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Administration & Society
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Alternative Politics and the Transformation of SocietyMilitary

Relations: The Israeli Experience
Yagil Levy and Shlomo Mizrahi
Administration & Society 2008; 40; 25 originally published online Jan 4,
2008;
DOI: 10.1177/0095399707311649
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Alternative Politics and

the Transformation of
SocietyMilitary Relations

Volume 40 Number 1
March 2008 25-53
2008 Sage Publications
10.1177/0095399707311649
http://aas.sagepub.com
hosted at
http://online.sagepub.com
The Israeli Experience

Yagil Levy
Shlomo Mizrahi
Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Israel
This article attempts to explain transformations in militarysociety relations

using models developed in the context of political participation and social
learning. The authors suggest that patterns of alternative politics might evolve
from the undermining of the republican contract, that is, the exchange
between citizens military sacrifice and the rights and rewards granted to them
by the state. This situation creates growing dissatisfaction among citizens that
may trigger collective action, even among soldiers. Barriers to internal bargaining
within the military generate modes of alternative politics in the militarysociety
realm. Drawing from the case of Israel, the authors illustrate these strategies by
focusing on conscientious objection, gray refusal, reservists rebellions, and
a direct form of civilian monitoring of the army.
Keywords: alternative politics; republican contract; societymilitary relations;
Israel
his article attempts to explain transformations in militarysociety

relations using models developed in the context of political participation
and social learning. Traditionally, analyses of these relations have neglected
the conceptual context of political participation as an analytical tool to tackle
militarysociety relations. A large body of literature has focused on how
military service triggers political participation by empowering the groups
serving in the military to convert their military participation into political
participation (see, e.g., Krebs, 2006; Porter, 1994; Tilly, 1997; Vasquez, 2005).
Authors Note: We would like to thank the editor and the referees for their helpful comments.
Both authors contributed equally to this study. Please address correspondence to Shlomo Mizrahi,
Department of Public Policy and Administration, School of Management, Ben-Gurion
University of the Negev, Beer-Sheva 84105, Israel; e-mail: shlomom@bgu.ac.il.
25
26
Other studies have focused on how relations between the military and social
groups staffing its ranks reflect the power relations in the broader society,
with the patterns of collective action that those relations entail. Modes of
bargaining between the military and the groups are patterned by external
power relations and significantly affect the policies of recruitment (for different perspectives, see Enloe, 1980; Kier, 1995).
Nevertheless, scholars have refrained from combining these avenues of
research and utilizing the theoretical concepts of collective action. Combined
analysis will go beyond the previously established argument that military
service stimulates external state-groups bargaining and, at the same time,
stimulates internal bargaining between the military command and the social
groups staffing the ranks. Going one step further, it is argued in this article that
barriers to internal bargaining within the military that cannot be externalized
to the sphere of state-groups bargaining due to external barriers generate
modes of alternative politics.
The core argument in the general framework can be summarized as follows. Alternative politics is the result of the undermining of what is termed
the republican contract, that is, the exchange between the willingness of
citizens to sacrifice their lives and wealth by bearing the costs of war and the
preparations for it in return for civil, social, and political rights as well as
other rewards granted to them by the state. This situation creates growing
dissatisfaction among citizens with respect to their relations with the army and
their obligations to it. From their perspective, the investment is relatively
greater than their return. We suggest that in such situations, citizens first try to
improve their outcomes through conventional channels of influence by utilizing a wide range of strategies of collective action and bargaininginternal and
external alikewith the states civil institutions as well as with the army.
These strategies are aimed primarily at decreasing their burden or increasing
their return. However, when citizens feel that these avenues have been exhausted
and that they are effectively blocked both externally and internally, they are
likely to turn to other strategies of alternative politics that combine exit and
voice in a way that pressures the government through semilegal or illegal
activities.
The framework elaborated in this article attempts to identify the conditions for the evolution of such a strategy, which we term quasi-exit behavior
or alternative politics. The significant components in this framework are
the political culture and the processes of collective learning. The nature of
the political culture strongly influences the choices people make between
various strategies, and the processes of collective learning explain how values,
behavior, and strategies spread from one area of life to another. We suggest
Levy, Mizrahi / Alternative Politics
27
that such a framework can basically be applied to any society. We then

apply the framework to the case of Israel.
In the Israeli version of the republican contract, the middle class, comprising mostly secular Ashkenazi Jews (Jews of European descent), has historically
been successful in exchanging its military burden for social dominance.
However, in the wake of the 1973 Yom Kippur War and the ensuing erosion
of the armys status, which dovetailed with the materialization and globalization of Israeli society, many members of this middle class began to feel
a sense that the republican contract had not been working for them and
hence were gradually distancing from the military. The military used its
power to block channels of influence, so disgruntled Israelis adopted a
quasi-exit strategy, an approach that has been internalized in Israeli political
culture and ultimately spread to all areas of life through a process of collective
learning.
Specifically, we illustrate how strategies such as conscientious objection,
gray refusal, reservists rebellion, and the activities of groups such as Machsom
Watch (machsom being the Hebrew word for checkpoint) evolved as a part
of the general trend toward alternative politics that spread to many areas of
life in Israeli society.
Methodologically, we use the two-step approach for case studies as
partly designed by Yin (1993). First, we define a conceptual framework to
explain the evolvement of alternative politics from the republican contract.
Then, we illustrate a set of theoretical dynamics through a single case.
Single cases are most often used to confirm or challenge a theory, or to represent a unique or extreme case. Israel helps to analyze a case study of a
democratic republic with an army whose members are conscripted through
a universal draft. Given that alternative politics is a reactive strategy to a
centralized, blocked environment, and that democracies are generally more
tolerant of alternative politics than authoritarian regimes are, the Israeli
case would seem to be an appropriate case study. As such, the article offers
a study of a typical, standard example of a wider category to which the findings can be generalized. Within the context of a single case study, multiple
sources of evidence backed by illustrations from other societies support the
trustworthiness of the conclusions.
The article proceeds as follows. The next section presents the theoretical
framework, which connects the republican contract to alternative politics.
Then we present the Israeli case and the transformation of societymilitary
relations toward and through alternative politics. We conclude the analysis
by presenting the main insights of the research and the possible application
to other cases.
28
The Republican Contract and the

Evolution of Alternative Politics
In this section, we explain the development of societymilitary relations
as the evolution of a republican contract and then show how it is modified
in modern societies. The second part of the section suggests a framework
for analyzing the response of citizens to such processes and the impact of
these strategies on the states military policy.
The Republican Contract

Protection is the main service the state provides its citizens. Nevertheless,
protection is not supplied for free but in exchange for military participation,
which takes the shape of military service and taxation for military funding.
The state is inclined to demand an excessive price for its services as a means
of retaining surplus value in the form of increased internal control, whereas
citizens prefer purchasing protection at the lowest price (Lake, 1992).
Accordingly, two main strategies are at the states disposal. First, the state
can artificially increase demand for its protection services by exaggerating
the foreign threats from which it allegedly needs to protect society (Lake,
1992; Tilly, 1992). Second, and especially whenever the first strategy has
proven ineffective, the state will reward its citizens for their military sacrifice,
both as soldiers and taxpayers. Modes of bargaining indeed typified the
formation of the modern military. Consequently, the republican contract
has been formed.
Historically, the nation-state was founded on the republican order that
established a reciprocal relationship between the state and its citizens,
according to which citizens were willing to sacrifice their lives and wealth by
bearing the costs of war and the preparations for it in return for civil, social,
and political rights granted to them by the state. Seeing military sacrifice as
the supreme civic obligation fits neatly with the republican tradition that
ascribed great value to active participation in democratic politics in order to
promote the common good (Oldfield, 1990). This exchange of sacrifice for
rewards laid the foundation for Western democratization and the creation of
the welfare state. By definition, therefore, modern military service fulfilled a
historical role in defining the boundaries of citizenship by equating it with
bearing arms. It is against this background that the army became a historical
mechanism of mobility for social groups (Burk, 1995; Tilly, 1997).
At the same time, the citizen-soldier embodied the republican model of
the transfer of sovereignty from the ruler to the community of citizens that
29
staffed and politically controlled the military. The interweaving of democratization with mass conscription generated networks of interpersonal
commitment in which compliance with the draft rested on the citizens faith
in the trustworthiness and legitimacy of the democratic government (Levy,
1997). Relations of trust are especially critical inasmuch as the dispensing
of weaponry to the civilian population as citizen-soldiers might jeopardize
the principles of Hobbesian contractualism. Loss of trust might cause
uncontrolled use of the weapons (see Dolman, 1995).
Based on an exchange of social resources for military sacrifice, the republican
order was a veiled arrangement between the state and leading groups of its
citizens. This arrangement did not require ongoing bargaining, in particular
because it was universal in nature, at least at the declarative and formal level,
in that it posited a uniform set of criteria for military service based on universal,
not attributive, principles for recruitment and promotion. Accordingly, this
arrangement assured a high level of obligatory citizenship, that is, internalizing the states authority while also internalizing the reciprocal relations
established by the state with its citizens (Giddens, 1985). Consequently,
Western nations enjoyed a high degree of autonomy in maintaining mass
armies and waging wars, an autonomy that in turn enhanced the states
internal control.
This pattern of exchange is modified when the gains made in the military
are socially devalued relative to the level of sacrifice. Several sets of conditions
may bring this situation about. First, leading groups may come to believe
that the security provided by the state is too materially or morally expensive
and as such is disproportional to the purported threats. For example, as the
cold war drew to a close, the value of defense was pushed to the bottom of
the scale of social priorities in European countries (Inglehart, 1977, p. 49).
Sentiments of this kind reflect the states failure to artificially increase the
demand for its protection services by amplifying external threats (in Lakes
[1992] terms).
Second, and similarly, the states failure to provide protection, evident in
a military defeat or blunder, exemplifies another form of asymmetric burden
(see, e.g., the case of Argentina; Zagorski, 1994).
Third, leading groups may (implicitly or explicitly) claim breach of
contract, especially following the erosion of the republican criterion for the
distribution of social goods and the justification for social dominance
with military sacrifice at the center. Erosion of this sort was experienced by
upper-middle-class groups in the United States and Western Europe from
the 1950s onwards. Whereas the equation of soldiering with citizenship traditionally generated social mobility, as soon as groups attained a status of
30
their own that was no longer conditional on military sacrifice, they lost
much of their interest in serving in the army (Burk, 1995), especially when
social benefits remained stable or even declined asymmetrically relative to
the heavy military burden. Moreover, military sacrifice became increasingly
incongruent with ever more widespread postmaterialist values and trends
toward globalization in Western societies, and the concomitant ascendancy
of the market society, highlighting market-based individualistic values over
national ones. Hence, the legitimation system was being reconstituted.
More so than others, upper-middle-class groups internalized the cultural
change that the diminished military threat brought about by the waning of
the cold war wrought and became increasingly disinclined to serve in the
military.
Claims voiced by social groups to modify the republican contract are,
therefore, originated in the groups subjective perception that asymmetrical
structure of rewards versus sacrifice is formed, and hence there is a room
for negotiation over the terms of the contract. Under the above conditions,
sensitivity to the asymmetric equation between sacrifice and rewards is
more likely to emerge. Availability of resources and changes in the opportunities for collective action will lead to action (see Tilly, 1978). Different
strategies may then be employed as a means to reconstitute the republican
contract by either decreasing the burden or increasing the return. In the next
subsection, we explain these strategies in the context of Hirschmans (1970)
framework regarding exit, voice, and loyalty.
Citizen Dissatisfaction and the Evolution

of Alternative Politics
The question we address in this article refers to the strategies adopted by
citizens and interest groups in response to the changing nature of the relations
between them and the army. More specifically, we examine the circumstances that may lead them to adopt a do-it-yourself approach and decide
on their own how they will treat the obligations imposed on them by the army
and the state.
As explained earlier, the starting point is the undermining of the republican contract, which creates growing dissatisfaction among citizens regarding
their relations with the army. As Hirschman (1970) indicated, dissatisfied
citizens may respond in two basic waysvoice and exit.
The choice between these alternatives depends heavily on the availability
of a good alternative outside the organizational framework. Good alternatives
increase the likelihood that citizens will react strongly to any dissatisfaction.
31
Those who belong to the lower socioeconomic stratum of society usually

have fewer alternatives, so their responses are likely to be more conservative
in nature. As we will see, limited alternatives breed passivity, that is, loyalty
or neglect (Lyons & Lowery, 1986).
The voice option is clearly the most straightforward and widespread in
democratic societies, yet there are many situations in which citizens respond
with a certain type of exit. The issue of exit has long been discussed in the
literature. It is now customary to assume that in addition to the ultimate exit
strategy of physically leaving the society by emigration, there are other
modes of exit behavior in which citizens engage while remaining in the society
in which they live. Examples of such behavior include passive acceptance
of the situation combined with social alienation, that is, neglect (LehmanWilzig, 1991; Lyons & Lowery, 1986; Rosbult & Lowery, 1985). Besides
neglect, which includes an indifference to social issues, there are alternative
modes of behavior that correspond to the concept of quasi-exit behavior.
Lehman-Wilzig (1991) suggests that there may be a strategy between
exit and voice that was missed by Hirschman in his seminal work. Such a
strategy, which he terms alternative politics or quasi-exit, includes bypassing
the traditional system of governmental services and establishing alternative
social and economic networks to offer what the official political system
cannot, or will not, provide. Lehman-Wilzig identifies two preconditions for
the evolution of such a strategy. First, on the governmental level, a necessary
condition for the emergence of alternative politics is the inability or unwillingness of the authorities to provide the services demanded by the public,
either due to economic crisis and increasing deficits (e.g., Sweden, United
States, France, and Great Britain toward the late 1970s and early 1980s) or
due to government failure and inefficiencies. Second, a countrys population
needs a fairly high level of education to know how to set up, coordinate,
supervise, and maintain alternative systems as well as enough economic
resources to finance such a system. Given these two conditions, alternative
politics will materialize when the political system is largely unresponsive
to the wishes and demands of its citizens.
In this article, we suggest that the concepts of quasi-exit behavior and
alternative politics may apply not only to an alternative method for providing
services but also to alternative modes of consuming public services. In the
context of protection as a public service provided by the state, a quasi-exit
behavior would mean recognizing the high costs associated with it, understanding how it is produced, and becoming familiar with possible alternatives
to this method of production. Those who serve as soldiers and pay taxes to
finance the services that provide this protection are the most likely to utilize
this quasi-exit behavior (Lake, 1992).
32
Indeed, there are cases where citizens cannot or do not want to exit or
protest (voice)generally because they believe that conventional democratic
influence channels are blocked. There may be various reasons for the evolution of such a belief, that is, the decline of traditional power groups such as
trade unions (Pierson, 1995), a direct governmental policy of weakening the
opposition (Tarrow, 1994), structural factors such as strong centralization that
significantly weaken the voice option (Pierson, 1995), and economic crises
that significantly reduce the governments ability to respond positively to
citizens demands (Lehman-Wilzig, 1991). The degree to which influence
channels are open can be measured by citizens views regarding what Tarrow
terms the political opportunity structure. The following are the specific
aspects of political systems that affect the structuring of collective action and
protest activity: (a) the relative openness or closure of the institutionalized
political system; (b) the stability of that broad set of elite alignments that
typically undergird a polity; (c) the presence of elite allies; and (d) the states
capacity and propensity for repression (Tarrow, 1994).
However, this process also entails a mechanism through which citizens
gradually internalize the structural conditions and the available strategies.
In a recent paper, Mantzavinos, North, and Shariq (2004) adopt an approach
that views human learning as a continuous process in which the individual
is constantly engaged in learning ways to solve problemseither existing
ones or new ones. Solutions to given problems are formed using a mental
model, that is, a coherent but transitory set of rules that enables people to make
predictions about the environment based on available knowledge. A belief
is formed when environmental feedback confirms the same mental model
so many times that it becomes stabilized. A belief system is defined as the
interconnection of beliefs (Mantzavinos, 2001; Mantzavinos et al., 2004).
We suggest that when citizens believe that a given political opportunity
structure does not allow conventional democratic channels of influence to
materialize, they look for alternative ways to improve policy outcomes and
political performance. In the terms outlined by Mantzavinos et al. (2004),
people attempt to find new ways to solve social problems, which after a
process of collective learning may also lead to the transformation of the
belief system. In our context, citizens attempt to find new ways to solve the
problem of the violation of the republican contract. It follows that individuals learn existing or new ways to solve problems through direct interaction
with the environment. Therefore, norms, values, and ideas transmitted to the
individual through cultural and educational mechanisms play a significant
role in the learning process and the creation of mental models.
This learning mechanism implies that citizens are strongly influenced by
structural factors and the political culture of a given society when forming
33
their strategies. They do not necessarily apply cost-benefit calculations to

choosing the best alternative but rather examine the alternatives via cultural
filters (adaptive rationality, as termed by Johnston, 1995). Historical choices,
analogies, metaphors, and precedents are invoked to guide their choice.
Thus, cultural filters simplify reality, restrict the range of possible decisions,
determine what is taken for granted and what may be debated, and create a
repertoire of scripts that the army is comfortable shaping.
When strong centralization motivates the belief that influence channels
are blocked and that the strategies of exit and voice are not available, citizens are pushed toward quasi-exit strategies. The exact type of strategies is
influenced by the nature of the political culture, that is, the level of plurality in the society and the legitimacy that social values give to each strategy,
and by the extent to which the republican contract is undermined. Furthermore,
because quasi-exit strategies are usually the result of weak and inefficient
government, the government tends to respond positively rather than suppress
these initiatives although these strategies counter the governments monopoly
and authority. When this pattern happens repeatedly, citizens are further
encouraged to utilize quasi-exit strategies.
Empirical evidence shows that in situations similar to those characterized
above, people often adopt a do-it-yourself approach, which can also be understood as a quasi-exit strategy. Helmke and Levitsky (2004) point to a set of
informal norms (blat) that have emerged in the Soviet Unionset up by individuals and personal networks to provide basic needsthat created incentives
to behave in ways that alter the substantive effect of formal rules without directly
violating them. They also characterize substitutive informal institutionssuch
as alternative methods of providing public goods in rural northern Peru and in
rural Chinaas attempts at achieving what formal institutions were designed,
but fail, to achieve. Such informal institutions emerge where state structures
are weak or lack authority.
Applying this general setting to militarysociety relations, the reconstitution of the republican contract may ultimately lead to any one of the strategies
discussed above. The exit strategy is avoiding military service through bargaining power, particularly by middle-class groups, even within the terms
of compulsory service. Such a strategy was employed by middle-class
groups in the United States after World War II. The second strategy is voice,
taking the form of protest groups, organized by former soldiers and others,
which draw support from those who have asymmetrically shouldered the
military burden.
A combined exit/voice strategy is one in which groups condition their
military participation and bargain over those conditions with the state or the
34
military. Most common are forms of monetary bargaining over the terms of
military service, which gradually form what Moskos (1977) called the transition from institution to occupation. This is the shift from obligation to
contractualism in the citizens relations vis--vis the state. At this stage, the
pattern of exchange, which has been previously internalized as an unquestionable civilian pattern, is converted into an exchange that takes the form
of open and even direct bargaining. Both strategies, and the combination of
them, are employed as a means of reducing the military burden (e.g., draft
evasion) or increasing the return (e.g., improving military benefits). It was
this pattern of bargaining that gradually led most Western states to bring an
end to the draft and move toward a voluntary, professional army. Indeed,
efforts to impose the burdens of military service have often been resisted in
many ways at the personal level; we, however, refer to more organized or group
patterns that show themselves when the basic sacrificereward symmetry is
under question.
However, when groups feel that these strategies have been exhausted or
that they are effectively blocked both externally and internally, they are likely
to turn to strategies of alternative politics that combine exit and voice in the
form of semilegal or illegal activities, that is, a quasi-exit strategy. As we later
illustrate, forms of conscientious objection best exemplify this pattern.
The Evolution of Alternative Politics in the

SocietyMilitary DomainThe Israeli Experience
In this section, we explain the background of the evolution of alternative
politics in Israel as a central mode of political participation and an alternative
method of providing public services. We then focus on the unique implications of this development on the relations between society and the army.
Alternative Politics in Israel

Israeli society and political culture were shaped under the British mandate in Palestine from 1917-1948. As explained elsewhere (Mizrahi &
Meydani, 2003), the Jewish community in Palestine under the British mandate had a relatively large measure of autonomy in managing its own affairs
in most fields of life (Arian, 1997; Horowitz & Lissak, 1978; 1989; Migdal,
2001; Shprinzak, 1986). The Jewish leadership, elected via a relatively
independent political system, created its own organizations, separate from
those of both the British authorities and the Arab community, to accelerate
35
economic development, provide public services such as health, education,

and welfare, and develop an infrastructure such as electricity, roads, water
supply, and building construction. Thus, the idea that the Jewish community
should not trust others and had to create its own institutions and organizations gradually became a building block of the Zionist ethos. At the same
time, facing significant threats from the Arab population and a British ban
on widespread Jewish immigration, as well as the aspiration to expand
Jewish settlement in Palestine, the Jewish leadership gradually built illegal
paramilitary forces that had three main goals: fighting the Arab paramilitary
forces, organizing illegal Jewish immigration, and establishing and defending
illegal settlements. These channels of activity were not only alternative but
also illegal as far as British mandatory law was concerned. The political
culture passed down to generations of Israelis included the idea that acting
via unilateral initiatives that might skirt the letter of the law, and sometimes
even operate outside formal regulatory structures, is not only permitted but
actually serves national goals. To a large extent, this became the modus
operandi of Israeli society (Lehman-Wilzig, 1992; Migdal, 2001; Shprinzak,
1986).
Due to a high level of centralization, the Jewish, and later the Israeli, institutional setting enabled politicians to repress similar initiatives directed
toward the Jewish, or Israeli, system itself (Aharoni, 1998; Horowitz &
Lissak, 1989; Shprinzak, 1986). Yet, as explained elsewhere, in the 1970s and
1980s the central systems consistently failed to respond to the demand for
public services (Ben-Porat & Mizrahi, 2005; Mizrahi & Meydani, 2003).
Faced with a situation that they interpreted as blocked influence channels,
significant groups in Israeli society turned back to a problem-solving
approach they knew wellunilateral initiatives and alternative politics.
Specifically, during the 1980s and 1990s, many groups and individuals in
Israeli society employed noninstitutionalized initiatives to create alternatives,
often illegal or semilegal, to governmental services. The 1980s were characterized by a significant growth in the black-market economyparticularly
the illegal trade in foreign currency (Bruno, 1993), gray-market medicine
the semilegal, private supply of health services using public facilities
(Chernichovsky, 1991), gray-market educationthe employment of privately paid teachers and the evolution of independent private schools (Yogev,
1999), and pirate cable televisionall of which were alternatives to inadequate
governmental services (Lehman-Wilzig, 1992). These processes intensified
during the 1990s, when unilateral initiatives and alternative politics were
expanded to other policy areas such as internal security (Zinger, 2004),
social welfare (Gidron, Bar, & Katz, 2003), and even the policy toward the
36
ArabIsraeli conflict (Ben-Porat & Mizrahi, 2005). Indeed, during the 1990s
it became clear that for the most part, only initiatives of this kind could help
people access the services they needed (Mizrahi & Meydani, 2003).
Furthermore, the Israeli government responded positively to these initiatives by changing its policies in the direction demanded by the groups. In
this process, the legislative and the executive branches of government were
weakened, whereas the supreme court, which enjoyed public legitimacy
and trust, gained considerable strength (Barzilai, 1999; Mizrahi & Meydani,
2003).
The prevalence of alternative politics in Israeli society and the learning
processes the society has undergone also encouraged the evolution of quasiexit strategies and alternative politics in the area of societymilitary relations
when the republican contract was violated.
The Israeli Republican Contract and Its Modification

Jewish Israeli society has assimilated the republican principle of the
citizen-soldier as a core value deeply ingrained through compulsory service
for all Jewish men and women in the IDF (Israel Defense Forces). Ashkenazi
secular middle-class Jews formed the core of this service as the group that
founded the army, staffed its upper echelons, and was identified with its
achievements. Due to the republican ethos that defined Israeli societys
devotion to the military effort as a supreme social value, military service
became a decisive standard by which rights were awarded to individuals
and groups that were portrayed as acting in the service of the state (Shafir
& Peled, 2002). Male Ashkenazi warriors identified with the glorification
of the military and succeeded in translating their dominance in the military
into what was regarded as legitimate social dominance, through which they
were granted preferential social status relative to the groups that were relegated to peripheral status in the military, primarily immigrants from
Muslim countries (Mizrachim). IsraeliPalestinian citizens were completely
excluded from military service, a situation that reinforced their low social
status in Israeli society. Ashkenazi groups also preferentially enjoyed the
other material fruits of war, such as the availability of a cheap Palestinian
labor force and Palestinian property and the growth of the militaryindustrial
complex, all of which served as engines of economic growth. As long as it
advanced its social status, the secular Ashkenazi group supported the militaristic ideology (see Ben-Eliezer, 1998) because the trade-off of sacrificing
for the army brought with it many social rewards (Levy, 2003). Conceptually,
the Israeli version of the republican contract embodies a broader form of
37
exchange. Military sacrifice was traded not just for formal rights but also
for social dominance.
Under these conditions, with the dominant group benefiting from the state
of war, government agencies were greatly empowered to internalize their
vision of the external political world as a threatening one while often ignoring dovish signals that the Arab world transmitted to Israel. In turn, this
power led to an increase in the states relative autonomy in implementing
policies that might otherwise have been debated politically (Levy, 1997).
The essential premises underpinning the contract were changed since the
1973 Yom Kippur War. Several factors were at work in a manner that created
an asymmetric system of sacrifice versus rewards: The weakness demonstrated by the army in the Yom Kippur War that was amplified in the failures
in the First Lebanon War (1982-1985) and in the first Intifada (1987-1993)
contributed to the erosion of its prestige and thus denied the Ashkenazis much
of their symbolic power as omnipotent warriors. Furthermore, unlike previous wars, which had led to an expansion of the Israeli economy, the Yom
Kippur War brought financial crisis, thus reducing the material rewards the
Ashkenazi secular middle class received for bearing the burden of war.
Furthermore, the real cost of the security product actually increased. The
need to rehabilitate the army after the Yom Kippur War added to the publics
fiscal burden by increasing external and internal government debts and elevated the investment in security to the peak of about 30% of the GDP in
1974-1976 from around 20% during the former period. Similarly, the burden
of military service was made even more onerous because the human
resources of both the regular and reserve soldiers were utilized more frequently and more heavily (Barnett, 1992, p. 185-209).
In addition, the motivation to make such sacrifices had also declined due
to the growing materialist, consumerist ethos among the middle class. This
ethos was itself a consequence of the economic fruits of the 1967 Six-Day
War together with the rise of economic globalization, which gradually took
hold of Israeli society and transformed it into a market society. The ethos
of the market economy eroded the armys role in defining the social hierarchy. The value of ones contribution to the state through military service
was no longer necessarily the criterion that would determine the distribution of social goods and justify the social domination of a particular group.
Instead, individual achievement replaced the test of statism (see Ram,
2005). Yet, this cultural change could alter the equation of sacrifice versus
rewards only in part had the level of other variablesthe level of burden
and the military prestigeremained solid. Furthermore, the profile of
social reward was even farther eroded as groups that did not serve in the
38
army, or who made a lesser contributionsuch as the ultra-Orthodox Jews,

Palestinian citizens of Israel, and womenwere now able to collect some
achievements not based on the test of military service but rather based on
their own political power, wrapped in the liberal discourse of citizenship.
Nothing was more symbolic of this change than the decisions made by
Yitzhak Rabins government (in the early 1990s) to drop the requirement
for military service as a basic condition for employment in the public sector and to extend the payment of child benefits to everyone, regardless of
their service in the military (see Aronoff, 1999, p. 44). Whereas the
Ashkenazis retained their social dominance, it came at a higher price, while
in a market society their social status relied less and less on their military
sacrifice. In short, the state was demanding a higher payment for reduced
returns, thereby creating conditions to reconstitute the terms of the republican contract.
A reduction in the legitimacy of sacrifice among the Ashkenazis was the
result. As a dominant group that had exhausted its ability to reap more significant benefits from military service, Ashkenazis focused on the other
side of the equation, namely, reducing the military burden or increasing the
immediate return for military service. A drop in the motivation was therefore the first reaction and was evident in several patterns: a slow and continual decline in the general willingness to enlist, particularly in combat
units; fewer volunteers for officers training; a rise in the number of potential recruits purposely trying to alter their medical profilewhich determines the soldiers qualification to perform his or her dutiesin order to
avoid combat duty; a rise in the number of enlistees requesting to serve at
a base close to their home; and a significant increase in the number of
youngsters dropping out before and during their service on the grounds of
apparent mental illness (for various aspects of this issue, see Mayseless,
1993; Nevo & Shor, 2002, pp. 9-35).
Peripheral and religious groups that had previously been relegated to
peripheral status in the armys ranks came to fill the vacuum created by the
secular Ashkenazi middle classs partial abandonment of combat units. For
these groups, the traditional foundations of the republican contract still bore
significance relative to other, less accessible social avenues that rendered
obsolete for more privileged groups, the groups that created new sources of
social capital. The peripheral and religious groups saw the IDF as a pathway for legitimately attaining social and political rights and privileges. In
addition, they could also advance their nationalist goals and portray themselves as the new, true patriots. It was especially so as the IDF still retained
much of its social value (see below). Yet, these groups expectations drew
39
upon their historical image of the military, although their integration within
which did not necessarily prove effective as a real corridor for social mobility. Indeed, ultra-Orthodox groups, who had been disappointed by their
inability to gain recognition or attain a worthy status in the army, leveraged their political empowerment to set up alternative tracks of mobility.
Differentiated statuses meant differentiated modes of political action.
Indications of this social change in the military makeup can be found in
the social composition of the militarys casualties in combat in the Occupied
Territories during the al-Aqsa Intifada (2000-2005). A drop was observed
in the proportion of Ashkenazi casualties from about 48% in the first week
of the First Lebanon War (1982) to about 28% in the al-Aqsa Intifada, a
considerably larger decline than the relative decrease in this stratums general demographic weight (Levy, 2006). It is worth noting that in keeping
with the myth that portrays the peoples army as being above ethno-class
divisions in Israeli society, no official statistics are available regarding the
representation of different groups. Therefore, the demographic composition
of the army must be inferred from other indications, such as the demographic
analysis of the social origins of casualties in war.
In terms of voice, Ashkenazi groups led protests and peace movements
that eroded the states internal autonomy in executing military policies (see
Helman, 1999). Pure exit patterns typified a segment of the middle-class,
secular Ashkenazi Jews who left the country following the 1973 Yom
Kippur War (Shavit, Cohen, Stier, & Bolotin, 1999). Exit/voice strategies
were utilized in various ways to legally evade military service or at least to
avoid combat roles through patterns of internal bargaining (Levy, LomskyFeder, & Harel, 2007).
More significant, however, was the quasi-exit strategy in the sense that
influence channels did not entirely open, although the Yom Kippur War created a political opportunity structure utilized by several groups to voice their
grievances against the state. Politicalcultural institutionalized barriers remained
in force at several levels. First, the republican political culture is a two-edged
sword: It offers a template for political rhetoric that equates military service
with rights and thus serves minority groups as much as dominant groups
(Krebs, 2006). At the same time, the republican rhetoric also sets up cultural
barriers to collective action, whose standard-bearers are inclined to use communitarian discourse and employ national symbols (Lainer-Vos, 2006). In
Israel, although military service had lost much of its social value for the
Ashkenazi upper-middle class, republican rhetoric was still in force. For the
dominant groups, although the market ethoses gradually legitimized their social
status, the republican rhetoric was still utilized as a means of blocking the
40
upward mobility of mainly ultra-Orthodox groups and nonmobile Mizrachim

by presenting them as free-riders evading military service. Furthermore,
as later indications revealed, the low levels of social legitimacy for making
military sacrifices did not correspond to the high levels of political legitimacy for using force on which the republican discourse relied and which
empowered the IDF (see Arian, Atmor, & Hadar, 2007). Hence, the remnants
of the republican discourse discouraged most of the groups from a total exit
in the form of evading mandatory military service en masse. Groups, particularly those with ideologically loaded values, were then constrained to
embark on a road of quasi-exit, believing this was the most effective way to
claim their rights within the framework of the still powerful, albeit declining, republican discourse. Second, despite the criticism and the erosion in
its social status, the IDF remained a central institution that enjoyed the
highest rates of public confidence (Vigoda-Gadot & Mizrahi, 2005, p. 17).
Third, the military has been portrayed as an organization that is relatively
shielded from effective political monitoring. Images conjured up by the
phrase, when the al-Aqsa Intifada broke out, that the IDF instigated a
silent putsch (Shelah, 2003, pp. 63-82) filtered down into the public discourse and deterred from direct confrontation with the IDF. In sum, one
may see indications for politicalcultural change but not a total and immediate breakdown of the military symbols. Military sacrifice retained only
part of its rhetorical powernot enough as social and symbolic capital for
the dominant groups but enough to be used as an attempt to block others
and even the Ashkenazis themselves from total exit. In other words,
although the IDF lost much of its social power, it retained much of its political power that could work as a blocking mechanism to conventional forms
of collective action.
We should emphasize that the strong presence of alternative politics in
Israeli society also triggered learning processes in the militarysociety
arena, meaning that the nature of the political culture can help explain
trends such as those outlined below. The Ashkenazi groups did not explicitly contend that the republican contract had been broken. However, it is
safe to assume that had the IDF and the wars from 1973 onward produced
the sort of prestige and economic growth that were in evidence before 1973
in exchange for a reduced military burden, the sense that the contract had
been undermined would not have emerged.
Alternative explanations have been offered, other than the concept of the
modified contract, to explain the decline in the motivation to serve or the emergence of protest politics. These explanations have largely drawn on the decline
of the republican discourse in the wake of globalization and liberalization (see
41
mainly Ram, 2005; Shafir & Peled, 2002). This article does not attempt to
affirm or refute this explanation but to go one step beyond by offering two
advantages: first, it integrates these explanations within broader social-cultural
processes that give weight to other factors, such as the level of military
burden, to enlighten the dynamics of the republican contract. Second,
although others explained the attitudinal and cultural changes toward individualization, plurality, and decentralization, they refrained from explaining
what would lead citizens to adopt the semilegal or illegal strategies of alternative politics to solve social problems. This article links the drop in motivation of the leading group with the more structural traits of the political
system that inhibited specific patterns of collective action.
Quasi-Exit Strategies of Alternative Politics

This section outlines some forms of alternative politics that have been
expressed in militarysociety relations and that embody quasi-exit strategies.
1. Conscientious Objection
The IDF is more than simply a conscripted military. Israelis have long
viewed the IDF as the peoples army, a crucial institution both for the
defense of the state and the self-image of the nation. According to the myth
surrounding the military, conscription applies to almost everyone in Israeli
Jewish societymen and women, native-born citizens and new immigrants
alike. Furthermore, the IDF cultivated its image as a universal, demilitarized military that stands above the sectarian divisions of society. Under
these conditions, politicalcultural barriers have always repressed any sense
of challenging the totality of military service and even blocked the potential for bargaining over the political terms of military service.
Such barriers notwithstanding, Yesh Gvul (Hebrew for there is a limit,
which is a play on words because the Hebrew word gvul also means border), the first Israeli conscientious objection movement, emerged during
the Lebanon War (1982) initiated by Israel and was composed mainly of
secular Ashkenazi reservists. It was a response to what the group perceived
as the unprecedented war of choice that contrasted sharply with previous
wars, which had been perceived as wars of no choice that were forced
upon Israel. Culturally constrained by the republican repertoire, Yesh Gvul
members were not pacifists but rather called for the right to selectively
refuse to serve (Lainer-Vos, 2006, pp. 286-287). In other words, the group
wanted to bargain with the military over the political terms of military
42
service, a demand that far exceeded the tolerance limits of the military
command, which put many of the refusniks, that is, those who formally
declared their refusal to serve in Lebanon, in jail.
In our terms, Yesh Gvul embarked on a strategy of quasi-exit as long as
the group refrained from a total exit from military service. At the same
time, it utilized a tactic other than simply voicing against the war before or
after service, a pattern that was much more common.
Alternative politics of this sort thrived under the conditions in which the
conventional channels of influence were seemingly blocked. Just as formal
bargaining with the military went beyond the established format of military
reservists relations, so too did changes in political activism come about
with the recognition that political channels were unresponsive to the public.
Two phenomena merit attention in this regard. First, Peace Now, the leading
peace and protest movement, which had been constituted on reservists,
sheltered the military from the political debate as conscription policies
were not part of its repertoire. Furthermore, this movement even negated
the option of refusal (Lainer-Vos, 2006, p. 286). Conversely, the European
pacifist movements in the early 1980s (such as in France, Italy, and
Germany) struggled to improve the profile of conscientious objection rather
than focusing on ending conscription itself. The result was a small number
of conscientious objectors and practices of disobedience (Ajangiz, 2002).
In other words, European peace movements made those who objected to the
military believe that they could influence the ruling powers through existing channels, and thus reduced the likelihood of alternative politics.
Second, Yesh Gvul found itself maneuvering between its ideology of
conscience politics and the left-wing parties (mainly the Labor Party as
opposed to the ruling Likud Party). Leftist parties supported the initial
phase of the war and later only vaguely condemned the extended targets of
the war, but strongly condemned Yesh Gvul. Yesh Gvul, however, attempted
to draw its supporters from the very constituency of these parties. Hence,
the slippery approach of yes to military service and no to Lebanon.
Stronger opposition to the war could have balanced refusal-oriented sentiments by opening established channels for political protest.
A similar scenario repeated itself time and time again when the first
Intifada broke out in 1987with Yesh Gvul at the forefrontand when the
Al-Aqsa Intifada generated the renewal of Israeli occupation of the West Bank
(2002). This time, however, Yesh Gvul was joined by Courage to Refuse, a
movement that selectively refused to serve in the Occupied Territories in what
its members perceived as a battle aimed at expanding Jewish settlements at the
expense of oppressing the local Palestinian population and working against
43
Israels security interests. Courage to Refuse distinguished itself from Yesh

Gvul by positioning itself at the heart of the Zionist-left camp (Dloomy,
2005, p. 713). Within this framework of illegal political action, more than
280 members of Courage to Refuse have, in fact, been court-martialed and
jailed for periods of up to 35 days (see Courage to Refuse, http://www
.seruv.org.il/english/default.asp).
Again, with high rates of public support for the governments military
policies, which have been portrayed as a battle against Palestinian terror,
the moderate left wing had effectively been swept away and the opportunities for institutionalized collective action aimed at curbing military policies
were limited. Hence, the movement adopted a quasi-exit strategy.
Unlike previous displays of disobedience, the refusal of groups such as
Courage to Refuse and other groups consisting of high-ranking officers,
pilots, and members of elite units to serve in the Occupied Territories were
considered more effective. Subsequently, Dov Weisglass, a senior advisor to
Prime Minister Sharon, testified that this widening phenomenon was among
the factors that brought about Sharons reversal of policy from warfare to the
Disengagement Plan of 2005 (Shavit, 2004). Thus, as explained in the conceptual framework, alternative politics have proven themselves effective.
2. Gray Refusal
Whereas explicit refusal may demand a high personal cost, gray refusal is
far more widespread, and hence more painful, from the IDFs perspective.
In this case, soldiers express their discomfort with sensitive missions that
might involve attacks against civilians, negotiate with their commanders,
and have themselves removed from the assignment. This negotiation is
conducted quietly, often without the knowledge of senior commanders. Although
explicit refusal affects the symbolic power of the military, as it increases its
permeability to politics, gray refusal might affect the militarys operational
capabilities if this informal phenomenon becomes widespread and thus
reduces the number of fully operational combatants.
The gray form exemplifies a quasi-exit strategy more than the standard refusal. The former utilizes voice, as soldier-citizens loudly protest
against military policies, concurrently with exit. Alternatively, the gray
refuseniks achieve their goal of having a clean conscience without voice,
and thus without paying any significant cost. Exit is partially in evidence
because the individual keeps his place in the military unit while at the same
time essentially selecting his missions, that is, partly exiting from the ordinary
framework. This strategy is a type of maneuvering between two blocked
44
channels: explicit refusal, which is not tolerated by the military and therefore
penalized, and the perceived futile institutional collective action aimed at
moderating military policies. Indeed, middle-class groups, formerly the backbone of the peace coalition, reacted to the Al-Aqsa Intifada with a passivity
mixed with the delegitimization of the institutionalized peace organizations.
Furthermore, military service in Israel is not only a legal obligation
imbued with symbolic meaning. It also creates a community that is experienced by its members as overlapping with society (Helman, 1997). Within
this structure, the military unit as a cohesive group plays a key role in disciplining its members and mitigating imported political values that may be
in dissonance with military policy. Exit, under these conditions, is costly in
social terms, hence the elegance of gray refusal. And hence, the amplified
weight of the voice raised by the standard refuseniks, who could have opted
for the silent, gray form of protest. Against this backdrop, it is not difficult
to understand why the IDF command, concerned about the growth of this
phenomenon during the al-Aqsa Intifada, managed to control the threat by
avoiding massive and direct confrontation with it, in part by tolerating gray
refusal. In this manner, the IDF portrayed the gray refuseniks as a small
group of extremists who did not challenge the consensual peoples army
(Dloomy, 2005, p. 708).
It is little wonder that gray refusal has come to be used particularly in
the IDF. Other conscripted militaries in democracies allow conscientious
refusal by offering alternative tracks to military service, such as the civilian
service in Germany. Although gray refusal is significant in the Russian
armed forces, it is not as much the result of widespread antimilitarism as it
is a result of the violations of the human rights of the conscripts (Speck,
2005). On the other hand, volunteer forces by their very nature generally
screen out those whose ideology does not fit with military service.
During the first Intifada (1987-1993), the assumption that the number of
refuseniks, particularly the gray ones, might grow with the intensification of
the IDFs suppressive actions played a role in moderating military policies
(see Lehman-Wilzig, 1992, p. 143). During the al-Aqsa Intifada, it was estimated
that there were 10 gray refuseniks for every soldier who officially refused
to serve (Dloomy, 2005, p. 706). It also became known that gray refusal was
widespread in the air force with the mounting protest against air attacks
against the civilian population (see ynet, http://www.ynet.co.il/articles/
0,7340,L-2767679,00.html [Hebrew]).
We may infer from Dov Weisglasss testimony that the protest of the
pilots had a tremendous impact on Sharons political moves.
Likewise, gray refusal was expressed in the 2005 Disengagement Plan,
with the evacuation of Jewish settlements it entailed. Religious soldiers, for
45
whom the IDFs role in the dismantling of settlements caused a crisis of

faith, refrained from explicit refusal (only several dozen refused to take part
in the mission), in large part due to informal agreements that removed them
from the mission. Here, it was not the classic form of gray refusal but a
new form through which units with a high representation of religious soldiers were distanced from the mission in order to avert an ideological
dilemma (Cohen, 2007, p. 109). Though the mission was carried out effectively, the IDF was forced to moderate its professional values and change
its deployment to reflect the political priorities of its soldiers.
3. Reservists Rebellion
In 1999, reserve pilots staged what was effectively a revolt when they
refused to fly until complete insurance coverage was provided for pilots who
were injured during service and for their families (Levy, 2003, pp. 253-255).
In 2001, this revolt widened and included some commanders of reserve battalions. Although an arrangement was reached, there is no doubt that a
reservists refusal to carry out a mission constitutes a violation of military
discipline and, as such, is illegal.
Yet, reservists, in this case middle-class young people with organizational
skills and access to political networks, opted for this form of alternative
politics over other, more institutionalized forms. To a large extent, this quasiexit form of action embodied the crisis of confidence between the reservists
and the IDF senior command that had begun in the mid-1990s.
Traditionally, the IDF drew its strength from the reserve units, which form
the bulk of the armed forces, under a law stipulating that Israeli (Jewish)
males must perform reserve duty until their late 40s. The emerging contradiction we observed between the materialization of the middle class and
lengthy reserve service was also reflected in a gradual reduction in the reserve
duty, beginning in the mid-1980s, primarily for economic reasons. This tendency reduced the equal distribution of burden to a point where only a minority were shouldering the main burden of reserve service. Reaching its peak
during the mid-1990s, this trend not only eroded the reservists motivation but
also encouraged unprecedented organizing by reservists.
This conjunction of a motivation crisis with new models of collective
action only helped expose, and at the same time encourage, new forms of
bargaining between reservists and the military command. Avoidance of military
service, shortening the period of service due to apparent health problems,
difficulties in imposing discipline, and the gray forms of disobedience
described above were among the types of bargaining. At the same time,
46
reservists increased their criticism by claiming unequal distribution of the

burden among and within units, unfair treatment of reservists, and exploitation of reservists as cheap labor in unnecessary administrative tasks.
The foundations have therefore been laid for illegal action by those who
believe the formal channels are, for all practical purposes, blocked. Very
often the reservists activists express themselves in the rhetoric of frustration,
passivity, and failure in a number of venues, the most prominent of which
is the Hapashim (Hebrew for simple soldiers) Forum (http://ipaper.co.il/
cgi-bin/v.cgi). Even the option of forming ad hoc coalitions with politicians
to promote reservists interests was seriously exhausted only in the 2000s.
It is against this backdrop that the rebellions mentioned above took place.
The rebellion of soldiers in a conscript military and their refusal to fight
is not a new phenomenon. As the case of Vietnam indicates, the draft system, which blocked alternative routes to rebellions, together with the lack
of awareness of the antiwar movements about the actual state of fighting,
spurred the emergence of GI underground newspapers (see Lewes, 2003).
In Israel, the remains of the notion that Israel is a nation fighting for its very
survival still constrain other forms of rebellion.
In the long term, however, the new forms of protest propelled the IDF
and the government to reform the reserve service. Advocates of the reform
claimed adamantly that refraining from taking strong measures might lead
to the collapse of the reserve system (Lubin, 2001), or at least warned the
government about the crisis this system faced (Heiman et al., 2004).
Consequently, in 2005 the government adopted a reform plan that would
reduce the load on army reserve soldiers by reducing the age to which they
had to serve to 40, deploying reserves in emergencies only, shortening the
annual period of service, and releasing thousands of soldiers from the
service (Braverman Committee, 2005). Again, alternative politics proved
more effective in bargaining than the established methods.
4. Machsom WatchA Unique Model of Civilian Monitoring

Machsom Watch (Checkpoint Watch) is a civil rights movement consisting exclusively of women. It was founded in 2001, inspired by reports
of human rights abuses of Palestinians at the many checkpoints the IDF had
set up throughout the West Bank allegedly to perform security checks on
the Palestinian population. Machsom Watch monitored the behavior of soldiers and police at the checkpoints through which Palestinians enter Israel
to ensure that their human and civil rights were protected, and reported the
results of their observations. Their primary modus operandum was to stand
47
at each of the main checkpoints observing how Palestinian civilians were

treated by the soldiers. Perceived patterns of abuse and humiliation were
documented and reported, and very often activists intervened with the soldiers on site or even helped Palestinians in their interactions with the IDF.
Four hundred Jewish women, most of whom are middle-class, professional
women, were active in the volunteer organization during the mid-2000s
(see http://www.machsomwatch.org/eng/aboutUsEng&lang=eng).
Seen from the perspective of the changing republican contract, the very
entry of the organization into the military scene largely resulted from the partial exit of many male, middle-class, secular Ashkenazis from combat roles,
the consequence of the undermined contract. Had the secular Ashkenazi exit
not occurred, the more dovish Ashkenazi group might have increased its
presence at the checkpoints and hence improved its ability to inform the high
command from within of any wrongdoings by soldiers and even to rally
public opinion through its social networks, as it had often done in the past. In
other words, the exit of the male group triggered the entrance of the female
group, whose social background was for the most part identical.
Symbolically, as Machsom Watch activists state on their Web site, their
quiet but assertive presence at checkpoints is a direct challenge to the
dominant militaristic discourse that prevails in Israeli society. Indeed,
women watchers have often clashed with their watched men.
Conceptually, Machsom Watch offers a unique model of civilian monitoring of the military. As an alternative to the customary model of monitoring by
which civilian groups raise issues and approach the political arena through
the media, interests groups, and politicians, Machsom Watch has taken an
active part in the monitoring process. Military practices are directly observed.
To a large extent, the very presence of women with access to the IDFs
senior command and to the media helped restrain the soldiers conduct. Simply
said, Machsom Watch performed direct, unmediated monitoring over one
of the most sensitive areas of military operation. It is no wonder that the
women, naturally estranged from male-made militarism, were accused of
disrupting the work of the soldiers at the checkpoints, work whose goal was
to curb terrorism (Stannard, 2005).
Machsom Watch embodies the quasi-exit form of alternative politics.
Pure exit would mean a withdrawal from public politics, as typified by the
Israeli middle class, especially in regard to civilian supervision of the
armed forces (Levy, 2006). On the other hand, the organization did not
restrict itself only to voice, as it did not simply protest against military practices in the West Bank. It is safe to assume that it is precisely the same
mood of apathy that brings many members of the upper-middle class to exit
48
the public sphere that directed Machsom Watch away from futile voicing in
favor of this quasi-exit, albeit absolutely legal, mode of action.
Beyond the direct mode of monitoring, by documenting the soldiers behavior, the organizations efforts have proved instrumental in attracting media
attention and challenging the overall concept of checkpoints. Consequently, the
army has displayed more sensitivity, improved its monitoring mechanisms,
and increased its supervision to counter civilian criticism more effectively.
Three main steps are worth noting.
First, the IDF increased the level of communication by placing an
Arabic-speaking officer or noncommissioned officer at every checkpoint
(Israels Prime Ministers Office, 2002). Second, in 2002 the IDF established the Volunteers Unit, composed of mature, veteran reservists, who
joined the young, conscripted soldiers to help them operate the checkpoints
more sensitively (Buchbut, 2006). Third, in 2005 the Israeli government
initiated the civilianization of the crossing points between Israel and the
West Bank to deliberately reduce friction between Palestinian citizens and
Israeli soldiers at the checkpoints (Ben, 2005).
In short, this pattern of alternative politics has proven instrumental not
only in tightening civilian control over the military at a level that exceeds
the direct monitoring of Machsom Watch but also brought about a slight
change in the policies themselves. Though the checkpoints remained in
force, their management has been improved.
Conclusion
In this article, we combined several analytical tools to study alternative
politics in societymilitary relations. Research can benefit from the mlange
of approaches that combine military sociologywhich examines the links
between internal patterns of bargaining within the military and external
patterns of collective action in the broader societytogether with the conceptual
tools of alternative politics that have stemmed from Hirschmans (1970) writing.
We maintained that barriers to internal bargaining within the militarythose
that cannot be externalized to the sphere of state-groups bargaining due to
external barriersgenerate modes of alternative politics.
Treating Israel as a case study for exploring these concepts, this article
illustrated how the dissatisfaction of actors in the military engenders patterns of alternative politics provided the actors realize that they cannot
overcome fundamental problems by utilizing conventional channels of
influence because of structural obstacles inherent in those channels. Such a
49
realization is part of a learning process, which in itself is motivated by

structural and cultural factors. The article discussed the major processes
that led to the formation of a political culture characterized by unilateral
initiatives, often illegal, quasi-exit behaviors, and alternative politics.
Alternative politics, in the form of quasi-exit strategies, exemplify the balance between exit and voice and the combination of both strategies.
Applying this general setting to militarysociety relations, changes in the
foundations of the republican contract may lead to any one of the strategies
discussed above. When strong centralization causes the public to believe
that channels of influence are blocked and ineffective and the strategies of exit
and voice are not available, citizens are pushed toward quasi-exit strategies.
The exact type of these strategies is influenced by the nature of the political
culture, that is, the level of plurality in the society, the legitimacy that social
values confer on each strategy, and the extent to which the republican contract is undermined. Generalizing from the Israeli case, we may expect, for
example, that a decrease in the economic values of the contract will lead
individuals to perform quasi-exit strategies that will compensate for this
decrease, whereas a decrease in political rights or values will motivate
quasi-exit strategies that will compensate for this loss, as long as in both
cases politicalcultural barriers obstruct exit or make voice futile.
When soldiers who have ideological objections to their missions cannot
enter into a dialog about their grievances within the military, and at the
same time feel their grievances are not sufficiently addressed by civilian
politicians, they adopt conscientious objection. For them, this approach
strikes a balance between defection and gray refusal without voice or voicing their protest upon their release from military service. A similar dilemma
is resolved in another way by the gray refuseniks, who, to avoid the personal cost, opt for a selective exit rather than voice with explicit refusal.
Likewise, reservists who feel they are being discriminated against relative
to their peers who do not serve and feel ignored by civilian politicians but
still feel obliged to honor their military commitments may embark on an
alternative politics strategy that takes the form of a revolt. Finally, the activists
of Machsom Watch believe that neither reliance on internal military networks
of information or bargainingdue to the exit of more moderate social groups
from combat rolesnor the reliance on institutional, voice-produced
modes of civilian supervision of the IDF will bring about the restraint of
aggressive behavior at the checkpoints. Hence, their unique model of civilian
monitoring. In each case, had internal or external channels of influence
been opened, the groups would have probably acted otherwise or been less
effective in garnering support.
50
Theoretically, this argument illustrates how the power relations within

the military and power relations in the ambient society coalesce and work
as a web with mutual influences on each other. Having argued for this
mutuality, we went beyond existing approaches that focus solely on the unidirectional path of influence from the society to the military or vice versa.
Even though we used Israel as a case study, we believe that the article offers
a broader conceptual framework because it deals with patterns that exist in
other societies, not just in Israel. Gray refusal in the Israeli context may
have some unique features but also typifies other militaries, for example,
the above-mentioned Russian army. Conscientious objection, rebellious
groups bargaining internally within the military, and active and innovative
strategies by civil rights movements vis--vis the military are evident in
other militaries as well. In particular, drafted militaries may stimulate similar
patterns as the very constraints of this recruitment model lay the foundations
for alternative politics. In each case, our analysis traced the origins of these
quasi-exit patterns to what we conceptualized as barriers to internal bargaining within the military that coalesced with external barriers.
Alternative politics thus contribute both to the study of politicsby
identifying the role of the military in stimulating collective actionand to
the study of militarysociety relationsby borrowing the advanced exitvoice terms of Hirschman.
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Yagil Levy teaches in the Department of Public Policy and Administration and the Division of
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include the theoretical aspects of societymilitary relations and the linkage between Israels
war/peace policies and the social structure of the military. He is the author of Trial and Error:
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Other Army of IsraelMaterialist Militarism in Israel (Yediot Achronot Books, 2003, in
Hebrew); From Peoples Army to Army of the Peripheries (Carmel Publications, 2007, in
Hebrew); Israels Materialist Militarism (Rowman & Littlefield-Lexington Books, 2007); and
co-author of Israel Since 1980 (Cambridge University Press, forthcoming in 2008, with Guy
Ben-Porat et al).
Shlomo Mizrahi is a senior lecturer and chair of the Department of Public Policy and
Administration at Ben-Gurion University of the Negev. His research interests include public
policy, public sector performance, public choice and game theory, collective action, bargaining and conflict resolution. His recent publications include Political Participation via the
Judicial System: Exit, Voice and Quasi-Exit in Israeli Society, Israel Studies (co-authored
with Assaf Meydani, 2003); The Political Economy of Water Policy in Israel: Theory and
Practice, Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis (2004); Political Culture, Alternative
Politics and Foreign Policy: The Case of Israel, Policy Sciences (co-authored with Guy BenPorat, 2005); and co-author of Israel Since 1980 (Cambridge University Press, forthcoming in
2008, with Guy Ben-Porat et al).

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