Action and Identity in Nietzsche

Author(s): Paul de Man

Source: Yale French Studies, No. 52, Graphesis: Perspectives in Literature and Philosophy
(1975), pp. 16-30
Published by: Yale University Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2929746 .
Accessed: 31/03/2014 20:38
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Yale University Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Yale French
Studies.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 194.177.218.24 on Mon, 31 Mar 2014 20:38:59 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Paul de Man
Actionand Identityin Nietzsche

The questionof the relationship

betweenphilosophical
and literary
discourseis linked,in Nietzsche,to his critiqueof the mainconceptsunderlying
Westernmetaphysics:
theconceptoftheone (hen),
the good (agathon)and the true(aletheia).I This critiqueis not
conductedin the toneand by meansof the arguments
usuallyassociatedwithclassical criticalphilosophy.
It is oftencarriedout
as
by meansof such pragmatic
and demagogical
value-oppositions
disease and health,herdand the "happy
weaknessand strength,
valorizedthatit becomesdifficult
to take
few,"termsso arbitrarily
themseriously.
But sinceit is commonly
admittedthatvalue-seductexts
tionsare tolerated(and evenadmired)in so-called"literary"
in a mannerthatwouldnotpass musterin "philosophical"
writings,
of distinthevalueof thesevaluesis itselflinkedto thepossibility
fromliterary
guishingphilosophical
texts.This is also the crudely
the specificdifficulty
empiricallevel on whichone firstencounters
of textsthat keep
of Nietzsche'sworks: the patentliterariness
ratherthanwith
makingclaimsusuallyassociatedwithphilosophy
literature.
Nietzsche'sworkraisestheperennialquestionofthedisand literature
tinctionbetweenphilosophy
by wayof a deconstructionofthevalueofvalues.
ofnon-contra"value"ofall,theprinciple
The mostfundamental
dictiongroundof the identity
is the targetof a posthuprinciple,
mouspassagedatingfromtheFall of 1887:
We are unable to affirmand to deny one and the same thing: this is a
subjectiveempiricallaw, not the expressionof any "necessity"but only of
an inability.
1

Eugen Fink, Nietzsches Philosophie(Stuttgart,1960).

16

This content downloaded from 194.177.218.24 on Mon, 31 Mar 2014 20:38:59 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Paul de Man
If, accordingto Aristotle,the law of contradictionis the most certain
of all principles,if it is the ultimategroundupon whicheverydemonstrative
proof rests, if the principle of every axiom lies in it; then one should
consider all the more rigorouslywhat presuppositions[Voraussetzungen]
already lie at the bottom of it. Either it asserts somethingabout actual
entities,as if one already knew this fromsome othersource; namelythat
oppositeattributescannot be ascribedto them [konnen].Or the proposition
means: opposite attributesshould not be ascribed to it [sollen]. In that
case, logic would be an imperative,not to know the true [erkennen]but to
posit [setzen] and arrangea world that should be true for us.
In short,the question remainsopen: are the axioms of logic adequate
to realityor are they a means and measure for us to create the real, the
concept of "reality,"for ourselves?... To affirmthe formerone would, as
already stated, have to have a previous knowledgeof entities; which is
certainlynot the case. The propositionthereforecontains no criterionof
truth,but an imperativeconcerningthat which should count as true.
Supposing [gesetzt] there were no self-identicalA, such as is presupposed [vorausgesetzt]by every propositionof logic (and of mathematics),
and the A were alreadymere appearance,then logic would have a merely
apparentworld as its pre-condition[Voraussetzung].In fact,we believe in
this propositionunder the influenceof ceaseless experiencewhich seems
continuouslyto confirmit. The "thing"-that is the real substratumof A;
our belief in thingsis the precondition[Voraussetzung]of our belief in
logic. The A of logic is, like the atom, a reconstruction
[Nachkonstruktion]
of the "thing". . . Since we do not graspthis,but make of logic a criterionof
true being, we are on the way to positing [setzen] as realities all those
hypostases: substance,attribute,object, subject, action, etc.; that is, to
conceivinga metaphysicalworld, that is a "true world" (-this, however,
is the apparentworld once more...)
The veryfirstacts of thought,affirmation
and denial, holdingtrue and
not holding true, are, in as much as they presuppose[voraussetzen]not
only the habit of holding thingstrue and holdingthem not true, but the
rightto do so, already dominatedby the belief that there is such a thing
as knowledgefor us and that judgmentsreally can reach the truth:-in
short,logic does not doubt its abilityto assert somethingabout the truein-itself(namelythat it can not have oppositeattributes).
Here reignsthe coarse sensualisticpreconceptionthat sensationsteach
us truthsabout things-that I cannot say at the same time of one and the
same thing that it is hard and that it is soft. (The instinctiveproof "I
cannot have two opposite sensationsat the same time"-quite coarse and
false.)
The conceptualban on contradictionsproceeds fromthe belief that we
can formconcepts,that the concept not only designates[bezeichnen]the
essence of a thing but comprehendsit [fassen]... In fact, logic (like
geometryand arithmetic)applies onlyto fictitioustruths[fingierte
Wahrheiten] that we have created. Logic is the attemptto understandthe actual

17

This content downloaded from 194.177.218.24 on Mon, 31 Mar 2014 20:38:59 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Yale FrenchStudies
world by means of a scheme of being posited [gesetzt]by ourselves,,more
correctly:to make it easier to formalizeand to compute [berechnen]....2

In thistext,the polaritiesare no longersuch spatialproperties

as insideand outside,or categoriessuch as cause and effect,or
prominently
experiences
suchas pleasureandpainall ofwhichfigure
or selfhoodare the
in the manysectionsin whichconsciousness
targetsof Nietzsche'scritique.We are dealingwiththe moreeluand necessity,"kUnnen"and
sive oppositionsbetweenpossibility
"sollen,"and especiallybetweenknowingand positing"erkennen"
function
thatasand"'setzen."To know(erkennen)is a transitive
sumesthe priorexistenceof an entityto be knownand thatpredIt does notitself
icatestheabilityofknowing
bywaysofproperties.
but receivesthem,so to speak,fromthe
predicatetheseattributes
entityitselfby merelyallowingit to be whatit is. To the extent
and constative.It
that it is verbal it is properlydenominative
withinthe systemthatunitesthe
dependson a built-incontinuity
the grammarthat links the adjectiveto
entityto its attributes,
verbalintervention
stems
The specifically
the nounby predication.
with
but sincethe predicateis non-positional
fromthe predication,
a
be
called
act.
We
could
speech
regardto theproperties,
it cannot
call it a speechfactor a factthatcan be spokenand,consequently,
deviations.Such a factcan,
knownwithoutnecessarily
introducing
on the one hand,be spoken(konnen)withoutchangingthe order
of thingsbut it does not,on the otherhand,have to be spoken
(sollen)sincetheorderof thingsdoes notdependon its predicative
dependson this
powerfor its existence.Knowledge(Erkenntnis)
and in factenunciatesit by ways of the
non-coercive
possibility
A."
of entities,"the self-identical
principleof the selfidentity
2 FriedrichNietzsche, Werke KritischeGesamtausgabe(KGW), ed. by
Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari(Berlin: de Gruyter,1970), VIII, 2, 9
[97], p. 53. In earlier editions,the passage appears as section 516 of Der
Wille zur Macht (for instance,Musarion edition,XIX, pp. 28-29). I quote
in EnglishfromFriedrichNietzsche,The Will to Power,translatedby Walter
Kaufmannand R. J.Hollingdale(New York: Random House, 1967),pp. 279280, with some slight modificationsfor the sake of terminologicalconsistency.All italics are Nietzsche's. The syntacticalform of the German
termshas been altered to avoid lengthyquotation. See also note 9.

18

This content downloaded from 194.177.218.24 on Mon, 31 Mar 2014 20:38:59 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Paul de Man
On the otherhand,languagecan also predicateentities:in this
Nietzschetext,thisis called"setzen"(to posit),thekey-verb
around
whichthelogicofthepassagetwistsitssnakelikeway.It designates
genuineacts of speech,the questionbeingwhetherthe identityprincipleis an obligatory
speechact or a factmerelysusceptible
of being spoken. Classical epistemology,
Nietzscheasserts,has
maintained the latter at least since Aristotle: ".... according to

is the mostcertainof all prinAristotle,

the law of contradiction
ciples..., the ultimategroundupon whicheverydemonstrative
proofrests.. ."; it is thegroundofall knowledge
andcanonlybe so
bybeinga priorigivenand not"putup,""gesetzt."The deconstruction sets out to show that this is not necessarily
the case. The
convincing
powerof the identity
principleis due to an analogical,
of the sensationof thingsfortheknowlmetaphorical
substitution
of entities(thefactthat,as
edgeof entities.A contingent
property
a "thing,"theycan be accessibleto the senses)is, as Nietzsche's
earlytreatiseon rhetoric
putsit,"tornawayfromits support..." 3
and falselyidentified
withthe entityas a whole.Like Rousseau,
Nietzscheassimilatesthe delusive"abstraction"of the "coarse
sensualistpreconception"
of conceptualization:
withthepossibility
link of the sensation(Empfindung)
the contingent,
metonymic
linkoftheconcept:"The conbecomesthenecessary,
metaphorical
ceptualban on contradiction
proceedsfromthe belief... thatthe
conceptnotonlydesignates
theessenceofa thingbutcomprehends
it...." The semiologicalmoment(bezeichnen),which can simplybe

deconstruction
fromnecessity
describedas themetonymic
intoconis clearlyapparentin this sentence.It assertsthat,for
tingency,
Nietzscheas forRousseau,conceptualization
a verbal
is primarily
of a semioticfor a
process,a tropebased on the substitution
substantial
modeof reference,
of signification
(bezeichnen)forpossession(fassen).This is, however,only one amonga varietyof
and historical
deconstructive
gesturesand it is chosenforstrategic
reasons.
ratherthanforintrinsic
3 FriedrichNietzsche,GesammelteWerke (Munchen: Musarion, 1922),
V, p. 319.

19

This content downloaded from 194.177.218.24 on Mon, 31 Mar 2014 20:38:59 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Yale FrenchStudies
For the textgoes well beyondthe assertionthatthe claimto
knowis just an unwarranted
totalization
of the claimto perceive
and to feel.Elsewhere,Nietzschewill devoteconsiderableenergy
to questioningthe epistemological
authority
of perceptionand of
eudaemonic
patterns
ofexperience.
Butherehe has otherobjectives.
of knowledgefor mere sensation
The unwarranted
substitution
fora wideset of aberrations
becomesparadigmatic
all linkedto the
of
positionalpower languagein general,and allowingfortheradical
possibilitythat all being,as the groundfor entities,may be
ofspeechacts.The textasserts
linguistically
"gesetzt,"a correlative
this withoutequivocation:"To affirm(that logical axioms are
adequateto reality)one would... have to have a previousknowledge of entities: whichis certainlynot the case (my italics)." It has,

in truth,not been shown explicitlythat we have no a priori

knowledgeof the beingof entities.What has and will be shown,
withinthe confinesof thisparticular
of
is the possibility
fragment,
unwarranted
substitutions
leadingto ontologicalclaimsbased on
misinterpreted
systemsof relationship
(such as, forexample,subforsignification).
The possibility
of arousingsuch
stituting
identity
a suspicionsufficesto put into questiona postulateof logical
And
adequacywhichmightwell be based on a similaraberration.
is not necessarily
intentional
but groundedin
sincethisaberration
the structureof rhetoricaltropes,it cannotbe equated with a
norprovento be rightor wrong.It cannotbe refuted,
consciousness,
can
and of a
be made aware of the rhetorical
substratum
but we
of errorthatescapesour control.We cannot
subsequentpossibility
say thatwe know"das Seiende"norcan it be said thatwe do not
know it. What can be said is that we do not know whetheror
not we knowit, becausethe knowledgewe once thoughtwe possessed has been shownto be open to suspicion;our ontological
confidence
has foreverbeen shaken.
Nietzscheseemsto go further
thanthisand concludes:"(The
law of contradiction)
therefore
(myitalics)containsno criterion
of
that whichshouldcountas
truth,but an imperative
concerning
true."The conclusionseemsirrevocable.
As is stated,in the form
20

This content downloaded from 194.177.218.24 on Mon, 31 Mar 2014 20:38:59 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Paul de Man
of the passage,the inabilityto conof a thesis,at the beginning
tradict,to stateat the same timethatA is and is not A, is not a
necessity
but an inadequacy,
"ein Nicht-vermdgen."
Something
one
has failedto do can becomefeasibleagain onlyin the mode of
correlateof "I cannot"is "I (or you)
compulsion;theperformative
must."The languageof identity
and of logic assertsitselfin the
imperative
modeand thusrecognizes
itsownactivity
as thepositing
of entities.Logic consistsof positionalspeechacts. As such, it
acquiresa temporaldimensionfor it posits as futurewhat one
is unableto do in thepresent:all "setzen"is "voraussetzen,"
posi' But this hypothetical
tionallanguageis necessarily
hypothetical.
a pre-positional
"voraussetzen"
is in error,forit presents
statement
as if it were established,presentknowledge.This beliefcan be
deconstructed
by showingthatthetruthsof a logicbased on noncontradiction
are "fictitious
truths."But in so doingthe temporal
orderhas also been reversed:it now turnsout thatthe futureassertionwas in factdetermined
projected,prospective
by earlier
that the futuretruthwas in fact past error.All
assumptions,
"voraussetzen"
is "Nachkonstruktion"
(as whenit is saidthattheA
of logic is "eine Nachkonstruktion
des Dinges").The deconstrucintothemetonymy
tionof themetaphor
of sensation
of knowledge
of a moreinclusivedeconstruction
that
is a surfacemanifestation
and
revealsa metalepticreversalof the categoriesof anteriority
of "before"and "after."The "truth"of identity,
which
posteriority,
in thefuture
was to becomeestablished
thatfollowsitsformulation
turnsout to havealwaysalreadyexistedas thepastof its aberrant
"position."
Does thismeanthatwe can nowrestsecure(thoughhardlysafe)
in the knowledgethat the principleof contradiction
is aberrant
and that,consequently,
all languageis a speechact thathas to be
performedin an imperativemode? Can we consequentlyfree
of identityby
ourselvesonce and foreverfromthe constraints
at the same time?Is
assertingand denyingthe same proposition
4 "man sollte erwagen was (der Satz vom Widerspruch)im Grunde
schon an BehauptungenVoraussetzt."KGW 9 [97], 11.9-10.

21

This content downloaded from 194.177.218.24 on Mon, 31 Mar 2014 20:38:59 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Yale FrenchStudies
languagean act,a "sollen"or a "tun,"and nowthatwe knowthat
thereis no longersuch an illusionas thatof knowledgebut only
can we replaceknowledge
feigned
truths,
by performance?
The text
seemsto assertthiswithoutquestion: it acts by denyingthe oneness and the samenessof things.But in so doingit does not do
to do. The textdoes notsimultaneously
whatit claimsto be entitled
I This is not the
and denyidentity
affirm
but it deniesaffirmation.
same as to assertand to denyidentity
at the same time.The text
deconstructs
theauthority
ofcontradiction
oftheprinciple
byshowing thatthisprincipleis an act, but whenit acts out thisact, it
the deed to whichthe textowed its statusas act.
failsto perform
can be retracedby observing
The inconsistency
the playof the
same verb-root"setzen" in the followingsentence: "Supposing
[gesetzt]therewere no self-identical
A, such as is presupposed
of logic(and of mathematics),
[vorausgesetzt]
by everyproposition
thenlogicwouldhave a
and the A werealreadymereappearance,
merelyapparent world as its pre-condition[Voraussetzung]."The

oflogicaland mathematical
truthis basedon thefact
deconstruction
thatit is notrootedknowledge
butthatit dependson a prioract of
This prioract is itselfthe targetand
assumption(Vouraussetzen).
the outcomeof the deconstruction.
But the conclusionthatwould
seemto followfromthis,namelythattheprinciple
of contradiction
in a positionalmode:
is to be discarded,is again formulated
A garnicht...."
"Gesetzt,es gabeeinsolchesSich-selbst-identisches
is eminently
forwe saw thatthenegative
This terminology
correct,
proposition
(thereis no suchthingas an A thatis equal to A) has
not been establishedas knowledge(proven)but merelyas a pos- and anyhypothetical
a suspicion
is positional.
sibility,
knowledge
Yet all "setzen" has been discreditedas unable to controlthe
and this discreditnow
epistemological
rigorof its own rhetoric,
as well.The burden
ofidentity
extendsto thedenialoftheprinciple
back and forthbetweenincompatible
of proofshiftsincessantly
such as A = A, A betterbe equal to A or else.....
propositions
5 Perhapsmore clearly,in German: "Der Text bejaht und verneintnicht
ein und dasselbe sonderner verneintdas Bejahen."

22

This content downloaded from 194.177.218.24 on Mon, 31 Mar 2014 20:38:59 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Paul de Man
is characteristic
or A cannotbe equal to A, etc.This complication
states the
for all deconstructive
discourse: the deconstruction
in a necessarily
referential
mode.Thereis no
fallacyof reference
escape fromthis,forthe textalso establishesthatdeconstruction
we can decideto do or not to do at will.It is
is not something
co-extensive
withany use of language,and thisuse is compulsive
Moreover,the reversal
it, imperative.
or, as Nietzscheformulates
discoursenever
fromdenialto assertionimplicitin deconstructive
of what it denies. In the
counterpart
reaches the symmetrical
sentenceunderdiscussion,
forexample,theassertionthatlanguage
-is

an act (the symmetricalcounterpartof the negative assertion

cannot
ofidentity)
thatit is nota knowledge
based on theprinciple
be takenas final: the term"gesetzt"functions
as a markerwhich
of such a conclusion.But it does not
undermines
the authority
followthat,if it cannotbe said of languagethatit is an act, that
it has to be a knowledge.
The negativethrustof thedeconstruction
afterNietzsche(and,indeed,afterany"text"),
remainsunimpaired;
we can no longerhope ever"to know"in peace. Neithercan we
leastof all to expurge"to know"and "to
expect"to do" anything,
fromourvocabulary.
do," as wellas theirlatentopposition,
passage
Lest we be inclinedto read thistextas an irreversible
one,
froma constativeconceptionof languageto a performative
fromthe same generalperiod
thereare severalotherstatements
of "doing"is as manifestly
in whichthe possibility
beingdeconis being
thegroundofknowledge,
as theidentity
structed
principle,
put in questionhere.This is notobviouslythecase: in manytexts
that are more clearlydestinedfor publicationthan the posthuseems to privilege
the valorizationconsistently
mous fragments,
activeformsof languageoverpassiveor merelyreactiveones; the
Genealogy
ofMoralsis, of course,a clearcase in point.Activeand
passive (or reactive)modes are coordinatedwithvalues of high
withthose of masterand slave,
and low or, moreprovocatively,
The passages
and vulgarity.
and populace,distinction
aristocracy
is
are well known: ressentiment
fromthe Genealogyon ressentiment

the state of mind of "such creaturesthat are denied the true

23

This content downloaded from 194.177.218.24 on Mon, 31 Mar 2014 20:38:59 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Yale FrenchStudies
always
thatofdeeds..."; "In orderto exist,slavemorality
reaction,
speakfirstneedsa hostileexternalworld; it needs,physiologically
ing,externalstimuliin orderto act at all-its actionis fundamentally reaction.The reverseis the case withthe noblemodeof valuain the same work,in connection
tion...."6 And a littlefurther
witha discussionof causalitythatanticipatesmanysimilararguof actionas the
thehypostasis
mentsin theposthumous
fragments,
affirmed:"there
horizonof all beingseemsto be unquestionably
becoming;the'doer'is merely
is no 'being'behinddoing,effecting,
(es gibtkein
a fictionadded to the deed-the deed is everything
"Sein" hinterdem Tun,Wirken,Werden;"der Tater"ist zum Tun
bloss hinzugedichtet-das Tun ist alles."I The use of the term
as wellas thecontext,
(addedbypoeticinvention),
"hinzugedichtet"
indicatethat action here is conceivedin close connectionwith
and notwithin
readingand interpretation,
acts of writing,
linguistic
to action.
a polaritythatopposeslanguage,as speechor as writing,
withregardto
Of course,one cannotexpectthe same strategy
as a
designated
in a book like theGenealogyexplicitly
valorization
as in themore
pamphletand destinedto condemnand to convince,
speculativetreatisesthat Nietzsche'slater book (or books) were,
amongotherthings,destinedto be. On a specificquestion(suchas
should
of acts) the speculativestatements
theontologicalauthority
nextto theemphatic,
persuasive
be givenat leastequalconsideration
a slogansuchas "Tun itsalles"
has to confront
ones.One therefore
witha passage like the following:"The 'Spirit',somethingthat
thinks... herewe firstimaginean act thatdoes not exist,'thinkof thisact a subjectin
ing',and secondwe imagineas substratum
thismeans
and nothingelse originates:
whicheveryact of thought
thatthe deed as well as thedoerare fictions(sowohldas Tun,als
us is thesym8 The parallelthatconcerns
der Tdtersindfingiert)."
Tun) and the ficmetrybetweenthis fictitiousdoing(fingiertes
6 Musarion,XV, p. 295; quoted in English fromF. Nietzsche,On the
Genealogyof Morals,editedand translatedby WalterKaufmann(New York:
Random House, 1967), First essay, section 10, pp. 36-37.
7 Op. cit., First essay, section 13, p. 45; Musarion,XV, p. 305.
8 KGW, VIII 2, 11 [113], p. 296, 11.9-17. Previouslypublishedas section
477 of Der Willezur Nacht (Musarion,XIX, p. 8), Kaufmann,op. cit.,p. 263.

24

This content downloaded from 194.177.218.24 on Mon, 31 Mar 2014 20:38:59 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Paul de Man
titioustruths(fingierte
Wahrheiten)
thatappearin the previously
discussedpassageon theprinciple
ofidentity:
"Logic(likegeometry
and arithmetic)
applies only to fictitious
truths"
9: here,in section516,truthis opposedto actionas fiction
is opposedto reality.
In the later passage (section477), this conceptionof actionas a
"reality"opposedto the illusionof knowledgeis, in its turn,undermined.Performative
languageis not less ambivalentin its
referential
function
thanthe languageof constatation.
It could be objectedthat,in the passagenow underdiscussion
(section477),it is not the realityof actionin generalthatis being
the act of thinking
put in questionbut specifically
and, furthermore,thatthe linkagebetweentheact and theperforming
subject
ratherthan
is beingdeconstructed
(the principleof intentionality)
actionas such.But Nietzscheis notconcernedwiththedistinction
betweenspeech(or thought)acts and,on theotherhand,acts that
in the distinction
between
would not be verbal.He is interested
speech acts and otherverbalfunctionsthat would not be perNon-verbal
formative
(suchas knowing).
acts,if sucha thingwere
are of no concernto him,sinceno act can ever
to be conceivable,
fromthe interbe separatedfromthe attemptat understanding,
and
it. The fictional
thatnecessarily
pretation,
accompanies falsifies
truths,whichare shownto be acts, are alwaysorientedtowards
an attempt"to understand
(myitalics)theactualworld... to make
it easierto formalizeand to compute(berenchenbar
machen)..."
and, in thelaterpassage,thoughtis also describedas "an artificial
forthe purposeof understanding
adjustment
(myitalics)..." (eine
zumZweckder Verstdndlichung)
kiinstliche
Zurechtmachung
[1296,
11.8-9].Evenin theGenealogy
thepureactthatis saidto be all there
and the
is, is conceivedas verbal: its paradigmis denomination
deconstruction
of its genesis is best carriedout by means of
etymology.
9 The earlier Nietzsche editions (includingthe Schlechta edition in 3
volumes) all print"fingierteWesenheiten"(fictitiousentities)but the Colli
and Montinaricriticaleditiongives "fingierte
Wahrheiten"(fictitioustruths).
The authoritativeversionis more germaneto our argument.

25

This content downloaded from 194.177.218.24 on Mon, 31 Mar 2014 20:38:59 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Yale FrenchStudies
linkbetweenact and subject,it has been
As fortheintentional
numberof late texts,not to mention
the targetof a considerable
severalearlierversionsthatgo back at least as faras theBirthof
Tragedy.In the posthumoustexts,it is oftencarriedout as a
of the metalepsisof cause and effect;
rhetoricaldeconstruction
of consciousness
is
the well-known
passageon the phenomenalism
process
a good case in point.10This momentin the deconstructive
withwhichwe are
is undoubtedly
still presentin the fragment
and epistemoconcerned:it is, afterall, entitled"On psychology
logy"" and, in it, Nietzschedenouncesthe acceptanceof an "unmediatedand causal link betweenideas" as "the crudestand
12 There is nothingnew about such utclumsiestobservation."
is thatthe
terances;whatgivesthe passagea specialsignificance
for the act is explicitlycalled
fictionof a "subject-substratum"
secondaryas comparedto the priorfictionof the act itself("first
we imaginean act thatdoes not exist... and secondwe imagine
of the
a subject-substratum
forthisact.. .). The aberrantauthority
subjectis takenfor granted;the new attackis upon the more
notionof "act." Hencealso theapparentcontradiction
fundamental
of consciousbetweenthistextand theone on thephenomenalism
ness alludedto earlier(Section479). Whereasthe notionsof an
reduced
"inner"spaceor timeseemto be moreor less definitively
section477
to the statusof a deceptionin the latterfragment,
of the inner
beginsby asserting:"I maintainthe phenomenalism
of the sentence
world,too...." But the immediatecontinuation
("...everythingof whichwe becomeconsciousis arranged,simplified,schematized,interpretedthroughand through... and
13 makesclear thatphenomenality
is
is perhapspurelyimaginary")
termthat has to be denow no longerused as an authoritative
but as thenameof a metaphysical
conceptconsidered
constructed,
to be aberrant.Section477 takes forgrantedthe deconstruction
10 Section479 of Der Willezur Macht (Musarion,XIX, p. 10); Kaufmann,
op. cit., pp. 265-266.
11 This heading only appears in the new Colli and Montinaricritical
edition,VIII; 2, 11 [113], p. 295.
12 KGW, id., p. 295, 11.26-30, Kaufmann,p. 264.
13 KGW, id., p. 295, 11.15-22, Kaufmann,pp. 263-264.

26

This content downloaded from 194.177.218.24 on Mon, 31 Mar 2014 20:38:59 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Paul de Man
of the phenomenalism
of consciousness
and of the subjectcarried
out in section479 and it moveson to the moreadvancedtarget
of "denken"as act. If Nietzsche'snoteswereto be re-ordered
as
a logical progression
(in itselfa nightmarish
and absurdassign477 in the old classification
ment),fragment
wouldhave to come
afterfragment
479.
The deconstruction
of thoughtas act also has a different
rhetorical
structure
fromthatof consciousness:it is not based on
metalepsis
but on synecdoche:"'Thinking,'as epistemologists
conceiveofit (ansetzen),simplydoes notoccur: it is a quitearbitrary
fiction,arrivedat by singlingout one elementfromthe process
and eliminating
all the rest,an artificial
arrangement
forthe purpose of intelligibility..."1" Whereas the subject results from an

reversalof cause and effect,the illusionof thought

unwarranted
as actionis the resultof an equallyillegitimate
totalization
from
partto whole.
The rhetorical
of thefigures
structure
concernus less herethan
theoutcomeof theiranalysis:thetexton theprinciple
of identity
of the linguisticmodelas speechact,
establishedthe universality
albeitby voidingit of epistemological
and by demonstraauthority
to perform
tingits inability
thisveryact. But thelatertext,in its
turn,voids even this dubiousassurance,forit puts in question,
but thatit can be said to
not onlythatlanguagecan act rightly
act at all. The firstpassage(section516) on identityshowedthat
constative
but thesecondpassage
languageis in factperformative,
forlanguageto perform
(section477) assertsthat the possibility
as the possibility
forlanguageto assert.Since
is just as fictional
of
the analysishas been carriedout on passagesrepresentative
'Nietzsche'sdeconstructive
procedureat its mostadvancedstage,it
can be
wouldfollowthat,in Nietzsche,the critiqueof metaphysics
of the illusionthat the language
describedas the deconstruction
of truth(episteme)could be replacedby a languageof persuasion
of "setzen"
(doxa). Whatseemsto lead to an establishedpriority
14 KGW,

id., p. 296, 11.4-8, Kaufmann,p. 264.

27

This content downloaded from 194.177.218.24 on Mon, 31 Mar 2014 20:38:59 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Yale FrenchStudies
over"erkennen,"
oflanguageas actionoverlanguageas truth,
never
quitereachesits mark.It under-or overshoots
it and,in so doing,
it revealsthat the targetwhichone long since assumedto have
beeneliminated
has merelybeendisplaced.The epistemehas hardibutit has notbeendefinlybeenrestoredintactto itsformer
glory,
betweenperformative
itivelyeliminatedeither.The differentiation
and constativelanguage (which Nietzsche anticipates)is undecidable; the deconstruction
leadingfromthe one modelto the
otheris irreversible
but it alwaysremainssuspended,regardless
of how oftenit is repeated.
which
This conclusiontakesus back to theCourseon Rhetoric,
precedesthe posthumousfragments
by fifteen
years.The course
as a system
distinction
betweenrhetoric
startsout froma pragmatic
of
do
of tropesand rhetoric
as havingto
withthe skills persuasion
dismissesthe popular
(Beredsamkeit).
Nietzschecontemptuously
insteadon the
meaningof rhetoricas eloquenceand concentrates
of thetropes.
complexand philosophically
challenging
epistemology
is not actuallyaccountedforbut takenover emThe distinction
piricallyfromthe historyof rhetoric.Privileging
figureover persuasion is a typicallypost-romantic
gestureand Nietzsche'sdein the Germanromantictradition,
pendanceon his predecessors
15The
fromFriedrichSchlegelon down,has beenwelldocumented.
and coincideswith the
question,however,is eternallyrecurrent
term"rhetoric"
itself.Withinthepedagogicalmodelof thetrivium,
the place of rhetoric,
has alwaysbeen amas well as its dignity,
bivalent: on the one hand, in Plato for exampleand again at
crucialmomentsin the historyof philosophy
(Nietzschebeingone
of them),rhetoricbecomesthe groundfor the furthest-reaching
conceivableto themind; on theotherhand,
dialecticalspeculations
in
it
text-books
littlechangefrom
as appears
thathave undergone
Quintillianto the present,it is the humbleand not-quite-respectable handmaidenof the fraudulent
grammarused in oratory;
15 See, for instance,Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe,"Le detour" in Pogtique,
5, 1971, pp. 53-76.

28

This content downloaded from 194.177.218.24 on Mon, 31 Mar 2014 20:38:59 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Paul de Man
Nietzschehimself
beginshis coursebypointing
out thisdiscrepancy
and documenting
it with examplestaken fromPlato and elsewhere.16 Betweenthe two functions,
the distanceis so wide as to
be nearlyunbridgeable.
Yet the two modes manageto exist side
by side whereone wouldleast expectit. Nietzsche'sphilosophical
fororatoryfindsimpressive
contempt
confirmation
in the rigorof
his epistemology,
yet, as any readerof The Birthof Tragedy.
The Genealogyof Morals,or thatirrepressable
oratorZarathustra
knows,therehardlyis a trickof the oratoricaltradewhichhe is
not willingto exploitto the full.In a sense,Nietzschehas earned
a rightto thisinconsistency
laborofdeconstrucbytheconsiderable
tion thatmakesup the bulk of his moreanalyticalwritings.
For
this deconstruction
seems to end in a reassertion
of the active,
performative
functionof languageand it rehabilitates
persuason
as the finaloutcomeof the deconstruction
of figuralspeech.This
would allow forthe reassuring
convictionthatit is legitimate
to
do just about anything
withwords,as long as we know that a
rigorousmind,fullyawareof themisleading
powerof tropes,pulls
the strings.
But if it turnsout thatthissame minddoes not even
knowwhetherit is doingor not doingsomething,
thenthereare
considerable
groundsforsuspicionthatit does not knowwhatit
is doing.Nietzsche'sfinalinsightmaywell concernrhetoric
itself,
the discoverythat what is called "rhetoric"is preciselythe gap
thatbecomesapparentin thepedagogicaland philosophical
history
of the term.Consideredas persuasion,
rhetoric
is performative
but
when consideredas a systemof tropes,it deconstructs
its own
performance.
Rhetoricis a textin thatit allows fortwo incompatible,mutuallyself-destructive
pointsof viewand therefore
puts
an insurmountable
obstaclein the way of any readingor underThe aporiabetweenperformative
standing.
and constative
language
is merelya versionof the aporia betweentropeand persuasion
thatboth generatesand paralyzesrhetoricand thus givesit the
appearanceof a history.
16

Musarion,V, p. 298.

29

This content downloaded from 194.177.218.24 on Mon, 31 Mar 2014 20:38:59 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Yale FrenchStudies
If thecritiqueof metaphysics
is structured
as an aporiabetween
performative
and constativelanguage,this is the same as saying
thatit is structured
as rhetoric.
And since,if one wantsto conone shouldnot hesitateto assimilate
servethe term"literature,"
of
it withrhetoric,
thenit would followthatthe deconstruction
or "philosophy,"
to the precise
metaphysics,
is an impossibility
extentthatit is "literary."
This by no meansresolvestheproblem
of the relationship
in Nietzsche,
betweenliterature
and philosophy
but it at least establishesa somewhatmorereliablepointof reference fromwhichto ask the question.

30

This content downloaded from 194.177.218.24 on Mon, 31 Mar 2014 20:38:59 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions