Midwest Modern Language Association

The Textual Space: On the Notion of Text

Author(s): Jenaro Talens and Juan M. Company
Source: The Journal of the Midwest Modern Language Association, Vol. 17, No. 2 (Autumn,
1984), pp. 24-36
Published by: Midwest Modern Language Association
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The TextualSpace:
On the Notion of Text
JenaroTalensandJuanM. Company
One of the most importantproblemsfacedby theoristswho dealwith the
is theambiguityof thekeytermuponwhich,in
analysisof "signifyingpractices"
onewayor another,theirdiscussions
hinge:the notionof "text."Eversincethe
of
OPOYAZ
and
activities
the
MoscowLinguisticCircle,literarytheory
early
hasfunctionedwith threemodelsof semiotics.The firsttwo arebasedon the
aswell ason themathematical
workof Saussure
theoryof information
presented
and
for
by Shannon Weaver(1949); both models,the text hasan autonomous
whetherin termsof "structure,"
asin the firstcase,or in
systemof signification,
of
in
terms "message,"
as thesecondcase.Thethirdmodelderivesfromthework
of Peirceanddoesnot definethe "sign"on the basisof entitiesor relationships.
Rather,it confrontsthe semioticproblemfroma differentperspective,
namely,
the analysisanddescription
of theconditionsthatarenecessary
foractions,facts,
or objectsto functionassigns.Thefirsttwo modelsbelongto a semioticsof communicationandarededicated
to thestudyof themeansandprocesses
usedby sign
not onlyto affectothersin variousways,but alsoto gainrecognition
producers,
fromthem. In a broadersense,the thirdmodelbelongsto the
andacceptance
andincludesallusesandbehaviorsthatbecomesignifisemioticsof signification
cantonly becausethey takeplacein a socialcontext.
In thisessay,we wish to addressourselvesto theproductivemanifestations
of
It is perhapsafterMay1968in Francethatsemiotics
the workof "signification."
ceasesto be understoodas a "scienceof signs"andstartsto functionasa critical
discipline.Becauseitscriticalobjectscometo bedefinedas(a)communication,
(b)
and(c) the languagesthatareimpliedwithin
the structuresof communication,
communication,semioticsappearsno longeras a study of the signified,but
rather,as a studyof the operationsof signifying.Yet thereis no humanscience
(andsemioticsis no exception)thatdoesnot compromisethosewho practiceit,
in a fixedzone of
situatesits practitioners
sincea scientificpracticenecessarily
andobligesthem to selectamongculturaloptionsthat in
knowledge("saber")
turn act upon the very processof investigation.So it is that the dominant
ideologiesin capitalistmodesof productionnot only determinethe modelsof
but alsothe instruments
usedto analyzethe structureandfunccommunication
tionof thosemodels.Thereareno neutral
sciences:themythof scientificneutralwith
the "scientificman"of the Renaisthat
arises
illusion
is
an
ity
ideological
sance.Thereis implicitin anyprocessof the productionof meaning("sentido")

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an entire system of aesthetic, economic, and ideological conditions. The particularproductionof a scientificdiscoursethat we will urge, therefore,cannotbe
thought of as an intuitiveor neutralactivityin searchof "real"knowledge ("conocimiento").
The so-calledexact sciencescan neitherignore nor avoid theseproblems.These
sciences are historically linked to various state apparatusesand are subject
themselvesto an economic law of supply and demand. Today, for example, one
does not investigate nuclear physics in the abstract; rather, one investigates
nuclearphysicswithin the context of specificgeopoliticalpracticesof power. We
could also make similar observationsabout the world of the human sciences,
especiallysince the ideological determinationsupon researchin those disciplines
areeven more obvious. All scientificdiscourseis a processof meaningproduction
and, as such, is at the same time subject to the sameconditions as are the texts,
speech acts, or utterancesthat constitute their field of investigation. A scientific
practicesuch as that of semiotics, therefore,cannot disregardits own inscription
into a determinantideology.
Saussureanandinformation-basedtheoriescanbe saidto err, then, in this initial
respect. Semiotics is born here primarily as a discipline dealing with critical
metalanguages;it claims to offer a scientific base to a kind of work formerly
characterizedby a lack of method (as, for example, in the case of evaluative
analysesof poetic language). Its aim initially is to reducecriticalinterventionto
of utterancesfrom one discursivesystem into a language different
the translation
from the one in which such utterancesare constituted. In this view, referenceto
the reality implied in the processof communicationis disregarded;the semiotic
project is limited to an analysis of systems of "communication" (and/or
"significance").The eventual appearanceof a third model does not really solve
much. The work of Peircediffersfrom the proposalsof Saussure,not becauseit reopens the question of the recurrenceof an exterior realityin the communicative
process, but rather, becauseit introduces the concepts of "interpretant"and of
"semiosis." By means of this second concept, the communicative process is
opened up to the field of signification;by means of the first concept, a semiotic
mechanism is instrumentalizedthrough which the signified is predicatedby a
signifier.
In the Hjelmslevian concepts of "expression"and "content," for example,
semioticspassesthe problemof content onto semantics,while, with the sameappearanceof neutrality, it continues to analyzethe systematicmechanismsof expression. The naive quality of Morris's behaviorism, moreover, causes his
semiotic theory to referPeirce'sthird model back to the two earlierones, insofar
as it also tendstowardthe translation
of one languageinto another.The only external appearanceof the processof communication(and/or signification)figuresas
embodiedwithin the universeof thought and not within the universeof socially
and historicallydeterminedreality: it is conceived of, therefore, as an external

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appearanceimmanentto the act of communication.Consequently,when analyzed

from without, the sum of contents addsan ideologicalcomponent, which neverthelesshas not been theorizedas reachingthe level of expression.In a crudeway,
we might say that a semiotics so understoodwould end up as the consequenceof
articulating two different practices, which we could label "formalist" and
"sociological."
If the processof the productionof meaning ("sentido")
is confrontedas a work
must
refer
back
to
the
cultural, political, and
investigation
critically
("trabajo"),
that
have
caused
the
to
occur
as
it does. Investigation,
ideologicalsystems
process
no
a
of
but
is
then,
rather,of discerningthe malonger question definingcodes,
trices (with their dependenciesand contradictions)that have formed them and
that govern their operation. We must take into accountthe concrete
processof the
of
in
not
which
the
elements
to
production meaning,
only
belonging the discursive objectsof analysisaretouched upon, but also others, such as the relationship
to other discourses,and so forth. Becauseall of this relatesto concretefactors,it is
not possible to delimit the field or even to touch bottom within it.
All discourse is the product of a transformationproduced from previous or
paralleldiscourseswhich, simultaneously,is the resultof convertingmatterinto a
signifying element. The analysisof the concrete
processmust take into accountthis
characteristicof discursivepractice.The functioning of this double transformation that is a live process, and for which discourselives, has been definedby Tel
This concept stressesthe materialform of a discourseby linking
Quel as"'criture."
that discoursewith other discourses;that is, by fixing discourseas a signifying
practice, it is related and articulated with other practices such as politics,
economics, psychoanalysis,etc.
The analysisof a concrete process of the production of meaning must touch
upon threeaspects:(1) the semioticformalizationof texts, with the analysisof the
communicationsystems that act within them; (2) the semiotic formalizationof
the system of productionof meaning, becausethe text in question is a concrete
manifestationof it, and(3) the relationshipof the text with the context of cultural
objectsinsofaras this context conditions the way in which the text is manifested.
All of this canbe articulatedthrough a multidisciplinaryrule for the analysis;but,
becauseof the very characterof a practice,even though it is specificand differentiated, this rule only exists when it is articulatedin relationto, superimposedon,
and traversedby other practices,in a fixed socialformation.This is why semiotics
has currentlyshiftedits fieldof action fromsignsto systemsofsignification
by focusing its gaze on the objectcalledtext.Although such a shift haspermittedan initial
atomismto be overcome,it has not solvedall the problems;this is due to the essential vaguenesswith which text, as a notion, is used by semiotic theory.
This is how "text" is definedin the DictionaryofPhilologicalTerms:"A specialized term (Glossematics)which indicatesany group of analyzablesigns: a pieceof
conversation; an entire conversation;a line of poetry; a novel; language as a

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whole;etc."(LazaroCarreter1968).Thisdefinitionis in facta densesynthesisof

variousdefinitionsproposedupto now and,assuch,it setsupitsown possibilities
aswellasits own problems.Evenif we canderivefromsuchadefinitionLotman's
of "text"and"sign"in thecaseof artistictexts(1973:53ff),we still
identification
aroundit turnout to be
cannotescapethefactthatthefeaturesthatsetboundaries
excessivelyvagueandgeneric.
Thefollowingcommentsaremeantasmorethanjustanotherstandard
attempt
a possibleepistemological
at establishing
boundaryforthe notionof "text"asan
operationalinstrumentin the fieldof verbalactivity.Our purposeis to orient
presentresearchtowarda notionof "text"thatcanbe used,withoutmetaphoric
in the analysisof anykindof practiceof theproductionof meaning.
transcendence,
Suchanalysisimplies:(1) thatthenotionof text shouldnotbe limitedonlyto verballanguages(whethertheseareartisticornot);and,(2)thatthefunctionof texts
shouldinclude"non-verbal"
languages(whethertheseareartisticor not) aswell
as thoseareasthatwe cancall"paralanguages"
(forexample,"bodydiscourse,"
"discourseof desire,""dailylife").
We shallheredefinelanguage
asa systemof organizedsignsthatcantransmitinformation.We acknowledgethatthisdefinitionis onlypreliminary
andperhaps
it
a
is
reformulation
of
Lotman's
views
with
of our
some
superficial;
coupled
variants.Yet the definitionis usefulbecauseit putsinto playthreeelements:(a)
functionfromthe "mark"("seflal");
the "sign"as a "differentiated"
(b) the existenceof a "code"thatcanbringaboutthe "articulation"/"organization"
of such
the
information
that
such
"signs";and, (c)
signs "transmit"/"communicate,"
sincesuchinformationis the "signified"thata codegrantsto the signsboth in
isolationandin its articulation
with othersigns.
We establish,then, limitsto the conceptof "communication."
It is defined
hereasthe concreteactualization
of "communicativeness"
alreadyanticipated
by
the code (andonlythat).We alsodistinguishbetween"signified"(whichevery
languagebearsandin somewaysis) and"meaning"("sense").Now, language
lackssucha "meaning"
("sense"),butits productionis possiblewheneverit is actualizedasa languagein texts.Yet with a proviso:thatthesetextsareunderstood
of
(andherewe haveanoperativedefinition[Coseriu1977])notasmanifestations
language,but rather,as its superiormodalities,in which languageas such
becomesexpressionfor contentsof anotherlevel.
This distinctionbetween"signified"and"meaning"("sense")doesnot corwhich
respondto the classicoppositionestablished
by Frege(Bedeutung/Sinn),
relieson the oppositionbetween "semanticreferentialvalue"and "semantic
theunityof the"semanlinguisticvalue."We understand
by theterm"signified"
tic linguisticvalue"(thatwhichis communicated)
andthe "semanticreferential
value"(thatwhichis produced),because,asa languagein actualperformance,
it
bringsinto playthe roleof theexplicitcontext.By the term"meaning"
("sense"
or "sentido"),
we understand
(followingGarroni1979)the implicitcontextof the

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explicit context, that is, the productof a processas it is individualizedby the appropriation/readingof what is "signified."We shallreturnto this questionlater.
The presentproposalfor defining languageis a way of substituting the broad
and ambiguousfield of communication(which is closerto the Lotmanmodel) by
the more limited andmanageablefield of "transmissibleinformation."In the first
place, there is the triple division of "nonlanguages"elaboratedby Lotman:
(a) systems which utilize nonorganizedsigns as communications;(b) organized
systems that serve for communicationbut do not use signs; (c) systems that use
organized signs but do not serve as communication. These three factorscan be
reducedto only the firstdoublepossibility:the transmissionof informationcanbe
given as long as there is an organizationof utilized signs, that is, a code which
servesas "organizer/decipherer."In the secondinstance(of systemswhich do not
utilize signs even though they might be organized), we shall speak of
"nonlanguage."In the other instance (of systems which utilize signs that are
somewhat or not at all organized), we shall refer to "paralanguages":a "use"
always ends up by establishingits own code becauseit grants meaning to that
which did not have it.
The proposed definition has other advantages.Consider the concept of the
"real"(in Lacan,the "real"is that which cannotbe hallucinatedby the subject:all
that is left outside consciousness,or unconsciousness,and has no possibilityto be
representedby language). How is the "action"or "object"of the "real"susceptible to the production of meaning? This is a challenging problem because the
"real"does not start by having a "signified"and, consequently, it cannot communicate anything. Now, what our definition proposesto do is to explain how
and why the "real,"even though without signifieds,is involved in the dailyproduction of meanings.
We are thus dealing with the possibility of "meaning"becausemeaning is a
partboth of languagesand of the above mentionedvariantsof nonlanguage.We
haveto attemptviabledefinitionsof the "text"which could functionin both areas
of "language"/"nonlanguage,"yet without being limited to any one of the two.
Contemporarysemiotic theory contains differentnotions about "text." We
need to establishtwo clearlydifferentiatedparadigms:(a) one which considersthe
text as a "closure"so that a structuralpoint of view canbe formalized;and(b) one
which confrontsthe text in the areaof signifyingproductionin orderto formalize
a functionalpoint of view. * Two representativepositions of the first paradigm
can be clearlyperceivedin the proposalsof Todorov (1972) and Lotman (1973).
For Todorov, what definesa text is the notion of "autonomy/closure,"even
though, in anothersense, some texts might not be "closed."The text constitutes
of usesof thisconceptis developed
*Alargerdescription
byJorgeLozano(1982).Forourpurposes,
however,thisproposeddoublemodel,in spiteof its genericandsimplisticnature,is moreuseful,
becausethe intelligentandhighlysuggestiveproposalsof Lozanocontinueto accepttheoperative
validityof the notionof text.

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a system that is not to be identifiedwith the linguistic systembut which, nevertheless, is related to it. This relation is one, simultaneously,of proximity and
similarity.As articulatedby Hjelmslev, the text is a "connotative"systembecause
it is secondaryto another system of signification. Such a definition, on the one
hand, limits the notion of text to the fieldof verballanguageswhile, on the other,
it does not manage to clarifythe distinction (text of) "closure"/"closed"even as
far as its own presuppositionsare concerned. As for the notion of autonomy,
Todorov relies on Hjelmslev, which is to say, Saussure'sbinomial set of
"signifier"/"signified"that underlineshis theory; he thus excludes the trial-like,
experimentalcharacterof compromisedsense, that is, the presenceof the subject
and of the spaceoutside the text (hors-texte),as articulatedby Lotman (1970).
For his part, Yuri M. Lotmanestablishesconditions which might be necessary
but, not really, sufficientfor the existence of any text. In a 1969 article, Lotman
accepted Pjatigorskij's1968 formulation of two propertiesas defining the existenceof texts: (a) the expressionwithin a determinedsystemof signs ('fijacidn");
and (b) the capacitythat the subjectenjoys to presenthimselfundercertainorientational relationships- deictic markers-which allow the utterancesto function
as a whole. A year later, in his fundamentallyimportantStructure
of theArtistic
Text, Lotman'sdefinitionof "text" becomes more explicit in termsof threeconditions: (a) that it be composed by "signs" ("expression");(b) that "signs"be
hierarchicallystructured("structuralcharacter");and (c) that "signs"occur between a beginning and an end ("markingout the boundaries").
The condition of necessitybut not of sufficiencyto which we havealludednow
could be explainedwith two arguments:(1) the ambiguityof Lotman'snotion of
hierarchy, which depends on a type of articulation that does not make clear
whether suchan articulationis inherentto the text or whether, on the contrary,it
and (2) the absenceof a clear
belongs to the subjectoutsidethe text (hors-texte);
definitionof the value of the notions of beginning andend. Whether temporalor
symbolic, it is this gap that later theoreticalwork by Lotman tries but fails to
eliminate.
We must indicate next the so-called"functional"approachesto defining textuality as representedby positions taken by Schmidt (1971)and Kristeva(1969).
Schmidtdistinguishesbetween "textuality"and"text"; he uses linguisticsto construct his theory of the text and then situates both concepts in their field of
reference.He defines textuality as the structureof socio-communicativeactions
among interlocutors.A text, therefore,is the correspondingconcreterealization
of "structuredtextuality" in a determinedmedium of communication. Schmidt
succeeds here in broadening the field of application beyond that of verbal
language. He does so, however, in an ambiguous and contradictoryway. He
merelyextends written language to language-in-situation,that is, to all those actions whose form of manifestationimpliesandincludesverballanguage. His position is part of the polemic surrounding "competence"/"performance"and is

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relatedto the discovery(by Lieb and Henne) that competence, which is supposedly capableof engulfing performance,can only be developedas a performanceof
implicit competence.
In addition, Schmidt'sconception presentstwo points that have in common a
reduction and simplificationof the nature of the problem. Everything seems
limited, strictly, to the theoreticalareaof the so-calledtheory of communication.
Moreover, the presentationof the problemin these terms (which areat the same
time broadand vague) does not allow for a cleardistinctionbetween the level of
and the level of "expression"(speech
what is "expressedutterance"("enunciado")
For Schmidt, the question is one only of a "transact; "enunciacidn").
missible"/"decipherable"message. In this way, he sets aside the problems involved, first, in determiningthe space"subject-from-whereit is expressed,"and,
next, in the space "subject-producer-ofsenses." Such considerationsno longer
posit a mere "inter-locutor"which happensto function in an extratextualposition.
For her part,Julia Kristevadefines"text" as a certaintype of "signifyingproduction" which occupies a definite place in history and which emerges from a
specificscience that must in turn be defined. From this standpoint, she opposes
structuralistpositions becausethey eliminatefrom their horizon the characterof
signification. She considers significationas an ongoing process at a time when
structuralistsproposeonly a mechanicaland staticconceptionof significationas a
totality made up of diverseparts. Her proposalties in with that of Lacan(1966).
Lacandefines"letter"as a materialbasewhich a concretediscourseborrowsfrom
language;that is, "letter"is a structureessentiallylocatedin the "signifier."For
in
Lacan,the relation"signifier"/"signified"is presentedas a relationof insistence
the flow of the signifying chainand notas a relationof consistence.No one of the
links in the chain can consist of the "signification"of which the same"moment"
(as a whole) is capable. Kristeva also returns to Saussure:in his conception of
Anagrams,he bases the searchfor "signification"on a "signifier"that has been
dismantled by an insistent meaning("sense"; "sentido")in action. Kristeva's
discoursefocuseson the areaof verballanguage. Yet her proposalis closer to the
one which we are sketching here.
In the two positions sketched above ("structural"and "functional"),"function" must, in one way or another, play a role. The structuralposition seems
more rigorously autonomous because demarcationsigns are provided to the
with the help of contextualmarkers.On the other hand, the
"reader"/"receiver"
functional position derives from a pragmatic focus. It is thus evident that a
"definitionof types of texts dependson the descriptionof types of relationsbetween texts and contexts"- provided, of course, that "the text is not in the
materiality of the writing ("escritura")but rather in the conventional
sign/oriented values"(Segre 1978).

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To the question "what constitutes a text?" Segre answers lucidly by

eliminating such a question;in its place, he proposesa more generaldefinitionof
that which is "expressed."The following considerationsshould be kept in mind:
(a) the type of "pragmatic"context within which a given text is produced;(b) the
type of "illocutionary"function which the text can develop in that context,
whether it was meant to developit or not; (c) the modalityof the communication
of the text ("improvised"/"nonimprovised,""with"/"without" appealto nonverbal codes or direct actions, "monological"/"dialogical,""oral"/"written,"
etc.); (d) the existence of precise norms concerning the constitution of texts
(norms that are especiallyrigorous for "written" texts); and (e) the measureof
repeatability("repetibilidad")
(Segre 1978).
This developing classificationdemandsdifferentiatedproceduresfor each level
(as Lotman has shown, 1973). The manner of its articulation is, for Segre,
"paraphrasis,"that is, "the individualityof the text could be affirmed,whenever
it permits, on any level a unitaryparaphrase."This position is richly articulated:
the "superficial"structure(the "textual" one) has a linguistic order, while the
"deep"structure,which makesa paraphrasepossibleby introducingthe context
in a text, has a semiotic order. It is this condition that makesimpossiblethe existence of so-called"rulesof transformation"between the two of them.
Nevertheless, whether it deals with "writing" or "orality," Segre'sposition
moves in the terrainof the "verbal."It is necessary,therefore, to broaden the
senseof his conclusions. To begin, we can distinguishbetween differentiatednotions: (1) textualspace,which correspondsboth to whatis communicated,
that is, to
textual structure, and to what is signified,that is, to the results of the cited
The
paraphrase;and (2) text, which correspondsto meaning("sense"or "sentido").
terms"signified"and"meaning"areto be understoodas they were definedabove.
Lyotard(1979) emphasizesone of the main aspectsof the problem.
Whateverexistsis not a text. . . . It containsa certainkindof density,in other
thatwe shouldnotread,butsee.Thisdifference,
towords,aconstitutivedifference
with
the
immobile
which
reveals
is
what
is
it,
gether
mobility
continuously
neglectedin the act of signifying.. . . The factthat the worldis legiblebrutally
meansthatthereis an"other"in theothershore,writingthethingsthatexist,andit
alsomeansthatfroma properstandpoint,I shouldbe ableto unravelit.
Whatever exists is not a text, therefore,but a place to which all of us have given
meaning, in the effort to reconstruct/unravelthe presenceof the "other." We
shall call that place "textual space,"as opposed to "text," in orderto distinguish
the double form manifestedin whatever exists. This spacecan be organizedand
fixed- accordingto Lotman'sdefinitionof what a text is - between a beginning
and an end (TS). It can be a simple proposalopen to severalways of organization/fixation (TS'); or, finally, it may not imply any kind of fixation/organization, lacking the limits or frontiersthat would make possibleits fixation (TS ").

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Thefirstcaseis thatof suchtextualspacesas:theliterary

work(thereis a specific
the
limits
of
the
first
between
obvious
andlastpages);canlinguisticorganization
vasor painting(realistor non-realistpainting:color is organizedfollowinga
etc. Thesecond
specificcodewithinthelimitsof thecanvasspace);film
(orvideo);
text"is only a
caseis thatof suchtextualspacesas:play(theso-called"dramatic
varyingin
proposalopento multiplewaysof temporalandspatialorganization,
in
as
the
the
forms, flexibility
everysettingandshow);music(in thiscase,aswell
assuch- happening,aleatoryscore,
of theproposal,whichis not evenconsidered
jazz, etc.- makesonly a subtledifference,the sameas in thosealeatoryliterary
etc.
"texts"whichUmbertoEcohascalledopenworks(Eco 1962);performance;
Thethirdaspect(TS"'')is thatof suchtextualspacesas:nature
(opento be read
forexample);conversation
aslandscape,
(opento beanalyzedasa dialogueconcernin
(whichis usedin psychoanalysis
freeassociation
ing delimitablerelationships);
orderto decodewhata patientdoesorsays);theloverelationship
(opento bereadas
thehistoricalrepetitionof a rite);alecture
(opento beconfrontedasaperformance
etc.
of an actor,herecalledprofessor);
Followingwhat we havesaid,"text"now canbe definedas the resultof a
labormadeoverthetextualspace.Theaimof thislabor
reading/transformational
is not to extractan "inherent"meaningfromthe textualspaceby actualizing
language-TS andTS'-so as to adda textualspaceto anothertextualspace;
rather,theaimis to producemeaning.We aretalkingabouta taskof readingand
not aboutdecodingor unraveling.It must be clearthat this
transformation,
is
specificpoint disconnectedfrom what we have previouslyquoted from
Lyotard.What remainsto be shownis how this taskof meaningproduction
operates.
In the caseof TS andTS' we will use the word"system"in orderto definea
mannerof organizationor patterning(unitaryin TS, variablein TS'). This
assystemimposeslimitsanddirectionson theproductionof meanorganization
of what one of us has previouslycalled"semanticrestriction"
means
ing by
(Talens1978). Such restrictionpreventsthe arbitraryand vivid multiplication/manipulationof meaning, thus establishinglimits of pertinence.The
of the textualspacein varioustextsis madeby reorganizing
transformation
(rethe
by a patsystematizing) elementsconstitutingthissystem,whichis sustained
tern of articulationthat is as complexas one could wish but which still is
analyzableempirically.Such reorganizationimpliesthe projectionover the
to (evenif it is different
systemof a new patternthatcannotbe contradictory
the systemits "organof
call
the
We
one.
the
earlier
articulating
pattern
from)
new
and
the
patternits "semanorganizational
principle"
(Talens
1975),
izing
This so-called"semanticgesture"doesnot belong
tic gesture"(Mukarovskij).
to the textualspace;therefore,it belongsnot to the realmof the signified(potentiallycontainedin the code, aspreviouslyindicated),but to the realmof the
hisorherlessonintoa reading,hisorher
realsubject,thepersonwho transforms

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The TextualSpace

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sightinto a vision,or hisor herhearinginto listening.In doingso, he or sheimplies in the meaning,not only the signifieditself of the textualspace,but
constituteshisor herexistenceasa
everythingthatconsciouslyor unconsciously
a "structure."
Thetransformation
subject.We will callthiswayof organization
of thesystemon a structure(s)
is thusanappropriation
or generalized,
(individual
but not foreseenby the code) of the textualspace.Thisjustifies,within the
framework
of a givensetof semanticrestrictions,
thedifferentpossiblemeanings
of the concreteworkor act for all thoseconcretesubjectsfacingit.
In thecaseof TS ', wherewe cannotproperlyspeakabouta systembecausewe
havedefinedit aslackingorganization/fixation,
thetransformation
will workon
the basis of an implantation/projection
of a certainsystemmodel over its
elements.This systemmodelis takenfrom a textualspace(TS or TS') with
whichthe othertextualspace(TS') maintainssomekindof relationship.
In this
way, for example,it is possibleto projectover a panoramaof mountainsthe
which"means"an
systemcanvas,
makingfeasiblethe productionof a landscape,
aestheticfeeling.BertoltBrechtexemplifiesthis processquite accuratelyin a
famouspoemfromthe Buckower
Elegien.
DerRauch
1 DaskleineHausunterBaumen
anSee
2 VomDachsteightRauch
3 Fehlteer
4 Wietrostlosdannwaren
5 Haus,Baumen
undSee
("Thecottagebetweentreesbesidethe lake/ a wire of smoke/ If it is not
/ house,treesandlake")
there/ whata desolation
What givesmeaningto what the poematicprotagonistseesis not so muchthe
possible"natural"dispositionof its elementsas the emotionalvaluesthat the
observerprojectsoverit, placing,therefore,a pictorialmodeloverreality.This
mechanismexplainsthe possibilityof givingcoherence(in otherwords,of producingmeaning)to anordinarygestureas happens,forexample,in the analysis
madeby Freudof the symptomaticactof Dora'splayingwith herpurse(Freud
1948).
As a corollary,a two-folddistinctioncanbe established
betweenthe "textual
and
the
"text":
as
a
the
textual
characterizes
itselfby having
space"
system,
space
a preciseempiricalexistence,whetherstabilized(as in the caseof TS), or as a
a
elaborated
changingproposal(as in the caseof TS'), or as a presupposition
case
of
TS
In
the
text
not
does
have
a
fixed
contrast,
structure,
posteriori
(the
").
or, moreexactly,thereareas manytexts as structure;thatis, thereareasmany
texts as readingappropriations
of the corresponding
system.Oppositeto what
occursin thecaseof the textualspace,theexistenceof the text is not theresultof
of relationships,
but rather,the outcomeof a new ardescribingan articulation
ticulation, individualizedand unrepeatable.
JenaroTalensand]
JuanM. Company 33

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Nevertheless,the borderlinethat separatesthe notions of TS andT is not a rigid

one and, if both concepts are approachedas functions ratherthan entities, it will
allow us to understandthe processualcharacterof the production of discourse.
For instance,in the caseof the so-called"creativepractices"(poetry, fiction, film,
music, painting, etc.), the raw materialelaboratedby the artist(biographicalexperience,culturalor existentialmemory, soundsor colors from nature)will function as a textual spaceof the third kind (TS "). The processof artisticproduction
transformsthis raw materialinto a text (Ti) which in turn constitutes a textual
spaceof the second kind (TS') for the function "reader"which every processof
productionentails, thus allowing the artistto go back to his draftin orderto correct it. The correctionor revisionof a text impliesin fact the elaborationof a new
text (T2), which is what we understandas the "author'swork." For the reader,
consideredas an entity outside the discourse,this text (T2)operatesas TS or TS',
dependingon the modality in question.
If this final result belongs to the second type (TS'), as happens,for instance,
with a play, the processof transformationsoccurring until the moment of performancein front of an audiencecould be schematizedin the following fashion:
a) TS' (Dramatictext) Ti (story board)
T2 (proposalof articulationT2 and what the actors,
b) (Ti = ) TS1'
choreographers,etc., exhibit as final version
after rehearsing)
T3(n) (what every memberof the audiencesees at
c) (T2=) TS2'
the performance)
A first theoreticalresult of this processis the need for redefiningthe conceptsof
authorandreceiver,sinceboth constitute elementsof processratherthan entities;
that is to say, they are to be consideredas inscriptionsof the discourseand not as
physicalpersons.That is why the use of conventionalconcepts such as "author,"
"reader,"or "message"is highly problematicfor the analysisof signifying practices. When we speakof a "reader,"for example, arewe referringto the readingfunction, or to Bousofio's"idealreader"(1977), or to Eco's model reader(1979),
or to the "socialreader"positioned in a given collectivity, as sociologicalschools
and receptiontheory understandit? The sameambiguityand confusioncould be
found in the terms "author"and "message."
The combinationof diversemethodologies which have developedon the basis
of an ambiguous determinationof their own subject of inquiry cannot achieve
complementarity,since we are not facing a variety of approachesthat deal with
differentaspectsof the same object, but with methodologies that entail different
objects. This is not the casewith the analysisproposedin this essay, sinceour approachplacesall the elements in the same space(the discourse)and relationships
can be establishedwithout dangerousmetaphysicaltranspositions.

34

The TextualSpace

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A second theoreticalresult concerns the clarificationthat an approachof this

kind can makeregardingthe role of criticismandtranslationin the processof production of meaning. In fact, from the point of view of the operational
mechanism, there is no differencebetween the critic's work and the readingfunction performedby the author while correcting his/her manuscript. They
both operate on a TS in order to produce a T. However, while the T of the
reading-function lies inscribed in the object as a new form of TS, the one
elaboratedby the critic remainsoutside of it. And this meansthat, in the firstinstance, the text of the readingfunction on the part of the author transformsits
meaning into signified, while the readingfunction of the critic does not. Yet it
must be kept in mind that the work of the critic, being part of the cultural
heritage of the readers,also remainsintegratedin the process;it should not be
considered,therefore,as a marginaladdition. This is why we could proposethat
Brecht is reflectedin Cervantes,or Valle-Inclin in Shakespeare,since within the
limits imposedby the textual spacesof Don Quijoteor TheMerchant
of Venice,our
reading develops from a perspectivein which Brecht and Valle are present. Finally, it can be arguedthat translationswork similarlyto criticaldiscourse;they
do not inscribethemselvesin the TS in which they operate,but they createa new
TS within the boundariesof a new language and a new culture. Therefore, the
traduttore
is never a tradittore,
but rather, another kind of autorewho, instead of
of
free
as does the original author, is subjectedto them
restrictions,
working
and
(TS). Reading, writing,
translatingarejust threevariantsof the sameprocess
of discourseproduction.
Translated
byJenaroTalens
University of Valencia(Spain)
References
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JenaroTalensandJuanM. Company 35

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36

The TextualSpace

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