Global Financial Development Report

GLOBAL FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT REPORT
Financial Inclusion
Financial
Inclusion
2014
Financial Inclusion
GLOBAL FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2014
Financial Inclusion
2014 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank
1818 H Street NW, Washington DC 20433
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AttributionPlease cite the work as follows: World Bank. 2014. Global Financial Development Report
2014: Financial Inclusion. Washington, DC: World Bank. doi:10.1596/978-0-8213-9985-9. License: Creative Commons Attribution CC BY 3.0
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ISBN (paper): 978-0-8213-9985-9
ISBN (electronic): 978-0-8213-9990-3
ISSN 2304-957X
DOI: 10.1596/978-0-8213-9985-9
The report reflects information available up to September 30, 2013.
Contents
Foreword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi
Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xiii
Abbreviations and Glossary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xvii
Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1 Financial Inclusion: Importance, Key Facts, and Drivers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

2 Financial Inclusion for Individuals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
3 Financial Inclusion for Firms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
Statistical Appendixes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
A Basic Data on Financial System Characteristics, 200911 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
B Key Aspects of Financial Inclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
C Islamic Banking and Financial Inclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
151
152
167
174
Bibliography. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177
vi
CONTENTS
BOXES
O.1
O.2
O.3
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
2.5
2.6
2.7
2.8
3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4
3.5
3.6
3.7
3.8
Main Messages of This Report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3

The Views of Practitioners on Financial Inclusion: The Global Financial Barometer . .4
Navigating This Report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9
What Makes Finance Different? Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection . . . . . . . . . . .17
Overview of Global Data Sources on Financial Inclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .19
The Gender Gap in Use of Financial Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .23
Islamic Finance and Inclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .36
Three Tales of Overborrowing: Bosnia and Herzegovina, India, and the
United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .45
Remittances, Technology, and Financial Inclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .55
Correspondent Banking and Financial Inclusion in Brazil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .59
The Credit Market Consequences of Improved Personal Identification . . . . . . . . . . .62
Insurance: Designing Appropriate Products for Risk Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . .71
Behavior Change through Mass Media: A South Africa Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .86
Case Study: New Financial Disclosure Requirements in Mexico . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .90
Monopoly Rents, Bank Concentration, and Private Credit Reporting . . . . . . . . . . . .97
Exiting the Debt Trap: Can Borrower Bailouts Restore Access to Finance? . . . . . . .99
Financial Inclusion of Informal Firms: Cross-Country Evidence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .108
Returns to Capital in Microenterprises: Evidence from a Field Experiment . . . . . . .110
The Effect of Financial Inclusion on Business Survival, the Labor Market,
and Earnings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .114
Financing SMEs in Africa: Competition, Innovation, and Governments . . . . . . . . .119
Collateral Registries Can Spur the Access of Firms to Finance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .124
Case Study: Factoring in Peru . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .127
Case Study: Angel Investment in the Middle East and North Africa . . . . . . . . . . . .135
Case Study: Nigerias YouWiN! Business Plan Competition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .137
FIGURES
O.1
BO.2.1
O.2
O.3
O.4
O.5
Use of Bank Accounts and Self-Reported Barriers to Use . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2

Views on Effective Financial Inclusion Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5
Correlates of Financial Inclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6
Effect of Collateral Registry Reforms on Access to Finance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7
Fingerprinting and Repayment Rates, Malawi. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .10
Individuals Who Work as Informal Business Owners in Municipalities with and
without Banco Azteca over Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .12
O.6
Effects of Entertainment Education . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .12
1.1
Use of and Access to Financial Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .16
B1.1.1 Financial Exclusion in Market Equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .17
1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
1.7
1.8
1.9
1.10
1.11
1.12
1.13
1.14
B1.4.1
1.15
1.16
2.1
B2.1.1
B2.2.1
B2.3.1
2.2
2.3
B2.4.1
B2.4.2
2.4
2.5
2.6
2.7
B2.5.1
B2.5.2
2.8
2.9
2.10
B2.7.1
B2.8.1
3.1
3.2
B3.1.1
CONTENTS
Trends in Number of Accounts, Commercial Banks, 200411 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .20

Provider-Side and User-Side Data on Financial Inclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .21
Selected Methods of Payment, 2011 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .24
Reasons for Loans Reported by Borrowers, Developing Economies . . . . . . . . . . . . .25
The Use of Accounts and Loans by Firms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .26
Finance Is a Major Constraint among Firms, Especially Small Firms . . . . . . . . . . . . .27
Sources of External Financing for Fixed Assets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .27
Business Constraints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .28
Formal and Informal Firms with Accounts and Loans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .29
Reasons for Not Applying for a Loan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .29
Financial Inclusion vs. Depth, Efficiency, and Stability (Financial Institutions) . . . . .32
Correlates of Financial Inclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .33
Reported Reasons for Not Having a Bank Account . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .34
Islamic Banking, Religiosity, and Access of Firms to Financial Services . . . . . . . . . . .38
Ratio of Cooperatives, State Specialized Financial Institutions, and Microfinance
Institution Branches to Commercial Bank Branches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .39
Correlation between Income Inequality and Inequality in the Use of Financial
Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .42
Mobile Phones per 100 People, by Country Income Group, 19902011 . . . . . . . . . .54
Remittances and Financial Inclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .55
Voyager III: Bradescos Correspondent Bank in the Amazon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .60
Fingerprinting in Malawi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .62
Mobile Phone Penetration and Mobile Payments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .65
Share of Adults with an Account in a Formal Financial Institution . . . . . . . . . . . . . .66
Growth in Livestock and Weather Microinsurance, India . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .71
Payouts Relative to Premiums, Rainfall and Livestock Insurance, India . . . . . . . . . .72
Equity Banks Effect on Financial Inclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .74
Borrowing for Food and Other Essentials, by Level of Education . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .78
Survey Results on Financial Capability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .79
Effects of Secondary-School Financial Education, Brazil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .83
Scandal! Cast . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .86
Effects of Entertainment Education . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .87
Consumer Protection Regulations and Enforcement Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .91
Evolution of Business Conduct, by Financial Market Depth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .93
Credit Information Sharing and Per Capita Income . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .95
Credit Bureaus and Registries Are Less Likely if Banks Are Powerful . . . . . . . . . . . .97
Bailouts and Moral Hazard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .100
Percentage of Micro, Very Small, Small, and Medium Firms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .107
Biggest Obstacles Affecting the Operations of Informal Firms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .107
Use of Finance by Informal Firms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .109
vii
viii
CONTENTS
B3.2.1 Estimated Returns to Capital . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .110

B3.3.1 Individuals Who Work as Informal Business Owners in Municipalities with and
without Banco Azteca over Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .114
3.3
Employment Shares of SMEs vs. Large Firms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .116
3.4
Voluntary vs. Involuntary Exclusion from Loan Applications, SMEs . . . . . . . . . . .117
3.5
Voluntary vs. Involuntary Exclusion from Loan Applications, Large Firms . . . . . . .117
3.6
The Depth of Credit Information. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .118
B3.4.1 Financing Small and Medium Enterprises in Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .119
B3.5.1 Effect of Collateral Registry Reforms on Access to Finance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .124
B3.6.1 Actors and Links in the Financing Scheme, Peru . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .127
3.7
Average Loan Term . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .129
3.8
Financing Patterns by Firm Age . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .133
3.9
The Estimated Effect of Financing Sources on Innovation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .136
B3.8.1 Business Sectors of YouWiN! Winners . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .138
3.10 Number of Countries with Joint Titling of Major Assets for Married Couples . . . .139
3.11 Adults with an Account Used for Business Purposes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .142
MAPS
O.1
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
2.1
A.1
A.2
A.3
A.4
A.5
A.6
A.7
A.8
Adults Using a Bank Account in a Typical Month . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6

Adults with an Account at a Formal Financial Institution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .22
Origination of New Formal Loans. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .25
Access by Firms to Securities Markets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .30
Geography Matters: Example of Subnational Data on Financial Inclusion . . . . . . . .31
Mobile Phones per 100 People, 2011. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .53
DepthFinancial Institutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .159
AccessFinancial Institutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .160
EfficiencyFinancial Institutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .161
StabilityFinancial Institutions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .162
DepthFinancial Markets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .163
AccessFinancial Markets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .164
EfficiencyFinancial Markets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .165
StabilityFinancial Markets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .166
TABLES
BO.2.1
B1.4.1
B1.4.2
B1.4.3
B2.2.1
Selected Results of the 201213 Financial Development Barometer . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4

OIC Member Countries and the Rest of the World . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .36
Islamic Banking, Religiosity, and Household Access to Financial Services . . . . . . . . .37
Islamic Banking, Religiosity, and Firm Access to Financial Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . .37
Correspondent Banking, Brazil, December 2010 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .59
CONTENTS
2.1
2.2
B3.1.1
A.1
A.1.1
A.1.2
A.1.3
A.1.4
A.1.5
Financial Knowledge around the World. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .76

Effects of Financial Literacy Interventions and Monetary Incentives, Indonesia . . . .81
Snapshot of Informal Firms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .108
Countries and Their Financial System Characteristics, Averages, 200911 . . . . . . .152
DepthFinancial Institutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .159
AccessFinancial Institutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .160
EfficiencyFinancial Institutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .161
StabilityFinancial Institutions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .162
DepthFinancial Markets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .163
A.1.6
A.1.7
A.1.8
B.1
C.1
AccessFinancial Markets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .164

EfficiencyFinancial Markets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .165
StabilityFinancial Markets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .166
Countries and Their Level of Financial Inclusion, 2011 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .167
OIC Member Countries, Account Penetration Rates, and Islamic Financial
Institutions, 2011 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .174
ix
Foreword
he second Global Financial Development Report seeks to contribute to the

evolving debate on financial inclusion. It follows the inaugural 2013 Global Financial
Development Report, which re-examined
the states role in finance following the global
financial crisis. Both reports seek to avoid
simplistic views, and instead take a nuanced
approach to financial sector policy based on a
synthesis of new evidence.
Financial inclusion has moved up the
global reform agenda and become a topic of
great interest for policy makers, regulators,
researchers, market practitioners, and other
stakeholders. For the World Bank Group,
financial inclusion represents a core topic,
given its implications for reducing poverty
and boosting shared prosperity.
The increased emphasis on financial inclusion reflects a growing realization of its
potentially transformative power to accelerate
development gains. Inclusive financial systems
provide individuals and firms with greater
access to resources to meet their financial
needs, such as saving for retirement, investing in education, capitalizing on business
opportunities, and confronting shocks. Realworld financial systems are far from inclusive.
Indeed, half of the worlds adult population

lacks a bank account. Many of the worlds
poor would benefit from financial services but
cannot access them due to market failures or
inadequate public policies.
This Global Financial Development
Report contributes new data and research
that helps fill some of the gaps in knowledge
about financial inclusion. It also draws on
existing insights and experience to contribute
to the policy discussion on this critical development issue.
The new evidence demonstrates that financial inclusion can significantly reduce poverty and boost shared prosperity, but underscores that efforts to foster inclusion must be
well designed. For example, creating bank
accounts that end up lying dormant has little
impact, and policies that promote credit for
all at any cost can actually exacerbate financial and economic instability. This years
report offers practical, evidence-based advice
on policies that maximize the welfare benefits
of financial inclusion. It also builds on the
benchmarking of financial institutions and
markets first introduced in the 2013 Global
Financial Development Report. A rich array
of new financial sector data, made publicly
xi
xii
FOREWORD
available through the World Bank Groups

Open Data Agenda, also accompany the new
report.
Following in the footsteps of its predecessor, this years installment of the Global
Financial Development Report represents
one component of a broader initiative to
enhance the stability and inclusiveness of
the global financial system. We hope that it
proves useful to a wide range of stakeholders,
including governments, international financial institutions, nongovernmental organizations, think tanks, academics, private sector
participants, donors, and the wider development community.
Jim Yong Kim
President
The World Bank Group
Acknowledgments
lobal Financial Development Report

2014 reflects the efforts of a broad
and diverse group of experts, both inside and
outside the World Bank Group. The report
has been cosponsored by the World Bank, the
International Finance Corporation (IFC), and
the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency
(MIGA). It reflects inputs from a wide range of
units, including the Development Economics
Vice Presidency, Financial and Private Sector
Development Vice Presidency, all the regional
vice presidencies, the Poverty Reduction and
Economic Management Network, and External and Corporate Relations Publishing and
Knowledge, as well as inputs from staff at the
Consultative Group to Assist the Poor.
Asl Demirg-Kunt was the projects
director. Martin Cihk

led the core team,
which included Miriam Bruhn, Subika Farazi,
Martin Kanz, Maria Soledad Martnez Pera,
Margaret Miller, Amin Mohseni-Cheraghlou,
and Claudia Ruiz Ortega. Other key contributors included Leora Klapper (chapter 1), Dorothe Singer (box 1.3), Christian Eigen-Zucchi
(box 2.1), Gunhild Berg and Michael Fuchs
(box 3.4), Rogelio Marchetti (box 3.6), Sam
Raymond and Oltac Unsal (box 3.7), and
David McKenzie (box 3.8).
Kaushik Basu, Chief Economist and Senior

Vice President, and Mahmoud Mohieldin,
Special Envoy of the World Bank President,
provided overall guidance. The authors
received invaluable advice from members
of the World Banks Financial Development
Council, the Financial and Private Sector
Development Council, and the Financial
Inclusion and Infrastructure Practice.
External advisers included Meghana Ayyagari (Associate Professor of International
Business, George Washington University),
Thorsten Beck (Professor of Economics
and Chairman of the European Banking Center, Tilburg University, Netherlands), Ross
Levine (Willis H. Booth Professor in Banking and Finance, University of Cali fornia
Berkeley), Jonathan Morduch (Professor of
Public Policy and Economics, New York
University Wagner Graduate School of Public
Service, and Managing Director, Financial
Access Initiative), Klaus Schaeck (Professor
of Empirical Banking, Bangor University,
United Kingdom), Robert Townsend (Elizabeth and James Killian Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology),
and Christopher Woodruff (Professor of
Economics, University of Warwick). Aart
xiii
xiv
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Kraay reviewed the draft for consistency and

quality multiple times.
Peer Stein and Bikki Randhawa have been
the key contacts at IFC. Gaiv Tata, Douglas
Pearce, and Massimo Cirasino have been
the interlocutors at the Financial Inclusion
and Infrastructure Practice. Ravi Vish has
been the key contact at MIGA. Detailed
comments on individual chapters have been
received from Ardic Alper, Nina Bilandzic,
Maria Teresa Chimienti, Massimo Cirasino,
Tito Cordella, Quy-Toan Do, Mary Hallward-Driemeier, Oya Pinar, Mohammad Zia
Qureshi, and Sergio Schmukler. The authors
also received valuable suggestions and other
contributions from Daryl Collins, Augusto
de la Torre, Shantayanan Devarajan, Xavier
Faz, Michael Fuchs, Matt Gamser, Xavier
Gin, Jasmina Glisovic, Richard Hinz,
Martin Hommes, Zamir Iqbal, Juan Carlos
Izaguirre, Dean Karlan, Alexia Latortue,
Timothy Lyman, Samuel Maimbo, Kate
McKee, David McKenzie, Ajai Nair, Evariste
Nduwayo, Douglas Pearce, Tomas Prouza,
Alban Pruthi, Steve Rasmussen, Rekha
Reddy, Mehnaz Safavian, Manohar Sharma,
Dorothe Singer, Ghada Teima, Hourn Thy,
Judy Yang, and Bilal Zia. The manuscript
also benefitted from informal conversations
with colleagues at the International Monetary Fund, the Gates Foundation, Banco
Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria (BBVA), the U.K.
Department for International Development,
and the World Economic Forum.
In the World Bankwide review, comments were received from Makhtar Diop,
Yira Mascaro, Xiaofeng Hua, Francesco
Strobbe, Ben Musuku, and Gunhild Berg
(all Africa Region); Sudhir Shetty, Nataliya
Mylenko, and Hormoz Aghdaey (all East
Asia and Pacific Region); Laura Tuck, Ulrich
Bartsch, Megumi Kubota, John Pollner, and
Vahe Vardanyan (all Europe and Central
Asia Region); Hasan Tuluy, Marialisa Motta,
Holger Kray, Jane Hwang, Marisela Montoliu Munoz, P. S. Srinivas, Pierre Olivier Colleye, Rekha Reddy, and Aarre Laakso (all
Latin America and the Caribbean Region);
Shantayanan Devarajan (Middle East and
North Africa Region); Idah Pswarayi-Riddihough, Sujata Lamba, Shamsuddin Ahmad,

Thyra Riley, Aruna Aysha Das, Henry Bagazonzya, Kiran Afzal, and Niraj Verma (all
South Asia Region); Jorge Familiar Calderon, Maria Cristina Uehara, and Sivan Tamir
(all Corporate Secretariat); Cyril Muller
(External and Corporate Relations); Mukesh
Chawla, Robert Palacios, Olav Christensen,
and Jee-Peng Tan (all Human Development
Network); Caroline Heider, Andrew Stone,
Beata Lenard, Jack Glen, Leonardo Alfonso
Bravo, Raghavan Narayanan, and Stoyan
Tenev (all Independent Evaluation Group);
Jaime Saavedra-Chanduvi, Lucia Hanmer,
and Swati Ghosh (all Poverty Reduction and
Economic Management); Vijay Iyer (Sustainable Development Network); and Madelyn
Antoncic (Treasury).
The background work was presented in
14 Global Financial Development Seminars (http://www.worldbank.org/financial
development). The speakers and discussants
included, in addition to the core team, the
following: Abayomi Alawode, Michael
Bennett, Gunhild Berg, Timothy Brennan,
Francisco Campos, Robert Cull, Tatiana
Didier, Vincenzo Di Maro, Xavier Gin,
Mary Hallward-Driemeier, Zamir Iqbal,
Leora Klapper, Cheng Hoon Lim, Rafe
Mazer, David Medine, Martin Meleck,
Bernardo Morais, Florentina Mulaj, Maria
Lourdes Camba Opem, Douglas Pearce,
Valeria Perotti, Mehnaz Safavian, Sergio
Schmukler, Sandeep Singh, Jonathan Spader,
P. S. Srinivas, Wendy Teleki, Niraj Verma,
and Bilal Zia.
The report would not be possible without the production team, including Stephen
McGroarty (editor in chief), Janice Tuten
(project manager), Nora Ridolfi (print
coordinator), and Debra Naylor (graphic
designer). Roula Yazigi assisted the team
with the website. The communications team
included Merrell Tuck, Nicole Frost, Ryan
Douglas Hahn, Vamsee Kanchi, and Jane
Zhang. Excellent administrative assistance
was provided by Hdia Arbi, Zenaida Kranzer, and Tourya Tourougui. Other valuable
assistance was provided by Parabal Singh,

Meaghan Conway and Julia Reichelstein.
Azita Amjadi, Liu Cui, Shelley Lai Fu,
Patricia Katayama, Buyant Erdene Khaltarkhuu, William Prince, Nora Ridolfi, Jomo
Tariku, and Janice Tuten have been helpful
in the preparation of the updated Little Data
Book on Financial Development, accompanying this report.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The authors would also like to thank the

many country officials and other experts who
participated in the surveys underlying this
report, including the Financial Development
Barometer.
Financial support from Knowledge for
Change Programs research support budget
and the IFC is gratefully acknowledged.
xv
Abbreviations and Glossary
GDP
IFC
MFI
SME
gross domestic product

International Finance Corporation
microfinance institution
small and medium enterprises
Note: All dollar amounts are U.S. dollars ($) unless otherwise indicated.
GLOSSARY
Country
A territorial entity for which statistical data are maintained and provided internationally on a separate, independent basis (not necessarily
a state as understood by international law and practice).
Financial
development
Conceptually, financial development is a process of reducing the costs

of acquiring information, enforcing contracts, and making transactions. Empirically, measuring financial development directly is challenging. This report focuses on measuring four characteristics (depth,
access, efficiency, and stability) for financial institutions and markets
(4x2 framework).
Financial inclusion
The share of individuals and firms that use financial services.
Financial services
Services provided to individuals and firms by the financial system.
Financial system
The financial system in a country is defined to include financial institutions (banks, insurance companies, and other nonbank financial
institutions) and financial markets (such as those in stocks, bonds,
and financial derivatives). It also encompasses the financial infrastructure (for example, credit information sharing systems and payments
and settlement systems).
xvii
xviii
A B B R E V I AT I O N S A N D G L O S S A R Y
Formal financial
institution
A commercial bank, insurance company, or any other financial institution that is regulated by the state.
State
The countrys government as well as autonomous or semi-autonomous

agencies such as a central bank or a financial supervision agency.
Unbanked
A person who does not use or does not have access to commercial
banking services.
Overview
inancial inclusiontypically defined as

the proportion of individuals and firms
that use financial serviceshas become a
subject of considerable interest among policy
makers, researchers, and other stakeholders.
In international forums, such as the Group of
Twenty (G-20), financial inclusion has moved
up the reform agenda. At the country level,
about two-thirds of regulatory and supervisory agencies are now charged with enhancing financial inclusion. In recent years, some
50 countries have set formal targets and goals
for financial inclusion.
The heightened interest reflects a better
understanding of the importance of financial inclusion for economic and social development. It indicates a growing recognition
that access to financial services has a critical
role in reducing extreme poverty, boosting
shared prosperity, and supporting inclusive
and sustainable development. The interest also derives from a growing recognition
of the large gaps in financial inclusion. For
example, half of the worlds adult populationmore than 2.5 billion peopledo not
have an account at a formal financial institution (figure O.1). Some of this nonuse demonstrates lack of demand, but barriers such as
cost, travel distance, and amount of paperwork play a key part. It is encouraging that
most of these barriers can be reduced by better policies.
Indeed, some progress has been achieved.
For example, in South Africa, 6 million basic
bank accounts were opened in four years,
significantly increasing the share of adults
with a bank account. Worldwide, hundreds
of millions have gained access to electronic
payments through services using mobile
phone platforms. In the World Banks Global
Financial Barometer (Cihk

2012; World
Bank 2012a), 78 percent of the financial sector practitioners surveyed indicated that, in
their assessment, access to finance in their
countries had improved substantially in the
last five years.
But boosting financial inclusion is not
trivial. Creating new bank accounts does not
always translate into regular use. For example, of the above-mentioned 6 million new
accounts in South Africa, only 3.5 million
became active, while the rest lie dormant.
Moreover, things can goand do go
badly, especially if credit starts growing rapidly. The promotion of credit without sufficient regard for financial stability is likely
OVERVIEW
FIGURE O.1 Use of Bank Accounts and

Self-Reported Barriers to Use
Not enough money
Have a bank account
11%
50%
39%
Other reasons for nonuse

(lack of trust, lack of
documentation, distance to
bank, religious reasons,
another family member
already has an account)
Source: Global Financial Inclusion (Global Findex) Database, World Bank,

Washington, DC, http://www.worldbank.org/globalfindex.
Note: Self-reported barriers to use of formal bank accounts. Respondents
could choose more than one reason. Not enough money refers to the
percentage of all adults who reported only this reason.
to result in a crisis. A spectacular recent

example is the subprime mortgage crisis in
the United States in the 2000s: the key contributing factors included the overextension
of credit to noncreditworthy borrowers and
relaxation in mortgage-underwriting standards. Another example of overextension
of credit in the name of access was the crisis in Indias microfinance sector in 2010.
Because of a rapid growth in loans, Indias
microfinance institutions were able to report
high profitability for years, but this resided
on large indebtedness among clients. While
these two examples (explored in chapter 1,
box 1.5) are more complex, they illustrate the
broader point that deep social issues cannot
be resolved purely with an infusion of credit.
If not implemented properly, efforts to promote financial inclusion can lead to defaults
and other negative effects.
This is where the current report fits in.

It provides a careful review and synthesis
of recent and ongoing research on financial
inclusion, identifying which policies work,
and which do not, as well as areas where
more evidence is still needed. Box O.1 provides the main messages of this synthesis.
Despite the growing interest, the views
of policy makers and other financial sector
practitioners on the policies that work best
are widely split (box O.2), underscoring the
major gaps in knowledge about the effects
of key policies on financial inclusion. Hence,
this Global Financial Development Report,
while recognizing the complexity of the questions and the limits of existing knowledge,
introduces new data and research and draws
on available insights and experience to contribute to the policy discussion.
FINANCIAL INCLUSION:
MEASUREMENT AND IMPACT
Financial inclusion and access to finance
are different issues. Financial inclusion is
defined here as the proportion of individuals and firms that use financial services. The
lack of use does not necessarily mean a lack
of access. Some people may have access to
financial services at affordable prices, but
choose not to use certain financial services,
while many others may lack access in the
sense that the costs of these services are prohibitively high or that the services are simply
unavailable because of regulatory barriers,
legal hurdles, or an assortment of market
and cultural phenomena. The key issue is the
degree to which the lack of inclusion derives
from a lack of demand for financial services
or from barriers that impede individuals and
firms from accessing the services.
Globally, about 50 percent of adults have
one or more bank accounts, and a nearly
equal share are unbanked. In 2011, adults
who were banked included the 9 percent of
adults who received loans and the 22 percent of adults who saved through financial
institutions.
Looking beyond global averages, we find
that financial inclusion varies widely around
BOX O.1
OVERVIEW
Main Messages of This Report
The level of financial inclusion varies widely around

the world. Globally, about 50 percent of adults have
a bank account, while the rest remain unbanked,
meaning they do not have an account with a formal financial institution. Not all the 2.5 billion
unbanked need financial services, but barriers such
as cost, travel distance, and documentation requirements are critical. For example, 20 percent of the
unbanked report distance as a key reason they do
not have an account. The poor, women, youth, and
rural residents tend to face greater barriers to access.
Among firms, the younger and smaller ones are confronted by more binding constraints. For instance,
in developing economies, 35 percent of small firms
report that access to finance is a major obstacle to
their operations, compared with 25 percent of large
firms in developing economies and 8 percent of large
firms in developed economies.
Financial inclusion is important for development
and poverty reduction. Considerable evidence indicates that the poor benefit enormously from basic
payments, savings, and insurance services. For firms,
particularly the small and young ones that are subject to greater constraints, access to finance is associated with innovation, job creation, and growth. But
dozens of microcredit experiments paint a mixed
picture about the development benefits of microfinance projects targeted at particular groups in the
population.
Financial inclusion does not mean finance for
all at all costs. Some individuals and firms have no
material demand or business need for financial services. Efforts to subsidize these services are counterproductive and, in the case of credit, can lead to
overindebtedness and financial instability. However,
in many cases, the use of financial services is constrained by regulatory impediments or malfunctioning markets that prevent people from accessing beneficial financial services.
The focus of public policy should be on addressing market failures. In many cases, the use of
financial services is constrained by market failures
that cause the costs of these services to become
prohibitively high or that cause the services to
become unavailable due to regulatory barriers, legal
hurdles, or an assortment of market and cultural
phenomena. Evidence points to a function for government in dealing with these failures by creating
the associated legal and regulatory framework (for
example, protecting creditor rights, regulating business conduct, and overseeing recourse mechanisms
to protect consumers), supporting the information
environment (for instance, setting standards for

disclosure and transparency and promoting credit
informationsharing systems and collateral registries), and educating and protecting consumers.
An important part of consumer protection is represented by competition policy because healthy competition among providers rewards better performers
and increases the power that consumers can exert
in the marketplace. Policies to expand account penetrationsuch as requiring banks to offer basic or
low-fee accounts, granting exemptions from onerous documentation requirements, allowing correspondent banking, and using electronic payments
into bank accounts for government paymentsare
especially effective among those people who are
often excluded: the poor, women, youth, and rural
residents. Other direct government interventions
such as directed credit, debt relief, and lending
through state-owned bankstend to be politicized
and less successful, particularly in weak institutional environments.
New technologies hold promise for expanding
financial inclusion. Innovations in technologysuch
as mobile payments, mobile banking, and borrower
identification using biometric data (fingerprinting, iris scans, and so on)make it easier and less
expensive for people to use financial services, while
increasing financial security. The impact of new
technologies can be amplified by the private sectors
adoption of business models that complement technology platforms (as is the case with banking correspondents). To harness the promise of new technologies, regulators need to allow competing financial
service providers and consumers to take advantage
of technological innovations.
Product designs that address market failures,
meet consumer needs, and overcome behavioral
problems can foster the widespread use of financial services. Innovative financial products, such as
index-based insurance, can mitigate weather-related
risks in agricultural production and help promote
investment and productivity in agricultural firms.
Improvements in lending to micro and small firms
can be achieved by leveraging existing relationships.
For example, novel mechanisms have broadened
financial inclusion by delivering credit through retail
chains or large suppliers, relying on payment histories in making loan decisions, and lowering costs by
using existing distribution networks.
It is possible to enhance financial capability
financial knowledge, skills, attitudes, and behaviorsthrough well-designed, targeted interven(box continued next page)
OVERVIEW
BOX O.1
Main Messages of This Report
tions. Financial education has a measurable impact

if it reaches people during teachable moments, for
instance, when they are starting a job or purchasing a major financial product. Financial education
is especially beneficial for individuals with limited financial skills. Leveraging social networks
(for example, involving both parents and children)
tends to enhance the impact of financial education.
Delivery mode matters, too; thus, engaging delivery
BOX O.2
(continued)
channelssuch as entertainment educationshows
promise. In microenterprises, business training programs have been found to lead to improvements in
knowledge, but have a relatively small impact on
business practices and performance and depend on
context and gender, with mixed results. The content of training also matters: simple rule-of-thumb
training is more effective than standard training in
business and accounting.
The Views of Practitioners on Financial Inclusion:

The Global Financial Barometer
To examine views on financial inclusion among

some of the World Banks clients, the Global Financial Development Report team has undertaken the
second round of the Financial Development Barometer, following up on the first such survey from the
previous round (Cihk

2012; World Bank 2012a).
The barometer is a global informal poll of views,
opinions, and sentiments among financial sector
practitioners (central bankers, finance ministry officials, market participants, and academics, as well as
representatives of nongovernmental organizations
and interdisciplinary research entities focusing on
financial sector issues).
The barometer contains 23 questions arranged
in two categories: (1) general questions about financial development and (2) specific questions relating
to the specific topic of the relevant Global Financial Development Report. The results of the first
barometer, which addresses specific questions on

the states role in finance, were reported in Global
Financial Development Report 2013. Selected
results of the second barometer, with specific questions on financial inclusion, are reported in this
box. (Additional information is available on the
reports website, at http://www.worldbank.org
/financialdevelopment.) The barometer poll was
carried out in 2012/13 and covers respondents from
21 developed and 54 developing economies. Of the
265 individuals polled, 161 responded (a response
rate of 61 percent).
According to the survey results, a majority of
respondents see financial inclusion as a big problem
both for households and for small enterprises. At the
same time, most respondents see an improving trend
in the access to finance in the last five years (table
BO.2.1, rows 13).
TABLE BO.2.1 Selected Results of the 201213 Financial Development Barometer

% of respondents agreeing with the statements
1. Access to basic financial services is a significant problem for households in my country.
61
2. Access to finance is a significant barrier to the growth of small enterprises in my country.
76
3. In my country, access to finance has improved significantly over the last 5 years.
78
4. State banks and targeted lending programs to poorer segments of the population (social banking) are a
useful tool to increase financial access.
80
5. Social banking actually plays an important role in increasing financial access in my country.
43
6. The lack of knowledge about basic financial products and services is a major barrier to financial access
among the poor in my country.
78
Source: Financial Development Barometer; for full results, see the Global Financial Development Report website, at http://www.worldbank.org/financialdevelopment.
(box continued next page)
BOX O.2
OVERVIEW
The Views of Practitioners on Financial Inclusion:

The Global Financial Barometer (continued)
On the role of the state, there is an interesting

disconnect: 80 percent of the respondents consider
social bankingthat is, state banks and lending
programs targeted at poorer segments of the populationas a useful tool to increase financial access,
but only about 50 percent think that social banking
actually plays a major part in expanding financial
access (table BO.2.1, rows 45).
Another interesting result is that 78 percent of
the respondents consider the lack of knowledge
about basic financial products and services as a
major barrier to financial access among the poor
(table BO.2.1, row 6). Corresponding to this result,
for views about the best policy to improve access to
finance among low-income borrowers, the policy
selected by the greatest number of respondents (32
percent) was financial education (figure BO.2.1).
FIGURE BO.2.1 Views on Effective Financial

Inclusion Policies
Financial
education
Better legal
framework
18%
32%
17%
Promotion of
new lending
technologies
33%
Other
Source: Financial Development Barometer; for full results, see the Global
Financial Development Report website, at http://www.worldbank.org
/financialdevelopment.
the world. Newly available user-side data

show striking disparities in the use of financial services by individuals in developed
and developing economies. For instance,
the share of adults with a bank account in
developed economies is more than twice the
corresponding share in developing ones. The
disparities are even larger if we examine the
actual use of accounts (map O.1). Worldwide,
44 percent of adults regularly use a bank
account. However, if we focus on the bottom
40 percent of income earners in developing
countries, we find that only 23 percent regularly use an account, which is about half the
participation rate among the rest of the populations of these countries (the corresponding
participation rates in developed economies
are 81 percent and 88 percent, respectively).
From the viewpoint of shared prosperity,
it is particularly troubling that the disparities in financial inclusion are large in terms of
population segments within countries. People
who are poor, young, unemployed, out of the
workforce, or less well educated, or who live

in rural areas are much less likely to have an
account (figure O.2). Account ownership also
goes hand in hand with income equality: the
more even the distribution of income within
a country, the higher the countrys account
penetration. What helps is a better enabling
environment for accessing financial services,
such as lower banking costs, proximity to
financial providers, and fewer documentation
requirements to open an account.
While the disparities are less pronounced
in the access of firms to finance, significant
differences persist across countries and by
characteristics such as firm age and size.
Younger and smaller firms face greater constraints, and their growth is affected relatively more by the constraints.
Research highlighted in this report shows
that financial inclusion matters for economic
development and poverty reduction. A range
of theoretical models demonstrate how the
lack of access to finance can lead to poverty
OVERVIEW
MAP O.1
Adults Using a Bank Account in a Typical Month
Source: Global Financial Inclusion (Global Findex) Database, World Bank, Washington, DC, http://www.worldbank.org/globalfindex.
Note: Percentage of adults (age 15 years or older) depositing to or withdrawing from an account with a formal financial institution at least once in a typical month.
FIGURE O.2
Correlates of Financial Inclusion
10
Effect on probability of owning an account, %
7
5
0
2
5
6
10
9
12
13
15
16
20
Poorest
20%
Second
20%
Middle
20%
Fourth
20%
Age
Rural
Married
Log of
08 yrs of
education household
size
Employed Unemployed Out of

workforce
Source: Based on Allen, Demirg-Kunt, and others 2012.

Note: Results from a probit regression of a financial inclusion indicator on country fixed effects and a set of individual characteristics for 124,334 adults (15 years of age and older)
covered in 2011 in the Global Financial Inclusion (Global Findex) Database (http://www.worldbank.org/globalfindex). The financial inclusion indicator is a 0/1 variable indicating
whether a person had an account at a formal financial institution in 2011. See Allen, Demirg-Kunt, and others (2012) for definitions, data sources, the standard errors of the
parameter estimates, additional estimation methods, and additional regressions for other dependent variables (savings and the frequency of use of accounts).
PUBLIC POLICY ON FINANCIAL

INCLUSION: OVERALL FINDINGS
Enhancing financial inclusion requires the
policy and market problems that lead to
financial exclusion to be addressed. The public sector can promote this goal by developing
the appropriate legal and regulatory framework and supporting the information environment, as well as by educating and protecting the users of financial services. Many
of the public sector interventions are more
effective if the private sector is involved. For
example, improvements in the credit environment, disclosure practices, and the collateral
framework can be more effective with private
sector buy-in and support.
New evidence showcased in this report
suggests that the government has a particularly important role in overseeing the
information environment. Public policy can
achieve potentially large effects on financial
inclusion through reforms of credit bureaus
and collateral registries. Evidence highlighted
in the report indicates that the introduction
or reform of registries for movable collateral,
FIGURE O.3
Finance
Effect of Collateral Registry Reforms on Access to
80
73
70
Firms with access to finance, %
traps and inequality. Empirical evidence on

the impact of financial inclusion paints a picture that is far from black and white. The evidence varies by type of financial services. For
basic payments and savings, evidence on the
benefits, especially among poor households,
is quite supportive. For insurance products,
there is also some evidence of a positive
impact, although studies on the effects of
microinsurance are inconclusive. As regards
access to credit, evidence on microcredit is
mixed, with some cautionary findings on the
pitfalls of microcredit. For small and young
firms, access to credit is important.
The message from the research is thus a
nuanced one: for inclusion to have positive
effects, it needs to be achieved responsibly.
Creating many bank accounts that lie dormant makes little sense. While inclusion has
important benefits, the policy objective cannot be inclusion for inclusions sake, and the
goal certainly cannot be to make everybody
borrow.
OVERVIEW
60
50
54
50
41
40
30
20
10
0
Prereform
Registry reformers
Postreform
Nonreformers (matched by region and income)
Source: Doing Business (database), International Finance Corporation and World Bank, Washington, DC, http://www.doingbusiness.org/data; Enterprise Surveys (database), International Finance
Corporation and World Bank, Washington, DC, http://www.enterprisesurveys.org; calculations by
Love, Martnez Pera, and Singh 2013.
Note: Based on firm-level surveys in 73 countries, the study compares the access of firms to credit
in seven countries that have introduced collateral registries for movable assets against the access
of firms in a sample of countries matched by region and income per capita.
such as machines and other equipment,

can greatly spur firm access to finance (figure O.3). Importantly, the improvements
in access to finance are larger among small
firms.
This evidence shows that improvements in
the legal, regulatory, and institutional environment, which tend to be helpful for development in general, are also quite useful for
financial inclusion.
How about policies aimed more directly
at financial inclusion? New evidence on
142,000 people in 123 countries suggests
that policies aimed specifically at enhancing account penetration and payments can
be effective, especially among the poor,
women, youth, and rural residents. Specifically, Allen, Demirg-Kunt, and others
(2012) show that, in countries with higher
banking costs, financially excluded individuals are more likely to report that they perceive not having enough money as a barrier
to opening an account. Focusing only on
OVERVIEW
financially excluded individuals who report

not having enough money as the only barrier, they observe that the presence of basic
or low-fee accounts, correspondent banking, consumer protection, and accounts to
receive government-to-person (G2P) payments lower the likelihood that these individuals will cite lack of funds as a barrier.
While these results are not causal, they hint
that government policies to enhance inclusion may be related to a higher likelihood
that individuals consider that financial services are within their reach.
In contrast, direct government interventions in credit markets tend to be politicized
and less successful, particularly in environments with weak institutions. Examples of
such direct interventions include bailouts
and debt relief for households, directed
credit, subsidies, and lending via stateowned financial institutions. The challenges
associated with these direct government
interventions are discussed in Global Financial Development Report 2013, where the
focus is Rethinking the Role of the State in
Finance. The current report highlights additional, novel evidence. For example, recent
in-depth analysis of Indias 2008 debt relief
for highly indebted rural households finds
that, while the initiative led to the intended
reductions in household debt, it was associated with declines in investment and agricultural productivity (Kanz 2012).
Research also suggests that it matters how the various interventions are put
together. Packaging reforms together leads
to scale effectspositive and negative
and to sequencing issues. For example, in a
country in which creditor rights are weakly
enforced because of a poorly functioning
judiciary, a policy that would center solely
on the computerization and unification of
credit registries for movable collateral would
have a limited impact on credit inclusion if
it were not combined with other supportive
reforms that may take longer to implement.
Considerations of this sort help impart some
welcome realism to aspirational objectives
of universal access and assist countries in
operationalizing their national financial
inclusion strategies.
Against this broader policy context, the

report examines three focus areas: (1) the
potential of new technology to increase
financial inclusion; (2) the role of business
models and product design; and (3) the role
of financial literacy, financial capability, and
business training. These three areas can reinforce each other. For example, new technology can be used not only to boost financial
inclusion, but also to improve product design
and strengthen financial capability (as examined in the studies on the use of text messages
to promote savings behavior that are referenced in chapter 2). The reports emphasis of
these areas reflects the impact these areas can
have on financial inclusion and shared prosperity, as well as the fact that there is new
evidence to highlight. (For help in navigating
the report, see box O.3.)
FOCUS AREA 1:
THE PROMISE OF TECHNOLOGY
Technological innovations can lower the cost
and inconvenience of accessing financial services. The last decade has been marked by a
rapid growth in new technologies, such as
mobile payments, mobile banking, Internet
banking, and biometric identification technologies. These technological innovations
allow for a significant reduction in transaction costs, leading to greater financial
inclusion.
While much of the public discussion has
focused on mobile payments and mobile
banking, other new technologies are also
promising. Recent research suggests that
biometric identification (such as fingerprinting, iris scans, and so on) can substantially
reduce information problems and moral hazard in credit markets. To illustrate, figure
O.4 shows results from a study authored by
World Bank researchers and based on a field
experiment involving the introduction of fingerprinting among borrowers. The intervention significantly improved the lenders ability to deny credit in a later period based on
previous repayment performance. This, in
turn, reduced adverse selection and moral
hazard, leading to improved loan performance among the weakest borrowers.
BOX O.3
OVERVIEW
Navigating This Report
The rest of the report consists of three chapters,

which cover (1) the importance of financial inclusion,
some key facts, and drivers of financial inclusion;
(2) financial inclusion for individuals; and (3) financial inclusion among firms. Within these broader
topic areas, the report focuses on policy-relevant
issues on which new evidence can be provided.
Chapter 1 introduces the concept of financial
inclusion and reviews the evidence on its links to
financial, economic, and social development. It discusses the benefits of and the limits to inclusion and
the importance of pursuing this agenda responsibly. It highlights evidence based on theoretical and
empirical research on the impact of financial inclusion on economic development and identifies transmission channels through which financial inclusion
contributes to income equality and poverty reduction. The chapter introduces cross-cutting issues
related to financial inclusion, such as the relationship
between financial sector structure and inclusion.
Chapter 2 focuses on financial inclusion among
individuals. It starts with a discussion on the role
of technology in financial inclusion. This is followed by an examination of private sector initiatives in financial inclusion, particularly product
designs that address market failures, meet consumer
needs, and overcome behavioral problems to foster
the widespread use of financial services. Financial
literacy and capability are another area of special
focus. The chapter ends with an in-depth discussion of the various public sector policies in financial
inclusion and provides some evidence-based policy
recommendations.
Chapter 3 covers financial inclusion among firms.
It focuses on firms that face market failures that
restrict access to finance, such as small firms and
young firms. The discussion covers access not only
to formal bank credit, but also to microfinance, private equity, and other forms of finance, such as factoring and leasing. The chapter focuses on access to
The adoption of new technologies has

taken different paths in different economies.
In mobile technology, for instance, neither
ubiquity nor a high penetration of mobile
phones is a necessary condition for the development of mobile banking. To illustrate this,
consider the example of Kenya, where mobile
credit, but it also discusses the importance of savings

and insurance products for firms. The chapter highlights three topics that have recently received much
policy and research attention: (1) whether gender
matters in lending and the extent to which differences in firm growth arise because of differences in
access to finance among firms owned by women and
firms owned by men; (2) the challenges and financing needs of rural firms; and (3) the role of finance in
promoting innovation.
The Statistical Appendix consists of three parts.
Appendix A presents basic country-by-country data
on financial system characteristics around the world.
It also shows averages of the same indicators for
peer categories of countries, together with summary
maps. It is an update of information in the 2013
Global Financial Development Report. Appendix
B provides additional information on key aspects
of financial inclusion around the world. Appendix
C contains additional data on Islamic banking and
financial inclusion in member countries of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC).
The accompanying website (http://www.world
bank.org/financialdevelopment) contains a wealth of
underlying research, additional evidence, including
country examples, and extensive databases on financial development. It provides users with interactive
access to information on financial systems. The website is a place where users can supply feedback on the
report, participate in an online version of the Financial Development Barometer, and submit suggestions
for future issues of the report. The website also presents an updated and expanded version of the Global
Financial Development Database, a data set of 104
financial system characteristics for 203 economies
since 1960, which was launched together with the
2013 Global Financial Development Report. The
database has now been updated with data on 2011,
and new series have been added to the data set, especially in areas related to the nonbank financial sector.
payment services took off when the countrys mobile phone penetration rate was only
about 20 percent. This was similar to the
penetration rate in countries such as Afghanistan, Rwanda, and Tanzania, where mobile
payments have not developed to such a high
degree.
OVERVIEW
FIGURE O.4
Fingerprinting and Repayment Rates, Malawi
100
90
88
79
98
96
93
92
91
80
Repayment rate, %
10
89
74
70
60
50
40
26
30
20
10
0
Q1
Q2
Q3
Fingerprinted
Q4
Q5
Control
Source: Calculations based on Gin, Goldberg, and Yang 2012.

Note: The repayment rates among fingerprinted and control groups by quartiles of the ex ante probability of default. Individuals in the worst quintile
(Q1) are those with the highest probability of default and those on whom fingerprinting had the largest effect.
The evidence indicates that one of the factors that truly make a difference is competition among providers of financial services. To
harness the potential of technologies, regulators need to allow competing financial service
providers and consumers to take advantage
of technological innovations. This may seem
controversial for two main reasons. First,
regulators have to walk a fine line between
providing incentives for the development of
new payment technologies (allowing providers to capture some monopoly rents to
recoup investments) and requiring the new
platforms to be open. Second, competition
without proper regulation and supervision
could cause credit to become overextended
among people who are not qualified, which
could lead to a crisis. But, as noted in the
first Global Financial Development Report
(World Bank 2012a), the evidence on crises
actually underscores that healthy competition
among providers rewards better performers
and increases the power that consumers can
exert in the marketplace. The present report
follows up on this theme, highlighting new
evidence that low rates of competition among
banks diminish the access of firms to finance.

This effect is stronger if financial development is less advanced, if the share of government banks is higher, and if credit information is less available or of lower quality.
FOCUS AREA 2:
PRODUCT DESIGN AND
BUSINESS MODELS
Wider use of financial services can also be
fostered by innovative product designs that
address market failures, meet consumer
needs, and overcome behavioral problems.
One example of such product design is the
commitment savings account, whereby an
individual deposits a certain amount and
relinquishes access to the cash for a period of
time or until a goal has been reached. These
accounts have been viewed as a tool to promote savings by mitigating self-control issues
and family pressures to share windfalls.
One of the studies authored by World Bank
researchers and highlighted in this report
(Brune and others 2011) finds that farmers who were offered commitment accounts
saved more than farmers who were offered

checking accounts. This had positive effects
on agricultural input use, crop sales, and
household expenditures. The study finds that
commitment accounts work primarily by
shielding the funds of farmers from the social
networks of the farmers, rather than by helping the farmers deal with self-control issues.
Another example of innovative product
design is index-based insurance. In contrast
to traditional insurance, payouts for indexbased insurance are linked to a measurable
index, such as the amount of rainfall over a
given time or commodity prices at a given
date. Index insurance reduces problems of
moral hazard because payouts occur according to a measurable index that is beyond
the control of the policyholder. Also, index
insurance is well suited to protect against the
adverse shocks that affect many members of
informal insurance networks simultaneously.
It has clear benefits for lenders and a potential to increase financial inclusion and agricultural production. Interestingly, however,
the take-up of index insurance has often been
low. For example, in a randomized experiment with farmers highlighted in this report,
take-up was only 20 percent for loans with
rainfall insurance, compared with 33 percent
for loans without insurance (Gin and Yang
2009). New evidence from field experiments
suggests that lack of trust and liquidity constraints are significant nonprice frictions that
constrain demand. Therefore, what helps is
to design financial products that pay often
and quickly; endorsements by credible, wellregarded institutions; the simplification of
products; and consumer education.
Beyond product design, innovative business models can help enhance economic
growth. For example, microenterprises are
often financially constrained because of a
lack of information. This constraint can be
addressed by leveraging existing relationships. Recent years have seen a growth in
innovative channels for the delivery of credit
through retail chains or large suppliers, reliance on payment histories to make loan decisions, and the reduction of costs through the
use of existing distribution networks.
OVERVIEW
An interesting case that illustrates this

point is Mexicos Banco Azteca (Bruhn
and Love 2013). In October 2002, the
bank simultaneously opened more than
800 branches in all the stores of its parent
company, Grupo Elektra, a large retailer of
consumer goods. The bank catered to lowand middle-income groups that were mostly
excluded from the commercial banking sector. Capitalizing on the parent companys
rich data, established information, collection technology, and experience in making
small installment loans for merchandise, the
bank was able to require less documentation
than traditional commercial banks, often
accepting collateral and cosigners instead
of valid documents. Analysis highlighted in
this report shows that the new bank branch
openings led to an increase in the proportion
of individuals who ran informal businesses,
but to no change in formal businesses. After
the Banco Azteca branches were opened,
the proportion of informal business owners increased significantly in municipalities
with Banco Azteca branches (figure O.5).
Additionally, Banco Aztecas branch openings generated increases in employment
and income levels. These findings illustrate
that innovative business models can address
some of the failures that lead to financial
exclusion.
FOCUS AREA 3:
FINANCIAL LITERACY AND
BUSINESS TRAINING
Financial literacy is different from financial
capability. Research indicates that standard,
classroom-based financial education aimed at
the general population does not have much
of an impact on financial inclusion. It takes
more than lectures and memorizing definitions to develop the capacity needed to benefit from financial services. This can be illustrated through an analogy with driving cars.
A person can learn the meaning of street
signs, but this does not make him capable of
driving in traffic. Similarly, financial literacy
does not ensure that a person is financially
capable and able to make financially sound
11
12
OVERVIEW
Individuals who are informal business owners

(municipalities without Banco Azteca), %
15.0
9.0
Banco Azteca opening
8.8
14.5
8.6
14.0
8.4
13.5
8.2
13.0
8.0
12.5
7.8
7.6
12.0
2000
2001
2002
2003
Individuals who are informal business owners

(municipalities with Banco Azteca), %
FIGURE O.5 Individuals Who Work as Informal Business Owners in Municipalities with and without
Banco Azteca over Time
2004
2nd 3rd 4th 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 1st 2nd 3rd 4th
Quarter
Quarter
Quarter
Quarter
Quarter
Municipalities without Banco Azteca
Municipalities with Banco Azteca
Source: Bruhn and Love 2013.

Note: The study uses the predetermined locations of Banco Azteca branches to identify the causal impact of Banco Azteca branch openings on economic
activity through a difference-in-difference strategy. It controls for the possibility that time trends in outcome variables may be different in municipalities
that had Grupo Elektra stores and those that did not have such stores (see the text).
decisions. Promoting financial capability

through standard financial education has
proven to be extremely challenging.
Recent research has identified some interventions that can raise the financial skills of
FIGURE O.6
Effects of Entertainment Education

31
30
26
Respondents, %
25
20
19
15
10
5
0
Has someone in the household
used hire purchase in the
past 6 months?
Treatment
Has someone in the household

gambled money in the
past 6 months?
Control
Source: Berg and Zia 2013.

Note: Hire purchase refers to contracts whereby people pay for goods in installments.
individuals and firms. It is possible to boost

financial capability through well-designed
and targeted interventions. Interventions that
use teachable moments, such as starting a job
or purchasing a major financial product, have
been shown to have a measurable impact.
The evidence also demonstrates that financial
education is especially beneficial among people with below-average education and limited
financial skills. The impact of financial education is enhanced by leveraging social networks, which means involving both parents
and children in the program or, in the case
of remittances, both senders and recipients. In
microenterprises, business training programs
have been found to lead to improvements in
knowledge; however, these programs have a
relatively small impact on business practices
and performance. Recent research suggests
that education focusing on rules of thumb is
particularly helpful because it avoids information overload.
New research on financial capability
indicates that the mode of delivery can be a
major factor in the effectiveness of outreach.
One example of engaging delivery channels
that show some promise is entertainment

education, highlighted in this report through
a study that analyzes the impact of South
Africas soap opera Scandal. The soap
operas story line incorporated examples of
financially irresponsible behavior and the
effects of such behavior. Researchers found
OVERVIEW
statistically and economically significant

effects on the financial behavior of respondents who watched the show (figure O.6). At
the same time, the effects of this and other
financial interventions are often short-lived,
suggesting the need for these interventions
to be repeated.
13
CHAPTER 1: KEY MESSAGES

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1
Financial Inclusion:
Importance, Key Facts, and Drivers
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FIGURE 1.1
Use of and Access to Financial Services
#1: No need for

financial services
Users of formal
financial services
Voluntary exclusion
(self-exclusion)
Population
#2: Cultural, religious reasons

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high risk
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Source: Adapted from Demirg-Kunt, Beck, and Honohan 2008.
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17
What Makes Finance Different? Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection
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a. Expected return from a loan
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18
BOX 1.1
What Makes Finance Different? Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection

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Overview of Global Data Sources on Financial Inclusion
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Trends in Number of Accounts, Commercial Banks, 200411
1,300
a. Deposit accounts
1,200
846
804
800
700
Middle income
600
500
400
300
423
738
World average
386
200
100
0
1,200
1,100
High income
1,000
116
Low income
b. Loan accounts
1,300
1236
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900
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2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Loan accounts per 1,000 adults
FIGURE 1.2
Deposit accounts, 1,000 adults
20
1,000
900
800
High income
802
700
600
500
400
300
200
100
0
459
204
166
21
World average
Middle income
Low income
381
320
24
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Source: Calculations based on data from the Financial Access Survey (database), International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC, http://fas.imf.org.
FIGURE 1.3
Provider-Side and User-Side Data on Financial Inclusion

a. Branches per capita
b. Branch density
100
Account penetration, %
100
80
60
40
y = 8.70x0.57
R 2 = 0.48
20
0
80
60
40
0
0
50
y = 21.45x0.28
R 2 = 0.34
20
100
50
150
Commercial bank branches

per 1,000 km2
Commercial bank branches

per 100,000 adults
c. ATMs per capita
d. ATM density
100
100
80
80
100
60
40
y = 7.67x0.48
R 2 = 0.58
20
0
0
50
100
150
200
60
40
y = 17.23x0.30
R 2 = 0.46
20
0
0
100
200
300
400
ATMs per 1,000 km2
ATMs per 100,000 adults
Sources: Calculations based on data from the Global Financial Inclusion (Global Findex) Database, World Bank, Washington, DC, http://www.worldbank
.org/globalfindex for account penetration rates and the Financial Access Survey (database), International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC, http://fas.imf
.org/ for the other four indicators.
Note: ATM = automatic teller machine.
Ownership of accounts
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The Gender Gap in Use of Financial Services
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23
24
FIGURE 1.4
Selected Methods of Payment, 2011
59
Pays with debit card
29
36
Pays with credit card
15
24
Pays electronically
16
Developed economies
Developing economies
10
Pays with mobile device
3
0
20
40
60
80
Adults, %
Source: Calculations based on data from the Global Financial Inclusion (Global Findex) Database,
World Bank, Washington, DC, http://www.worldbank.org/globalfindex.
Note: The response on mobile payments may subsume some of the other categories. (For example,
using a credit card to make a payment by phone may be seen as a mobile payment by the
respondent.)
Insurance
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MAP 1.2 Origination of New Formal Loans
FIGURE 1.5 Reasons for Loans Reported by

Borrowers, Developing Economies
Adults with an outstanding loan, by purpose of loan
12
10
Adults, %
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8
6
4
2
0
Home
construction
School
fees
Emergency/
health
Funerals/
weddings
Source: Global Financial Inclusion (Global Findex) Database, World Bank,

Washington, DC, http://www.worldbank.org/globalfindex.
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FINANCIAL INCLUSION AMONG
FIRMS
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FIGURE 1.6
100
The Use of Accounts and Loans by Firms

93
98
Firms, %
80
60
51
39
34
40
48
20
0
Firms with a checking

or savings account
Firms with a bank loan

or line of credit
Firms not needing a loan
Developed economies
Source: Enterprise Surveys (database), International Finance Corporation and World Bank, Washington, DC, http://www.enterprisesurveys.org.
Note: The sample includes 137 countries from 2005 to 2011. The income groups are based on
World Bank definitions; high income refers to countries with gross national income per capita of
at least $12,476.
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35
29
16
25
15
8
< 20 employees
2099 employees
Source: Enterprise Surveys (database), International Finance Corporation and World Bank,
Washington, DC, http://www.enterprisesurveys.org.
Note: The sample includes 137 countries from 2005 to 2011. The income groups are based on
World Bank definitions; high income refers to countries with gross national income per capita of
at least $12,476.
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18.3
15
10.8
10
5.2
6.7 6.4
3.1
4.0 3.9
1.8 1.9 1.8
0.9 0.6 0.4
0
Banks
Supplier credit
Equity shares
Small firms (< 20)
> 100 employees
Developed economies
24.2
20
Firms, %
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
Sources of External Financing for Fixed Assets
25
27
FIGURE 1.7 Finance Is a Major Constraint among Firms, Especially

Small Firms
Firms, %
NBFIs
Medium firms (2099)
Informal sources
0.3 0.5 0.8

New debt
Large firms (> 100)
Note: The sample includes 120 countries from 2006 to 2012. The numbers in parentheses represent the number of employees. NBFI = nonbank financial
institution. New debt = issuance of new debt instruments such as commercial paper and debentures.
28
FIGURE 1.9
Business Constraints
2.0
2.0
1.9
1.9
1.8
1.7
1.7
1.6
1.5
1.5
1.5
1.5
1.3
Responses, %
1.2
1.1
1.1
1.1
1.1
1.0
1.0
0.9
0.5
s
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ity
0.0
Note: The sample includes 120 countries from 2006 to 2012. The figure shows the percentage of total responses to a question asking firms about the biggest obstacle they face.
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FIGURE 1.10
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i>}iV>i\i}i
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wiiVi>i
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>}i v>V v i > > >i`
Firms that have not applied for loans, %
FIGURE 1.11
20
Formal and Informal Firms with Accounts and Loans
100
86
Firms, %
80
60
53
47
37
40
20
42
12
0
Firms with a bank account
Firms with a loan
Informal
Firms not needing a loan
Formal
Sources: World Bank informal surveys; Enterprise Surveys (database), International Finance
Corporation and World Bank, Washington, DC, http://www.enterprisesurveys.org.
Note: The sample includes 13 countries from 2008 to 2011.
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i>}ii>iViii
iiì>`-Vi
V>]>i]iViiViii>iiVi>ii>v]
Reasons for Not Applying for a Loan
18
17
17
16
15
12
10
12
8
4
0
Complex
High
applications interest
rates
Lacking
Not
guarantees registered
Informal
Other
High
interest
rates
High
Complex Wouldn't
collateral applications
be
approved
Formal
Sources: World Bank informal surveys; Enterprise Surveys (database), International Finance Corporation and World Bank, Washington, DC,
http://www.enterprisesurveys.org.
Note: The sample includes 13 countries from 2008 to 2011.
Informal Loan size

payments
and
to get
maturity
bank loans
29
30
MAP 1.3
Access by Firms to Securities Markets
Source: Global Financial Development Report (database), World Bank, Washington, DC, http://www.worldbank.org/financialdevelopment.
Note: The map is based on the share in market capitalization of firms that are outside the top 10 largest companies. The World Federation of Exchanges provided data on individual
exchanges. The variable is aggregated up to the country level by taking a simple average over exchanges. The four shades of blue in the map are based on the average value of the
variable in 200811: the darker the blue, the higher the quartile of the statistical distribution of the variable.
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CORRELATES OF FINANCIAL
INCLUSION AND EXCLUSION
Income seems to matter, as does

inequality
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Geography matters, too

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MAP 1.4 Geography Matters: Example of Subnational Data on Financial Inclusion
Source: Calculations based on data from Comisin Nacional Bancaria y de Valores, Mexico.
Note: The indicator is the sum of all formal accounts, including deposit accounts, savings accounts, open market transaction
accounts, debit card accounts, credit card accounts, and payroll transaction accounts.
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Financial inclusion vs. depth, efficiency,

and stability
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31
FIGURE 1.12
Financial Inclusion vs. Depth, Efficiency, and Stability (Financial Institutions)

Financial Institutions
a. Depth
200
R 2 = 0.5805
100
50
0
0
50
60
50
50
40
40
30
Z-scorea
Lending minus deposit rate, percentage points
Private sector credit to GDP, %
250
150
c. Stability
b. (In)efficiency
300
2
10
10
0
0
100
R 2 = 0.0012
30
20
R 2 = 0.2204
Population with account, %
50
100
50
100

Financial Markets
e. Efficiency
d. Depth
300
250
250
200
150
R = 0.11178
2
100
50
0
f. Stability
80
70
Standard deviation/average price
300
Market turnover/capitalization
Market capitalization to GDP, %
32
200
R 2 = 0.2733
150
100
50
50
100
Market cap outside top 10, %
R 2 = 0.0065
50
40
30
20
10
0
0
60
0
0
20
40
60
80
20
40
60
80
Source: Global Financial Development Report (database), World Bank, Washington, DC, http://www.worldbank.org/financialdevelopment.
Note: Each point corresponds to a country; averages are for 200811. For definitions and a discussion of the 4x2 matrix for benchmarking financial systems,
see Cihk and others (2013). Market cap is short for market capitalization.
a. The z-score is a ratio, defined as (ROA + equity)/assets)/sd(ROA ), where ROA is average annual return on end-year assets and sd(ROA ) is the standard
deviation of ROA.
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FIGURE 1.13
33
Correlates of Financial Inclusion
10
Effect on probability of owning an account, %
7
5
0
2
5
6
10
9
12
13
15
16
20
Poorest
20%
Second
20%
Middle
20%
Fourth
20%
Age
Rural
Married
Log of
08 yrs of
education household
size
Employed Unemployed Out of

workforce
Source: Based on Allen, Demirg-Kunt, and others 2012.

Note: The figure shows probit regression results of a financial inclusion indicator on country fixed effects and a set of individual characteristics, for 124,334 adults (15 years and
older) covered by the Global Financial Inclusion (Global Findex) Database (http://www.worldbank.org/globalfindex) in 2011. The financial inclusion indicator is a 0/1 variable indicating whether a person had an account at a formal financial institution in 2011. See Allen, Demirg-Kunt, and others (2012) for definitions, data sources, standard errors of the
parameter estimates, additional estimation methods, and additional regressions for other dependent variables (savings and the frequency of use of accounts).
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An econometric examination of financial

inclusion
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34
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BARRIERS TO FINANCIAL
INCLUSION
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FIGURE 1.14
Reported Reasons for Not Having a Bank Account
Not enough money
30
25
Family member already has account

Too expensive
23
Too far away
20
Lack of documentation
18
Lack of trust
13
5
Religious reasons
0
10
15
20
25
30
Adults without an account, %

Source: Global Financial Inclusion (Global Findex) Database, World Bank, Washington, DC,
http://www.worldbank.org/globalfindex.
Note: Respondents could choose more than one reason.
35
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STRUCTURE, COMPETITION,
AND INCLUSION
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35
36
BOX 1.4
Islamic Finance and Inclusion
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TABLE B1.4.1 OIC Member Countries and the Rest of the World
% of respondents, unless otherwise indicated
All
OIC countries
Non-OIC countries
Have an account at a formal financial institution*

Reason for not having an account
religious reasons*
distance*
account too expensive*
lack of documentation*
lack of trust
lack of money*
family member already has an account*
50
25
57
5
20
25
18
13
65
23
7
23
29
22
13
75
11
4
19
23
16
13
61
28
Source: Calculations based on the Global Financial Inclusion (Global Findex) Database, World Bank, Washington, DC, http://www.worldbank.org/globalfindex.
* The means t-test between the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) and non-OIC countries is significant at the 1 percent level.
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BOX 1.4
37
(continued)
TABLE B1.4.2 Islamic Banking, Religiosity, and Household Access to Financial Services
Indicator
All countries
OIC dummy
GDP per capita, US$, 1,000s
Islamic assets per adult, US$, 1,000s
Observations
R-squared
5.79***
0.02
0.18*
137
0.21
OIC countries
OIC countries
with religiosity > 85%
Non-OIC countries
..
0.38**
0.61***
41
0.06
..
0.43**
0.65**
32
0.08
..
0.005
3.85
96
0.00
Sources: Based on the Global Financial Inclusion (Global Findex) Database, World Bank, Washington, DC, http://www.worldbank.org/globalfindex; World
Development Indicators (database), World Bank, Washington, DC, http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators; Bankscope (database),
Bureau van Dijk, Brussels, http://www.bvdinfo.com/en-gb/products/company-information/international/bankscope.
Note: Dependent variable: percentage of adults citing religious reasons for not having an account. Regressions include a constant term. Robust standard errors are
reported.
.. indicates that the variable could not be included in the regression. OIC = Organization of Islamic Cooperation.
Significance level: * = 10 percent, ** = 5 percent, *** = 1 percent.
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TABLE B1.4.3
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Islamic Banking, Religiosity, and Firm Access to Financial Services
Indicator
All countries
OIC countries
OIC countries with religiosity > 85%
OIC dummy
GDP per capita, US$, 1,000s
Islamic banks per 100,000 adults
Observations
R-Squared
8.59**
1.23***
52.70*
107
0.25
..
6.12***
61.97*
32
0.35
..
5.79***
108.76**
24
0.38
Sources: Calculations based on Enterprise Surveys (database), International Finance Corporation and World Bank, Washington, DC, http://www.enterprisesurveys
.org; World Development Indicators (database), World Bank, Washington, DC, http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators; Bankscope
(database), Bureau van Dijk, Brussels, http://www.bvdinfo.com/en-gb/products/company-information/international/bankscope.
Note: Dependent variable: percentage of firms identifying access to finance as a major constraint. All regressions include a constant term. Robust standard errors
are reported.
.. indicates that the variable was not included in the regression. OIC = Organization of Islamic Cooperation.
Significance level: * = 10 percent, ** = 5 percent, *** = 1 percent.
BOX 1.4
FIGURE B1.4.1
(continued)
Islamic Banking, Religiosity, and Access of Firms to Financial Services

0
Size of the regression coefficients for

number of Islamic banks per 100,000 adults
38
25
75
125
175
All countries
OIC countries
All firms
Small firms
OIC countries with

religiosity index > 85%
Medium firms
Sources: Calculations based on Enterprise Surveys (database), International Finance Corporation and World Bank, Washington, DC, http://www.enterprisesurveys.org;
World Development Indicators (database), World Bank, Washington, DC, http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators; Bankscope (database), Bureau van Dijk, Brussels, http://www.bvdinfo.com/en-gb/products/company-information/international/bankscope.
Note: The dependent variable is the percentage of firms identifying access to finance as a major constraint. All regressions include a constant term and GDP per capita.
Robust standard errors are used. Only coefficients significant at 10 percent or less are included in the figure. OIC = Organization of Islamic Cooperation.
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FIGURE 1.15 Ratio of Cooperatives, State Specialized Financial Institutions, and Microfinance Institution Branches to
Commercial Bank Branches
Financial institution branches

per 1,000 commercial bank branches
700
600
500
400
480
300
49
200
100
269
44
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74
138
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countries
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East Asia
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53
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4
44
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Central Asia
Latin America and

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209
35
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37
61
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Asia
Sub-Saharan
Africa
Microfinance institutions
Source: Financial Access (database) 2010, Consultative Group to Assist the Poor and World Bank, Washington, DC, http://www.cgap.org/data/financial-access-2010-database-cgap.
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70
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60
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42
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Philippines
40
30
Sweden
20
0
10
15
Account penetration in the richest 20% as a multiple of that in the poorest 20%
Source: Calculations based on Demirg-Kunt and Klapper 2012; World Development Indicators (database), World Bank, Washington, DC, http://data
.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators.
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FIGURE 2.1
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125
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Source: World Development Indicators (database), World Bank, Washington, DC, http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators.
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FIGURE B2.1.1
Remittances and Financial Inclusion

b. Remittances per capita
a. Remittances to GDP
100
90
90
Account penetration among adults, %
100
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
R 2 = 0.253
10
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
0
0
10
20
30
Gross remittance flows, % of GDP
40
50
0.0
1.0
2.0
3.0
4.0
Log, gross remittance flows per capita

> 1 mobile per person
< 1 mobile per person
Source: Calculations based on Global Financial Inclusion (Global Findex) Database, World Bank, Washington, DC, http://www.worldbank.org/globalfindex.
Note: Gross remittance flows is the sum of remittance payments and receipts.
56
BOX 2.1
Remittances, Technology, and Financial Inclusion
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Correspondent Banking and Financial Inclusion in Brazil
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TABLE B2.2.1
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Correspondent Banking, Brazil, December 2010

Links, %
Region
North
Northeast
Central-West
Southeast
South
All
59
Number
6,850
31,752
11,948
67,878
31,195
151,623
Activities authorized, operational correspondents, %
Bank
Financial
company
Open
account
Funds
transfers
Payments
(send and receive)
Loans and
finance
Credit
cards
91
93
86
82
80
84
14
13
19
31
27
24
34
29
25
23
28
26
48
47
40
31
37
37
79
81
72
61
68
68
53
51
58
66
66
62
42
41
40
38
38
39
Source: Calculations based on data of the Central Bank of Brazil.
60
BOX 2.2
Correspondent Banking and Financial Inclusion in Brazil
FIGURE B2.2.1 Voyager III: Bradescos Correspondent

Bank in the Amazon
Source: Banco Bradesco. Used with permission; further permission required

for reuse.
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identification and credit reporting
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61
BOX 2.3
The Credit Market Consequences of Improved Personal Identification
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Fingerprinting in Malawi
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
91 92
88
79
93 96
b. Repayment: balance, eventual

98
8,000
89
7,609
7,000
74
6,000
5,000
MK
Paid on time, %
a. Repayment: balance paid on time
3,888
4,000
2,975
3,000
26
2,000
1,506
1,486
1,133
1,000
Q2
Q3
Quintiles
Q4
Q5
Q1
Q2
c. Land allocated to paprika

25
22 21
21
20
19
572
197
11,803
12,000
10,000
MK
11
8,381
6,000
5
Q5
Fingerprinted
8,088
8,874
2,503
2,000
Q4
12,378
4,911
4,000
Q3
Quintiles
Q5
11,262
9,858
9,600
8,000
10
Q2
Q4
d. Market inputs used on paprika
19
Q1
Q3
Quintiles
14,000
23 23
15 16
15
1,737
1,024
0
Q1
Allocated land, %
62
Q1
Q2
Q3
Quintiles
Q4
Q5
Control
Source: Calculations based on Gin, Goldberg, and Yang 2012.

Note: The graphs show the repayment rates among fingerprinted (gold) and control (blue) groups by quintiles of the ex ante probability of default. Individuals in the
worst quintile (Q1) are those with the highest probability of default and those on whom fingerprinting had the largest effect. MK = Malawi kwacha.
BOX 2.3
The Credit Market Consequences of Improved Personal Identification

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Mobile Phone Penetration and Mobile Payments

b. Mobile phones and sending money
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Sources: Calculations based on data from the World Development Indicators (database), World Bank, Washington, DC, http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development
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Sources: Global Financial Inclusion (Global Findex) Database, World Bank, Washington, DC, http://www.worldbank.org/globalfindex; World Development Indicators (database),
World Bank, Washington, DC, http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators; Faz and Moser 2013.
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FIGURE B2.4.1 Growth in Livestock and Weather
Microinsurance, India
600
500
Index, 2005 = 100
BOX 2.4
400
300
200
100
0
2005
2006
2007
Livestock
2008
2009
Weather
Source: BASIX administrative data.

Note: Total nominal premiums (in Rs) paid on livestock and weather microinsurance policies. Rainfall insurance data are for Andhra Pradesh only; livestock
insurance data are for all states.
BOX 2.4
Insurance: Designing Appropriate Products for Risk Management

(continued)
FIGURE B2.4.2 Payouts Relative to Premiums,

Rainfall and Livestock Insurance, India
4.0
Payouts divided by premiums
72
3.5
3.0
2.5
2.0
1.5
1.0
0.5
0
2003
2004
2005
2006
Livestock
2007
2008
2009
Weather
Source: BASIX administrative data.

Note: The figure shows the payouts relative to the total premiums paid for
insurance policies sold by BASIX across all states.
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FIGURE 2.4
Equity Banks Effect on Financial Inclusion
Changes in the probability of a

household having a bank account, %
6.9
5.8
5.3
5.2
5
4
3
2
1
0.5
1.1
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0.2
0
Low asset
score
High asset
score
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own house
Owns
house
No secondary
or tertiary
education
Has secondary
or tertiary
education
Nonsalaried
job
Salaried job
Source: Based on Allen and others 2012a.

Note: The figure shows estimates from a probit model of changes in the probability of a household having a bank account that are associated with the presence of Equity Bank.
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75
76
TABLE 2.1 Financial Knowledge around the World

Economy, year
Q1:a Compound
interest, %
Q2:b
inflation, %
Q3:c Risk
diversification, %
63 (20)
60 (32)
64 (31)
82
64 (47)
61 (46)
76 (29)
40
71
85
86
75 (54)
60 (27)
35
61 (37)
65
74
80
86
78
61
78
58
60
59
77
81
87
77
60
61
64
41
54
57
62
60
61
47
45
40
52
27
51
55
68
55
52
535
1,005
993
1,059
1,005
998
1,010
3,992
5,268
1,324
850
2,117
1,008
1,302
1,579
1,488
40 (10)
46
22
39
2
26
54 (30)
31
40 (14)
24
36
44 (21)
61
46
58
46
26
69
62
56
63
43
51
49
63
46
43
51
13
48
1,008
1,207
1,036
1,618
13,054
1,526
1,046
2,022
2,254
2,048
1,366
3,017
83
25
61
39
17
64
59
31
28
60
52
1,545
1,496
3,360
2,500
1,000
2,022
Survey
sample, total
Source
High income
British Virgin Islands, 2011
Czech Republic, 2010
Estonia, 2010
Germany, 2009
Germany, 2010
Hungary, 2010
Ireland, 2010
Italy, 2006
Japan, 2010
Netherlands, 2010
New Zealand, 2009
Norway, 2010
Poland, 2010
Sweden, 2010
United Kingdom, 2010
United States, 2009
OECD survey
OECD survey
OECD survey
Bucher-Koenen and Lusardi 2011
OECD survey
OECD survey
OECD survey
Fornero and Monticone 2011
Sekita 2011
Alessie, Van Rooij, and Lusardi 2011
Crossan, Feslier, and Hurnard 2011
OECD survey
OECD survey
Almenberg and Save-Soderbergh 2011
OECD survey
Lusardi and Mitchell 2011a
Upper-middle income
Albania, 2011
Azerbaijan, 2009
Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2011
Bulgaria, 2010
Chile, 2006
Colombia, 2012
Malaysia, 2010
Mexico, 2012
Peru, 2010
Romania, 2010
Russian Federation, 2009
South Africa, 2010
OECD survey
World Bank
World Bank
World Bank
Behrman and others 2010
World Bank
OECD survey
World Bank
OECD survey
World Bank
Klapper and Panos 2011
OECD survey
Lower-middle income and lower income

Armenia, 2010
India, 2006
Indonesia, 2007
Mongolia, 2012
Tajikistan, 2012
West Bank and Gaza, 2011
53 (18)
59
78
58
56
51
OECD survey
Cole, Sampson, and Zia 2011
Cole, Sampson, and Zia 2011
World Bank
World Bank
World Bank
Source: An expanded and updated version of Xu and Zia 2012.

Note: Countries are ordered alphabetically. Additional information on World Bank surveys of financial capability can be found at Responsible Finance (database), World Bank,
Washington, DC, http://responsiblefinance.worldbank.org/. OECD = Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. = not available. The questions have been
worded as indicated in the table notes below. The correct answers are shown in italics.
a. Q1: Suppose you had $100 in a savings account, and the interest rate was 2 percent per year. After five years, how much do you think you would have in the account if you left
the money to grow? (More than $102/Exactly $102/Less than $102/Do not know/Refuse to answer). Respondents in Azerbaijan, Chile, Romania, Russia, and Sweden were asked a
more difficult question. For example, in Sweden, the question was Suppose you have SKr 200 in a savings account. The interest is 10 percent per year and is added into the same
account. How much will you have in the account after two years? The OECD data for compound interest in the table include correct responses to a question on the calculation of
interest and principal and, in the parentheses, the correct responses to two questions on compound interest.
b. Q2: Imagine that the interest rate on your savings account were 1 percent per year, and inflation were 2 percent per year. After one year, how much would you be able to buy
with the money in this account? (More than today/Exactly the same/Less than today/Do not know/Refuse to answer). In Russia and in the West Bank and Gaza the question was
Lets assume that, in 2010, your income is twice as much as now, and consumer prices also grow twofold. Do you think that, in 2010, you will be able to buy more, less, or the
same amount of goods and services as today?
c. Q3: True or false: Buying a single companys stock usually provides a safer return than a stock mutual fund. (True/False/Do not know/Refuse to answer). Respondents in New
Zealand were asked a more difficult question: Which one of the following is generally considered to make you the most money over the next 15 to 20 years: a savings account,
a range of shares, a range of fixed interest investments, or a checking account? Respondents in Russia were asked: Which is the riskier asset to invest in: shares in a single
company stock, or shares in a unit fund, or are the risks identical in both cases? In Indonesia and India: Do you think the following statement is true or false? For farmers, planting
one crop is usually safer than planting multiple crops. The result for Italy is from a 2008 update of the survey, since a comparable question was not asked in 2006.
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77
78
FIGURE 2.5
Borrowing for Food and Other Essentials, by Level of Education
100
Share of all respondents, %
80
38
41
65
72
69
30
22
27
78
63
76
79
72
67
77
65
65
68
37
50
42
61
33
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28
55
44
53
29
72
76
24
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60
40
29
36
20
33
23
21
1
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20
20
24
4
21
6
10
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y
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im
ar
y
Se
co
nd
ar
y
Te
rti
ar
y
26
25
Armenia
Colombia
Lebanon
Regularly
Mexico
Nigeria
Sometimes
Turkey
Uruguay
No
Sources: Based on data of the World Bank Survey of Financial Capability 2012; World Bank 2013a.
Note: Primary, secondary, and tertiary refer to the respondents highest education. The chart shows responses to the following question: Do you ever use credit or borrow money
to buy food or essentials?
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FIGURE 2.6
Survey Results on Financial Capability

a. Not overspending
b. Living within means
100
100
71
70
69
72
80
60
40
20
81
67
64
60
40
20
80
80
60
48
42
35
49
44
39
20
ua
y
ug
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Tu
Ur
ria
ge
Ni
ico
60
55
47
45
55
43
39
40
23
20
ua
y
ug
Ur
Tu
rke
ria
ge
Ni
ico
ex
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n
no
ba
Le
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nia
me
ug
Ur
Ar
ua
y
y
rke
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ge
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ico
ex
M
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ba
Le
bia
lom
Co
me
Ar
0
nia
Average response, 0100
100
40
ex
d. Saving
100
60
no
Le
ba
lom
bia
nia
Ar
Ur
ug
me
ua
y
y
rke
Tu
ria
ge
Ni
ex
M
ba
Le
Co
ico
n
no
bia
lom
me
Ar
c. Monitoring
82
78
0
nia
81
75
Co
82
78
84
80
Sources: World Bank Survey of Financial Capability 2012; Kempson, Perotti, and Scott 2013.
Note: The figure illustrates the average among respondents, on a range from 0 to 100. The score for each component is a weighted combination of variables generated from the
responses to several questions about different, but related behaviors or attitudes.
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FINANCIAL EDUCATION
PROGRAMS
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TABLE 2.2
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Effects of Financial Literacy Interventions and Monetary Incentives, Indonesia
Effect on the probability of opening a bank account, percentage points

Indicator
Full sample
By education level
Financial literacy training

Monetary incentive Rp 75,000 ($8)
Monetary incentive Rp 125,000 ($14)
Financial literacy training and no formal schooling
Financial literacy training and below median financial literacy
+2.9
+6.6*
+13.7***
3.2
+6.1**
+9.9***
+15.5**
Source: Based on Cole, Sampson, and Zia 2011.

Note: Empty cells indicate the information was not included in the regression.
Significance level: * = 10 percent, ** = 5 percent, *** = 1 percent
By financial
literacy score
4.9
+6.0
+10.0***
+10.0**
81
82
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FIGURE 2.7
Effects of Secondary-School Financial Education, Brazil

a. Students financial knowledge
b. Students who save
65
50
49
62
60
60
46
45
59
Students, %
Average score, scale 0100
83
56
55
50
44
40
40
35
Control
Treatment
Follow-up 1
Control
Treatment
Follow-up 2
Control
Treatment
Control
Follow-up 1
Treatment
Follow-up 2
Source: Bruhn and others 2013.

Note: Students completed surveys that included a test of financial proficiency, with scores from 0 to 100. The intervention was launched in August 2010; the first follow-up survey
was conducted in early December 2010; and the second follow-up survey was conducted in December 2011.
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CONSUMER PROTECTION AND
MARKET CONDUCT
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85
86
BOX 2.5
Behavior Change through Mass Media: A South Africa Example
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Source: Ochre Media and e.tv. Used with permission; further permission required for reuse.
Behavior Change through Mass Media: A South Africa Example
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FIGURE B2.5.2
Effects of Entertainment Education

31
30
Respondents, %
BOX 2.5
26
25
20
19
15
10
5
0
Has someone in the
household used hire purchase
in the past 6 months?
Treatment
Has someone in the

household gambled money
in the past 6 months?
Control
Source: Berg and Zia 2013.

Note: Hire purchase refers to contracts whereby people pay for goods in
installments.
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Case Study: New Financial Disclosure Requirements in Mexico
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350
300
250
3
200
150
100
1
Actions taken per year
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FIGURE 2.8
Actions
Instruments available
The rules on the books vs. enforcement
91
50
0
0
Low income
Lower-middle Upper-middle
income
income
High income
Actions taken per year (right axis)

Instruments available (left axis)
Sources: Bank Regulation and Supervision Survey (database), World Bank, Washington, DC, http://
go.worldbank.org/WFIEF81AP0; Cihk and others 2013.
Note: The numbers are per country averages for the respective country groups.
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b. High financial depth economies
60
30
20
40
35
50
Share of countries, %
40
40
30
20
10
10
c. Low financial depth economies

45
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
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19
9
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20
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20
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20
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10
a. All economies
60
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00
20
01
20
0
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0
20 3
0
20 4
05
20
06
20
07
20
0
20 8
0
20 9
10
FIGURE 2.9
Twin peaks
Source: Meleck and Podpiera 2012.
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GOVERNMENT POLICIES FOR
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Credit Information Sharing and Per Capita Income
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0.8
Coverage of credit reporting system, % of population

Sources: Global Financial Development Report (database), World Bank, Washington, DC,
http://www.worldbank.org/financialdevelopment; International Financial Statistics (database),
International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC, http://elibrary-data.imf.org/FindDataReports
.aspx?d=33061&e=169393.
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FIGURE B2.7.1 Credit Bureaus and Registries Are
Less Likely if Banks Are Powerful
1.0
Probability of existence of a credit reporting
BOX 2.7
0.92
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0.6
0.4
0.56
0.53
0.39
0.37
0.2
0
Credit registry
Credit bureau
Low bank concentration
Any credit reporting
High bank concentration
Source: Based on Bruhn, Farazi, and Kanz 2012.

Note: The figure shows the percentage of countries with private (credit
bureau), public (credit registry), or any credit reporting institutions. The
countries are distinguished by high or low bank concentration (above or below
the sample mean). Bank concentration is the asset share of a countrys three
largest banks.
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99
Exiting the Debt Trap: Can Borrower Bailouts Restore Access to Finance?
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BOX 2.8
Exiting the Debt Trap: Can Borrower Bailouts Restore Access to Finance?
(continued)
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FIGURE B2.8.1
Bailouts and Moral Hazard

a. Credit growth
b. Loan performance
Program
launched
5,000
70
15
60
4,000
40
3,000
30
2,000
20
1,000
10
0
0
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
New credit (amount)
New loans (number)
Loans ['000]
50
Nonperforming loans, %
6,000
Agricultural credit, Rs million
100
Program
launched
13
11
9
7
5
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
Nonperforming agricultural loans/loans outstanding
Source: Based on Gin and Kanz 2013.

Note: Rs = Indian rupees.
a. Waiving, Not Drowning: India Writes Off Farm Loans. Has It Also Written Off the Rural Credit Culture? The Economist, July 3, 2008.
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FIGURE 3.1 Percentage of Micro, Very Small, Small,

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100
90
80
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2
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1
12
17
23
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3
15
50
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Source: IFC Enterprise Finance Gap Database, SME Finance Forum, http://smefinanceforum.org.
Note: The data cover 177 countries. The observation year varies from 2003 to 2010 by country. Firm
size is based on the number of employees (14: micro; 59: very small; 1049: small; and 50250:
medium). The data set does not include large firms (typically less numerous than medium firms).
FIGURE 3.2 Biggest Obstacles Affecting the Operations of

Informal Firms
40
36
30
22
16
20
10
0
High returns to capital for

microenterprises
23
60
30
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MICROENTERPRISES
107
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public
land infrastructure
Source: World Bank informal enterprise surveys.

Note: The figure covers microenterprises (05 employees) and small firms (620 employees) in
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obstacle to business. Other includes difficult business registration procedures, the workforce,
limited demand for products or services, and political instability.
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BOX 3.1
Financial Inclusion of Informal Firms: Cross-Country Evidence
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TABLE B3.1.1 Snapshot of Informal Firms

Indicator
Share of firms, %
Size: microenterprise (05 employees)

Age: 10 years or less
Level of education: no education
Largest owner has a job in a formal business
Use of accounts
Use of loans
Working capital finance: internal funds, family, and moneylenders
Investment finance: internal funds, family, and moneylenders
Would like to register
Main reason for not registering: taxes
Most important benefit of registering: access to finance
89
74
6
8
23
11
80
84
59
26
52
Source: Farazi 2013.
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BOX 3.1
Financial Inclusion of Informal Firms: Cross-Country Evidence

(continued)
FIGURE B3.1.1
Use of Finance by Informal Firms
15
0.10
Regression estimates,
probability of use of finance
10
0.06
0.06
0.04
0.02
0
5
0.03
0.06 0.07
10
0.07
15
20
0.16
Size Education Job
Accounts
Education
Education Job
Loans
Internal funds, etc.
Size
Job
Financing Sources:
Banks
Size Education
MFIs
Regressions
Source: Farazi 2013.
Note: Variables listed above the line are independent variables, while those listed below the line are dependent variables. The orange bars are regression
estimates for accounts as a dependent variable (equals 1 if a firm has a bank account and 0 otherwise); the blue bar is a regression estimate for loans as a
dependent variable (equals 1 if a firm has a loan and 0 otherwise); and the red bars are estimates derived from separate regressions for different sources for
the financing of working capital (outcome variables equal 1 if firms use a given financing source and 0 otherwise). Each regression controls for firm-level variables (age, microsize, sector, owners gender, educational level, and job in the formal sector) and country fixed effects. The results are robust if country-level
variables (proxies for financial sector development and the quality of institutions) are used instead of country fixed effects. A probit model is used; estimates
show marginal effects. MFI = microfinance institution.
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109
BOX 3.2
Returns to Capital in Microenterprises: Evidence from a Field Experiment
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5.29
5
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110
3.80
4
3
2
1.56
2.43
0
1
2
3
Average returns
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Average returns
to capital with
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Change in returns
for higher value
of household
asset index
Change in returns
for higher value
of years of
education
Change in returns
for higher value
of digit span recall
Source: De Mel, McKenzie, and Woodruff 2008.

Note: The returns are shown in percent per month. The orange bar shows the average returns to capital for the whole sample. The
blue bar shows the estimated returns based on regressions that control for indicators of ability (including years of schooling and
digit span recall) and household assets. The household asset index is the first principal component of variables representing the
ownership of 17 household durables; digit span recall is the number of digits the owner was able to repeat from memory 10 seconds
after viewing a card showing the numbers (ranging from 3 to 11). The three red bars show how much returns changed relative to the
blue bar at a higher household asset index, more years of education, or longer digit span recall, respectively.
BOX 3.2
Returns to Capital in Microenterprises: Evidence from a Field Experiment

(continued)
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without Banco Azteca over Time
15.0
9.0
Banco Azteca opening
8.8
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14.0
8.4
13.5
8.2
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8.0
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7.8
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2000
2001
2002
2003
Individuals who are informal business

owners (municipalities with Banco Azteca), %
BOX 3.3
Individuals who are informal business

owners (municipalities without Banco Azteca), %
114
2004
2nd 3rd 4th 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 1st 2nd 3rd 4th
Quarter
Quarter
Quarter
Quarter
Quarter
Municipalities without Banco Azteca
Municipalities with Banco Azteca
Source: Bruhn and Love 2013.
BOX 3.3

and Earnings (continued)
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115
116
FIGURE 3.3
Employment Shares of SMEs vs. Large Firms
Percentage of employees working in . . .
100
90
80
70
45
50
60
55
40
45
Upper middle
High
60
50
40
30
20
55
50
10
0
Low
Lower middle

Small and medium enterprises
Large firms
Source: Calculations based on Ayyagari, Demirg-Kunt, and Maksimovic 2011a.

Note: The year of observation varies by country, ranging from 2006 to 2010. Firm size categories
are defined based on the number of employees: 599 refers to small and medium enterprises
(SMEs), and 100+ refers to large firms. Shown are the mean employment shares across countries
within each income group. The data do not cover employment in firms with less than 5 employees
or employment in informal firms.
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117
FIGURE 3.4 Voluntary vs. Involuntary Exclusion from Loan

Applications, SMEs
All small and medium enterprises

100%
Applied
for a loan
Low: 25%
Middle: 33%
High: 33%
Did not apply

Low: 75%
Middle: 67%
High: 67%
No need
for a loan
Low: 31%
Middle: 40%
High: 46%
Low: 44%
Middle: 28%
High: 20%
Interest
rates
Low: 13%
Middle: 9%
High: 4%
Application Collateral
Other
procedures requirements Low: 12%
Low: 7%
Low: 12%
Middle: 9%
Middle: 5% Middle: 4%
High: 10%
High: 4%
High: 2%
Source: 200612 data from the Enterprise Surveys (database), International Finance Corporation
and World Bank, Washington, DC, http://www.enterprisesurveys.org.
Note: The figure includes data on 120 countries and relies on the most recent enterprise survey
for each country. It covers only small and medium enterprises ( SMEs), that is, firms with 599
employees. The last row lists the main reason firms did not apply for loans. Other reasons for
involuntary exclusion include Did not think would be approved; Size of loan and maturity are
insufficient; It is necessary to make side payments; and unspecified reasons. Low, Middle,
High refer to low, middle, and high-income economies, respectively.
FIGURE 3.5 Voluntary vs. Involuntary Exclusion from Loan

Applications, Large Firms
All large firms

100%
Applied
for a loan
Low: 41%
Middle: 47%
High: 47%
Did not apply

Low: 59%
Middle: 53%
High: 53%
No need
for a loan
Low: 34%
Middle: 39%
High: 39%
Low: 25%
Middle: 14%
High: 14%
Interest
rates
Low: 8%
Middle: 4%
High: 2%
Application Collateral
procedures requirements
Low: 3%
Low: 5%
Middle: 2% Middle: 2%
High: 2%
High: 1%
Other
Low: 10%
Middle: 6%
High: 9%
Source: 200612 data from the Enterprise Surveys (database), International Finance Corporation
and World Bank, Washington, DC, http://www.enterprisesurveys.org.
Note: The figure includes data on 120 countries and relies on the most recent enterprise survey
for each country. It covers only large firms, that is, firms with 100+ employees. The last row lists
the main reason firms did not apply for loans. Other reasons for involuntary exclusion include
Did not think would be approved; Size of loan and maturity are insufficient; It is necessary to
make side payments; and unspecified reasons. Low, Middle, High refer to low, middle, and highincome economies, respectively.
118
FIGURE 3.6
The Depth of Credit Information
4.5
4.2
3.7
Depth of credit information index
4
3.5
2.9
3
2.5
Private sector initiatives to expand

SME lending
2
1.5
1.3
1
0.5
0
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Source: 2012 data from Doing Business (database), International Finance Corporation and World
Bank, Washington, DC, http://www.doingbusiness.org/data.
Note: The figure shows average values across all countries in each income group. The depth of
credit information runs from 0 to 6; the higher values indicate the availability of more comprehensive credit information. The index measures rules and practices affecting the coverage, scope, and
accessibility of the credit information available through either a public credit registry or a private
credit bureau.
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Financing SMEs in Africa: Competition, Innovation, and Governments
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Financing Small and Medium Enterprises in Africa

b. Share of SME loans in total loans
59
60
48
50
40
23
20
10
10
12
0
Kenya
Nigeria
Rwanda South Africa Tanzania
SME lending,
% of all bank lending
SMEs with bank loan or line of credit, %
a. Share of SMEs with loans
70
30
119
18
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
17
17
14
8
5
Kenya
Nigeria
Rwanda South Africa Tanzania
Sources: Panel a: Enterprise Surveys (database), International Finance Corporation and World Bank, Washington, DC, http://www.enterprisesurveys.org;
additional small and medium enterprise (SME) surveys (see the text). Panel b: SME finance surveys (see the text).
120
BOX 3.4
Financing SMEs in Africa: Competition, Innovation, and Governments

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Effect of Collateral Registry Reforms

on Access to Finance
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70
60
50
40
54
50
41
30
20
10
0
Prereform
Registry reformers
Postreform
Nonreformers
(matched by region and income)
Source: Doing Business (database), International Finance Corporation and

World Bank, Washington, DC, http://www.doingbusiness.org/data; Enterprise Surveys (database), International Finance Corporation and World Bank,
Washington, DC, http://www.enterprisesurveys.org; calculations by Love,
Martnez Pera, and Singh 2013.
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127
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Source: Data for 2006, 2007, and 2009 from Enterprise Surveys (database), International Finance
Corporation and World Bank, Washington, DC, http://www.enterprisesurveys.org.
Note: The data cover 23 countries. It shows results based on the most recent enterprise survey for
each country.
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Financing Patterns by Firm Age
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Source: Chavis, Klapper, and Love 2011 based on 19992006 data on 170 cross-sectional surveys
in 104 countries in Enterprise Surveys (database), International Finance Corporation and World
Bank, Washington, DC, http://www.enterprisesurveys.org.
Note: The figure shows the share of firms that use the financing source for working capital or new
investment. Informal sources of finance include family and friends.
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0.02
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External financing
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Increase in core innovation index when proportion of new investment

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Source: Ayyagari, Demirg-Kunt, and Maksimovic 2011b.
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upgraded an existing product line, or introduced a new technology. External financing comprises
bank financing and all other financing that is not from internal funds or retained earnings.
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FIGURE B3.8.1
Business Sectors of YouWiN! Winners
Agriculture
IT and computer services
Manufacturing
Other professional services
Other industries
Tailoring
Construction
Retail trade
Personal services
Food preparation
0
10
15
20
25
30
35
Firms in each business sector, %

New businesses
Existing businesses
Source: YouWiN! program organizers.

Note: The data are based on the self-classification of applicants at the time of
the submission of their business plans. IT = information technology.
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FIGURE 3.10 Number of Countries with Joint

Titling of Major Assets for Married Couples
No joint
titling,
11
Joint titling
is default,
54
Joint titling
available, but
not default, 76
Source: Calculations based on 2012 data of the Women, Business, and

the Law (database), World Bank, Washington, DC, http://wbl.worldbank
.org/.
Note: The sample includes 141 countries. Major assets include land or the
marital home.
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FIGURE 3.11
25
Adults with an Account Used for Business Purposes

24 23
20
Adults, %
142
15
10
6
2
4 4
0
High
income
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and Pacific
Europe and
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Latin America
and the
Caribbean
Rural
Middle East and

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South
Asia
Sub-Saharan
Africa
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Source: Calculations based on the Global Financial Inclusion (Global Findex) Database, World Bank, Washington, DC, http://www.worldbank.org/globalfindex.
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149
Statistical Appendixes
This section consists of three appendixes.
to the 2014 Global Financial Development

Report.
Appendix A presents basic country-bycountry data on financial system characteristics around the world. It also presents averages of the same indicators for peer groups
of countries, together with summary maps. It
is an update on information from the 2013
Global Financial Development Report. The
eight indicators in this part remain the same
as those shown in the previous report, with
the exception of account at a formal financial institution (%, age 15+), which replaces
the previously shown accounts per thousand
adults, commercial banks. A key reason
for this change is the higher coverage of the
newly shown indicator.
Appendix B provides additional country-bycountry information on key aspects of financial inclusion around the world. It is specific
Appendix C contains additional country-bycountry information on Islamic banking and

financial inclusion in Organization of Islamic
Cooperation (OIC) member countries. It is
also specific to the 2014 Global Financial
Development Report.
These appendixes present only a small
part of the Global Financial Development
Database (GFDD), available at http://www
.worldbank.org/financialdevelopment. The
2014 Global Financial Development Report
is also accompanied by The Little Data Book
on Financial Development 2014, which is
a pocket edition of the GFDD. It presents
country-by-country and also regional figures of a larger set of variables than what are
shown here.
151
152
APPENDIX A
APPENDIX A
BASIC DATA ON FINANCIAL SYSTEM CHARACTERISTICS, 200911
TABLE A.1
Countries and Their Financial System Characteristics, Averages, 200911

Financial institutions
Economy
Afghanistan
Private credit
by deposit
money banks
to GDP (%)
Account
at a formal
financial
institution
(%, age 15+)
Financial markets
Bank
lendingdeposit
spread
(%)
Bank
Z-score
7.8
9.0
Albania
35.7
28.3
6.3
3.2
Algeria
14.4
33.3
6.3
20.3
Stock market
Market
capitalization
capitalization
+ outstanding
excluding top
domestic
10 companies
private debt
to total market
securities to
capitalization (%)
GDP (%)
Stock
market
turnover
ratio (%)
Stock
price
volatility
8.8
Andorra
19.0
Angola
18.3
Antigua and Barbuda
77.7
Argentina
12.7
33.1
3.0
5.2
16.7
Armenia
25.6
17.5
9.6
17.7
1.5
7.8
20.9
3.1
11.7
166.3
57.0
84.2
22.0
27.4
71.6
36.8
57.8
35.5
87.2
2.5
11.6
Aruba
39.2
10.1
12.4
7.3
58.8
Australia
122.4
99.1
Austria
120.9
97.1
Azerbaijan
17.0
14.9
8.3
10.2
29.4
5.1
Bahamas, The
84.8
2.1
29.2
Bahrain
79.4
64.5
6.1
17.9
Bangladesh
41.2
39.6
5.2
8.1
12.0
146.7
Barbados
81.2
6.1
13.8
119.8
0.4
Belarus
33.3
58.6
0.5
15.8
Belgium
94.3
96.3
104.0
48.4
Belize
63.2
Benin
22.5
15.8
0.6
6.0
6.3
10.5
25.1
18.4
17.0
Bermuda
15.9
Bhutan
36.4
Bolivia
32.9
28.0
9.1
9.4
Bosnia and Herzegovina
51.7
56.2
4.6
14.3
Botswana
25.3
30.3
6.0
14.6
32.2
Brazil
50.3
55.9
33.1
21.2
81.7
Brunei Darussalam
39.5
Bulgaria
11.1
52.8
37.1
5.0
9.5
6.5
16.7
Burkina Faso
17.3
13.4
8.5
Burundi
14.7
7.2
19.3
Cambodia
25.4
3.7
9.7
Cameroon
11.1
14.8
30.5
Canada
Cape Verde
35.1
0.3
95.8
59.0
2.4
7.5
20.1
12.6
45.6
15.2
142.3
70.4
3.1
7.7
68.5
33.8
4.8
26.5
78.0
25.5
TABLE A.1
APPENDIX A
153
Countries and Their Financial System Characteristics, Averages, 200911 (continued)

Economy
Private credit
by deposit
money banks
to GDP (%)
Account
at a formal
financial
institution
(%, age 15+)
Financial markets
Bank
lendingdeposit
spread
(%)
Cayman Islands
Central African Republic
Bank
Z-score
Stock market
Market
capitalization
capitalization
+ outstanding
excluding top
domestic
10 companies
private debt
to total market
securities to
capitalization (%)
GDP (%)
Stock
market
turnover
ratio (%)
Stock
price
volatility
9.0
7.6
3.3
13.7
Chad
4.9
9.0
Chile
64.6
42.2
4.0
17.9
15.1
145.5
53.4
18.4
19.3
China
118.1
63.8
3.1
19.4
95.2
74.5
188.9
30.9
Colombia
31.2
30.4
6.5
6.5
57.7
22.9
12.6
20.2
Comoros
15.1
21.7
5.2
3.7
39.8
4.2
28.3
4.4
2.4
19.4
28.2
2.0
58.1
40.5
4.6
Congo, Dem. Rep.

5.0
9.0
Costa Rica
Congo, Rep.
46.0
50.4
12.2
Cte dIvoire
17.6
Croatia
68.6
88.4
8.3
272.7
85.2
Cuba
Cyprus
9.6
Czech Republic
80.7
Denmark
99.7
Djibouti
25.8
Dominica
52.4
Dominican Republic
20.9
38.2
Ecuador
27.2
36.7
Egypt, Arab Rep.
33.2
9.7
4.6
13.8
El Salvador
Equatorial Guinea
Estonia
12.3
3.8
4.7
11.9
35.0
36.0
32.5
246.5
78.5
27.7
2.1
7.1
7.0
15.4
39.9
38.1
45.3
33.2
27.1
21.2
1.0
11.2
14.1
13.8
1.7
9.4
7.8
8.4
18.4
7.1
99.5
17.9
12.3
6.2
4.9
25.9
14.7
9.4
56.6
16.6
96.8
5.4
Ethiopia
Fiji
27.7
8.0
26.1
10.4
48.1
2.9
Finland
93.3
99.7
12.7
72.0
102.3
28.6
France
112.2
97.0
14.2
123.3
79.9
29.7
8.6
18.9
Gabon
Gambia, The
13.2
13.5
13.4
Georgia
30.8
33.0
8.1
6.3
Germany
108.0
98.1
12.9
68.5
Ghana
13.9
29.4
9.0
9.4
Greece
109.2
77.9
0.3
44.3
Grenada
79.5
Guatemala
23.7
22.3
15.5
5.5
7.6
13.6
8.1
18.8
0.3
53.7
115.5
39.2
62.9
27.8
3.2
36.3
(appendix continued next page)
154
APPENDIX A
TABLE A.1 Countries and Their Financial System Characteristics, Averages, 200911 (continued)
Economy
Private credit
by deposit
money banks
to GDP (%)
Guinea
5.0
Guinea-Bissau
33.6
Haiti
13.2
Honduras
48.7
166.3
Hungary
Iceland
Bank
lendingdeposit
spread
(%)
3.7
Stock
price
volatility
3.2
12.3
18.9
22.0
14.8
19.5
20.5
9.4
30.0
88.7
5.0
11.9
465.5
61.8
150.6
32.6
72.7
3.3
11.7
25.6
4.1
97.9
35.2
110.0
India
45.5
35.2
Indonesia
24.4
19.6
5.6
Iran, Islamic Rep.
24.6
73.7
0.1
Iraq
Bank
Z-score
Stock
market
turnover
ratio (%)
6.7
Guyana
Hong Kong SAR, China
Account
at a formal
financial
institution
(%, age 15+)
Financial markets
Stock market
Market
capitalization
capitalization
+ outstanding
excluding top
domestic
10 companies
private debt
to total market
securities to
capitalization (%)
GDP (%)
14.0
2.4
84.0
40.2
76.7
70.3
17.5
85.2
30.7
2.8
37.9
55.6
56.3
27.6
15.3
57.4
30.7
26.9
33.7
5.9
10.6
21.8
225.0
93.9
1.6
142.9
19.0
Israel
92.7
90.5
25.5
83.0
45.6
59.9
24.8
Italy
115.7
71.0
11.6
55.5
38.1
172.8
31.6
Ireland
Jamaica
2.9
26.9
71.0
13.1
3.2
49.4
2.8
12.2
Japan
105.1
96.4
1.1
13.0
107.3
65.9
111.6
28.2
Jordan
70.5
25.5
5.0
45.1
119.8
29.9
28.3
16.7
Kazakhstan
42.2
42.1
0.8
34.9
5.2
40.4
Kenya
30.9
42.3
9.4
14.6
35.8
100.8
93.0
1.8
10.2
154.6
Kosovo
32.3
44.3
Kuwait
66.1
86.8
3.0
17.9
3.8
26.8
23.9
17.9
26.8
20.3
4.6
Korea, Rep.
Kyrgyz Republic
Lao PDR
Latvia
7.0
11.0
200.1
26.3
80.6
43.3
14.4
1.7
34.7
67.0
89.7
7.3
4.1
5.7
2.4
29.6
Lebanon
67.9
37.0
2.0
52.7
30.5
9.8
17.1
Lesotho
12.5
18.5
7.8
13.2
Liberia
16.4
18.8
10.5
Libya
9.3
6.1
25.2
Lithuania
Luxembourg
73.8
184.3
Macao SAR, China
52.0
Macedonia, FYR
43.0
Madagascar
11.0
Malawi
14.6
3.5
48.1
4.0
4.2
12.1
27.6
172.8
94.6
5.2
38.5
73.7
2.8
14.7
5.5
38.0
11.9
16.5
20.8
26.4
3.7
0.2
7.9
6.6
26.3
2.3
22.3
TABLE A.1
APPENDIX A
155

Economy
Private credit
by deposit
money banks
to GDP (%)
Malaysia
106.3
Maldives
84.2
Account
at a formal
financial
institution
(%, age 15+)
66.2
Financial markets
Bank
lendingdeposit
spread
(%)
2.5
Bank
Z-score
30.7
Stock market
Market
capitalization
capitalization
+ outstanding
excluding top
domestic
10 companies
private debt
to total market
securities to
capitalization (%)
GDP (%)
Stock
market
turnover
ratio (%)
188.6
62.3
30.4
40.4
6.4
1.2
Stock
price
volatility
13.5
6.3
Mali
17.8
8.2
13.2
Malta
126.2
95.3
14.8
Mauritania
25.5
17.5
9.8
26.8
Mauritius
84.0
80.1
1.0
21.1
59.0
43.2
7.0
15.8
Mexico
18.0
27.4
51.7
35.0
27.2
25.2
4.6
24.9
Micronesia, Fed. Sts.
4.4
21.9
14.0
25.9
Moldova
33.3
18.1
7.1
10.3
Mongolia
39.8
77.7
7.6
22.4
12.3
Montenegro
71.2
50.4
5.9
85.7
Morocco
71.8
39.1
31.4
69.3
Mozambique
22.6
39.9
Myanmar
4.1
28.8
24.2
14.4
32.0
6.3
2.2
5.0
0.5
4.7
6.8
9.2
2.0
4.8
6.2
32.0
2.8
4.5
145.0
25.6
47.9
Namibia
47.5
Nepal
48.9
25.3
Netherlands
204.2
98.7
New Zealand
145.1
99.4
2.0
Nicaragua
32.1
14.2
9.0
Niger
12.0
1.5
Nigeria
29.9
29.7
Norway
27.7
105.6
29.0
44.8
29.8
13.3
11.4
23.7
29.1
106.6
37.0
7.7
18.0
8.8
0.1
19.5
2.0
21.5
83.1
Oman
40.6
73.6
3.4
13.3
31.4
22.6
23.2
Pakistan
21.0
10.3
6.0
13.4
17.5
52.3
22.3
Panama
79.5
24.9
4.7
41.3
30.5
1.2
10.1
Papua New Guinea
25.1
8.9
8.6
113.4
0.4
Paraguay
32.8
21.7
25.6
11.8
1.9
Peru
23.5
20.5
17.3
13.1
56.2
36.1
5.0
32.4
Philippines
28.7
26.6
4.5
22.8
58.5
55.9
22.9
23.8
9.6
32.2
45.5
52.7
30.3
Poland
Portugal
70.2
3.0
186.9
81.2
16.9
94.9
46.6
24.1
Qatar
41.9
65.9
3.6
26.1
79.1
22.6
27.1
Romania
38.4
44.6
6.0
11.0
16.0
8.3
36.6
Russian Federation
42.1
48.2
5.2
7.0
53.6
107.1
45.9
32.8
9.6
8.0
7.7
20.4
Rwanda
Samoa
43.7
36.7
156
APPENDIX A
TABLE A.1 Countries and Their Financial System Characteristics, Averages, 200911 (continued)
Economy
Private credit
by deposit
money banks
to GDP (%)
Account
at a formal
financial
institution
(%, age 15+)
Financial markets
Bank
lendingdeposit
spread
(%)
San Marino
Bank
Z-score
Stock market
Market
capitalization
capitalization
+ outstanding
excluding top
domestic
10 companies
private debt
to total market
securities to
capitalization (%)
GDP (%)
Stock
market
turnover
ratio (%)
Stock
price
volatility
11.3
So Tom and Prncipe
31.6
Saudi Arabia
44.8
17.2
46.4
14.1
69.8
40.5
88.2
27.4
3.7
28.1
85.9
23.8
4.5
23.2
Senegal
25.2
5.8
Serbia
46.9
62.2
6.7
16.2
Seychelles
23.1
8.2
15.1
8.5
15.3
12.2
4.2
Singapore
99.7
98.2
5.2
27.8
153.8
Slovak Republic
47.9
79.6
19.4
10.4
Slovenia
92.0
97.1
12.1
27.1
20.0
5.9
20.6
Solomon Islands
22.3
8.9
205.4
66.8
55.9
25.1
Sierra Leone
Somalia
South Africa
Spain
Sri Lanka
St. Kitts and Nevis
St. Lucia
71.1
31.0
53.6
209.6
93.3
25.3
68.5
3.3
21.7
138.9
62.5
128.8
31.3
3.8
12.9
25.4
58.4
21.1
18.8
66.2
4.4
20.5
85.8
111.5
7.2
14.5
51.4
Sudan
10.5
Suriname
22.6
Swaziland
23.2
Sweden
Syrian Arab Republic
4.5
25.2
11.1
72.4
St. Vincent and the Grenadines
Switzerland
40.4
6.2
6.9
28.6
19.7
5.4
14.5
6.0
16.5
99.0
21.6
156.2
2.7
7.8
223.2
23.3
3.7
7.7
2.5
15.7
9.0
165.6
19.4
Tajikistan
Tanzania
15.0
17.3
7.7
12.9
5.6
Thailand
96.7
72.7
4.8
6.3
77.8
Timor-Leste
12.2
Togo
21.6
1.0
98.7
29.2
36.0
78.4
22.9
2.6
6.5
53.0
99.1
25.8
10.2
10.2
4.4
Tonga
43.9
Trinidad and Tobago
32.8
75.9
Tunisia
61.2
Turkey
38.5
Uganda
12.3
20.5
10.8
19.0
20.7
0.3
Ukraine
64.6
41.3
6.8
2.6
18.3
8.3
Turkmenistan
7.4
4.3
7.6
20.8
58.7
32.2
23.3
20.2
57.6
5.8
31.6
0.4
1.5
52.4
15.2
11.4
160.1
31.0
4.3
44.8
TABLE A.1
APPENDIX A
157

Economy
United Arab Emirates
Private credit
by deposit
money banks
to GDP (%)
Account
at a formal
financial
institution
(%, age 15+)
Financial markets
Bank
lendingdeposit
spread
(%)
Bank
Z-score
Stock market
Market
capitalization
capitalization
+ outstanding
excluding top
domestic
10 companies
private debt
to total market
securities to
capitalization (%)
GDP (%)
Stock
market
turnover
ratio (%)
Stock
price
volatility
70.4
59.7
21.2
24.8
48.3
21.4
202.4
97.2
6.6
132.9
65.9
118.6
24.7
United States
55.7
88.0
72.6
240.6
28.2
Uruguay
22.1
23.5
United Kingdom
Uzbekistan
Vanuatu
Venezuela, RB
Vietnam
26.1
209.9
7.4
2.7
0.4
4.0
15.9
22.5
62.4
6.3
18.8
44.1
3.2
10.1
1.4
1.0
14.3
104.4
21.4
2.4
18.6
16.5
87.0
30.0
West Bank and Gaza
19.4
17.8
Yemen, Rep.
6.0
3.7
5.8
26.8
Zambia
2.2
21.4
13.4
11.3
Zimbabwe
1.6
39.7
21.0
17.9
2.3
Source: Data from and calculations based on the Global Financial Development Database. For more information, see Cihk and others 2013.
Note: Empty cells indicate lack of data.
NOTES
Table layout: The layout of the table follows
the 4x2 matrix of financial system characteristics introduced in the 2013 Global Financial Development Report, with four variables
approximating depth, access, efficiency, and
stability of financial institutions and financial
markets, respectively.
Additional data: The above table presents a
small fraction of observations in the Global
Financial Development Database, accompanying this report. For additional variables,
historical data, and detailed metadata, see
the full data set at http://www.worldbank
.org/financialdevelopment.
Period covered: The table shows averages for
200911.
Averaging: Each observation is an arithmetic
average of the corresponding variable over
200911. When a variable is not reported
or not available for a part of this period, the
average is calculated for the period for which
observations are available.
Visualization: To illustrate where a countrys observation is in relation to the global

distribution of the variable, the table includes
four bars on the left of each observation.
The four-bar scale is based on the location
of the country in the statistical distribution of the variable in the Global Financial
Development Database: values below the
25th percentile show only one full bar, values equal to or greater than the 25th and less
than the 50th percentile show two full bars,
values equal to or greater than the 50th and
less than the 75th percentile show three full
bars, and values greater than the 75th percentile show four full bars. The bars are calculated using winsorized and rescaled
variables, as described in the 2013 Global
Financial Development Report. To prepare
for this, the 95th and 5th percentile for each
variable for the entire pooled country-year
data set are calculated, and the top and bottom 5 percent of observations are truncated.
Specifically, all observations from the 5th
percentile to the minimum are replaced by
the value corresponding to the 5th percentile, and all observations from the 95th percentile to the maximum are replaced by the
value corresponding to the 95th percentile.
3.6
158
APPENDIX A
To convert all the variables to a 0100 scale,

each score is rescaled by the maximum and
the minimum for each indicator. The rescaled indicator can be interpreted as the percent distance between the worst (0) and the
best (100) financial development outcome,
defined by the 5th and 95th percentile of the
original distribution (for further information see the 2013 Global Financial Development Report). The four bars on the left of the
country name show the unweighted arithmetic average of the winsorized and rescaled
variables (dimensions) for each country. This
average is reported only for those countries
where data for 200911 are available for at
least four variables (dimensions).
Private credit by deposit money banks to GDP
(%) measures the domestic private credit to
the real sector by deposit money banks as a
percentage of local currency GDP. Data on
domestic private credit to the real sector by
deposit money banks are from the International Financial Statistics (IFS), line 22D, published by the International Monetary Fund
(IMF). Local currency GDP is also from IFS.
Account at a formal financial institution (%,
age 15+) measures the percentage of adults
with an account (self or together with someone else) at a bank, credit union, another
financial institution (e.g., cooperative, microfinance institution), or the post office (if
applicable), including adults who report having a debit card. The data are from the Global
Financial Inclusion (Global Findex) Database
(Demirg-Kunt and Klapper 2012).
Bank lending-deposit spread (percentage
points) is lending rate minus deposit rate.
Lending rate is the rate charged by banks on
loans to the private sector and deposit interest
rate is the rate paid by commercial or similar
banks for demand, time, or savings deposits.
The lending and deposit rates are from IFS
lines 60P and 60L, respectively.
Bank Z-score is calculated as [ROA + (equity /
assets)] / (standard deviation of ROA). To
approximate the probability that a countrys
banking system defaults, the indicator compares the systems buffers (returns and capitalization) with the systems riskiness (volatility
of returns). Return of Assets (ROA), equity,

and assets are country-level aggregate figures
(calculated from underlying bank-by-bank
unconsolidated data from Bankscope).
Stock market capitalization + outstanding
domestic private debt securities to GDP (%)
measures the market capitalization plus the
amount of outstanding domestic private debt
securities as percentage of GDP. Market capitalization (also known as market value) is the
share price times the number of shares outstanding. Listed domestic companies are the
domestically incorporated companies listed
on the countrys stock exchanges at the end
of the year. Listed companies do not include
investment companies, mutual funds, or
other collective investment vehicles. Data are
from Standard & Poors Global Stock Markets Factbook and supplemental Standard &
Poors data, and are compiled and reported by
the World Development Indicators. Amount
of outstanding domestic private debt securities is from table 16A (domestic debt amount)
of the Securities Statistics by the Bank for
International Settlements. The amount
includes all issuers except governments.
Market capitalization excluding top 10 companies to total market capitalization (%)
measures the ratio of market capitalization
outside of the top 10 largest companies to
total market capitalization. The World Federation of Exchanges (WFE) provides data
on the exchange level. This variable is aggregated up to the country level by taking a simple average over exchanges.
Stock market turnover ratio (%) is the total
value of shares traded during the period
divided by the average market capitalization for the period. Average market capitalization is calculated as the average of
the end-of-period values for the current
period and the previous period. Data are
from Standard & Poors Global Stock
Markets Factbook and supplemental Standard
& Poors data, and are compiled and reported
by the World Development Indicators.
Stock price volatility is the 360-day standard
deviation of the return on the national stock
market index. The data are from Bloomberg.
MAP A.1
APPENDIX A
DEPTHFINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
To approximate financial institutions depth, this

map uses domestic private credit to the real sector
by deposit money banks as a percentage of local currency GDP. Data on domestic private credit to the
real sector by deposit money banks are from the
International Financial Statistics (IFS), line 22D,
TABLE A.1.1
159
published by the International Monetary Fund

(IMF). Local currency GDP is also from IFS. The
four shades of blue in the map are based on the average value of the variable in 200911: the darker the
blue, the higher the quartile of the statistical distribution of the variable.
DepthFinancial Institutions
Number of
countries
Average
Median
Standard
deviation
Minimum
163
53.8
36.9
49.1
0.0
284.6
88.6
Developed economies
By income level
43
120
107.4
34.6
96.3
26.8
59.0
25.3
6.5
0.0
284.6
121.5
100.9
64.1
High income
Upper-middle income
Lower-middle income
Low income
By region
43
46
49
25
107.4
48.1
31.2
17.1
96.3
43.2
27.8
14.3
59.0
28.8
19.9
10.6
6.5
7.9
0.0
3.9
284.6
121.5
109.1
51.1
100.9
72.3
36.9
26.9
High income: OECD

High income: non-OECD
East Asia & Pacific
Europe & Central Asia
Latin America & the Caribbean
Middle East & North Africa
South Asia
25
18
16
16
28
12
8
126.8
79.5
51.2
40.4
39.8
36.3
38.8
111.4
64.5
41.4
37.7
31.4
28.1
39.5
49.5
60.8
34.8
13.9
25.0
26.3
22.2
47.1
6.5
11.5
16.5
4.4
3.3
6.8
237.6
284.6
121.5
83.6
112.6
74.5
90.4
102.0
77.4
105.8
41.3
35.5
28.6
42.4
Sub-Saharan Africa
40
20.9
16.6
17.4
0.0
86.7
38.2
Private credit by deposit money banks to GDP (%)
World
Maximum
Weighted
averagea
By developed/developing economies
Source: Global Financial Development Database, 200911 data.

Note: OECD = Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.
a. Weighted average by current GDP.
160
APPENDIX A
MAP A.2
ACCESSFINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
To approximate access to financial institutions, this

map uses the percentage of adults (age 15+) who
reported having an account at a formal financial institution. The data are taken from the Global Financial
Inclusion (Global Findex) Database. The four shades

of blue in the map are based on the value of the variable in 2011: the darker the blue, the higher the quartile of the statistical distribution of the variable.
TABLE A.1.2 AccessFinancial Institutions

Account at a formal financial institution
(%, age 15+)
Number of
countries
Average
Median
Standard
deviation
Minimum
Maximum
Weighted
averagea
147
45.7
38.2
31.7
0.4
99.7
50.6
Developed economies
By income level
40
107
87.1
30.3
93.2
25.5
13.2
20.9
46.4
0.4
99.7
89.7
89.2
41.9
High income
Upper-middle income
Lower-middle income
Low income
By region
40
40
38
29
87.1
46.3
24.0
16.5
93.2
44.4
21.4
13.4
13.2
20.1
15.3
12.9
46.4
0.4
3.7
1.5
99.7
89.7
77.7
42.3
89.2
57.1
28.5
23.3
High income: OECD

East Asia & Pacific
South Asia
28
12
9
23
20
12
6
91.2
77.4
42.0
40.7
32.0
26.6
31.3
96.1
80.6
26.8
44.3
27.7
24.4
30.3
9.5
15.8
27.7
24.2
14.7
18.8
22.1
70.2
46.4
3.7
0.4
13.8
3.7
9.0
99.7
98.2
77.7
89.7
71.0
73.7
68.5
90.5
66.7
55.1
44.8
39.3
33.9
33.1
Sub-Saharan Africa
37
21.0
17.5
16.3
1.5
80.1
23.8
World

a. Weighted average by total adult population in 2011.
MAP A.3
APPENDIX A
EFFICIENCYFINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
To approximate efficiency of financial institutions,

this map uses the spread (difference) between lending
rate and deposit interest rate. Lending rate is the rate
charged by banks on loans to the private sector, and
deposit interest rate is the rate paid by commercial or
similar banks for demand, time, or savings deposits.
TABLE A.1.3
161
The lending and deposit rates are from IFS, lines 60P
and 60L, respectively. The four shades of blue in the
map are based on the average value of the variable in
200911: the darker the blue, the higher the quartile
of the statistical distribution of the variable.
EfficiencyFinancial Institutions
Number of
countries
Average
Median
Standard
deviation
Minimum
Maximum
Weighted
averagea
126
7.9
6.2
6.6
0.1
49.3
3.7
Developed economies
By income level
26
100
4.2
8.8
4.3
6.9
2.0
7.0
1.0
0.1
8.6
49.3
2.0
6.2
High income
Upper-middle income
Lower-middle income
Low income
By region
26
43
39
18
4.2
6.5
8.9
14.3
4.3
5.5
8.0
10.7
2.0
5.3
4.8
10.9
1.0
0.1
1.9
3.2
8.6
35.4
26.8
49.3
2.0
6.2
5.7
5.5
High income: OECD

East Asia & Pacific
South Asia
13
13
17
17
26
9
6
3.1
5.3
7.2
8.2
9.7
4.7
6.2
2.7
5.2
5.8
6.7
7.6
4.5
5.9
1.4
1.9
4.7
6.2
6.9
2.5
2.6
1.0
1.7
1.9
0.1
1.4
0.1
3.0
6.7
8.6
21.5
33.8
35.4
9.7
12.0
1.8
5.0
3.3
5.4
26.4
4.5
5.3
Sub-Saharan Africa
25
11.5
9.1
9.4
0.5
49.3
5.0
Bank lending-deposit spread (percentage points)
World

a. Weighted average by total banking assets.
162
APPENDIX A
MAP A.4
STABILITYFINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
To approximate stability of financial institutions,

this map uses the Z-score for commercial banks. The
indicator is estimated as follows: [ROA + (equity /
assets)] / (standard deviation of ROA). Return on
equity (ROA), equity, and assets are country-level
aggregate figures (calculated from underlying bankby-bank unconsolidated data from Bankscope). The
TABLE A.1.4
indicator compares the banking systems buffers

(returns and capital) with its riskiness (volatility of
returns). The four shades of blue in the map are based
on the average value of the variable in 200911: the
darker the blue, the higher the quartile of the statistical distribution of the variable.
StabilityFinancial Institutions
Number of
countries
Average
Median
Standard
deviation
Minimum
Maximum
Weighted
averagea
175
15.5
13.6
10.6
-4.5
65.3
15.8
Developed economies
By income level
54
121
16.3
15.1
14.4
13.1
10.1
10.9
-3.3
-4.5
58.4
65.3
14.9
19.2
High income
Upper-middle income
Lower-middle income
Low income
By region
54
47
45
29
16.3
15.2
17.6
11.2
14.4
12.7
16.8
9.9
10.1
12.3
10.7
6.9
-3.3
-4.5
-4.1
0.1
58.4
65.3
49.5
27.3
14.9
18.0
30.5
2.4
High income: OECD

East Asia & Pacific
South Asia
32
22
15
22
27
12
7
14.2
19.6
14.6
9.6
15.2
28.7
18.1
13.0
16.7
16.4
8.5
13.6
25.3
13.1
8.2
11.7
9.3
6.2
9.7
15.1
14.1
-3.3
1.0
0.1
-4.5
2.0
6.4
3.6
35.8
58.4
31.8
26.4
42.3
65.3
49.5
14.8
18.4
17.9
7.0
19.0
36.5
37.4
Sub-Saharan Africa
38
13.7
12.7
8.5
-4.1
42.7
9.8
Bank Z-score
World

a. Weighted average by total banking assets.
MAP A.5
APPENDIX A
DEPTHFINANCIAL MARKETS
To approximate depth of financial markets, this map

uses market capitalization plus the amount of outstanding domestic private debt securities as percentage of GDP. Market capitalization (also known as
market value) is the share price times the number of
shares outstanding. Listed domestic companies are
the domestically incorporated companies listed on
the countrys stock exchanges at the end of the year.
Listed companies do not include investment companies, mutual funds, or other collective investment
vehicles. Data are from Standard & Poors Global
TABLE A.1.5
163
Stock Markets Factbook and supplemental S&P

data, and are compiled and reported by the World
Development Indicators. Amount of outstanding
domestic private debt securities is from table 16A
(domestic debt amount) of the Securities Statistics by
the Bank for International Settlements. The amount
includes all issuers except governments. The four
shades of blue in the map are based on the average
value of the variable in 200911: the darker the blue,
the higher the quartile of the statistical distribution
of the variable.
DepthFinancial Markets
Stock market capitalization plus outstanding

domestic private debt securities to GDP (%)
Number of
countries
Average
Median
Standard
deviation
Minimum
107
66.5
41.5
69.2
Developed economies
By income level
45
62
101.7
39.7
82.1
24.7
High income
Upper-middle income
Lower-middle income
Low Income
By region
45
33
22
7
101.7
50.0
29.8
20.6
High income: OECD

East Asia & Pacific
South Asia
32
13
9
14
16
6
5
Sub-Saharan Africa
12
World
Maximum
Weighted
averagea
0.4
538.5
123.0
80.5
43.1
9.1
0.4
538.5
229.8
144.9
71.8
82.1
32.0
18.7
22.9
80.5
51.6
28.4
12.8
9.1
0.4
1.4
1.5
538.5
229.8
141.1
38.4
144.9
77.2
53.2
18.7
103.1
98.3
68.2
22.6
34.5
53.1
32.7
93.3
63.6
58.6
14.8
20.7
36.5
24.7
62.2
114.7
57.4
23.0
34.8
38.4
24.6
9.1
20.4
8.4
1.4
0.4
15.3
7.6
259.4
538.5
202.2
93.2
150.0
140.8
87.9
145.7
124.0
89.5
40.8
62.0
40.0
66.8
41.8
25.3
55.2
5.6
229.8
108.3

a. Weighted average by current GDP.
164
APPENDIX A
MAP A.6
ACCESSFINANCIAL MARKETS
To approximate access to financial markets, this map

uses the ratio of market capitalization excluding the
top 10 largest companies to total market capitalization. The World Federation of Exchanges (WFE)
provides data on the exchange level. This variable is
TABLE A.1.6
aggregated up to the country level by taking a simple

average over exchanges. The four shades of blue in
the map are based on the average value of the variable in 200911: the darker the blue, the higher the
quartile of the statistical distribution of the variable.
AccessFinancial Markets
Market capitalization excluding top

10 companies (%)
Number of
countries
Average
Median
Standard
deviation
Minimum
Maximum
Weighted
averagea
46
45.7
47.4
19.4
2.8
76.7
64.9
Developed economies
By income level
25
21
43.1
48.7
43.6
51.8
22.4
15.0
2.8
20.7
76.3
76.7
66.2
61.0
High income
Upper-middle income
Lower-middle income
Low income
By region
25
15
6
0
43.1
46.6
54.1
43.6
46.9
56.4
22.4
15.1
13.5
2.8
20.7
25.7
76.3
76.7
72.4
66.2
60.2
65.1
High income: OECD

East Asia & Pacific
South Asia
20
5
5
2
6
4
2
44.0
39.5
60.3
44.5
37.1
42.9
64.3
45.2
41.5
58.8
44.6
35.0
40.8
66.0
21.6
25.7
8.4
9.1
10.5
15.1
7.2
2.8
5.4
51.6
32.4
20.7
25.7
53.9
76.3
74.3
76.7
55.1
55.0
60.7
72.4
66.5
59.1
71.3
40.1
42.1
46.9
70.4
55.0
49.6
15.5
39.0
74.8
65.5
World
Sub-Saharan Africa

a. Weighted average by stock market capitalization.
MAP A.7
APPENDIX A
EFFICIENCYFINANCIAL MARKETS
To approximate efficiency of financial markets, this

map uses the total value of shares traded during the
period divided by the average market capitalization
for the period. Average market capitalization is calculated as the average of the end-of-period values
for the current period and the previous period. Data
are from Standard & Poors Global Stock Markets
TABLE A.1.7
165
Factbook and supplemental S&P data, and is compiled and reported by the World Development Indicators. The four shades of blue in the map are based
on the average value of the variable in 200911: the
darker the blue, the higher the quartile of the statistical distribution of the variable.
EfficiencyFinancial Markets
Number of
countries
Average
Median
Standard
deviation
Minimum
106
43.7
17.4
54.7
Developed economies
By income level
45
61
65.5
26.7
58.0
5.9
High income
Upper-middle income
Lower-middle income
Low income
By region
45
33
21
7
65.5
28.8
21.9
30.7
High income: OECD

East Asia & Pacific
South Asia
32
13
9
14
15
6
5
Sub-Saharan Africa
12
Stock market turnover ratio (%)
World
Maximum
Weighted
averagea
0.1
347.0
150.7
59.2
44.1
0.1
0.2
347.0
226.5
161.6
114.5
58.0
7.0
6.2
4.1
59.2
47.5
32.0
58.9
0.1
0.4
0.2
0.3
347.0
226.5
144.5
213.9
161.6
125.2
67.3
53.0
76.9
37.2
54.6
25.7
11.1
24.9
61.6
73.9
17.4
30.0
5.2
3.0
17.3
37.0
60.1
46.7
63.1
48.6
18.3
16.0
60.5
0.1
0.3
0.2
0.2
0.4
4.9
1.7
347.0
161.9
226.5
172.3
76.3
59.2
213.9
164.7
106.8
163.3
107.2
47.1
32.5
83.7
8.9
3.3
15.6
0.3
63.8
49.9

a. Weighted average by stock market capitalization.
166
APPENDIX A
MAP A.8
STABILITYFINANCIAL MARKETS
To approximate stability of financial markets, this

map uses the 360-day standard deviation of the
return on the national stock market index. Data
are from Bloomberg. The four shades of blue in the
TABLE A.1.8
map are based on the average value of the variable in

200911: the darker the blue, the higher the quartile
of the statistical distribution of the variable.
StabilityFinancial Markets
Number of
countries
Average
Median
Standard
deviation
Minimum
Maximum
Weighted
averagea
83
25.3
24.0
10.8
2.4
68.0
29.4
38
26.8
24.0
26.3
22.6
9.3
11.8
8.8
2.4
51.1
45
68.0
28.9
31.5
High income
Upper-middle income
Lower-middle income
Low Income
By region
38
31
12
2
26.8
23.9
26.3
8.3
26.3
23.6
24.3
10.9
9.3
12.1
9.9
4.5
8.8
5.8
9.9
2.4
51.1
68.0
52.9
12.5
28.9
31.6
31.2
10.8
High income: OECD

East Asia & Pacific
South Asia
29
9
7
12
10
6
3
27.9
23.2
25.2
31.0
21.8
19.0
23.9
27.4
22.0
22.7
28.4
17.0
16.2
20.4
8.7
10.5
8.1
13.1
11.0
9.3
9.0
8.8
9.5
9.2
10.7
5.8
8.4
15.6
51.1
47.1
41.0
68.0
48.4
40.2
43.8
28.9
30.3
30.9
38.5
30.3
27.4
32.0
17.7
16.5
11.0
2.4
43.1
24.9
Stock price volatility
World
Developed economies
By income level
Sub-Saharan Africa

a. Weighted average by total value of stocks traded.
APPENDIX B
167
APPENDIX B
KEY ASPECTS OF FINANCIAL INCLUSION
TABLE B.1
Countries and Their Level of Financial Inclusion, 2011

Individuals
Economy
Afghanistan
Firms (formal sector)
Providers
Account
Loan from Electronic
Firms with
Firms using Firms using
at a formal a financial
payments
a checking Firms with a banks to
Bank
banks to
financial institution in used to make
or savings bank loan/
finance
finance
branches
institution the past year payments Debit card
account line of credit investments working
per 100,000
(%, age 15+) (%, age 15+) (%, age 15+) (%, age 15+)
(%)
(%)
(%)
adults
capital (%)
9.0
7.4
0.2
4.7
73.1
3.4
1.4
2.5
1.9
Albania
28.3
7.5
3.2
21.1
92.4
42.2
12.4
33.3
22.2
Algeria
33.3
1.5
1.8
13.5
83.8
31.1
8.9
28.6
5.3
Angola
39.2
7.9
17.0
29.8
Antigua and Barbuda
86.4
9.5
13.1
13.4
10.5
100.0
49.2
49.4
46.3
23.4
33.3
Argentina
33.1
6.6
5.7
29.8
96.2
49.3
30.3
Armenia
17.5
18.9
2.2
5.2
89.5
44.3
31.9
99.1
17.0
79.2
79.1
Aruba
Australia
13.5
18.8
19.5
Austria
97.1
8.3
55.3
86.8
Azerbaijan
14.9
17.7
0.7
10.0
Bahrain
64.5
21.9
6.0
62.2
Bangladesh
39.6
23.3
0.5
2.3
Bahamas, The
Barbados
29.6
15.2
75.9
19.9
19.0
97.6
34.2
14.6
24.7
43.1
7.8
97.4
58.2
45.5
38.7
19.9
92.3
49.5
35.8
95.3
9.9
28.5
38.0
Belarus
58.6
16.1
10.4
50.3
Belgium
96.3
10.5
71.1
85.8
100.0
43.9
36.7
57.0
10.5
4.2
0.6
0.7
99.2
42.8
4.2
32.9
92.6
58.6
64.2
59.5
16.4
Bolivia
28.0
16.6
0.7
12.8
95.6
49.1
27.8
40.5
9.7
Bosnia and Herzegovina
56.2
13.0
6.2
34.4
99.8
65.0
59.7
Botswana
30.3
5.6
6.8
15.6
99.0
50.0
32.8
32.1
8.6
Brazil
55.9
6.3
16.6
41.2
99.4
65.3
48.4
60.0
46.2
Belize
Benin
Bhutan
2.1
44.0
23.2
31.3
Brunei Darussalam
23.1
Bulgaria
52.8
7.8
4.6
45.8
96.8
40.2
34.7
Burkina Faso
13.4
3.1
0.6
2.0
96.8
28.4
25.6
33.1
90.5
35.3
12.3
25.5
2.4
20.7
11.3
12.6
4.3
30.3
31.4
41.6
Burundi
7.2
1.7
0.1
0.8
Cambodia
3.7
19.5
0.5
2.9
Cameroon
14.8
4.5
0.4
2.1
Canada
95.8
20.3
69.2
88.0
Cape Verde
92.5
58.6
1.7
24.3
96.5
41.5
35.3
49.8
30.7
168
APPENDIX B
TABLE B.1
Countries and Their Level of Financial Inclusion, 2011 (continued)

Individuals
Economy
Central African Republic
3.3
0.9
Chad
9.0
6.2
Chile
42.2
7.8
China
63.8
7.3
6.9
41.0
Colombia
30.4
11.9
6.8
22.7
Comoros
21.7
7.2
0.4
5.7
3.7
1.5
0.3
Congo, Dem. Rep.

Congo, Rep.
Providers
Account
Firms with
payments
banks to
Bank
finance
branches
finance
per 100,000
(%, age 15+) (%, age 15+) (%, age 15+) (%, age 15+)
(%)
(%)
(%)
adults
capital (%)
0.1
1.0
98.5
26.0
25.3
25.3
0.9
1.6
5.3
95.9
20.6
4.2
16.1
0.7
11.1
25.8
97.9
79.6
44.8
55.1
17.5
95.8
57.2
35.0
49.2
15.0
1.7
71.3
10.7
6.7
8.8
9.0
2.8
2.1
3.6
86.7
12.8
7.7
9.7
2.7
50.4
10.0
14.5
43.8
97.5
56.8
22.2
30.1
23.1
67.4
11.5
13.9
8.3
Croatia
88.4
14.4
17.3
74.8
99.8
67.3
60.0
63.2
Cyprus
85.2
27.0
30.2
46.4
Czech Republic
80.7
9.5
44.7
61.0
98.1
46.6
33.4
Denmark
99.7
18.8
85.6
90.1
Djibouti
12.3
4.5
1.5
7.6
100.0
32.8
46.2
37.9
17.7
Dominican Republic
38.2
13.9
4.4
21.3
98.4
56.9
39.1
72.4
10.7
Ecuador
36.7
10.6
4.2
17.1
100.0
48.9
17.0
42.3
9.7
3.7
0.4
5.1
74.3
17.4
5.6
7.5
13.8
3.9
3.0
10.9
94.7
53.1
31.7
44.5
Costa Rica
Cte dIvoire
Dominica
Egypt, Arab Rep.

El Salvador
34.8
103.9
23.1
39.0
Equatorial Guinea
4.9
Eritrea
98.2
10.9
11.9
97.4
50.8
41.5
Ethiopia
91.8
46.0
10.9
40.7
2.0
Fiji
96.1
37.8
37.1
50.7
11.0
Estonia
96.8
7.7
74.1
92.3
5.7
18.6
Finland
99.7
23.9
88.2
89.3
15.0
France
97.0
18.6
65.1
69.2
41.6
Gabon
18.9
2.3
3.3
8.6
Gambia, The
Georgia
33.0
11.0
2.0
20.2
Germany
98.1
12.5
64.2
88.0
Ghana
29.4
5.8
2.9
11.4
Greece
77.9
7.9
7.7
34.0
Grenada
Guatemala
Guinea
Guinea-Bissau
Guyana
83.6
9.0
6.3
8.5
5.8
72.8
16.6
7.6
14.3
8.9
90.8
41.8
38.2
45.0
83.5
22.2
19.6
42.2
16.0
21.4
5.5
25.9
26.3
38.7
98.7
49.0
37.3
50.3
34.5
22.3
13.7
2.6
13.0
61.0
49.1
26.6
26.2
37.1
3.7
2.4
0.5
2.3
53.9
6.0
0.9
2.6
1.5
59.0
2.8
0.7
1.1
100.0
50.5
34.5
59.4
7.6
TABLE B.1
APPENDIX B
169

Individuals
Economy
Haiti
Providers
Account
Firms with
payments
Bank
banks to
finance
finance
branches
per 100,000
(%, age 15+) (%, age 15+) (%, age 15+) (%, age 15+)
(%)
(%)
(%)
adults
capital (%)
22.0
8.3
2.9
2.7
Honduras
20.5
7.1
1.4
11.1
Hong Kong SAR, China
88.7
7.9
51.2
75.8
Hungary
72.7
9.4
28.7
62.4
2.7
81.3
31.2
17.0
25.6
97.7
43.0
48.7
15.7
Iceland
52.4
India
35.2
7.7
2.0
8.4
Indonesia
19.6
8.5
3.1
10.5
Iran, Islamic Rep.
73.7
30.7
32.9
58.3
Iraq
10.6
8.0
1.0
3.3
Ireland
93.9
15.7
61.5
70.5
Israel
90.5
16.7
54.4
7.5
Italy
71.0
4.6
27.8
35.2
Jamaica
71.0
7.9
7.2
41.1
Japan
96.4
6.1
44.8
13.0
Jordan
25.5
4.5
3.4
14.7
Kazakhstan
42.1
13.1
4.5
Kenya
42.3
9.7
5.4
Korea, Rep.
93.0
16.6
64.8
57.9
Kosovo
44.3
6.1
5.9
29.0
Kuwait
86.8
20.8
21.9
83.9
46.6
36.4
10.6
51.5
18.2
11.7
13.8
8.5
43.2
3.8
2.7
4.6
37.4
46.1
29.5
5.1
27.7
20.4
66.3
99.8
27.2
44.2
53.1
94.2
25.5
8.6
18.3
6.2
21.1
31.3
92.1
33.2
31.0
29.9
89.1
25.4
22.9
26.0
5.2
39.9
41.2
18.8
34.0
3.4
Kiribati
Kyrgyz Republic
21.6
23.8
4.0
96.6
15.0
25.3
19.4
3.8
11.3
0.6
1.7
68.9
20.4
17.9
Lao PDR
26.8
18.1
0.3
6.5
91.8
18.5
0.0
Latvia
89.7
6.8
52.7
77.8
99.5
48.5
37.3
Lebanon
37.0
11.3
2.0
21.4
86.7
69.4
23.8
7.3
10.7
30.0
51.3
31.5
Lesotho
18.5
3.0
2.7
14.5
89.7
32.2
32.7
31.9
3.2
Liberia
18.8
6.5
3.6
3.3
67.8
14.0
10.1
12.8
3.8
98.3
53.0
47.4
Lithuania
73.8
5.6
31.5
61.3
Luxembourg
94.6
17.4
67.7
73.2
88.6
Macao SAR, China

Macedonia, FYR
Madagascar
37.2
73.7
10.6
14.1
36.3
96.8
61.1
47.0
5.5
2.3
0.1
0.9
94.1
20.6
12.2
24.3
20.2
1.4
Malawi
16.5
9.2
0.8
9.4
96.9
40.1
20.6
31.0
1.1
Malaysia
66.2
11.2
12.6
23.1
97.7
60.4
48.6
49.3
10.5
Mali
8.2
3.7
0.1
1.8
85.6
16.6
29.3
21.4
Malta
95.3
10.0
34.5
71.2
Maldives
Marshall Islands
17.2
41.6
12.8
170
APPENDIX B
TABLE B.1

Individuals
Economy
Providers
Account
Firms with
payments
banks to
Bank
finance
branches
finance
per 100,000
(%, age 15+) (%, age 15+) (%, age 15+) (%, age 15+)
(%)
(%)
(%)
adults
capital (%)
Mauritania
17.5
7.9
2.6
6.3
Mauritius
80.1
Mexico
27.4
14.3
7.4
50.9
97.2
7.6
8.3
22.3
61.8
98.5
18.1
6.4
2.2
16.0
88.2
Mongolia
77.7
24.8
21.6
60.6
Montenegro
50.4
21.8
3.5
22.0
Morocco
39.1
4.3
7.4
22.4
86.8
33.4
12.3
30.2
22.3
Mozambique
39.9
5.9
17.3
37.3
75.7
14.2
10.5
8.5
3.6
97.5
24.0
8.1
19.6
73.7
39.1
17.5
32.1
Micronesia, Fed. Sts.

Moldova
76.3
16.0
3.2
13.5
47.4
37.5
39.5
21.3
32.0
16.2
26.9
14.9
43.0
7.2
19.4
14.2
39.6
30.8
11.3
61.4
52.9
26.5
66.4
78.5
49.6
75.8
39.6
Myanmar
1.7
Namibia
Nepal
25.3
10.8
0.5
3.7
Netherlands
98.7
12.6
80.2
97.6
New Zealand
99.4
26.6
83.2
93.8
Nicaragua
14.2
7.6
1.5
8.3
75.7
43.4
21.9
18.4
94.0
29.7
9.3
33.4
3.8
2.7
4.3
Niger
Nigeria
1.5
1.3
0.2
0.8
29.7
2.1
2.4
18.6
73.6
9.2
17.5
53.0
6.7
21.5
34.0
7.4
6.4
10.9
Norway
Oman
7.1
23.6
Pakistan
10.3
1.6
0.2
2.9
64.7
8.6
9.7
4.6
8.7
Panama
24.9
9.8
3.0
11.3
69.1
20.7
1.1
9.0
23.9
Paraguay
21.7
12.9
4.2
11.3
89.7
60.2
30.1
48.0
9.5
Peru
20.5
12.7
1.9
14.1
87.4
66.8
45.9
49.9
58.7
Philippines
26.6
10.5
2.1
13.2
97.8
33.2
21.9
19.1
Poland
70.2
9.6
31.4
37.3
95.8
50.1
40.7
Portugal
81.2
8.3
48.3
68.2
Qatar
65.9
12.6
21.9
49.5
Romania
44.6
8.4
10.5
27.7
50.4
42.3
37.3
Russian Federation
48.2
7.7
7.7
37.0
98.0
31.3
30.6
Rwanda
32.8
8.4
0.3
5.3
71.6
46.3
24.2
44.5
5.5
97.0
51.3
48.3
68.7
18.4
Samoa
24.4
8.1
32.3
20.3
17.8
37.1
So Tom and Prncipe

Saudi Arabia
Senegal
23.4
46.4
2.1
22.6
42.3
8.7
5.8
3.5
0.5
1.8
83.4
15.3
19.8
62.2
12.3
9.6
43.1
100.0
67.6
42.8
Sierra Leone
15.3
6.1
1.1
4.0
67.8
17.4
6.9
Singapore
98.2
10.0
41.5
28.6
Serbia
64.2
9.6
9.6
37.2
Seychelles
24.6
3.0
10.2
TABLE B.1
APPENDIX B
171

Individuals
Economy
Providers
Account
Firms with
payments
banks to
Bank
finance
branches
finance
per 100,000
(%, age 15+) (%, age 15+) (%, age 15+) (%, age 15+)
(%)
(%)
(%)
adults
capital (%)
Slovak Republic
79.6
11.4
43.4
68.3
18.0
42.4
33.5
25.8
Slovenia
97.1
12.8
40.6
91.9
99.9
71.2
52.2
38.3
Solomon Islands
7.1
Somalia
31.0
1.6
21.5
15.6
South Africa
53.6
8.9
13.1
45.3
Spain
93.3
11.4
43.4
62.2
Sri Lanka
68.5
17.7
0.5
10.0
97.9
30.1
34.8
21.1
10.7
32.6
35.8
89.7
89.4
40.4
43.6
40.6
16.7
St. Kitts and Nevis
100.0
49.3
46.4
52.0
37.7
St. Lucia
100.0
24.5
52.2
49.1
22.5
98.5
56.5
55.8
52.7
21.2
St. Vincent and the Grenadines

Sudan
6.9
1.8
2.1
3.3
Swaziland
28.6
11.5
4.7
21.0
Sweden
99.0
23.4
84.9
95.5
Suriname
2.4
100.0
44.3
37.0
57.6
11.2
97.8
21.9
7.7
16.0
7.2
Switzerland
51.0
23.3
13.1
3.1
6.2
Taiwan, China
87.3
9.6
29.2
37.0
92.7
37.4
20.7
16.0
Tajikistan
2.5
4.8
0.7
1.8
86.9
33.6
21.4
Tanzania
17.3
6.6
3.5
12.0
86.2
16.3
6.8
17.3
1.9
Thailand
72.7
19.4
8.6
43.1
99.6
72.5
74.4
71.9
11.3
87.8
6.9
1.6
2.6
Timor-Leste
Togo
10.2
3.8
0.0
1.2
Tonga
Trinidad and Tobago
75.9
8.4
9.3
64.1
Tunisia
32.2
3.2
2.7
21.0
Turkey
57.6
4.6
11.1
56.6
0.4
0.8
0.0
0.3
Turkmenistan
94.2
21.6
16.9
16.9
100.0
54.3
33.9
3.0
99.9
53.7
36.7
63.8
90.6
56.8
51.9
Uganda
20.5
8.9
3.1
10.3
85.8
17.2
7.7
41.3
8.1
6.4
33.6
90.2
31.8
32.1
59.7
10.8
14.8
55.4
97.2
11.8
65.3
87.6
United States
88.0
20.1
64.3
71.8
Uruguay
23.5
14.8
3.2
16.4
Uzbekistan
22.5
1.5
4.3
20.4
Vanuatu
21.5
17.2
Ukraine
United Kingdom
6.7
18.3
14.0
2.4
1.6
14.5
35.4
90.8
48.6
13.7
93.8
10.5
8.2
96.0
45.8
41.4
26.4
13.7
33.2
20.9
47.7
Venezuela, RB
44.1
1.7
15.0
35.1
96.5
35.4
35.3
27.1
17.1
Vietnam
21.4
16.2
2.5
14.6
89.4
49.9
21.5
47.0
3.6
West Bank and Gaza
19.4
4.1
1.7
10.7
87.8
18.0
4.2
14.2
172
APPENDIX B
TABLE B.1

Individuals
Providers
Account
Firms with
payments
banks to
Bank
finance
finance
branches
per 100,000
(%, age 15+) (%, age 15+) (%, age 15+) (%, age 15+)
(%)
(%)
(%)
adults
capital (%)
Economy
Yemen, Rep.
3.7
0.9
0.6
2.2
31.3
8.1
4.2
6.0
1.8
Zambia
21.4
6.1
3.3
15.7
95.0
16.0
10.2
15.0
4.4
Zimbabwe
39.7
4.9
6.9
28.3
93.5
12.5
13.1
12.8
Source: Data on individuals are from the Global Financial Inclusion (Global Findex) Database, data on firms are from Enterprise Surveys, and data providers are from Financial
Access Survey (FAS).
Note: Global Findex data pertain to 2011. Data from Enterprise Survey range from 2005 to 2011. Financial Access Survey covers 2001 through 2011. For both the Enterprise Survey
and Financial Access Survey, the table shows data from 2011 or the most recent year. Empty cells indicate lack of data.
NOTES
Additional data. The above table presents a
small fraction of observations in the Global
Findex, the Enterprise Surveys, and Financial
Access Survey. These data can be accessed at
Global Findex:
http://www.worldbank
.org/globalfindex
Enterprise Survey: http://www.enterprise

surveys.org/
Financial Access
Survey:
http://fas.imf.org/
Period covered. The table shows 2011 or

the most recent data for individuals, formal
firms, and providers.
Account at a formal financial institution
(%, age 15+): Percentage of adults with an
account (self or together with someone else)
at a bank, credit union, another financial
institution (e.g., cooperative, microfinance
institution), or the post office (if applicable)
including adults who report having a debit
card to total adults. The data are from Global
Findex (Demirg-Kunt and Klapper 2012).
Loan from a financial institution in the past
year (%, age 15+): Percentage of adults who
report borrowing any money from a bank,
credit union, microfinance institution, or
another financial institution such as a cooperative in the past 12 months. The data are
from Global Findex (Demirg-Kunt and
Klapper 2012).
Electronic payments used to make payments

(%, age 15+): Percentage of adults who
report having made electronic payments
or that are made automatically, including
wire transfers or payments made online to
make payments on bills or purchases using
money from their account. The data are
from Global Findex (Demirg-Kunt and
Klapper 2012).
Debit card (%, age 15+): Percentage of adults
who report having a debit card where a debit
card is defined as a card that allows a holder
to make payments, get money, or make purchases and the money is taken out of the
holders bank account right away. The data
are from Global Findex (Demirg-Kunt and
Klapper 2012).
Firms with a checking or savings account (%):
Percentage of firms in the survey that report
having a checking or savings account. The data
are based on surveys of more than 130,000
firms spanning 2005 and 2011 and conducted
by the World Banks enterprise unit.
Firms with a bank loan/line of credit (%):
Percentage of firms in the survey that report
having a loan or a line of credit from a financial institution. The data are based on surveys of more than 130,000 firms spanning
2005 and 2011 and conducted by the World
Banks enterprise unit.
Firms using banks to finance investments
(%): Percentage of firms in the survey that
report using banks to finance their investment. The data are based on surveys of more
than 130,000 firms spanning 2005 and 2011
and conducted by the World Banks enterprise unit.
Firms using banks to finance working capital (%): Percentage of firms in the survey that
report using banks to finance their working
APPENDIX B
capital. The data are based on surveys of

more than 130,000 firms spanning 2005 and
2011 and conducted by the World Banks
enterprise unit.
Bank branches per 100,000 adults: Number
of commercial bank branches per 100,000
adults. The data are from IMFs Financial
Access Survey (FAS).
173
174
APPENDIX C
APPENDIX C
ISLAMIC BANKING AND FINANCIAL INCLUSION
TABLE C.1 Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) Member Countries, Account Penetration Rates, and Islamic Financial
Institutions, 2011
Religiosity and financial inclusion
Economy
Islamic financial institutions (IFIs)
Adults with no
Account at a
account due
Adults with no
formal financial to religious
account due to
Religiosity
institution
religious reasons
reasons
(%)
(%, age 15+)
(%, age 15+) (thousands, age 15+)
Number
of IFIs
Number
Number of
Islamic assets
of IFIs per
per adult
IFIs per
(US$)
10 million adults 10,000 km 2
Afghanistan
97
9.0
33.6
5,830
1.1
0.03
Albania
39
28.3
8.3
150
4.0
0.36
Algeria
95
33.3
7.6
1,330
0.8
0.01
Azerbaijan
50
14.9
5.8
355
1.4
0.12
Bahrain
94
64.5
0.0
32
29,194
301.6
421.05
Bangladesh
99
39.6
4.5
2,840
12
14
1.2
0.92
0.0
0.00
1.1
0.04
Benin
10.5
1.7
77
Burkina Faso
13.4
1.2
98
Cameroon
96
14.8
1.1
114
Chad
95
9.0
10.0
573
1.7
0.04
0.0
0.00
Comoros
97
21.7
5.8
20
0.0
0.00
Djibouti
98
12.3
22.8
117
0.0
0.00
Egypt, Arab Rep.
97
Gabon
Guinea
Indonesia
99
Iraq
84
Jordan
9.7
2.9
1,480
11
146
1.9
0.11
18.9
1.5
12
0.0
0.00
3.7
5.0
279
0.0
0.00
19.6
1.5
2,110
23
30
1.3
0.13
10.6
25.6
4,310
14
98
7.4
0.32
25.5
11.3
329
1,583
15.4
0.68
Kazakhstan
43
42.1
1.7
126
0.0
0.00
Kuwait
91
86.8
2.6
18
28,102
87.2
10.10
0.0
0.00
12.4
3.91
Kyrgyz Republic
72
3.8
7.3
272
Lebanon
87
37.0
7.6
155
Malaysia
96
66.2
0.1
34
4,949
16.8
1.03
Mali
95
8.2
2.8
218
0.0
0.00
Mauritania
98
17.5
17.7
312
76
4.7
0.01
Morocco
97
39.1
26.8
3,810
0.0
0.00
Mozambique
Niger
99
Nigeria
96
Oman
39.9
2.3
189
0.0
0.00
1.5
23.6
1,910
0.0
0.00
29.7
3.9
2,520
0.0
0.00
73.6
14.2
78
14.4
0.10
Pakistan
92
10.3
7.2
7,400
29
40
2.5
0.38
Qatar
95
65.9
11.6
64
14
13,851
86.5
12.08
Saudi Arabia
93
46.4
24.1
2,540
18
1,685
9.2
0.08
Senegal
96
5.8
6.0
411
0.0
0.00
15.3
9.9
287
0.0
0.00
Sierra Leone
TABLE C.1
APPENDIX C
175
OIC Member Countries, Account Penetration Rates, and Islamic Financial Institutions, 2011 (continued)
Religiosity and financial inclusion
Economy
Islamic financial institutions (IFIs)
Adults with no
Account at a
account due
Adults with no
formal financial to religious
account due to
Religiosity
institution
religious reasons
reasons
(%)
(%, age 15+)
(%, age 15+) (thousands, age 15+)
Somalia
Number
of IFIs
Number of
Number
Islamic assets
of IFIs per
IFIs per
per adult
(US$)
10 million adults 10,000 km 2
31.0
8.9
325
0.0
0.00
Sudan
93
6.9
4.5
871
29
103
14.0
0.12
89
23.3
15.3
1,560
18
3.0
0.22
Tajikistan
85
2.5
7.6
329
0.0
0.00
10.2
1.2
40
0.0
0.00
93
32.2
26.8
1,490
72
3.7
0.19
Turkey
82
57.6
7.9
1,820
538
0.9
0.06
Turkmenistan
80
0.4
9.9
360
0.0
0.00
Uganda
93
20.5
3.4
485
0.0
0.00
91
59.7
3.2
84
22
9,298
33.5
2.63
Uzbekistan
51
22.5
5.9
952
0.0
0.00
West Bank and Gaza

Yemen, Rep.
93
99
19.4
3.7
26.7
8.9
502
1,190
9
8
0
179
38.5
5.8
14.95
0.15
Togo
Tunisia
Sources: Calculations based on BankScope, Islamic Development Bank, Gallup Poll, and the Global Financial Inclusion (Global Findex) Database.
Note: This project is in progress; data in this table are preliminary and subject to change. OIC = Organization of Islamic Cooperation. Empty cells indicate lack of data.
Religiosity (%): Percentage of adults in a

given country who responded affirmatively to
the question, Is religion an important part
of your daily life? in a 2010 Gallup poll.
Account at a formal financial institution (%,
age 15+): Percentage of adults with an account
(self or together with someone else) at a bank,
credit union, another financial institution
(such as a cooperative or microfinance institution), or the post office (if applicable) including adults who reported having a debit card to
total adults. The data are from Global Findex
(Demirg-Kunt and Klapper 2012).
Number of IFIs (Islamic financial institutions): Number of banks in a country that

offer Sharia-compliant financial services to
their clients. The data are compiled by the
Global Financial Development Report team
members.
Islamic assets per adult (US$): Size of the
Islamic assets in the banking sector of an
economy per its adult population. The size of
the Islamic assets is taken from BankScope.
Adult population is taken from World Development Indicators.
Adults with no account due to religious reasons (%, age 15+): Percentage of those adults
who point to a religious reason for not having
an account at a formal financial institution.
The data are from Global Findex (DemirgKunt and Klapper 2012).
Number of Islamic financial institutions

per 10 million adults: Number of banks
in a country that offer Sharia-compliant
financial services to their clients per 10 million adults. The data are compiled by the
Global Financial Development Report team
members.
Adults with no account due to religious reasons (thousands, age 15+): Number of adults
that point to a religious reason for not having
an account at a formal financial institution.
The data are from Global Findex (DemirgKunt and Klapper 2012).
Number of Islamic financial institutions per

10,000 km2: Number of banks in a country
that offer Sharia-compliant financial services
to their clients per 10,000 km2. The data are
compiled by the Global Financial Development Report team members.
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Global Financial Development Report 2014 is the second in a new World Bank series. It contributes to financial sector policy
debates, building on new data, surveys, research, and country experience, with emphasis on emerging markets and developing
economies. The reports findings and policy recommendations are relevant for policy makers; staff of central banks, ministries of
finance, and financial regulation agencies; nongovernmental organizations and donors; academics and other researchers and
analysts; and members of the finance and development community.
This years report focuses on financial inclusionthe share of individuals and firms that use financial servicesand
demonstrates its importance for reducing poverty and boosting shared prosperity. It also underscores that the objective is not
financial inclusion for the sake of inclusion. For example, policies promoting credit for all at all costs can lead to greater financial
and economic instability. The report offers practical, evidence-based advice on policies that support healthy financial inclusion.
Accompanying the report is an updated and expanded version of the Global Financial Development Database, which tracks
financial systems in more than 200 economies since 1960. The databasetogether with relevant research papers and other
background materialsis available on the reports interactive website, www.worldbank.org/financialdevelopment.
ISBN 978-0-8213-9985-9
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GLOBAL FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2014

1 Financial Inclusion: Importance, Key Facts, and Drivers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

GLOBAL FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2014

GLOBAL FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2014

Main Messages of This Report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3

Use of Bank Accounts and Self-Reported Barriers to Use . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2

GLOBAL FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2014

Trends in Number of Accounts, Commercial Banks, 200411 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .20

GLOBAL FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2014

B3.2.1 Estimated Returns to Capital . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .110

Adults Using a Bank Account in a Typical Month . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6

Selected Results of the 201213 Financial Development Barometer . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4

GLOBAL FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2014

Financial Knowledge around the World. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .76

AccessFinancial Markets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .164

he second Global Financial Development Report seeks to contribute to the

Indeed, half of the worlds adult population

GLOBAL FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2014

available through the World Bank Groups

GLOBAL FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2014

lobal Financial Development Report

director. Martin Cihk

Kaushik Basu, Chief Economist and Senior

GLOBAL FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2014

Kraay reviewed the draft for consistency and

GLOBAL FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2014

North Africa Region); Idah Pswarayi-Riddihough, Sujata Lamba, Shamsuddin Ahmad,

GLOBAL FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2014

assistance was provided by Parabal Singh,

The authors would also like to thank the

Abbreviations and Glossary

gross domestic product

Conceptually, financial development is a process of reducing the costs

The share of individuals and firms that use financial services.

Services provided to individuals and firms by the financial system.

GLOBAL FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2014

GLOBAL FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2014

The countrys government as well as autonomous or semi-autonomous

inancial inclusiontypically defined as

Financial Barometer (Cihk

GLOBAL FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2014

GLOBAL FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2014

FIGURE O.1 Use of Bank Accounts and

Have a bank account

Other reasons for nonuse

Source: Global Financial Inclusion (Global Findex) Database, World Bank,

to result in a crisis. A spectacular recent

This is where the current report fits in.

GLOBAL FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2014

Main Messages of This Report

The level of financial inclusion varies widely around

environment (for instance, setting standards for

GLOBAL FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2014

Main Messages of This Report

tions. Financial education has a measurable impact

The Views of Practitioners on Financial Inclusion:

To examine views on financial inclusion among

previous round (Cihk

barometer, which addresses specific questions on

TABLE BO.2.1 Selected Results of the 201213 Financial Development Barometer

2. Access to finance is a significant barrier to the growth of small enterprises in my country.

(box continued next page)

GLOBAL FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2014

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