G.R. No.

91958 January 24, 1991

WILFREDO D. LICUDAN and CRISTINA LICUDANCAMPOS, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and ATTY. TEODORO
O. DOMALANTA, respondents.

On August 13,1979, the respondent lawyer filed a Petition for

Attorney's Lien with Notification to his Clients which substantially
alleged that his clients executed two written contracts for
professional services in his favor which provided that:
a) The undersigned counsel is entitled to own
97.5 square meters of the plaintiff's share of
the lot in question.

Arnold V. Guerrero & Associates for petitioners.

b) The undersigned counsel shall have a

usufructuary right for a period of ten (10) years
of plaintiffs' share of the lot in question.

Teodoro O. Domalanta for and on his behalf as private

respondent.

c) And that all damages accruing to plaintiffs to

be paid by the defendant is for the undersigned
counsel.(Annex "H" of the Petition, Rollo, p. 54)

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:p

The practice of law is a profession rather than trade. Courts must
guard against the charging of unconscionable and excessive fees
by lawyers for their services when engaged as counsel. Whether
or not the award of attorney's fees in this case is reasonable,
being in the nature of contingent fees, is the principal issue.
This petition for review on certiorari assails:

On September 19, 1979, the trial court handling Civil Case No. Q12254 ordered the annotation at the back of TCT No. 818 of the
Register of Deeds of Quezon City of the respondent lawyer's
Contract for Professional Services dated August 30, 1979 signed
by petitioner Wilfredo Licudan and Aurelio Licudan on his own
behalf and on behalf of his daughter, petitioner Cristina LicudanCampos. The said trial court's Order, being one of two Orders
being essentially challenged in this petition, is reproduced below:
Before the court for consideration is a Petition
for Attorney's Lien filed by Atty. Teodoro D.
Domalanta, counsel for the plaintiff, praying
that his attorney's fees be annotated as a lien
at the back of Transfer Certificate of Title No.
818 of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City,
subject matter of this case.

1) The Decision of the public respondent dated September 12,

1989 which dismissed the petitioners' appeal thereby upholding
the reasonableness of the respondent lawyer's lien as attorney's
fees over the properties of his clients; and
2) The Resolution of the public respondent dated January 30,
1990 which denied the petitioners' motion for reconsideration.

For the protection of the plaintiffs, the court

required the plaintiff Aurelio Licudan as well as
his son to appear this morning. Plaintiff Aurelio
Licudan together with his son Wilfredo Licudan,
who appears to be intelligent and in fact he
speaks (the) English language well, appeared.
Both Aurelio and Wilfredo Licudan manifested
that they have freely and voluntarily signed the
Contract for Professional Services, dated August
30, 1979 and notarized before Notary Public
Amado Garrovillas as Doc. No. 32, Page 8, Book
No. XIX, Series of 1979.

The grounds relied upon by the petitioners are as follows:

The respondent Court, in upholding the
entitlement of private respondent-attorney on
the attorney's fees he claimed, decided the
question in a manner not in accord with law or
with the applicable decisions of this Honorable
Tribunal.
The respondent Court, in refusing to review and
determine the propriety, reasonableness and
validity of the attorney's fees claimed by the
private respondent-attorney, departed from the
usual course of judicial proceedings.
The respondent Court, in failing to declare the
attorney's fees claimed by the private
respondent-attorney as unconscionable,
excessive, unreasonable, immoral and
unethical, decided the question in a way not in
accord with law and with applicable decisions of
this Honorable Tribunal. (Petition, pp. 1213; Rollo, pp. 16-17)
The following are the antecedent facts pertinent to the case at
bar:
The respondent lawyer was retained as counsel by his brother-inlaw and sister, the now deceased petitioners' parents, spouses
Aurelio and Felicidad Licudan. His services as counsel pertained to
two related civil cases docketed as Civil Case No. Q-12254 for
partition and Civil Case No. Q-28655 for a sum of money in
connection with the redemption of the property subject matter of
the two cases covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 818 of
the Register of Deeds of Quezon City. In both cases, the
respondent lawyer obtained a judgment in favor of his clients.

Considering the manifestation of plaintiff,

Aurelio Licudan and Alfredo (sic) Licudan that
they have entered freely and voluntarily in the
said contract of professional services, let the
same be annotated at the back of TCT 818 of
the Register of Deeds of Quezon City, upon
payment of the required legal fees. (CA
Decision, pp. 7-8; Rollo, pp. 36-37)
The Contract for Professional Services dated August 30, 1979
differs from the earlier contractual provisions in that it entitled
the respondent lawyer to one-third (1/3) of the subject property
or 90.5 square meters and provided for usufructuary rights over
the entire lot in question in favor of the respondent lawyer's son,
Teodoro M. Domalanta, Jr. for an agreed consideration. (Annex "J"
of the Petition; Rollo, p. 59)
On July 25, 1985, the respondent lawyer filed a motion ex
parte to amend the Order dated September 19, 1979 so as to
conform with an additional professional fee covering 31 square
meters more of the lot for services rendered in Civil Case No. Q28655 as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale dated May 1,
1983 executed by Aurelio Licudan in favor of the respondent
lawyer.

1 | BACUDIO [LEGAL COUNSEL CASES]

On September 6, 1985, the trial court ordered the respondent

lawyer to submit a subdivision plan in conformity with his
attorney's fees contract under which one-third (1/3) of the
property or 90.5 square meters was alloted to him.

After the petitioners' Opposition to the said motion was filed, the
trial court, on February 26, 1987, rendered an Order with the
following dispositive portion:
WHEREFORE, this Court has no alternative but
to set aside its orders of 29 August 1986 and 3
October 1986 and declare its Orders of 19
September 1979 and 21 October 1985
irrevocably final and executory. (CA Decision, p.
5; Rollo, p. 34)

On September 23, 1985, the respondent lawyer filed a motion for

reconsideration praying for the amendment of the Order dated
September 19, 1979 to conform with the Deed of Absolute Sale
dated May 1, 1983 which was executed after the annotation of
the original attorney's lien of 90.5 square meters.
On September 30, 1985, the trial court denied the motion on the
ground that the respondent lawyer cannot collect attorney's fees
for other cases in the action for partition.
On October 4, 1985, the respondent lawyer filed a second motion
for reconsideration of the Order dated September 6, 1985
explaining that what he sought to be included in the Order dated
September 19, 1979 is the additional attorney's fees for handling
the redemption case which was but a mere offshoot of the
partition case and further manifesting that the additional 31
square meters as compensation for the redemption case must be
merged with the 90.5 square meters for the partition case to
enable the said respondent lawyer to comply with the Order dated
September 6,1985 which directed him to submit a subdivision
plan as required.
On October 21, 1985, the trial court issued the second Order
being assailed in this petition. The said Order reads:
Acting on the "Second Motion for
Reconsideration" filed by Atty. Teodoro
Domalanta and finding the same to be justified,
let an attorney's lien be annotated in the title of
the property for 31 square meters as attorney's
fees of said Atty. Teodoro Domalanta in addition
to the original 90.5 square meters. (CA
Decision, p. 8; Rollo, p. 37)
On August 22, 1986, more than ten (10) months after the Orders
of September 6, 1985 and October 21, 1985 had become final
and executory, the petitioners as substituted heirs of the
respondent lawyers' deceased clients filed a motion to set aside
orders on the ground that the award of professional fees covering
121.5 square meters of the 271.5 square meter lot is
unconscionable and excessive.
After the respondent lawyer filed his Opposition to the above
petitioners' motion, the lower court, on August 29, 1986, finding
that the petitioners as substituted plaintiffs are not in full
agreement with the respondent lawyer's claim for attorney's fees,
set aside its Orders dated September 6, 1985 and October 21,
1985.
On September 16, 1986, the respondent lawyer filed a motion for
reconsideration stressing the fact that the payment of the
professional services was pursuant to a contract which could no
longer be disturbed or set aside because it has already been
implemented and had since then become final. This motion was
denied on October 3, 1986.
On November 15, 1986, the respondent lawyer filed a motion to
set aside the orders dated August 29, 1986 and October 3, 1986
reiterating his position that the Orders of September 6, 1985 and
October 21, 1985 have become final and are already
implemented. The respondent lawyer further asked for the
modification of the October 21, 1985 Order to reflect 60.32
square meters instead of 31 square meters only since the
stipulation in the Additional Contract for Professional Services
entitled him to 60.32 square meters.

On Appeal, the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the respondent

lawyer by dismissing the appeal and the prayed for writ of
preliminary injunction. Their subsequent motion for
reconsideration having been denied', the petitioners filed the
instant petition.
The petitioners fault the respondent Court for its failure to
exercise its inherent power to review and determine the propriety
of the stipulated attorney's fees in favor of the respondent lawyer
and accuse the respondent lawyer of having committed an unfair
advantage or legal fraud by virtue of the Contract for Professional
Services devised by him after the trial court awarded him
attorney's fees for P1,000.00 only instead of respecting the trust
and confidence of the highest level reposed on him considering
the close blood and affinal relationship between him and his
clients.
The petitioners contend that under the award for professional
services, they may have won the case but would lose the entire
property won in litigation to their uncle-lawyer. They would be
totally deprived of their house and lot and the recovered damages
considering that of the 271.5 square meters of the subject lot,
the respondent lawyer is claiming 121.5 square meters and the
remaining portion of 150 square meters would also go to
attorney's fees since the said portion pertains to the lawyer's son
by way of usufruct for ten (10) years.
The aforesaid submissions by the petitioners merit our
consideration.
It is a well-entrenched rule that attorney's fees may be claimed in
the very action in which the services in question have been
rendered or as an incident of the main action. The fees may be
properly adjudged after such litigation is terminated and the
subject of recovery is at the disposition of the court.
(see Camacho v. Court of Appeals, 179 SCRA 604 [1989];
Quirante v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 169 SCRA 769 [1989]).
It is an equally deeply-rooted rule that contingent fees are
not per se prohibited by law. They are sanctioned by Canon 13 of
the Canons of Professional Ethics and Canon 20, Rule 20.01 of
the recently promulgated Code of Professional Responsibility.
However, as we have held in the case of Tanhueco v. De
Dumo (172 SCRA 760 [1989]):
. . . When it is shown that a contract for a
contingent fee was obtained by undue influence
exercised by the attorney upon his client or by
any fraud or imposition, or that the
compensation is clearly excessive, the Court
must and will protect the aggrieved party.
(Ulanday v. Manila Railroad Co., 45 Phil. 540
[1923]; Grey v. Insular Lumber Co., 97 Phil.
833 [1955]).
In the case at bar, the respondent lawyer caused the annotation
of his attorney's fees lien in the main action for partition docketed
as Civil Case No. Q-12254 on the basis of a Contract for
Professional Services dated August 30, 1979. We find reversible
error in the Court of Appeals' holding that:

2 | BACUDIO [LEGAL COUNSEL CASES]

When the reasonableness of the appellee's lien

as attorney's fees over the properties of his
clients awarded to him by the trial court had not
been questioned by the client, and the said
orders had already become final and executory,
the same could no longer be disturbed, not
even by the court which rendered them (Taada
v. Court of Appeals, 139 SCRA 419). (CA
Decision p. 7; Rollo, p. 36)

e) The probability of losing other employment

as a result of acceptance of the proferred case;
f) The customary charges for similar services
and the schedule of fees of the IBP Chapter to
which he belongs;
g) The amount involved in the controversy and
the benefits resulting to the client from the
service;

On the contrary, we rule that the questioned Orders dated

September 19, 1979 and October 21, 1985 cannot become final
as they pertain to a contract for a contingent fee which is always
subject to the supervision of the Court with regard to its
reasonableness as unequivocally provided in Section 13 of the
Canons of Professional Ethics which reads:

h) The contingency or certainty of

compensation;
i) The character of the employment, whether
occasional or established; and

13. Contingent Fees.

j) The professional standing of the lawyer.
A contract for a contingent fee, where
sanctioned by law, should be reasonable under
all the circumstances of the case including the
risk and uncertainty of the compensation, but
should alwaysbe subject to the supervision of a
court, as to its reasonableness. (Emphasis
supplied).
There is no dispute in the instant case that the attorney's fees
claimed by the respondent lawyer are in the nature of a
contingent fee. There is nothing irregular about the execution of a
written contract for professional services even after the
termination of a case as long as it is based on a previous
agreement on contingent fees by the parties concerned and as
long as the said contract does not contain stipulations which are
contrary to law, good morals, good customs, public policy or
public order.
Although the Contract for Professional Services dated August 30,
1979 was apparently voluntarily signed by the late Aurelio
Licudan for himself and on behalf of his daughter, petitioner
Cristina Licudan-Campos and by the petitioner Wilfredo Licudan
who both manifested in open court that they gave their free and
willing consent to the said contract we cannot allow the said
contract to stand as the law between the parties involved
considering that the rule that in the presence of a contract for
professional services duly executed by the parties thereto, the
same becomes the law between the said parties is not absolute
but admits an exceptionthat the stipulations therein are not
contrary to law, good morals, good customs, public policy or
public order (see Philippine American Life Insurance Company v.
Pineda, 175 SCRA 416 [1989]; Syjuco v. Court of Appeals, 172
SCRA 111 [1989]).
Under Canon 20 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a
lawyer shall charge only fair and reasonable fees. In determining
whether or not the lawyer fees are fair and reasonable, Rule 2001 of the same Code enumerates the factors to be considered in
resolving the said issue. They are as follows:
a) The time spent and the extent of the services
rendered or required;
b) The novelty and difficulty of the questions
involved;

A similar provision is contained under Section 24, Rule 138 of the

Revised Rules of Court which partly states that:
Sec. 24. Compensation of attorneys; agreement
as to fees. An attorney shall be entitled to
have and recover from his client no more than a
reasonable compensation for his services, with
a view to the importance of the subject matter
of the controversy, the extent of the services
rendered, and the professional standing of the
attorney. . . . A written contract for services
shall control the amount to be paid therefor
unless found by the court to be unconscionable
or unreasonable.
All that the respondent lawyer handled for his deceased sister and
brother-in-law was a simple case of partition which necessitated
no special skill nor any unusual effort in its preparation. The
subsequent case for redemption was admittedly but an offshot of
the partition case. Considering the close blood and affinal
relationship between the respondent lawyer and his clients, there
is no doubt that Atty. Domalanta took advantage of the situation
to promote his own personal interests instead of protecting the
legal interests of his clients. A careful perusal of the provisions of
the contract for professional services in question readily shows
that what the petitioners won was a pyrrhic victory on account of
the fact that despite the successful turnout of the partition case,
they are now practically left with nothing of the whole subject lot
won in the litigation. This is because aside from the 121.5 square
meters awarded to Atty. Domalanta as attorney's fees, the said
contract for professional services provides that the remaining
portion shall pertain to the respondent lawyer's son by way of
usufruct for ten (10) years. There should never be an instance
where a lawyer gets as attorney's fees the entire property
involved in the litigation. It is unconscionable for the victor in
litigation to lose everything he won to the fees of his own lawyer.
The respondent lawyer's argument that it is not he but his son
Teodoro M. Domalanta, Jr. who is claiming the usufructuary right
over the remaining portion of the subject lot is inaccurate. The
records show that the matter of usufruct is tied up with this case
since the basis for the said usufructuary right is the contract for
professional services the reasonableness of which is being
questioned in this petition. We find the ten-year usufruct over the
subject lot part and parcel of the attorney's fees being claimed by
the respondent lawyer.

c) The importance of the subject matter;

d) The skill demanded;

In resolving the issue of reasonableness of the attorney's fees, we

uphold the time-honoured legal maxim that a lawyer shall at all
times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession so
that his basic ideal becomes one of rendering service and
securing justice, not money-making. For the worst scenario that

3 | BACUDIO [LEGAL COUNSEL CASES]

can ever happen to a client is to lose the litigated property to his

lawyer in whom an trust and confidence were bestowed at the
very inception of the legal controversy. We find the Contract for
Professional Services dated August 30, 1979, unconscionable and
unreasonable. The amount of P20,000.00 as attorney's fees, in
lieu of the 121.5 square meters awarded to the respondent
lawyer and the ten-year usufructuary right over the remaining
portion of 150 square meters by the respondent lawyer's son, is,
in the opinion of this Court, commensurate to the services
rendered by Atty. Domalanta.
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is
GRANTED. The Court of Appeals' decision of September 12, 1989
is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Atty. Domalanta is awarded
reasonable attorney's fees in the amount of P20,000.00.
SO ORDERED.

4 | BACUDIO [LEGAL COUNSEL CASES]

G.R. No. L-24288

May 28, 1968

LEONOR MANUEL CASTILLO UDAN, petitioner,

vs.
THE HON. MUNICIPAL JUDGE QUIRICO C. AMON, ETC., and
BEATRIZ CASTANEDA, respondents.
Peralta and Cardenas for petitioner.
Amado T. Evangelista for respondents.
ZALDIVAR, J.:
A petition for certiorari to annul the order of respondent Judge
issued on August 27, 1964 denying petitioner's motion for
postponement of the hearing of Cadastral Case No. 12, LRC
Cadastral Record No. 377 (Lots Nos. 9102 and 9103) of the Court
of First Instance of Zambales, as well as his subsequent orders
denying petitioner's motions for reconsideration.

After the case was remanded to the Court of First Instance of

Zambales, the district Judge, pursuant to Section 88 of Republic
Act 296, issued Administrative Order No. 1 designating
respondent Municipal Judge Quirico C. Amon of San Narciso,
Zambales, to try the case. Thereupon, respondent Judge set the
case for hearing on August 27, 1964, and notice of said hearing
was received by petitioner's counsel on August 12, 1964.
On the day of the scheduled hearing, petitioner personally
submitted to respondent Judge her counsel's motion (dated
August 26, 1964) to postpone the hearing to the following day,
based on the ground that he had to appear before the Court of
First Instance of Olongapo, Zambales in the hearing of Civil Case
No. 1684 and Cad. Case No. 14. This motion was forthwith denied
by respondent Judge in his order issued on the same day, as
follows:
The Court noted that there is a motion for postponement
attached to the record of the case, which motion was
only received today. This fact was made known to Atty.
Evangelista, counsel for claimant Beatriz Castaeda, and
he manifested likewise that he only received a copy of
the said motion at 9:00 a.m., today. Atty. Evangelista
argued against the said motion for postponement
contending, among others, that the said motion is not in
conformity with the provisions of Rule 26, Rules of Court,
in that the required three days notice was not complied
with; that counsel for movant, (Atty. Dolojan) should not
have presumed that his motion will be granted; and, that
if said counsel, Atty. Gregorio Dolojan, wanted to
postpone this case, he should have taken steps toward
this end since it appears that he received notice since
August 12, 1964, in order to spare the claimants
unnecessary delay and expenses in coming all the way
from Manila to this Court.

The factual background of this petition is as follows: At the

hearing of Cadastral Case No. 12 (LRC Cad. Rec. No. 377) of the
Court of First Instance of Zambales on June 12, 1956, only
respondent Beatriz Castaeda appeared, and so the court entered
an order of general default, and said respondent was allowed to
present evidence in support of her claim of possession and
ownership over two parcels of lands known as Lots Nos. 9102 and
9103.
On the following day, June 13, 1956, Tomas Manuel, grandfather
of petitioner Leonor Manuel Castillo Udan, who was then a minor,
filed in behalf of said petitioner an answer (opposition) claiming
ownership and possession of the two lots. Thereafter, said Tomas
Manuel, again in behalf of petitioner, filed a motion to set aside
the hearing and/or order of default alleging that respondent
Castaeda misrepresented that the two lots were in her
possession although she fully knew that the lots were in the
possession of petitioner and had been in the possession of her
predecessor-in-interest since 1936, publicly, continuously, and
peacefully; and that respondent was fully aware that those lots
were sold by Maria Fontillas to Visitacion Aglibot, who in turn sold
them to petitioner's mother, because in the morning of June 12,
1956, the day of the hearing, respondent Castaeda was with
Tomas Manuel in the office of petitioner's counsel and was shown
the deed of sale of said lots in favor of petitioner's mother. Acting
on the motion of Tomas Manuel, the trial court issued an order,
dated September 28, 1956, lifting the order of default an
admitting the answer of petitioner.
Thereafter, respondent Castaeda filed motions to set the case for
hearing, but the record does not show that the case was ever
heard. On December 10, 1956, said respondent filed a motion to
dismiss the opposition or answer of petitioner, which motion was
granted by the trial court in its order of October 15, 1957, and
thereupon the two lots were adjudicated to respondent.
Contending that the lower court erred in entering the
aforementioned order adjudicating the lots in question to
respondent Castaeda without giving petitioner an opportunity to
be heard or present her evidence, petitioner brought an appeal to
this Court, which was docketed as G.R. No. L-18372. On
November 29, 1962, this Court rendered a decision, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
On the whole, we believe that the interests of justice will
be subserved if this case is remanded to the courta
quo for further proceedings, giving appellant Castillo the
opportunity to present her evidence of alleged ownership
of the lots in question.1

Considering that this case has been pending for already

a long time, and finding that the vigorous opposition of
counsel for claimant Beatriz Castaeda to be well taken
and meritorious and for an overriding consideration that
any lawyer has no reason to assume that this Court
would grant his motion for postponement (Montelibano,
et al. vs. Benares, G.R. No. L-10824) the Court is
constrained to deny the motion for postponement.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the previous order of this
court adjudicating the property in question in favor of
the claimant Beatriz Castaeda stands undisturbed.
On September 1, 1964, petitioner filed her motion for
reconsideration, but the same was denied for lack of merit. On
October 24, 1964, petitioner filed her second motion for
reconsideration, and this was again denied by respondent Judge
in his order of December 4, 1964 for being pro forma and for
non-compliance with the rules. When her third motion for
reconsideration was also denied by respondent Judge, petitioner
filed, on March 11, 1965, the instant petition for certiorari before
this Court, imputing abuse of discretion on the part of respondent
Judge in denying her motion for postponement and her
subsequent motions for reconsideration.
The issue before this Court now is whether, or not, respondent
Judge had abused his discretion in issuing his order of August 27,
1964 denying petitioner's motion for postponement of the hearing
and forthwith reviving the previous order of the court adjudicating
the property in question in favor of respondent Beatriz
Castaeda, and in denying later the subsequent motions for
reconsideration that were filed by petitioner.
Motions for postponement are addressed to the sound discretion
of the courts. That discretion must be exercised wisely,
considering the peculiar circumstances obtaining in each case and

5 | BACUDIO [LEGAL COUNSEL CASES]

with a view to doing substantial justice.2 In the case at bar, it is

not denied that on the day of the hearing petitioner herself
submitted to the court her counsel's motion for postponement of
the hearing because the counsel had to attend to other trials in
the Court of First Instance at Olongapo, Zambales on the same
day. The fact that counsel for petitioner requested that the
hearing be postponed even to the following day shows that his
purpose was not to delay the proceedings. The record shows that
that was the first time that the case was set for hearing after it
was remanded from the Supreme Court, and that was also the
first time that petitioner asked for postponement. Considering
that the case was remanded by the Supreme Court precisely for
the purpose of giving the petitioner the opportunity to present her
evidence, We believe that respondent Judge should have granted
the motion.
In the case of Crisologo, et al. v. Duran, L-19885, July 31, 1965,
one of the plaintiffs therein, at the scheduled hearing on June 28,
1961, delivered to the court personally the telegram of their
counsel asking for postponement of the trial. The court denied the
motion and upon appeal this Court set aside the order of denial,
and held:
There seems to be no question that motions for
continuance are addressed to the sound discretion of the
court. However, it has been repeatedly held that the said
discretion must be exercised wisely (Capital Subdiv. v.
Prov. of Neg. Occ., L-6204, July 31, 1956). It is evident
from the records, that appellants were not neglectful of
their duties and obligations towards the court. One of the
plaintiffs (Eufrasia Capiao) was present during the
hearing of June 28, 1961, and she was the one who
presented the telegram of their counsel to the court. A
delay in the adjudication of a case occasioned by a
reasonably justified continuance of the hearing, to afford
a party (here the plaintiffs) the opportunity to present
his evidence would not materially prejudice the
defendant. On the contrary, one more postponement in
the instant case, would be in consonance with fair play
and justice (Ty v. Fil. Cia. de Seguros, et al., L-15928-33,
Sept. 3, 1960). In a case of recent vintage, We have
made the following pronouncements:
Viewed from the strictly legal perspective, it appears that
the petition was presented outside the reglementary
period of sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment.
Nevertheless, due to the very peculiar circumstances
obtaining in the premises, We consider that the rule was
substantially complied with and the petition for relief
from judgment was seasonably filed. The rules should
receive liberal interpretation in order to promote their
object and to assist the parties in obtaining a just,
speedy and inexpensive determination of every action.
Procedural technicality, should not be made a bar to the
vindication of a legitimate grievance. When such
technicality "deserts from being an aid to justice", the
Courts are justified in excepting from its operation a
particular case.... (PHHC v. Tiongco, et al., L-18891, Nov.
28, 1964.)

would be served thereby. In the case at bar, this

consideration seems to have been incompletely
observed.
In the first place, the motion for postponement under
consideration was the very first filed by the counsel for
the appellant. Its ground was not unreasonable and
hardly flimsy since it is not denied that then, the counsel
for the appellant was under some contractual
commitments from which he needed time to be released.
Under these circumstances, it does seem that the denial
of the motion prevented rather than serve the ends of
justice.1vvphi1.nt
This Court has held that in incidents of this nature before the trial
court two circumstances should be taken into consideration,
namely, (1) the reasonableness of the postponement and (2) the
merits of the case of the movant.3
While the filing of the motion for postponement in the instant
case may not be timely because it was done only on the day of
the hearing, the circumstance, however, was that counsel for
petitioner had a trial commitment in another court. As We have
adverted to, the motion for postponement could not have been
intended for delay as counsel for petitioner asked that the hearing
be postponed to the next day.
The record shows that on the day of the hearing, on August 27,
1964, the petitioner was in possession of the two lots in
question.4 Possession is an attribute of ownership. This Court in
remanding this case to the court below, as ordered in the decision
in G.R. No. L-18372, November 29, 1962, was precisely
impressed by the merit of the claim of ownership of petitioner.
We are of the considered view that under the circumstances
obtaining in this case in the court below respondent Judge gravely
abused his discretion when he issued the order of August 27,
1964 denying petitioner's motion to postpone the hearing of this
case to the day following the date set for the hearing and reviving
the previous order of the court adjudicating the property in
question to respondent Beatriz Castaeda without giving
petitioner a chance to present evidence in support of her claim of
ownership over the said property. Likewise, respondent Judge
gravely abused his discretion when he denied the three motions
for reconsideration of the order of August 27, 1964 filed by
petitioner.
At this juncture We consider it meet to quote what this Court said
in the case of McEntee v. Manotok, supra, as follows:
At this stage of the proceedings we must remind judges
and counsel that the rules of procedure are not to be
applied in a very rigid, technical sense; rules of
procedure are used only to help secure substantial
justice. (Rule 1, Sec. 2). If a technical and rigid
enforcement of the rules is made, their aim would be
defeated. In the case at bar, it appears that the rules
which are merely secondary in importance are made to
override the ends of justice; the technical rules had been
misapplied to the prejudice of the substantial right of a
party.

In the case of Aurora Camara Vda. de Zubiri v. Zubiri, et al., L16745, December 17, 1966, this Court said:
Although the allowance or denial of petitions for
postponement and the setting aside of previous duly
issued orders rest principally upon the sound discretion
of the magistrate to whom they are addressed (Tell v.
Tell, 48 Phil. 70; Macke v. Camps, 5 Phil. 185; Salva v.
Palacio, et al., G.R. No. L-4247, January 30, 1952), the
exercise of this power, however, ought to be prudent and
just. It should always be predicated on the consideration
that more than the convenience of the courts or of the
parties of the case, the ends of justice and fairness

WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari prayed for is granted. The

orders of respondent Judge in Cadastral Case No. 12, LRC Cad.
Record No. 377 (Lots Nos. 9102 and 9103), of the Court of First
Instance of Zambales, dated August 27, 1964, September 26,
1964, December 4, 1964, and February 3, 1965, respectively, are
set aside. Respondent Judge is ordered to reopen the proceedings
in the cadastral case herein-mentioned and receive the evidence
that petitioner Leonor Manuel Castillo Udan will present in support
of her claim of ownership over Lots Nos. 9102 and 9103, and

6 | BACUDIO [LEGAL COUNSEL CASES]

decide the case accordingly. Costs against respondent Beatriz

Castaeda. It is so ordered.

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