FREE ACCESS TO COURTS

Case 1
In Re: Query of Mr. Roger Prioreschi
A.M. No. 09-6-9-SC
August 19, 2009
Facts:
In his letter dated May 22, 2009 addressed to the Chief Justice, Mr.
Roger C. Prioreschi, administrator of the Good Shepherd
Foundation, Inc., questioned OCA Circular No. 42-2005 and Rule
141 of the Rules of Court of the Philippines that reserve the
privilege of exemption from docket and filing fees to indigent
persons. He questioned why the rules excluded foundations or
associations that work with and for the most Indigent persons, as
in the case of the Good Shepherd Foundation, Inc. which had been
reaching out since 1985 to the poorest among the poor, the
newly born and abandoned babies, children who never saw the
smile of their mother, old people who cannot afford a few pesos to
pay for common prescriptions, broken families who returned to a
normal life, whom the Philippine Government and the Filipino
society could not reach to or had rejected or abandoned.
To answer the query of Mr. Prioreschi, the Supreme Court held that
it could not grant to foundations like the Good Shepherd
Foundation, Inc. the same exemption from payment of legal fees
granted to indigent litigants even if the foundations are working
for indigent and underprivileged people. The basis for the
exemption from legal and filing fees is the free access clause,
embodied in Sec. 11, Art. III of the 1987 Constitution, which
provides that free access to the courts and quasi judicial bodies
and adequate legal assistance shall not be denied to any person
by reason of poverty.
Held:
In implementation of the right of free access under the
Constitution, the Supreme Court promulgated rules, specifically,
Sec. 21, Rule 3, Rules of Court, and Sec. 19, Rule 141, Rules of
Court.
The Court held that the clear intent and precise language of the
aforequoted provisions of the Rules of Court indicated that only a
natural party litigant may be regarded as an indigent litigant. The

Good Shepherd Foundation, Inc., being a corporation invested by

the State with a juridical personality separate and distinct from
that of its members, is a juridical person. Among others, it has the
power to acquire and possess property of all kinds as well as incur
obligations and bring civil or criminal actions, in conformity with
the laws and regulations of their organization. As a juridical
person, it cannot be accorded the exemption from legal and filing
fees granted to indigent litigants.
The Court stated that the free access clause of the Constitution
applies only to a natural person who suffers from poverty. It added
that extending the exemption to a juridical person on the ground
that it works for indigent and underprivileged people may be prone
to abuse (even with the imposition of rigid documentation
requirements), particularly by corporations and entities bent on
circumventing the rule on payment of the fees and that the
scrutiny of compliance with the documentation requirements may
prove too time-consuming and wasteful for the courts.
SECTION 12 CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION
(1) Any person under investigation for the commission of
an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right
to remain silent and to have competent and independent
counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot
afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with
one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and
in the presence of counsel.
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any
other means which vitiate the free will shall be used
against
him.
Secret
detention
places,
solitary,
incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are
prohibited.
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of
this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible in
evidence against him.
Case 2
HO WAI PANG v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 176229
October 19, 2011
Facts:

On September 6, 1991, at around 11:30 in the evening,

United Arab Emirates Airlines Flight No. 068 from Hongkong
arrived at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA). Among

the passengers were 13 Hongkong nationals who came to the

Philippines as tourists.
At the arrival area, Customs Examiner Gilda L. Cinco
examined the baggages of each of the 13 passengers and found,
all in all, 18 chocolate boxes with white crystalline substance
contained in a white transparent plastic from the baggages of the
petitioner and his five co-accused.
Six separate Informations all dated September 19, 1991
were filed against petitioner and his co-accused for violation of
R.A. No. 6425. After pleading not guilty to the crime charged, all
the accused testified almost identically, invoking denial as their
defense.
They claimed that they have no knowledge about the
transportation of illegal substance (shabu) taken from their
traveling bags which were provided by the travel agency.
The RTC found Pang guilty of violation of the Dangerous
Drugs Act. The CA while affirming the RTC decision took note that
their right to counsel during custodial investigation was violated.
ISSUE:
Did CA err in not excluding evidence taken during the custodial
investigation?
HELD:

No. While there is no dispute that petitioner was subjected

to all the rituals of a custodial questioning by the customs
authorities and the NBI in violation of his constitutional right under
Section 12 of Article III of the Constitution, we must not, however,
lose sight of the fact that what said constitutional provision
prohibits as evidence are only confessions and admissions of the
accused as against himself.
In the case at bench, petitioner did not make any
confession or admission during his custodial investigation. The
prosecution did not present any extrajudicial confession extracted
from him as evidence of his guilt. Moreover, no statement was
taken from petitioner during his detention and subsequently used
in evidence against him. Verily, in determining the guilt of the
petitioner and his co-accused, the trial court based its Decision
on the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and on the
existence of the confiscated shabu.
Case 3

Gamboa v Cruz
G.R. No. L-56291
June 27, 1988
Facts: Petitioner was arrested for vagrancy without a warrant.
During a line-up of 5 detainees including petitioner, he was
identified by a complainant to be a companion in a robbery,
thereafter he was charged. Petitioner filed a Motion to Acquit on
the ground that the conduct of the line-up, without notice and in
the absence of his counsel violated his constitutional rights to
counsel and to due process. The court denied said motion. Hearing
was set, hence the petition.
Issue: Whether or Not petitioners right to counsel and due
process violated.
Held: No. The police line-up was not part of the custodial inquest;
hence, petitioner was not yet entitled, at such stage, to counsel.
He had not been held yet to answer for a criminal offense. The
moment there is a move or even an urge of said investigators to
elicit admissions or confessions or even plain information which
may appear innocent or innocuous at the time, from said suspect,
he should then and there be assisted by counsel, unless he waives
the right, but the waiver shall be made in writing and in the
presence of counsel.
On the right to due process, petitioner was not, in any way,
deprived of this substantive and constitutional right, as he was
duly represented by a counsel. He was accorded all the
opportunities to be heard and to present evidence to substantiate
his defense; only that he chose not to, and instead opted to file a
Motion to Acquit after the prosecution had rested its case. What
due process abhors is the absolute lack of opportunity to be heard.
Case 4
People v Macam
G.R. Nos. 91011-12
November 24, 1994
Facts: Accused was charged and prosecuted for robbery with
homicide as guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Defense assails the
court decision contending the constitutional rights of the accused
were violated for subjecting them to a police line up at the hospital

where they were identified by the victims without the presence of

their counsel and without any warrant.
Issue: Whether or not the constitutional rights of the accused
were violated.
Held: The right to counsel is extended to critical stages of
prosecution which include police line-up. After the start of the
custodial investigation, any identification of an uncounseled
accused made in a police line-up is inadmissible.
Although the accused were arrested without a warrant such
defect was cured during the proceeding when the defense failed to
object on the issue during the initial proceedings before the court.
Having failed to assail the issue beforehand the accused is
estopped to assail the validity of their arrest as they further
voluntarily submitted their self before the court by entering the
plea of not guilty instead of moving to quash the information
before the court on ground of an invalid arrest. HOWEVER, the
prosecution did not present evidence regarding appellants
identification at the line-up. The witnesses identified the accused
again in open court. Also, accused did not object to the in-court
identification as being tainted by illegal line-up. The witnesses and
victims positively identified the accused thereby further affirming
the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. SC affirmed the
decision of the lower court.
Case 5
People v Judge Ayson
G.R. No. 85215
July 7, 1989
Facts:
Private respondent Felipe Ramos was a ticket freight clerk
of the Philippine Airlines (PAL), assigned at its Baguio City station.
It having allegedly come to light that he was involved in
irregularities in the sales of plane tickets, the PAL management
notified him of an investigation to be conducted into the matter of
February 9, 1986. During the investigation, private respondent
freely answered the questions given to him which were recorded.
After 2 months, private respondent was charged with
estafa. During the trial, respondent judge dismissed the case
stating that the evidence was inadmissible because private
respondent was not reminded of his constitutional right to remain

silent and to have counsel. Further, it did not appear that private
respondent waived his rights thereto.
The private prosecutors are here now alleging that the
judge committed a grave abuse of discretion by not allowing the
evidence.
Issue:
Whether or not private respondents rights to a proper
custodial investigation were violated?
Held:

Petition is granted. Sec. 12 of Article III of the 1987

constitution provides that the accused must be warned prior to
any questioning that he has the right to remain silent, that
anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he
has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot
afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any
questioning if he so desires. After such warnings have been given,
such opportunity afforded him, the individual may knowingly and
intelligently waive these rights and agree to answer or make a
statement. But unless and until such warnings and waivers are
demonstrated by the prosecution at the trial, no evidence obtained
as a result of interrogation can be used against him.
The rights above specified, to repeat, exist only in
"custodial interrogations," or "in-custody interrogation of
accused persons." And, as this Court has already stated, by
custodial interrogation is meant "questioning initiated by law
enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or
otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way."
Not every statement made to the police by a person
involved in some crime is within the scope of the constitutional
protection. If not made "under custodial interrogation," or "under
investigation for the commission of an offense," the statement is
not protected.
Case 6
People v Pinlac
G.R. Nos. 74123-24
September 26, 1988
Facts: The accused was convicted for two separate criminal cases
for robbery and robbery with homicide. He assailed his conviction
on the contention that the court erred in admitting his extrajudicial
confession as evidence which was taken by force, violence,

torture, and intimidation without having appraised of

constitutional rights and without the assistance of counsel.

his

Issue: Whether or not due process was observed during the

custodial investigation of the accused.
Held: The court find it meritorious to declare that the
constitutional rights of the accused was violated in the failure of
the authorities in making the accused understand the nature of
the charges against him without appraising him of his
constitutional right to have a counsel during custodial
investigation. Moreover the prosecution merely presented the
extrajudicial confession of the accused which is inadmissible as
evidence and the other evidences provided therein are merely
circumstantial and subject for rebuttal. The court acquitted the
accused.
Case 7
People v Bolanos
G.R. No. 101808
July 3, 1992
Facts: Police authorities arrested the accused for murder. Together
with the accused the police boarded a jeep to take him to their
station. While on board the jeep the accused started admitting
killing the deceased. This extrajudicial confession was used as
evidence in court and the accused was convicted.
Issue: Whether or not accused-appellant was deprived of his
constitutional right to counsel.
Held: Yes. The accused on board the police vehicle on the way to
the police station is already under custodial investigation and
should therefore be accorded his rights under the Constitution and
be informed of his Miranda rights. Any extrajudicial confession he
makes without his counsel is deemed inadmissible to court.
Case 8
People vs. Pablito Andan
G.R. No. 116437
March 3, 1997

Re.: Extrajudicial
Admissible

Confessions

to

Mayor

and

Media

Facts:
Pablito Andan alias "Bobby" was accused of the crime of rape with
homicide. The offense was committed on February 19,1994 in
Baliuag, Bulacan; the victim being Marianne Guevarra, 22 and a
2nd year student at the Fatima School of Nursing. On said day,
victim left her home for her school dormitory in Valenzuela. While
on her way, appellant invited her to his house. He used the pretext
that the blood pressure of his wife's grandmother should be taken.
Marianne agreed to do so as the old woman was her distant
relative. She did not know that nobody was inside the house.
Appellant then punched her in the abdomen, brought her to the
kitchen and raped her. By night time, Marianne, who was still
unconscious, was dragged by appellant to their backyard that was
adjacent to a vacant lot. Appellant was to transfer Marianne to the
vacant lot when she moved, prompting appellant to hit her head
with a piece of concrete block. No longer moving, he dragged her
to the lot and abandoned her. At 11am her body was discovered.
The autopsy revealed that she died of "traumatic injuries.
"Marianne's gruesome death drew public attention and prompted
Baliuag Mayor Cornelio Trinidad to form an investigation team. The
investigation pointed to the appellant. Appellant's nearby house
was searched but he was not there. On February 24, a police team
led by Mayor Trinidad traced appellant in his parents' house. They
took him and brought him to the police headquarters where he
was interrogated. Initially, he denied any knowledge of Marianne's
death. However, when the police confronted him with evidence,
appellant relented but implicated two of his neighbors, and that he
was merely a lookout. The police likewise brought Larin and Dizon
there. The following day a physical examination conducted on the
suspects revealed that appellant has multiple scratches on the
neck, chest and back. By that time, people and media
representatives were already at the police headquarters awaiting
the results of the investigation. Mayor Trinidad arrived. Upon
seeing the mayor, appellant approached him and whispered that
they talk privately. The mayor led him to the office of the Chief of
Police and there, he broke down and said "Mayor, patawarin mo
ako! I will tell you the truth. I am the one who killed Marianne."
The mayor opened the door of the room to let the public and
media representatives witness the confession. Since no lawyer was
available he ordered the proceedings photographed and
videotaped. In the presence of the mayor, the police,

representatives of the media and appellant's own wife and son,

appellant confessed his guilt. He asked for forgiveness from Larin
and Dizon whom he falsely implicated saying he did it because of
ill-feelings against them. He also said that the devil entered his
mind because of the pornographic magazines and tabloid he read
almost everyday. After his confession, appellant hugged his wife
and son and asked the mayor to help him. His confession was
captured on videotape and covered by the media nationwide. On
arraignment, however, appellant entered a plea of "not guilty." He
testified that on said date he was at his parent's house for the
birthday party of his nephew. He, his wife and son went home after
5pm, slept at 8pm, and woke up at 6am the next day. Appellant
claimed that after he was picked up by the police on February 24,
he was coerced to confess that he raped and killed Marianne.
Fearing for his life, appellant did as he was told. The trial court
convicted the appellant and sentenced him to death. He was found
guilty of the crime charged in the Information (Rape with
Homicide) and penalized accordingly. Hence, the automatic review.

to preclude the slightest use of coercion by the state as would lead

the accused to admit something false, not to prevent him from
freely and voluntarily telling the truth. Hence we hold that
appellant's confession to the mayor was correctly admitted by the
trial court. Appellant's confessions to the media were likewise
properly admitted. The confessions were made in response to
questions by news reporters, not by the police or any other
investigating officer. We have held that statements spontaneously
made by a suspect to news reporters on a televised interview are
deemed voluntary and are admissible in evidence. The Court
therefore held accused-appellant Pablito Andan guilty of the
special complex crime of rape with homicide.

Issue: W/N the appellants confession not being assisted by a

counsel is in violation of the constitution, and is therefore
inadmissible as evidence against him.

Facts: Petitioner is the collecting and disbursing officer of

Numancia
National
Vocational
School
found
to
have
misappropriated public funds for private benefit after a COA audit.
He failed to restitute the amount despite COA demands. A warrant
of arrest was issued but petitioner pleaded not guilty and invokes
his right to custodial investigation since during the COA audit and
actual cash count he was made to sign the certification on the
fund shortage in the absence of a counsel. He further contends
that the shortage of funds was due to the assurance of certain
Macasemo to settle his unliquidated cash advance and his failure
to do so resulted to the fund shortage.

Held:
Under these circumstances, it cannot be successfully claimed that
appellant's confession before the mayor is inadmissible. It is true
that a municipal mayor has "operational supervision and control"
over the local police and may arguably be deemed a law
enforcement officer for purposes of applying Section 12 (1) and (3)
of Article III of the Constitution. However, appellant's confession to
the mayor was not made in response to any interrogation by the
latter. In fact, the mayor did not question appellant at all. No police
authority ordered appellant to talk to the mayor. It was appellant
himself who spontaneously, freely and voluntarily sought the
mayor for a private meeting. The mayor did not know that
appellant was going to confess his guilt to him. When appellant
talked with the mayor as a confidant and not as a law enforcement
officer, his uncounseled confession to him did not violate his
constitutional rights. Thus, it has been held that the constitutional
procedures on custodial investigation do not apply to a
spontaneous statement, not elicited through questioning by the
authorities, but given in an ordinary manner whereby appellant
orally admitted having committed the crime. What the
Constitution bars is the compulsory disclosure of incriminating
facts or confessions. The rights under Section 12 are guaranteed

Case 9
Navallo v Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 97214
July 18, 1994

Issue: Whether or not the right to counsel be invoked during the

COA audit
Held:
No, the right to counsel could not be invoked during the
COA audit since the procedure is not within the ambit of custodial
investigation. A person may be subject to malversation of funds
even in the absence of direct proof of misappropriation as long as
there is evidence of fund shortage which the petitioner failed to
explain with convincing justification.
Well-settled is the rule that such rights are invocable only
when the accused is under "custodial investigation," or is "in
custody investigation," 4 which we have since defined as any
"questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person

has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom

of action in any significant way." 5 A person under a normal audit
examination is not under custodial investigation. An audit
examiner himself can hardly be deemed to be the law
enforcement officer contemplated in the above rule. In any case,
the allegation of his having been "pressured" to sign the
Examination Report prepared by Dulguime appears to be belied by
his own testimony.
Case 10
People v Dy
G.R. No. 74517
February 23, 1988
Facts: Accused is the owner of Bennys Bar at Boracay Island and
was sentenced with murder before the trial court for shooting a
Swiss national in his bar. The accused contends the court erred in
admitting the presentation of the prosecution of evidence that he
came to a police officer and made a confession on the crime and
informed said officer where to find the gun he used, a statement
the accused denied to have done. They assail its admissibility to
the court on the grounds that such statement was not made in
writing and is in violation of the due process required in custodial
investigation.
Issue: Whether or not the evidence presented by the prosecution
be admissible to warrant guilt of the accused.
Held: In view of the documentary evidence on record the defense
lost its credibility before the court. An oral confession made by the
accused to the officer and telling him the gun is in his bar which he
wants to surrender can be held admissible in court as evidence
against him. This is because such confession was made unsolicited
by the police officer and the accused was not under investigation
when he made the oral confession. Therefore there is no need to
invoke compliance of the proper procedure in a custodial
investigation at the case at bar. The rule on RES GESTAE is
applicable where a witness who heard the confession is competent
to satisfy the substance of what he heard if he heard and
understood it. An oral confession need not be repeated verbatim,
but in such a case it must be given in substance. Thus the oral
confession made by the accused outside the ambit of custodial
investigation can be admissible in court and was given due
credence to warrant the judgment of the accused being guilty of
the crime.

Case 11
People vs Alicando
GR No. 117487
December 12, 1995
Facts:
Arnel Alicando was charged of the crime of rape with homicide for
raping a 4 year old girl named, Khazie Mae Penecilla. The records
show that appellant was arrested and interrogated by PO3 Danilo
Tan. The accused verbally confessed his guilt without the
assistance of counsel. The trial court convicted Alicando with the
crimes and charged sentencing him death penalty thus; the case is
submitted to the Supreme Court for automatic review.
Issue:
Whether or not admission of guilt made without the presence of
counsel is valid
Held:
The evidence gathered by PO3 Danilo Tan as a result of the
custodial investigation is inadmissible because appellant verbally
confessed without the benefit of counsel.
As provided in Section 12(1) and (3) Article 3 of the Constitution
any person under investigation for a commission of an offense
have the right to xxx have competent and independent counsel
xxx; any confession or admission obtained in violation of this
and preceding section shall be inadmissible against him
We are equally committed to the ideal that the process of
detection, apprehension, conviction, and incarceration of criminals
should be accomplished with fairness and without impinging on
the dignity of the individual.

SECTION 13 RIGHT TO BAIL

All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable
by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong,
shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties,

or be released on recognizance as may be prescribed by

law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended.
Excessive bail shall not be required.

HELD:
No, a judge cannot grant a petition for bail without a trial.
Since the determination of whether or not the evidence of guilt of
the accused is strong is a matter of judicial discretion, the judge is
mandated to conduct a hearing even in cases where the
prosecution chooses to just file a comment or leave the application
of bail to the discretion of the court.

Case 12
BASCO vs RAPATALO
A.M. No. RTJ-96-1335.
March 5, 1997
FACTS:
Petitioner Inocencio Basco filed a complaint against respondent
Judge Leo H. Rapatalo of RTC, Branch 32 of Agoo, La Union for
gross ignorance or willful disregard of established rule of law for
granting bail to an accused in a murder case without receiving
evidence and conducting a hearing.
Basco is the father of the victim of a murder by three men. There
were three accused men; one of them is Roger Morente. Roger
Morente filed for a petition for bail. A hearing for the petition was
set for several times but did not push through.
After allegedly seeing Morente in Rosario, La Union, the petitioner
learned that the respondent Judge granted the Morentes petition
for bail even though the petition was not heard at all.
The Judge alleged that he granted the petition based on the
prosecutors option not to oppose the petition as well as the
latters recommendation setting the bail bond in the amount of
P80,000.00. Respondent said that when the prosecution chose not
to oppose the petition for bail, he had the discretion on whether to
approve it or not. The respondent approved the petition for bail
based on his presumption that the prosecutor was more familiar
with the case and more knowledgeable on what he was doing
since the latter conducted the preliminary investigation. The
respondent further added that when he approved the petition, he
presumed that the private prosecutor was not around at the time
the public prosecutor recommended bail. Eventually, Morentes
bail bond was cancelled. A warrant of arrest was issued on account
of Bascos motion for consideration. Morente is then confined in
the La Union Provincial Jail.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a Judge can grant a petition for bail without a
hearing for such.

1.
2.

3.
4.

The Supreme Court reiterated the following rules outlining the

duties of a judge in case an application for bail is set:
Notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the application for
bail or require him to submit his recommendation (Section 18, Rule
114 of the Rules of Court as amended).
Conduct a hearing of the application for bail regardless of
whether or not the prosecution refuses to present evidence to
show that the guilt of the accused is strong for the purpose of
enabling the court to exercise its discretion (Sections 7 and 8,
supra).
Decide whether the evidence of guilt of the accused is
strong based on the summary of evidence of the prosecution
(Baylon v. Sison, supra).
If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the
accused upon the approval of the bail bond. (Section 19, supra).
Otherwise, petition should be denied.
While it may be true that the respondent Judge set the application
for bail for hearing three times, thus showing lack of malice or bad
faith in granting bail to the accused, nonetheless, this does not
completely exculpate him because the fact remains that a hearing
has not actually been conducted in violation of his duty to
determine whether or not the evidence against the accused is
strong for purposes of bail.
The Judge is reprimanded with the warning that a repetition of the
same or similar acts in the future will be dealt with more severely.
Case 13
People v. Judge Donato,
G.R. No. 79269, June 5, 1991
Facts:

The People of the Philippines, through the Chief State

Prosecutor of the Department of Justice, the City Fiscal of Manila
and the Judge Advocate General, filed the instant petition
for certiorari and prohibition, with a prayer for restraining
order/preliminary injunction, to set aside the order of respondent
Judge dated July 7, 1987 granting bail to the accused Rodolfo
Salas alias "Commander Bilog" in Criminal Case No. 86-48926 for
Rebellion. on 24 October 1986, private respondent Rodolfo
Salas, alias "Commander Bilog", and his co-accused were charged
for the crime of rebellion under Article 134, in relation to Article
135. Instead of asking for a reconsideration of said Order, private
respondent filed on 9 May 1987 a petition for bail, 9which herein
petitioner opposed in an Opposition filed on 27 May 1987. the fact
that in the Joint Manifestation and Motion dated October 14, 1986,
in G.R. No. 76009, private respondent categorically conceded that:
Par. 2 (B) Petitioner Rodolfo Salas will remain in legal custody
and face trial before the court having custody over his person.
Issue:
1. WON the accused can have the right to bail
2. WON the respondent Waive such right

Ruling:
1. We agree with the respondent court that bail cannot be denied
to the private respondent for he is charged with the crime of
rebellion as defined in Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code to
which is attached the penalty of prision mayor and a fine not
exceeding P20,000.00. 30 It is, therefore, a bailable offense under
Section 13 of Article III of the 1987 Constitution which provides
thus: Sec. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses
punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong,
shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be
released on recognizance as may be prescribed by law. The right
to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be
required. Therefore, before conviction bail is either a matter of
right or of discretion. It is a matter of right when the offense
charged is punishable by any penalty lower than reclusion
perpetua. 31 To that extent the right is absolute.

2. We agree with Petitioner that private respondent has, however,

waived his right to bail in G.R. No. 76009. It is the stand of the
petitioner that private respondent, "in agreeing to remain in legal
custody even during the pendency of the trial of his criminal case,
[he] has expressly waived his right to bail. When the parties in G.R.
No. 76009 stipulated that: b. Petitioner Rodolfo Salas will remain in
legal custody and face trial before the court having custody over
his person. they simply meant that Rodolfo Salas, herein
respondent, will remain in actual physical custody of the court, or
in actual confinement or detention, as distinguished from the
stipulation concerning his co-petitioners, who were to be
released in view of the recall of the warrants of arrest against
them; they agreed, however, "to submit themselves to the
court having jurisdiction over their persons.
CASE 14
PEOPLE VS. FORTES
G.R. NO. 90643
JUN 25,1993
Facts:

This case is about the conviction of Agustin Fortes y Garra

for the rape of a young girl. Agripino Gine of Barangay Naburacan,
Municipality of Matnog, Province of Sorsogon, accompanied his 13year old daughter, Merelyn, to the police station of the said
municipality to report a rape committed against the latter by the
accused. Following this, the accused was apprehended and
charged. The bond for the accuseds temporary liberty was initially
fixed at P30,000.00 but was later reduced to P25,000.00 upon
motion of the accused. The Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC)
found him guilty. An appeal to the RTC was filed and the accused
was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape
and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua.
The accused filed again an Application for Bail on Appeal but was
denied. The accused later on filed a special civil action for
certiorari to the Supreme Court for the denial of RTC on the ground
that the same amounted to an undue denial of his constitutional
right to bail.
Issue:
Whether or not the accuseds right to bail has been violated.
Held:

No. It is clear from Section 13, Article III of the 1987

Constitution and Section 3, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Court,

as amended, that before conviction bail is either a matter of right

or of discretion. It is a matter of right when the offense charged is
punishable by any penalty lower than reclusion perpetua. To that
extent the right is absolute. If the offense charged is punishable by
reclusion perpetua bail becomes a matter of discretion. It shall be
denied if the evidence of guilt is strong. The court's discretion is
limited to determining whether or not evidence of guilt is strong.
But once it is determined that the evidence of guilt is not strong,
bail also becomes a matter of right.
The clear implication, therefore is that if an accused who is
charged with a crime punishable by reclusion perpetua is
convicted by the trial court and sentenced to suffer such a
penalty, bail is neither a matter of right on the part of the accused
nor of discretion on the part of the court. In such a situation, the
court would not have only determined that the evidence of guilt is
strong, which would have been sufficient to deny bail even before
conviction, it would have likewise ruled that the accused's guilt
has been proven beyond reasonable doubt. Bail must not then be
granted to the accused during the pendency of his appeal from the
judgment of conviction.
CASE 15
COMMENDADOR VS. DE VILLA
G.R. No. 93177, Aug. 2, 1991
Facts:
The petitioners in G.R. Nos. 93177 and 96948 who are officers of
the AFP were directed to appear in person before the Pre-Trial
Investigating Officers for the alleged participation in the failed
coup d etat on December 1 to 9, 1989. Petitioners now claim that
there was no pre-trial investigation of the charges as mandated
by Article of War 71. A motion for dismissal was denied. Now, their
motion for reconsideration. Alleging denial of due process.
In G.R. No. 95020, Ltc Jacinto Ligot applied for bail on June 5, 1990,
but the application was denied by GCM No.14. He filed with the
RTC a petition for certiorari and mandamus with prayer for
provisional liberty and a writ of preliminary injunction. Judge of
GCM then granted the provisional liberty. However he was not
released immediately. The RTC now declared that even military
men facing court martial proceedings can avail the right to bail.
The private respondents in G.R. No. 97454 filed with SC a petition

for habeas corpus on the ground that they were being detained in
Camp Crame without charges. The petition was referred to RTC.
Finding after hearing that no formal charges had been filed against
the petitioners after more than a year after their arrest, the trial
court
ordered
their
release.
Issues:
(1) Whether or Not there was a denial of due process.
(2) Whether or not there was a violation of the accused right to
bail.

Held:
NO denial of due process. Petitioners were given several
opportunities to present their side at the pre-trial investigation.
Instead, they filed a verbal motion for reconsideration which they
were again asked to submit in writing. They had been expressly
warned in the subpoena that "failure to submit counter-affidavits
on the date specified shall be deemed a waiver of their right to
submit controverting evidence." Petitioners have a right to
peremptory
challenge.
The right to bail invoked by the private respondents has
traditionally not been recognized and is not available in the
military, as an exception to the general rule embodied in the Bill of
Rights. The right to a speedy trial is given more emphasis in the
military
where
the
right
to
bail
does
not
exist.
On the contention that they had not been charged after more than
one year from their arrest, there was substantial compliance with
the requirements of due process and the right to a speedy trial.
The AFP Special Investigating Committee was able to complete the
pre-charge investigation only after one year because hundreds of
officers and thousands of enlisted men were involved in the failed
coup.
Accordingly, in G.R. No. 93177, the petition is dismissed for lack of
merit. In G.R. No. 96948, the petition is granted, and the
respondents are directed to allow the petitioners to exercise the
right of peremptory challenge under article 18 of the articles of
war. In G.R. Nos. 95020 and 97454, the petitions are also granted,

and the orders of the respondent courts for the release of the
private respondents are hereby reversed and set aside. No costs.
Case 16
Baylon v Judge Sison
A.M. No. 92-7-360-0
April 6, 1995

this motion.

A guided legal principle in the right to bail includes:

Facts:
Respondent judge is accused for malfeasance in granting bail to
the accused charged with double murder. Prosecution was not
given notice of at least 3 days before the scheduled hearing for
bail in violation of Rule 15, section 4 of the Rules of Court and the
filing of petition for bail has only 2 non-working day interval from
the schedule of the hearing. Moreover the prosecution also assails
that they were not given the chance to present evidence that
strongly prove the guilt of the accused. Respondent judge justifies
not having committed grave abuse of discretion since the
prosecution did not interpose objection with his orders and the
lack of previous notice was cured with the filing of motion for
reconsideration.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent judge exercised abuse in
discretion in the grant of bail to the accused.

. . The prosecution must first be accorded an opportunity to

present evidence because by the very nature of deciding
applications for bail, it is on the basis of such evidence that judicial
discretion is weighed against in determining whether the guilt of
the accused is strong. In other words, discretion must be exercised
regularly, legally and within the confines of procedural due
process, that is, after evaluation of the evidence submitted by the
prosecution. Any order issued in the absence thereof is not a
product of sound judicial discretion but of whim and caprice and
outright arbitrariness.
Case 17
Manotoc v Court of Appeals
G.R. No. L-62100
May 30, 1986

HELD:
The Supreme Court held that there was abuse in the
discretion of the judge in granting bail to the accused considering
that the motion for bail was filed on a Saturday and the hearing
was immediately conducted on Monday thereby depriving the
prosecution to make an opposition thereto and violating the 3-day
notice rule embodied in Rule 15, Sec. 4 of Rules of Court. It is a
well-established rule of law that bail is not a matter of right and
requires a hearing where the accused is charged with an offense
which

the validity of petition for bail before making an outright grant of

is

punishable

by

death, reclusion

perpetua or

life

imprisonment. Respondent judge should have carefully scrutinized

FACTS:
There was a torrens title submitted and accepted by
Manotoc Securities Inc., which was suspected to be fake. Six of its
clients filed separate criminal complaints against the petitioner
and Leveriza, President and V-President respectively. He was
charged with estafa and was allowed by the Court to post bail.
Petitioner filed before each trial court motion for permission to
leave the country stating his desire to go to U.S. relative to his
business transactions and opportunities. Such was opposed by the
prosecution and was also denied by the judges. He filed petition

for certiorari with CA seeking to annul the prior orders and the SEC

we found no reversible error to have been committed by the

communication request denying his leave to travel abroad.

appellate court in allowing him to leave the country after it had

According to the petitioner, having been admitted to bail as a

satisfied itself that she would comply with the conditions of her

matter of right, neither the courts that granted bail nor SEC, which

bail bond.

has no jurisdiction over his liberty, could prevent him from

exercising his constitutional right to travel.

Case 18
Gov. of the US vs Judge Puruganan
GR no. 148571
Sept 24, 2002; Dec 17, 2002

ISSUE:

FACTS:

Whether or not the Court acted with grave abuse of

discretion in denying the petitioners motion for permission to
leave the country.
HELD:
A court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to bail
from leaving the Philippines. This is a necessary consequence of
the nature and function of a bail bond. Rule 114 Section 1 of the

Pursuant to the existing RP-US Extradition Treaty, the

United States Government through diplomatic channels requested
the extradition of Mark Jimenez, also known as Mario Batacan
Crespo. A petition for extradition was filed with the RTC, but before
the court could act, Jimenez filed before it an Urgent
Manifestation/ Ex-Parte Motion, which prayed that petitioners
application for an arrest warrant be set for hearing. This was
granted by the Court. After hearing, Jimenez submitted a required
memorandum, which sought an alternative prayer: that in case a
warrant should issue, he be allowed to post bail in the amount of
P100, 000.

Rules of Court defines bail as the security required and given for

ISSUE:

the release of a person who is in the custody of the law, that he

Whether or not Jimenez is entitled to bail and to provisional

liberty while the extradition proceedings are pending.

will appear before any court in which his appearance may be

required as stipulated in the bail bond or recognizance. The
condition imposed upon petitioner to make himself available at all
times whenever the court requires his presence operates as a valid
restriction on his right to travel. If the accused were allowed to
leave the Philippines without sufficient reason, he may be placed

HELD:
As suggested by the use of the word conviction, the
constitutional provision on bail, as well as Sec. 4 of Rule 114 of the
Rules of Court applies only when a person has been arrested and
detained for violation of Philippine criminal laws. It does not apply
to extradition proceedings, because extradition courts do not
render judgements of conviction or acquittal.

beyond the reach of the courts. As petitioner has failed to satisfy

the trial courts and the appellate court of the urgency of his travel,
the duration thereof, as well as the consent of his surety to the
proposed travel, we find no abuse of judicial discretion in their
having denied the petitioners motion for permission to leave the
country, in much the same way, albeit with contrary results, that

Case 19
Gov of Hong Kong vs Hon. Olalia
GR no. 153675
April 19, 2007
FACTS:

Juan Antonio Munoz was charged before the Hong Kong

Court with 3 counts of the offense of accepting an advantage as
an agent, conspiracy to defraud, was penalized by a common law
of Hong Kong. A warrant of arrest was issued and if convicted, he
may face jail terms. On September 23, 1999, he was arrested and
detained. On November 22, 1999, Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region filed with the RTC of Manila a petition for his
extradition. Juan Antonio Munoz filed a petition for bail, which
judge Felixberto Olalia granted.
ISSUE:

Whether or not Juan Antonio Munoz has the right to post

bail when there is nothing in the constitution or statutory law
providing a potential extraditee a right to bail.
HELD:
The right of a prospective extraditee to apply for bail must
be viewed in the light of the various treaty obligations of the
Philippines concerning respect for the promotion and protection of
human rights. Under these treaties, the presumption lies in favour
of human liberty. While extradition law does not provide for the
grant of bail to an extraditee, however, there is no provision
prohibiting him or her from filing a motion for bail, alright to due
process under the Constitution.

Case 20
Tatad v. Sandiganbayan
G.R. Nos. L-72335-39
March 21, 1998
Facts:
The complainant, Antonio de los Reyes, originally filed what

he termed "a report" with the Legal Panel of the Presidential

Security Command (PSC) on October 1974, containing charges of
alleged violations of RA No. 3019 against then Secretary of Public
Information Francisco S. Tatad. The "report" was made to "sleep" in
the office of the PSC until the end of 1979 when it became widely
known that Secretary Tatad had a falling out with President Marcos
and had resigned from the Cabinet. On December 12, 1979, the
1974 complaint was resurrected in the form of a formal complaint
filed with the Tanodbayan. The Tanodbayan acted on the complaint
on April 1, 1980 which was around two months after petitioner
Tatad's resignation was accepted by Pres. Marcos by referring the
complaint to the CIS, Presidential Security Command, for
investigation and report. On June 16, 1980, the CIS report was
submitted to the Tanodbayan, recommending the filing of charges
for graft and corrupt practices against former Minister Tatad and
Antonio L. Cantero. By October 25, 1982, all affidavits and counteraffidavits were in the case was already for disposition by the
Tanodbayan. However, it was only on June 5, 1985 that a
resolution was approved by the Tanodbayan. Five criminal
information were filed with the Sandiganbayan on June 12, 1985,
all against petitioner Tatad alone.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused
constitutional right to due process?

was

deprived

of

his

Ruling:
Yes. Due process and right to speedy disposition of trial
were violated. First, the complaint came to life, only after
petitioner Tatad had a falling out with President Marcos. Second,
departing from established procedures prescribed by law for
preliminary investigation, which require the submission of
affidavits and counter-affidavits by the complainant and the
respondent and their witnesses, the Tanodbayan referred the
complaint to the Presidential Security Command for finding
investigation and report. P.D. 911 prescribes a ten-day period for
the prosecutor to resolve a case under preliminary investigation by
him from its termination. Although, the period fixed by law was
merely directory, a delay of close to three years cannot be
deemed reasonable.