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A p a r t a d o V:
Reproduccin de p artes de la obra, p a ra la crtica e investigacin cientfica, lite ra ria o artstica.
ECONOMIC
ANTHROPOLOGY
R ea d in g s in T h eo ry
an d A n a ly sis
edited by
EDWARD E. Le CLAIR, JR.
RENSSELAER POLYTECHNIC INSTITUTE
HAROLD K. SCHNEIDER
LAWRENCE UNIVERSITY
* section I
ANTHROPOLOGY AND
ECONOMICS
30
A N T H R O P O L O G Y A N D ECO NO M ICS
R ich a rd F. Salisbury
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works of sociologists such as Mason Haire with his studies (1959) on growth
of business organizations. Such works enable economists to conceive of alterna
tive total organizations, and to compare the efficiency of overall structures in
terms of their ability to respond to particular environmental problems and their
eventual outputs. In short, this enables economists to see organization and
managerial skills as factors of production to be measured and considered in
general analysis.
T he A nthropological Side
Ethno-Economics
As economists have escaped from their cell, anthropologists have become
more focused on the internal analysis of single cells. Starting with Bohannans
study of the Tiv (1955), there have been several studies of the economic
categories used in non-Western societies, which are intra-cell studies of single
economic systems. My own study of categories used in relatively affluent tribal
societies (Salisbury 1962) would serve as another example. Fosters (1964)
discussion of the concept of the limited good is a major comparative summary
of a form of conceptualization that would appear to be prevalent in many
societies. This important new sub-field may be labelled ethno-economics
insofar as it aims merely at the description of single economies. As descrip
tion, it undoubtedly benefits from the refined methodology of the new
ethnography. I would maintain, however, that its major theoretical importance
has been the advances it has permitted in the field of formal analysis. I will
return to ethno-economics when I deal with formal analysis.
Substantivism
Achieving greater prominence in the period 1957-1966, the so-called substantivist school generalizes about the channels through which goods flow in
total economies. This school stems largely from Polanyis (1957) seminal
Trade and Markets in the Early Empires which introduced a typology of
societies integrated by reciprocity, redistribution, and market exchanges.
Considering the lack of quantitative studies then available, this was a remarkable
synthesis. Unfortunately, most of the subsequent work of the school has in
volved the application of labels from Polanyis typology, rather than the detailed
investigation of the underlying processes which generate the social types
Polanyi discussed. The major finding of Bohannan and Daltons (1962 ) 800page compilation of studies of African marketplace trade is that societies where
trade is imbedded" in other institutions and which do not use cash differ
from those which form some system of market exchange.
Redistributive. as a label, has been applied to societies such as those in
Polynesia and West African kingdoms. This use seems indiscriminate in the
light of quantitative studies. INadels excellent early study of the Nupe economy
( ] (H2) shows that only a small portion of the total flow of goods and services
480
is channeled through the king, and even where guilds nominally operate as
agents for the king, the degree to which they organize production in terms of
private customers is mainly determined by the size of the private market.
Village self-sufficiency, trade partnerships, and open market trading are more
common. What substantivists have done is to seize upon some rare, but distinc
tive, features a court, guilds, tribute payments, and negotiated foreign trade
between the court and foreignersand to use a label based on these features to
characterize the total economy.
Polanyis own posthumous work on Dahomey (1966) does indeed get away
from the rigidity of regarding reciprocity, redistribution and market exchange
as mutually exclusive and as characterizing entire economies or integrating
entire societies. He sees all three principles as operating together, each in a
different domain within the single society. Yet, at the same time, he sees the
main achievements of the book as the classification of institutions as primi
tive (i.e., found in reciprocative societies), archaic (i.e., characteristic of
redistributive societies), or market. Thus, Polanyi goes to great lengths (pp.
141-169) to unravel the difficulties Europeans had in balancing their book
keeping in the 17th and 18th century slave trade, resulting from empirically
fluctuating and varied, but nominally fixed, units used in different areas and
times in West Africa. He concludes that West Africa had archaic money,
incompatible with a modern monetary system. Polanyi then isolates the charac
teristics of archaic money in terms of its status-building function in the
emergence of state systems (p. 192). To an audience that accepts the fact of
trade in equivalencies, mere classification appears sterile. The identification
of what caused the changes in exchange ratessuch as differences of power
balance, numbers of slaves, or availability of manufacturesbecomes the
interesting problem.
In short, redistribution or archaic economy may be useful labels for
summarizing the way emergent national polities centralize certain services and
organize taxation and the production of specialized commodities by infant
industries by providing stability in market, raw materials, and labor. But such
concepts would appear equally useful for analyzing the actions of newly inde
pendent, but fully monetized, nation states. They are not terms that characterize
entire economies or modes of integration, nor are they terms which fit
economies into a unilineal progression from primitive to archaic to
market.
The same is true of the concept reciprocity. Analyses of the actual working
of societies crudely labelled as reciprocative (Salisbury 1960, Sahlins 1963,
1965) have shown that inter-individual transactions are always unbalanced and
involve a continual struggle to obtain as much advantage over an opponent
as possible, short of breaking off the relationship and establishing new rela
tionships with another partner. Each relationship between a pair implies a
series of other relationships by each of them, and the terms of trade between
one pair can be understood only against a background of their other relation
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life were a zero-sum game. Game theory (or formal economic theory) could
then be used to make predictions about such matters as the size of coalitions
found, or the degree of tolerance of income inequalities. Anthropologists have
been generally averse to such as if deductive theorizing, preferring to stick
to the facts. Exposure to economists and their methods could be invaluable
in correcting this bias and in making deductive model-building familiar.
At the same time as ethno-economic description of the principles of choice
verbalized by informants is leading to the formulation of ideal or hypothetical
models, behavioral analysis must also be progressing. It must determine prin
ciples of choice from a consideration of transactions actually occurring and
test the fit of hypothetical models against quantitative reality. Here, too, anthro
pologists have much to learn from working with economists and their tools.
In the 1950s, Gluckman argued (1964) that it is better to Veniajn rfaiye'j about
other disciplines, even when intruding on fields which they cover. I do not
feel that this is true for anthropology and Economics in the 1960s. Anthropolo
gists should study Economics and vice versa. I do agree with Gluckman that
this should be done not to make the anthropologist an economist, but a better
anthropologist. Given economic tools, he will improve anthropology. Give an
economist the anthropological tools of sensitivity to what people say and of
readiness to try to see order in different conceptual systems, and he may
improve economics.