dismissed petitioners Petition for Certiorari for
his failure to give any explanation why a copy of the said Petition
was not personally served upon the counsel of the adverse
parties.

Since petitioner failed to timely file a Motion for

Reconsideration, the Resolution dated 10 November 2006 of the
Court of Appeals became final and executory, and an Entry of
Judgment was made in CA-G.R. S.P. No. 96343 on 2 December
2006.

On 19 July 2007, petitioners new counsel filed an Entry of

Appearance
with
an
Urgent
Motion
for
Reconsideration. Petitioner, through his new counsel, sought for
the liberality of the Court of Appeals, faulting his former counsel
for the procedural defects of his Petition and for his failure to
seasonably
seek
reconsideration
of
the 10
November
2006 Resolution of the appellate court. Also, this time, it would
appear that petitioner provided the explanation required by
Section 11, Rule 13 of the Revised Rules of Court.

In a Resolution dated 9 November 2007, the Court of

Appeals denied petitioners Urgent Motion for Reconsideration for
being filed out of time.

Hence, petitioner comes before this Court via the instant

Special Civil Action for Certiorari assailing the Resolutions
dated 10 November 2006 and 9 November 2007 of the Court of
Appeals. Petitioner raises the following issues in the Petition at
bar:

I.

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY

ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN NOT EXCUSING PETITIONERS
PROCEDURAL LAPSES.

II.

WHETHER OR NOT THE NLRC GRAVELY ABUSED ITS

DISCRETION IN REDUCING THE AMOUNT OF BACKWAGES
AWARDED COMPUTED FROM THE TIME THE COMPLAINT
FOR ILLEGAL DISMISSAL WAS FILED.

III.

WHETHER OR NOT THE NLRC GRAVELY ABUSED ITS

DISCRETION IN ORDERING THE PAYMENT OF SEPARATION
PAY IN LIEU OF REINSTATEMENT.

IV.

WHETHER OR NOT THE NLRC GRAVELY ABUSED ITS

DISCRETION IN DELETING THE AWARD FOR ATTORNEYS
FEE.

The Court first disposes the procedural issues involved in

the present case.

It is evident from a perusal of the records that petitioner

indeed failed to provide the Court of Appeals a written
explanation as to why he did not personally serve a copy of his
Petition therein upon the adverse parties, as required by Section
11, Rule 13[8] of the Revised Rules of Court. The records also
readily reveal that petitioner did not file a timely Motion for
Reconsideration of the 10 November 2006 Resolution of the Court
of Appeals.

Petitioner, however, submits that he raised meritorious

arguments in his Petition before the Court of Appeals, and the
dismissal thereof on a mere technicality defeated the greater
interest of substantial justice. Petitioner attributes the technical
flaws committed before the appellate court to his former counsel,
and urges the Court to excuse him therefrom since compliance
with the procedural rules calls for the application of legal
knowledge and expertise which he, as a layman, cannot be
expected to know. Petitioner, thus, prays that this Court give his
Petition due course and set aside the Resolutions dated 10
November 2006 and 9 November 2007 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 96343.

For their part, respondents CCBP and Taguibao had long

conceded in this battle when they no longer appealed the 31 May
2006 Decision of the NLRC, therefore, rendering the same final
and executory with respect to them. Yet, respondents CCBP and
Taguibao still insist before this Court that petitioner was not
illegally dismissed, since he was employed for a fixed-term only,
and his services were terminated upon the expiration
thereof. Respondents CCBP and Taguibao also argue that
petitioners procedural faux pas cannot be excused by merely
attributing the same to his former counsel, in view of the doctrinal
rule that negligence of the counsel binds his client.

The Court rules in favor of petitioner.

It is true that for petitioners failure to comply with Section

11, Rule 13 of the Revised Rules of Court, his petition should be
expunged from the records. In the case ofSolar Team
Entertainment, Inc. v. Ricafort,[9] the Court stressed the
mandatory character of Section 11, Rule 13, viz:

We thus take this opportunity to clarify that under

Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
personal service and filing is the general rule, and resort
to
other
modes
of
service
and
filing,
the
exception. Henceforth, whenever personal service or
filing is practicable, in light of the circumstances of time,
place and person, personal service or filing is
mandatory. Only when personal service or filing is not
practicable may resort to other modes be had, which
must then be accompanied by a written explanation as to
why personal service or filing was not practicable to begin
with. In adjudging the plausibility of an explanation, a

court shall likewise consider the importance of the subject

matter of the case or the issues involved therein, and
theprima facie merit of the pleading sought to be
expunged for violation of Section 11. This Court cannot
rule otherwise, lest we allow circumvention of the
innovation introduced by the 1997 Rules in order to
obviate delay in the administration of justice.

Nevertheless, the Rules of Court itself calls for its liberal

construction, with the view of promoting their objective of
securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every
action and proceeding.[10] The Court is fully aware that procedural
rules are not to be belittled or simply disregarded for these
prescribed
procedures
insure
an
orderly
and
speedy
administration of justice. However, it is equally true that litigation
is not merely a game of technicalities. Law and jurisprudence
grant to courts the prerogative to relax compliance with
procedural rules of even the most mandatory character, mindful
of the duty to reconcile both the need to put an end to litigation
speedily and the parties right to an opportunity to be heard. [11]

In numerous cases,[12] the Court has allowed liberal

construction of Section 11, Rule 13 of the Revised Rules of Court
when doing so would be in the service of the demands of
substantial justice and in the exercise of the equity jurisdiction of
this Court. In one such case, Fulgencio v. National Labor
Relations Commission,[13] this Court provided the following
justification for its non-insistence on a written explanation as
required by Section 11, Rule 13 of the Revised Rules of Court:

The rules of procedure are merely tools designed to

facilitate the attainment of justice. They were conceived
and promulgated to effectively aid the court in the
dispensation of justice. Courts are not slaves to or robots
of technical rules, shorn of judicial discretion. In
rendering justice, courts have always been, as they ought
to be, conscientiously guided by the norm that on the
balance, technicalities take a backseat against
substantive rights, and not the other way around. Thus, if
the application of the Rules would tend to frustrate rather
than promote justice, it is always within our power to
suspend the rules, or except a particular case from its
operation.

The call for a liberal interpretation of the Rules is even more

strident in the instant case which petitioners former counsel was
obviously negligent in handling his case before the Court of
Appeals. It was petitioners former counsel who failed to attach
the required explanation to the Petition in CA-G.R. SP No.
96343. Said counsel did not bother to inform petitioner, his client,
of the 10 November 2006 Resolution of the appellate court
dismissing
the
Petition
for
lack
of
the
required
explanation. Worse, said counsel totally abandoned petitioners
case by merely allowing the reglementary period for filing a
Motion for Reconsideration to lapse without taking any remedial
steps; thus, the 10 November 2006 Resolution became final and
executory.

The basic general rule is that the negligence of counsel binds

the client. Hence, if counsel commits a mistake in the course of
litigation, thereby resulting in his losing the case, his client must
perforce suffer the consequences of the mistake. The reason for

the rule is to avoid the possibility that every losing party would
raise the issue of negligence of his or her counsel to escape an
adverse decision of the court, to the detriment of our justice
system, as no party would ever accept a losing verdict. This
general rule, however, pertains only to simple negligence of the
lawyer. Where the negligence of counsel is one that is so
gross, palpable, pervasive, reckless and inexcusable, then
it does not bind the client since, in such a case, the client
is effectively deprived of his or her day in court.[14]

The circumstances of this case qualify it under the exception,

rather than the general rule. The negligence of petitioners
former counsel may be considered gross since it invariably
resulted to the foreclosure of remedies otherwise readily available
to the petitioner. Not only was petitioner deprived of the
opportunity to bring his case before the Court of Appeals with the
outright dismissal of his Petition on a technicality, but he was also
robbed of the chance to seek reconsideration of the dismissal of
his Petition. What further impel this Court to heed the call
for substantial justice are the pressing merits of this case
which, if left overshadowed by technicalities, could result
in flagrant violations of the provisions of the Labor Code
and of the categorical mandate of the Constitution
affording protection to labor.

Higher interests of justice and equity demand that petitioner

should not be denied his day in court and made him to suffer for
his counsels indiscretions. To cling to the general rule in this
case would only to condone, rather than rectify, a serious injustice
to a party -- whose only fault was to repose his faith and trust in
his previous counsel -- and close our eyes to the glaring grave
abuse of discretion committed by the NLRC.

This Court is aware that in the instant case, since petitioners

appeal before the Court of Appeals is to be given due course, the
normal procedure is for us to remand the case to the appellate
court for further proceedings. The Court, however, dispensed
with this time-consuming procedure, since there is enough basis
on which proper evaluation of the merits of the case may be
had. Remand of this case would serve no purpose save to further
delay its disposition contrary to the spirit of fair play. It is already
an accepted rule of procedure for us to strive to settle the entire
controversy in a single proceeding, leaving no root or branch to
bear the seed of future litigation.[15]

Having thus settled the procedural matters in the instant

case, the Court now proceeds to resolve the substantive issues.

The Court is convinced beyond cavil that the NLRC

committed grave abuse of its discretion, amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction, in modifying the 30 April 2005 Decision of
the Labor Arbiter, for in so doing, the NLRC not only disregarded
the elementary statutory and jurisprudential principles, but also
violated the basic principles of social justice and protection to
labor enshrined in the Constitution.

Explicit is Art. 279 of the Labor Code which states:

Art. 279. Security of Tenure. -- In cases of regular

employment, the employer shall not terminate the
services of an employee except for a just cause or when
authorized by this Title. An employee who is unjustly
dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement
without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to

his full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his

other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed
from the time his compensation was withheld from him up
to the time of his actual reinstatement.

Applying the above-quoted statutory provision, this Court

decreed in Pheschem Industrial Corporation v. Moldez[16]:

Article 279 of the Labor Code provides that an illegally

dismissed employee shall be entitled, inter alia, to the
payment of his full backwages, inclusive of allowances
and to his other benefits or their monetary
equivalent computed from the time that his
compensation was withheld from him, i.e., from the
time of his illegal dismissal, up to the time of his
actual reinstatement. Thus, where reinstatement is
adjudged, the award of backwages and other benefits
continues beyond the date of the Labor Arbiters Decision
ordering reinstatement and extends up to the time said
order of reinstatement is actually carried out. (Emphasis
supplied.)

The Court was more emphatic in Philippine Industrial

Security Agency Corporation v. Dapiton, [17] when it ruled that
backwages had to be paid by the employer as part of the price or
penalty he had to pay for illegally dismissing his employee. It
was to be computed from the time of the employees
illegal dismissal (or from the time his compensation was
withheld from him) up to the time of his reinstatement.

One of the natural consequences of a finding that an

employee has been illegally dismissed is the payment of
backwages corresponding to the period from his dismissal up to
actual reinstatement. The statutory intent of this matter is clearly
discernible. The payment of backwages allows the employee to
recover from the employer that which he has lost by way of
wages as a result of his dismissal. [18] Logically, it must be
computed from the date of petitioners illegal dismissal up to the
time of actual reinstatement. There can be no gap or
interruption, lest we defeat the very reason of the law in granting
the same. That petitioner did not immediately file his Complaint
should not affect or diminish his right to backwages, for it is a
right clearly granted to him by law -- should he be found to have
been illegally dismissed -- and for as long as his cause of action
has not been barred by prescription.

The law fixes the period of time within which petitioner

could seek remedy for his illegal dismissal and for as long as he
filed his Complaint within the prescriptive period, he shall be
entitled to the full protection of his right to backwages. In illegal
dismissal cases, the employee concerned is given a period of four
years from the time of his illegal dismissal within which to
institute the complaint. This is based on Article 1146 of the New
Civil Code which states that actions based upon an injury to the
rights of the plaintiff must be brought within four years. [19] The
four-year prescriptive period shall commence to run only upon the
accrual of a cause of action of the worker. [20] Here, petitioner was
dismissed from service on 15 September 2001. He filed his
complaint for illegal dismissal on 14 June 2004. Clearly, then, the
instant case was filed within the prescriptive period.

The Labor Arbiter, in his computation of the award for

backwages to petitioner, had followed the long-settled rule [21] that
full backwages should be awarded, to be reckoned from the time
of illegal dismissal up to actual reinstatement. The NLRC,
however, modified the Labor Arbiters award for backwages by
computing the same only from the time petitioner filed his
Complaint for illegal dismissal before the Labor Arbiter, i.e., on 24
October 2004, up to the day when the Labor Arbiter promulgated
his judgment, i.e., 30 April 2005. The NLRC provided no other
explanation for its modification except that it was just and
equitable to reduce the amount of backwages given to petitioner
since, having been dismissed on 15 September 2001, it took him
more than three years to file his Complaint against respondents
CCBP and Taguibao.

We find no justice or rationality in the distinction created by

the NLRC; and when there is neither justice or rationality, the
distinction transgresses the elementary principle of equal
protection and must be stricken out. Equal protection requires
that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated
alike, as to both rights conferred and responsibilities imposed.
[22]
There is no sufficient basis why petitioner should not be
placed in the same plane with other illegally dismissed employees
who were awarded backwages without qualification.

Herein petitioner, having been unjustly dismissed from work,

is entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and
other privileges and to full backwages, inclusive of allowances,
and to other benefits or their monetary equivalents
computed from the time compensation was withheld up to
the time of actual reinstatement. [23] Accordingly, backwages
must be awarded to petitioner in the amount to be computed
from the time his employment was unlawfully terminated by

respondents CCBP and Taguibao on 15 September 2001 up to

the time he was actually reinstated on 1 March 2006.

We also do not agree with the NLRC in deleting the directive

of the Labor Arbiter for the reinstatement of petitioner to his
former position, on the flimsy excuse that the petitioners position
as Route Salesman was confidential in nature and that the
relationship between petitioner and respondents CCBP and
Taguibao was already strained.

To protect the employees security of tenure, the Court has

emphasized that the doctrine of strained relations should be
strictly applied so as not to deprive an illegally dismissed
employee of his right to reinstatement. Every labor dispute
almost always results in strained relations, and the phrase
cannot be given an overarching interpretation; otherwise, an
unjustly dismissed employee can never be reinstated. [24] The
assumption of strained relations was already debunked by the
fact that as early as March 2006 petitioner returned to work for
respondent CCBP, without any antagonism having been reported
thus far by any of the parties. Neither can we sustain the NLRCs
conclusion that petitioners position is confidential in
nature. Receipt of proceeds from sales of respondent CCBPs
products does not make petitioner a confidential employee. A
confidential employee is one who (1) assists or acts in a
confidential capacity, in regard to (2) persons who formulate,
determine, and effectuate management policies specifically in the
field of labor relations.[25] Verily, petitioners job as a salesman
does not fall under this qualification.

Finally, the Court overrules the deletion by the NLRC of the

Labor Arbiters award for attorneys fees to petitioner. Petitioner

is evidently entitled to attorneys fees, since he was compelled to

litigate[26] to protect his interest by reason of unjustified and
unlawful termination of his employment by respondents CCBP and
Taguibao.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition

is GRANTED. The Resolutions dated 10 November 2006 and 9
November 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
96343 and the Decision dated 31 May 2006 of the NLRC in NLRC
NCR CA No. 044658-05 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Decision of the Labor Arbiter in NLRC-NCR Case No. 00-06-0716114 is hereby REINSTATED. Let the records of this case be
remanded to the Labor Arbiter for implementation of this
Decision, and he shall report his compliance herewith within ten
(10) days from receipt hereof.

SO ORDERED.

SPOUSES CONSTANTE
AGBULOS AND ZENAIDA
PADILLA AGBULOS,
Petitioners,

G.R. No. 176530

Present:
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA, and
PERALTA, JJ.

- versus -

NICASIO GUTIERREZ, JOSEFA

GUTIERREZ and ELENA G.
GARCIA,
Respondents.

Promulgated:

June 16, 2009

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

RESOLUTION
NACHURA, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks the review of the Decision[1] of
the Court of Appeals (CA) dated February 6, 2007 in CAG.R. CV No. 83994
which set aside the dismissal of a complaint for declaration of nullity of contract,
cancellation of title, reconveyance and damages.
The case stems from the following antecedents:
On October 16, 1997, respondents, Dr. Nicasio G. Gutierrez, Josefa
Gutierrez de Mendoza and Elena G. Garcia, through their counsel, Atty. Adriano B.
Magbitang, filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Gapan, Nueva Ecija, a
complaint against petitioners, spouses Constante Agbulos and Zenaida Padilla
Agbulos, for declaration of nullity of contract, cancellation of title, reconveyance
and damages. The complaint alleged that respondents inherited from their father,
Maximo Gutierrez, an eight-hectare parcel of land located in Callos, Penaranda,
Nueva Ecija, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. NT-123790 in the
name of Maximo Gutierrez. Through fraud and deceit, petitioners succeeded in

making it appear that Maximo Gutierrez executed a Deed of Sale on July 21, 1978
when, in truth, he died on April 25, 1977. As a result, TCT No. NT-123790 was
cancelled and a new one, TCT No. NT-188664, was issued in the name of
petitioners. Based on the notation at the back of the certificate of title, portions of
the property were brought under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program
(CARP) and awarded to Lorna Padilla, Elenita Nuega and Suzette Nuega who were
issued Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOAs).
In their defense, petitioners averred that respondents were not the real parties
in interest, that the Deed of Sale was regularly executed before a notary public, that
they were possessors in good faith, and that the action had prescribed.
On the day set for the presentation of the respondents (plaintiffs) evidence,
petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss, assailing the jurisdiction of the RTC over the
subject matter of the case. Petitioners contended that the Department of Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB), not the RTC, had jurisdiction since the
subject land was covered by the CARP, and CLOAs had been awarded to tenants.
Respondents opposed the motion, arguing that the motion had been filed beyond
the period for filing an Answer, that the RTC had jurisdiction over the case based
on the allegations in the complaint, and that the DARAB had no jurisdiction since
the parties had no tenancy relationship.
In an Order[2] dated October 24, 2002, the RTC granted the petitioners
motion and dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. The RTC held that the
DARAB had jurisdiction, since the subject property was under the CARP, some
portions of it were covered by registered CLOAs, and there was prima
facie showing of tenancy. [3]
Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration. On November 13, 2003, the
RTC denied the motion.[4]
Atty. Magbitang filed a Notice of Appeal [5] with the RTC, which gave due
course to the same.[6] The records reveal that on December 15, 2003, respondent
Elena G. Garcia wrote a letter to Judge Arturo M. Bernardo, Acting Judge of RTC
Gapan, Branch 87, stating that they were surprised to receive a communication
from the court informing them that their notice of appeal was ready for disposition.

She also stated in the letter that there was no formal agreement with Atty.
Magbitang as to whether they would pursue an appeal with the CA, because one of
the plaintiffs was still in America.[7]
On February 6, 2007, the CA rendered a Decision in favor of respondents.
The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby
GRANTED and the assailed Order dated October 24, 2002 issued by the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Gapan, Nueva Ecija, Branch 87, is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the subject complaint
is

reinstated and the records of the case is (sic) hereby remanded to the
RTC for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.[8]

The CA concluded that the dispute between the parties was purely civil, not
agrarian, in nature. According to the CA, the allegations in the complaint revealed
that the principal relief sought was the nullification of the purported deed of sale
and reconveyance of the subject property. It also noted that there was no tenurial,
leasehold, or any other agrarian relations between the parties.
Thus, this petition, raising the following issues for the resolution of this
Court:
1. Whether or not the CA erred in not dismissing the appeal
despite the undisputed fact that Atty. Magbitang filed the notice of
appeal without respondents knowledge and consent;
2. Whether or not the CA erred in giving due course to the appeal
despite the fact that Atty. Magbitangs appellants brief failed to comply
with the mandatory requirements of Section 13, Rule 44 of the Rules of
Court regarding the contents of an appellants brief; and
3. Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that the RTC (Regional
Trial Court), not the DARAB (Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board) or the PARAD/RARAD (Provincial/Regional
Agrarian Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator), has jurisdiction over
respondents complaint.[9]

The CA did not err in giving due course to the appeal, on both procedural
and substantive grounds.
A lawyer who represents a client before the trial court is presumed to
represent such client before the appellate court. Section 22 of Rule 138 creates this
presumption, thus:

SEC. 22. Attorney who appears in lower court presumed to

represent client on appeal. An attorney who appears de parte in a
case before a lower court shall be presumed to continue representing his
client on appeal, unless he files a formal petition withdrawing his
appearance in the appellate court.

A reading of respondent Elena Garcias letter to the RTC would show that
she did not actually withdraw Atty. Magbitangs authority to represent respondents
in the case. The letter merely stated that there was, as yet, no agreement that they
would pursue an appeal.
In any case, an unauthorized appearance of an attorney may be ratified by
the client either expressly or impliedly. Ratification retroacts to the date of the
lawyers first appearance and validates the action taken by him. [10] Implied
ratification may take various forms, such as by silence or acquiescence, or by
acceptance and retention of benefits flowing therefrom.[11] Respondents silence or
lack of remonstration when the case was finally elevated to the CA means that they
have acquiesced to the filing of the appeal.
Moreover, a lawyer is mandated to serve his client with competence and
diligence.[12] Consequently, a lawyer is entreated not to neglect a legal matter
entrusted to him; otherwise, his negligence in connection therewith shall render
him liable.[13] In light of such mandate, Atty. Magbitangs act of filing the notice of
appeal without waiting for her clients to direct him to do so was understandable, if
not commendable.
The CA was likewise correct in holding that the case is within the
jurisdiction of the RTC, not the DARAB.
For the DARAB to have jurisdiction over a case, there must be a tenancy
relationship between the parties. It is, therefore, essential to establish all the
indispensable elements of a tenancy relationship, to wit: (1) that the parties are the
landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee; (2) that the subject matter of the
relationship is an agricultural land; (3) that there is consent between the parties to
the relationship; (4) that the purpose of the relationship is to bring about

agricultural production; (5) that there is personal cultivation on the part of the
tenant or agricultural lessee; and (6) that the harvest is shared between the
landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee.[14]
Basic is the rule that jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in the
complaint.[15] Respondents complaint did not contain any allegation that would,
even in the slightest, imply that there was a tenancy relation between them and the
petitioners. We are in full agreement with the following findings of the CA on this
point:
x x x A reading of the material averments of the complaint reveals that
the principal relief sought by plaintiffs-appellants is for the nullification
of the supposedly forged deed of sale which resulted in the issuance of
TCT No. NT-188664 covering their 8-hectare property as well as its
reconveyance, and not for the cancellation of CLOAs as claimed by
defendants-appellees. Moreover, the parties herein have no tenurial,
leasehold, or any other agrarian relations whatsoever that could have
brought this controversy under the ambit of the agrarian reform laws.
Neither were the CLOA awardees impleaded as parties in this case nor
the latters entitlement thereto questioned. Hence, contrary to the
findings of the RTC, the herein dispute is purely civil and not agrarian in
nature falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of the trial courts.

On the alleged deficiency of the appellants brief filed before the CA by the
respondents, suffice it to state that the requirements in Section 13, Rule 44 are
intended to aid the appellate court in arriving at a just and proper resolution of the
case. Obviously, the CA found the appellants brief sufficient in form and
substance as the appellate court was able to arrive at a just decision. We have
repeatedly held that technical and procedural rules are intended to help secure, not
to suppress, substantial justice. A deviation from a rigid enforcement of the rules
may, thus, be allowed in order to attain this prime objective for, after all, the
dispensation of justice is the core reason for the existence of courts.[16]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Court
of Appeals Decision dated February 6, 2007 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

CONRADO QUESADA, ANGELITA

QUESADA EJERCITO, HECTOR A.
QUESADA, AUGUST QUESADA,
ENGRACIA A. QUESADA, and
GAVINA ASUNCION,
Petitioners,
- versus HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HEIRS
OF ILDEFONSO DEREQUITO and
AGUSTIN D. DEREQUITO,
represented by EUGENIO
DEREQUITO and FOR HIMSELF,
Respondents.

G.R. No.

177516

Present:
QUISUMBING, J.,* Chairperson,
CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA,
VELASCO, JR., and
BRION, JJ.

Promulgated:
March 13, 2009

x-------------------------------------------------- x

DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Epitacio Asuncion, predecessor-in-interest of herein petitioners Conrado
Quesada, et al., was the owner of Lot No. 225-B (the lot) covered by Original
Certificate of Title No. F-24467 of the Register of Deeds of Iloilo and containing
about 3.4 hectares.[1] One-and-a-half (1 ) hectares of the lot were leased to one
Claro San Luis (San Luis).
The lot is separated from the land occupied by Querubin Derequito
(Querubin),
predecessor-in-interest
of
respondents,
by

the Balabag River. Querubin converted a portion of the Balabag River into a fish
pond and occupied a portion of the lot leased to San Luis.
Querubin later filed a complaint for forcible entry against San Luis,
docketed as Civil Case No. 8863. Branch I of the Iloilo then Court of First
Instance rendered a decision dated August 25, 1975 in favor of the therein
defendant San Luis,[2] disposing as follows:
FOR ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is rendered:
a.
ordering plaintiff [Querubin] to renounce possession
of the little over one hectare indicated as Exhibit A-2
and Exhibit A-3 on Exhibit A for plaintiff and Exhibit
5 for defendant;
b.
ordering plaintiff to limit his fishpond operation on
the area North and Northeast of the original bank
(before encroachment) of the Balabag River in
Dumangas, Iloilo;
c.
ordering defendant to limit his fishpond operation
along the curb line indicated in red pencil from point
x to y on the sketch plan, Exhibit B for the plaintiff,
of the area South and southeast of the original bank
of the Balabag River.
No pronouncement as to cost.
Let copy of this decision be furnished the Regional Director of
the Department of Public Works, Transportation and Communication
with offices in Iloilo City.
SO ORDERED. (Underscoring supplied)[3]

The Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision was denied by Order of September
15, 1976. The decision having become final and executory, a writ of execution was
issued by the trial court but it appears that it was not implemented.[4]
In 1977, San Luis contract of lease expired.

After Querubin died, respondents succeeded in the possession and enjoyment

of the fruits of the questioned portion of the lot.
On August 26, 1985, San Luis, together with petitioners, filed before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iloilo City a complaint to revive the judgment in
Civil Case No. 8863 (for forcible entry, which was decided in favor of the therein
defendant San Luis) and to recover possession and damages. [5] The complaint,
docketed as Civil Case No. 16681, was later amended to implead respondents
Agustin Derequito and Eugenio Derequito (Eugenio) as defendants and to drop San
Luis as a plaintiff.[6]
Branch 32 of the Iloilo City RTC, by Decision of July 8, 2002, rendered
judgment in Civil Case No. 16681 in favor of petitioners, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby
rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants as
follows:
1.

The Decision rendered in Civil Case No. 8863 be

revived in favor of the plaintiffs[-herein
petitioners] Quesadas, Ejercito, and Asuncion after
they have acquired the rights and interest of Claro San
Luis by subrogation upon the termination of the lease
contract of Claro San Luis in 1977 in the Decision
Dated August 25, 1975 which reads as follows:
a. ordering plaintiff to renounce possession of the
little over one hectare indicated as Exhibit A-2
and Exhibit A-3 on Exhibit A for plaintiff and
Exhibit 5 for defendant;
b. ordering plaintiff to limit his fishpond operation
on the area North and Northeast of the original
bank
(before
encroachment)
of
the Balabag River in Dumangas,Iloilo;
c. ordering defendant to limit his fishpond operation
along the curb line indicated in red pencil from
point x to y on the sketch plan, Exhibit B for the

plaintiff, of the area South and southeast of the

original bank of the Balabag River.
No pronouncement as to cost.
Let copy of this decision be furnished the
Regional Director of the Department of Public
Works, Transportation and Communication with
offices in Iloilo City.
SO ORDERED.
Iloilo City, August 25, 1975.
2.

The defendants-[herein respondents] are hereby ordered

jointly and severally to pay plaintiffs the sum of no less than
Forty Thousand (P40,000.00) Pesos a year for damages from
1977 until plaintiffs are restored to the possession of that
1-1/2 hectares more or less of Lot 225-B;

3. Defendants are ordered jointly and severally to pay

plaintiffs the sum of Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) Pesos
as attorneys fees and Two Thousand (P2,000.00)
as litigation expenses every time case is called for trial;
4. Defendants are ordered to pay the costs of the suit; and
5. Defendants are ordered jointly and severally to return that
portion of Lot 225-B covered by Original Certificate of Title
No. F-24467 in the name of Epitacio Asuncion, the
predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiffs, Quesadas, Ejercito
and Asuncion.
SO ORDERED.[7] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Respondents filed a Notice of Appeal[8] of the trial courts decision which

was denied due course as it was filed beyond the reglementary period.[9] A Writ of
Execution was thereupon issued.[10]

Respondents subsequently filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and

injunction[11] before the Court of Appeals, alleging that the trial judge acted without
or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in
x x x MODIFYING the original judgment [in the forcible
entry case] which has long become final and executory, rendered
by Hon. Judge Sancho Y. Inserto, by requiring the defendantspetitioner[s] to pay monetary damages which was not awarded on
the original judgment,
x x x reviving the original judgment which has long
PRESCRIBE[D];
xxxx
x x x granting the ex-parte motion to serve the Writ of
Execution of the revived judgment here in Digos City upon he
defendant-petitioner, Eugenio Derequito[;][12](Emphasis and
underscoring in the original; CAPITALIZATION supplied);

and that the Ex-Officio Provincial Sheriff and Clerk of Court of the Iloilo City RTC
committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the Writ of Execution.[13]
By Decision[14] of May 31, 2006, the Court of Appeals, finding that
prescription had set in as 30 years had already passed from the time the decision
in the forcible entry case became final and executory in 1975, and that the said
decision may no longer be reviewed in the new action for its enforcement, found
merit in respondents petition. Thus it ratiocinated:
It must be stressed that Article 1444 (3) of the New Civil Code
provides that actions upon a judgment must be brought within ten (10)
years from the time the right of action accrues. In other words, the
action to revive a judgment prescribes in ten (10) years counted from
the date said judgment became final or from the date of its
entry. Additionally, after the lapse of five (5) years from the date
of entry of judgment or the date said judgment became final and
executory, and before the expiration of ten (10) years from such date,

the judgment may be enforced by instituting an ordinary action

alleging said judgment as the cause of action. Furthermore, Section 6,
Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides that a final and executory
judgment or order may be executed on motion within five (5) years
from the date of its entry. After the lapse of such time and before it is
barred by the statute of limitations, a judgment may be enforced by
action. The records of the case at bar reveal that prescription had
already set in against the original judgment because it became final
and executory in 1975 and more than 30 years have already passed,
thus the judgment can no longer be enforced.
xxxx
x x x The petitioners are therefore correct in assailing the court
a quos decision since it is already unalterable and may not be
modified in any respect.
Moreover, the rule is well-settled that the judgment sought to
be enforced may no longer be reviewed in the new action for its
enforcement, an action the purpose of which is not
to
re-examine and re-try the issues already
decided but to revive the judgment. x x x
xxxx
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the petition
is GRANTED. Consequently, the Decision and Order dated July 8,
2002 and January 9, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
32, Iloilo City, are vacated and set aside.
IT IS SO ORDERED.[15] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration having been denied by Resolution

of April 12, 2007,[16] the present petition[17] was filed, faulting the appellate court
(a)
x x x IN NOT DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI,
PROHIBITION AND INJUNCTION IN CA-G.R. SP NO.

01489
ON THE GROUND THAT IT SUFFERED FROM BOTH
SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL INFIRMITIES.
(b)
x x x IN FINDING AND CONCLUDING THAT THE LOWER
COURT ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN
MODIFYING THE ORIGINAL JUDGMENT, WHICH HAS LONG
BECOME FINAL AND EXECUTORY, BY REQUIRIING THE
PETITIONERS TO PAY MONETARY DAMAGES NOT AWARDED
IN THE ORIGINAL JUDGMENT.
(c)
x x x IN UPHOLDING THE CLAIM OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS
THAT PRESCRIPTION HAD ALREADY SET IN AGAINST THE
ORIGINAL JUDGMENT BECAUSE IT BECAME FINAL AND
EXECUTORY IN 1975 AND MORE THAN 30 YEARS HAVE
ALREADY PASSED, THUS THE JUDGMENT CAN NO LONGER
BE ENFORCED.[18]

The petition is impressed with merit on procedural and substantive

grounds.
One of the requirements for certiorari to lie is that there is no appeal nor any
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.[19] Respondents
had the remedy of appeal when the trial court rendered judgment in favor of
petitioners. Respondents did in fact file a Notice of Appeal, which was denied due
course, however, because it was filed beyond the reglementary period. Having
lost the remedy of appeal, they should not have been allowed by the Court of
Appeals to avail of the remedy of certiorari.

Respondents nevertheless argue that respondent Eugenio learned of Civil

Case No. 16681-action for revival of judgment only when the writ of execution was
served on him; and that Eugenio, who has been living in Hagonoy, Davao del Sur
since 1960, has not been served with copies of the orders, notices, and other court
processes issued in said case.[20]
The Court is not impressed. Respondent Eugenio, together with the other
respondents, participated in the proceedings of the case through their counsel Atty.
Teofilo G. Leonidas, Jr. (Atty. Leonidas) who received the court processes in their
behalf. It is axiomatic that when a client is represented by counsel, notice to
counsel is notice to client.[21]
Respondents argue, however, that there is no proof that Atty. Leonidas had
been given the authority to represent them. [22] Again, the Court is not
impressed. The presumption in favor of a counsels authority to appear in behalf of
a client is a strong one, and a lawyer is not required to present a written
authorization from his client.[23]
Respecting the issue of prescription, contrary to respondents contention, the
action to revive the judgment in the forcible entry case had not prescribed. The
judgment sought to be revived was rendered on August 25, 1975 and the motion for
reconsideration of the said judgment was denied on September 15, 1976.[24] A writ
of execution was in fact issued.
The writ of execution was not enforced, however, within five years or up to
or on or about September 15, 1981. Hence, the filing of Civil Case No. 16681
the action for revival of judgment on August 26, 1985, was well within the 10year prescriptive period.[25] STRANGELY, the appellate court,
in its challenged decision of May 31, 2006, appears to have reckoned the 10-year
prescriptive period from the finality of the trial courts decision up to the
promulgation of its (the appellate courts) decision on May 31, 2006, hence, its
ruling that 30 years had already passed from the finality of the trial courts decision.

As for respondents claim that the trial court erred in modifying the revived
judgment by awarding damages, the same fails. The damages awarded represented
those suffered by petitioners on account of respondents withholding possession of
the lot since 1977 (when San Luis lease contract expired and petitioners took over
his rights and interests over the questioned portion of the lot) and attorneys fees
and litigation expenses. It need not be underlined that the relief to which the
judgment creditor-plaintiff in a complaint for revival of a judgment depends upon
the contents of the judgment in said complaint, and not on what was granted in the
judgment sought to be revived.
Thus, petitioners complaint for revival of judgment and recovery of
possession and damages had two causes of action. The first sought the revival of
judgment in the case for forcible entry, which was in favor of former lessee San
Luis. The second sought the recovery of possession and damages against
respondents for violation of petitioners right to the possession and fruits of the lot
since 1977.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Decision
dated May
31,
2006 and
Resolution
dated April
12,
2007 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The July 8, 2002 Decision of Branch 32 of the Iloilo City Regional Trial
Court in Civil Case No. 16681 is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.

GLEN
PASCUAL
Y
MALUMAYalias YEYE and
PAULITO
PASCUAL
Y
JUDALENA aliasBOYET,

G.R. No. 162286

Present:

Petitio
ners,

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
CARPIO,*
-versus-

CORONA,**
NACHURA, and
PERALTA, JJ.

Promulgated:
PEOPLE
THE PHILIPPINES,

OF
Respon

June 5, 2009

dent.
x---------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION
PERALTA, J.:

Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari under

Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, in connection with
Section 2, Rule 125 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, seeking to
set aside the entry of judgment in CA-G.R. CR No. 26329 and to
reinstate the appeal of herein petitioners before the Court of
Appeals (CA).

The instant petition is brought about by the following factual

and procedural antecedents:

On July 25, 1996, Criminal Case No. 96-151438 for homicide

was filed against petitioners with the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Manila, Branch 6, the Information on which reads:

That on or about June 30, 1996, in the City of Manila,

Philippines,
the
said
accused,
conspiring
and
confederating together with two others whose true names,
real identities and present whereabouts are still unknown
and helping one another, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to kill, attack,
assault and use personal violence upon the person of
TEOFILO CORNEL Y DACASIN, by then and there kicking,
boxing the latter on the different parts of his body and,
thereafter, striking him in the head with a stone, thereby
inflicting upon him mortal and fatal wounds which were
the direct and immediate cause of his death thereafter.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[1]

During their arraignment on January 31, 1997, petitioners,

with the assistance of their counsel de parte, pleaded not guilty.

At the trial, the RTC found the following facts based on the
testimonies of prosecution witnesses Rodolfo C. Cortez (Cortez),
an eyewitness to the mauling incident which led to the killing of
the victim; Edgardo Ko (Ko), the police investigator of the case;
Flora Cornel (Flora), who testified as to the civil liability of the
case, she, being the mother of the victim; and the testimony of
petitioner Paulito Pascual, for the defense:

On June 30, 1996, at about 12:30 in the morning, Rodolfo

Cortez was on his way to buy liempo at Andok's Litson Manok
(Andok's) located at the corner of Palawan and Rosalito Streets,
along G. Tuazon, Sampaloc, Manila. Cortez was approaching
Andok's when he saw a male person sporting long hair being
kicked, mauled and ganged up on by six persons in front of the
same store. Cortez recognized two of the six persons as
petitioners Glen Pascual alias Yeye and Paulito Pascual alias
Boyet, as the former sometimes played basketball with Cortez
and the latter lived in Masbate Street, the next street from Leo
Street, where Cortez lived. Petitioner Glen Pascual hit the head of
the victim with a knapsack, which caused the victim to fall with
his face down. While the victim was lying prostrate on the ground,
petitioners Glen Pascual and Paulito Pascual continuously kicked
the said victim. Cortez next saw petitioner Glen Pascual with a
shiny instrument, which the latter struck on the neck area (the
lower earlobe) of the victim. After that, Cortez heard somebody
shout the name Yeye, which made petitioner Glen Pascual turn
around, prompting both of them to have an eye to eye contact. [2]

The following day, after the mauling incident, while Cortez

was on his way home from work, he passed by the barangay hall
and noticed that somebody was lying in state. Cortez entered
the barangay hall and recognized the corpse inside the coffin as
the same victim who was mauled the night before. Cortez
informed somebody, who turned out to be the brother of the
victim, about the mauling incident which led to the killing of the
victim and told the latter that he was willing to testify as to the
incident he witnessed.[3] Thus, on July 2, 1996, Cortez executed an
Affidavit[4] stating what he witnessed during the mauling.

Edgardo Ko testified that on June 30, 1996, at 10:00 in the

morning, while he was in his office at the Western Police District,
Homicide Section, he received a telephone call from Senior Police
Officer (SPO4) Domingo Almeda of the Balic-Balic Police Station
informing him that a victim of a mauling incident was admitted
dead on arrival at theOspital ng Sampaloc. Hearing said
information, he and PO3 Diomedes Labarda then proceeded to the
said hospital and traced the victim's body inside the emergency
room. Upon seeing the victims body, Ko examined it. It showed
lacerated wounds at the back of his head, busted lips and a
puncture wound on the chin. He also came to know the name of
the victim as Teofilo Cornel y Dacasin (Teofilo). Afterwards, Ko and
his companion proceeded to the scene of the mauling incident.
They conducted an ocular inspection and found splashes of blood
along the gutter of the road. They also found the bloodstained,
gray and aquamarine colored knapsack containing assorted
technician's tools and clothing which allegedly belonged to the
victim. They recovered said bag at the Pascual compound
at 1024 Rosalito Street, Sampaloc, Manila.[5]

The autopsy conducted by Dr. Antonio S. Vertido, MedicoLegal Officer of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), upon a
letter-request of the victim's brother, indicated the following: (1)
the victim suffered fractures, linear, on the right and left frontotemporo-parietal bones; (2) as a result of the said injuries, the
victim suffered hematoma on the scalp, generalized, and
hemorrhages, subdural, on the right and left cerebralhemisphere; (3) the injuries could have been caused by a blunt
instrument like a lead pipe or a 2x2 piece of wood; (4) considering
that the victim suffered fractures on both sides of his head, the
blunt instrument could have been used twice in inflicting the
wounds; (5) that the person who inflicted the blunt instrument
could have been one arm's length from the victim, and that if the
blunt instrument was placed inside a bag and that bag was used
to hit the head of the victim, the same would still be a blunt
instrument and could have produced the same injuries; (6) that
the external injuries like lacerated wounds, hematoma, and
contusions were also caused by a blunt instrument; (7) that these
wounds could have been sustained also if the victim was boxed
and kicked, because a closed fist is a blunt object; and (8) that in
view of the location of the external injuries in the anterior position
of the body of the victim, the assailant and the victim could have
been facing each other about an arms length from each other. [6]

On the other hand, petitioner Paulito Pascual, in his

testimony, narrated that on June 30, 1996, he went to sleep at
around 11:30 in the evening and woke up at about 12:30 to
1:00 in the morning because his housemaid arrived and informed
him that there was a commotion outside his house. He went
outside the house but did not see any commotion; instead, he
saw a lone person lying prostrate along G. Tuazon Street. He
returned to the house and asked the housemaid as to the identity
of the person lying prostrate on the ground. While he was inside
his house, three policemen entered and invited him for
investigation while four other policemen remained outside the
compound where the house was located and held his
relatives, i.e., Balam Pascual, Eddie Mamaril and Tiyo Van Pascual
for questioning. They all boarded an owner-type jeepney and the
policemen brought them to the police headquarters at Police
Station 5. The policemen did not show him any warrant for his
arrest or for the arrest of his other relatives. They were detained
at the police station for one week. Thereafter, he was transferred
to the Manila City Jail. He did not know the victim or the name and
identity of the person he saw lying prostrate outside his house. [7]

After trial, the RTC found petitioners guilty beyond

reasonable doubt of the crime charged. The dispositive portion of
the Decision[8] dated September 7, 2001 reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of the afore-going, the Court

finds accused GLEN PASCUAL Y MALUMAY alias YEYE and
PAULITO PASCUAL Y JUDALENA alias BOYET GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of HOMICIDE. The
Court hereby sentences them to suffer an indeterminate
sentence of SIX (6) YEARS AND ONE (1) DAY TO TWELVE

(12) YEARS and to jointly and severally pay the mother of

the victim, Mrs. Flora Cornel the following amounts:

a. P50,000.00 for the death of Teofilo Cornel y

Dacasin;
b. P50,000.00 as reimbursement of burial expenses;
and
c. P50,000.00 as moral damages.

SO ORDERED.[9]

Due to the conviction, petitioners filed an Urgent Motion for

Reconsideration[10] dated September 25, 2001, which was denied
by the trial court.[11]

Consequently, petitioners filed an Urgent Notice of

Appeal[12] on October 17, 2001 and, on July 9, 2002, the CA issued
a notice[13] to petitioner's former counsel, Atty. Edilberto R. Balce,
requiring petitioners to file their brief within thirty (30) days from
receipt of the said notice. On August 13, 2002, petitioners filed
through their new counsel, Atty. Humberto B. Basco, an
Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Extension of Time to Submit Appeal
Brief,[14] which
was
granted
by
the
CA
in
a
Resolution[15] dated October 15, 2002. However, no brief was
filed by petitioners.

For failure of petitioners to file the required brief, their

appeal was deemed abandoned and dismissed, pursuant to
Section 8, Rule 124 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, by

the CA on February 13, 2003.[16] And, as a consequence thereof,

an Entry of Judgment was made on March 8, 2003.

Subsequently, petitioners filed an Urgent Omnibus

Motion[17] dated September 10, 2003 with the CA alleging that the
dismissal of the appeal amounted to punishing them for
something which they did not do or in which they had no
participation whatsoever. They also argued that the dismissal of
the appeal and the entry of judgment did not preclude the CA
from reinstating the appeal, as there were instances when the
same court had set aside entries of judgments and reinstated
appeals due to the failure of counsels to file appellants' briefs.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), in its
Comment[18] dated January 28, 2004, argued that the claim of the
petitioners that they were not informed by their counsel of the
filing of the motion for extension of the period for the filing of
their brief and the dismissal of the appeal on account of the nonfiling of the said required pleading, was devoid of any merit. The
OSG pointed out that the petitioners were aware of the notice to
file brief, since what they disclaimed knowledge of were merely
the motion for extension filed by their counsel and the resolution
dismissing the appeal. It was also observed by the OSG that the
lack of coordination by the petitioners with their counsel
respecting the appeal may be attributed to the possibility that
petitioners were confused as to who their counsel was, as shown
in their Omnibus Motion, wherein they referred to their counsel as
Atty. Humberto Basco on page 1 and as Atty. Edilberto R. Balce on
page 3, which indicate that the petitioners did not even bother to
know who their counsel was. It was also claimed by the OSG that
petitioners omitted to state in their Motion the date when they
discovered the dismissal of their appeal and, thereby, hiding the
unreasonable delay or laches on their part with regard to their
Urgent Motion, which was filed more than 11 months since the
Resolution dismissing the appeal was promulgated. In sum, the

OSG, citing jurisprudence,[19] contended that a client is bound by

the actions of his counsel, as well as by his mistake or negligence,
and that a party cannot blame his counsel for negligence when he
himself is guilty of neglect.

In their Reply (to Comment)[20] dated February 10, 2004,

petitioners argued that they relied on the supposed
professionalism of every member of the Bar. They also claimed
that no amount of prodding would guarantee that the brief would
be prepared and filed on time, as the lawyer concerned was
negligent. According to them, if they made any mistake, it was
their act of trusting their lawyer and not their failure to follow up
the status of the case. It was also their contention that they
should not be blamed for the fact that they had not secured the
services of a counsel because they tried hard to convince lawyers
to handle their case, but they seemed to believe that their case
was hopeless. Finally, citing jurisprudence,[21] they state that
procedural rules should be liberally construed in order to promote
their object and assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy and
inexpensive determination of every action or proceeding.

In its Resolution[22] dated February 18, 2004, the CA denied

the Urgent Omnibus Motion dated September 10, 2003 of
petitioners by agreeing with the OSG that petitioners were aware
of the notice to file brief, and that they themselves were guilty of
neglect for failing to monitor the status of their appeal. The CA
also ruled that petitioners did not state when they discovered the
dismissal of their appeal, the omission of which appears to hide
their own delay in filing the motion, which was one for
reconsideration of a final resolution and, hence, subject to a
reglementary period.

On March 11, 2004, petitioners filed a Motion for Extension

of Time to File Petition for Review on Certiorari,[23] which was
denied by this Court in a Resolution[24]dated April 12, 2004 for
petitioners' failure to show that they had not lost the fifteen (15)day reglementary period within which to appeal pursuant to
Section 2, Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended, in view of the lack of statement of the date of receipt of
the assailed judgment of the CA.

The present petition was filed on April 6, 2004.

On May 18, 2004, petitioners filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of this Court's Resolution dated April 12, 2004 on
the ground of negligence of their counsel. They claimed that they
could not comply with the requirement to indicate in their petition
the date when they received the Resolution of the CA dismissing
their appeal, because they never received a copy of the
Resolution of the CA; and that their counsel was so grossly
negligent that he did not even bother to inform petitioners of the
developments in their appeal. In its Resolution dated May 24,
2004, this Court required the OSG to file a comment on the
petition and on the motion for reconsideration.

In its Comment on the petition dated September 2, 2004, the

OSG argued that the petitioners were likewise at fault for the
dismissal of their appeal because they failed to diligently monitor
the status of their appeal. The OSG reiterated the arguments it
raised in its Comment dated January 28, 2004. Anent the
petitioners motion for reconsideration, the OSG countered that
despite the provisions of Section 6, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court,
which provides that the said procedural rules, as a general rule,
are liberally construed, periods for filing an appeal or a motion for
reconsideration are strictly enforced. Thus, according to the OSG,
having had actual notice of the issuance of the Resolution of the

CA dismissing their appeal, petitioners should have indicated the

date of such notice in their petition with this Court, which
inclusion is necessary to establish compliance with Section 2, Rule
45 of the Rules of Court.

On October 13, 2004, the Court granted petitioners' Motion

for Reconsideration of its Resolution dated April 12, 2004 denying
petitioners' Motion for Extension to File Petition dated March 11,
2004. In the same Resolution, this Court gave due course to the
instant petition and required the parties to submit their respective
memoranda within thirty (30) days from notice.

On November 30, 2004, petitioners submitted their

Memorandum, and on February 4, 2005, the OSG filed a
Manifestation and Motion praying that it be allowed to adopt its
Comment dated September 2, 2004 as its Memorandum, which
the Court granted on March 16, 2005.

The issues raised in this petition are:

A
THE DISMISSAL OF PETITIONERS APPEAL AMOUNTED TO
PENALIZING THEM FOR SOMETHING OVER WHICH THEY
HAD NO CONTROL WHATSOEVER.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RIGIDLY

APPLYING THE RULES RATHER THAN THE SPIRIT BEHIND
THEM.

The petition has no merit.

Petitioners insist that they relied on the supposed

professionalism of their counsel. According to them, having
received the notice from the Court of Appeals to file a brief, their
counsel was supposed to know his duty, not only as their counsel
but also as an officer of the court; and they conclude that they
should not be blamed and penalized if the conduct of their
counsel fell way short of what was expected of him. This
reasoning of petitioners merits no consideration.

It is a well-settled rule that the client is bound by the

counsel's conduct, negligence, and mistakes in handling the case;
and the client cannot be heard to complain that the result might
have been different had his lawyer proceeded differently. [25]

In People of the Philippines and Bricio Ygana v. Rafael

Bitanga,[26] an exception to the foregoing rule is enunciated, and
that is when the negligence of counsel had been so egregious that
it prejudiced his client's interest and denied him his day in
court. For this exception to apply, however, the gross negligence
of counsel should not be accompanied by his client's own
negligence or malice.[27] Clients have the duty to be vigilant of
their interests by keeping themselves up to date on the status of

their case.[28] Failing in this duty, they suffer whatever adverse

judgment is rendered against them.

The CA is correct in its finding that petitioners were aware of

the notice to file brief, since what the petitioners disclaimed
knowledge of was only their counsel's motion for extension to file
the brief. The previous pleadings, as well as the petition itself, are
without any claim by petitioners that they had no knowledge of
the notice to file brief with the CA. No allegation was even made
that after the discovery of the dismissal of their case by the CA,
petitioners asked or confronted their lawyer for the latter's failure
to file the brief. It is the duty of a party-litigant to be in contact
with his counsel from time to time in order to be informed of the
progress of his case.[29]

All of the above would lead anyone to conclude that

petitioners were not vigilant. Although there is no doubt that
petitioners' counsel was negligent, such negligence was not so
gross because it still afforded petitioners the necessary remedy,
provided that they themselves were not negligent. Hence, the
negligence of their counsel binds them. A contrary view would be
inimical to the greater interest of dispensing justice. For all that a
losing party would need to do is invoke the mistake or negligence
of his counsel as a ground for reversing or setting aside a
judgment adverse to him, thereby putting no end to litigation. To
allow this obnoxious practice would be to put a premium on the
willful and intentional commission of errors by accused persons
and their counsel, with a view to securing favorable rulings in
cases of conviction.[30]

Petitioners likewise argue that the CA rigidly applied the

rules rather than the spirit behind them. They proceeded to cite a

case wherein the rules were relaxed and the relief sought, which
was the cancellation of the entry of judgment by the CA, was
ordered upon the finding of negligence on the part of the
counsel. However, the cited case bears scant resemblance to the
instant case. As discussed earlier, petitioners' counsel may have
committed negligence, but such was not so gross as to deprive
them of their right to due process. On the contrary, Mario
S. Mariveles v. Court of Appeals,[31] which petitioners cited, the
negligence committed by the counsel was so great that the rights
of the accused were prejudiced. Thus:

It is true that the failure of counsel to file brief for the

appellant which led to the dismissal of the appeal does not
necessarily warrant the reinstatement thereof. However,
where the negligence of the counsel is so great that the
rights of the accused are prejudiced and he is prevented
from presenting his defense, especially where appellant
raises issues which place in serious doubt the correctness
of the trial court's judgment of conviction, the aforesaid
rule must not be rigidly applied to avoid a miscarriage of
justice. These teachings of jurisprudence are present in
the case at bar.

Hence, the above case is inapplicable to the instant case.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, and the Resolution

dated February 18, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No.
26329 is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

DOMINGA RUIZ, APOLONIA RUIZ,

FLORENCIO RUIZ, CORNELIA
RUIZ, OLIMPIO RUIZ, and HEIRS
OF TOMASA RUIZ,
Petitioners,

- versus -

G.R. No. 166386

Present:
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
Acting Chairperson,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
NACHURA, and
DE CASTRO, JJ.

CIRILA DELOS SANTOS,

Promulgated:

January 27, 2009

Respondent.
x----------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari and mandamus seeking that the
Resolutions dated September 21, 2004[1] and December 21, 2004[2] of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 85872 be reversed and set aside; and that the CA be directed to
give due course to the petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus filed before it by
herein petitioners.

A brief factual background is necessary for a proper perspective in the resolution of

herein petition.
Dominga, Apolonia, Florencio, Cornelia, Tomasa and Olimpio, all surnamed Ruiz
(petitioners), were the original owners of seven parcels of land with a total area of 194,284
square meters located in Barangay Kaytinga, Alfonso, Cavite, covered by OCT No. P4017 in the name of Tomasa, covering 46,235 sq. meters; OCT No. P-4018 in the name of
Cornelia, 49,803 sq. meters; OCT No. P-4288 in the name of Dominga, 19,649 sq. meters;
OCT No. P-4289 in the name of Apolonia, 19,649 sq. meters; OCT No. P-4290 in the
name of Olimpio, 19,650 sq. meters; OCT No. P-4291 in the name of Florencio, 19,650 sq.
meters; and OCT No. P-4292 in the name of Cornelia, 19,648 sq. meters (collectively
referred to as subject property).
Cirila delos Santos (respondent) is a duly licensed real estate broker.
Sometime in 1995, Olimpio gave respondent the plan of the subject property and
verbally authorized her to sell the same. Thereafter, respondent referred in writing the
subject property to Odessa Antiporda (Antiporda), a realtor and a fellow estate broker, who
had earlier informed respondent that she had a prospective buyer interested to buy a land
with an area of about 15 to 20 hectares to be used as a retirement village. Antiporda in turn
referred the subject property to one Alfred Tantiansu (Tantiansu). Olimpio then gave
respondent a written authority to sell the same.[3]
In May 1996, respondent introduced Olimpio to Tantiansu and they all went
together to the location of the properties. Tantiansu showed interest in the properties and
asked for the lowering of price, which Olimpio pegged at P315.00 per square
meter. Respondent asked Olimpio for the renewal of her authority, to sell to which the
former obliged. In the authority to sell, it was specified that she would still be paid her
commission even after the said authority expired, provided she registered in writing her
prospective buyer with whom she negotiated during the period of authority. Accordingly,
respondent notified petitioners in writing that Tantiansu was her buyer. [4]
A meeting was subsequently held among Olimpio, respondent and Tantiansu in
Tantiansu's office where the prospective buyer showed interest in buying the properties. A
few weeks later, a meeting was held between Olimpio and Tantiansu only, without
respondent. Olimpio asked respondent to lower her commission from 5% to 2.5%;

otherwise, the sale would not push through. But respondent, through a letter sent to
Olimpio, answered that she was amenable to a commission of 4%.[5]
Respondent later learned that the properties were sold to different corporations
at P60.00 per square meter, as indicated in the deeds of sale. Upon her verification of the
articles of incorporation of the corporation-buyers with the Securities and Exchange
Commission, she found out that the corporations were owned by Tantiansu. Respondent
then demanded the payment of her broker's commission, but was unheeded.
Respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 275, Las Pias
City, a complaint[6] for collection of sum of money and damages against all petitioners,
alleging that it was through her effort as a real estate broker that she was able to bring about
the consummation of the sale of the subject property, to petitioners' immense gain and
benefits; that despite the sale and her repeated demands, petitioners refused to pay her
broker's fee.
Petitioners Domingo Ruiz, et al. filed their Answer with counterclaim and
alleged as affirmative defense that at the time of the consummation of the sale of the
subject properties, there was no longer any existing broker's agreement between them; that
respondent had no more authority from them to sell the properties or, assuming there was
such authority, the same had already lapsed or expired; that it was petitioners'
understanding at the time of the sale of the subject properties that Tantiansu, the buyer,
would be responsible for the payment of the broker's commission, whoever the broker may
be; that petitioners knew that respondent had initially claimed her broker's commission
from Tantiansu; but after Tantiansu's death, and failing to collect any broker's commission
from said buyer, respondent commenced the present action against them.
Issues having been joined, a full-blown trial on the merits ensued.
On September 22, 2003, the RTC[7] rendered its judgment, the dispositive portion
of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered in favor of plaintiff [respondent]
and against the defendants [petitioners], ordering the latter to pay the plaintiff
jointly and severally the sum of P2,447,524.80 plus legal interest thereon from
the filing of the complaint and moral damages of P500,000.00 as well as

exemplary damages of P200,000.00 and attorney's fees of P100,000.00

and P2,000.00 per court appearance and to pay the cost.[8]

Petitioners filed their notice of appeal.[9] On November 6, 2003, respondent

filed her Comment and/or opposition thereto, alleging that the appeal was not perfected for
failure of petitioners to file the docket/appeal fee within the reglementary period to appeal.
In an Order[10] dated January 16, 2004, the RTC denied petitioners' appeal and
considered the appeal barred for failure of petitioners to pay the appeal fee within the
reglementary period as provided under Section 4, Rule 41 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure. It ruled that the decision had already become final and executory, and there
was nothing more to be appealed to the CA.
With the denial of their appeal, petitioners filed a petition for relief[11] alleging that
they were prevented from awaiting themselves of an appeal due to mistake and excusable
negligence of their counsel on record, and that they had a good and substantial
defense. Attached to the petition was the Affidavit of Merit of Atty. Mark Edsel Ang (Atty.
Ang), petitioners' former counsel, wherein he stated that when he received the decision on
September 30, 2003, he immediately sent copies thereof to petitioners by registered mail,
as four of the six petitioners live abroad while the other two live in Cavite; that he
communicated with the RTC Clerk of Court the fact that a notice of appeal was already
filed and the fees would be paid as soon as he got the confirmation of petitioners' desire to
appeal, to which the clerk of court gave her assurance on the acceptance of the late
payment of docket fees; that he received a long distance call from petitioner Cornelia on
October 15, 2003 confirming petitioners' desire to appeal the decision; thus, he paid the
appellate fees on October 24, 2003. Atty. Ang admitted that it was through his negligence
that the appeal was belatedly filed.
In its Decision[12] dated June 18, 2004, the RTC denied the petition for relief for
lack of merit. The RTC found no merit in petitioners' contention that the error of counsel
to pay the appellate fees in due time was a mistake constituting excusable negligence and
ruled that the mistake of counsel binds his client. The RTC held that petitioners' claim of a
good and valid defense was belied by the court's findings and conclusions contained in its
Decision dated September 22, 2003.

In an Order[13] dated June 24, 2004, the RTC granted the motion for execution filed
by respondent on the ground that the decision dated September 22, 2003 had already
become final and executory.
On July 5, 2004, notices of garnishment[14] were issued to the different banks by
sheriff Josefino Ortiz. Notice[15] of sale on execution of the subject property was scheduled
onSeptember 3, 2004.
Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus with prayer
for the issuance of a temporary restraining order/writ of preliminary injunction with the
CA, verified and certified by Dominga, seeking to set aside the following: (1) Order dated
January 16, 2004, which denied petitioners' notice of appeal; (2) Decision dated June 18,
2004 denying petitioners' petition for relief; (3) Order dated June 24, 2004 declaring the
Decision as final and executory and granting the motion for execution filed by respondent;
(4) notice of garnishment issued on July 5, 2004; and notice of sale.
On September 21, 2004, the CA dismissed the petition, the dispositive portion
of which reads:
WHEREFORE, for being procedurally flawed, at the very least, this
petition is hereby DENIED DUE COURSE, and consequently DISMISSED.
And since the temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction
is merely an adjunct to the main case, the same must be pro tanto denied. [16]

The reasons given by the CA dismissing the petition outright are as follows:
(1)

No motion for reconsideration was filed against the challenged

Order issued by the respondent judge on January 16, 2004. Well
settled is the rule that a filing of a motion for reconsideration is a
prerequisite to the institution of a special civil action for certiorari.

(2)

The names of the heirs of the petitioner Tomasa Ruiz are not
indicated, in violation of the first par. Section 3, Rule 46 of the 1997
Rules, which requires that the petition shall contain the full names
and actual addresses of all petitioners and respondents, a concise
statement of the matters involved, the factual background of the case,
and the grounds relied upon for the relief prayed for.

(3)

There is no special power of attorney executed by the said heirs

authorizing Dominga to sign the verification and certification in their
own behalf.[17]

Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied in the assailed Resolution

dated December 21, 2004, as the CA found that the arguments put forward in the motion
were a virtual rehash of those alleged in support of the petition.
Hence, herein petition raising the following issues:
1.

WHETHER A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION IS REQUIRED

BEFORE RESORTING TO THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI FILED
BY PETITIONERS BEFORE THE CA;

2.

WHETHER THE NAMES OF THE HEIRS OF THE PETITIONER

TOMASA RUIZ ARE INDICATED IN THE PETITION;

3.

WHETHER THERE IS NO SPECIAL POWER OF ATTORNEY

EXECUTED BY SAID HEIRS AUTHORIZING PETITIONER TO SIGN
THE VERIFICATION AND CERTIFICATION ON THEIR OWN
BEHALF.

4.

WHETHER THE CA ACTED WITH HASTE ON ITS BASESLESS

CONCLUSION
THAT
PETITIONERS'
MOTION
FOR
RECONSIDERATION IS A VIRTUAL REHASH OF THOSE ALLEGED
IN SUPPORT OF ITS PETITION.[18]

The parties filed their respective memoranda.

Anent the first issue, petitioners assert that the CA erred in finding that the filing of a
motion for reconsideration is a prerequisite for the institution of a special civil action
for certiorari.
Under the peculiar circumstances of the present case, we agree with
petitioners. There is no question that the filing of a motion for reconsideration before
resort to certiorari will lie is intended to afford the court an opportunity to correct any
actual or fancied error attributed to it by way of re-examination of the legal and factual
aspects of the case.[19]

However, the filing of a motion for reconsideration before availing of the remedy
of certiorari is not always a sine qua non[20] requirement, as there are recognized
exceptions: (a) where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no
jurisdiction; (b) where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been
duly, or are the same as those, raised and passed upon by the lower court; (c) where
there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any further delay
would prejudice the interests of the government or of the petitioner, or the subject
matter of the action is perishable; (d) where, under the circumstances, a motion for
reconsideration would be useless; (e) where petitioner was deprived of due process and
there is extreme urgency for relief; (f) where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of
arrest is urgent and the granting of such relief by the trial court is improbable; (g) where the
proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process; (h) where the
proceedings were ex parte, or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and (i)
where the issue raised is one purely of law, or public interest is involved. [21] We find this
case falling under exceptions b, c and d.
Petitioners' notice of appeal was earlier denied by the RTC due to the late payment
of docket fees, and it ruled that its decision dated September 22, 2003 had already become
final and executory and there was nothing more to be appealed to the CA. Clearly then, a
motion for reconsideration would be useless in the light of such declaration by the RTC.
Petitioners' subsequent petition for relief from the denial of appeal was denied by
the RTC in its Decision dated June 18, 2004. The court reiterated its disquisition found in
its main decision dated September 22, 2003. In fact, just after the petition for relief was
denied on June 18, 2004, the RTC issued an Order dated June 24, 2004 granting the
motion for execution filed by respondent. Thereafter, on July 5, 2004, notices of
garnishment of petitioners' goods, stocks, interest on stocks, shares and any other personal
properties in their control and possession were already served by the sheriff on the different
banks. Thus, petitioners sufficiently showed that there was an urgent necessity for the
filing of the petition with the CA to rule on the issue of the denial of appeal and the petition
for relief.
Anent the second issue, the CA erred in finding that the names of the heirs of
petitioner Tomasa Ruiz were not indicated in the petition. In the petition filed before the
CA, it was alleged that the petitioners are as follows:

Dominga Ruiz, resident of Kaytinga, Alfonso Cavite;

Apolonia
Ruiz,
resident
of 105
Eagle
Head
Drive, Fort
Washington, Maryland, USA;
Cornelia
Ruiz,
resident
of 12903
Turnberry
Circle, Fort
Washington, Maryland, USA;
Olimpio Ruiz, resident of 4510 N. Troy, Chicago, Illinois, USA;
Florencio Ruiz, resident of Detecon Al Saudia Co. Ltd., PO Box 31443,
Jeddah, 21497;
Heirs of Tomasa Ruiz, all the above residents of the above-mentioned addresses.
[22]

In their motion for reconsideration of the CA Resolution dated September 21,

2004, petitioners alleged that there was substantial compliance with the requirement that
the full names and actual residents of all petitioners must be stated, since all the petitioners
are the only children of the late Tomasa Ruiz, a fact that they had sufficiently alleged in
their petition. We find such explanation plausible, considering that the phrase heirs of
Tomasa Ruiz was followed by the words all the above, which means that the heirs of
Tomasa are the persons whose names are immediately preceding.
As to the third issue, we also find that the CA erred in finding that there were no
special powers of attorney (SPAs) executed by the heirs of Tomasa authorizing petitioner
Dominga to sign the verification and certification on their behalf. However, an examination
of the CA rollo shows that when the petition was filed with the CA, attached were separate
SPAs[23] of petitioners Apolonia, Cornelia, Olimpio, Florencio, the heirs of Tomasa,
executed in favor of their co-petitioner Dominga, giving her the authority to sign the
required verification and certification of non-forum shopping.
Anent the fourth issue, we rule that the CA hastily concluded that the allegations in
petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the Resolution dated September 21, 2000, were a
mere rehash of those in support of their petition for certiorari. Notably, the motion had
sufficiently stated the circumstances which would excuse petitioners for their non-filing of
a motion for reconsideration of the RTC decision dated June 24, 2004 before resorting to a
petition for certiorari in the CA, to wit: the RTC's declaration that its decision had already
become final and executory and that there was nothing more to be appealed to the CA; and
the granting of respondent's motion for execution as well as the sheriff's implementation of
such writ by the issuance of notices of garnishment. Petitioners also pointed out to the CA

that it had overlooked the fact that the names of the heirs of Tomasa Ruiz were alleged in
the petition and clarified that they were the only heirs of petitioner Tomasa and that they
had executed separate SPAs in favor of petitioner Dominga.
Thus, the CA committed a reversible error in outrightly dismissing the petition and
not giving due course to it as well as in denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
Petitioners further claim that the RTC should have given due course to their notice
of appeal of the RTC Decision dated September 22, 2003 to the CA since the late payment
of appellate docket fees was due to the mistake and excusable negligence of their counsel
and they had a good and substantial defense.
Instead of remanding the case to the CA which would only unduly prolong the
disposition of the case between the parties, we shall resolve[24] the substantive issue raised
in the petition for certiorari filed with the CA, to wit: Whether the RTC committed grave
abuse of discretion in denying petitioners' petition for relief from denial of appeal.
To begin with, petitioners, through counsel, received a copy of the RTC decision
dated September 22, 2003 on September 30 2003. Thus, petitioners had until October 15,
2003 within which to perfect their appeal by filing the notice of appeal [25] and paying the
appellate docket and other legal fees.[26] On October 14, 2003, petitioners filed their notice
of appeal through registered mail without paying the appeal fees.
It is a well-settled rule that the mere filing of the notice of appeal is not enough, for it
must be accompanied by the payment of the correct appellate docket fees. [27] Payment in
full of docket fees within the prescribed period is mandatory.[28] It is an essential
requirement without which the decision appealed from would become final and executory
as if no appeal has been filed. Failure to perfect an appeal within the prescribed period is
not a mere technicality but jurisdictional, and failure to perfect an appeal renders the
judgment final and executory.[29]
Hence, there is no question that the RTC correctly dismissed petitioners' appeal
pursuant to Section 13, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court which reads:
SEC. 13. Dismissal of appeal. Prior to the transmittal of the original
record or the record on appeal to the appellate court, the trial court

may, motu proprio or on motion dismiss the appeal for having been taken out
of time, or for non-payment of the docket and other lawful fees within the
reglementary period.

However, petitioners filed a petition for relief from the RTC Order that did not
giving due course to their notice of appeal on the grounds of mistake and excusable
negligence committed by their counsel. They contend that their counsel mistakenly erred
when he relied in good faith on the affirmation made by the trial court's clerk of court that
the appeal fees would be accepted even after the period for the filing of the notice of
appeal; that counsel also mistakenly relied on jurisprudence that technical rules of
procedure would be relaxed provided that the same were substantially complied with; that
counsel's negligence should not be binding on them; that they have good and substantial
defenses which would result in the dismissal of the complaint or a reduction of the
monetary awards set forth in the decision.
Section 2, Rule 38 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 2. Petition for relief from denial of appeal. When a judgment
or final order is rendered by any court in a case, and a party thereto, by fraud,
accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, has been prevented from taking an
appeal, he may file a petition in such court and in the same case praying that the
appeal be given due course.

Negligence to be excusable must be one which ordinary diligence and prudence

could not have guarded against.[30] Petitioners' counsel filed a notice of appeal within the
reglementary period for filing the same without, however, paying the appellate docket
fees. Counsel very well knew that under the Rules of Court, the full amount of appellate
docket and other lawful fees must be paid within the same period that the notice of appeal
was filed, as he even allegedly communicated to the clerk of court his request for
additional time in order to consolidate the confirmation of petitioners' desire to appeal.
The failure of counsel to pay the appellate docket fees on time constitutes
negligence. Despite receiving an overseas call on October 15, 2003, i.e., the last day to
file the appeal, from petitioner Cornelia, who then lived in Japan and expressed in behalf
of the other petitioners their desire to appeal the RTC decision, he paid the fees only
on October 24, 2003.

It bears stressing that the Rules of Court explicitly provides for the procedure for the
perfection of appeal. The counsel of petitioners should not have relied on the alleged
assurance by the clerk of court of the acceptance of the late payment of docket fees. As an
officer of the court, he should know that the affirmation of the clerk of court could not
prevail over the specific requirement of the rules. The rules of procedure are meant to be
followed and not to be subjected to the whims and convenience of the parties and their
counsels or by mere opinions of the clerk of court.
Atty. Ang should not have presumed that the rules of procedure would be relaxed in
favor of his clients. His reliance on jurisprudence that the application of the technical rules
of procedure would be relaxed if the same was subsequently complied with is not
justified. The liberal application of rules of procedure for perfecting appeals is still the
exception, and not the rule; and it is only allowed in exceptional circumstances to better
serve the interest of justice.[31] Atty. Ang's negligence in not paying the docket fees on time
cannot be considered as excusable. The circumstances surrounding this case do not warrant
the relaxation of the rules.
Petitioners insist that they are not bound by the mistake of their counsel, citing De
Guzman v. Sandiganbayan[32] and Samala v. Court of Appeals.[33]
In De Guzman, petitioner was convicted by the Sandiganbayan of anti-graft and
corrupt practices act for his failure to account for the P200,000.00 he received for certain
training programs of the Department of Agriculture based on the testimony of the lone
prosecution witness that no such training program was held at the designated places.
Petitioner sought to be relieved from what he considered as the serious and costly mistake
of his former lawyers in demurring to the prosecution evidence after leave was denied, the
effect of which deprived him of presenting the pieces of documentary evidence showing
due disbursement of the P200,000 received for the training program which was actually
conducted. The original documents were all along kept in the records section of the
Bureau of Plant Industry; and these original copies were readily available, which if
presented would have completely belied the accusation against him. We ruled that since no
less than petitioner's liberty was at stake, the higher interests of justice and equity demand
that petitioner be not penalized for the costly mistake of his previous counsel.

In contrast, the present case does not involve the life or liberty of petitioners, and
they were adequately heard with all the issues fully ventilated and evidence presented
before the decision was rendered.
In Samala, the last day for filing the notice of appeal fell on a Friday, October 13,
1995. The person to whom the filing of the notice was entrusted suffered stomach pains
and was able to file it only on the next business day which was October 16, a Monday. We
held that the delay was only for one day, as Saturday and Sunday were excluded and,
considering the facts of the case, found the delay to be excusable.
In the case of herein petitioners, the payment of the docket fees was done nine days
after the lapse of the period to appeal. In fact, in the affidavit of merit of petitioners' counsel
attached to the petition for relief, he stated that on October 15, 2003, which was the last
day to appeal, he received a long distance call from petitioner Cornelia who confirmed
their desire to appeal the decision. However counsel, instead of immediately paying the
appeal fee, waited for nine days before doing so.

Petitioners also allege that subsequent and substantial compliance with the rule
may call for the relaxation of the rules of procedure, citing our ruling in Jaro v. Court of
Appeals.[34]
We are not persuaded.
In Jaro, the CA dismissed the petition filed before it for being defective, as it was
not in the form of a petition for review and the annexes thereto attached were certified as
true xerox copies by counsel, not by the proper public official who had custody of the
records. Petitioner subsequently filed an amended petition in the proper form accompanied
by annexes, all of which were certified true copies by the Department of Agriculture
Regional Adjudication Board. This Court ruled that there was more than substantial
compliance, and the hard stance taken by the CA was unjustified under the circumstances.
Notably, petitioner therein committed a lapse in the formal requirement which was curable
by amendment. In the present case, however, petitioners failed to pay the appellate docket
fees on time, which is jurisdictional and which divests the trial court of jurisdiction to act
on the appeal. The payment of the appellate docket and other lawful fees is not a mere
technicality of law or procedure.[35] It is an essential requirement, without which the

decision or final order appealed from would become final and executory, as if no appeal
was filed at all.[36]
The failure of petitioners' counsel to perfect the appeal binds petitioners. It is
settled that clients are bound by the mistakes, negligence and omission of their counsel.
[37]
While, exceptionally, the client may be excused from the failure of counsel, the factual
circumstances in the present case do not give us sufficient reason to suspend the rules of
the most mandatory character. Petitioners themselves may not be said to be entirely
faultless.
Atty. Ang, petitioners' counsel, claims that as soon as he received the decision, he
sent copies to petitioners. Records show that at that time, while some of the petitioners
were already abroad, Dominga and Tomasa were still living in Cavite. Cornelia who lives
abroad was able to receive a copy of the decision and was able to make an overseas call to
Atty. Ang to express her desire to appeal the decision. However, neither Dominga nor
Tomasa who only live in Cavite, took steps to call Atty. Ang at the earliest possible time to
protect their interest. No prudent party would leave the fate of his case completely to his
lawyer.[38] It is the duty of the client to be in touch with his counsel so as to be constantly
posted about the case.[39] Thus, we find that there was participatory negligence on the
part of petitioners, which would not relieve them of the consequence of the negligence
of their counsel.
The Court may deign to veer away from the general rule only if, in its assessment,
the appeal on its face appears absolutely meritorious.[40] Indeed, the Court has, in a number
of instances, relaxed procedural rules in order to serve and achieve substantial justice.
[41]
However, the instant case does not warrant the desired relaxation.
Respondent has sufficiently shown that she was authorized in writing by
petitioners to sell the subject property; that respondent was instrumental in bringing about
the meeting of petitioner Olimpio and Tantiansu and the transaction concerning the sale of
subject property; and that it was proven by evidence that the buyer of the subject property
was Tantiansu. Thus, respondent is entitled to the broker's commission as agreed upon
between her and the petitioners. Petitioners' claim that Tantiansu had explicitly bound
himself to pay the broker's commission after the consummation of the sale would not
relieve petitioners of their liability to respondent since, as correctly held by RTC, whatever
Tantiansu and petitioners agreed relative to the payment of broker's commission is binding

only upon themselves and not binding on respondent who does not appear to have
consented thereto.
Thus, we find no grave abuse of discretion committed by the RTC in denying
petitioners' petition for relief, since they were not prevented from filing their notice of
appeal and payment of docket fees by mistake or excusable negligence that would have
deprived them of their day in court. Such relief under Rule 38, Section 2 of the Rules of
Court will not be granted to a party who seeks to be relieved from the effects of the
judgment when the loss of the remedy of law was due to his own negligence, or a mistaken
mode of procedure for that matter; otherwise, the petition for relief will be tantamount to
reviving the right of appeal which has already been lost, because of either inexcusable
negligence or counsels mistake in procedure.[42]
It bears stressing that appeal is not a right, but a mere statutory privilege.
Corollary to this principle is that the appeal must be exercised strictly in accordance
with the provisions set by law.[44]
[43]

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED.

Cost against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

WILHELMINA C. VIRGO,
Complainant,

A.C. No. 7861

(CBD Case No. 06-1829)

Present:
- versus -

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.,
Acting Chairperson,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,

NACHURA, and
PERALTA, JJ.
ATTY. OLIVER V. AMORIN,
Promulgated:
Respondent.
January 30, 2009
x----------------------------------------------------------x

R E S O LU TI O N
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition filed by Atty. Oliver V. Amorin (Atty. Amorin)
seeking the reversal of the Resolution of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Board
of Governors dated February 6, 2008, suspending him from the practice of law for one
year.
Wilhelmina Virgo (complainant) filed with the IBP a Complaint for disbarment
against Atty. Amorin dated September 11, 2006 before the IBP Committee on Bar
Discipline (CBD), alleging, as follows: She and her husband
(collectively referred to
as Virgos) owned a house in Loyola Grand Villas (the Virgo Mansion) situated on two
lots[1] which Atty. Amorin offered to buy in 1996. They agreed at the price
of P45,000,000.00 (P45M) with the Virgos retaining the certificates of title so that Atty.
Amorin could borrow from banks using the name of complainant who had a good credit
standing. Atty. Amorin was kind and accommodating and offered to be complainant's
legal consultant on several occasions free of charge. Complainant fully trusted Atty.
Amorin, and the latter prepared Deeds of Sale bearing different amounts which the Virgos
signed. Of the P45M price, however, Atty. Amorin only paid P20M, P10M of which
came from loans made by complainant using the property as collateral. In April 1998,
Atty. Amorin issued three checks[2] to cover the balance of P25M, which checks, however,
were dishonored because the payments were stopped or had insufficient funds. Atty.
Amorin also intentionally altered his signature on the checks. Complainant made several
demands on Atty. Amorin to no avail; thus, she filed estafa and Batas Pambansa (B.P.)
Blg. 22 cases against him on February 1, 2002.[3] Atty. Amorin in turn filed one civil[4] and

nine criminal cases[5] against complainant which damaged her good business reputation
and credit standing.[6]
Atty. Amorin filed an Answer[7] denying the charges against him and claiming that
complainant only filed the complaint against him because of the reversals in complainant's
court cases against him. He also asserts that assuming that the accusations of complainant
are true, such are not grounds for disbarment, not being related to his professional conduct
but at most are merely bases for civil action, in this case Civil Case No. Q-01-45798
pending before Branch 221, Regional Trial Court, Quezon City (RTC-QC).[8]
Atty. Amorin avers: The property was not sold to him personally but
to Loveland Estate Developers, Inc. (LEDI) of which he is the President. Complainant did
not mention in her complaint that the property is involved in three other cases: (1) Civil
Case No. Q-01-45798[9] pending before RTC-QC Branch 221, (2) LRC Case No. Q-15382
(02)[10] before RTC-QC Branch 216, and (3) CA-GR SP No. 77986[11] before the Court of
Appeals (CA). In CA-GR SP No. 77986, the CA found that the Virgos, in bad faith,
received P12M from the Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI) after having been already
paid by him. The Virgos no longer own the property, as they have already sold the same to
LEDI through the Deed of Absolute Sale with Assumption of Mortgage for the lot covered
by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 25894, the Deed of Absolute Sale for the lot
covered by TCT No. 26376 and the Deed of Absolute Sale with Assumption of Mortgage
which consolidates the two previous deeds of sale. It is not true that they agreed on the
price of P45M, as shown by a copy of the affidavit of Antonio Virgo, complainant's
husband, and the receipts for the commissions of complainant's real estate broker. The
truth is that as early as 1994, the property was being sold for P20M, but there were no
buyers so complainant lowered the price to P15M, of which P10M was paid by him with a
Far East Bank and Trust Co. (FEBTC) Check[12] dated May 28, 1996; the amount of P2M
with FEBTC Check[13] dated June 3, 1996; and for the balance, by assuming complainant's
loan from FEBTC for P3million.[14]
Atty. Amorin further alleges: He and complainant used to have cordial relations,
but he never offered her legal services. He gave complainant the deeds of sale so she
could have them notarized and have the assumption of loan approved by FEBTC. Said
loan, which complainant obtained without his knowledge and consent and using the house
and lots as collateral, was for her own benefit and this was the transaction which the CA
condemned. It is also not true that he paid complainant P25million in April 1998 with

three checks. Complainant stole 3 blank checks from him and forged the same which was
his basis for filing falsification and perjury cases against complainant. He did not file said
cases in order to threaten her, as he filed them earlier than IS No. 02-1551 -- the estafa
and B.P. Blg. 22 case which complainant filed against him.[15]
A Mandatory Conference was held before the IBP Investigating Commissioner
on March 16, 2007, and both parties and their respective counsels appeared. [16] Thereafter,
the parties submitted their position papers reiterating their arguments. In her Position
Paper, complainant asserts that the attorney-client relationship that existed between her and
Atty. Amorin are shown by the letters of Atty. Amorin to her, one of which clearly states
that Atty. Amorin has given her and her husband legal services and consultations for free.
[17]
Atty. Amorin in his Memorandum meanwhile insists that there is no lawyer-client
relationship between them, since there was no specific case or transaction in which
represented her or gave her professional advice.[18] Complainant filed a Reply arguing that
the fact that the legal advice given by Atty. Amorin was for free is immaterial, since
lawyering does not confine itself to actually handling a case, but includes giving legal
advice through consultations.[19] Complainant also filed a Supplement to Reply to
Respondent's Memorandum pointing out that CA-GR SP No. 77986 repeatedly referred to
by Atty. Amorin does not include her as a party; thus, she was not given any opportunity to
explain her side.[20]
Atty. Salvador B. Hababag, Commissioner of the IBP-CBD, submitted his Report
dated January 7, 2008 finding Atty. Amorin guilty of misconduct and recommending his
suspension from the practice of law for six months.
Commissioner Hababag found that: Atty. Amorin used his legal knowledge and
training to induce complainant to part with her property; Atty. Amorin admitted preparing
three deeds of sale, but denies the existence of a fourth one which complainant claims to
embody their real intent as to the purchase price; this was Atty. Amorin's scheme to defraud
not only complainant but also the government of its taxes from the sale; Atty. Amorin
failed to fulfill his promise to pay the purchase price in cash and to pay the P25million
balance, issuing three postdated checks which were dishonored, however, due to
insufficient funds; Atty. Amorin also intentionally altered his signature on the checks and
when complainant tried to collect the balance, Atty. Amorin filed several cases to harass
her; Atty. Amorin violated Rule 1.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which
provides that A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or

at lessening confidence in the legal system and Rule 1.01 of the CPR, which states A
lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct; finally,
complainant was not a party to CA-GR SP No. 77986; thus, she was not able to defend
herself and introduce evidence on her behalf.[21]
On February 6, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors passed RESOLUTION NO.
XVIII-2008-77, CBD Case No. 06-1829, to wit:
Wilhelmina C. Virgo vs.
Atty. Oliver V. Amorin
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously
ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigation Commissioner of the above-entitled case,
herein made part of this Resolution as Annex A; and finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable
laws and rules, considering Respondent's violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and
Rule 1.02 of the Canons of Responsibility when he used his legal knowledge
and training to induce complainant to part with her property and eventually
defraud her in the process, Atty. Oliver V. Amorin is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year.[22]

Atty. Amorin is now before the Court assailing the IBP Resolution, raising the
main issue:
whether or not there is sufficient evidence to support the finding of
[Complainant] that [Atty. Amorin] violated Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Rule 1.02 of
the Canons of Professional Responsibility when he used his legal knowledge
and training to induce [complainant] to part with her property and eventually,
defraud her in the process

and two sub-issues:

whether or not the Decision dated September 7, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-GR SP No. 77986 Loveland Estate Developers, Inc. etc. vs. Hon. Ofelia
Arelano Marquez, et al. can serve as evidence against [complainant]; and
whether or not public respondent (Board of Governors, IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline) can legally decide the complaint of (Virgo) based on alleged facts

which are the subject of Civil Case No. Q-01-45798, Loveland Estate
Developers, Inc. vs. BPI Leasing and Finance Corporation, Ricky Sunio, Fred
Galang, Danilo T. Reyes, Antonio L. Virgo, Wilhelmina Virgo and the Registry
of Deeds of Quezon City, still pending before Branch 221 of the Regional Trial
Court in Quezon City.

Atty. Amorin argues that: the IBP Commissioner's Report which the IBP Board of
Governors adopted is based solely on the pleadings and documents of complainant which
are self-serving and unsupported by official documents; the findings of fact of the IBP
crumble when arrayed against the CA Decision dated September 7, 2004 in CA-GR SP
No. 77986 which found complainant to have acted in bad faith; his evidence, consisting
primarily of the CA Decision in CA-GR SP No. 77986 and the sworn statement of
complainant's own husband show the opposite of the IBP's findings of facts, i.e., it was
complainant who committed fraud and deceit against him; both documents show that
complainant used the property which she already sold to him, as collateral for a new loan
of P12M from the BPI; the Counter-Affidavit of Antonio Virgo, as one of the respondents
in IS No. 17683, an Estafa and B.P. Blg. 22 case, stated that he and his wife sold the Virgo
Mansion to Atty. Amorin for P15M to be paid with FEBTC checks and the assumption of
the balance of the complainant's loan with FEBTC; although complainant is not a
respondent in CA-GR SP No. 77986, said case is admissible as evidence against her, since
the CA case was derived from two other cases in the RTC; Civil Case No. Q-01-45798 and
LRC Case No. Q-1538 (02); complainant is a private respondent in Civil Case No. Q-0145798 pending before Branch 221 of RTC-QC. Atty. Amorin also argues that the facts
which are used by the IBP as the basis for placing Atty. Amorin under suspension from the
practice of law for one year are the facts in litis in said case; thus, it is premature and
improper for the IBP to render the herein assailed Resolution, as it will preempt the
findings and decision that the RTC will render in the civil case.
Complainant filed her Comment reiterating her arguments before the IBP and
adding that her husband's affidavit, which is being invoked by Atty. Amorin in his Petition,
cannot be considered as impartial since she and her husband have not been in good terms
after she filed a criminal case for concubinage against him, for which he was found guilty
by the trial court.
The Court finds the petition to be with merit.

First, the existence of an attorney-client relationship between Atty. Amorin and

complainant was not established.
An attorney-client relationship is said to exist when a lawyer acquiesces or
voluntarily permits the consultation of a person, who in respect to a business or trouble of
any kind, consults a lawyer with a view of obtaining professional advice or assistance. It is
not essential that the client should have employed the lawyer on any previous occasion or
that any retainer should have been paid, promised or charged for; neither is it material that
the attorney consulted did not afterward undertake the case about which the consultation
was had, for as long as the advice and assistance of the attorney is sought and received in
matters pertinent to his profession.[23]
There are instances, however, when the Court finds that no attorney-client
relationship exists between the parties, such as when the relationship stemmed from a
personal transaction between them rather than the practice of law of respondent or when
the legal acts done were only incidental to their personal transaction.[24]
In trying to prove that there exists an attorney-client relationship between them,
complainant attached to her Position Paper four letters and a Memorandum of Agreement
drafted by and sent to them by Atty. Amorin. As to the first letter dated October 14, 1998,
complainant argues that the part in the letter which states:
As to why you did this to us (Amorins), inspite of all the favors my wife
and I have given you, the free legal services and consultations granted you
without any consideration or expectation of any renumeration.[25]

should be considered as proof that there exists an attorney-client relationship between

them.
Reading the letter in its entirety, especially the preceding paragraph, to wit:
Incidentally, we have been informed by our bank, United Coconut
Planters Bank, Diliman Branch, to the effect that you attempted to encash three
(3) checks allegedly issued to me. They did not honor the three checks in the
total amount of TWENTY FIVE MILLION PESOS (P25,000,000.00) as the
signature appearing therein was not my own signature. As to why this
happened is beyond my comprehension, knowing as you do that we do not have

any obligation with you. On the contrary, you are the one who owe us TWO
MILLION TWO HUNDRED FORTY THOUSAND PESOS, which we
previously encash but the two checks bounced.

would show however that Atty. Amorin was confronting complainant about her act of
using the subject property as a collateral for a P12M loan from the FEBTC when she and
her husband had already sold the property to LEDI. Rather than confirming any attorneyclient relationship between them, the said paragraph, if read in its full context, actually
conveys Atty. Amorin's frustration over what he felt was an act of betrayal on
complainant's part despite the free legal services and consultations he had extended to
complainant without any consideration or expectation of any remuneration. Read in this
light, the Court cannot appreciate such statement as proof that an attorney-client
relationship existed between them.
Complainant also attached other letters sent by respondent, dated July 6, 1999,
[26]
December 17, 1999[27] and an undated one,[28] plus a draft Memorandum of Agreement,
[29]
which talk about the complainant's property in Tanay, its excavation for possible hidden
treasure, their supposed sharing in the expenses and Atty. Amorin's interest in buying the
said property. Rather than bolstering complainant's claim that there exists an attorneyclient relationship between them, such letters actually strengthen the idea that the
relationship of complainant and Atty. Amorin is mainly personal or business in nature, and
that whatever legal services may have been rendered or given to them by Atty. Amorin for
free were only incidental to said relationship. Noteworthy also is the fact that complainant
was not able to specify any act or transaction in which Atty. Amorin acted as her or her
husband's counsel.
Second, Atty. Amorin has pointed out and complainant does not deny, the
existence of other cases related to the present disbarment case. Civil Case No. 01-45798,
pending before RTC-QC Branch 221, a case for Annulment of Real Estate Mortgage and
Foreclosure Proceedings with Damages, Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary
Injunction and Preliminary Attachment, filed by LEDI against BPI Leasing and Finance
Corp., its officers, the Registrar of Quezon City and the Virgos, assail the foreclosure by
BPI of the Virgo Mansion which LEDI claims to have already been sold by the Virgos to
them. In claiming ownership of the property, LEDI necessarily has to raise factual matters
pertaining to the sale by the Virgos of the property to them, such as the actual selling price,

the validity of the deeds of sale, and the terms of payment, which are inextricably
intertwined with the present disbarment case.[30]
LRC Case No. Q-15382 (02), a petition for the issuance of writ of possession filed
by the BPI before RTC QC Br. 216 seeks to foreclose the Virgo Mansion, which
complainant and her husband mortgaged to BPI in 1998, [31] while CA-GR SP. No. 77986 is
a petition for certiorari and prohibition asking the CA to stop the judge therein from
enforcing the writ of possession issued pursuant to LRC Case No. Q-15382.[32]
While it is true that disbarment proceedings look into the worthiness of a
respondent to remain as a member of the bar, and need not delve into the merits of a related
case, the Court, in this instance, however, cannot ascertain whether Atty. Amorin indeed
committed acts in violation of his oath as a lawyer concerning the sale and conveyance of
the Virgo Mansion without going through the factual matters that are subject of the
aforementioned civil cases, particularly Civil Case No. 01-45798. As a matter of prudence
and so as not to preempt the conclusions that will be drawn by the court where the case is
pending, the Court deems it wise to dismiss the present case without prejudice to the filing
of another one, depending on the final outcome of the civil case.
WHEREFORE, Resolution No. XVIII-2008-77 dated February 6, 2008 of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the
administrative case filed against Atty. Oliver V. Amorin docketed as A.C. No. 7861
is DISMISSED without prejudice.
SO ORDERED.

JUANITA A. AQUINO,
Petitioner,

G.R. No. 147782

Present:

- versus -

QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,

CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES,

TINGA, and
VELASCO, JR., JJ.
TERESITA B. PAISTE,
Respondent.

Promulgated:

June 25, 2008

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
Conspiracy may be deduced from the mode, method, and manner by which
the offense was perpetuated, or inferred from the acts of the accused persons
themselves when such acts point to a joint purpose and design, concerted action,
and community of interests. In this case before us, a series of overt acts of a coconspirator and her earlier admission of participation documented in an amicable
settlement she signed in the presence of counsel, all lead to the conclusion that the
co-accused conspired to commit estafa.
The Court of Appeals (CA) culled the facts this way, as established by the
prosecution:
At about 9:00 oclock in the morning of March 14, 1991, petitioner Juanita
Aquino, Elizabeth Garganta, and another woman identified only as Adeling,
went to the house of respondent Teresita Paiste at 611 Pealosa St.,
Tondo, Manila. The children of respondent and petitioner were grade school
classmates. After the usual pleasantries, petitioner started to convince respondent
to buy a gold bar owned by a certain Arnold, an Igorot. After respondent was
shown a sample of the gold bar, she agreed to go with them to a pawnshop in
Tondo to have it tested. She was told that it was genuine. However, she told the
three that she had no money.
Regardless, petitioner and Garganta went back to the house of respondent
the following day. The two convinced her to go with them to Angeles City,
Pampanga
to
meetArnold and
see
the
gold
bar. They
reached Angeles City around 2:30 p.m. and met Arnold who showed them the gold

bar. Arnold informed her that it was worth PhP 60,000. After respondent informed
them again she had no money, petitioner continued to press her that buying the
gold bar would be good investment. The three left and went home.
On March 16, 1991, petitioner, Garganta, and Adeling returned to the house
of respondent. Again, they failed to convince her to buy the gold bar.
On the next day, the three returned, this time they told respondent that the
price was reduced to PhP 10,000. She agreed to go with them to Angeles City to
meet Arnoldonce more. Arnold pretended to refuse the PhP 10,000 offer and
insisted on PhP 50,000.
On petitioners insistence, on March 18, 1991,
to Angeles City and bought the gold bar for PhP 50,000.[1]

the

two

went

On March 19, 1991, respondent had the gold bar tested and she was
informed that it was fake.[2] Respondent then proceeded to petitioners house to
inform the latter that the gold bar was fake. Petitioner replied that they had to see
Garganta, and that she had nothing to do with the transaction.[3]
On March 27, 1991, respondent brought petitioner to the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI)-NCR in the presence of a certain Atty. Tolentino where
petitioner amicably promised respondent they would locate Garganta, and the
document they both signed would be disregarded should they locate Garganta. The
amicable settlement reads:
In view of the acceptance of fault by MRS. JUANITA ASIOAQUINO of the case/complaint filed by MRS. TERESITA PAISTE
before the NBI-National Capital Region for Swindling, Mrs. J. Aquino
agreed to pay the complainant half the amount swindled from the
latter. Said P25,000.00 offered by Mrs. J. Aquino as settlement for the
case of Estafa will be paid by her through installment scheme in the
amount of P1,000.00 per month beginning from the month of March,
1991 until fully paid.
In witness whereof, the parties hereunto set their hands this
27th day of March 1991 at NBI-NCR, Taft Avenue, Manila.

(Sgd.) MRS. JUANITA ASIO-AQUINO

Respondent
(Sgd.) MRS. TERESITA PAISTE
Complainant
Witnesses:
1. Signed (Illegible)
2.
WAIVER OF RIGHT TO COUNSEL
The undersigned accused/respondent hereby waives her right to
counsel despite the recital of her constitutional rights made by NBI agent
Ely Tolentino in the presence of a lawyer Gordon S. Uy.
(Sgd.) MRS. JUANITA ASIO-AQUINO
(Sgd.) MRS. TERESITA PAISTE[4]

On April 6, 1991, petitioner brought Garganta to the house of respondent. In

the presence of Barangay Chairperson Pablo Atayde and a police officer,
respondent pointed to Garganta as the person who sold the fake gold bar. Garganta
was brought to the police station where there was a demand against Garganta
alone.
Subsequently, respondent filed a criminal complaint from which an
Information against Garganta, petitioner, and three others for the crime of estafa in
Criminal Case No. 92-99911 was filed before the Manila Regional Trial Court
(RTC). The Information reads:
That on or about March 18, 1991, in the City of Manila,
Philippines, the said accused conspiring and confederating together with
three others, whose true names, real identities and present whereabouts
are still unknown and helping one another, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously defraud Teresita B. Paiste in the following

manner to wit: the said accused, by means of false manifestations and

fraudulent representations which they made to the said Teresita B. Paiste
to the effect that a certain Arnold, an Igorot is selling a gold bar for
P50,000.00, and by means of other similar deceits, induced and
succeeded in inducing the said Teresita B. Paiste to buy the said gold bar
and to give and deliver to said accused the total amount of P50,000.00,
the herein accused well knowing that their manifestations and
representations were all false and untrue and were made only for the
purpose of obtaining, as in fact they did obtain the said amount of
P50,000.00, which once in their possession, they thereafter willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to defraud, misappropriated,
misapplied and converted to their own personal use and benefit, to the
damage and prejudice of the said Teresita B. Paiste in the aforesaid
amount of P50,000.00, Philippine Currency.[5]

Accused Garganta and the others remained at large; only petitioner was
arraigned and entered a plea of not guilty.
Trial ensued with the prosecution presenting the testimonial evidence of
private complainant, herein respondent, Yolanda Pomer, and Ely Tolentino. For
her defense, petitioner testified along with Barangay Chairperson Atayde, Jose
Aquino, and SPO1 Roberto Cailan. The prosecution presented as documentary
evidence three (3) documents, one of which is the amicable settlement signed in
the NBI, while the defense relied solely on its testimonial evidence.
The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On July 16, 1998, the trial court rendered a Decision convicting petitioner of
the crime charged, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Juanita Aquino guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of estafa and hereby sentences her
to suffer the indeterminate penalty of FIVE (5) YEARS OF PRISION
CORRECCIONAL as minimum to NINE (9) YEARS OF PRISION
MAYOR as maximum, and to indemnify the complainant, Teresita B.
Paiste the sum of P50,000.00 with 12% interest per annum counted from
the filing of the Information until fully paid, and to pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.[6]

The RTC found that petitioner conspired with Garganta, Adeling, and Arnold
in committing the crime of estafa. The trial court likewise gave credence to the
amicable settlement as additional proof of petitioners guilt as an amicable
settlement in criminal cases is an implied admission of guilt.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Aggrieved, petitioner brought on appeal the above RTC decision before the
CA, which was docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 22511.
After the parties filed their respective briefs, on November 10, 2000, the
appellate court rendered the assailed Decision which affirmed in toto[7] the July 16,
1998 RTC Decision.
In affirming the trial courts findings and conclusions of law, the CA found
that from the tenor of the amicable settlement, the investigation before the NBI did
not push through as both parties came to settle the matter amicably. Nonetheless,
the CA pointed out that petitioner was assisted, although unnecessarily, by an
independent counsel, a certain Atty. Gordon S. Uy, during the proceedings. The
CA held that petitioners mere bare allegation that she signed it under threat was
insufficient for she presented no convincing evidence to bolster her
claim. Consequently, the amicable settlement was admitted and appreciated as
evidence against petitioner.
Nevertheless, the CA ruled that even if the amicable settlement was not
admissible or was totally disregarded, the RTC still did not err in convicting
petitioner as it was indubitably shown by the prosecution through convincing
evidence replete in the records that respondent conspired with the other accused
through active participation in the commission of the crime of estafa. In fine, the
CA found that the prosecution had indeed established the guilt of petitioner beyond
reasonable doubt.

Through the assailed April 6, 2001 Resolution, the appellate court denied
petitioners motion for reconsideration.
The Issues
Hence, we have the instant petition under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, ascribing the following errors, which are essentially the same ones
raised before the CA:
I
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN NOT DECLARING AS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND LACKING IN CERTAIN PRESCRIBED
REQUIREMENTS THE INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED BY THE
INVESTIGATOR
OF
THE
NATIONAL
BUREAU
OF
INVESTIGATION (NBI), OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT AND
COROLLARY THERETO, TO CONSIDER ANY AND ALL
EVIDENCE PROCURED THEREBY TO BE INADMISSIBLE AS
AGAINST ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
II
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN NOT DECLARING AS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND LACKING IN CERTAIN POSITIVE
PARTICULARS AND STRICT COMPLIANCE THE MANNER IN
WHICH THE WAIVER OF RIGHT TO COUNSEL HAD BEEN
ASKED TO BE EXECUTED AND SUBSCRIBED BY ACCUSEDAPPELLANT.
III
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE ACCUSEDAPPELLANT TOOK AN ACTIVE PART IN THE COMMISSION OF
THE FELONY IMPUTED TO HER AND IN DECLARING HER
GUILTY THEREFOR BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
IV

THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING THAT CONSPIRACY

EXISTED BETWEEN HEREIN ACCUSED-APPELLANT AND HER
CO-ACCUSED, ELIZABETH GARGANTA DELA CRUZ.[8]

The Courts Ruling

In gist, the instant petition proffers the twin issues on (1) whether the
amicable settlement executed in the NBI is admissible as evidence, and (2) whether
conspiracy has indeed been proven to convict petitioner of the crime of estafa.
The instant petition hinges on the issue of the assessment of evidence and
their admissibility. As consistently ruled in innumerable cases, this Court is not a
trier of facts. The trial court is best equipped to make the assessment on said issues
and, therefore, its factual findings are generally not disturbed on appeal unless the
courts a quo are perceived to have overlooked, misunderstood, or misinterpreted
certain facts or circumstances of weight, which, if properly considered, would
affect the result of the case and warrant a reversal of the decision involved. We do
not find in the instant case any such reason to depart from this general
principle. However, in the interest of substantial justice, we shall deal with the
issues raised by petitioner.
First Core Issue: Admissibility of amicable instrument
Petitioner ascribes error to the CA when it gave due weight and
consideration to the amicable settlement with waiver of right to counsel that she
signed in the NBI during the custodial investigation. She claims she executed the
agreement under threat and not freely and voluntarily, in violation of Sec. 12(1)
[9]
of the Constitution which guarantees her rights under the Miranda Rule.
We are not convinced.
Custodial investigation involves any questioning initiated by law
enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise
deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. It is only after the
investigation ceases to be a general inquiry into an unsolved crime and begins to

focus on a particular suspect, the suspect is taken into custody, and the police
carries out a process of interrogations that lend itself to eliciting incriminating
statements, that the rule begins to operate. [10] Republic Act No. (RA) 7438[11] has
extended this constitutional guarantee to situations in which an individual has not
been formally arrested but has merely been invited for questioning.
[12]
Specifically, Sec. 2 of RA 7438 provides that custodial investigation shall
include the practice of issuing an invitation to a person who is investigated in
connection with an offense he is suspected to have committed x x x.
It is evident that when petitioner was brought by respondent before the NBINCR on March 27, 1991 to be investigated, she was already under custodial
investigation and the constitutional guarantee for her rights under the Miranda Rule
has set in. Since she did not have a lawyer then, she was provided with one in the
person of Atty. Uy, which fact is undisputed.
However, it can be gleaned from the amicable agreement, as aptly pointed
out by the CA, that the custodial investigation on the inquiry or investigation for
the crime was either aborted or did not push through as the parties, petitioner, and
respondent agreed to amicably settle. Thus, the amicable settlement with a waiver
of right to counsel appended was executed with both parties affixing their
signatures on it in the presence of Atty. Uy and NBI agent Atty. Ely Tolentino.
Petitioners contention that her constitutional rights were breached and she
signed the document under duress falls flat for the following reasons:
First, it is undisputed that she was provided with counsel, in the person of
Atty. Uy. The presumption that Atty. Uy is a competent and independent counsel
whose interests are not adverse to petitioner has not been overturned. Petitioner
has merely posed before the CA and now this Court that Atty. Uy may not be an
independent and competent counsel. Without any shred of evidence to bolster such
claim, it cannot be entertained.
Second, petitioner made much of the fact that Atty. Uy was not presented as
witness by the prosecution and that what petitioner and Atty. Uy supposedly
conferred about was likewise not presented. Basic is the principle that consultation
and information between counsel and client is privileged communication and the
counsel may not divulge these without the consent of the client. Besides, a party in

a case has full discretion to choose whoever it wants as testimonial witnesses to

bolster its case. We cannot second guess the reason of the prosecution in not
presenting Atty. Uys testimony, more so on account of the counsel-client
privileged communication. Furthermore, petitioner could have asserted its right
to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses, [13] for which
she could have compelled Atty. Uy to testify. She did not.
Third, petitioner never raised any objection against Atty. Gordon Uys
appointment during the time she was in the NBI and thereafter, when she signed
the amicable settlement. As this Court aptly held in People v. Jerez, when the
accused never raised any objection against the lawyers appointment during the
course of the investigation and the accused thereafter subscribes to the veracity of
his statement before the swearing officer[14] the accused is deemed to have
engaged such lawyer. Verily, in the instant case, petitioner is deemed to have
engaged Atty. Uy when she conferred with him and thereafter signed the amicable
settlement with waiver of right to counsel in his presence. We do not see how the
answer of NBI agent Atty. Tolentino upon cross-examination about the petitioners
counsel in the NBI, could be evasive when the NBI agent merely stated the fact
that an independent counsel, Atty. Uy, was provided petitioner.
Fourth, when petitioner engaged Atty. Uy as her lawyer, she undoubtedly
executed the amicable settlement. Verily, she was provided with an independent
counsel and such right to counsel is intended to preclude the slightest coercion as
would lead the accused to admit something false. The lawyer, however, should
never prevent an accused from freely and voluntarily telling the truth. [15] An
amicable settlement is not and does not partake of the nature of an extrajudicial
confession or admission but is a contract between the parties within the parameters
of their mutually recognized and admitted rights and obligations. Thus, the
presence of Atty. Uy safeguarded petitioners rights even if the custodial
investigation did not push through and precluded any threat of violence, coercion,
or intimidation.
Moreover, while we hold in this case that petitioners Miranda rights were
not violated, still we will not be remiss to reiterate what we held in People v.
Malimit that the infractions of the so-called Miranda rights render inadmissible
only the extrajudicial confession or admission made during custodial

investigation. The admissibility of other evidence, provided they are relevant to

the issue and is not otherwise excluded by law or rules, is not affected even if
obtained or taken in the course of custodial investigation. [16] An admission is an
act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact, [17] while confession is a
declaration of an accused acknowledging his guilt of the offense charged, or of any
offense necessarily included therein.[18]
Fifth, even granting arguendo that the amicable settlement is in the nature of
an admission, the document petitioner signed would still be admissible since none
of her constitutional rights were violated. Petitioners allegations of threat,
violence, and intimidation remain but bare allegations. Allegations are not
proof. Pertinently, this Court ruled in People v. Calvo:
A confession is not rendered involuntary merely because
defendant was told that he should tell the truth or that it would be better
for him to tell the truth. Stated elsewise, telling the accused that it would
be better for him to speak or tell the truth does not furnish any
inducement, or a sufficient inducement, to render objectionable a
confession thereby obtained, unless threats or promises are
applied. These threats or promises which the accused must
successfully prove in order to make his confession inadmissible,
must take the form of violence, intimidation, a promise of reward or
leniency.[19]

In fine, we agree with the courts a quo that even assuming arguendo that the
amicable settlement is not admissible, still the conviction of petitioner would be
affirmed as conspiracy was duly proven by other pieces of evidence.
Second Core Issue: Conspiracy duly proven
It is petitioners strong contention in her last two assigned errors that
conspiracy has not been proven to convict her of estafa. She asserts that there was
no strong showing of any convincing and solidly conclusive proof that she took an
active part in any phase of the transaction concerning the overt acts
constituting estafa that has been imputed to her. She argues that whatever act that
might have been imputed to her has always been through the request or insistence

of either Garganta or respondent as the transcript of stenographic notes

reveals. She points out that after she introduced Garganta to respondent in the
morning of March 14, 1991, she almost immediately left them and she did not
accompany Garganta when the latter went back to respondents house in the
afternoon of March 14, 1991. And she avers that significantly, she did not remain
in Pampanga after the completion of the transaction on March 18, 1991, but came
to Manila with respondent. According to her, her non-participation in these two
crucial meetings shows she was not part of any conspiracy to defraud respondent.
We are not persuaded.
Conspiracy is deemed to arise when two or more persons come to an
agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it.
Conspiracy need not be proven by direct evidence of prior agreement to commit
the crime.[20] In criminal law, where the quantum of evidence required is proof
beyond reasonable doubt, direct proof is not essential to show conspiracyit may
be deduced from the mode, method, and manner by which the offense was
perpetrated, or inferred from the acts of the accused themselves when such acts
point to a joint purpose and design, concerted action, and community of interest.
[21]

It is common design which is the essence of conspiracyconspirators may

act separately or together, in different manners but always leading to the same
unlawful result. The character and effect of conspiracy are not to be adjudged by
dismembering it and viewing its separate parts but only by looking at it as a whole
acts done to give effect to conspiracy may be, in fact, wholly innocent acts.
[22]
Once proved, the act of one becomes the act of all. All the conspirators are
answerable as co-principals regardless of the extent or degree of their participation.
To be held guilty as a co-principal by reason of conspiracy, the accused must
be shown to have performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the
complicity. Mere presence when the transaction was made does not necessarily
lead to an inference of concurrence with the criminal design to commit the crime
of estafa. Even knowledge, acquiescence, or agreement to cooperate is not enough
to constitute one as a party to a conspiracy because the rule is that neither joint nor
simultaneous action is per se sufficient proof of conspiracy.[23]

In the instant case, the courts a quo unanimously held that conspiracy was
duly proven. As aptly observed by the CA, the records are replete with instances
to show that petitioner actively participated to defraud respondent. The following
instances all point to the conclusion that petitioner conspired with others to commit
the crime:
First, petitioner was with her co-accused Garganta and Adeling when they
went to respondents house on March 14, 1991 to tell her of the existence of a gold
bar, showed her a sample, tried to convince respondent to buy one, and went to a
pawnshop in Tondo to have the sample gold bar tested.
Second, the following day, March 15, petitioner was again with her coaccused when they went to Angeles City to view the gold bar in the residence
of Arnold, and participated in convincing respondent to raise PhP 50,000 for the
purchase of the gold bar, and if respondent did not have money, to find a buyer.
Third, on March 16, petitioner was again with her co-accused when they
returned to the house of respondent to ask if she had found a buyer. Since she had
not, they again pressed her to look for one.
Fourth, on March 17, she with her co-accused again accompanied
respondent to Angeles City and met with Arnold to convince him to accept PhP
10,000 as deposit, but were refused.
Fifth, on March 18, respondent again pressed respondent to buy the gold bar
until the latter finally succumbed and paid PhP 50,000. Petitioner even re-counted
the cash payment, wrapped it in newspaper, and handed the money herself
to Arnold.
It is unquestionable that petitioner was not a passive observer in the five
days from March 14 to 18, 1991; she was an active participant in inducing
respondent to buy the gold bar. We find no cogent reason to alter the conclusions
of the CA. Indeed, the records bear out that conspiracy was duly proven by the
coordinated actions of petitioner and her companions.

Clearly, petitioners contention that all she did was at the behest of either
Garganta or respondent is belied by the fact that she took part in all the phases of
the inducement right up to the purchase by respondent of the fake gold. If it was
true that she had no part in the transaction, why would she still accompany
Garganta to visit respondent on the 15th, 16th, 17th, and 18th of March
1991? Moreover, with trips to Pampanga made on the 15th, 17th, and 18th that
take several hours, it is unfathomable that petitioner was only doing a favor to
either Garganta or respondent, or to both.
Ineluctably, after having been introduced to respondent, Garganta could have
made the visits to respondent without tagging along petitioner. Yet, the facts
clearly show that respondent could not have been thereby induced without
petitioners active participation in encouraging respondent to buy the gold
bar. Petitioner is the lynchpin upon whom respondents interest was stoked, and
ultimately to succumb to the lure of gaining a fat profit by buying the gold bar.
Moreover, the fact that petitioner went back on the 18th with respondent
to Manila instead of staying in Pampanga does not preclude her active participation
in the conspiracy as shown by the foregoing narration. It would have been strange
to respondent if petitioner stayed in Pampanga after the transaction. Thus,
petitioner indeed took active part in the perpetration of estafa. And, petitioner has
not shown any convincing proof that she was not part of the transaction given the
undisputed factual milieu of the instant case.
Finally, it bears stressing that petitioner was the one who knows
respondent. She introduced respondent to the other accused.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The

CAs November 10, 2000 Decision and April 6, 2001 Resolution in CA-G.R. CR
No. 22511 are herebyAFFIRMED IN TOTO. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.