FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. Nos. L-42783-85. November 29, 1976.]

CARIDAD CRUZ DE SYQUIA, petitioner, vs. BOARD OF POWER
AND WATER WORKS (formerly Public Service Commission),
RAFAEL J. RUIZ, PETER ENRIQUEZ and CYRIL D. MOSES,
respondents.
Enrique O. Chan for petitioner.
Zosimo Rivas for private respondents.

DECISION

TEEHANKEE, J :
p

The Court sets aside respondent board's orders ruling upon the complaints of the three
private respondents-tenants of petitioner's apartment building that petitioner may not
charge them pro rata the extra cost of electricity consumed for the building's common
areas and facilities such as the elevator and servants' quarters. The question of the
proportionate amount that each tenant should bear for the additional electricity cost for
common facilities of the apartment building used by the tenants in common is purely civil
in character, (involving the conditions of lease between landlord and tenant), to be
adjudged under the applicable civil laws exclusively by the regular courts of general
jurisdiction and is beyond the jurisdiction of respondent board.
In December, 1974, private respondents filed three separate complaints with respondent
Board of Power and Waterworks charging petitioner as administrator of the South Syquia
Apartments at Malate, Manila with the offense of selling electricity without permit or
franchise issued by respondent board, in that petitioner billed respondents-complainants
various specified amounts for their electricity consumption at their respective apartments
for the months of May to September, 1974 in excess of the Meralco rates authorized by
respondent board.
LexLib

Petitioner's motion to dismiss the complaints asserting that they involved contractual
obligations of respondents as apartment tenants and were beyond respondent board's
jurisdiction was denied by the latter.

Petitioner thereupon filed her answer, wherein she again questioned the complaints as
beyond the jurisdiction of respondent as a regulatory board, since she is not engaged in
the sale of electric power but merely passes to the apartment tenants as the end-users their
legitimate electric current bills in accordance with their lease contracts, and their
relationship is contractual in nature.
Petitioner added that the tenants including respondents had no complaint under the
contractual set-up of billings for water and electric service consumption, whereby while
individual electric meters are installed in each apartment, Meralco billings include all
consumption in the entire compound, including the common areas, servants' quarters and
elevators, the payment for which was advanced by petitioner and later collected by way
of reimbursement from the tenants pro rata; but that respondents alone complained later
when on account of the energy crisis, additional fuel adjustment costs were added by
Meralco to their billings which were likewise passed on by petitioner to all the tenants
pro rata.
As stated in respondent board's questioned order of August 28, 1975, petitioner further
manifested her willingness to abide by such computations as respondent board may
determine to be the correct electric billing that should be charged against complainantsrespondents for their respective electric consumption and submitted pertinent records of
the electrical consumption and Meralco billings. Respondent board in said order however
came up with its computation which would allow petitioner to charge respondents only
the cost of electricity registered in their individual apartment meters and disallow the
actual cost of additional electricity charged them pro rata by petitioner for the cost of
electricity consumed by all tenants in the common areas.
When petitioner pointed out in her motion for reconsideration that respondent board's
computation would not reimburse petitioner for the cost of the electric consumption in
the common areas and elevators with a resultant loss to her at the least of P1,250.00 a
month or P15,000.00 a year and reiterated that this was a contractual obligation of the
tenants over which respondent regulatory board had no jurisdiction, the board, acting
through its Acting Chairman alone, Cesar S. de Guzman, (as seems to be the case with all
the board actions herein involved) denied reconsideration and ruled that
"It is the considered opinion of this Board, that since the tenants complainants)
are already paying rentals for the use of their rooms and for the cost of their
electricity within their rooms, they should no longer be required to pay for the
extra cost of electricity in common areas such as the elevator and the servants'
quarters, for it is only fair and equitable that the cost of electricity for common
areas such as the elevator and servants' quarters be shouldered alone by the
owner of the building as part of the cost for the rentals being paid by the tenants
(complainants). . . ."

Hence, the petition at bar, wherein petitioner raises the basic question of the board's lack
of jurisdiction, aside from the error of its action based on the admitted facts.
LLpr

The Court required comment and private respondents as well as respondent board's
counsel filed their comments simply assuming the board's jurisdiction and supported its
questioned orders.
Also required to comment, Acting Solicitor General Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr. concurred
with petitioner and submitted that respondent regulatory board acted without jurisdiction
over the subject-matter of the complaints, succinctly stating the State's position as
follows:
"Since the petitioner does not operate, manage or control the power plant and
furthermore, since electricity is directly and uninterruptedly supplied to the enduser, it cannot be correctly claimed that the petitioner is selling electricity nor
can she be considered a middleman in the electric power business.
"The dispute between the petitioner landlord and her tenants as to how much
each tenant should be correspondingly billed, for the actual electricity consumed
and as to the proportionate amount each tenant should bear for the common
facilities used in the apartments, if such amounts should be borne by the tenants
at all, is an issue affecting mathematical computations and conditions of lease
between landlord and tenant."

The Court resolved to treat the petition as a special civil action and to grant the petition.
Under the reorganization plan effected by Presidential Decree No. 1 as amended by
Presidential Decree No. 458 issued on May 16, 1974, jurisdiction, supervision and
control over public service related to electric light, power and waterworks utilities
formerly vested in the Public Service Act 1 were transferred to respondent board.
Respondent board as a regulatory board manifestly exceeded its jurisdiction in taking
cognizance of and adjudicating the complaints filed by respondents against petitioner.
Respondent board acquired no jurisdiction over petitioner's contractual relations with
respondents-complainants as her tenants, since petitioner is not engaged in a public
service nor in the sale of electricity without permit or franchise.
Respondents' complaints against being charged the additional cost of electricity for
common facilities used by the tenants (in addition to those registered in their respective
apartment meters) give rise to a question that is purely civil in character that is to be
adjudged under the applicable provisions of the Civil Code (not the Public Service Act)
and not by the respondent regulatory board which has no jurisdiction but by the regular
courts of general jurisdiction.

Respondent board in resolving the complaints against petitioner and requiring her to
absorb the additional rising costs of electricity consumed for the common areas and
elevator service even at a resultant loss of P15,000.00 a year arrogated the judicial
function. Its orders were beyond its jurisdiction and must be set aside as null and void.
prLL

ACCORDINGLY, the questioned orders of respondent board are annulled and the
complaints of private respondents are ordered dismissed, With costs against private
respondents.
SO ORDERED.
Makasiar, Muoz Palma, Concepcion, Jr. and Martin, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1.Sec. 13(a) of the Public Service Act, C.A. No. 146, provides that: "The Commission shall
have jurisdiction, supervision, and control over all public services and their franchises,
equipment, and other properties, and in the exercise of its authority, it shall have the
necessary powers and the aid of public force".
Sec. 13(b) defines the term "public service" thus: The term 'public service' includes every
person that now or hereafter may own, operate, manage, or control in the Philippines,
for hire or compensation, with general or limited clientele, whether permanent,
occasional or accidental, and done for general business purposes. . . . gas, electric, light,
heat and power, water supply and power . . ."

(De Syquia v. Board of Power and Water Works, G.R. Nos. L-42783-85, November 29,
1976)
|||

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-27520. January 21, 1987.]
GLOBE WIRELESS LTD., petitioner, vs. PUBLIC
COMMISSION and ANTONIO B. ARNAIZ, respondents.

SERVICE

RESOLUTION

G.R. No. 27520 [Globe Wireless Ltd., vs. Public Service Commission and Antonio B.
Arnaiz]. Challenged in this petition for certiorari is the jurisdiction of the defunct
Public Service Commission [PSC] under Section 21 of Commonwealth Act No. 146, as
amended, to discipline and impose a fine upon petitioner, Globe Wireless, Ltd., a dulyorganized Philippine corporation engaged in international telecommunication business
under a franchise granted by Public Acts Nos. 3495, 3692 and 4150, as amended by
Republic Act No. 4630.
A message addressed to Maria Diaz, Monte Esquina 30, Madrid, Spain, filed by private
respondent Antonio B. Arnaiz with the telegraph office of the Bureau of
Telecommunications in Dumaguete City was transmitted to the Bureau of
Telecommunications in Manila. It was forwarded to petitioner Globe Wireless Ltd. for
transmission to Madrid. Petitioner sent the message to the American Cable and Radio
Corporation in New York, which, in turn, transmitted the same to the Empresa Nacional
de Telecommunicaciones in Madrid. The latter, however, mislaid said message, resulting
in its non-delivery to the addressee.
After being informed of said fact, private respondent Arnaiz sent to then Public Service
Commissioner Enrique Medina an unverified letter-complaint relating the incident. The
complaint was docketed as PSC Case No. 65-39-OC and petitioner was required to
answer the same, Petitioner, in its answer, questioned PSC's jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the letter-complaint, even as it denied liability for the non-delivery of the
message to the addressee.
prcd

Hearing ensued, after which the PSC issued an order finding petitioner "responsible for
the inadequate and unsatisfactory service complained of, in violation of the Public
Service Act" and ordering it "to pay a fine of TWO HUNDRED [P200.00] PESOS under
Sec. 21 of Com. Act 146, as amended." Petitioner was likewise required to refund the
sum of P19.14 to the remitter of the undelivered message. [Annex "C", Petition, p, 23,
Rollo]

Its motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner instituted the instant
petition.
We find for petitioner.
Verily, Section 13 of Commonwealth Act No. 146, as amended, otherwise known as the
Public Service Act, vested in the Public Service Commission jurisdiction, supervision
and control over all public services and their franchises, equipment and other properties.
However, Section 5 of Republic Act No. 4630, the legislative franchise under which
petitioner was operating, limited respondent Commission's jurisdiction over petitioner
only to the rate which petitioner may charge the public. Thus,
"Sec. 5. The Public Service Commission is hereby given jurisdiction over the
grantee only with respect to the rates which the grantee may charge the public
subject to international commitments made or adhered to by the Republic of the
Philippines." (Emphasis supplied.)

The act complained of consisted in petitioner having allegedly failed to deliver the
telegraphic message of private respondent to the addressee in Madrid, Spain. Obviously,
such imputed negligence had nothing whatsoever to do with the subject matter of the very
limited jurisdiction of the Commission over petitioner.
Moreover, under Section 21 of C.A. No. 146, as amended, the Commission was
empowered to impose an administrative fine in cases of violation of or failure by a public
service to comply with the terms and conditions of any certificate or any orders, decisions
or regulations of the Commission. Petitioner operated under a legislative franchise, so
there were no terms nor conditions of any certificate issued by the Commission to violate.
Neither was there any order, decision or regulation from the Commission applicable to
petitioner that the latter had allegedly violated, disobeyed, defied or disregarded.
llcd

Too basic in administrative law to need citation of jurisprudence is the rule that the
jurisdiction and powers of administrative agencies, like respondent Commission, are
limited to those expressly granted or necessarily implied from those granted in the
legislation creating such body; and any order without or beyond such jurisdiction is void
and ineffective. The order under consideration belonged to this category.
ACCORDINGLY, the instant petition is hereby granted and the order of respondent
Public Service Commission in PSC Case No. 65-39-OC is set aside for being null and
void.
(Globe Wireless Ltd. v. Public Service Commission, G.R. No. L-27520 (Resolution),
January 21, 1987)
|||

EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-12426. February 16, 1959.]
PHILIPPINE
LAWYER'S
ASSOCIATION,
petitioner,
vs.
CELEDONIO AGRAVA, in his capacity as Director of the
Philippines Patent Office, respondent.
Arturo A. Alafriz for petitioner.
Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla and Solicitor Pacifico P. de Castro for
respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. ATTORNEYS AT LAW; PRACTICE OF LAW; BEFORE PATENT
OFFICE. Practice of law in the Philippines includes such appearance before the
Patent Office, the representation of applicants, oppositors, and other persons, and the
prosecution of their applications for patent, their oppositions thereto or the
enforcement of their rights in patent cases.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; WITHOUT FURTHER EXAMINATION. A member of
the bar, because of his legal knowledge and training should be allowed to practice
before the Patent Office, without further examination or other qualification.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; REASON. Under the present law, members of the
Philippine Bar authorized by the Supreme Court to practice law, and in good standing,
may practice their profession before the Patent Office, for the reason that much of the
business in said office involves the interpretation and determination of the scope and
application of the patent law and other laws applicable as well as the presentation of
evidence to establish facts involved. That part of the functions of the Patent Director
are judicial or quasi-judicial, so much so that appeals from his orders and decision are
under the law taken to the Supreme Court.

DECISION

MONTEMAYOR, J :
p

This is a petition filed by the Philippine Lawyer's Association for prohibition

and injunction against Celedonio Agrava, in his capacity as Director of the
Philippines Patent Office.
On May 27, 1957, respondent Director issued a circular announcing that he had
scheduled for June 27, 1957 an examination for the purpose of determining who are
qualified to practice as patent attorneys before the Philippines Patent Office, the said
examination to cover patent law and jurisprudence and the rules of practice before
said office. According to the circular, members of the Philippine Bar, engineers and
other persons with sufficient scientific and technical training are qualified to take the
said examination. It would appear that heretofore, respondent Director has been
holding similar examinations.
It is the contention of the petitioner Philippine Lawyer's Association that one of
the petitioner Philippine Lawyer's Association that one who has passed the bar
examinations and is licensed by the Supreme Court to practice law in the Philippines
and who is in good standing, is duly qualified to practice before the Philippines Patent
Office, and that consequently, the act of the respondent Director requiring members of
the Philippine Bar in good standing to take and pass an examination given by the
Patent Office as a condition precedent to their being allowed to practice before said
office, such as representing applicants in the preparation and prosecution of
applications for patent, is in excess of his jurisdiction and is in violation of the law.
In his answer, respondent Director, through the Solicitor General, maintains
that the prosecution of patent cases "does not involve entirely or purely the practice of
law but includes the application of scientific and technical knowledge and training, so
much so that, as a matter of actual practice, the prosecution of patent cases may be
handled not only by lawyers, but also by engineers and other persons with sufficient
scientific and technical training who pass the prescribed examinations as given by the
Patent Office; . . . that the Rules of Court do not prohibit the Patent Office, or any
other quasi-judicial body from requiring further condition or qualification from those
who would wish to handle cases before such bodies, as in the prosecution of patent
cases before the Patent Office which, as stated in the preceding paragraph, requires
more of an application of scientific and technical knowledge than the mere application
of provisions of law; . . . that the action taken by the respondent is in accordance with
Republic Act No. 165, otherwise known as the Patent Law of the Philippines, which
is similar to the United States Patent Law, in accordance with which the United States
Patent Office has also prescribed a similar examination as what prescribed by
respondent. . . . ."
Respondent further contends that just as the Patent Law of the United States of
America authorizes the Commissioner of Patents to prescribe examinations to
determine as to who may practice before the United States Patent Office, the
respondent, is similarly authorized to do so by our Patent Law, Republic Act No. 165.

Although as already stated, the Director of Patents, in the past, would appear to
have been holding tests or examinations the passing of which was imposed as a
required qualification to practice before the Patent Office, to our knowledge, this is
the first time that the right of the Director of Patents to do so, specially as regards
members of the bar, has been questioned formally, or otherwise put in issue. And we
have given it careful thought and consideration.
The Supreme Court has the exclusive and constitutional power with respect to
admission to the practice of law in the Philippines 1 and any member of the Philippine
Bar in good standing may practice law anywhere and before any entity, whether
judicial or quasi-judicial or administrative, in the Philippines. Naturally, the question
arises as to whether or not appearance before the Patent Office and the preparation
and prosecution of patent applications, etc., constitutes or is included in the practice of
law.
"The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in
court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to
actions and special proceedings, the management of such actions and
proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition,
conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in
matters connected with the law incorporation services, assessment and
condemnation services contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the
foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and
insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in
matters of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice, as
do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done
involves the determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts
and conditions." (5 Am. Jur. p. 262, 263). (Italics supplied)
"Practice of law under modern conditions consists in no small part of
work performed outside of any court and having no immediate relation to
proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a
large variety of subjects, and the preparation and execution of legal instruments
covering an extensive field of business and trust relations and other affairs.
Although these transactions may have no direct connection with court
proceedings, they are always subject to become involved in litigation. They
require in many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide experience with men
and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult and complex situations.
These customary functions of an attorney or counselor at law bear an intimate
relation to the administration of justice by the courts. No valid distinction, so far
as concerns the question set forth in the order, can be drawn between that part of
the work of the lawyer which involves appearance in court and that part which
involves advice and drafting of instruments in his office. It is of importance to
the welfare of the public that these manifold customary functions be performed
by persons possessed of adequate learning and skill, of sound moral character,
and acting at all times under the heavy trust obligations to clients which rests
upon all attorneys." (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 3 (1953

ed.), p. 665-666, citing In re Opinion of the Justices (Mass.), 194 N. E. 313,

quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. vs. Automobile Service Assoc. (R. I.) 179 A.
139, 144). (Emphasis supplied)

In our opinion, the practice of law includes such appearance before the Patent Office,
the representation of applicants, oppositors, and other persons, and the prosecution of
their applications for patent, their oppositions thereto, or the enforcement of their
rights in patent cases. In the first place, although the transaction of business in the
Patent Office involves the use and application of technical and scientific knowledge
and training, still, all such business has to be conducted and all orders and decisions
of the Director of Patents have to be rendered in accordance with the Patent Law, as
well as other laws, including the Rules and Regulations promulgated by the Patent
Office in accordance with law. Not only this, but practice before the Patent Office
involves the interpretation and application of other laws and legal principles, as well
as the existence of facts to be established in accordance with the law of evidence and
procedure. For instance: Section 8 of our Patent Law provides that an invention shall
not be patentable if it is contrary to public order or morals, or to public health or
welfare. Section 9 says that an invention shall not be considered new or patentable if
it was known or used by others in the Philippines before the invention thereof by the
inventor named in the application for patent, or if it was patented or described in any
printed publication in the Philippines or any foreign country more than one year
before the application for a patent therefor, or if it had been in public use or on sale in
the Philippines for more than one year before the application for the patent therefor.
Section 10 provides that the right to the patent belongs to the true and actual inventor,
his heirs, legal representatives or assigns, and Section 12 says that an application for a
patent may be filed only by the inventor, his heirs, legal representatives or assigns.
Section 25 and 26 refer to correction of any mistake in a patent. Section 28
enumerates the grounds for cancellation of a patent; that although any person may
apply for such cancellation, under Section 29, the Solicitor General is authorized to
petition for the cancellation of a patent. Section 30 mentions the requirements of a
petition for cancellation. Sections 31 and 32 provide for a notice of hearing of the
petition for cancellation of the patent by the Director of Patents in case the said
cancellation is warranted. Under Section 34, at any time after the expiration of three
years from the day the patent was granted, any person may apply for the grant of a
license under a particular patent on several grounds, such as, if the patented invention
is not being worked in the Philippines on a commercial scale, or if the demand for the
patented article in the Philippines is not being met to an adequate extent and
reasonable terms, or if by reason of the patentee's refusal to grant a license on
reasonable terms or by reason of the conditions attached by him to the license,
purchase, lease or use of the patented article or working of the patented process or
machine of production, the establishment of a new trade or industry in the Philippines
is prevented; or if the patent or invention relates to food or medicine or is necessary to
public health or public safety. All these things involve the application of laws, legal

principles, practice and procedure. They call for legal knowledge, training and
experience for which a member of the bar has been prepared.
In support of the proposition that much of the business and many of the acts,
orders and decisions of the Patent Director involve questions of law or a reasonable
and correct evaluation of facts, the very Patent Law, Republic Act No. 165, Section
61, provides that:
". . . . The applicant for a patent or for the registration of a design, any
party to a proceeding to cancel a patent or to obtain a compulsory license, and
any party to any other proceeding in the Office may appeal to the Supreme
Court from any final order or decision of the Director."

In other words, the appeal is taken to this Tribunal. If the transaction of business in
the Patent Office and the acts, orders and decisions of the Patent Director involved
exclusively or mostly technical and scientific knowledge and training, then logically,
the appeal should be taken not to a court or judicial body, but rather to a board of
scientists, engineers or technical men, which is not the case.
Another aspect of the question involves the consideration of the nature of the
functions and acts of the Head of the Patent Office.
". . . . The Commissioner, in issuing or withholding patents, in reissues,
interferences, and extensions, exercises quasi-judicial functions. Patents are
public records, and it is the duty of the Commissioner to give authenticated
copies to any person, on payment of the legal fees." (40 Am. Jur. 537).
(Emphasis supplied). ". . . . The Commissioner has the only original initiatory
jurisdiction that exists up to the granting and delivering of a patent, and it is his
duty to decide whether the patent is new and whether it is the proper subject of a
patent; and his action in awarding or refusing a patent is a judicial function. In
passing on an application the commissioner should decide not only questions of
law, but also questions of fact, as whether there has been a prior public use or
sale of the article invented. . . . ." (60 C. J. S. 460). (Emphasis supplied).

The Director of Patents, exercising as he does judicial or quasi-judicial functions, it is

reasonable to hold that a member of the bar, because of his legal knowledge and
training, should be allowed to practice before the Patent Office, without further
examination or other qualification. Of course, the Director of Patents, if he deems it
advisable or necessary, may require that members of the bar practising before him
enlist the assistance of technical men and scientists in the preparation of papers and
documents, such as, the drawing or technical description of an invention or machine
sought to be patented, in the same way that a lawyer filing an application for the
registration of a parcel of land on behalf of his client, is required to submit a plan and
technical description of said land, prepared by a licensed surveyor.
But respondent Director claims that he is expressly authorized by the law to
require persons desiring to practice or to do business before him to submit to an

examination, even if they are already members of the bar. He contends that our Patent
Law, Republic Act No. 165, is patterned after the United States Patent Law; and that
the U. S. Patent Office in its Rules of Practice of the United States Patent Office in
Patent Cases prescribes an examination similar to that which he (respondent) has
prescribed and scheduled. He invites our attention to the following provisions of said
Rules of Practice:
"Registration of attorneys and agents. A register of attorneys and a
register of agents are kept in the Patent Office on which are entered the names
of all persons recognized as entitled to represent applicants before the Patent
Office in the preparation and prosecution of applications for patent. Registration
in the Patent Office under the provisions of these rules shall only entitle the
person registered to practice before the Patent Office.
"(a) Attorneys at law. Any attorney at law in good standing admitted
to practice before any United States Court or the highest court of any State or
Territory of the United States who fulfills the requirements and complied with
the provisions of these rules may be admitted to practice before the Patent
Office and have his name entered on the register of attorneys.
xxx xxx xxx
"(c) Requirement for registration. No person will be admitted to
practice and register unless he shall apply to the Commissioner of Patents in
writing on a prescribed form supplied by the Commissioner and furnish all
requested information and material; and shall establish to the satisfaction of the
Commissioner that he is of good moral character and of good repute and
possessed of the legal and scientific and technical qualifications necessary to
enable him to render applicants for patent valuable service, and is otherwise
competent to advise and assist him in the presentation and prosecution of their
application before the Patent Office. In order that the Commissioner may
determine whether a person seeking to have his name placed either of the
registers has the qualifications specified, satisfactory proof of good moral
character and repute, and of sufficient basic training in scientific and technical
matters must be submitted and an examination which is held from time to time
must be taken and passed. The taking of an examination may be waived in the
case of any person who has served for three years in the examining corps of the
Patent Office."

Respondent states that the promulgation of the Rules of Practice of the United States
Patent Office in Patent Cases is authorized by the United States Patent Law itself,
which reads as follows:
"The Commissioner of Patents, subject to the approval of the Secretary
of Commerce may prescribe rules and regulations governing the recognition of
agents, attorneys, or other persons representing applicants or other parties
before his office, and may require of such persons, agents, or attorneys, before
being recognized as representatives of applicants or other persons, that they
shall show they are of good moral character and in good repute, are possessed of
the necessary qualifications to enable them to render to applicants or other

persons valuable service, and are likewise competent to advise and assist
applicants or other persons in the presentation or prosecution of their
applications or other business before the Office. The Commissioner of Patents
may, after notice and opportunity for a hearing, suspend or exclude, either
generally or in any particular case, from further practice before his office any
person, agent, or attorney shown to be incompetent or disreputable, or guilty of
gross misconduct, or who refuses to comply with the said rules and regulations,
or who shall, with intent to defraud in any manner, deceive, mislead, or threaten
any applicant or prospective applicant, or other person having immediate or
prospective business before the office, by word, circular, letter, or by
advertising. The reasons for any such suspension or exclusion shall be duly
recorded. The action of the Commissioner may be reviewed upon the petition of
the person so refused recognition or so suspended or excluded by the district
court of the United States for the District of Columbia under such conditions
and upon such proceedings as the said court may by its rules determine."
(Emphasis supplied).

Respondent Director concludes that Section 78 of Republic Act No. 165 being
similar to the provisions of law just reproduced, then he is authorized to prescribe the
rules and regulations requiring that persons desiring to practice before him should
submit to and pass an examination. We reproduce said Section 78, Republic Act No.
165, for purposes of comparison:
"SEC. 78. Rules and regulations. The Director subject to the approval
of the Secretary of Justice, shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations,
not inconsistent with law, for the conduct of all business in the Patent Office."

The above provisions of Section 78 certainly and by far, are different from the
provisions of the United States Patent Law as regards authority to hold examinations
to determine the qualifications of those allowed to practice before the Patent Office.
While the U. S. Patent Law authorizes the Commissioner of Patents to require
attorneys to show that they possess the necessary qualifications and competence to
render valuable service to and advise and assist their clients in patent cases, which
showing may take the form of a test or examination to be held by the Commissioner,
our Patent Law, Section 78, is silent on this important point. Our attention has not
been called to any express provision of our Patent Law, giving such authority to
determine the qualifications of persons allowed to practice before the Patent Office.
Section 551 of the Revised Administrative Code authorizes every chief of
bureau to prescribe forms and make regulations or general orders not inconsistent
with law, to secure the harmonious and efficient administration of his branch of the
service and to carry into full effect the laws relating to matters within the jurisdiction
of his bureau. Section 608 of Republic Act 1937, known as the Tariff and Customs
Code of the Philippines, provides that the Commissioner of Customs shall, subject to
the approval of the Department Head, make all rules and regulations necessary to
enforce the provisions of said code. Section 338 of the National Internal Revenue
Code, Commonwealth Act No. 466 as amended, states that the Secretary of Finance,

upon recommendation of the Collector of Internal Revenue, shall promulgate all

needful rules and regulations for the effective enforcement of the provisions of the
code. We understand that rules and regulations have been promulgated not only for
the Bureaus of Customs and Internal Revenue, but also for other bureaus of the
Government, to govern the transaction of business in and to enforce the law for said
bureaus.
Were we to allow the Patent Office, in the absence of an express and clear
provision of law giving the necessary sanction, to require lawyers to submit to and
pass on examination prescribed by it before they are allowed to practice before said
Patent Office, then there would be no reason why other bureaus specially the Bureaus
of Internal Revenue and Customs, where the business in the same area are more or
less complicated, such as the presentation of books of accounts, balance sheets, etc.,
assessments exemptions, depreciation, these as regards the Bureau of Internal
Revenue, and the classification of goods, imposition of customs duties, seizures,
confiscation, etc., as regards the Bureau of Customs, may not also require that any
lawyer practising before them or otherwise transacting business with them on behalf
of clients, shall first pass an examination to qualify.
In conclusion, we hold that under the present law, members of the Philippine
Bar authorized by this Tribunal to practice law, and in good standing, may practice
their profession before the Patent Office, for the reason that much of the business in
said office involves the interpretation and determination of the scope and application
of the Patent Law and other laws applicable, as well as the presentation of evidence to
establish facts involved; that part of the functions of the Patent Director are judicial or
quasi-judicial, so much so that appeals from his orders and decisions are, under the
law, taken to the Supreme Court.
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for prohibition is granted and the
respondent Director is hereby prohibited from requiring members of the Philippine
Bar to submit to an examination or tests and pass the same before being permitted to
appear and practice before the Patent Office. No costs.
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Labrador,
Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L. and Endencia, JJ., concur.
|||

(Philippine Lawyer's Ass'n. v. Agrava, G.R. No. L-12426, February 16, 1959)

EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-12596. July 31, 1958.]
JOSE L. GUEVARA, petitioner, vs. THE COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, respondent.
Enrique M. Fernando for petitioner.
Dominador D. Dayot for respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; JURISDICTION AND POWER TO
PUNISH FOR CONTEMPT. Under section 2, Article X of the Constitution and
section 5 of the Revised Election Code, the Commission on Elections not only has the
duty to enforce and administer all laws relative to the conduct of elections but the
power to try, hear and decide any controversy that may be submitted to it in
connection with the elections. And as an incident of this power, it may also punish for
contempt in those cases provided for in Rule 64 of the Rules of Court under the same
procedure and with the same penalties provided therein. In this sense, the
Commission, although it cannot be classified as a court of justice within the meaning
of the Constitution (section 13, Art. VIII) for it is merely an independent
administrative body (The Nacionalista Party vs. Vera, 85 Phil., 126), may however
exercise quasi-judicial functions in so far as controversies that by express provision of
the law come under its jurisdiction. As to what questions may come within this
category, neither the Constitution nor the Revised Election Code specifies. The
former merely provides that it shall come under its jurisdiction, saving those
involving the right to vote, all administrative questions affecting elections, including
the determination of the number and location of polling places, and the appointment
of election inspectors and other election officials, while the latter is silent as to what
questions may be brought before it for determination. But it is clear that, to come
under its jurisdiction, the questions should be controversial in nature and must refer to
the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections.
2. ID.; ID.; ON MINISTERIAL ACT; NEWSPAPER COMMENTS ON
REQUISITION FOR BALLOT BOXES. The requisitioning and preparation of the
necessary ballot boxes to be used in the elections is an imperative ministerial duty of
the Commission on Elections performed in its administrative capacity in relation to
the conduct of election ordained by our Constitution. In proceeding on this matter, it
only dicharges a ministerial duty; it does not exercise any judicial functions. Such

being the case, it can not exercise the power to punish for contempt as postulated in
the law, for such power is inherently Judicial in nature.
3. ID.; ID.; POWER TO PUNISH FOR CONTEMPT IS INHERENTLY
JUDICIAL; EXEMPTION. "The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all
courts; its existence is essential to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings,
and to the enforcement of judgments, orders and mandates of Courts, and,
consequently, in the administration of justice" (Slade Perkins vs. Director of Prisons,
58 Phil., 271; U. S. vs. Loo Koe, 36 Phil., 867; In re Sotto 46 Off. Gaz., 2570; In re
Kelly, 35 Phil, 944). The exercise of this power has always been regarded as a
necessary incident and attribute of courts (Slade Perkins vs. Director of Prisons, Ibid.)
Its exercise by administrative bodies has been invariably limited to making effective
the power to elicit testimony (People vs. Swena, 296 p. 271), and the exercise of that
power by an administrative body in furtherance of its administrative function has been
held invalid (Langenberg vs. Decker, 31 N. E. 190; In re Sims, 37 Phil., 135; Roberts
vs. Hacney, 58 S.W. 180).

DECISION

BAUTISTA ANGELO, J :
p

Petitioner was ordered by the Commissioner on Elections to show cause why

he should not be punished for contempt for having published in the Sunday Times
issue of June 2, 1957 an article entitled "Ballot Boxes Contract Hit", which tended to
interfere with and influence the Commission on Elections and its members in the
adjudication of a controversy then pending investigation and determination before
said body "arising from the third petition for reconsideration of May 20, 1957 and the
supplementary petition thereof of June 1, 1957 filed by Acme Steel Mfg. Co., Inc.,
praying for reconsideration of the resolutions of the Commission of May 4 and 13,
1957, awarding the contracts for the manufacture and supply of 34,000 ballot boxes to
the National Shipyards & Steel Corporation and the Asiatic Steel Mfg. Co., Inc. and
the respective answers of the latter two corporations to said petitions; and which
article likewise tended to degrade, bring into disrepute, and undermine the exclusive
constitutional function of this Commission and its Chairman Domingo Imperial and
Member Sixto Brillantes in the administration of all the laws relative to the conduct of
elections."
Petitioner, answering the summons issued to him by the Commission, appeared
and filed a motion to quash on the following grounds:
"a) The Commission has no jurisdiction to punish as contempt the
publication of the alleged contemptuous article, as neither in the Constitution
nor in statutes is the Commission granted a power to so punish the same, for

should Section 5 of Republic Act No. 180, vesting the Commission with 'power
to punish contempts provided for in Rule 64 of the Rules of Court under the
same procedure and with the same penalties provided therein,' be applied to the
case at hand, said provision would be unconstitutional.
"b) Assuming that the Commission's power to punish contempt exists,
the same cannot be applied to the instant case, where the Commission is
exercising a purely administrative function of purchasing ballot boxes.
"c) Assuming that the Commission's power to punish contempt exists,
said power cannot apply to the present case because the matter of purchasing the
ballot boxes was already a closed case when the article in question was
published.
"d) Assuming that controversy contemplated by the law was still
pending, the article in question was a fair report because it could be assumed
that the news report of the respondent was based on the motion for
reconsideration filed by the Acme Steel where there was an allegation of fraud,
etc."

The Commission, after hearing, denied the motion to quash but granted
petitioner a period of fifteen (15) days within which to elevate the matter to the
Supreme Court in view of the issue raised which assails the jurisdiction of the
Commission to investigate and punish petitioner for contempt in connection with the
alleged publication. Hence the present petition for prohibition with preliminary
injunction.
The facts which gave rise to the present contemptuous incident are: The
Commission on Elections, on May 4, 1957, after proper negotiations, awarded to the
National Shipyards & Steel Corporation (NASSCO), the Acme Steel Mfg. Co., Inc.
(ACME), and the Asiatic Steel Mfg. Co., Inc. (ASIATIC), the contracts to
manufacture and supply the Commission 12,000, 11,000 and 11,000 ballot boxes at
P17.64, P14.00 and P17.00 each, respectively. On May 8, 1957, both the NASSCO
and the ASIATIC signed with the Commission on Elections the corresponding
contracts thereon. On May 13, 1957, the Commission cancelled the award to the
ACME for failure of the latter to sign the contract within the designated time and
awarded to the NASSCO and the ASIATIC, one-half each, the 11,000 ballot boxes
originally alloted to the ACME. The corresponding contracts thereon were signed on
May 16, 1957.
Then followed a series of petitions filed by the ACME for the reconsideration
of the resolution of the Commission of May 13, 1957. The first of these petitions was
filed on May 14, 1957 which, after hearing, was denied by the Commission in its
resolution of May 16, 1957. The second petition was filed on May 16, 1957 and was
denied on May 17, 1957. The third petition was filed on May 20, 1957, and because
of the seriousness of the grounds alleged therein for the annulment of its previous
resolutions, the Commission resolved to conduct a formal investigation on the matter
ordering the NASSCO and the ASIATIC to file their respective answers. Thereafter,

after these corporations had filed their answers, the Commission held a formal hearing
thereon on May 24, 1957. On May 28, 1957, the ACME filed a memorandum on the
points adduced during the hearing, and on June 4, 1957, the Commission issued its
resolution denying the third motion for reconsideration. The article signed by
petitioner was published in the June 2, 1957 issue of the Sunday Times, a newspaper
of nationwide circulation.
The question to be determined is whether the Commission on Elections has the
power and jurisdiction to conduct contempt proceedings against petitioner with a view
to imposing upon him the necessary disciplinary penalty in connection with the
publication of an article in the Sunday Times issue of June 2, 1957 which, according
to the charge, tended to interfere with and influence said Commission in the
adjudication of a controversy then pending determination and to degrade and
undermine the function of the Commission and its members in the administration of
all laws relative to the conduct of elections.
The Commission on Elections is an independent administrative body which
was established by our Constitution to take charge of the enforcement of all laws
relative to the conduct of elections and devise means and methods that will insure the
accomplishment of free, orderly, and honest elections (Sumulong vs. Commission on
Elections, 73 Phil., 288; Nacionalista Party vs. The Solicitor General, 85 Phil., 101; 47
Off. Gaz. 2356). Its powers are defined in the Constitution. It provides that it "shall
have exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the
conduct of elections and shall exercise all other functions which may be conferred
upon it by law. It shall decide, save those involving the right to vote, all
administrative questions, affecting elections, including the determination of the
number and location of polling places, and the appointment of election inspectors and
of other election officials" (Section 2, Article X). The Revised Election Code
supplements what other powers may be exercised by said Commission. Among these
powers are those embodied in Section 5 thereof which, for ready reference, we quote:
"SEC. 5. Powers of Commission. The Commission on Elections or
any of the members thereof shall have the power to summon the parties to a
controversy pending before it, issue subpoenas and subpoenas duces tecum and
otherwise take testimony in any investigation or hearing pending before it, and
delegate such power to any officer. Any controversy submitted to the
Commission on Elections shall be tried, heard and decided by it within fifteen
days counted from the time the corresponding petition giving rise to said
controversy is filed. The Commission or any of the members thereof shall have
the power to punish contempts provided for in rule sixty-four of the Rules of
Court, under the same procedure and with the same penalties provided therein.
"Any violation of any final and executory decision, order or ruling of the
Commission shall constitute contempt of the Commission.

"Any decision, order or ruling of the Commission on Elections may be

reviewed by the Supreme Court by writ of certiorari in accordance with the
Rules of Court or with such rules as may be promulgated by the Supreme
Court."

It would therefore appear that the Commission on Elections not only has the
duty to enforce and administer all laws relative to the conduct of elections but the
power to try, hear and decide any controversy that may be submitted to it in
connection with the elections. And as an incident of this power, it may also punish for
contempt in those cases provided for in Rule 64 of the Rules of Court under the same
procedure and with the same penalties provided therein. In this sense, the
Commission, although it cannot be classified as a court of justice within the meaning
of the Constitution (Section 13, Article VIII), for it is merely an independent
administrative body (The Nacionalista Party vs. Vera, 85 Phil., 126; 47 Off. Gaz.
2375), may however exercise quasi-judicial functions in so far as controversies that
by express provision of the law come under its jurisdiction. As to what questions may
come within this category, neither the Constitution nor the Revised Election Code
specifies. The former merely provides that it shall come under its jurisdiction, saving
those involving the right to vote, all administrative questions affecting elections,
including the determination of the number and location of polling places, and the
appointment of election inspectors and other election officials, while the latter is
silent as to what questions may be brought before it for determination. But it is clear
that, to come under its jurisdiction, the questions should be controversial in nature and
must refer to the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of
election. The difficulty lies in drawing the demarcation line between a duty which
inherently is administrative in character and a function which is justiciable and which
would therefore call for judicial action by the Commission. But this much depends
upon the factors that may intervene when a controversy should arise.
Thus, it has been held that the Commission has no power to annul an election
which might not have been free, orderly and honest for such matter devolves upon
other agencies of the Government (Nacionalista Party vs. Commission on Elections,
85 Phil., 148; 47 Off. Gaz. 2851); neither does it have the power to decide the validity
or invalidity of votes cast in an election for such devolves upon the courts or the
electoral tribunals (Ibid.); it does not also have the power to order a recounting of the
votes before the proclamation of election even if there are discrepancies in the
election returns for it is a function of our courts of justice (Ramos vs. Commission on
Elections, 80 Phil., 722); nor does it have the power to order the correction of a
certificate of canvass after a candidate had been proclaimed and assumed office (De
Leon vs. Imperial, 94 Phil., 680); and only very recently this Court has held that the
Commission has no power to reject a certificate of candidacy except only when its
purpose is to create confusion in the minds of the electors (Abcede vs. Imperial, 103
Phil., 136).

On the other hand, it has been held that the Commission has the power to annul
an illegal registry list of voters (Feliciano, et al. vs. Lugay, et al., 93 Phil., 744; 49 Off.
Gaz. 3863); to annul an election canvass made by a municipal board of canvassers
(Mintu vs. Enage, et al., G. R. No. L-1834); and to investigate and act on the illegality
of a canvass of election made by a municipal board of canvassers (Ramos vs.
Commission on Elections, 80 Phil., 722). And as to what are the ministerial duties
which the Commission on Elections must perform in connection with the conduct of
elections, the following resume made by the Commission itself in a controversy
which was submitted to it for determination is very enlightening:
"In the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the
conduct of elections, the first duty of the Commission is to set in motion all the
multifarious preparatory processes ranging from the purchase of election
supplies, printing of election forms and ballots, appointments of members of the
boards of inspectors, establishment of precincts and designation of polling
places to the preparation of the registry lists of voters, so as to put in readiness
on election day the election machinery in order that the people who are legally
qualified to exercise the right of suffrage may be able to cast their votes to
express their sovereign will. It is incumbent upon the Commission to see that all
these preparatory acts will insure free, orderly and honest elections. All
provisions of the Revised Election Code contain regulations relative to these
processes preparatory for election day. It is incumbent upon the Commission on
Elections to see that all these preparatory acts are carried out freely, honestly
and in an orderly manner. It is essential that the Commission or its authorized
representatives, in establishing precincts or designating polling places, must act
freely, honestly and in an orderly manner. It is also essential that the printing of
election forms and the purchase of election supplies and their distribution are
done freely, honestly and in an orderly manner. It is further essential that the
political parties or their duly authorized representatives who are entitled to be
represented in the boards of inspectors must have the freedom to choose the
person who will represent them in each precinct throughout the country. It is
further essential that once organized, the boards of inspectors shall be given all
the opportunity to be able to perform their duties in accordance with law freely,
honestly and in an orderly manner, individually and as a whole. In other words,
it is the duty of the Commission to see that the boards of inspectors, in all their
sessions, are placed in an atmosphere whereby they can fulfill their duties
without any pressure, influence and interference from any private person or
public official. All these preparatory steps are administrative in nature and all
questions arising therefrom are within the exclusive powers of the Commission
to resolve. All irregularities, anomalies and misconduct committed by any
election official in these preparatory steps are within the exclusive power of the
Commission to correct. Any erring official must respond to the Commission for
investigation. Of these preparatory acts, the preparation of the permanent list of
voters is the matter involved in this case, which to our mind is completely an
administrative matter." (Decision of the Commission on Elections, October 28,
1951, In Re Petition of Angel Genuino vs. Prudente, et al., Case No. 196) 1

Considering that the paramount administrative duty of the Commission is to set

in motion all the multifarious preparatory processes ranging from the purchase of
election supplies, printing of election forms and ballots, appointments of members of
the board of inspectors, establishment of precincts and designation of polling places to
the preparation of registry lists of voters, so as to put in readiness on election day the
election machinery, it may also be reasonably said that the requisitioning and
preparation of the necessary ballot boxes to be used in the elections is by the same
token an imperative ministerial duty which the Commission is bound to perform if the
elections are to be held. Such is the incident which gave rise to the contempt case
before us. It stems from the ministerial act of the Commission in requisitioning for the
necessary ballot boxes in connection with the last elections and in so proceeding it
provoked a dispute between several dealers who offered to do the job.
Although the negotiation conducted by the Commission has resulted in
controversy between several dealers, that however merely refers to a ministerial duty
which the Commission has performed in its administrative capacity in relation to the
conduct of elections ordained by our Constitution. In proceeding on this matter, it
only discharged a ministerial duty; it did not exercise any judicial function. Such
being the case, it could not exercise the power to punish for contempt as postulated in
the law, for such power is inherently judicial in nature. As this Court has aptly said:
"The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts; its existence is essential to
the preservation of order in judicial proceedings, and to the enforcement of
judgments, orders and mandates of courts, and, consequently, in the administration of
justice" (Slade Perkins vs. Director of Prisons, 58 Phil., 271; U. S. vs. Loo Hoe, 36
Phil., 867; In Re Sotto, 46 Off. Gaz. 2570; In Re Kelly, 35 Phil., 944). The exercise of
this power has always been regarded as a necessary incident and attribute of courts
(Slade Perkins vs. Director of Prisons, Ibid.). Its exercise by administrative bodies has
been invariably limited to making effective the power to elicit testimony (People vs.
Swena, 296 P., 271). And the exercise of that power by an administrative body in
furtherance of its administrative function has been held invalid (Langenberg vs.
Decker, 31 N.E. 190; In Re Sims 37 P., 135; Roberts vs. Hacney, 58 S.W., 810). We
are therefore persuaded to conclude that the Commission on Elections has no power
nor authority to submit petitioner to contempt proceedings if its purpose is to
discipline him because of the publication of the article mentioned in the charge under
consideration.
Wherefore, petition is granted. Respondent Commission is hereby enjoined
from proceeding with the contempt case set forth in its resolution of June 20, 1957,
without pronouncement as to costs.
The preliminary injunction issued by this Court is made permanent.
Paras, C.J., Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Reyes, J.B.L., Endencia and
Felix, JJ., concur.

|||

(Guevara v. COMELEC, G.R. No. L-12596, July 31, 1958)

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 46496. February 27, 1940.]
ANG TIBAY, represented by TORIBIO TEODORO, manager and
proprietor, and NATIONAL WORKERS' BROTHERHOOD,
petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS and
NATIONAL LABOR UNION, INC., respondents.
Solicitor-General Ozaeta and Assistant Attorney Barcelona for the Court of
Industrial Relations.
Antonio D. Paguia; for National Labor Union.
Claro M. Recto; for petitioner "Ang Tibay".
Jose M. Casal; for National Workers' Brotherhood.
SYLLABUS
1. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS; POWER. The nature of the
Court of Industrial Relations and of its power is extensively discussed in the decision.
2. ID.; ID.; TECHNICAL RULES OF PROCEDURE; DUE PROCESS OF
LAW. The Court of Industrial Relations is not narrowly constrained by technical
rules of procedure, and Commonwealth Act No. 103 requires it to act according to
justice and equity and substantial merits of the case, without regard to technicalities or
legal evidence but may inform its mind in such manner as it may deem just and
equitable (Goseco vs. Court of Industrial Relations et al., G. R. No. 46673). The fact,
however, that the Court of Industrial Relations may be said to be free from the rigidity
of certain procedural requirements does not mean that it can, in justiciable cases
coming before it, entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential
requirements of due process in trials and investigations of an administrative character.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CARDINAL PRIMARY RIGHTS. There are cardinal
primary rights which must be respected even in proceedings of this character. The
first of these rights is the right to a hearing, which includes the right of the party
interested or affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof.
Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce
evidence tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider
the evidence presented. While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to
decide right, it does imply a necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of
having something to support its decision. Not only must there be some evidence to

support a finding or conclusion, but the evidence must be substantial. The decision
must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the
record and disclosed to the parties affected. The Court of Industrial Relations or any
of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own independent consideration of the
law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in
arriving at a decision. The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controvercial
questions, render its decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can
know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the decisions rendered. The
performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it.
4. ID.; ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; ID.; CASE AT BAR ; NEW TRIAL GRANTED. In
the light of the foregoing fundamental principles, it is sufficient to observe here that,
except as to the alleged agreement between the Ang Tibay and the National Workers'
Brotherhood (appendix A), the record is barren and does not satisfy the thirst for a
factual basis upon which to predicate, in a rational way, a conclusion of law. This
result, however, does not now preclude the concession of a new trial prayed for by the
respondent National Labor Union, Inc. The interest of justice would be better served
if the movant is given opportunity to present at the hearing the documents referred to
in his motion and such other evidence as may be relevant to the main issue involved.
The legislation which created the Court of Industrial Relations and under which it acts
is new. The failure to grasp the fundamental issue involved is not entirely attributable
to the parties adversely affected by the result. Accordingly, the motion for a new trial
should be, and the same is hereby, granted, and the entire record of this' case shall be
remanded to the Court of Industrial Relations, with instruction that it re-open the case,
receive all such evidence as may be relevant, and otherwise proceed in accordance
with the requirements set forth in the decision.

DECISION

LAUREL, J :
p

The Solicitor-General in behalf of the respondent Court of Industrial Relations

in the above-entitled case has filed a motion for reconsideration and moves that, for
the reasons stated in his motion, we reconsider the following legal conclusions of the
majority opinion of this Court:
"1. Que un contrato de trabajo, asi individual como colectivo, sin
termino fijo de duracion o que no sea para una determinada, termina o bien por
voluntad de cualquiera de las partes o cada vez que llega el plazo fijado para el
pago de los salarios segun costumbre en la localidad o cuando se termine la
obra;

"2. Que los obreros de una empresa fabril, que han celebrado contrato,
ya individual ya colectivamente, con ella, sin tiempo fijo, y que se han visto
obligados a cesar en sus trabajos por haberse declarado paro forzoso en la
fabrica en la cual trabajan, dejan de ser empleados u obreros de la misma;
"3. Que un patrono o sociedad que ha celebrado un contrato colectivo de
trabajo con sus obreros sin tiempo fijo de duracion y sin ser para una obra
determinada y que se niega a readmitir a dichos obreros que cesaron como
consecuencia de un paro forzoso, no es culpable de practica injusta ni incurre en
la sancion penal del articulo 5 de la Ley No. 213 del Commonwealth, aunque su
negativa a readmitir se deba a que dichos obreros pertenecen a un determinado
organismo obrero, puesto que tales ya han dejado de ser empleados suyos por
terminacion del contrato en virtud del paro."

The respondent National Labor Union, Inc., on the other hand, prays for the
vacation of the judgment rendered by the majority of this Court and the remanding of
the case to the Court of Industrial Relations for a new trial, and avers:
"1. That Toribio Teodoro's claim that on September 26,1938, there was
shortage of leather soles in ANG TIBAY making it necessary for him to
temporarily lay off the members of the National Labor Union Inc., is entirely
false and unsupported by the records of the Bureau of Customs and the Books
of Accounts of native dealers in leather.
"2. That the supposed lack of leather materials claimed by Toribio
Teodoro was but a scheme adopted to systematically discharge all the members
of the National Labor Union, Inc., from work.
"3. That Toribio Teodoro's letter to the Philippine Army dated
September 29, 1938, (re supposed delay of leather soles from the States) was
but a scheme to systematically prevent the forfeiture of this bond despite the
breach of his CONTRACT with the Philippine Army.
"4. That the National Workers' Brotherhood of ANG TIBAY is a
company or employer union dominated by Toribio Teodoro, the existence and
functions of which are illegal. (281 U. S., 548, petitioner's printed
memorandum, p. 25.)
"5. That in the exercise by the laborers of their rights to collective
bargaining, majority rule and elective representation are highly essential and
indispensable. ( Sections 2 and 5, Commonwealth Act No. 213.)
"6. That the century provisions of the Civil Code which had been (the)
principal source of dissensions and continuous civil war in Spain cannot and
should not be made applicable in interpreting and applying the salutary
provisions of a modern labor legislation of American origin where industrial
peace has always been the rule.
"7. That the employer Toribio Teodoro was guilty of unfair labor
practice for discriminating against the National Labor Union, Inc., and unjustly
favoring the National Workers' Brotherhood.

"8. That the exhibits hereto attached are so inaccessible to the

respondents that even with the exercise of due diligence they could not be
expected to have obtained them and offered as evidence in the Court of
Industrial Relations.
"9. That the attached documents and exhibits are of such far-reaching
importance and effect that their admission would necessarily mean the
modification and reversal of the judgment rendered herein."

The petitioner, Ang Tibay, has filed an opposition both to the motion for
reconsideration of the respondent Court of Industrial Relations and to the motion for
new trial of the respondent National Labor Union, Inc.
In view of the conclusion reached by us and to be herein- after stated with
reference to the motion for a new trial of the respondent National Labor Union, Inc.,
we are of the opinion that it is not necessary to pass upon the motion for
reconsideration of the Solicitor-General. We shall proceed to dispose of the motion
for new trial of the respondent labor union. Before doing this, however, we deem it
necessary, in the interest of orderly procedure in cases of this nature, to make several
observations regarding the nature of the powers of the Court of Industrial Relations
and emphasize certain guiding principles which should be observed in the trial of
cases brought before it. We have re-examined the entire record of the proceedings had
before the Court of Industrial Relations in this case, and we have found no substantial
evidence to indicate that the exclusion of the 89 laborers here was due to their union
affiliation or activity. The whole transcript taken contains what transpired during the
hearing and is more of a record of contradictory and conflicting statements of
opposing counsel, with sporadic conclusion drawn to suit their own views. It is
evident that these statements and expressions of views of counsel have no evidentiary
value.
The Court of Industrial Relations is a special court whose functions are
specifically stated in the law of its creation (Commonwealth Act No. 103). It is more
an administrative board than a part of the integrated judicial system of the nation. It is
not intended to be a mere receptive organ of the Government. Unlike a court of justice
which is essentially passive, acting only when its jurisdiction is invoked and deciding
only cases that are presented to it by the parties litigant, the function of the Court of
Industrial Relations, as will appear from perusal of its organic law, is more active,
affirmative and dynamic. It not only exercises judicial or quasijudicial functions in the
determination of disputes between employers and employees but its functions are far
more comprehensive and extensive. It has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines, to
consider, investigate, decide, and settle any question, matter controversy or dispute
arising between, and/or affecting, employers and employees or laborers, and landlords
and tenants or farm-laborers, and regulate the relations between them, subject to, and
in accordance with, the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 103 (section 1). It shall
take cognizance for purposes of prevention, arbitration, decision and settlement, of
any industrial or agricultural dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout,

arising from differences as regards wageshares or compensation, hours of labor or

conditions of tenancy or employment, between employers and employees or laborers
and between landlords and tenants or farm-laborers, provided that the number of
employees, laborers or tenants or farm-laborers involved exceeds thirty, and such
industrial or agricultural dispute is submitted to the Court by the Secretary of Labor or
by any or both of the parties to the controversy and certified by the Secretary of Labor
as existing and proper to be death with by the Court for the sake of public interest.
(Section A, ibid.) It shall, before hearing the dispute and in the course of such hearing,
endeavor to reconcile the parties and induce them to settle the dispute by amicable
agreement. (Paragraph 2, section 4, ibid.) When directed by the President of the
Philippines, it shall investigate and study all pertinent facts related to the industry
concerned or to the industries established in a designated locality, with a view to
determining the necessity and fairness of fixing and adopting for such industry or
locality a minimum wage or share of laborers or tenants, or a maximum "canon" or
rental to be paid by the "inquilinos" or tenants or lessees to landowners. (Section 5,
ibid.) In fine, it may appeal to voluntary arbitration in the settlement of industrial
disputes; may employ mediation or conciliation for that purpose, or recur to the more
effective system of official investigation and compulsory arbitration in order to
determine specific controversies between labor and capital in industry and in
agriculture. There is in reality here a mingling of executive and judicial functions,
which is a departure from the rigid doctrine of the separation of governmental powers.
In the case of Goseco vs. Court of Industrial Relations et al., G. R. No. 46673,
promulgated September 13, 1939, we had occasion to point out that the Court of
Industrial Relations is not narrowly constrained by technical rules of procedure, and
the Act requires it to "act according to justice and equity and substantial merits of the
case, without regard to technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by any
technical rules of legal evidence but may inform its mind in such manner as it may
deem just and equitable." (Section 20, Commonwealth Act No. 103.) It shall not be
restricted to the specific relief claimed or demands made by the parties to the
industrial or agricultural dispute, but may include in the award, order or decision any
matter or determination which may be deemed necessary or expedient for the purpose
of settling the dispute or of preventing further industrial or agricultural disputes.
(Section 13, ibid.) And in the light of this legislative policy, appeals to this Court have
been especially regulated by the rules recently promulgated by this Court to carry into
effect the avowed legislative purpose. The fact, however, that the Court of Industrial
Relations may be said to be free from the rigidity of certain procedural requirements
does not mean that it can, in justiciable cases coming before it, entirely ignore or
disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of due Process in trials and
investigations of an administrative character. There are cardinal primary rights which
must be respected even in proceedings of this character:

(1) The first of these rights is the right to a hearing which includes the right of
the party interested or affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support
thereof. In the language of Chief Justice Hughes, in Morgan v. U. S., 304 U. S. 1, 58
S. Ct. 773, 999, 82 Law. ed 1129, "the liberty and property of the citizen shall be
protected by the rudimentary requirements of fair play."
(2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to
adduce evidence tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must
consider the evidence presented. (Chief Justice Hughes in Morgan v. U. S. 298 U. S.
468, 56 S. Ct. 906, 80 Law. ed. 1288.) In the language of this Court in Edwards vs.
McCoy, 22 Phil., 598, "the right to adduce evidence, without the corresponding duty
on the part of the board to consider it, is vain. Such right is conspicuously futile if the
person or persons to whom the evidence is presented can thrust it aside without notice
or consideration."
(3) "While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right,
it does imply a necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having
something to support its decision. A decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a
nullity, a place when directly attached." (Edwards vs. McCoy, supra.) This principle
emanates from the more fundamental principle that the genius of constitutional
government is contrary to the vesting of unlimited power anywhere. Law is both a
grant and a limitation upon power.
(4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion
(City of Manila vs. Agustin, G. R. No. 45844, promulgated November 29, 1937,
XXXVI O. G. 1335), but the evidence must be "substantial." (Washington, Virginia &
Maryland Coach Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 301 U. S. 142, 147, 57 S. Ct.
648, 650, 81 Law ed 965.) Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla It means
such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion."
(Appalachian Electric Power v. National Labor Relations Board, 4 Cir., 93 F.
2d 985, 989; National Labor Relations Board v. Thompson Products, 6 Cir., 97 F. 2d
13, 15; Ballston-stillwater Knitting Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 2 Cir., 98
F. 2d 758, 760.) . . . The statute provides that 'the rules of evidence prevailing in
courts of law and equity shall not be controlling.' The obvious purpose of this and
similar provisions is to free administrative boards from the compulsion of technical
rules so that the mere admission of matter which would be deemed incompetent in
judicial proceedings would not invalidate the administrative order. (Interstate
Commerce Commission v. Baird, 194 U. S. 25, 44, 24 S. Ct. 563, 568, 48 Law. ed.
860; Interstate Commerce Commission v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 227 U. S.
88, 93, 33 S. Ct. 185, 187, 57 Law. ed. 431; United States v. Abilene & Southern Ry.
Co., 265 U. S. 274, 288, 44 S. Ct. 565, 569, 68 Law. ed. lola; Tagg Bros. & Moorhead
v. United States, 280 U. S. 420, 442, 50 S. Ct. 220, 225, 74 Law. ed. 624.) But this
assurance of a desirable flexibility in administrative procedure does not go so far as to
justify orders without a basis in evidence having rational probative force. Mere

uncorroborated hearsay or rumor does not constitute substantial evidence.

(Consolidated Edison Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 59 S. Ct. 206, 83 Law.
ed. No. 4, Adv. Op., p. 131.)"
(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or
at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected. (Interstate
Commence Commission vs. L. & N. R. Co., 227 U. S. 88, 33 S. Ct. 185, 57 Law. ed.
431.)Only by confining the administrative tribunal to the evidence disclosed to the
parties, can the latter be protected in their right to know and meet the case against
them. It should not, however, detract from their duty actively to see that the law is
enforced, and for that purpose, to use the authorized legal methods of securing
evidence and informing itself of facts material and relevant to the controversy. Boards
of inquiry may be appointed for the purpose of investigating and determining the facts
in any given case, but their report and decision are only advisory. (Section 9,
Commonwealth Act No. 103.) The Court of Industrial Relations may refer any
industrial or agricultural dispute of any matter under its consideration or advisement
to a local board of inquiry, a provincial fiscal, a justice of the peace or any public
official in any part of the Philippines for investigation, report and recommendation,
and may delegate to such board or public official such powers and functions as the
said Court of Industrial Relations may deem necessary, but such delegation shall not
affect the exercise of the Court itself of any of its powers (Section 10, ibid.)
(6) The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges, therefore, must act on
its or his own independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and
not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision. It may be that
the volume of work is such that it is literally impossible for the titular heads of the
Court of Industrial Relations personally to decide all controversies coming before
them. In the United States the difficulty is solved with the enactment of statutory
authority authorizing examiners or other subordinates to render final decision, with
right to appeal to board or commission, but in our case there is no such statutory
authority.
(7) The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controversial questions,
render its decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the
vario issues involved, and the reasons for the decisions rendered. The performance of
this duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it.
In the light of the foregoing fundamental principles, it is sufficient to observe
here that, except as to the alleged agreement between the Ang Tibay and the National
Workers' Brotherhood (appendix A), the record is barren and does not satisfy the
thirst for a factual basis upon which to predicate, in a rational way, a conclusion of
law.
This result, however, does not now preclude the concession of a new trial
prayed for by the respondent National Labor Union, Inc. In the portion of the petition
hereinabove quoted of the National Labor Union, Inc., it is alleged that "the supposed

lack of leather material claimed by Toribio Teodoro was but a scheme adopted to
systematically discharge all the members of the National Labor Union, Inc., from
work" and this averment is desired to be proved by the petitioner with the "records of
the Bureau of Customs and the Books of Accounts of native dealers in leather"; that
"the National Workers' Brotherhood Union of Ang Tibay is a company or employer
union dominated by Toribio Teodoro, the existence and functions of which are
illegal." Petitioner further alleges under oath that the exhibits attached to the petition
to prove his substantial averments "are so inaccessible to the respondents that even
with the exercise of due diligence they could not be expected to have obtained them
and offered as evidence in the Court of Industrial Relations", and that the documents
attached to the petition "are of such far reaching importance and effect that their
admission would necessarily mean the modification and reversal of the judgment
rendered therein." We have considered the reply of Ang Tibay and its arguments
against the petition. By and large, after considerable discussion, we have come to the
conclusion that the interest of justice would be better served if the movant is given
opportunity to present at the hearing the documents referred to in his motion and such
other evidence as may be relevant to the main issue involved. The legislation which
created the Court of Industrial Relations and under which it acts is new. The failure to
grasp the fundamental issue involved is not entirely attributable to the parties
adversely affected by the result. Accordingly, the motion for a new trial should be,
and the same is hereby granted, and the entire record of this case shall be remanded to
the Court of Industrial Relations, with instruction that it reopen the case, receive all
such evidence as may be relevant, and otherwise proceed in accordance with the
requirements set forth hereinabove. So ordered.
Avancea, C.J., Villa-Real, Imperial, Diaz, Concepcion and Moran, JJ.,
concur.
|||

(Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations, G.R. No. 46496, February 27, 1940)

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 139465. January 18, 2000.]
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, petitioner, vs. HON. RALPH C.
LANTION, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch
25, and MARK B. JIMENEZ, respondents.
Estelito P. Mendoza for private respondent.
SYNOPSIS
The United States Government, on June 17, 1999, through Department of Foreign Affairs
U. S. Note Verbale No. 0522, requested the Philippine Government for the extradition of
Mark Jimenez, herein private respondent, to the United States. The request was
forwarded the following day by the Secretary of Foreign Affairs to the Department of
Justice (DOJ). Pending evaluation of the extradition documents by the DOJ, private
respondent requested for copies of the official extradition request and all pertinent
documents and the holding in abeyance of the proceedings. When his request was denied
for being premature, private respondent resorted to an action for mandamus, certiorari
and prohibition. The trial court issued an order maintaining and enjoining the DOJ from
conducting further proceedings, hence, the instant petition.
ECTSDa

Although the Extradition Law does not specifically indicate whether the extradition
proceeding is criminal, civil, or a special proceeding, it nevertheless provides the
applicability of the Rules of Court in the hearing of the petition insofar as practicable and
not inconsistent with the summary nature of the proceedings.
The prospective extraditee under Section 2[c] of Presidential Decree No. 1069 faces the
threat of arrest, not only after the extradition petition is filed in court, but even during the
evaluation proceeding itself by virtue of the provisional arrest allowed under the treaty
and the implementing law. Thus, the evaluation process, in essence, partakes of the
nature of a criminal investigation making available certain constitutional rights to the
prospective extraditee. The Court noted that there is a void in the provisions of the RPUS Extradition Treaty regarding the basic due process rights available to a prospective
extraditee at the evaluation stage of the proceedings. The Court was constrained to apply
the rules of fair play, the due process rights of notice and hearing. Hence, petitioner was
ordered to furnish private respondent copies of the extradition request and its supporting
papers and to grant the latter a reasonable time within which to file his comment with
supporting evidence.

SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; EXTRADITION TREATY; EVALUATION PROCESS,
AN INVESTIGATIVE OR INQUISITORIAL PROCESS. The evaluation process,
just like the extradition proceedings proper, belongs to a class by itself. It is sui generis. It
is not a criminal investigation, but it is also erroneous to say that it is purely an exercise
of ministerial functions. At such stage, the executive authority has the power: (a) to make
a technical assessment of the completeness and sufficiency of the extradition papers; (b)
to outrightly deny the request if on its face and on the face of the supporting documents
the crimes indicated are not extraditable; and (c) to make a determination whether or not
the request is politically motivated, or that the offense is a military one which is not
punishable under non-military penal legislation (tsn, August 31, 1999, pp. 28-29; Article
2 and Paragraph [3], Article 3, RP-US Extradition Treaty). Hence, said process may be
characterized as an investigative or inquisitorial process in contrast to a proceeding
conducted in the exercise of an administrative body's quasi-judicial power.
2. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; QUASI-JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS; PHASES. In
administrative law, a quasi-judicial proceeding involves: (a) taking and evaluation of
evidence; (b) determining facts based upon the evidence presented; and (c) rendering an
order or decision supported by the facts proved (De Leon, Administrative Law: Text and
Cases, 1993 ed., p. 198, citing Morgan vs. United States, 304 U.S. 1).
3. ID.; ID:; TEST OF DETERMINING WHETHER ADMINISTRATIVE BODY
EXERCISES JUDICIAL FUNCTIONS OR MERELY INVESTIGATORY
FUNCTIONS. In Ruperto v. Torres (100 Phil. 1098 [1957], unreported), the Court had
occasion to rule on the functions of an investigatory body with the sole power of
investigation. It does not exercise judicial functions and its power is limited to
investigating the facts and making findings in respect thereto. The Court laid down the
test of determining whether an administrative body is exercising judicial functions or
merely investigatory functions: Adjudication signifies the exercise of power and authority
to adjudicate upon the rights and obligations of the parties before it. Hence, if the only
purpose for investigation is to evaluate evidence submitted before it based on the facts
and circumstances presented to it, and if the agency is not authorized to make a final
pronouncement affecting the parties, then there is an absence of judicial discretion and
judgment.
4. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; EXTRADITION TREATY; ADMINISTRATIVE BODY
AUTHORIZED TO EVALUATE EXTRADITION DOCUMENTS MERELY
EXERCISES INVESTIGATORY FUNCTIONS. The above description in Ruperto
applies to an administrative body authorized to evaluate extradition documents. The body
has no power to adjudicate in regard to the rights and obligations of both the Requesting
State and the prospective extraditee. Its only power is to determine whether the papers
comply with the requirements of the law and the treaty and, therefore, sufficient to be the

basis of an extradition petition. Such finding is thus merely initial and not final. The body
has no power to determine whether or not the extradition should be effected. That is the
role of the court. The body's power is limited to an initial finding of whether or not the
extradition petition can be filed in court.
5. ID.; ID.; EVALUATION PROCESS, PARTAKES OF NATURE OF CRIMINAL
INVESTIGATION. In contrast to ordinary investigations, the evaluation procedure is
characterized by certain peculiarities. Primarily, it sets into motion the wheels of the
extradition process. Ultimately, it may result in the deprivation of liberty of the
prospective extraditee. This deprivation can be effected at two stages: First, the
provisional arrest of the prospective extraditee pending the submission of the request.
Second, the temporary arrest of the prospective extraditee during the pendency of the
extradition petition in court (Section 6, Presidential Decree No. 1069). Clearly, there is an
impending threat to a prospective extraditee's liberty as early as during the evaluation
stage. It is not only an imagined threat to his liberty, but a very imminent one. Because of
these possible consequences, we conclude that the evaluation process is akin to an
administrative agency conducting an investigative proceeding, the consequences of which
are essentially criminal since such technical assessment sets off or commences the
procedure for, and ultimately, the deprivation of liberty of a prospective extraditee. As
described by petitioner himself, this is a "tool" for criminal law enforcement. In essence,
therefore, the evaluation process partakes of the nature of a criminal investigation.
6. ID.; BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHTS AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION; EXTENDS
TO ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS WHICH POSSESS A CRIMINAL OR
PENAL ASPECT. In Pascual v. Board of Medical Examiners (28 SCRA 344 [1969]),
we held that the right against self-incrimination under Section 17, Article III of the 1987
Constitution which is ordinarily available only in criminal prosecutions, extends to
administrative proceedings which possess a criminal or penal aspect.
7. ID.; ID.; DUE PROCESS; COMPONENTS. Due process is comprised of two
components substantive due process which requires the intrinsic validity of the law in
interfering with the rights of the person to his life, liberty, or property, and procedural due
process which consists of the two basic rights of notice and hearing, as well as the
guarantee of being heard by an impartial and competent tribunal (Cruz, Constitutional
Law, 1993 Ed., pp. 102-106).
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; PERVADES NOT ONLY IN CRIMINAL AND CIVIL PROCEEDINGS
BUT IN ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS AS WELL. The basic rights of notice
and hearing pervade not only in criminal and civil proceedings, but in administrative
proceedings as well. Non-observance of these rights will invalidate the proceedings.
Individuals are entitled to be notified of any pending case affecting their interests, and
upon notice, they may claim the right to appear therein and present their side and to
refute the position of the opposing parties (Cruz, Phil. Administrative Law, 1996 ed., p,

64). In a preliminary investigation which is an administrative investigatory proceeding,

Section 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court guarantees the respondent's basic due process
rights, granting him the right to be furnished a copy of the complaint, the affidavits, and
other supporting documents, and the right to submit counter-affidavits and other
supporting documents within ten days from receipt thereof. Moreover, the respondent
shall have the right to examine all other evidence submitted by the complainant.
9. ID.; ID.; ID.; CANNOT BE DISPENSED WITH AND SHELVED ASIDE IN
EXTRADITION CASES. Worthy of inquiry is the issue of whether or not there is
tentativeness of administrative action. Is private respondent precluded from enjoying the
right to notice and hearing at a later time without prejudice to him? Here lies the
peculiarity and deviant characteristic of the evaluation procedure. On one hand, there is
yet no extraditee, but ironically on the other, it results in an administrative determination
which, if adverse to the person involved, may cause his immediate incarceration. The
grant of the request shall lead to the filing of the extradition petition in court. The
"accused" (as Section 2[c] of Presidential Decree No. 1069 calls him), faces the threat of
arrest, not only after the extradition petition is filed in court, but even during the
evaluation proceeding itself by virtue of the provisional arrest allowed under the treaty
and the implementing law. The prejudice to the "accused" is thus blatant and manifest.
Plainly, the notice and hearing requirements of administrative due process cannot be
dispensed with and shelved aside.

10. ID.; ID.; POLITICAL RIGHTS AVAILABLE TO FILIPINO CITIZENS. Section

7 of Article III of the Constitution guarantees political rights which are available to
citizens of the Philippines, namely: (1) the right to information on matters of public
concern, and (2) the corollary right of access to official records and documents. The
general right guaranteed by said provision is the right to information on matters of public
concern. In its implementation, the right of access to official records is likewise
conferred. These cognate or related rights are "subject to limitations as may be provided
by law" (Bernas, The 1987 Phil. Constitution A Reviewer-Primer, 1997 ed., p. 104) and
rely on the premise that ultimately it is an informed and critical public opinion which
alone can protect the values of democratic government (Ibid.).
11. ID.; ID.; ID.; RIGHT TO INFORMATION ON MATTERS OF PUBLIC
CONCERN, CONSTRUED. The concept of matters of public concern escapes exact
definition. Strictly speaking, every act of a public officer in the conduct of the
governmental process is a matter of public concern (Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of the
Republic of the Philippines, 1996 ed., p. 336). This concept embraces a broad spectrum
of subjects which the public may want to know, either because these directly affect their
lives or simply because matters arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen (Legaspi v. Civil

Service Commission, 150 SCRA [1987]). Hence the real party in interest is the people
and any citizen has "standing."
12. ID.; ID.; RIGHT TO INFORMATION; IMPLEMENTED BY ACCESS TO
INFORMATION WITHIN GOVERNMENT'S CONTROL. The right to information
is implemented by the right of access to information within the control of the government
(Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, 1996 ed., p. 337).
Such information may be contained in official records, and in documents and papers
pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions.
13. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT AVAILABLE DURING EVALUATION STAGE OF
EXTRADITION WHERE NO OFFICIAL PHILIPPINE ACTION HAS YET BEEN
DONE. In the case at bar, the papers requested by private respondent pertain to
official government action from the U.S. Government. No official action from our
country has yet been taken. Moreover, the papers have some relation to matters of foreign
relations with the U.S. Government. Consequently, if a third party invokes this
constitutional provision, stating that the extradition papers are matters of public concern
since they may result in the extradition of a Filipino, we are afraid that the balance must
be tilted, at such particular time, in favor of the interests necessary for the proper
functioning of the government. During the evaluation procedure, no official
governmental action of our own government has as yet been done; hence the invocation
of the right is premature. Later, and in contrast, records of the extradition hearing would
already fall under matters of public concern, because our government by then shall have
already made an official decision to grant the extradition request. The extradition of a
fellow Filipino would be forthcoming.
14. ID.; INTERNATIONAL LAW; RULE OF PACTA SUNT SERVANDA;
CONSTRUED. The rule of pacta sunt servanda, one of the oldest and most
fundamental maxims of international law, requires the parties to a treaty to keep their
agreement therein in good faith. The observance of our country's legal duties under a
treaty is also compelled by Section 2, Article II of the Constitution which provides that
"[t]he Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, adopts the generally
accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land, and adheres to the
policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity with all nations."
15. ID.; ID.; DOCTRINE OF INCORPORATION; WHEN APPLIED; CASE AT BAR.
Under the doctrine of incorporation, rules of international law form part of the law of
the land and no further legislative action is needed to make such rules applicable in the
domestic sphere (Salonga & Yap, Public International Law, 1992 ed., p. 12). The doctrine
of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals (or local courts) are confronted
with situations in which there appears to be a conflict between a rule of international law
and the provisions of the constitution or statute of the local state. Efforts should first be
exerted to harmonize them, so as to give effect to both since it is to be presumed that

municipal law was enacted with proper regard for the generally accepted principles of
international law in observance of the Incorporation Clause in the above-cited
constitutional provision (Cruz, Philippine Political Law, 1996 ed., p. 55). In a situation,
however, where the conflict is irreconcilable and a choice has to be made between a rule
of international law and municipal law, jurisprudence dictates that municipal law should
be upheld by the municipal courts (Ichong vs. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155 [1957];
Gonzales vs. Hechanova, 9 SCRA 230 [1963]; In re: Garcia, 2 SCRA 984 [1961]) for the
reason that such courts are organs of municipal law and are accordingly bound by it in all
circumstances (Salonga & Yap, op. cit., p. 13).
16. ID.; ID.; ID.; NO PRIMACY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW OVER NATIONAL OR
MUNICIPAL LAW. The fact that international law has been made part of the law of
the land does not pertain to or imply the primacy of international law over national or
municipal law in the municipal sphere. The doctrine of incorporation, as applied in most
countries, decrees that rules of international law are given equal standing with, but are not
superior to, national legislative enactments. Accordingly, the principle lex posterior
derogat priori takes effect a treaty may repeal a statute and a statute may repeal a
treaty. In states where the constitution is the highest law of the land, such as the Republic
of the Philippines, both statutes and treaties may be invalidated if they are in conflict with
the constitution (Ibid.).
17. ID.; EXTRADITION TREATY; DOES NOT PRECLUDE APPLICATION OF DUE
PROCESS. In the absence of a law or principle of law, we must apply the rules of fair
play. An application of the basic twin due process rights of notice and hearing will not go
against the treaty or the implementing law. Neither the Treaty nor the Extradition Law
precludes these rights from a prospective extradites. Similarly, American jurisprudence
and procedures on extradition pose no proscription. In fact, in interstate extradition
proceedings as explained above, the prospective extraditee may even request for copies
of the extradition documents from the governor of the asylum state, and if he does, his
right to be supplied the same becomes a demandable right (35 C.J.S. 410).
18. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; ESSENCE OF DUE PROCESS IN ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEEDINGS. The basic principles of administrative law instruct us that "the
essence of due process in administrative proceedings is an opportunity to explain one's
side or an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the actions or ruling complained of
(Mirano vs. NLRC, 270 SCRA 96 [1997]; Padilla vs. NLRC, 273 SCRA 457 [1997];
PLDT vs. NLRC, 276 SCRA 1 [1997]; Helpmate, Inc. vs. NLRC, 276 SCRA 315 [1997];
Aquinas School vs. Magnaye, 278 SCRA 602 [1997]; Jamer vs. NLRC, 278 SCRA 632
[1997]). In essence, procedural due process refers to the method or manner by which the
law is enforced (Corona vs. United Harbor Pilots Association of the Phils., 283 SCRA 31
[1997]). This Court will not tolerate the least disregard of constitutional guarantees in the
enforcement of a law or treaty. Petitioner's fears that the Requesting State may have valid

objections to the Requested State's non-performance of its commitments under the

Extradition Treaty are insubstantial and should not be given paramount consideration.
19. REMEDIAL LAW; SUPREME COURT; EQUITY JURISDICTION; AVAILED OF
ONLY IN ABSENCE OF, AND NEVER AGAINST, STATUTORY LAW OR
JUDICIAL PRONOUNCEMENTS. We have ruled time and again that this Court's
equity jurisdiction, which is aptly described as "justice outside legality," may be availed
of only in the absence of, and never against, statutory law or judicial pronouncements
(Smith Bell & Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 267 SCRA 530 [1997]; David-Chan vs.
Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA 677 [1997]). The constitutional issue in the case at bar does
not even call for "justice outside legality," since private respondent's due process rights,
although not guaranteed by statute or by treaty, are protected by constitutional
guarantees. We would not be true to the organic law of the land if we choose strict
construction over guarantees against the deprivation of liberty. That would not be in
keeping with the principles of democracy on which our Constitution is premised.
KAPUNAN, J., separate concurring opinion:
1. REMEDIAL LAW; SUPREME COURT; DOES NOT EXERCISE JURISDICTION
OVER CASES WHICH ARE MOOT AND ACADEMIC. Since, as alleged in the
petition, a copy of the TRO was served on respondents below on August 10, 1999, the
TRO ceased to be effective on August 30, 1999; consequently, the instant petition has
become moot and academic. This Court does not exercise jurisdiction over cases which
are moot and academic or those not ripe for judicial consideration.
2. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; DUE PROCESS; PERSON
SUBJECT OF EXTRADITION PROCEEDINGS ENTITLED TO HAVE ACCESS
AND CONTROVERT EVIDENCE AGAINST HIM. While the evaluation process
conducted by the Department of Justice is not exactly a preliminary investigation of
criminal cases, it is akin to a preliminary investigation because it involves the basic
constitutional rights of the person sought to be extradited. A person ordered extradited is
arrested, forcibly taken from his house, separated from his family and delivered to a
foreign state. His rights of abode, to privacy, liberty and pursuit of happiness are taken
away from him a fate as harsh and cruel as a conviction of a criminal offense. For this
reason, he is entitled to have access to the evidence against him and the right to
controvert them. With respect to petitioner's claim that private respondent has no right to
demand access to the documents relating to the request for extradition, suffice it to say,
that any document used in a proceeding that would jeopardize a person's constitutional
rights is matter of public concern. As Martin Luther King said, "injustice anywhere is a
threat to justice everywhere," so any violation of one's rights guaranteed by the Bill of
Rights is everybody's concern because they, one way or another, directly or indirectly,
affect the rights of life and liberty of all the citizens as a whole.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; RIGHT THERETO, UNIVERSAL BASIC RIGHT. While the
extradition treaty and P.D. 1069 do not provide for a preliminary investigation, neither
does either prohibit it. The right to due process is a universal basic right which is deemed
written into our laws and treaties with foreign countries.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; APPLICABLE TO EXTRADITION PROCEEDINGS. Due process
rights in a preliminary investigation is now an established principle. The respondent has a
right of access to all of the evidence. He has the right to submit controverting evidence.
The prosecuting official who conducts the preliminary investigation is required to be
neutral, objective, and impartial in resolving the issue of probable cause. I see no reason
why the same rights may not be accorded a person sought to be extradited at the stage
where the Department of Justice evaluates whether a petition for extradition would be
filed before a regional trial court. If denied such rights, not only denial of due process
rights but of equal protection may be raised.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; NOTICE AND HEARING; MUST BE GRANTED AT TIME
DEPRIVATION CAN STILL BE PREVENTED. But why must he wait until the
petition for extradition is filed? As succinctly expressed, if the right to notice and hearing
is to serve its full purpose, then, it is clear that it must be granted at a time when the
deprivation can still be prevented. Like the filing of an information in a criminal case, the
mere filing of a petition for extradition causes immediate impairment of the liberty of the
person sought to be extradited and a substantial curtailment of other rights. His arrest
may be immediately ordered by the regional trial court. He would be compelled to face
an open and public trial. He will be constrained to seek the assistance of counsel and
incur other expenses of litigation. The public eye would be directed at him with all the
concomitant intrusions to his right to privacy. Where the liberty of a person is at risk, and
extradition strikes at the very core of liberty, invocation of due process rights can never
be too early.
QUISUMBING, J., concurring opinion:
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHTS OF ACCUSED; TAKES
PRECEDENCE OVER TREATY RIGHTS CLAIMED BY CONTRACTING STATE.
The human rights of a person, whether citizen or alien, and the rights of the accused
guaranteed in our Constitution should take precedence over treaty rights claimed by a
contracting state. Stated otherwise, the constitutionally mandated duties of our
government to the individual deserve preferential consideration when they collide with its
treaty obligations to the government of another state. This is so although we recognize
treaties as a source of binding obligations under generally accepted principles of
international law incorporated in our Constitution as part of the law of the land.

2. ID.; EXTRADITION TREATY; CANNOT BE UTILIZED FOR POLITICAL

OFFENSES OR POLITICALLY MOTIVATED CHARGES. That private respondent
is a Filipino citizen is not decisive of the issue here, although it is obviously pertinent.
Even if he were a resident alien (other than American perhaps), he is, in my view, entitled
to our full protection against the hazards of extradition (or deportation, similarly) from
the very start. More so because, looking at the facts adduced at the hearing and on the
record of this case, the charges against him involve or are co-mingled with, if not rooted
in, certain offenses of a political nature or motivation such as the ones involving alleged
financial contributions to a major American political party. If so, long established is the
principle that extradition could not be utilized for political offenses or politically
motivated charges.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., concurring opinion:
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; EXTRADITION TREATY; PERSON PRESUMED
INNOCENT AND NOT COVERED BY SANCTIONS UNTIL PROVED TO BE
SUBJECT OF EXTRADITION. Until proved to be a valid subject for extradition, a
person is presumed innocent or not covered by the sanctions of either criminal law or
international treaty. At any stage where a still prospective extraditee only seeks to know
so that he can prepare and prove that he should not be extradited, there should be no
conflict over the extension to him of constitutional protections guaranteed to aliens and
citizens alike.
2. ID.; ID.; SILENCE IN TREATY OVER CITIZEN'S RIGHT DURING
EVALUATION STAGE DOES NOT NECESSARILY EXCLUDE RIGHT TO
PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION OR INVESTIGATION. Petitioner cites as a
reason for the denial of respondent's requests, Article 7 of the Treaty. Article 7
enumerates the required documents and establishes the procedures under which the
documents shall be submitted and admitted as evidence. There is no specific provision on
how the Secretary of Foreign Affairs should conduct his evaluation. The Secretary of
Justice is not even in the picture at this stage. Under petitioner's theory, silence in the
treaty over a citizen's rights during the evaluation stage is interpreted as deliberate
exclusion by the contracting states of the right to know. Silence is interpreted as the
exclusion of the right to a preliminary examination or preliminary investigation provided
by the laws of either one of the two states. The right to be informed of charges which
may lead to court proceedings and result in a deprivation of liberty is ordinarily routine. It
is readily available to one against whom the state's coercive power has already been
focused. I fail to see how silence can be interpreted as exclusion. The treaty is silent
because at this stage, the preliminary procedure is still an internal matter. And when a
law or treaty is silent, it means a right or privilege may be granted. It is not the other way
around.

3. ID.; ID.; PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION, PURPOSE. Paraphrasing Hashim vs.

Boncan, 71 Phil. 216; Trocio vs. Manta, 118 SCRA 241 (1941); and Salonga vs. Hon.
Pao, 134 SCRA 438 (1985), the purpose of a preliminary evaluation is to secure an
innocent person against hasty, faulty and, therefore, oppressive proceedings; to protect
him from an open and extensively publicized accusation of crimes; to spare him the
trouble, expense, and anxiety of a public trial; and also to protect the state from useless
and expensive trials. Even if the purpose is only to determine whether or not the
respondent is a proper subject for extradition, he is nonetheless entitled to the guarantees
of fairness and freedom accorded to those charged with ordinary crimes in the
Philippines.
4. ID.; BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHT TO BE INFORMED; CONSTRUED. The right to
be informed is related to the constitutional right to a speedy trial. The constitutional
guarantee extends to the speedy disposition of cases before all quasi-judicial and
administrative bodies (Constitution, Art. III, Sec. 16). Speedy disposition, however, does
not mean the deliberate exclusion of the defendant or respondent from the proceedings.
As this Court ruled in Acebedo vs. Sarmiento, 36 SCRA 247 (1970), "the right to a
speedy trial, means one free from vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays, its salutary
objective being to assure that an innocent person may be free from the anxiety and
expense of a court litigation or, if otherwise, of having his guilt (in this case, his being
extradited) determined within the shortest possible time compatible with the presentation
and consideration of whatsoever legitimate defense he may interpose."
VITUG, J., separate opinion:
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; EXTRADITION TREATY; EXTRADITEE ENTITLED
TO COPIES OF PERTINENT DOCUMENTS WHILE APPLICATION FOR
EXTRADITION IS BEING EVALUATED. The only real issue before the Court is
whether or not private respondent can validly ask for copies of pertinent documents while
the application for extradition against him is still undergoing process by the Executive
Department. There is, I agree with the majority, a right of access to such extradition
documents conformably with the provisions of Article III, Section 7, of the Philippine
Constitution. The constitutional right to free access to information of public concern is
circumscribed only by the fact that the desired information is not among the species
exempted by law from the operation of the constitutional guaranty and that the exercise
of the right conforms with such reasonable conditions as may be prescribed by law.
2. ID.; BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHT TO FREE ACCESS TO INFORMATION ON
MATTERS OF PUBLIC CONCERN; "PUBLIC CONCERN," CONSTRUED. There
is no hornbook rule to determine whether or not an information is of public concern. The
term "public concern" eludes exactitude, and it can easily embrace a broad spectrum of
matters which the public may want to know either because the subject thereof can affect
their lives or simply because it arouses concern.

3. ID.; ID.; DUE PROCESS; CONSTRUED. The constitutional right to due process
secures to everyone an opportunity to be heard, presupposing foreknowledge of what he
may be up against, and to submit any evidence that he may wish to proffer in an effort to
clear himself. Like "public concern," the term due process does not admit of any
restrictive definition. Justice Frankfurter has viewed this flexible concept, as being "a
compounded by history, reason, the past course of decisions, and stout confidence in the
democratic faith." The framers of our own Constitution, it would seem, have deliberately
intended to make it malleable to the ever-changing milieu of society. Hitherto, it is
dynamic and resilient adaptable to every situation calling for its applications that makes it
appropriate to accept an enlarged concept of the term as and when there is a possibility
that the right of an individual to life, liberty and property might be diffused. Verily,
whenever there is an imminent threat to the life, liberty or property of any person in any
proceeding conducted by or under the auspices of the State, his right to due process of
law, when demanded, must not be ignored.

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; CLASSIFICATIONS. This right is two-pronged substantive and

procedural due process founded, in the first instance, on Constitutional or statutory
provisions, and in the second instance, on accepted rules of procedures. Substantive due
process looks into the extrinsic and intrinsic validity of the law that figures to interfere
with the right of a person to his life, liberty and property. Procedural due process the
more litigated of the two focuses on the rules that are established in order to ensure
meaningful adjudication in the enforcement and implementation of the law.
PUNO, J., dissenting opinion:
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; EXTRADITION TREATY; EXTRADITION,
CONCEPT. Extradition is well-defined concept and is more a problem in international
law. It is the "process by which persons charged with or convicted of crime against the
law of a State and found in a foreign State are returned by the latter to the former for trial
or punishment. It applies to those who are merely charged with an offense but have not
been brought to trial; to those who have been tried and convicted and have subsequently
escaped from custody; and those who have been convicted in absentia. It does not apply
to persons merely suspected of having committed an offense but against whom no
charges has been laid or to a person whose presence is desired as a witness or for
obtaining or enforcing a civil judgment."
2. ID.; ID.; TREATY-MAKING POWER BELONGS TO EXECUTIVE AND
LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENTS. In our constitutional scheme, the making of a
treaty belongs to the executive and legislative departments of our government. Between
these two departments, the executive has a greater say in the making of a treaty. Under
Section 21, Article VII of our Constitution, the President has the sole power to negotiate

treaties and international agreements although to be effective, they must be concurred in

by at least two thirds of all the members of the Senate.
3. ID.; PRESIDENT; TRADITIONALLY ACCORDED WIDER DEGREE OF
DISCRETION IN CONDUCT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS. The presidential role in a
foreign affairs is dominant and the President is traditionally accorded a wider degree of
discretion in the conduct of foreign affairs. The regularity, nay, validity of his actions are
adjudged under less stringent standards, lest their judicial repudiation lead to breach of
an international obligation, rupture of state relations, forfeiture of confidence, national
embarrassment and a plethora of other problems with equally undesirable consequences.
4. ID.; EXTRADITION TREATY; EXTRADITION PROCEEDINGS, NOT
CRIMINAL; CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF ACCUSED CANNOT BE INVOKED
BY EXTRADITEE. An extradition proceeding is sui generis. It is, thus, futile to
determine what it is. What is certain is that it is not a criminal proceeding where there is
an accused who can claim the entire array of rights guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. Let
it be stressed that in an extradition proceeding, there is no accused and the guilt or
innocence of the extraditee will not be passed upon by our executive officials nor by the
extradition judge. Hence, constitutional rights that are only relevant to determine the guilt
or innocence of an accused cannot be invoked by an extraditee.
5. ID.; ID.; EXTRADITION PROCEEDINGS DIFFERENT FROM CRIMINAL
PROCEEDINGS. Indeed, an extradition proceeding is summary in nature which is
untrue of criminal proceedings. Even the rules of evidence are different in an extradition
proceeding. Admission of evidence is less stringent, again because the guilt of the
extraditee is not under litigation. It is not only the quality but even the quantum of
evidence in extradition proceeding is different. In a criminal case, an accused can only be
convicted by proof beyond reasonable doubt. In an extradition proceeding, an extraditee
can be ordered extradited "upon showing of the existence of a prima facie case."
6. ID.; ID.; EXTRADITION DECISION DIFFERENT FROM JUDICIAL DECISION.
The nature of an extradition decision is different from a judicial decision whose
finality cannot be changed by executive fiat. Our courts may hold an individual
extraditable but the ultimate decision to extradite the individual lies in the hands of the
Executive. Section 3, Article 3 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty specifically provides that
"extradition shall not be granted if the executive authority of the Requested State
determines that the request was politically motivated, or that the offense is a military
offense which is not punishable under non-military penal legislation." In the United
States, the Secretary of State exercises this ultimate power and is conceded considerable
discretion. He balances the equities of the case and the demands of the nation's foreign
relations. In sum, he is not straitjacketed by strict legal considerations like an ordinary
court.

7. ID.; ID.; ISSUE ON PROVISIONAL ARREST RENDERED MOOT BY FILING OF

REQUEST FOR EXTRADITION. The issue of whether respondent Jimenez will be
provisionally arrested is now moot. Under Section 1 of Article 9 of the RP-US
Extradition Treaty, in relation to Section 20(a) of PD No. 1069, the general principle is
enunciated that a request for provisional arrest must be made pending receipt of the
request for extradition. By filing the request for extradition, the US authorities have
implicitly decided not to move for respondent's provisional arrest. But more important, a
request for respondent's arrest does not mean he will be the victim of an arbitrary arrest.
He will be given due process before he can be arrested.
8. ID.; ID.; REQUEST FOR PROVISIONAL ARREST; GRANT THEREOF, NOT
MINISTERIAL. The due process protection of the private respondent against
arbitrary arrest is written in cyrillic letters in Article 9 of the treaty and Section 20 of
P.D. No. 1069. It is self-evident under these provisions that a request for provisional
arrest does not mean it will be granted ipso facto. The request must comply with certain
requirements. It must be based on an "urgent" factor. This is subject to verification and
evaluation by our executive authorities. The request can be denied if not based on a real
exigency or if the supporting documents are insufficient. The protection of the respondent
against arbitrary provisional arrest does not stop on the administrative level. For even if
the Director of the National Bureau of Investigation agrees with the request for the
provisional arrest of the respondent, still he has to apply for a judicial warrant from the
"presiding judge of the Court of First Instance (now RTC) of the province or city having
jurisdiction of the place. . . . ." It is a judge who will issue a warrant for the provisional
arrest of the respondent. The judge has to comply with Section 2, Article III of the
Constitution which provides that "no . . . warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the . . . persons or things to be seized." The message that leaps to the eye is
that compliance with this requirement precludes any arbitrary arrest.
9. ID.; ID.; DENIAL OF REQUEST TO BE FURNISHED DOCUMENTS DURING
EVALUATION STAGE, NOT A DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS. Denying
respondent's constitutional claim to be furnished all documents relating to the request for
his extradition by the US authorities during their evaluation stage will not subvert his
right to fundamental fairness. It should be stressed that this is not a case where the
respondent will not be given an opportunity to know the basis of the request for his
extradition. In truth, and contrary to the impression of the majority, P.D. No. 1069 fixes
the specific time when he will be given the papers constituting the basis for his
extradition. The time is when he is summoned by the extradition court and required to
answer the petition for extradition. Upon receipt of the summons and the petition,
respondent is free to foist all defenses available to him. Such an opportunity does not
deny him fairness which is the essence of due process of law.

PANGANIBAN, J., dissenting opinion:

1. CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW;
EXTRADITION
TREATY;
STAGES
IN
EXTRADITION PROCEEDINGS. There are essentially two stages in extradition
proceedings: (1) the preliminary evaluation stage, whereby the executive authority of the
requested state ascertains whether the extradition request is supported by the documents
and information required under the Extradition Treaty; and (2) the extradition hearing,
whereby the petition for extradition is heard before a court of justice, which determines
whether the accused should be extradited.
2. ID.; ID.; PERSON SUBJECT OF EXTRADITION, DURING EVALUATION
STAGE, NOT ENTITLED TO COPIES OF PERTINENT DOCUMENTS. The
instant petition refers only to the first stage. Private respondent claims that he has a right
to be notified and to be heard at this early stage. However, even the ponencia admits that
neither the RP-US Extradition Treaty nor PD 1069 (the Philippine Extradition Law)
expressly requires the Philippine government, upon receipt of the request for extradition,
to give copies thereof and its supporting documents to the prospective extraditee, much
less to give him an opportunity to be heard prior to the filing of the petition in court.
3. ID.; ID.; RP-US TREATY; OCCASIONS WHERE PROSPECTIVE EXTRADITEE
MAY BE DEPRIVED OF LIBERTY. There are two occasions wherein the
prospective extraditee may be deprived of liberty: (1) in case of a provisional arrest
pending the submission of the extradition request and (2) his temporary arrest during the
pendency of the extradition petition in court.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; PROVISIONAL ARREST; REQUISITES. Article 9 on provisional
arrest is not automatically operative at all times, and its enforcement does not depend
solely on the discretion of the requested state. From the wordings of the provision itself,
there are at least three requisites: (1) there must be an urgency, and (2) there is a
corresponding request (3) which must be made prior to the presentation of the request for
extradition.

5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ABSENCE OF REQUEST IN CASE AT BAR. In the instant
case, there appears to be no urgency characterizing the nature of the extradition of private
respondent. Petitioner does not claim any such urgency. There is no request from the
United States for the provisional arrest of Mark Jimenez either. And the secretary of
justice stated during the Oral Argument that he had no intention of applying for the
provisional arrest of private respondent. Finally, the formal request for extradition has
already been made; therefore, provisional arrest is not likely, as it should really come
before the extradition request. Under the outlined facts of this case, there is no open door
for the application of Article 9, contrary to the apprehension of private respondent. In

other words, there is no actual danger that Jimenez will be provisionally arrested or
deprived of his liberty. There is as yet no threat that his rights would be trampled upon,
pending the filing in court of the petition for his extradition. Hence, there is no substantial
gain to be achieved in requiring the foreign affairs (or justice) secretary to notify and hear
him during the preliminary stage, which basically involves only the exercise of the
ministerial power of checking the sufficiency of the documents attached to the extradition
request.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; EXECUTIVE AUTHORITY, WITHOUT POWER TO DETERMINE
SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH PROBABLE CAUSE. It must be
borne in mind that during the preliminary stage, the foreign affairs secretary's
determination of whether the offense charged is extraditable or politically motivated is
merely preliminary. The same issue will be resolved by the trial court. Moreover, it is
also the power and the duty of the court, not the executive authority, to determine
whether there is sufficient evidence to establish probable cause that the extraditee
committed the crimes charged. The sufficiency of the evidence of criminality is to be
determined based on the laws of the requested state. Private Respondent Jimenez will,
therefore, definitely have his full opportunity before the court, in case an extradition
petition will indeed be filed, to be heard on all issues including the sufficiency of the
documents supporting the extradition request.
7. REMEDIAL LAW; SUPREME COURT; DOES NOT DECLARE JUDGMENTS OR
GRANT RELIEFS BASED ON SPECULATIONS. Private respondent insists that the
United States may still request his provisional arrest at any time. That is purely
speculative. It is elementary that this Court does not declare judgments or grant reliefs
based on speculations, surmises or conjectures.
8. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; TREATIES; CONTRACTING PARTIES PRESUMED
TO PERFORM OBLIGATIONS WITH UBERRIMAE FIDEI. The right of one state
to demand from another the return of an alleged fugitive from justice and the correlative
duty to surrender the fugitive to the demanding country exist only when created by a
treaty between the two countries. International law does not require the voluntary
surrender of a fugitive to a foreign government, absent any treaty stipulation requiring it.
When such a treaty does exist, as between the Philippines and the United States, it must
be presumed that the contracting states perform their obligations under it with uberrimae
fedei, treaty obligations being essentially characterized internationally by comity and
mutual respect.

DECISION

MELO, J :
p

The individual citizen is but a speck of particle or molecule vis-a-vis the vast and
overwhelming powers of government. His only guarantee against oppression and tyranny
are his fundamental liberties under the Bill of Rights which shield him in times of need.
The Court is now called to decide whether to uphold a citizen's basic due process rights,
or the government's ironclad duties under a treaty. The bugle sounds and this Court must
once again act as the faithful guardian of the fundamental writ.
The petition at our doorstep is cast against the following factual backdrop:
On January 13, 1977, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree No.
1069 "Prescribing the Procedure for the Extradition of Persons Who Have Committed
Crimes in a Foreign Country." The Decree is founded on: the doctrine of incorporation
under the Constitution; the mutual concern for the suppression of crime both in the state
where it was committed and the state where the criminal may have escaped; the
extradition treaty with the Republic of Indonesia and the intention of the Philippines to
enter into similar treaties with other interested countries; and the need for rules to guide
the executive department and the courts in the proper implementation of said treaties.
cdrep

On November 13, 1994, then Secretary of Justice Franklin M. Drilon, representing the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines, signed in Manila the "Extradition Treaty
Between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Government of the
United States of America" (hereinafter referred to as the RP-US Extradition Treaty). The
Senate, by way of Resolution No. 11, expressed its concurrence in the ratification of said
treaty. It also expressed its concurrence in the Diplomatic Notes correcting Paragraph
(5)(a), Article 7 thereof (on the admissibility of the documents accompanying an
extradition request upon certification by the principal diplomatic or consular officer of
the requested state resident in the Requesting State).
On June 18, 1999, the Department of Justice received from the Department of Foreign
Affairs U.S. Note Verbale No. 0522 containing a request for the extradition of private
respondent Mark Jimenez to the United States. Attached to the Note Verbale were the
Grand Jury Indictment, the warrant of arrest issued by the U.S. District Court, Southern
District of Florida, and other supporting documents for said extradition. Based on the
papers submitted, private respondent appears to be charged in the United States with
violation of the following provisions of the United States Code (USC):
A) 18 USC 371 (Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the United States;
two [2] counts; Maximum Penalty 5 years on each count);
B) 26 USC 7201 (Attempt to evade or defeat tax; four [4] counts; Maximum
Penalty 5 years on each count);
C) 18 USC 1343 (Fraud by wire, radio, or television; two [2] counts; Maximum
Penalty 5 years on each count);

D) 18 USC 1001 (False statement or entries; six [6] counts; Maximum Penalty
5 years on each count);
LLjur

E) 2 USC 441f (Election contributions in name of another; thirty-three [33]

counts; Maximum Penalty less than one year).
(p. 14, Rollo.)

On the same day, petitioner issued Department Order No. 249 designating and
authorizing a panel of attorneys to take charge of and to handle the case pursuant to
Section 5(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1069. Accordingly, the panel began with the
"technical evaluation and assessment" of the extradition request and the documents in
support thereof. The panel found that the "official English translation of some documents
in Spanish were not attached to the request and that there are some other matters that
needed to be addressed" (p. 15, Rollo).
Pending evaluation of the aforestated extradition documents, private respondent, through
counsel, wrote a letter dated July 1, 1999 addressed to petitioner requesting copies of the
official extradition request from the U.S. Government, as well as all documents and
papers submitted therewith; and that he be given ample time to comment on the request
after he shall have received copies of the requested papers. Private respondent also
requested that the proceedings on the matter be held in abeyance in the meantime.
Later, private respondent requested that preliminarily, he be given at least a copy of, or
access to, the request of the United States Government, and after receiving a copy of the
Diplomatic Note, a period of time to amplify on his request.
In response to private respondent's July 1, 1999 letter, petitioner, in a reply-letter dated
July 13, 1999 (but received by private respondent only on August 4, 1999), denied the
foregoing requests for the following reasons:
1. We find it premature to furnish you with copies of the extradition request and
supporting documents from the United States Government, pending evaluation
by this Department of the sufficiency of the extradition documents submitted in
accordance with the provisions of the extradition treaty and our extradition law.
Article 7 of the Extradition Treaty between the Philippines and the United
States enumerates the documentary requirements and establishes the procedures
under which the documents submitted shall be received and admitted as
evidence. Evidentiary requirements under our domestic law are also set forth in
Section 4 of P.D. No. 1069.
Evaluation by this Department of the aforementioned documents is not a
preliminary investigation nor akin to preliminary investigation of criminal
cases. We merely determine whether the procedures and requirements under the
relevant law and treaty have been complied with by the Requesting

Government. The constitutionally guaranteed rights of the accused in all

criminal prosecutions are therefore not available.
It is only after the filing of the petition for extradition when the person sought to
be extradited will be furnished by the court with copies of the petition, request
and extradition documents and this Department will not pose any objection to a
request for ample time to evaluate said documents.
2. The formal request for extradition of the United States contains grand jury
information and documents obtained through grand jury process covered by
strict secrecy rules under United States law. The United States had to secure
orders from the concerned District Courts authorizing the United States to
disclose certain grand jury information to Philippine government and law
enforcement personnel for the purpose of extradition of Mr. Jimenez. Any
further disclosure of the said information is not authorized by the United States
District Courts. In this particular extradition request the United States
Government requested the Philippine Government to prevent unauthorized
disclosure of the subject information. This Department's denial of your request
is consistent with Article 7 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty which provides that
the Philippine Government must represent the interests of the United States in
any proceedings arising out of a request for extradition. The Department of
Justice under P.D. No. 1069 is the counsel of the foreign governments in all
extradition requests.

3. This Department is not in a position to hold in abeyance proceedings in

connection with an extradition request. Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties, to which we are a party provides that "[E]very treaty in
force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good
faith." Extradition is a tool of criminal law enforcement and to be effective,
requests for extradition or surrender of accused or convicted persons must be
processed expeditiously.
(pp. 77-78, Rollo.)

Such was the state of affairs when, on August 6, 1999, private respondent filed with the
Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region a petition against the
Secretary of Justice, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and the Director of the National
Bureau of Investigation, for mandamus (to compel herein petitioner to furnish private
respondent the extradition documents, to give him access thereto, and to afford him an
opportunity to comment on, or oppose, the extradition request, and thereafter to evaluate
the request impartially, fairly and objectively); certiorari (to set aside herein petitioner's
letter dated July 13, 1999); and prohibition (to restrain petitioner from considering the
extradition request and from filing an extradition petition in court; and to enjoin the
Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the Director of the NBI from performing any act

directed to the extradition of private respondent to the United States), with an application
for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction (pp.
104-105, Rollo).
prcd

The aforementioned petition was docketed as Civil Case No. 99-94684 and thereafter
raffled to Branch 25 of said regional trial court stationed in Manila which is presided over
by the Honorable Ralph C. Lantion.
After due notice to the parties, the case was heard on August 9, 1999. Petitioner, who
appeared in his own behalf, moved that he be given ample time to file a memorandum,
but the same was denied.
On August 10, 1999, respondent judge issued an order dated the previous day, disposing:
WHEREFORE, this Court hereby Orders the respondents, namely: the Secretary
of Justice, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the Director of the National
Bureau of Investigation, their agents and/or representatives to maintain the
status quo by refraining from committing the acts complained of; from
conducting further proceedings in connection with the request of the United
States Government for the extradition of the petitioner; from filing the
corresponding Petition with a Regional Trial court; and from performing any act
directed to the extradition of the petitioner to the United States, for a period of
twenty (20) days from service on respondents of this Order, pursuant to Section
5, Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Court.
The hearing as to whether or not this Court shall issue the preliminary
injunction, as agreed upon by the counsels for the parties herein, is set on
August 17, 1999 at 9:00 o'clock in the morning. The respondents are, likewise,
ordered to file their written comment and/or opposition to the issuance of a
Preliminary Injunction on or before said date.
SO ORDERED.
(pp. 110-111, Rollo.)

Forthwith, petitioner initiated the instant proceedings, arguing that:

PUBLIC RESPONDENT ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN ISSUING
THE TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER BECAUSE:
I.

BY ORDERING HEREIN PETITIONER TO REFRAIN FROM

COMMITTING THE ACTS COMPLAINED OF, I. E., TO DESIST FROM
REFUSING PRIVATE RESPONDENT ACCESS TO THE OFFICIAL
EXTRADITION REQUEST AND DOCUMENTS AND FROM DENYING
PRIVATE RESPONDENT AN OPPORTUNITY TO FILE A COMMENT ON,
OR OPPOSITION TO, THE REQUEST, THE MAIN PRAYER FOR A WRIT
OF MANDAMUS IN THE PETITION FOR MANDAMUS, CERTIORARI AND
PROHIBITION WAS, IN EFFECT, GRANTED SO AS TO CONSTITUTE
AN ADJUDICATION ON THE MERITS OF THE MANDAMUS ISSUES;
II.
PETITIONER
WAS
UNQUALIFIEDLY
PREVENTED
FROM
PERFORMING LEGAL DUTIES UNDER THE EXTRADITION TREATY
AND THE PHILIPPINE EXTRADITION LAW;
III.
THE PETITION FOR (MANDAMUS), CERTIORARI AND PROHIBITION IS,
ON ITS FACE, FORMALLY AND SUBSTANTIALLY DEFICIENT; AND
IV.
PRIVATE RESPONDENT HAS NO RIGHT IN ESSE THAT NEEDS
PROTECTION AND ENFORCEMENT, AND WILL NOT SUFFER ANY
IRREPARABLE INJURY.
(pp. 19-20, Rollo.)

On August 17, 1999, the Court required private respondent to file his comment. Also
issued, as prayed for, was a temporary restraining order (TRO) providing:
NOW, THEREFORE, effective immediately and continuing until further orders
from this Court, You, Respondent Judge Ralph C. Lantion, your agents,
representatives or any person or persons acting in your place or stead are hereby
ORDERED to CEASE and DESIST from enforcing the assailed order dated
August 9, 1999 issued by public respondent in Civil Case No. 99-94684.

GIVEN by the Honorable HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR., Chief Justice, Supreme Court of
the Philippines, this 17th day of August 1999.
(pp. 120-121, Rollo.)

The case was heard on oral argument on August 31, 1999, after which the parties, as
directed, filed their respective memoranda.

From the pleadings of the opposing parties, both procedural and substantive issues are
patent. However, a review of these issues as well as the extensive arguments of both
parties, compel us to delineate the focal point raised by the pleadings: During the
evaluation stage of the extradition proceedings, is private respondent entitled to the two
basic due process rights of notice and hearing? An affirmative answer would necessarily
render the proceedings at the trial court, moot and academic (the issues of which are
substantially the same as those before us now), while a negative resolution would call for
the immediate lifting of the TRO issued by this Court dated August 24, 1999, thus
allowing petitioner to fast-track the process leading to the filing of the extradition petition
with the proper regional trial court. Corollarily, in the event that private respondent is
adjudged entitled to basic due process rights at the evaluation stage of the extradition
proceedings, would this entitlement constitute a breach of the legal commitments and
obligations of the Philippine Government under the RP-US Extradition Treaty? And
assuming that the result would indeed be a breach, is there any conflict between private
respondent's basic due process rights and the provisions of the RP-US Extradition
Treaty?
The issues having transcendental importance, the Court has elected to go directly into the
substantive merits of the case, brushing aside peripheral procedural matters which
concern the proceedings in Civil Case No. 99-94684, particularly the propriety of the
filing of the petition therein, and of the issuance of the TRO of August 17, 1999 by the
trial court.
To be sure, the issues call for a review of the extradition procedure. The RP-US
Extradition Treaty which was executed only on November 13, 1994, ushered into force
the implementing provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1069, also called as the
Philippine Extradition Law. Section 2(a) thereof defines extradition as "the removal of an
accused from the Philippines with the object of placing him at the disposal of foreign
authorities to enable the requesting state or government to hold him in connection with
any criminal investigation directed against him or the execution of a penalty imposed on
him under the penal or criminal law of the requesting state or government." The portions
of the Decree relevant to the instant case which involves a charged and not convicted
individual, are abstracted as follows:
The Extradition Request
The request is made by the Foreign Diplomat of the Requesting State, addressed to the
Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and shall be accompanied by:
1. The original or an authentic copy of the criminal charge and the warrant of
arrest issued by the authority of the Requesting State having jurisdiction over
the matter, or some other instruments having equivalent legal force;

2. A recital of the acts for which extradition is requested, with the fullest
particulars as to the name and identity of the accused, his whereabouts in the
Philippines, if known, the acts or omissions complained of, and the time and
place of the commission of these acts;
3. The text of the applicable law or a statement of the contents of said law, and
the designation or description of the offense by the law, sufficient for evaluation
of the request; and
4. Such other documents or information in support of the request.
(Section 4, Presidential Decree No. 1069.)

Section 5 of the Presidential Decree, which sets forth the duty of the Secretary of Foreign
Affairs, pertinently provides:
. . . (1) Unless it appears to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs that the request fails
to meet the requirements of this law and the relevant treaty or convention, he
shall forward the request together with the related documents to the Secretary of
Justice, who shall immediately designate and authorize an attorney in his office
to take charge of the case.

The above provision shows only too clearly that the executive authority given the task of
evaluating the sufficiency of the request and the supporting documents is the Secretary of
Foreign Affairs. What then is the coverage of this task?
In accordance with Paragraphs 2 and 3, Article 7 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty, the
executive authority must ascertain whether or not the request is supported by:
1. Documents, statements, or other types of information which describe the
identity and probable location of the person sought;
2. A statement of the facts of the offense and the procedural history of the case;
3. A statement of the provisions of the law describing the essential elements of
the offense for which extradition is requested;
4. A statement of the provisions of law describing the punishment for the
offense;
5. A statement of the provisions of the law describing any time limit on the
prosecution or the execution of punishment for the offense;

6. Documents, statements, or other types of information specified in paragraph 3

or paragraph 4 of said Article, as applicable.
(Paragraph 2, Article 7, Presidential Decree No. 1069.)
7. Such evidence as, according to the law of the Requested State, would provide
probable cause for his arrest and committal for trial if the offense had been
committed there;
8. A copy of the warrant or order of arrest issued by a judge or other competent
authority; and
9. A copy of the charging document.
(Paragraph 3, ibid.)

The executive authority (Secretary of Foreign Affairs) must also see to it that the
accompanying documents received in support of the request had been certified by the
principal diplomatic or consular officer of the Requested State resident in the Requesting
State (Embassy Note No. 052 from U.S. Embassy; Embassy Note No. 951309 from the
Department of Foreign Affairs).
In this light, Paragraph 3, Article 3 of the Treaty provides that "[e]xtradition shall not be
granted if the executive authority of the Requested State determines that the request is
politically motivated, or that the offense is a military offense which is not punishable
under non-military penal legislation."
cdphil

The Extradition Petition

Upon a finding made by the Secretary of Foreign Affairs that the extradition request and
its supporting documents are sufficient and complete in form and substance, he shall
deliver the same to the Secretary of Justice, who shall immediately designate and
authorize an attorney in his office to take charge of the case (Paragraph [1], Section 5,
P.D. No. 1069). The lawyer designated shall then file a written petition with the proper
regional trial court of the province or city, with a prayer that the court take the extradition
request under consideration (Paragraph [2], ibid.).
The presiding judge of the regional trial court, upon receipt of the petition for extradition,
shall, as soon as practicable, issue an order summoning the prospective extraditee to
appear and to answer the petition on the day and hour fixed in the order. The judge may
issue a warrant of arrest if it appears that the immediate arrest and temporary detention of
the accused will best serve the ends of justice (Paragraph [1], Section 6, ibid.),
particularly to prevent the flight of the prospective extraditee.

The Extradition Hearing

The Extradition Law does not specifically indicate whether the extradition proceeding is
criminal, civil, or a special proceeding. Nevertheless, Paragraph [1], Section 9 thereof
provides that in the hearing of the extradition petition, the provisions of the Rules of
Court, insofar as practicable and not inconsistent with the summary nature of the
proceedings, shall apply. During the hearing, Section 8 of the Decree provides that the
attorney having charge of the case may, upon application by the Requesting State,
represent the latter throughout the proceedings.
Upon conclusion of the hearing, the court shall render a decision granting the extradition
and giving the reasons therefor upon a showing of the existence of a prima facie case, or
dismiss the petition (Section 10, ibid.). Said decision is appealable to the Court of
Appeals, whose decision shall be final and immediately executory (Section 12, ibid.). The
provisions of the Rules of Court governing appeal in criminal cases in the Court of
Appeals shall apply in the aforementioned appeal, except for the required 15-day period
to file brief (Section 13, ibid.).
The trial court determines whether or not the offense mentioned in the petition is
extraditable based on the application of the dual criminality rule and other conditions
mentioned in Article 2 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty. The trial court also determines
whether or not the offense for which extradition is requested is a political one (Paragraph
[1], Article 3, RP-US Extradition Treaty).
With the foregoing abstract of the extradition proceedings as backdrop, the following
query presents itself: What is the nature of the role of the Department of Justice at the
evaluation stage of the extradition proceedings?
A strict observance of the Extradition Law indicates that the only duty of the Secretary of
Justice is to file the extradition petition after the request and all the supporting papers are
forwarded to him by the Secretary of Foreign Affairs. It is the latter official who is
authorized to evaluate the extradition papers, to assure their sufficiency, and under
Paragraph [3], Article 3 of the Treaty, to determine whether or not the request is
politically motivated, or that the offense is a military offense which is not punishable
under non-military penal legislation. Ipso facto, as expressly provided in Paragraph [1],
Section 5 of the Extradition Law, the Secretary of Justice has the ministerial duty of filing
the extradition papers.
However, looking at the factual milieu of the case before us, it would appear that there
was failure to abide by the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1069. For while it is true
that the extradition request was delivered to the Department of Foreign Affairs on June
17, 1999, the following day or less than 24 hours later, the Department of Justice received
the request, apparently without the Department of Foreign Affairs discharging its duty of

thoroughly evaluating the same and its accompanying documents. The statement of an
assistant secretary at the Department of Foreign Affairs that his Department, in this
regard, is merely acting as a post office, for which reason he simply forwarded the
request to the Department of Justice, indicates the magnitude of the error of the
Department of Foreign Affairs in taking lightly its responsibilities. Thereafter, the
Department of Justice took it upon itself to determine the completeness of the documents
and to evaluate the same to find out whether they comply with the requirements laid
down in the Extradition Law and the RP-US Extradition Treaty. Petitioner ratiocinates in
this connection that although the Department of Justice had no obligation to evaluate the
extradition documents, the Department also had to go over them so as to be able to
prepare an extradition petition (tsn, August 31, 1999, pp. 24-25). Notably, it was also at
this stage where private respondent insisted on the following: (1) the right to be furnished
the request and the supporting papers; (2) the right to be heard which consists in having a
reasonable period of time to oppose the request, and to present evidence in support of the
opposition; and (3) that the evaluation proceedings be held in abeyance pending the filing
of private respondent's opposition to the request.
The two Departments seem to have misread the scope of their duties and authority, one
abdicating its powers and the other enlarging its commission. The Department of Foreign
Affairs, moreover, has, through the Solicitor General, filed a manifestation that it is
adopting the instant petition as its own, indirectly conveying the message that if it were to
evaluate the extradition request, it would not allow private respondent to participate in the
process of evaluation.
Plainly then, the record cannot support the presumption of regularity that the Department
of Foreign Affairs thoroughly reviewed the extradition request and supporting documents
and that it arrived at a well-founded judgment that the request and its annexed documents
satisfy the requirements of law. The Secretary of Justice, eminent as he is in the field of
law, could not privately review the papers all by himself. He had to officially constitute a
panel of attorneys. How then could the DFA Secretary or his undersecretary, in less than
one day, make the more authoritative determination?
The evaluation process, just like the extradition proceedings proper, belongs to a class by
itself. It is sui generis. It is not a criminal investigation, but it is also erroneous to say that
it is purely an exercise of ministerial functions. At such stage, the executive authority has
the power: (a) to make a technical assessment of the completeness and sufficiency of the
extradition papers; (b) to outrightly deny the request if on its face and on the face of the
supporting documents the crimes indicated are not extraditable; and (c) to make a
determination whether or not the request is politically motivated, or that the offense is a
military one which is not punishable under non-military penal legislation (tsn, August 31,
1999, pp. 28-29; Article 2 & and Paragraph [3], Article 3, RP-US Extradition Treaty).
Hence, said process may be characterized as an investigative or inquisitorial process in

contrast to a proceeding conducted in the exercise of an administrative body's quasijudicial power.

In administrative law, a quasi-judicial proceeding involves: (a) taking and evaluation of
evidence; (b) determining facts based upon the evidence presented; and (c) rendering an
order or decision supported by the facts proved (De Leon, Administrative Law: Text and
Cases, 1993 ed., p. 198, citing Morgan vs. United States, 304 U.S. 1). Inquisitorial power,
which is also known as examining or investigatory power, is one of the determinative
powers of an administrative body which better enables it to exercise its quasi-judicial
authority (Cruz, Phil. Administrative Law, 1996 ed., p. 26). This power allows the
administrative body to inspect the records and premises, and investigate the activities, of
persons or entities coming under its jurisdiction (Ibid., p. 27), or to require disclosure of
information by means of accounts, records, reports, testimony of witnesses, production of
documents, or otherwise (De Leon, op. cit., p. 64).
The power of investigation consists in gathering, organizing, and analyzing evidence,
which is a useful aid or tool in an administrative agency's performance of its rule-making
or quasi-judicial functions. Notably, investigation is indispensable to prosecution.
In Ruperto v. Torres (100 Phil. 1098 [1957], unreported), the Court had occasion to rule
on the functions of an investigatory body with the sole power of investigation. It does not
exercise judicial functions and its power is limited to investigating the facts and making
findings in respect thereto. The Court laid down the test of determining whether an
administrative body is exercising judicial functions or merely investigatory functions:
Adjudication signifies the exercise of power and authority to adjudicate upon the rights
and obligations of the parties before it. Hence, if the only purpose for investigation is to
evaluate evidence submitted before it based on the facts and circumstances presented to
it, and if the agency is not authorized to make a final pronouncement affecting the parties,
then there is an absence of judicial discretion and judgment.
Cdpr

The above description in Ruperto applies to an administrative body authorized to evaluate

extradition documents. The body has no power to adjudicate in regard to the rights and
obligations of both the Requesting State and the prospective extraditee. Its only power is
to determine whether the papers comply with the requirements of the law and the treaty
and, therefore, sufficient to be the basis of an extradition petition. Such finding is thus
merely initial and not final. The body has no power to determine whether or not the
extradition should be effected. That is the role of the court. The body's power is limited to
an initial finding of whether or not the extradition petition can be filed in court.
It is to be noted, however, that in contrast to ordinary investigations, the evaluation
procedure is characterized by certain peculiarities. Primarily, it sets into motion the
wheels of the extradition process. Ultimately, it may result in the deprivation of liberty of

the prospective extraditee. This deprivation can be effected at two stages: First, the
provisional arrest of the prospective extraditee pending the submission of the request.
This is so because the Treaty provides that in case of urgency, a contracting party may
request the provisional arrest of the person sought pending presentation of the request
(Paragraph [1], Article 9, RP-US Extradition Treaty), but he shall be automatically
discharged after 60 days if no request is submitted (Paragraph 4). Presidential Decree No.
1069 provides for a shorter period of 20 days after which the arrested person could be
discharged (Section 20[d]). Logically, although the Extradition Law is silent on this
respect, the provisions only mean that once a request is forwarded to the Requested State,
the prospective extraditee may be continuously detained, or if not, subsequently
rearrested (Paragraph [5], Article 9, RP-US Extradition Treaty), for he will only be
discharged if no request is submitted. Practically, the purpose of this detention is to
prevent his possible flight from the Requested State. Second, the temporary arrest of the
prospective extraditee during the pendency of the extradition petition in court (Section 6,
Presidential Decree No. 1069).
Clearly, there is an impending threat to a prospective extraditee's liberty as early as
during the evaluation stage. It is not only an imagined threat to his liberty, but a very
imminent one.
Because of these possible consequences, we conclude that the evaluation process is akin
to an administrative agency conducting an investigative proceeding, the consequences of
which are essentially criminal since such technical assessment sets off or commences the
procedure for, and ultimately, the deprivation of liberty of a prospective extraditee. As
described by petitioner himself, this is a "tool" for criminal law enforcement (p. 78,
Rollo). In essence, therefore, the evaluation process partakes of the nature of a criminal
investigation. In a number of cases, we had occasion to make available to a respondent in
an administrative case or investigation certain constitutional rights that are ordinarily
available only in criminal prosecutions. Further, as pointed out by Mr. Justice Mendoza
during the oral arguments, there are rights formerly available only at the trial stage that
had been advanced to an earlier stage in the proceedings, such as the right to counsel and
the right against self-incrimination (tsn, August 31, 1999, p. 135; Escobedo vs. Illinois,
378 U.S. 478; Gideon vs. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335; Miranda vs. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436).
In Pascual v. Board of Medical Examiners (28 SCRA 344 [1969]), we held that the right
against self-incrimination under Section 17, Article III of the 1987 Constitution which is
ordinarily available only in criminal prosecutions, extends to administrative proceedings
which possess a criminal or penal aspect, such as an administrative investigation of a
licensed physician who is charged with immorality, which could result in his loss of the
privilege to practice medicine if found guilty. The Court, citing the earlier case of Cabal
vs. Kapunan (6 SCRA 1059 [1962]), pointed out that the revocation of one's license as a
medical practitioner, is an even greater deprivation than forfeiture of property.

Cabal vs. Kapunan (supra) involved an administrative charge of unexplained wealth

against a respondent which was filed under Republic Act No. 1379, or the Anti-Graft
Law. Again, we therein ruled that since the investigation may result in forfeiture of
property, the administrative proceedings are deemed criminal or penal, and such
forfeiture partakes the nature of a penalty. There is also the earlier case of Almeda, Sr. vs.
Perez (5 SCRA 970 [1962]), where the Court, citing American jurisprudence, laid down
the test to determine whether a proceeding is civil or criminal: If the proceeding is under
a statute such that if an indictment is presented the forfeiture can be included in the
criminal case, such proceeding is criminal in nature, although it may be civil in form; and
where it must be gathered from the statute that the action is meant to be criminal in its
nature, it cannot be considered as civil. If, however, the proceeding does not involve the
conviction of the wrongdoer for the offense charged, the proceeding is civil in nature.
The cases mentioned above refer to an impending threat of deprivation of one's property
or property right. No less is this true, but even more so in the case before us, involving as
it does the possible deprivation of liberty, which, based on the hierarchy of
constitutionally protected rights, is placed second only to life itself and enjoys precedence
over property, for while forfeited property can be returned or replaced, the time spent in
incarceration is irretrievable and beyond recompense.
By comparison, a favorable action in an extradition request exposes a person to eventual
extradition to a foreign country, thus saliently exhibiting the criminal or penal aspect of
the process. In this sense, the evaluation procedure is akin to a preliminary investigation
since both procedures may have the same result the arrest and imprisonment of the
respondent or the person charged. Similar to the evaluation stage of extradition
proceedings, a preliminary investigation, which may result in the filing of an information
against the respondent, can possibly lead to his arrest, and to the deprivation of his
liberty.
Petitioner's reliance on Wright vs. Court of Appeals (235 SCRA 241 [1992]) (p. 8,
Petitioner's Memorandum) that the extradition treaty is neither a piece of criminal
legislation nor a criminal procedural statute is not well-taken. Wright is not authority for
petitioner's conclusion that his preliminary processing is not akin to a preliminary
investigation. The characterization of a treaty in Wright was in reference to the
applicability of the prohibition against an ex post facto law. It had nothing to do with the
denial of the right to notice, information, and hearing.
As early as 1884, the United States Supreme Court ruled that "any legal proceeding
enforced by public authority, whether sanctioned by age or custom, or newly devised in
the discretion of the legislative power, in furtherance of the general public good, which
regards and preserves these principles of liberty and justice, must be held to be due
process of law" (Hurtado vs. California, 110 U.S. 516). Compliance with due process
requirements cannot be deemed non-compliance with treaty commitments.

The United States and the Philippines share a mutual concern about the suppression and
punishment of crime in their respective jurisdictions. At the same time, both States
accord common due process protection to their respective citizens.
The due process clauses in the American and Philippine Constitutions are not only
worded in exactly identical language and terminology, but more importantly, they are
alike in what their respective Supreme Courts have expounded as the spirit with which
the provisions are informed and impressed, the elasticity in their interpretation, their
dynamic and resilient character which make them capable of meeting every modern
problem, and their having been designed from earliest time to the present to meet the
exigencies of an undefined and expanding future. The requirements of due process are
interpreted in both the United States and the Philippines as not denying to the law the
capacity for progress and improvement. Toward this effect and in order to avoid the
confines of a legal straitjacket, the courts instead prefer to have the meaning of the due
process clause "gradually ascertained by the process of inclusion and exclusion in the
course of the decisions of cases as they arise" (Twining vs. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78).
Capsulized, it refers to "the embodiment of the sporting idea of fair play" (Ermita-Malate
Hotel and Motel Owner's Association vs. City Mayor of Manila, 20 SCRA 849 [1967]). It
relates to certain immutable principles of justice which inhere in the very idea of free
government (Holden vs. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366).
Due process is comprised of two components substantive due process which requires
the intrinsic validity of the law in interfering with the rights of the person to his life,
liberty, or property, and procedural due process which consists of the two basic rights of
notice and hearing, as well as the guarantee of being heard by an impartial and competent
tribunal (Cruz, Constitutional Law, 1993 Ed., pp. 102-106).
True to the mandate of the due process clause, the basic rights of notice and hearing
pervade not only in criminal and civil proceedings, but in administrative proceedings as
well. Non-observance of these rights will invalidate the proceedings. Individuals are
entitled to be notified of any pending case affecting their interests, and upon notice, they
may claim the right to appear therein and present their side and to refute the position of
the opposing parties (Cruz, Phil. Administrative Law, 1996 ed., p. 64).

In a preliminary investigation which is an administrative investigatory proceeding,

Section 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court guarantees the respondent's basic due process
rights, granting him the right to be furnished a copy of the complaint, the affidavits, and
other supporting documents, and the right to submit counter-affidavits and other
supporting documents within ten days from receipt thereof. Moreover, the respondent
shall have the right to examine all other evidence submitted by the complainant.

These twin rights may, however, be considered dispensable in certain instances, such as:
1. In proceedings where there is an urgent need for immediate action, like the summary
abatement of a nuisance per se (Article 704, Civil Code), the preventive suspension of a
public servant facing administrative charges (Section 63, Local Government Code, B.P.
Blg. 337), the padlocking of filthy restaurants or theaters showing obscene movies or like
establishments which are immediate threats to public health and decency, and the
cancellation of a passport of a person sought for criminal prosecution;
cdasia

2. Where there is tentativeness of administrative action, that is, where the respondent is
not precluded from enjoying the right to notice and hearing at a later time without
prejudice to the person affected, such as the summary distraint and levy of the property of
a delinquent taxpayer, and the replacement of a temporary appointee; and
3. Where the twin rights have previously been offered but the right to exercise them had
not been claimed.
Applying the above principles to the case at bar, the query may be asked: Does the
evaluation stage of the extradition proceedings fall under any of the described situations
mentioned above?
Let us take a brief look at the nature of American extradition proceedings which are quite
noteworthy considering that the subject treaty involves the U.S. Government.
American jurisprudence distinguishes between interstate rendition or extradition which is
based on the Extradition Clause in the U.S. Constitution (Art. IV, 2 cl 2), and
international extradition proceedings. In interstate rendition or extradition, the governor
of the asylum state has the duty to deliver the fugitive to the demanding state. The
Extradition Clause and the implementing statute are given a liberal construction to carry
out their manifest purpose, which is to effect the return as swiftly as possible of persons
for trial to the state in which they have been charged with crime (31A Am Jur 2d 754755). In order to achieve extradition of an alleged fugitive, the requisition papers or the
demand must be in proper form, and all the elements or jurisdictional facts essential to
the extradition must appear on the face of the papers, such as the allegation that the
person demanded was in the demanding state at the time the offense charged was
committed, and that the person demanded is charged with the commission of the crime or
that prosecution has been begun in the demanding state before some court or magistrate
(35 C.J.S. 406-407). The extradition documents are then filed with the governor of the
asylum state, and must contain such papers and documents prescribed by statute, which
essentially include a copy of the instrument charging the person demanded with a crime,
such as an indictment or an affidavit made before a magistrate. Statutory requirements
with respect to said charging instrument or papers are mandatory since said papers are
necessary in order to confer jurisdiction on the governor of the asylum state to effect the

extradition (35 C.J.S. 408-410). A statutory provision requiring duplicate copies of the
indictment, information, affidavit, or judgment of conviction or sentence and other
instruments accompanying the demand or requisitions be furnished and delivered to the
fugitive or his attorney is directory. However, the right being such a basic one has been
held to be a right mandatory on demand (Ibid., p. 410, citing Ex parte Moore, 256 S.W.
2d 103, 158 Tex. Cr. 407 and Ex parte Tucker, Cr., 324, S.W. 2d 853).
In international proceedings, extradition treaties generally provide for the presentation to
the executive authority of the Requested State of a requisition or demand for the return of
the alleged offender, and the designation of the particular officer having authority to act
in behalf of the demanding nation (31A Am Jur 2d 815).
In petitioner's memorandum filed on September 15, 1999, he attached thereto a letter
dated September 13, 1999 from the Criminal Division of the U.S. Department of Justice,
summarizing the U.S. extradition procedures and principles, which are basically
governed by a combination of treaties (with special reference to the RP-US Extradition
Treaty), federal statutes, and judicial decisions, to wit:
1. All requests for extradition are transmitted through the diplomatic channel. In
urgent cases, requests for provisional arrest of an individual may be made
directly by the Philippine Department of Justice to the U.S. Department of
Justice, and vice-versa. In the event of a provisional arrest, a formal request for
extradition is transmitted subsequently through the diplomatic channel.
2. The Department of State forwards the incoming Philippine extradition request
to the Department of Justice. Before doing so, the Department of State prepares
a declaration confirming that a formal request has been made, that the treaty is
in full force and effect, that under Article 17 thereof the parties provide
reciprocal legal representation in extradition proceedings, that the offenses are
covered as extraditable offenses under Article 2 thereof, and that the documents
have been authenticated in accordance with the federal statute that ensures
admissibility at any subsequent extradition hearing.
3. A judge or magistrate judge is authorized to issue a warrant for the arrest of
the prospective extraditee (18 U.S.C. 3184). Said judge or magistrate is
authorized to hold a hearing to consider the evidence offered in support of the
extradition request (Ibid.)
4. At the hearing, the court must determine whether the person arrested is
extraditable to the foreign country. The court must also determine that (a) it has
jurisdiction over the defendant and jurisdiction to conduct the hearing; (b) the
defendant is being sought for offenses for which the applicable treaty permits
extradition; and (c) there is probable cause to believe that the defendant is the
person sought and that he committed the offenses charged (Ibid.)

5. The judge or magistrate judge is vested with jurisdiction to certify

extraditability after having received a "complaint made under oath, charging
any person found within his jurisdiction" with having committed any of the
crimes provided for by the governing treaty in the country requesting extradition
(Ibid.) [In this regard, it is noted that a long line of American decisions
pronounce that international extradition proceedings partake of the character of
a preliminary examination before a committing magistrate, rather than a trial of
the guilt or innocence of the alleged fugitive (31A Am Jur 2d 826).]
6. If the court decides that the elements necessary for extradition are present, it
incorporates its determinations in factual findings and conclusions of law and
certifies the person's extraditability. The court then forwards this certification of
extraditability to the Department of State for disposition by the Secretary of
State. The ultimate decision whether to surrender an individual rests with the
Secretary of State (18 U.S.C. 3186).
7. The subject of an extradition request may not litigate questions concerning
the motives of the requesting government in seeking his extradition. However, a
person facing extradition may present whatever information he deems relevant
to the Secretary of State, who makes the final determination whether to
surrender an individual to the foreign government concerned.

From the foregoing, it may be observed that in the United States, extradition begins and
ends with one entity the Department of State which has the power to evaluate the
request and the extradition documents in the beginning, and, in the person of the
Secretary of State, the power to act or not to act on the court's determination of
extraditability. In the Philippine setting, it is the Department of Foreign Affairs which
should make the initial evaluation of the request, and having satisfied itself on the points
earlier mentioned (see pp. 10-12), then forwards the request to the Department of Justice
for the preparation and filing of the petition for extradition. Sadly, however, the
Department of Foreign Affairs, in the instant case, perfunctorily turned over the request
to the Department of Justice which has taken over the task of evaluating the request as
well as thereafter, if so warranted, preparing, filing, and prosecuting the petition for
extradition.
Private respondent asks what prejudice will be caused to the U.S. Government should the
person sought to be extradited be given due process rights by the Philippines in the
evaluation stage. He emphasizes that petitioner's primary concern is the possible delay in
the evaluation process.
We agree with private respondent's citation of an American Supreme Court ruling:
The establishment of prompt efficacious procedures to achieve legitimate state
ends is a proper state interest worthy of cognizance in constitutional
adjudication. But the Constitution recognizes higher values than speed and

efficiency. Indeed, one might fairly say of the Bill of Rights in general, and the
Due Process Clause, in particular, that they were designed to protect the fragile
values of a vulnerable citizenry from the overbearing concern for efficiency and
efficacy that may characterize praiseworthy government officials no less, and
perhaps more, than mediocre ones.
(Stanley vs. Illinois, 404 U.S. 645, 656)
The United States, no doubt, shares the same interest as the Philippine
Government that no right that of liberty secured not only by the Bills of
Rights of the Philippines Constitution but of the United States as well, is
sacrificed at the altar of expediency.

(pp. 40-41, Private Respondent's Memorandum.)

In the Philippine context, this Court's ruling is invoked:

One of the basic principles of the democratic system is that where the rights of
the individual are concerned, the end does not justify the means. It is not enough
that there be a valid objective; it is also necessary that the means employed to
pursue it be in keeping with the Constitution. Mere expediency will not excuse
constitutional shortcuts. There is no question that not even the strongest moral
conviction or the most urgent public need, subject only to a few notable
exceptions, will excuse the bypassing of an individual's rights. It is no
exaggeration to say that a person invoking a right guaranteed under Article III
of the Constitution is a majority of one even as against the rest of the nation
who would deny him that right (Association of Small Landowners in the
Philippines, Inc. vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, 175 SCRA 343, 375-376
[1989]).

There can be no dispute over petitioner's argument that extradition is a tool of criminal
law enforcement. To be effective, requests for extradition or the surrender of accused or
convicted persons must be processed expeditiously. Nevertheless, accelerated or fasttracked proceedings and adherence to fair procedures are, however, not always
incompatible. They do not always clash in discord. Summary does not mean precipitous
haste. It does not carry a disregard of the basic principles inherent in "ordered liberty."
Is there really an urgent need for immediate action at the evaluation stage? At that point,
there is no extraditee yet in the strict sense of the word. Extradition may or may not
occur. In interstate extradition, the governor of the asylum state may not, in the absence
of mandatory statute, be compelled to act favorably (37 C.J.S. 387) since after a close
evaluation of the extradition papers, he may hold that federal and statutory requirements,
which are significantly jurisdictional, have not been met (31 Am Jur 2d 819). Similarly,

under an extradition treaty, the executive authority of the requested state has the power to
deny the behest from the requesting state. Accordingly, if after a careful examination of
the extradition documents the Secretary of Foreign Affairs finds that the request fails to
meet the requirements of the law and the treaty, he shall not forward the request to the
Department of Justice for the filing of the extradition petition since non-compliance with
the aforesaid requirements will not vest our government with jurisdiction to effect the
extradition.
cdll

In this light, it should be observed that the Department of Justice exerted notable efforts
in assuring compliance with the requirements of the law and the treaty since it even
informed the U.S. Government of certain problems in the extradition papers (such as
those that are in Spanish and without the official English translation, and those that are
not properly authenticated). In fact, petitioner even admits that consultation meetings are
still supposed to take place between the lawyers in his Department and those from the
U.S. Justice Department. With the meticulous nature of the evaluation, which cannot just
be completed in an abbreviated period of time due to its intricacies, how then can we say
that it is a proceeding that urgently necessitates immediate and prompt action where
notice and hearing can be dispensed with?
Worthy of inquiry is the issue of whether or not there is tentativeness of administrative
action. Is private respondent precluded from enjoying the right to notice and hearing at a
later time without prejudice to him? Here lies the peculiarity and deviant characteristic of
the evaluation procedure. On one hand, there is yet no extraditee, but ironically on the
other, it results in an administrative determination which, if adverse to the person
involved, may cause his immediate incarceration. The grant of the request shall lead to
the filing of the extradition petition in court. The "accused" (as Section 2[c] of
Presidential Decree No. 1069 calls him), faces the threat of arrest, not only after the
extradition petition is filed in court, but even during the evaluation proceeding itself by
virtue of the provisional arrest allowed under the treaty and the implementing law. The
prejudice to the "accused" is thus blatant and manifest.
Plainly, the notice and hearing requirements of administrative due process cannot be
dispensed with and shelved aside.
Apart from the due process clause of the Constitution, private respondent likewise
invokes Section 7 of Article III which reads:
SECTION 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public
concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents and
papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to
government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be
afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.

The above provision guarantees political rights which are available to citizens of the
Philippines, namely: (1) the right to information on matters of public concern, and (2) the
corollary right of access to official records and documents. The general right guaranteed
by said provision is the right to information on matters of public concern. In its
implementation, the right of access to official records is likewise conferred. These
cognate or related rights are "subject to limitations as may be provided by law" (Bernas,
The 1987 Phil. Constitution A Reviewer-Primer, 1997 ed., p. 104) and rely on the
premise that ultimately it is an informed and critical public opinion which alone can
protect the values of democratic government (Ibid.).
Petitioner argues that the matters covered by private respondent's letter-request dated July
1, 1999 do not fall under the guarantee of the foregoing provision since the matters
contained in the documents requested are not of public concern. On the other hand,
private respondent argues that the distinction between matters vested with public interest
and matters which are of purely private interest only becomes material when a third
person, who is not directly affected by the matters requested, invokes the right to
information. However, if the person invoking the right is the one directly affected
thereby, his right to information becomes absolute.
The concept of matters of public concern escapes exact definition. Strictly speaking,
every act of a public officer in the conduct of the governmental process is a matter of
public concern (Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, 1996
ed., p. 336). This concept embraces a broad spectrum of subjects which the public may
want to know, either because these directly affect their lives or simply because such
matters arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen (Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission,
150 SCRA 530 [1987]). Hence, the real party in interest is the people and any citizen has
"standing."
When the individual himself is involved in official government action because said action
has a direct bearing on his life, and may either cause him some kind of deprivation or
injury, he actually invokes the basic right to be notified under Section 1 of the Bill of
Rights and not exactly the right to information on matters of public concern. As to an
accused in a criminal proceeding, he invokes Section 14, particularly the right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
The right to information is implemented by the right of access to information within the
control of the government (Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines, 1996 ed., p. 337). Such information may be contained in official records, and
in documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions.
In the case at bar, the papers requested by private respondent pertain to official
government action from the U.S. Government. No official action from our country has
yet been taken. Moreover, the papers have some relation to matters of foreign relations

with the U.S. Government. Consequently, if a third party invokes this constitutional
provision, stating that the extradition papers are matters of public concern since they may
result in the extradition of a Filipino, we are afraid that the balance must be tilted, at such
particular time, in favor of the interests necessary for the proper functioning of the
government. During the evaluation procedure, no official governmental action of our own
government has as yet been done; hence the invocation of the right is premature. Later,
and in contrast, records of the extradition hearing would already fall under matters of
public concern, because our government by then shall have already made an official
decision to grant the extradition request. The extradition of a fellow Filipino would be
forthcoming.
We now pass upon the final issue pertinent to the subject matter of the instant
controversy: Would private respondent's entitlement to notice and hearing during the
evaluation stage of the proceedings constitute a breach of the legal duties of the
Philippine Government under the RP-Extradition Treaty? Assuming the answer is in the
affirmative, is there really a conflict between the treaty and the due process clause in the
Constitution?
prcd

First and foremost, let us categorically say that this is not the proper time to pass upon the
constitutionality of the provisions of the RP-US Extradition Treaty nor the Extradition
Law implementing the same. We limit ourselves only to the effect of the grant of the
basic rights of notice and hearing to private respondent on foreign relations.
The rule of pacta sunt servanda, one of the oldest and most fundamental maxims of
international law, requires the parties to a treaty to keep their agreement therein in good
faith. The observance of our country's legal duties under a treaty is also compelled by
Section 2, Article II of the Constitution which provides that "[t]he Philippines renounces
war as an instrument of national policy, adopts the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the land, and adheres to the policy of peace,
equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity with all nations." Under the doctrine of
incorporation, rules of international law form part of the law of the land and no further
legislative action is needed to make such rules applicable in the domestic sphere (Salonga
& Yap, Public International Law, 1992 ed., p. 12).

The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals (or local courts)
are confronted with situations in which there appears to be a conflict between a rule of
international law and the provisions of the constitution or statute of the local state. Efforts
should first be exerted to harmonize them, so as to give effect to both since it is to be
presumed that municipal law was enacted with proper regard for the generally accepted
principles of international law in observance of the Incorporation Clause in the abovecited constitutional provision (Cruz, Philippine Political Law, 1996 ed., p. 55). In a

situation, however, where the conflict is irreconcilable and a choice has to be made
between a rule of international law and municipal law, jurisprudence dictates that
municipal law should be upheld by the municipal courts (Ichong vs. Hernandez, 101 Phil.
1155 [1957]; Gonzales vs. Hechanova, 9 SCRA 230 [1963]; In re: Garcia, 2 SCRA 984
[1961]) for the reason that such courts are organs of municipal law and are accordingly
bound by it in all circumstances (Salonga & Yap, op. cit., p. 13). The fact that
international law has been made part of the law of the land does not pertain to or imply
the primacy of international law over national or municipal law in the municipal sphere.
The doctrine of incorporation, as applied in most countries, decrees that rules of
international law are given equal standing with, but are not superior to, national
legislative enactments. Accordingly, the principle lex posterior derogat priori takes
effect a treaty may repeal a statute and a statute may repeal a treaty. In states where
the constitution is the highest law of the land, such as the Republic of the Philippines,
both statutes and treaties may be invalidated if they are in conflict with the constitution
(Ibid.).
In the case at bar, is there really a conflict between international law and municipal or
national law? En contrario, these two components of the law of the land are not pitted
against each other. There is no occasion to choose which of the two should be upheld.
Instead, we see a void in the provisions of the RP-US Extradition Treaty, as implemented
by Presidential Decree No. 1069, as regards the basic due process rights of a prospective
extraditee at the evaluation stage of extradition proceedings. From the procedures earlier
abstracted, after the filing of the extradition petition and during the judicial determination
of the propriety of extradition, the rights of notice and hearing are clearly granted to the
prospective extraditee. However, prior thereto, the law is silent as to these rights.
Reference to the U.S. extradition procedures also manifests this silence.
Petitioner interprets this silence as unavailability of these rights. Consequently, he
describes the evaluation procedure as an "ex parte technical assessment" of the
sufficiency of the extradition request and the supporting documents.
We disagree.
In the absence of a law or principle of law, we must apply the rules of fair play. An
application of the basic twin due process rights of notice and hearing will not go against
the treaty or the implementing law. Neither the Treaty nor the Extradition Law precludes
these rights from a prospective extraditee. Similarly, American jurisprudence and
procedures on extradition pose no proscription. In fact, in interstate extradition
proceedings as explained above, the prospective extraditee may even request for copies
of the extradition documents from the governor of the asylum state, and if he does, his
right to be supplied the same becomes a demandable right (35 C.J.S. 410).

Petitioner contends that the United States requested the Philippine Government to prevent
unauthorized disclosure of confidential information. Hence, the secrecy surrounding the
action of the Department of Justice Panel of Attorneys. The confidentiality argument is,
however, overturned by petitioner's revelation that everything it refuses to make available
at this stage would be obtainable during trial. The Department of Justice states that the
U.S. District Court concerned has authorized the disclosure of certain grand jury
information. If the information is truly confidential, the veil of secrecy cannot be lifted at
any stage of the extradition proceedings. Not even during trial.
A libertarian approach is thus called for under the premises.
One will search in vain the RP-US Extradition Treaty, the Extradition Law, as well as
American jurisprudence and procedures on extradition, for any prohibition against the
conferment of the two basic due process rights of notice and hearing during the
evaluation stage of the extradition proceedings. We have to consider similar situations in
jurisprudence for an application by analogy.
Earlier, we stated that there are similarities between the evaluation process and a
preliminary investigation since both procedures may result in the arrest of the respondent
or the prospective extraditee. In the evaluation process, a provisional arrest is even
allowed by the Treaty and the Extradition Law (Article 9, RP-US Extradition Treaty; Sec.
20, Presidential Decree No. 1069). Following petitioner's theory, because there is no
provision of its availability, does this imply that for a period of time, the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus is suspended, despite Section 15, Article III of the Constitution
which states that "[t]he privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended
except in cases of invasion or rebellion when the public safety requires it"? Petitioner's
theory would also infer that bail is not available during the arrest of the prospective
extraditee when the extradition petition has already been filed in court since Presidential
Decree No. 1069 does not provide therefor, notwithstanding Section 13, Article III of the
Constitution which provides that "[a]ll persons, except those charged with offenses
punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before
conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be
provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus is suspended . . ." Can petitioner validly argue that since these
contraventions are by virtue of a treaty and hence affecting foreign relations, the
aforestated guarantees in the Bill of Rights could thus be subservient thereto?
The basic principles of administrative law instruct us that "the essence of due process in
administrative proceedings is an opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to
seek reconsideration of the actions or ruling complained of (Mirano vs. NLRC, 270
SCRA 96 [1997]; Padilla vs. NLRC, 273 SCRA 457 [1997]; PLDT vs. NLRC, 276 SCRA
1 [1997]; Helpmate, Inc. vs. NLRC, 276 SCRA 315 [1997]; Aquinas School vs. Magnaye,
278 SCRA 602 [1997]; Jamer vs. NLRC, 278 SCRA 632 [1997]). In essence, procedural

due process refers to the method or manner by which the law is enforced (Corona vs.
United Harbor Pilots Association of the Phils., 283 SCRA 31 [1997]). This Court will
not tolerate the least disregard of constitutional guarantees in the enforcement of a law or
treaty. Petitioner's fears that the Requesting State may have valid objections to the
Requested State's non-performance of its commitments under the Extradition Treaty are
insubstantial and should not be given paramount consideration.
cdll

How then do we implement the RP-US Extradition Treaty? Do we limit ourselves to the
four corners of Presidential Decree No. 1069?
Of analogous application are the rulings in Government Service Insurance System vs.
Court of Appeals (201 SCRA 661 [1991]) and Go vs. National Police Commission (271
SCRA 447 [1997]) where we ruled that in summary proceedings under Presidential
Decree No. 807 (Providing for the Organization of the Civil Service Commission in
Accordance with Provisions of the Constitution, Prescribing its Powers and Functions
and for Other Purposes), and Presidential Decree No. 971 (Providing Legal Assistance
for Members of the Integrated National Police who may be charged for ServiceConnected Offenses and Improving the Disciplinary System in the Integrated National
Police, Appropriating Funds Therefor and for other purposes), as amended by
Presidential Decree No. 1707, although summary dismissals may be effected without the
necessity of a formal investigation, the minimum requirements of due process still
operate. As held in GSIS vs. Court of Appeals:
. . . [I]t is clear to us that what the opening sentence of Section 40 is saying is
that an employee may be removed or dismissed even without formal
investigation, in certain instances. It is equally clear to us that an employee must
be informed of the charges preferred against him, and that the normal way by
which the employee is so informed is by furnishing him with a copy of the
charges against him. This is a basic procedural requirement that a statute cannot
dispense with and still remain consistent with the constitutional provision on
due process. The second minimum requirement is that the employee charged
with some misfeasance or malfeasance must have a reasonable opportunity to
present his side of the matter, that is to say, his defenses against the charges
levelled against him and to present evidence in support of his defenses. . . .
(at p. 971)

Said summary dismissal proceedings are also non-litigious in nature, yet we upheld the
due process rights of the respondent.
In the case at bar, private respondent does not only face a clear and present danger of loss
of property or employment, but of liberty itself, which may eventually lead to his forcible
banishment to a foreign land. The convergence of petitioner's favorable action on the

extradition request and the deprivation of private respondent's liberty is easily

comprehensible.
We have ruled time and again that this Court's equity jurisdiction, which is aptly
described as "justice outside legality," may be availed of only in the absence of, and
never against, statutory law or judicial pronouncements (Smith Bell & Co., Inc. vs. Court
of Appeals, 267 SCRA 530 [1997]; David-Chan vs. Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA 677
[1997]). The constitutional issue in the case at bar does not even call for "justice outside
legality," since private respondent's due process rights, although not guaranteed by statute
or by treaty, are protected by constitutional guarantees. We would not be true to the
organic law of the land if we choose strict construction over guarantees against the
deprivation of liberty. That would not be in keeping with the principles of democracy on
which our Constitution is premised.

Verily, as one traverses treacherous waters of conflicting and opposing currents of liberty
and government authority, he must ever hold the oar of freedom in the stronger arm, lest
an errant and wayward course be laid.
dctai

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the instant petition is hereby

DISMISSED for lack of merit. Petitioner is ordered to furnish private respondent copies
of the extradition request and its supporting papers, and to grant him a reasonable period
within which to file his comment with supporting evidence. The incidents in Civil Case
No. 99-94684 having been rendered moot and academic by this decision, the same is
hereby ordered dismissed.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., joins Mr. Justice Puno in his dissent.
Bellosillo, Purisima, Buena and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Puno, J., please see dissent.
Vitug, J., see separate opinion.
Kapunan and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., see separate concurring opinion.
Mendoza, Pardo and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., join dissenting opinion of J. Puno and J.
Panganiban.
Panganiban, J., please see dissenting opinion.

Quisumbing, J., with concurring opinion.

Separate Opinions
KAPUNAN, J., concurring:
I vote to dismiss the petition, both on technical and substantial grounds.
The petition in the case at bar raises one and only issue, which is the validity of the
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) issued by respondent Judge Ralph C. Lantion on
August 9, 1999 in Civil Case No. 99-94684. The TRO directed respondent in said case to:
. . . maintain the status quo by refraining from committing the acts complained
of; from conducting further proceedings in connection with the request of the
United States Government for the extradition of the petitioner; from filing the
corresponding Petition with the Regional Trial Court; and from performing any
act directed to the extradition of the petitioner to the United States, for a period
of twenty days from the service on respondents of this Order, pursuant to
Section 5, Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Court. 1 (Italics ours.)

The petition itself categorically states that "(t)he issue sought to be presented and litigated
here is solely the validity of the TRO." 2
Notably, there is no allegation in the petition that respondent Judge is without jurisdiction
to hear the case below or that he has exceeded his jurisdiction in hearing the same. Nor is
there any other act, ruling, order, or decision, apart from the TRO already mentioned, of
respondent Judge that is being challenged in the petition before us.
Since, as alleged in the petition, a copy of the TRO was served on respondents below on
August 10, 1999, the TRO ceased to be effective on August 30, 1999; consequently, the
instant petition has become moot and academic. This Court does not exercise jurisdiction
over cases which are moot and academic or those not ripe for judicial consideration. 3
Assuming that the present case has not become moot and academic, still, it should be
dismissed for lack of merit.
The substantive issues raised in this case are: (a) whether a person whose extradition is
sought by a foreign state has due process rights under Section 2, Article III of the 1997
Constitution before the Department of Justice as the request for extradition is being
evaluated, or whether due process rights maybe invoked only upon the filing of a petition
for extradition before a regional trial court; and (b) whether or not private respondent has
a right of access to extradition documents under Section 7, Article III of the 1997
Constitution.

Petitioner contends that due process rights such as the right to be informed of the basis of
the request for extradition and to have an opportunity to controvert are not provided in
the extradition treaty or in P.D. 1069 and therefore does not exist in this stage of the
proceedings. Further, he argues that the documents sought to be furnished to private
respondent only involve private concerns, and not matters of public concern to which the
people have a constitutional right to access.
While the evaluation process conducted by the Department of Justice is not exactly a
preliminary investigation of criminal cases, it is akin to a preliminary investigation
because it involves the basic constitutional rights of the person sought to be extradited. A
person ordered extradited is arrested, forcibly taken from his house, separated from his
family and delivered to a foreign state. His rights of abode, to privacy, liberty and pursuit
of happiness are taken away from him a fate as harsh and cruel as a conviction of a
criminal offense. For this reason, he is entitled to have access to the evidence against him
and the right to controvert them.
While the extradition treaty and P.D. 1069 do not provide for a preliminary investigation,
neither does either prohibit it. The right to due process is a universal basic right which is
deemed written into our laws and treaties with foreign countries.
Like a preliminary investigation, the evaluation by the Department of Justice of the
extradition request and its accompanying documents is to establish probable cause and to
secure the innocent against hasty, malicious and oppressive prosecution.
In this connection, it should be stressed that the evaluation procedure of the extradition
request and its accompanying documents by the Department of Justice cannot be
characterized as a mere "ex-parte technical assessment of the sufficiency" thereof. The
function and responsibilities of the Department of Justice in evaluating the extradition
papers involve the exercise of judgment. They involve a determination whether the
request for extradition conforms fully to the requirements of the extradition treaty and
whether the offense is extraditable. These include, among others, whether the offense for
which extradition is requested is a political or military offense (Article 3); whether the
documents and other informations required under Article 7(2) have been provided
(Article 7); and whether the extraditable offense is punishable under the laws of both
contracting parties by deprivation of liberty for a period of more than one year (Article
2). Consequently, to arrive at a correct judgment, the parties involved are entitled to be
heard if the requirements of due process and equal protection are to be observed.
With respect to petitioner's claim that private respondent has no right to demand access to
the documents relating to the request for extradition, suffice it to say, that any document
used in a proceeding that would jeopardize a person's constitutional rights is matter of
public concern. As Martin Luther King said, "injustice anywhere is a threat to justice
everywhere," so any violation of one's rights guaranteed by the Bill of Rights is

everybody's concern because they, one way or another, directly or indirectly, affect the
rights of life and liberty of all the citizens as a whole.
Due process rights in a preliminary investigation is now an established principle. The
respondent has a right of access to all of the evidence. He has the right to submit
controverting evidence. The prosecuting official who conducts the preliminary
investigation is required to be neutral, objective, and impartial in resolving the issue of
probable cause. I see no reason why the same rights may not be accorded a person sought
to be extradited at the stage where the Department of Justice evaluates whether a petition
for extradition would be filed before a regional trial court. If denied such rights, not only
denial of due process rights but of equal protection may be raised.
LLpr

It is suggested that after a petition for extradition is filed with a regional trial court, the
person sought to be extradited may exercise all due process rights. He may then have
access to all the records on the basis of which the request for extradition has been made.
He may controvert that evidence and raise all defenses he may consider appropriate.
That, it is urged, meets the due process requirement.
But why must he wait until the petition for extradition is filed? As succinctly expressed,
if the right to notice and hearing is to serve its full purpose, then, it is clear that it must be
granted at a time when the deprivation can still be prevented. 4 Like the filing of an
information in a criminal case, the mere filing of a petition for extradition causes
immediate impairment of the liberty of the person sought to be extradited and a
substantial curtailment of other rights. His arrest may be immediately ordered by the
regional trial court. He would be compelled to face an open and public trial. He will be
constrained to seek the assistance of counsel and incur other expenses of litigation. The
public eye would be directed at him with all the concomitant intrusions to his right to
privacy. Where the liberty of a person is at risk, and extradition strikes at the very core of
liberty, invocation of due process rights can never be too early.
QUISUMBING, J., concurring:
As I concur in the result reached by the ponencia of Justice Melo, may I just add my
modest observations.
The human rights of person, whether citizen or alien, and the rights of the accused
guaranteed in our Constitution should take precedence over treaty rights claimed by a
contracting state. Stated otherwise, the constitutionally mandated duties of our
government to the individual deserve preferential consideration when they collide with its
treaty obligations to the government of another state. This is so although we recognize
treaties as a source of binding obligations under generally accepted principles of
international law incorporated in our Constitution as part of the law of the land.

For this primordial reason, I vote to DENY the petition.

Moreover, considering that the Extradition Treaty between the USA and Philippines
appears mute on the specific issue before us, the Court in the exercise of its judicial
power to find and state what the law is has this rare opportunity of setting a precedent
that enhances respect for human rights and strengthens due process of law.

As both majority and dissenting colleagues in the Court will recognize, American
authorities follow two tracks in extradition proceedings: (1) the interstate practice where,
pursuant to statute, the state Executive upon demand furnishes the would be extraditee or
counsel copies of pertinent documents as well as the request for extradition; and (2) the
international practice where the Executive department need not initially grant notice and
hearing at all. Rules of reciprocity and comity, however, should not bar us from applying
internationally now what appears the more reasonable and humane procedure, that is, the
interstate practice among Americans themselves. For in this case the American people
should be among the most interested parties.
Truly, what private respondent is asking our Executive department (notice, copies of
documents, and the opportunity to protect himself at the earliest time against probable
peril) does not, in my view, violate our Extradition Treaty with the USA. His request if
granted augurs well for transparency in interstate or intergovernmental relations rather
than secrecy which smacks of medieval diplomacy and the inquisition discredited long
ago.
That private respondent is a Filipino citizen is not decisive of the issue here, although it is
obviously pertinent. Even if he were a resident alien (other than American perhaps), he is,
in my view, entitled to our full protection against the hazards of extradition (or
deportation, similarly) from the very start. More so because, looking at the facts adduced
at the hearing and on the record of this case, the charges against him involve or are comingled with, if not rooted in, certain offenses of a political nature or motivation such as
the ones involving alleged financial contributions to a major American political party. If
so, long established is the principle that extradition could not be utilized for political
offenses or politically motivated charges.
There may, of course, be other charges against private respondent in the USA. But then
they are, in my view, already tainted there with political color due to the highly charged
partisan campaign atmosphere now prevailing. That private respondent's cases will be
exploited as political fodder there is not far-fetched, hence the need here for cautious but
comprehensive deliberation on the matter at bar. For, above all, it is not only a Treaty
provision we are construing; it is about constitutional and human rights we are most
concerned.

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., concurring:

I concur in the ponencia of Mr. Justice Jose A.R. Melo with its conceptive analysis of a
citizen's right to be given what is due to him. I join in his exposition of this Court's
constitutional duty to strike the correct balance between overwhelming Government
power and the protection of individual rights where only one person is involved.
However, I am constrained to write this short concurrence if only to pose the question of
why there should be any debate at all on a plea for protection of one's liberty which, if
granted, will not result in any meaningful impediment of thwarting any state policy and
objectives.
I see no reason why respondent Mark Jimenez, or other citizens not as controversial or
talked about, should first be exposed to the indignity, expense, and anxiety of a public
denunciation in court before he may be informed of what the contracting states in an
extradition treaty have against him. There is no question that everything which
respondent Jimenez now requests will be given to him during trial. Mr. Jimenez is only
petitioning that, at this stage, he should be informed why he may be deported from his
own country.
I see no ill effects which would arise if the extradition request and supporting documents
are shown to him now, instead of later.
Petitioner Secretary of Justice states that his action on the extradition request and its
supporting documents will merely determine whether or not the Philippines is complying
with its treaty obligations. He adds that, therefore, the constitutional rights of an accused
in all criminal prosecutions are not available to the private respondent.
The July 13, 1999 reply-letter from petitioner states the reasons why he is denying
respondent Jimenez's requests. In short, the reasons are:
1. In evaluating the documents, the Department merely determines whether the
procedures and requirements under the relevant law and treaty have been
complied with by the Requesting Government. The constitutional rights of the
accused in all criminal prosecutions are, therefore, not available.
2. The United States Government has requested the Philippine Government to
prevent unauthorized disclosure of certain grand jury information.
3. The petitioner cannot hold in abeyance proceedings in connection with an
extradition request. For extradition to be an effective tool of criminal law
enforcement, requests for surrender of accused or convicted persons must be
processed expeditiously.

I respectfully submit that any apprehensions in the Court arising from a denial of the
petition "breach of an international obligation, rupture of state relations, forfeiture of
confidence, national embarrassment, and a plethora of other equally undesirable
consequences" are more illusory than real. Our country is not denying the extradition
of a person who must be extradited. Not one provision of the extradition treaty is
violated. I cannot imagine the United States taking issue over what, to it, would be a
minor concession, perhaps a slight delay, accorded in the name of human rights. On the
other hand, the issue is fundamental in the Philippines. A citizen is invoking the
protection, in the context of a treaty obligation, of rights expressly guaranteed by the
Philippine Constitution.
Until proved to be a valid subject for extradition, a person is presumed innocent or not
covered by the sanctions of either criminal law or international treaty. At any stage where
a still prospective extraditee only seeks to know so that he can prepare and prove that he
should not be extradited, there should be no conflict over the extension to him of
constitutional protections guaranteed to aliens and citizens alike.
cdphil

Petitioner cites as a reason for the denial of respondent's requests, Article 7 of the Treaty.
Article 7 enumerates the required documents and establishes the procedures under which
the documents shall be submitted and admitted as evidence. There is no specific
provision on how the Secretary of Foreign Affairs should conduct his evaluation. The
Secretary of Justice is not even in the picture at this stage. Under petitioner's theory,
silence in the treaty over a citizen's rights during the evaluation stage is interpreted as
deliberate exclusion by the contracting states of the right to know. Silence is interpreted
as the exclusion of the right to a preliminary examination or preliminary investigation
provided by the laws of either one of the two states.
The right to be informed of charges which may lead to court proceedings and result in a
deprivation of liberty is ordinarily routine. It is readily available to one against whom the
state's coercive power has already been focused. I fail to see how silence can be
interpreted as exclusion. The treaty is silent because at this stage, the preliminary
procedure is still an internal matter. And when a law or treaty is silent, it means a right or
privilege may be granted. It is not the other way around.
The second reason alleging the need for secrecy and confidentiality is even less
convincing. The explanation of petitioner is self-contradictory. On one hand, petitioner
asserts that the United States Government requested the Philippine Government to
prevent unauthorized disclosure of certain information. On the other hand, petitioner
declares that the United States has already secured orders from concerned District Courts
authorizing the disclosure of the same grand jury information to the Philippine
Government and its law enforcement personnel.

Official permission has been given. The United States has no cause to complain about the
disclosure of information furnished to the Philippines.
Moreover, how can grand jury information and documents be considered confidential if
they are going to be introduced as evidence in adversary proceedings before a trial court?
The only issue is whether or not Mr. Jimenez should be extradited. His innocence or guilt
of any crime will be determined in an American court. It is there where prosecution
strategies will be essential. If the Contracting States believed in a total non-divulging of
information prior to court hearings, they would have so provided in the extradition treaty.
A positive provision making certain rights unavailable cannot be implied from silence.
I cannot believe that the United States and the Philippines with identical constitutional
provisions on due process and basic rights should sustain such a myopic view in a
situation where the grant of a right would not result in any serious setbacks to criminal
law enforcement.
It is obvious that any prospective extraditee wants to know if his identity as the person
indicated has been established. Considering the penchant of Asians to adopt American
names when in America, the issue of whether or not the prospective extraditee truly is the
person charged in the United States becomes a valid question. It is not only identity of the
person which is involved. The crimes must also be unmistakably identified and their
essential elements clearly stated.
There are other preliminary matters in which respondent is interested. I see nothing in our
laws or in the Treaty which prohibits the prospective extraditee from knowing until after
the start of trial whether or not the extradition treaty applies to him.
Paraphrasing Hashim vs. Boncan, 71 Phil. 216; Trocio vs. Manta, 118 SCRA 241 (1941);
and Salonga vs. Hon. Pao, 134 SCRA 438 (1985), the purpose of a preliminary
evaluation is to secure an innocent person against hasty, faulty and, therefore, oppressive
proceedings; to protect him from an open and extensively publicized accusation of
crimes; to spare him the trouble, expense, and anxiety of a public trial; and also to protect
the state from useless and expensive trials. Even if the purpose is only to determine
whether or not the respondent is a proper subject for extradition, he is nonetheless
entitled to the guarantees of fairness and freedom accorded to those charged with
ordinary crimes in the Philippines.

The third reason given by petitioner is the avoidance of delay. Petitioner views the
request to be informed as part of undesirable delaying tactics. This is most unfortunate.
Any request for extradition must be viewed objectively and impartially without any
predisposition to granting it and, therefore, hastening the extradition process.

In the first place, any assistance which the evaluating official may get from the
participation of respondent may well point out deficiencies and insufficiencies in the
extradition documents. It would incur greater delays if these are discovered only during
court trial. On the other hand, if, from respondent's participation, the evaluating official
discovers a case of mistaken identity, insufficient pleadings, inadequate complaints, or
any ruinous shortcoming, there would be no delays during trial. An unnecessary trial with
all its complications would be avoided.
The right to be informed is related to the constitutional right to a speedy trial. The
constitutional guarantee extends to the speedy disposition of cases before all quasijudicial and administrative bodies (Constitution, Art. III, Sec. 16). Speedy disposition,
however, does not mean the deliberate exclusion of the defendant or respondent from the
proceedings. As this Court ruled in Acebedo vs. Sarmiento, 36 SCRA 247 (1970), "the
right to a speedy trial, means one free from vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays,
its salutary objective being to assure that an innocent person may be free from the anxiety
and expense of a court litigation or, if otherwise, of having his guilt (in this case, his
being extradited) determined within the shortest possible time compatible with the
presentation and consideration of whatsoever legitimate defense he may interpose."
The right to be informed and the right to a preliminary hearing are not merely for
respondent. They also serve the interests of the State.
In closing, I maintain that the paramount consideration of guaranteeing the constitutional
rights of individual respondent override the concerns of petitioner. There should be no
hurried or indifferent effort to routinely comply with all requests for extradition. I
understand that this is truer in the United States than in other countries. Proposed
extraditees are given every legal protection available from the American justice system
before they are extradited. We serve under a government of limited powers and
inalienable rights. Hence, this concurrence.
PUNO, J., dissenting:
If the case at bar was strictly a criminal case which involves alone the right of an accused
to due process, I would have co-signed the ponencia of our esteemed colleague, Mr.
Justice Jose A.R. Melo, without taking half a pause. But the case at bar does not involve
the guilt or innocence of an accused but the interpretation of an extradition treaty where
at stake is our government's international obligation to surrender to a foreign state a
citizen of its own so he can be tried for an alleged offense committed within that
jurisdiction. The issues are of first impression and the majority opinion dangerously takes
us to unknown shoals in constitutional and international laws, hence this dissenting
opinion.

Extradition is well-defined concept and is more a problem in international law. It is the

"process by which persons charged with or convicted of crime against the law of a State
and found in a foreign State are returned by the latter to the former for trial or
punishment. It applies to those who are merely charged with an offense but have not been
brought to trial; to those who have been tried and convicted and have subsequently
escaped from custody; and those who have been convicted in absentia. It does not apply
to persons merely suspected of having committed an offense but against whom no charge
has been laid or to a person whose presence is desired as a witness or for obtaining or
enforcing a civil judgment." 1 The definition covers the private respondent who is
charged with two (2) counts of conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the United
States, four (4) counts of attempt to evade or defeat tax, two (2) counts of fraud by wire,
radio or television, six (6) counts of false statements or entries and thirty-three (33)
counts of election contributions in the name of another. There is an outstanding warrant
of arrest against the private respondent issued by the US District Court, southern District
of Florida.
LibLex

A brief review of the history of extradition law will illumine our labor. Possibly the most
authoritative commentator on extradition today, M. Cherif Bassiouni, divides the history
of extradition into four (4) periods: "(1) ancient times to seventeenth century a period
revealing almost exclusive concern for political and religious offenders; (2) the
eighteenth century and half of the nineteenth century a period of treaty-making chiefly
concerned with military offenders characterizing the condition of Europe during that
period; (3) from 1833 to 1948 a period of collective concern in suppressing common
criminality; and (4) post - 1948 developments which ushered in a greater concern for
protecting the human rights of persons and revealed an awareness of the need to have
international due process of law regulate international relations." 2
It is also rewarding to have a good grip on the changing slopes in the landscape of
extradition during these different periods. Extradition was first practiced by the
Egyptians, Chinese, Chaldeans and Assyro-Babylonians but their basis for allowing
extradition was unclear. Sometimes, it was granted due to pacts; at other times, due to
plain good will. 3 The classical commentators on international law thus focused their
early views on the nature of the duty to surrender an extraditee whether the duty is
legal or moral in character. Grotius and de Vattel led the school of thought that
international law imposed a legal duty called civitas maxima to extradite criminals. 4 In
sharp contrast, Puffendorf and Billot led the school of thought that the so-called duty was
but an "imperfect obligation which could become enforceable only by a contract or
agreement between states. 5
Modern nations tilted towards the view of Puffendorf and Billot that under international
law there is no duty to extradite in the absence of treaty, whether bilateral or multilateral.
Thus, the US Supreme Court in US v. Rauscher 6 held: ". . . . it is only in modern times
that the nations of the earth have imposed upon themselves the obligation of delivering

up these fugitives from justice to the states where their crimes were committed, for trial
and punishment. This has been done generally by treaties . . . Prior to these treaties, and
apart from them there was no well-defined obligation on one country to deliver up such
fugitives to another; and though such delivery was often made it was upon the principle
of comity . . ."
Then came the long and still ongoing debate on what should be the subject of
international law. The 20th century saw the dramatic rise and fall of different types and
hues of authoritarianism the fascism of Italy's Mussolini and Germany's Hitler, the
militarism of Japan's Hirohito and the communism of Russia's Stalin, etc. The sinking of
these isms led to the elevation of the rights of the individual against the state. Indeed,
some species of human rights have already been accorded universal recognition. 7
Today, the drive to internationalize rights of women and children is also on high gear. 8
The higher rating given to human rights in the hierarchy of values necessarily led to the
re-examination of the rightful place of the individual in international law. Given the
harshest eye is the moss-covered doctrine that international law deals only with States
and that individuals are not its subject. For its undesirable corollary is the sub-doctrine
that an individual's right in international law is a near cipher. Translated in extradition
law, the view that once commanded a consensus is that since a fugitive is a mere object
and not a subjectof international law, he is bereft of rights. An extraditee, so it was held,
is a mere "object transported from one state to the other as an exercise of the sovereign
will of the two states involved." 9 The re-examination consigned this pernicious doctrine
to the museum of ideas. 10 The new thinkers of international law then gave a significant
shape to the role and rights of the individual in state-concluded treaties and other
international agreements. So it was declared by then US Ambassador Philip C. Jessup in
audible italics: "A very large part of international affairs and, thus, of the process of
international accommodation, concerns the relations between legal persons known as
states. This is necessarily so. But it is no longer novel for the particular interest of the
human being to break through the mass of interstate relationship." 11 The clarion call to
re-engineer a new world order whose dominant interest would transcend the parochial
confines of national states was not unheeded. Among the world class scholars who joined
the search for the elusive ideological underpinnings of a new world order were Yale
professor Myres McDougal and Mr. Justice Florentino Feliciano. In their seminal work,
Law and Minimum World Public Order, they suggested that the object of the new world
order should be "to obtain in particular situations and in the aggregate flow of situations
the outcome of a higher degree of conformity with the security goals of preservation,
deterrence, restoration, rehabilitation and reconstruction of all societies comprising the
world community." 12 Needless to stress, all these prescient these accelerated the move
to recognize certain rights of the individual in international law.
We have yet to see the final and irrevocable place of individual rights, especially the
rights of an extraditee, in the realm of international law. In careful language, Bassiouni
observes that today, "institutionalized conflicts between states are still rationalized in

terms of sovereignty, national interest, and national security, while human interests
continue to have limited, though growing impact on the decision-making processes which
translate national values and goals into specific national and international policy." 13

I belabor the international law aspect of extradition as the majority opinion hardly gives
it a sideglance. It is my humble submission that the first consideration that should guide
us in the case at bar is that a bilateral treaty the RP-US Extradition Treaty is the
subject matter of the litigation. In our constitutional scheme, the making of a treaty
belongs to the executive and legislative departments of our government. Between these
two departments, the executive has a greater say in the making of a treaty. Under Section
21, Article VII of our Constitution, the President has the sole power to negotiate treaties
and international agreements although to be effective, they must be concurred in by at
least two thirds of all the members of the Senate. Section 20 of the same Article
empowers the President to contract or guarantee foreign loans with the prior concurrence
of the Monetary Board. Section 16 of the same Article gives the President the power to
appoint ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls subject to confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments. In addition, the President has the power to deport
undesirable aliens. The concentration of these powers in the person of the President is not
without a compelling consideration. The conduct of foreign relations is full of
complexities and consequences, sometimes with life and death significance to the nation
especially in times of war. It can only be entrusted to that department of government
which can act on the basis of the best available information and can decide with
decisiveness. Beyond debate, the President is the single most powerful official in our land
for Section 1 of Article VII provides that "the executive power shall be vested in the
President of the Philippines," whereas Section 1 of Article VI states that "the legislative
power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate
and a House of Representatives . . . except to the extent reserved to the people by the
provision on initiative and referendum," while Section 1 of Article VIII provides that
"judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law." Thus, we can see that executive power is vested in the President
alone whereas legislative and judicial powers are shared and scattered. It is also the
President who possesses the most comprehensive and the most confidential information
about foreign countries for our diplomatic and consular officials regularly brief him on
meaningful events all over the world. He has also unlimited access to ultra-sensitive
military intelligence data. 14 In fine, the presidential role in foreign affairs is dominant
and the President is traditionally accorded a wider degree of discretion in the conduct of
foreign affairs. The regularity, nay, validity of his actions are adjudged under less
stringent standards, lest their judicial repudiation lead to breach of an international
obligation, rupture of state relations, forfeiture of confidence, national embarrassment
and a plethora of other problems with equally undesirable consequences.

These are some of the dominant policy considerations in international law that the Court
must balance against the claim of the private respondent that he has a right to be given
the extradition documents against him and to comment thereon even while they are still at
the evaluation stage by the petitioner Secretary of Justice, an alter ego of the President.
The delicate questions of what constitutional rights and to what degree they can be
claimed by an extraditee do not admit of easy answers and have resulted in discrete
approaches the world over. 15 On one end of the pole is the more liberal European
approach. The European Court of Human Rights embraces the view that an extraditee is
entitled to the benefit of all relevant provisions of the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. It has held that ". . . in so far as
a measure of the extradition has consequences adversely affecting the enjoyment of a
convention right, it may, assuming that the consequences are not too remote, attract the
obligations of a contracting State under the relevant convention guarantee." 16 At the other
end of the pole is the more cautious approach of the various Courts of Appeal in the United
States. These courts have been more conservative in light of the principle of separation of powers
and their faith in the presumptive validity of executive decisions. By and large, they adhere to the
rule of non-inquiry under which the extraditing court refuses to examine the requesting country's
criminal justice system or consider allegations that the extraditee will be mistreated or denied a
fair trial in that country. 17

The case at bar, I respectfully submit, does not involve an irreconcilable conflict between
the RP-US Extradition Treaty and our Constitution where we have to choose one over the
other. Rather, it calls for a harmonization between said treaty and our Constitution. To
achieve this desirable objective, the Court should consider whether the constitutional
rights invoked by the private respondent have truly been violated and even assuming so,
whether he will be denied fundamental fairness. It is only when their violation will
destroy the respondent's right to fundamental fairness that his constitutional claims
should be given primacy.
LLjur

Given this balancing approach, it is my humble submission that considering all the facts
and facets of the case, the private respondent has not proved entitlement to the right he is
claiming. The majority holds that the Constitution, the RP-US extradition treaty and P.D.
No. 1069 do not prohibit respondent's claim, hence, it should be allowed. This is too
simplistic an approach. Rights do not necessarily arise from a vacuum. Silence of the law
can even mean an implied denial of a right. Also, constitutional litigations do not always
involve a clear cut choice between right and wrong. Sometimes, they involve a difficult
choice between right against right. In these situations, there is need to balance the
contending rights and primacy is given to the right that will serve the interest of the
nation at that particular time. In such instances, the less compelling right is subjected to
soft restraint but without smothering its essence. Proceeding from this premise of
relativism of rights, I venture the view that even assuming arguendo respondent's weak
claim, still, the degree of denial of private respondent's rights to due process and to
information is too slight to warrant the interposition of judicial power. As admitted in the

ponencia itself, an extradition proceeding is sui generis. It is, thus, futile to determine
what it is. What is certain is that it is not a criminal proceeding where there is an accused
who can claim the entire array of rights guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. Let it be
stressed that in an extradition proceeding, there is no accused and the guilt or innocence
of the extraditee will not be passed upon by our executive officials nor by the extradition
judge. Hence, constitutional rights that are only relevant to determine the guilt or
innocence of an accused cannot be invoked by an extraditee. Indeed, an extradition
proceeding is summary in nature which is untrue of criminal proceedings. 18 Even the
rules of evidence are different in an extradition proceeding. Admission of evidence is less
stringent, again because the guilt of the extraditee is not under litigation. 19 It is not only
the quality but even the quantum of evidence in extradition proceeding is different. In a
criminal case, an accused can only be convicted by proof beyond reasonable doubt. 20 In
an extradition proceeding, an extraditee can be ordered extradited "upon showing of the
existence of a prima facie case." 21 If more need be said, the nature of an extradition
decision is different from a judicial decision whose finality cannot be changed by
executive fiat. Our courts 22 may hold an individual extraditable but the ultimate decision
to extradite the individual lies in the hands of the Executive. Section 3, Article 3 of the
RP-US Extradition Treaty specifically provides that "extradition shall not be granted if
the executive authority of the Requested State determines that the request was politically
motivated, or that the offense is a military offense which is not punishable under nonmilitary penal legislation." In the United States, the Secretary of State exercises this
ultimate power and is conceded considerable discretion. He balances the equities of the
case and the demands of the nation's foreign relations. 23 In sum, he is not straitjacketed
by strict legal considerations like an ordinary court.
The type of issue litigated in extradition proceedings which does not touch on the guilt or
innocence of the extraditee, the limited nature of the extradition proceeding, the
availability of adequate remedies in favor of the extraditee, and the traditional leeway
given to the Executive in the conduct of foreign affairs have compelled courts to put a
high threshold before considering claims of individuals that enforcement of an
extradition treaty will violate their constitutional rights. Exemplifying such approach is
the Supreme Court of Canada which has adopted a highly deferential standard that
emphasizes international comity and the executive's experience in international matters.
24 It continues to deny Canada's charter protection to extraditees unless the violation can
be considered shocking to the conscience.
In the case, at bar and with due respect, the ponencia inflates with too much significance
the threat to liberty of the private respondent to prop us its thesis that his constitutional
rights to due process and access to information must immediately be vindicated.
Allegedly, respondent Jimenez stands in danger of provisional arrest, hence, the need for
him to be immediately furnished copies of documents accompanying the request for his
extradition. Respondent's fear of provisional arrest is not real. It is a self-imagined fear
for the realities on the ground show that the United States authorities have not manifested

any desire to request for his arrest. On the contrary, they filed the extradition request
through the regular channel and, even with the pendency of the case at bar, they have not
moved for respondent's arrest on the ground of probable delay in the proceedings. To be
sure, the issue of whether respondent Jimenez will be provisionally arrested is now moot.
Under Section 1 of Article 9 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty, in relation to Section 20(a)
of PD No. 1069, the general principle is enunciated that a request for provisional arrest
must be made pending receipt of the request for extradition. By filing the request for
extradition, the US authorities have implicitly decided not to move for respondent's
provisional arrest. But more important, a request for respondent's arrest does not mean
he will be the victim of an arbitrary arrest. He will be given due process before he can be
arrested. Article 9 of the treaty provides:

"PROVISIONAL ARREST
"1. In case of urgency, a Contracting Party may request the provisional arrest of
the person sought pending presentation of the request for extradition. A request
for provisional arrest may be transmitted through the diplomatic channel or
directly between the Philippine Department of Justice and the United States
Department of Justice.
"2. The application for provisional arrest shall contain:
"a) a description of the person sought;
"b) the location of the person sought, if known;
"c) a brief statement of the facts of the case, including, if possible, the
time and location of the offense;
"d) a description of the laws violated;
"e) a statement of the existence of a warrant of arrest or finding of guilt
or judgment of conviction against the person sought; and
"f) a statement that a request for extradition for the person sought will
follow.
"3. The Requesting State shall be notified without delay of the disposition of its
application and the reasons for any denial.
"4. A person who is provisionally arrested may be discharged from custody
upon the expiration of sixty (60) days from the date of arrest pursuant to this
Treaty if the executive authority of the Requested State has not received the

formal request for extradition and the supporting documents required in Article
7."

In relation to the above, Section 20 of P.D. No. 1069 provides:

"SECTION 20. Provisional Arrest. (a) In case of urgency, the requesting
state may, pursuant to the relevant treaty or convention and while the same
remains in force, request for the provisional arrest of the accused, pending
receipt of the request for extradition made in accordance with Section 4 of this
Decree.
"(b) A request for provisional arrest shall be sent to the Director of the National
Bureau of Investigation, Manila, either through the diplomatic channels or
direct by post or telegraph.
"(c) The Director of the National Bureau of Investigation or any official acting
on his behalf shall upon receipt of the request immediately secure a warrant for
the provisional arrest of the accused from the presiding judge of the Court of
First Instance of the province or city having jurisdiction of the place, who shall
issue the warrant for the provisional arrest of the accused. The Director of the
National Bureau of Investigation through the Secretary of Foreign Affairs shall
inform the requesting state of the result of its request.
"(d) If within a period of 20 days after the provisional arrest, the Secretary of
Foreign Affairs has not received the request for extradition and the documents
mentioned in Section 4 of this Decree, the accused shall be released from
custody."

The due process protection of the private respondent against arbitrary arrest is written in
cyrillic letters in these two (2) related provisions. It is self-evident under these provisions
that a request for provisional arrest does not mean it will be granted ipso facto. The
request must comply with certain requirements. It must be based on an "urgent" factor.
This is subject to verification and evaluation by our executive authorities. The request can
be denied if not based on a real exigency or if the supporting documents are insufficient.
The protection of the respondent against arbitrary provisional arrest does not stop on the
administrative level. For even if the Director of the National Bureau of Investigation
agrees with the request for the provisional arrest of the respondent, still he has to apply
for a judicial warrant from the "presiding judge of the Court of First Instance (now RTC)
of the province or city having jurisdiction of the place. . . . ." It is a judge who will issue a
warrant for the provisional arrest of the respondent. The judge has to comply with
Section 2, Article III of the Constitution which provides that "no . . . warrant of arrest
shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the . . . persons or things to be seized." The message

that leaps to the eye is that compliance with this requirement precludes any arbitrary
arrest.
cdphil

In light of all these considerations, I respectfully submit that denying respondent's

constitutional claim to be furnished all documents relating to the request for his
extradition by the US authorities during their evaluation stage will not subvert his right to
fundamental fairness. It should be stressed that this is not a case where the respondent
will not be given an opportunity to know the basis of the request for his extradition. In
truth, and contrary to the impression of the majority, P.D. No. 1069 fixes the specific time
when he will be given the papers constituting the basis for his extradition. The time is
when he is summoned by the extradition court and required to answer the petition for
extradition. Thus, Section 6 of P.D. No. 1069 provides:
"SECTION 6. Issuance of Summons; Temporary Arrest; Hearing, Service of
Notices. (1) Immediately upon receipt of the petition, the presiding judge of
the court shall, as soon as practicable, summon the accused to appear and to
answer the petition on the day and hour fixed in the order. He may issue a
warrant for the immediate arrest of the accused which may be served anywhere
within the Philippines if it appears to the presiding judge that the immediate
arrest and temporary detention of the accused will best serve the ends of justice.
Upon receipt of the answer within the time fixed, the presiding judge shall hear
the case or set another date for the hearing thereof.
"(2) The order and notice as well as a copy of the warrant of arrest, if issued,
shall be promptly served each upon the accused and the attorney having charge
of the case."

Upon receipt of the summons and the petition, respondent is free to foist all defenses
available to him. Such an opportunity does not deny him fairness which is the essence
of due process of law.
Thus, with due respect, I submit that the ponencia failed to accord due importance to the
international law aspect of an extradition treaty as it unduly stressed its constitutional
law dimension. This goes against the familiar learning that in balancing the clashing
interests involved in extradition treaty, national interest is more equal than the others.
While lately, humanitarian considerations are being factored in the equation, still the
concept of extradition as a national act is the guiding idea. Requesting and granting
extradition remains a power and prerogative of the national government of a State. The
process still involves relations between international personalities. 25 Needless to state, a
more deferential treatment should be given to national interest than to individual interest.
Our national interest in extraditing persons who have committed crimes in a foreign
country are succinctly expressed in the whereas clauses of P.D. No. 1069, viz:

"WHEREAS, the Constitution of the Philippines adopts the generally accepted

principles of international law as part of the law of the land, and adheres to the
policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity with all
nations;
"WHEREAS, the suppression of crime is the concern not only of the state where
it is committed but also of any other state to which the criminal may have
escaped, because it saps the foundation of social life and is an outrage upon
humanity at large, and it is in the interest of civilized communities that crimes
should not go unpunished. . . . ."

The increasing incidence of international and transnational crimes, the development

of new technologies of death, and the speed and scale of improvement of
communication are factors which have virtually annihilated time and distance. They
make more compelling the vindication of our national interest to insure that the
punishment of criminals should not be frustrated by the frontiers of territorial
sovereignty. This overriding national interest must be upheld as against respondent's
weak constitutional claims which in no way amount to denial of fundamental fairness.
At bottom, this case involves the respect that courts should accord to the Executive that
concluded the RP-US Extradition Treaty in the conduct of our foreign affairs. As early as
1800, the legendary John Marshall, then a congressman, has opined that the power to
extradite pursuant to a treaty rests in the executive branch as part of its power to conduct
foreign affairs. 26 Courts have validated this forward-looking opinion in a catena of
unbroken cases. They defer to the judgment of the Executive on the necessities of our
foreign affairs and on its view of the requirements of international comity. The
deferential attitude is dictated by the robust reality that of the three great branches of our
government, it is the Executive that is most qualified to guide the ship of the state on the
known and unknown continents of foreign relations. It is also compelled by
considerations of the principle of separation of powers for the Constitution has clearly
allocated the power to conduct our foreign affairs to the Executive. I respectfully submit
that the majority decision has weakened the Executive by allowing nothing less than an
unconstitutional headbutt on the power of the Executive to conduct our foreign affairs.
The majority should be cautious in involving this Court in the conduct of the nation's
foreign relations where the inviolable rule dictated by necessity is that the nation should
speak with one voice. We should not overlook the reality that courts, by their nature, are
ill-equipped to fully comprehend the foreign policy dimensions of a treaty, some of which
are hidden in shadows and silhouettes.
I vote to grant the petition.
VITUG, J.:

The only real issue before the Court, I would take it, is whether or not private respondent
can validly ask for copies of pertinent documents while the application for extradition
against him is still undergoing process by the Executive Department.

There is, I agree with the majority, a right of access to such extradition documents
conformably with the provisions of Article III, Section 7, of the Philippine Constitution. 1
The constitutional right to free access to information of public concern is circumscribed
only by the fact that the desired information is not among the species exempted by law
from the operation of the constitutional guaranty and that the exercise of the right
conforms with such reasonable conditions as may be prescribed by law.
cdtai

There is no hornbook rule to determine whether or not an information is of public

concern. The term "public concern" eludes exactitude, and it can easily embrace a broad
spectrum of matters which the public may want to know either because the subject
thereof can affect their lives or simply because it arouses concern. 2
I am not convinced that there is something so viciously wrong with, as to deny, the
request of private respondent to be furnished with copies of the extradition documents.
I add. The constitutional right to due process secures to everyone an opportunity to be
heard, presupposing foreknowledge of what he may be up against, and to submit any
evidence that he may wish to proffer in an effort to clear himself. This right is twopronged substantive and procedural due process founded, in the first instance, on
Constitutional or statutory provisions, and in the second instance, on accepted rules of
procedure. 3 Substantive due process looks into the extrinsic and intrinsic validity of the
law that figures to interfere with the right of a person to his life, liberty and property.
Procedural due process the more litigated of the two focuses on the rules that are
established in order to ensure meaningful adjudication in the enforcement and
implementation of the law. Like "public concern," the term due process does not admit of
any restrictive definition. Justice Frankfurter has viewed this flexible concept, aptly I
believe, as being ". . . compounded by history, reason, the past course of decisions, and
stout confidence in the democratic faith." 4 The framers of our own Constitution, it
would seem, have deliberately intended to make it malleable to the ever-changing milieu
of society. Hitherto, it is dynamic and resilient adaptable to every situation calling for its
application that makes it appropriate to accept an enlarged concept of the term as and
when there is a possibility that the right of an individual to life, liberty and property
might be diffused. 5 Verily, whenever there is an imminent threat to the life, liberty or
property of any person in any proceeding conducted by or under the auspices of the State,
his right to due process of law, when demanded, must not be ignored.

A danger to the liberty of the extraditee, the private respondent, is real. Article 9 of the
Extradition Treaty between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the
Government of the United States of America provides that in case of urgency, a
Contracting Party may request the provisional arrest of the person prior to the
presentation of the request for extradition. I see implicit in this provision that even after
the request for extradition is made and before a petition for extradition is filed with the
courts, the possibility of an arrest being made on the basis of a mere evaluation by the
Executive on the request for extradition by the foreign State cannot totally be discounted.
prcd

The conclusion reached by the majority, I hasten to add, does not mean that the Executive
Department should be impeded in its evaluation of the extradition request. The right of
the extraditee to be furnished, upon request, with a copy of the relevant documents and to
file his comment thereon is not necessarily anathema to the proceedings duly mandated
by the treaty to be made.
I vote to deny the petition.
PANGANIBAN, J., dissenting:
With due respect, I dissent.
The main issue before us is whether Private Respondent Mark B. Jimenez is entitled to
the due process rights of notice and hearing during the preliminary or evaluation stage of
the extradition proceeding against him.
Two Stages in
Extradition
There are essentially two stages in extradition proceedings: (1) the preliminary or
evaluation stage, whereby the executive authority of the requested state ascertains
whether the extradition request is supported by the documents and information required
under the Extradition Treaty; and (2) the extradition hearing, whereby the petition for
extradition is heard before a court of justice, which determines whether the accused
should be extradited.
cdrep

The instant petition refers only to the first stage. Private respondent claims that he has a
right to be notified and to be heard at this early stage. However, even the ponencia admits
that neither the RP-US Extradition Treaty nor PD 1069 (the Philippine Extradition Law)
expressly requires the Philippine government, upon receipt of the request for extradition,
to give copies thereof and its supporting documents to the prospective extraditee, much
less to give him an opportunity to be heard prior to the filing of the petition in court.

Notably, international extradition proceedings in the United States do not include the
grant by the executive authority of notice and hearing to the prospective extraditee at this
initial stage. It is the judge or magistrate who is authorized to issue a warrant of arrest and
to hold a hearing to consider the evidence submitted in support of the extradition request.
In contrast, in interstate rendition, the governor must, upon demand, furnish the fugitive
or his attorney copies of the request and its accompanying documents, pursuant to
statutory provisions. 1 In the Philippines, there is no similar statutory provision.
Evaluation Stage
Essentially Ministerial
The evaluation stage simply involves the ascertainment by the foreign affairs secretary of
whether the extradition request is accompanied by the documents stated in paragraphs 2
and 3, Article 7 of the treaty, relating to the identity and the probable location of the
fugitive; the facts of the offense and the procedural history of the case; provisions of the
law describing the essential elements of the offense charged and the punishment therefor;
its prescriptive period; such evidence as would provide probable cause for the arrest and
the committal for trial of the fugitive; and copies of the warrant or order of arrest and the
charging document. The foreign affairs secretary also sees to it that these accompanying
documents have been certified by the principal diplomatic or consular officer of the
Philippines in the United States, and that they are in the English language or have English
translations. Pursuant to Article 3 of the Treaty, he also determines whether the request is
politically motivated, and whether the offense charged is a military offense not
punishable under non-military penal legislation. 2
Upon a finding of the secretary of foreign affairs that the extradition request and its
supporting documents are sufficient and complete in form and substance, he shall deliver
the same to the justice secretary, who shall immediately designate and authorize an
attorney in his office to take charge of the case. The lawyer designated shall then file a
written petition with the proper regional trial court, with a prayer that the court take the
extradition request under consideration. 3
When the Right to Notice
and Hearing Becomes Available
According to Private Respondent Jimenez, his right to due process during the preliminary
stage emanates from our Constitution, particularly Section 1, Article III thereof, which
provides:
"No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of
law."

He claims that this right arises immediately, because of the possibility that he may be
provisionally arrested pursuant to Article 9 of the RP-US Treaty, which reads:
"In case of urgency, a Contracting Party may request the provisional arrest of
the person sought pending presentation of the request for extradition. A request
for provisional arrest may be transmitted through the diplomatic channel or
directly between the Philippine Department of Justice and the United States
Department of Justice.
xxx xxx xxx"

Justice Melo's ponencia supports private respondent's contention. It states that there are
two occasions wherein the prospective extraditee may be deprived of liberty: (1) in case
of a provisional arrest pending the submission of the extradition request and (2) his
temporary arrest during the pendency of the extradition petition in court. 4 The second
instance is not in issue here, because no petition has yet been filed in court.
However, the above-quoted Article 9 on provisional arrest is not automatically operative
at all times, and its enforcement does not depend solely on the discretion of the requested
state. From the wordings of the provision itself, there are at least three requisites: (1)
there must be an urgency, and (2) there is a corresponding request (3) which must be
made prior to the presentation of the request for extradition.
In the instant case, there appears to be no urgency characterizing the nature of the
extradition of private respondent. Petitioner does not claim any such urgency. There is no
request from the United States for the provisional arrest of Mark Jimenez either. And the
secretary of justice stated during the Oral Argument that he had no intention of applying
for the provisional arrest of private respondent. 5 Finally, the formal request for
extradition has already been made; therefore, provisional arrest is not likely, as it should
really come before the extradition request. 6
Mark Jimenez Not in
Jeopardy of Arrest
Under the outlined facts of this case, there is no open door for the application of Article
9, contrary to the apprehension of private respondent. In other words, there is no actual
danger that Jimenez will be provisionally arrested or deprived of his liberty. There is as
yet no threat that his rights would be trampled upon, pending the filing in court of the
petition for his extradition. Hence, there is no substantial gain to be achieved in
requiring the foreign affairs (or justice) secretary to notify and hear him during the
preliminary stage, which basically involves only the exercise of the ministerial power of
checking the sufficiency of the documents attached to the extradition request.

It must be borne in mind that during the preliminary stage, the foreign affairs secretary's
determination of whether the offense charged is extraditable or politically motivated is
merely preliminary. The same issue will be resolved by the trial court. 7 Moreover, it is
also the power and the duty of the court, not the executive authority, to determine
whether there is sufficient evidence to establish probable cause that the extraditee
committed the crimes charged. 8 The sufficiency of the evidence of criminality is to be
determined based on the laws of the requested state. 9 Private Respondent Jimenez will,
therefore, definitely have his full opportunity before the court, in case an extradition
petition will indeed be filed, to be heard on all issues including the sufficiency of the
documents supporting the extradition request. 10
Private respondent insists that the United States may still request his provisional arrest at
any time. That is purely speculative. It is elementary that this Court does not declare
judgments or grant reliefs based on speculations, surmises or conjectures.
In any event, even granting that the arrest of Jimenez is sought at any time despite the
assurance of the justice secretary that no such measure will be undertaken, our local laws
and rules of procedure respecting the issuance of a warrant of arrest will govern, there
being no specific provision under the Extradition Treaty by which such warrant should
issue. Therefore, Jimenez will be entitled to all the rights accorded by the Constitution
and the laws to any person whose arrest is being sought.
The right of one state to demand from another the return of an alleged fugitive from
justice and the correlative duty to surrender the fugitive to the demanding country exist
only when created by a treaty between the two countries. International law does not
require the voluntary surrender of a fugitive to a foreign government, absent any treaty
stipulation requiring it. 11 When such a treaty does exist, as between the Philippines and
the United States, it must be presumed that the contracting states perform their
obligations under it with uberrimae fidei, treaty obligations being essentially
characterized internationally by comity and mutual respect.
cdphil

The Need for Respondent Jimenez

To Face Charges in the US
One final point. Private respondent also claims that from the time the secretary of foreign
affairs gave due course to the request for his extradition, incalculable prejudice has been
brought upon him. And because of the moral injury caused, he should be given the
opportunity at the earliest possible time to stop his extradition. I believe that any moral
injury suffered by private respondent had not been caused by the mere processing of the
extradition request. And it will not cease merely by granting him the opportunity to be
heard by the executive authority. The concrete charges that he has allegedly committed
certain offenses already exist. These charges have been filed in the United States and are
part of public and official records there. Assuming the existence of moral injury, the only

means by which he can restore his good reputation is to prove before the proper judicial
authorities in the US that the charges against him are unfounded. Such restoration cannot
be accomplished by simply contending that the documents supporting the request for his
extradition are insufficient.
Conclusion
In the context of the factual milieu of private respondent, there is really no threat of any
deprivation of his liberty at the present stage of the extradition process. Hence, the
constitutional right to due process particularly the right to be heard finds no
application. To grant private respondent's request for copies of the extradition documents
and for an opportunity to comment thereon will constitute "over-due process" and
unnecessarily delay the proceedings.
WHEREFORE, I vote to grant the Petition.
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(Secretary of Justice v. Lantion, G.R. No. 139465, January 18, 2000)