China Banking Coproration vs.

Co
FACTS:
Petitioner China Bank sold a lot to Spouses Castro. It also sold two other lots located in the
same place to Ngogoy Spouses. These lots are commonly bound on the southeastern side by a
lot owned by Respondent Co. Co entered into a joint venture with Three Kings Construction
for the development their lots with this, they contracted respondent Engr. Olea.
Respondent started constructing a perimeter wall.
Petitioners wrote the respondents to stop constructing the wall since it blocks their ingress and
egress.
Demand was unheeded, hence, the filing before the RTC a complaint for injunction,
restoration of road/right of way, damages and writ of preliminary injunction. (later on inamend
nila to kasi since patapos na yung wall, di na nila mamodify pa yun so ang complaint na nila is
for mandatory injunction)
RTC- denied the application of injunction
CA- affirmed.
ISSUE:
WON the writ of injunction should be granted.
RULING:
NO. It is settled that a grant of a preliminary mandatory injunction rests on the sound
discretion of the court and the exercise of the judicial discretion by the lower court should not
be interfered with except in cases of manifest abuse.
Further, a court should avoid issuing a writ of preliminary injunction which would effectively
dispose of the main case without trial.
In order for one to be entitled to WPI, you must establish the following: 1)invasion of the right
sought to be protected is material and substantial; 2) the right of the complainant is clear and
unmistakable; and 3)there is an urgent and permanent necessity for the writ to prevent serious
damage.
Since a preliminary mandatory injunction commands the performance of an act, it does not
preserve the status quo and is thus more cautiously regarded than a mere prohibitive
injunction. Accordingly, the issuance of such is justified only in a clear case, free from doubt
or dispute. When the complainants right is doubtful or disputed, he does not have a clear legal
right and the issuance of injunctive order is improper.
*here kasi, it shows dun sa ocular inspection, petitioners will not lose access to their
residences and besides meron pa nga secondary road that serves as the main access road to the
highway.

LRTA vs CA
FACTS:
Respondent LAL donated a stereo system with the LRTA. LAL and LRTA entered into a
contract whereby the former will be granted the right to air commercial ads thru the stereo
donated for a period of 5 years and 3 months. (april 1, 1992 March 31, 1997)
By March 31, 1997, Lal filed an action for reformation of contract and damages with
application of preliminary injunction and TRO against LRTA. It alleged that there were
vibrations and noises coming from the light rail vehicles which caused the disruptions in the
sound system, resulting in the decline the ads aired over the sound system.
Respodent Judge issued a TRO.
LRTA filed a manifestation saying that there was failure on the part of LAL to post a bond
which
renders
the
decision
of
the
Judge
ineffective.
LAL filed a motion to cite the defendants in contempt. Later on, the motion for indirect
contempt was made. So warrants of arrest were issued against persons named in the warrant.
LRTA filed a petition for certiorari to assail the orders of the Judge.
ISSUE:
Can the lifetime of an expired contract be extended by a preliminary injunction?
RULING:
NO. The purpose of a preliminary injunction is to prevent threatened or continuous
irremediable injury to some of the parties before their claims can be thoroughly studied and
adjudicated. To be entitled to an injunctive writ, the petitioner has the burden to establish the
following requisites: a) a right in esse or a clear and unmistakable right to be protected; (b) a
violation of that right; and (c) that there is an urgent and permanent act and urgent necessity
for the writ to prevent serious damage.
In the present case, respondents entitlement to the injunctive writ is found on its prima facie
legal right to remain in the premises and continue broadcasting commercial advertisements
within the LRT stations. The only way to determine this is to look into the terms of the
contract between petitioner and respondent, as it provides for their respective rights and
obligations. It is fundamental that if the terms of a contract are clear and leave no doubt upon
the intention of the contracting parties, the literal meaning of its stipulations shall control. No
amount of extrinsic aids are required and no further extraneous sources are necessary in order
to ascertain the parties intent.
The contract explicitly states that it was due to expire on March 31, 1997, the same day
respondent filed its action for reformation of contract. When the trial court issued its Order
dated April 16, 1997, ordering petitioner to refrain from terminating the contract and to retain
respondents services until further orders from the court, the contract had already expired.
Respondent, therefore, has no clear and unmistakable right to be protected by the issuance of
the writ. This is but a consequence of their stipulation of a determinate period for its
expiration. The injunction, in effect, virtually extended the original period agreed upon.
It was the trial courts belief that to allow the contract to expire would render respondents
action for reformation of contract moot and academic. Needless to say, a contract can be
renewed, revived or extended only by mutual consent of the parties. No court can compel a
party to agree to a contract through the instrumentality of a writ of preliminary injunction.
Also, the possibility of irreparable damage without proof of actual existing right is not a
ground for an injunction.

Bacolod City Water District vs Labayen

FACTS:
ISSUE:
RULING:

Ortigas and Company vs CA and Sps King

FACTS:
Ortigas, thru its General Manager Lozano, Jr, leased to Syquiatco a unit in Gondola Alley at
Greenhills shopping center for a period of 10 years. Syquiatco subleased the unit to Sps. King.
Later on, Ortigas dismissed Lozano from service. It found out that the lease agreement with
Syquiatco included a clause providing that electric and Water bin shall be for our account.
Ortigas new General Manager, Lim, met with King to correct the inequities. The latter
however did not sign the new proposed contract.
Ortigas then tried to collect the amount of bills due to the Kings, but the latter did not pay and
so Ortigas disconnected the electricity supply for them.
Kings filed with the RTC a case of specific performance and damages plus the issuance of writ
of preliminary injunction.
RTC denied.
CA annulled the order of the RTC and issued a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction.
ISSUE:
Won the court a quo committee GAD in denying plaintiffs application for a preliminary
mandatory injunction.
RULING:
No. The writ of preliminary injunction, in general, cannot be sought as a matter of right, but its
grant or refusal rests in the sound discretion of the court under the circumstances and the facts
of the particular case. The writ is the strong arm of equity and therefore should not be used
to sanction inequity.
The defendant, herein petitioner, was able to how that the electricity consumed per month by
the Spouses was way above the amount of the monthly rentals which they were paying to the
petitioner, thereby in effect making the latter subsidize the business of the former in the leased
premises. Such an obviously inequitable situation by which the private respondents enriched
themselves at the expense of petitioner cannot be ignored as private respondents wanted the
trial court to do, by insisting on a strict adherence to the letter of the contract, which petitioner
questioned, alleging inter alia obvious mistake and collusion, and non-approval of the contract
by the principal of the signatory for the lessor defenses which must eventually be considered
by the courta quo in deciding the merits of the case. It is thus not a simple case of a
contracting party having made a bad bargain and who must be made to abide by it. The trial
court, considering the equities of the case, refused to issue the preliminary mandatory
injunction. We hold that in refusing to do so the trial court did not commit a grave abuse of
discretion.
In general, courts should avoid issuing a writ of preliminary injunction which in effect
disposes of the main case without trial. This is precisely the effect of the writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction issued by the respondent appellate court. Having granted through a writ
of preliminary mandatory injunction the main prayer of the complaint, there is practically
nothing left for the trial court to try except the plaintiffs' claim for damages.

Merville Park Homeowners association vs. Velez

FACTS:
MPHAI became the owner of the pipelines and waterworks system of the Merville
subdivision by virtue of a deed of donation. MPHAI entered into a contract of lease with
Respondent Salandanan whereby the latter will construct additional wells to the said
subdivision. Salandanan requested for increase in water rates. Ayaw ni MPHAI nung una pero
they ended up with a compromise.
MPHAI commenced an action with the RTC presided by Judge Francisco in order to seek the
rescission of the amended contract and compromise and the issuance of writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction. It also alleged na there was failure on the part of Salandanan to pay his
electric bills such much so that Meralco had to cut off the power supply of his rented power
pumps resulting in a severe water shortage within the subdivision. Judge Francisco granted the
prayer for injunction.
Nagfile ng answer si Salandanan. naraffle kay judge Puno ni lift nia yung order ni Judge
Francisco. Nareraffle na naman kay Judge Yuzon nireintstate yung writ. NARERAFFLE NA
NAMAN kay JUDGE VELEZ NA!! ni lift naman niya ulit.
Hence, this petition for certiorari.
ISSUE:
MAY GAD ba kay JUDGE VELEZ?
RULING:
NO. A preliminary mandatory injunction is not a proper remedy to take property, possession of
which is being disputed, out of the possession and control of one party and to deliver the same
to the other party. It may issue pendente lite only in cases of extreme urgency, where the right
to the possession, during the pendency of the main case, of the property involved is very clear;
where considerations of relative inconvenience bear strongly in favor of the complainant
seeking the possession pendente lite; where there was wilful and unlawful invasion of

plaintiffs rights, over his protest and remonstrance, the injury being a continuing one; where
the effect of the preliminary mandatory injunction is to re-establish and maintain a pre-existing
and continuing relationship between the parties, recently and arbitrarily interrupted by the
defendant, rather than to establish a new relationship during the pendency of the principal
case.
Under the terms and conditions of the amended contract of lease, private respondent
Salandanan is entitled to possess and manage the waterworks system for a period of ten (10)
years beginning 20 March 1981, unless, of course, the contract is judicially rescinded.
Petitioner's action for the rescission of the amended lease contract was pending before the trial
court at the time petitioner had recourse to the Supreme Court, and that action, so far as the
records before us show, remains pending to this date. Petitioner has failed to show the
existence of some extraordinary situation imposing upon it irreparable injury and clearly
calling for the issuance and maintenance of the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction.
Petitioner alleged that sometime in 1984, the power supply of the water pumps had been cut
off by Meralco for failure of private respondent Salandanan to pay his electric bills, resulting
in a severe water shortage within the Subdivision. There was, however, no showing that this
condition remained subsisting three (3) years later, at the time respondent Judge's orders here
assailed were rendered (August 1987 and March 1988) and at the time the Petition
for Certiorari was filed (May 1988) before the Supreme Court. There was, in other words, no
showing that the severe water shortage had not been remedied at or before the said material
times and that a clear and present danger of the same or similar default on Salandanan's part,
threatening the same severe consequences for the subdivision residents, persisted. On the
contrary, it appears from the record that the Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System
("MWSS") had commenced servicing the Subdivision before issuance of the respondent
Judge's orders here sought to be annulled, which circumstance surely reduced the probabilities
of recurrence of such breakdown of water supply. Succinctly put, petitioner has not shown that
the continued possession of the leased waterworks system by respondent Salandanan created a
continuing, clear and imminent danger that the Subdivision would suffer from lack of
adequate supply of potable water.
Pero dito pinagput up pa si Salandanan ng bond para daw di maprejudice yung mga residente.