Reading Bourdieu with Adorno: The Limits of Critical Theory and Reflexive Sociology

Author(s): Nedim Karakayali

Source: Sociology, Vol. 38, No. 2 (APRIL 2004), pp. 351-368
Published by: Sage Publications, Ltd.
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OCIOOI
2004
Copyright
BSA
Publications
Ltd
Volume
351-368
38(2):
DOI:10.1177/0038038504040869
SAGE
Publications
Thousand
London,
Oaks,
NewDelhi

with Adorno:
The Limits of
Bourdieu
Reading
Critical Theory
and Reflexive
Sociology
>

NedimKarakayali
Dalhousie
University

ABSTRACT
a certain
theconcerns
ofeveryday
from
distance
activity
presupposes
Scholarly
which
reflexive
hasbothliberating
andcrippling
effects,
Boundieu's
life,
sociology
of
thescholar
awareofthelimits
effects
hopesto undothesecrippling
bymaking
his
on
of
social
his/her
liberation'.
the
content
life,
emphasis
practical
Through
a powerful
ofcontemporary
totheoretical
alternative
Bourdieu
critiques
provides
Atthesametime,
readagainst
advanced
suchas Adamo*
society
bysociologists
'critical
this
as a
thebackground
move
itself
ofAdorno's
reflexive
appears
theory',
reflexlimitation.
ontheconditions
ofsociological
Dueto rtsemphasis
knowledge,
ivesociology
tendstosubordinate
hinders
to'epistemologi
and,therefore,
theory*
thesociobgstfromimagining
and
a different
Bourdieu'*
Readtogether;
society.
two
that
Adorno's
worksprovide
about
potential
dangers
insights
important
smf
that
onthepatiiofthesociologist
of'scienti
remain
Adorno's
critique
implies
the
not
to
fallato
an
be
may
escape
principle
adhering epistemologica!
enough
ofHheoretiasm'
whileBourdieu's
cious'representations
ofsocialreality
critique
it
thatonecannot
without
implies
graspsocialreality
'touching'
KEYWOHS
/critical
/reflexivity
/epistemology
Adomo/Bourdieu
/methodology
theory
Thesociology
ofhissocithateachsociologist
canperform
ofthesocialconditions
is
for
his
and
his
relation
to
...
the
ologicalpractice
sociology
precondition making
of
hisunconscious
andfora morecomplete
internalization
presuppositions
explicit
a moreadequateepistemology.
Pierre
etal.,1991:72)
Bourdieu
(Bourdieu
themselves.
Truethoughts
arethosealonewhichdo notunderstand
W.Adorno(1974:192)
Theodor
351

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352

38 Number
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2004
SociologyVolume
d f thereis a singlefeaturethatmakesBourdieustandout in thelandscape
I of contemporary
social theory',wroteLoie J.D. Wacquant(1992: 36), 'it
is his signatureobsessionwithreflexivity.'
is an
For Bourdieu,reflexivity
subjects',
epistemological
principlewhichadvisessociologists,as 'objectifying
to turntheirobjectifying
and becomeaware of thehidgaze upon themselves
denassumptions
thatstructure
theirresearch.Withoutthisreflexive
move,sociology cannot escape the 'fallaciesof scholasticism'and loses its chancesto
analysisof the social world. 'Reflexivesociology'
providea trulyscientific
involvestheconstitution
of a sociologicalhabitusthroughconstantrepetition
ofthisepistemological
Thus,Bourdieuoftenurgeshisreadersto read
principle.
he incessantly
hisworksas 'exercisebooks' ratherthanas theories.Conversely,
remindsus that'theory'shouldnot be valuedforitsown sake.
In theserespects,ifthereis a sociologistwho formsa starkcontrastwith
thatsociologistis no
Bourdieu,whileadheringto thesame 'critical'tradition,
doubtAdorno.AlthoughAdornotoo valuesself-reflection,
forhimreflexivity
is onlya firststepin thedevelopment
ofa criticalperspective.
The ultimateaim
ofcriticalthoughtis notso muchto havea more'scientific'
viewof socialrealand 'revealitto
ity,butto viewthisrealityfromthe'standpointofredemption'
be ... as indigentand distorted
as it willappearone day in themessianiclight'
cannotbe of muchhelphere;
(Adorno,1974: 247). Epistemological
principles
thisis the task of theory.Theoryis neverjust an instrument;
it is one of the
majorformsin whichcriticalthoughtcan have a life- evenifthisis a 'damaged life'.Justas Bourdieudisdains'theoreticaltheory',Adornoconstantly
of theoryto epistemology.
opposesthesubordination
Adorno'sand Bourdieu'sworks,of course,are fartoo complexto be sumbetween
marizedin termsof a simpledichotomy.
thediscrepancy
Nevertheless,
- whichshouldbe seen as aspects,ratherthan
theirapproachesto reflexivity
emblemsof theirworks- is not a mereexaggeration.
Indeed,one mighteven
sensea potentialhostility
whenfacedwiththe
here.'I felta certainirritation
aristocratic
demeanourofthattotalizing
critique',writesBourdieu(1990a: 19),
to theFrankfurt
School.He evensuggeststhatsociologyhas to define
referring
itselfagainstAdorno'swork(Bourdieu,1991: 247-8). Had Adornolivedlong
his replymighthave been equallyharsh.
enoughto counterthesecriticisms,
Bourdieu,he would most probablyargue,heraldsan age-old 'scientism'which,forAdorno,impliesa thoughtthatis preoccupiedwithitsown epistemologicalschemes- underthemaskof a 'reflexive
sociology'.
has remainedtiedto a numberofessential
Althoughtheissueof reflexivity
in contemporary
developments
sociology(Ashmore,1989; Bonner,2001; Piatt,
little
attention
has beenpaid to thispotentialdebateso far.Yet thedif1989),
a fruitful
feringapproachesof Bourdieuand Adornomightconstitute
starting
in social
to
a
tackle
the
role
of
point
generalproblemconcerning
reflexivity
research.This problemcan best be specifiedwithrespectto what Bourdieu
'
of thescholasticuniverses'.
(2000: 15) has called the fundamental
ambiguity
Due to theirdistancefromthesocial world,social scientists
can see thisworld

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Bourdieu
with
Adorno Karakayali 353
Reading
in a different
light,buttheyalso risklosingtheirconnectionto itspracticalcontent.Scholasticactivityentails'botha liberating
breakand a disconnection,
a
allowssocial
potentially
separation'(Bourdieu,2000: 15). Reflexivity
crippling
scientists
to recognizethelimitsof theirliberating
breakwiththesocial.While
Adornotoo is highlycriticalof thefalsesenseof redemption
thatmightresult
fromthescholasticbreak,he is muchlesshesitantaboutaffirming
itsliberating
'In
wrested
from
the
end
is
the
realitybynegatingit,
powers:
hope,
onlyform
inwhichtruthappears'(Adorno,1974: 98). Howevertheoretical
this'negation'
theverygroundson whichone can imaginea different
mightbe, it constitutes
If
reflexive
aimsto bringback intothepicturethat
society.
sociologyprimarily
whichis repressedin/byscholasticthought
aims to
, criticaltheoryprimarily
revealthatwhichis repressedin/bythesocial.
thesetwo tendencies
whichare emphaMy aim hereis notto 'synthesize'
but
sizedin different
Bourdieu
and
rather
to highlight
Adorno,
by
proportions
I
theirinterplay
and limits. tryto show thatAdorno'scritiqueof 'scientism'
of 'reflexive
bringsin to focussomeofthelimitations
sociology'withrespectto
theprojectof a criticalsocial science.Conversely,
Bourdieu'scritiqueof 'intellectualistbias' underlines
thepotentialrisksof a 'theoretical'critiqueas practicedbyAdorno.

Bourdieu and Reflexive Sociology

Bourdieu'searliestwork dealingwithepistemological
issues is The Craftof
Sociology(Bourdieuet al., 1991; firstpublishedin Frenchin 1968). The argumentsof this book, which Bourdieu(1991) has later characterizedas too
'theoreticist'
and 'somewhatridiculous',havebeenconsiderably
in his
modified
laterworks.Nevertheless,
The Craftprovidesthemostsystematic
presentation
of theepistemological
of Bourdieu'ssociology.1
underpinnings
Bourdieuand his colleaguesopen thisworkby arguingthat'forthesociwithhis social universeis theepistemological
obstaclepar
ologist,familiarity
'
excellence
(Bourdieuet al., 1991: 13). To be 'familiar'witha socialworldis to
possessa 'spontaneousknowledge'of thisworld,as in thecase of unconscious
internalization
of 'everydaynotions'.In thisearlywork,Bourdieupositsspontaneousknowledgeas theveryoppositeof scientific
knowledge.This polarization is partlybased on the theoriesof FrenchphilosopherGaston Bachelard
a generationof intellectuals
in Francein the 1960s,
(1968) who influenced
in
includingAlthusserand Foucault.What Bourdieufindsmost interesting
Bachelard'sworkis histhesisthatsciencebeginsand proceedswitha seriesof
breaks'.An epistemological
break,in essence,is a breakwith
'epistemological
familiarconceptionsof theworld.Scienceis, above all, a new way of looking
at things.A scientific
thatare most
sociologyhas to 'break the relationships
apparentbecause most familiar,in order to bringout the new systemof
relationsamongtheelements'(Bourdieuet al., 1991: 14). Thiscan be achieved

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whichhave themerit
throughtheuse of varioustechniquesof objectification,
of dissecting'concretetotalitiesthatare presentedto intuitionand replacing
themwiththesetof abstractcriteria... [like]occupation,income,educational
level,etc.' (Bourdieuet al., 1991: 14).
of
However,alreadyin The Craft
, Bourdieunotesthatmereobjectification
socialrelationsis neverenough.Everyday
notionsare 'tenacious'and theobjectification
processthroughwhichthe sociologistconstructshis/her
categories
can easilyfallpreyto these'pre-notions':'most ... metaphorical
schemesare
commonto naiveutterances
and eruditediscourse,and indeedtheyderivetheir
force
from
thisdoublelife'(Bourdieuet al., 1991: 23). This
pseudo-explanatory
to the'sociologyof sociology'- i.e. the'sociolis whereBourdieu'sinvitation
of thesocial conditionsof his sociologiogythateach sociologistcan perform
cal practice'(Bourdieuet al., 1991: 72) - comes into the picture.Since 'all
scientific
he contends,a true
practice... involvestheoretical
presuppositions',
in
that
break
the
social
researcher
become
epistemological
sociologyrequires
on whichs/hebuildshis/her
theories
consciousof the (latent)presuppositions
(Bourdieuet al., 1991: 39).
At thisearlystage,Bourdieuposits'sociologyof sociology'as a necessary
break'.This configuration
goes throughan
step towardsan 'epistemological
in
his
later
works.
The
transformation
Craftalreadyinvolveda cerimportant
as to whetherthe majortask of 'sociologyof sociology'is to
tain ambiguity
or to
clearsociologicalthoughtfromthecategoriesof spontaneousknowledge,
their
own
their
warnsocial scientists
objects
againstimposing
categoriesupon
who uses 'adult'categoriesin his/her
sur(as in thecase of a childpsychologist
betweenthesetwo
veys).In his laterworks,Bourdieubeginsto distinguish
mannerand associates'reflexive
sociology'almost
problemsin a moreclear-cut
break'withthelatterproblem.At thesametime,'epistemological
exclusively
whichBourdieunow beginsto referto as 'objectivistbreak' ceases to be the
ultimateaim of 'reflexive
sociology'.
breakwithpre-notions,
Theobjectivist
[etc.],
ideologies,
spontaneous
sociology,
saysBourdieu,in a lecturedelivered18 yearsafterthefirstpublicationof The
,
Craft
... [but]itisnecessary
ofthescientific
moment
isan inevitable,
necessary
enterprise
ina
breakwithobjectivism
toeffect
a secondandmoredifficult
, byreintroducing,
secondstage,whathad to be excludedin orderto construct
objective
reality.
of thesocialworld...
Sociologymustincludea sociologyof theperception
1990a:
129-30).
(Bourdieu,
of this
In his laterworks,Bourdieurepeatedly
emphasizestheimportance
reflection
is theone thatconsistsin objecti'secondbreak':'themosteffective
thesubjectofobjectification'
(Bourdieu,2000: 10; see also: 1977, 1990a,
fying
the main strugglewas between'spontaneoussociology'
1991). In The Crafty
whichremainedtoo 'close' to 'thesocial',and 'scientific
sociology',whichwas
supposedto constantlybreakwiththis familiarworld. In contrast,now he

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Bourdieu
withAdorno Karakayali 355
Reading
characterizes
break'as a 'social break'whichblindsthescholar
'epistemological
to thepracticallifeof his/her
subjects(Bourdieu,2000: 189).
Bourdieudoes notdishowever,
modifications,
Despiteall theseimportant
tancehimselffromThe Craftin a radicalway.Indeed,ifhis breakwithobjectivismdoes notlead himto adopt a 'subjectivist'
or 'relativist'position,thisis
becausehe nevergivesup themostessentialprojectof The Craft
, namely,the
searchfora 'moreadequateepistemology'
whichwill be thebasis of a 'scientificsociology'. The unmistakableprimacyhe attributesto epistemology2
remainsintactevenin his mostrecentworkswherehe continuesto characterize 'epistemological
questioning'as beingessentialforthecriticalanalysisof
'theveryformand contentof whatwe think'(Bourdieu,2000: 49).
I believeit is this'doublegesture'- breakwithobjectivism
butnotscience
- whichgivesBourdieu'sreflexive
and epistemology
sociologyits distinctive
characteristics.
As Wacquant(1992: 36-47) notes,Bourdieu'sapproachdiffers
fromtwocurrent,
i.e. the'phenomenological'
and 'postmodern',
usesof reflexBourdieudistanceshimself
fromphenomenology
ivityin sociology.3
bynotlinkby not using
ing reflexivity
directlyto 'subjects',and from'postmodernism'
to attackthefoundations
of thesocial sciencesas such.More generreflexivity
alternative
to thestandard
ally,Bourdieu'sworkis oftenviewedas a meaningful
cognitivemodels and antinomies(e.g. objectivism-subjectivism;
positivismrelativism)in the social sciences(Heilbron,1999; Meisenhelder,
1997; Pels,
2000). However,whenitcomesto comparingBourdieuto Adorno,who is also
a
keenlyaware of theproblemsassociatedwiththesemodelsand antinomies,
wholenew setof problemscomesto thefore.
Adorno, Critical Theory and Reflexivity
Like Bourdieu,Adornois highlycriticalof positivism
as well as thesociological applicationsof phenomenology
Adorno
et al., 1976; Rose,
(Adorno,2000;
concurwithBourdieuabout the
1978).4In fact,he would almostcompletely
natureof sociologicalknowledge:'The given,the factswhich,in accordance
withitsmethods,[sociology]encounters
as something
final,are notthemselves
finalbutratherare conditioned'(Adornoet al., 1976: 84-5).
Adornodoes stressthatsociologistsshould be particularly
Furthermore,
self-reflective
sincetheobjectof theirinquiry- 'society'- is also potentially
a
different
fromtheobjectof manyothersciences:
subjectand therefore
takesovertheself-sufficiency
oftheotherscience-types,
with[I]fsociology
simply
outincorporating
a manner
ofreflecting
bothon itself
andon itsrelationship
toits
itwillreallysuffer
from
deformation
ofthekindwhich
matter,
subject
phenomena
Habermas
referred
toas Restricted
2000: 128)
(Adorno,
experience'.
As withtheawarenessof thehistoricity5
of sociologicalcategories,a reflexive
a social
approachallowsthecriticalsociologistto avoid theillusionof treating
fact'as something
as something
whichin principle... is
natural,and therefore

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unalterable'(Adorno,2000: 149). To understand
thatsocial realityis alterable
of imagining
a different
entailsthepossibility
societyand thereinliesthesignificanceof a reflexive
approach.
is not a majorepistemological
However,accordingto Adorno,reflexivity
to a 'scientific'
principlein movingfroma 'prescientific'
sociology.He vehementlyopposes such a distinctionand maintainsthat '[unlessprescientific
or extra-scientific
interests
conceptsare importedintoeveryscientific
sociological investigation,
interests
and conceptsare entirely
thenscientific
lackingas
well' (Adorno,2000: 125-6). In fact,Adornosometimes
goes as faras to argue
- a certainnaivety- can be an asset.A thought
thattheabsenceof reflexivity
does notnecessarily
becomemore'true'becauseits'author'understands
it better.In Kafka,as wellas inWeber,someofthemostvaluableideasarethosethat
remainopaque to their'creators'(Adorno,1981b, 2000: 121).
to Adorno'srelationto 'reflexGillianRose (1978) has paid muchattention
ivesociology'in general.ForAdorno,shepointsout,whatcharacterizes
reflexconcernwiththegroundof itsown activity
ivesociologyis 'an epistemological
arisingfroma criticalawarenessof the way in whichconventionalsociology
"constitutes"its object in its theorizing'(Rose, 1978: 143). In this respect,
betweenpositivistand reflexive
Adornodoes not see any essentialdifference
more
or
less explicitly
Reflexive
whatpositivism
sociology.
sociology'repeats
the
of
bases
truth
or
on
does implicitly,
reality
analysis consciousness,
namely
constricted
consciousness
and therebyreducessocial realityto a demonstrably
is
no
less
of it' (Rose, 1978: 143). Positivist
sociology
preoccupiedwithelimiin
involved
researchthanreflexive
'bias'
from
the
nating
cognitiveprocesses
a
if
this
is
not
realized
even
through 'sociologyof sociology'but
sociology
tools.On manyoccasionsAdorno
of
through
allegedperfection methodological
whichimpliesan
as
'scientism'
refersto such an endeavour
(or 'scientifism')
epistemology
preoccupiedwith its own schemes(Adorno,2000: 19-26 and
reflexive,
127-8; Adornoet al., 1976). Justas positivistsociologyis implicitly
scientistic.
reflexive
sociologyis implicitly
However,Adorno'scritiqueof reflexivesociology,especiallyas Gillian
In
Rose reconstructs
it, is mostlybased on his critiqueof phenomenology.
extendingthiscritiqueto Bourdieu'swork,we need to pay attentionto the
In thiscontext,perhapsthebestway to
uniqueaspectsof his use of reflexivity.
betweenAdornoand Bourdieuis to compare
the main difference
understand
theirrespective
critiquesof positivism.
withpositivist
Adorno,likeBourdieu,is dissatisfied
sociology'sconception
of 'society'as a mere 'object' (Adorno, 1969/70; Adorno,2000: 136-44;
he insiststhatwhenpositivist
Adornoet al., 1976). At thesametime,however,
as an object,theyare notwrongas such.
sociologiststreat'society'exclusively
underthe reignof capitalismsociety
For especially,thoughnot exclusively,
What
whichconcealsitspotentialsubjectivity.
turnsintoan opaque structure
of
failto recognizeis thehistoricalbasis of theirconception society
positivists
(Adornoet al., 1976: 75-6). GillianRose describesAdorno'sviewson therela: 'science
sociologyand social realitybya chiasmus
tionshipbetweenpositivist

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Bourdieu
withAdorno Karakayali 357
Reading
societyas staticand invariant;
societyhas producedthestaticand
misrepresents
whichsciencedescribes'(Rose, 1978: 13). It shouldbe noted
invariant
features
thatthereis a doublecritique:a critiqueof positivist
sociologyas a misrepresentationof societybut also a critiqueof social relationsas theoriginof this
(see Adorno,1969/70;Adornoetal., 1976: 108). Thismeans
misrepresentation
thatone cannotcarryout a critiqueof thesocial scienceswithouta critiqueof
socialrelations;the'theoryofsociologicalknowledge'cannotbe detachedfrom
the'theoryof society'.
In contrast,Bourdieunot onlydrawsa sharpdistinction
between'theory'
theformer
to thelatter.The choice
and 'epistemology'
buthe also subordinates
of thesociologist,accordingto him,lies between'the untenabledemandfora
or the ineluctabledemandfor
general,universaltheoryof social formations
a theoryof sociologicalknowledge'(Bourdieuet al., 1991: 30). Such a sharp
in theworkofa sociologistwho at the
ofcourse,is quiteperplexing
distinction,
sametimemaintainsthat'erroris inseparablefromthesocialconditionswhich
makeit possibleand sometimesinevitable'(Bourdieuet al., 1991: 69). In fact,
of a generaltheoryof societyforhis
Bourdieuhimselfalludesto thenecessity
when
he
writesthat'[spontaneousopinions
of
critique spontaneoussociology
... becausethefunctions
constitute
havesuchstrength
themselves
a
theyfulfill
1991:
et
Bourdieu's
refusal
to
93). Yet,
system'(Bourdieu al.,
give 'theory'a
centralplace in hissociologyis neitheran oversight,
noris it uniqueto hisearlierworks.Thisrefusalis so constantand so strongthatitstopshimfromwritthisvolume'would have
ingthesecondvolumeof The Craftsince,ifwritten,
beena generaltheory'(Bourdieu,1991: 254).
If Bourdieurefusesto proposea generaltheoryof society,thisis mainly
becausehe sees something
even morehazardousin such an attemptthanthe
- namely,
paradoxicalconsequencesof separating'theory'from'epistemology'
thetendency
of sucha theoryto disregardempiricalresearchand to 'terrorize'
In thisrespect,Bourdieu's'choice' is diametrisociologywithitsspeculations.6
callyopposed to Adorno'sclaim thatin orderto performa criticalfunction,
sociologyshould necessarily'negate' the empirically
given:'only the person
who can conceptualizea different
societyfromtheexistingone can experience
it as a problem'(Adornoet al., 1976: 120). What,forexample,capitalistsoci- or,includesas a potentiality
- cannotsimplybe observed.7
It has
etyrepresses
to be imaginedor desired;a socialtheorythatdisregards
thiscan onlyservethe
statusquo (Adorno,2000: 66-8).
the non-empirical
notionof (social)
Thus, Adornoinsistson preserving
'totality'whichencompassesbothwhat a societyis in itsactualityand in its
(Adorno,1969/70,1999; Horkheimerand Adorno,1997). This
potentiality
insistence,as Jameson(1990: 38) pointsout, impliesthat '[i]n practice,...
Adorno'ssociologicaltheorizationwill always be meta-critical',
treatingthe
'concepts' of sociology themselvesas 'data'. In this respect,thereis not
much differencebetween Adorno and Bourdieu. However, as Jameson
(1990: 38) further
observes,Adorno'smeta-critique'is not a matterof the
sociologyof sociologistsexactly,... rather,even at theirmost intellectually

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energetic,the conceptsof sociologycannot but be flawed and fractured'.
The 'flaws' in sociological knowledgeexist because contemporary
society,
the object as well as the conditionof sociology,is itselfanimatedby contradiction.
The difference
betweenAdornoand Bourdieubecomesall themorevisible
whenwe look at theirrespective
approachesto whatmightbe consideredas the
to one such
mostgeneral'flaw'of sociology,namely,its'antinomies'.Referring
versussubjectivist
'antinomy'(i.e. objectivist
sociology),Bourdieu(1990a: 125)
writesthat'themoststeadfast(and, in myeyes,themostimportant)
intention
work
has
been
to
overcome
it'.
While
Bourdieu
also
maintains
that
guidingmy
'one would haveto havea naivefaithin thevirtuesof epistemological
preaching if one neglectedto considerthe social conditions'(Bourdieuet al., 1991:
believesthatreflexive
theartificial
69), he nevertheless
sociologycan 'transcend
'substantialist'
and
'relationalist'
between
modes
of
opposition'
thinking
(Bourdieu,1990a: 125). For Adorno,in contrast,theseoppositionsare not
buthistorical.
Likethecontradictions
ofidealism(Adorno,1999), or
'artificial',
of 'Enlightenment'
(Horkheimerand Adorno,1997), sociologicalantinomies
in the social structure
emanatefromreal contradictions
(Adorno,1969-70).
Thus,unlikeBourdieu(2000: 50) who wantsto 'surpass',througha reflexive
and Adorno
thedivisionbetween'low' and 'high'culture,Horkheimer
strategy,
this
'division
itself
is
the
truth'
i.e.
the
'truth'of
state
that
(1997: 135) bluntly
for
a
theoretical
which
Bourdieu,
society.If,
disregards
critique
contemporary
forAdornoto suggest
empiricalresearchis as untenableas 'blindempiricism',
thattheflawsof sociologicalknowledgecan be remediedby 'epistemological
sociologywhichis largelyemptiedof its
vigilance'is to proposea 'scientistic'
criticalpowers.
refrainfromreachingto a hastyconclusionlike
We should nevertheless
'Bourdieuthinksantinomiescan be overcomeand Adornodoes not'. Adorno,
forexample,emphasizesthat,althoughthe antinomiesof sociologyare not
'artificial',theyare neitheruniversal,nor inevitable.The task of 'negative
dialectics'is neitherto overcome,nor to accept,but to revealand agitate,to
Bourdieu(1990a: 125) does
induce'hope' (Adorno,1974, 1999). Conversely,
notthinkthattheflawsof sociologycan be remediedat one stroke.Alreadyin
The Craft
, he maintainsthatthe strugglebetweenspontaneousand scientific
as a
sociologyis a continuousone. In his laterworkshe refersto reflexivity
of theever'incomplete'
'constanteffort'(Bourdieu,2000: 52). The recognition
- also notedby Pels (2000) - entailsthatreflexive
sociolnatureof reflexivity
as
a
be
seen
should
practice.
ogy
betweenthetwo socioldifference
Andthisis perhapsthemostimportant
but
less
for
more
room
there
is
space for'imagination'in
'practice',
ogists:
Bourdieu'sreflexivesociologythan in Adorno'swork. Two questions,then,
cometo thefore:whatare thelimitsof Bourdieu's'practice',and whatare the
limitsof Adorno's'imagination'?

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Bourdieu
withAdorno Karakayali 359
Reading
Theoretical Critique and the Limits of Reflexive Sociology
Bourdieu'sreflexive
like'epistemologisociologyis fullof practicalsuggestions
'one shouldnot be afraidto encourca! vigilance',a 'systemof cross-checks',
age a systematic
prejudiceagainstall fashionableideas', etc. (Bourdieuet al.,
1991: 74-7). More importantly,
Bourdieuunceasingly
emphasizesthepractical
contentof social life.This orientation
towards'practice'mightevenbe seenas
resultingfromBourdieu'sstruggleagainstscientisticinclinationsin his own
work.In The Craft
Alexandre
, it shouldbe noted,Bourdieucould stillaffirm
that'directexperiencehas playedno part,otherthanas an
Koyr'sstatement
obstacle,in the birthof classicalsciences'(p. 37); two decades later,he will
ratherharshlyforproducing'a grandtheorywithout
attacktheAlthusserians
'a worker,or a peasant,or anything'(Bourdieu
without
ever
seeing
agents'
1991: 252).
turnsinto a 'constanteffort',
Paradoxicallyenough,the morereflexivity
and themoreBourdieuattacksscholasticism
throughhisemphasison practice,
themorereflexive
becomes
sociology
entangledin thescholasticfield.In effect,
mostof Bourdieu's'practical'suggestionsare essentiallymethodological
and
'I blamemostof myreaders',he writes,'forhavepistemological
suggestions.
handing consideredas theoreticaltreatises... works that,like gymnastics
forbeingput intopractice'
books,wereintendedforexercise,or even better,
(Bourdieu,1993: 271). This is not onlya protestagainstan abstractinterpretationof his works;whatBourdieureallywantshis readersto 'put intopractice' is a methodwhich will eventuallyturninto a habitusas a resultof
(Bourdieu,1993; Brubaker,
1993).
repetition
All thisentailsthatreflexive
withthe
sociologyconcernsitselfprimarily
the
.
Most
of
its
become
invested
in
the
practiceof
sociologist
powers
projectof
'a
of
to
the
constitution
of thecraftof
building system dispositionsnecessary
the sociologistin its universality'
(Bourdieu,1993: 271). As such,Bourdieu's
proposalthatthesociological'self'- evenwhenthisis consideredto be a collectiveself- shouldconstantly
be reconstituted
through'sociologyofsociology'
comes veryclose to repeatingwhat GillianRose (1978: 143) has called 'the
becausea reference
to selfis judgedlogically
paradoxofsociologicalreflexivity:
to
a
reference
to
and
are
lost
in an infinite
prior
society,society
history
regress
of self-constitution'.
to
Althoughitwouldbe absurdto accuseBourdieuof notpayingattention
Rose's
comments
are
not
irrelevant.
To
understand
the
comsociety,
completely
plexformin whichthe'paradoxof reflexivity'
operatesin Bourdieu'swork,we
needto focuson theclose linkhe drawsbetweensociologicaltheoryand social
conditions.Especiallyin his laterworks,Bourdieudefinesone of the major
tasksof reflexivity
as forcingscholasticthoughtto 'the pointwhereit would
encounterthesocial' (Bourdieu,2000: 50). Onlysuchan encountercan act as
an antidoteagainstthetendency
of scholasticthoughtto forgetitsown conditionsof existence.

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2 April
2004
38 Number
SociologyVolume
Bourdieu(1991) himself
has triedto explainthechangesin hissociological
to thehistorical
contextofhiswork,particularly
therise
trajectory
byreferring
ofstructuralism
whichhe foundtoo theoreticist.
We might,however,
traceback
Bourdieu'semphasison 'the social' also to a certaindifficulty
in his earlier
between'scientific'
works,namely,the embarrassing
similarity
sociologyand
what he identifies
as the aesthetic/scholastic
, as it is well
gaze. In Distinction
known,Bourdieushows how the 'pure aestheticgaze', whichhas been presentedas a universalpointof viewsinceKant,is theperspective
of a particular
class.This 'gaze' is theproductof 'a lifeofease - thattendsto inducean active
distancefromnecessity'(Bourdieu,1984: 5). Thanksto thisdistance,members
of upperclassescan movefromthe'primarystratum'of a culturalproductto
the 'stratumof secondarymeanings',to formsand relationships.
This move
ofcourse,is also a characteristic
ofthescholasfrom'practical'to 'theoretical',
ticgaze.
Whatis striking
hereis theclearparallelbetweentheway inwhichtheaesthetic/scholastic
givenand theway
'gaze' distancesitselffromtheimmediately
in whichwhat Bourdieuin The Craftrefersto as 'scientific'
sociologyis supfrom
common
sense
to
distance
itself
(Geldof,
1997;
0sterberg,1988:
posed
Bourdieu
has
In
his
most
recent
works,
180).
openlyacknowledgedthesesimilarities.The growingemphasisin hisworkon thesocial conditionsof scholasin a 'subversive'
tic thoughtcan be seen as an attemptto use this affinity
the
of
uses
manner.Reflexive
sociology,by'objectifying subject objectification',
Bourdieu
itself.
Reflexive
theaesthetic/scholastic
admits,
thought,
gaze against
scholastic
is 'itselfscholastic'but it provides'the only means ... of fighting
inclinations'(Bourdieu,2000: 52): by forcingscholasticthoughtto encounter
thefallaciesof scholasticism.
thesocial,it bothavoidsand fights
Rose's commentsabout the'paraSo far,so good. However,remembering
we need to ask: what about 'the social'? To put it more
dox of reflexivity',
whatgood does it do to 'thesocial' thatsociologyliberatesitselffrom
crudely,
scholasticfallacies?Can we assumethatby freeingsociologyfromscholasticism,one also liberatesthesocial world- which,as Bourdieuis keenlyaware,
involvesso muchsuffering?
True,reflexive
sociologycan counterthesymbolic
it has
violencecommitted
by scholarlydiscourses,but beyondthisresistance,
the
issue
of
it
comes
to
when
little
to
offer,
goingbeyondthe
especially
very
a move. With
forbids
such
it
If
conditions.
anything, deliberately
existing
seemsto
Bourdieu
of
scholastic
to
the
'fundamental
activity,
ambiguity'
respect
rather
than
from
its
the
scholastic
to
liberate
fallacies,
making
thought
prefer
break(see: Bourdieu,2000: 7).
full- and therefore
risky- use of itsliberating
butitis to say
Allthisis notto saythatreflexive
sociologyis 'conservative',
in
the
clarified
can
best
be
This
'vision'.
thatit lacksa
lightof Bourdieu's
point
'To
and
social
of
discussion 'symbolicpower'
change the world',
change.
the
has
to
'one
Bourdieu(1990a: 137) argues,
waysof worldmaking,
change
the
world
and
of
the
thatis,thevision
practicaloperationsbywhichgroupsare
producedand reproduced.'Symbolicpoweris thepowerof imposinga certain
social theory
visionof the worldupon the world.Seen fromthisperspective

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Bourdieu
withAdorno Karakayali 361
Reading
itselfappearsas a domainof struggle
for'symbolicpower',sinceitinvolvesdifferentvisionsof society.How does thisstrugglework?Here Bourdieupoints
to thegivenand capable of
out thattheoryshouldbe seenas bothsubordinate
it. On theone hand,'symbolicefficacy
dependson thedegreeto
transcending
whichthevisionproposedis foundedin reality';on theother,thisveryreality
'beginsto exist only when it is selectedand designatedas such' (Bourdieu,
1990a: 138).
The problemis thatalthoughBourdieurecognizesthepotentialof theory
to go beyondthegiven,in his own sociology,he deniessuch a role to theory.
can shapesocial reality,
but
Reflexive
sociologyrevealshow symbolicstruggles
in
the
of
science.
If
it oftenfallsshortof 'struggling'
name
Bourdieu's
except
attemptto break with scientismin his later works is imbuedwith friction
(Robbins,1991), this is preciselybecause the symbolicpower of Bourdieu's
restson itsclaimto 'scientificity'.
sociologyprimarily
in articulating
Thisis notto undermine
Bourdieu'slife-long
'interest'
reflexThis
latter
ivesociologywithhisfight
social
however,
injustice.
against
struggle,
is notintrinsic
to reflexive
sociology.WhenPinto(2000: 88) describesBourdieu
as 'a renownedsociologistwho has puthisscientific
capitalat theserviceofethical and politicalprinciples',
he revealsin a mostprofoundway,althoughpernatureof therelationship
theextrinsic
betweenreflexive
haps notintentionally,
and
involvement.
Bourdieu
himself
Bourdieu's
makesitclear
sociology
political
thathispoliticalinterventions
stemfrom'rage' or from'something
likea sense
of duty'(Bourdieu,1998a: vii) whichclearlyrequirelittle'reflexivity'.
Bourdieuuses his 'scientific
capital' not onlywithgreatcare but also for
the benefitof disadvantagedgroups.But thereis no guaranteethat'reflexive
thisway.Whenhe writes,'I was providing
sociology'willalwaysbe performed
instruments
thatcould be turnedagainstme' (Bourdieu,2000: 4), he also seems
to recognizethis risk. We need to appreciatethe strategicimportanceof
Bourdieu'sattemptto putthetoolsof scholarlypracticeat theserviceof social
we also
critique.At the same time,followingAdorno'scritiqueof scientism,
needto pay attentionto thedangerof fetishizing8
as a magictool
'reflexivity'
thatcan rendertheoretical
reflection
redundant.
Theoreticism and 'Intellectualist Bias'
That Bourdieu'ssystematic
refusalto allow 'theoreticallogic' to take precedencein reflexive
sociologyhas problematic
consequencesdoes not meanthat
his critiqueof 'theoreticism'
and 'intellectualism'
is withoutany significant
value.In turning
hisgaze back on thepracticeof sociologists,Bourdieuidentifiesa numberof biaseswhichcan cripplesociologicalresearch.The mostobvious sourcesof bias includethesocial positionof the researcher,
notablyclass
and gender,and the hiddeninterestsof individualacademicsas well as of
researchinstitutions
(Bourdieu,1977, 1988, 1990a; Wacquant,1992: 39). But
theseare notthemostdifficult
to
typesof bias to tacklesince'theyare unlikely

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2 April
38 Number
2004
SociologyVolume
criticism
of thosewho are drivenbyotherprejudices
escape theself-interested
or convictions'(Bourdieu,2000: 10). The mostprofoundtypeof bias thatpermeatesthescholasticfieldis whatBourdieucalls 'intellectualist'
(or 'scholastic')
bias ariseswhenthe researcher
is not consciousof or not
bias. Intellectualist
the
criticalof the 'presuppositions
inscribedin theact of thinking
sufficiently
fromtheworldand fromactionin theworldinorderto think
world,ofretiring
thataction' (Bourdieuand Wacquant,1992: 39). The resultis theinabilityto
graspthe'logicof practice'(Bourdieu,1977, 1990a, 1990b).
Attimes,Bourdieustretches
themeaningofintellectualist
bias a bittoo far:
'To be able to see and describetheworldas it is, you have to be readyto be
alwaysdealingwiththingsthatare complicated,confused,impure,uncertain,
'
all of whichrunscounterto theusual idea of intellectual
rigour(Bourdieuet
al., 1991: 259 [myemphasis]).It is ratherquestionablethattheaim of sociology,especiallyof a criticalkind,can simplybe definedas 'to describetheworld
as it is'. It is also doubtfulthat'intellectual
rigour'is alwaysopposedto comdialectics'
whichaim to underlinethe irreAdorno's
(1999)
'negative
plexity.
to
its
would
be a case in point (see also
of
the
'object'
ducibility
'concept'
Adornoet al., 1976: 77).
bias' mightbe muchmorehelpful
I believethe notionof 'intellectualist
in thesenseBourdieuuses it in
understoodin a narrowersense- particularly
bias operresearch9
wherehe showsthatintellectualist
hisearlierethnographic
in a societytoo literally,
ates bytakingabstractrulesor classifications
believing
thatpeople'follow'themblindlyin practice.By assumingthatone can understandsocial lifeby simply'discovering'its rulesand systemsof classification,
the 'intellectualist'
perspectiveignoresthe logic of practice,i.e. the ways in
it
are negotiatedor outrightviolated.Furthermore,
whichabstractstructures
also becomesa sourceof 'symbolicviolence'againstthe subjectsstudied,by
in thesocialworld(Bourdieu,
theiractiveparticipation
denyingor depreciating
As
Bourdieu's
such,
1977, 1990b; Taylor,1993).
critiquemightevenallow us
bias' at workin Adorno'sthought.
to recognizethe'intellectualist
can be observedin
The mostvividexamplesof Adorno's'intellectualism'
music
and
mass
culture
his workson popular
(Adorno,1981a; Adornoand
Horkheimer
and
Adorno,1997). 10For it is especiallyhere,I
Simpson,1949;
and
themostdisturbing
'theoreticism'
both
his
believe,
aspectof histhought,
i.e. his 'mandarin cultural conservatism'(Jay,1984), come to the fore.
Adorno's distastefor popular music is well known (1981a). The problem
butwithhis
hereis notso muchwithhis criticalviewson 'cultureindustry'11
with
music
to
analyticcategoriesderived
products
attempt analyzepopular
As someof hiscritchoice
is
not
This
'art
music'.
from
insignificant.
analytic
of musistructure
and
the
tonal
in
ics have pointedout, privileging
rhythmic
Adorno
art
in
is
as
cal products,
music,
ignoresthe
customary analyzing
social
various
tied
with
and
is
music
in
which
social context
experienced
pop
most
essenas
the
be
considered
What
movements(Gendron,1986).
might
tial aspects of pop music in its experientialcontext('sound', 'style',etc.)
appear to Adornoas mere'auxiliary'parts.His highlyspeculativeassump-

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Bourdieu
withAdorno Karakayali 363
Reading
tion that a simplemusical structurecan only lead to a 'regressive'social
experienceis a blatantexample of the subordinationof the concreteto the
abstract.As Bourdieuwould say,Adorno reads the logic of theoryinto the
logicof practice.
Much of the same disregardfor'practice'can also be seen in Adorno's
attackson mass culturein general (Jarvis,1998: 79-80). The absence of
'people' in some of Adorno'scriticalessaysis so conspicuousthatone might
questionwhetherthepeoplematterat all. We onlyneedto comparehisessays
on televisionto Bourdieu's(1998b) researchon the same topic, to notice
Adorno's'presumptuousness':
televisionmakesthem[i.e. viewers]
'Presumably
once again intowhattheyalreadyare, onlymoreso' (Adorno,1998a: 50). In
these respects,there is nothingin Adorno that even remotelyresembles
Bourdieu'sresistanceto elitism.Even whenAdorno(1981c) attacksthe 'elite'
culturecritic,he does so mainlybecause the criticflirtstoo muchwiththe
'masses'.This leavesone wondering
whetherAdornowould be able to perceive
the'irrational'tendencies
and 'self-despair'
and minoriamongtheunderclasses
as Bourdieu(1998a) and hiscoltiesofourworldtodayin theirfullcomplexity
laborators(Bourdieu et al., 1999) do - especiallyif one remembershis
commentsabout some of his informants
in The Authoritarian
humiliating
1969:
et
(Adorno
al.,
612).
Personality
The factthat Adorno'stheoreticism
can so easily fall preyto cultural
with
to
conservatism,especially
respect mass culture,justifiesBourdieu's
observationthatthe 'effectsof scholasticdistortionare all the moresignificant and scientifically
disastrouswhen the people that science takes as its
object are more remote from academic universes in their conditions'
Adorno'sdisregardfor'practice',com(Bourdieu,2000: 50). Furthermore,
binedwithhis bleak portrayalof contemporary
societyas one in whichthe
has
almost
all
exchangeprinciple penetrated
spheresof social life(Adorno,
1974; Horkheimerand Adorno,1997), has seriousimplicationsfor'politics
of mass culture' (Jarvis,1998: 77-80). This rathertotalizingconception
leads himto developa strongscepticismtowardsall attemptsof 'innovation'
in modern culture - the source of his well-knowndisagreementwith
Benjamin,Brechtand Hanns Eisler.12
Andthisis perhapswherewe shouldtakeBourdieu'swarningsagainstthe
mostseriously.Indeed,thoseraremoments
cripplingeffectsof 'theoreticism'
whenAdornotendsto giveup hisuncompromising
approachtowardsmasscultureare also the momentswhen he seemsto adopt a reflexive
For
strategy.
where
he
considers
his
example,in a semi-autobiographical
essay
experiencein
Americain retrospect,
Adorno (1998b) providesa much less 'ethnocentric'
of Americanculturethanin his earlierwritings,
that
interpretation
admitting
of
his
reaction
in
those
works
was
due
to
a
kindof 'culture-shock'.
This
part
attitudeallows himto partlyappreessayindicatesthatAdorno'sself-reflexive
ciatecertainpotentialsof 'mass culture'thathe had previously
denied.

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364

2 April
38 Number
2004
SociologyVolume
Conclusion
In concludingthisarticle,I should note thatthereis also muchcongruence
betweentheworksof thetwo sociologists- a pointwhichI havenotbeenable
to stressso far.13
Thereare, forexample,striking
parallelsbetweenAdorno's
(1999) critiqueof 'identitythinking'and Bourdieu's(2000: 50) critiqueof
"scholastic
fallacy'.It mightevenbe arguedthat,in thesecritiques,bothsociolof the'particular'to the'universal'.They
ogiststryto resistthesubordination
do so, of course,in quitedistinctways:one byemphasizing
the'logicof pracnotionof 'totality'.But even
tice',and the otherby evokinga non-empirical
here.WhenBourdieu(2000:
then,itis notimpossibleto sensea certainaffinity
55) refersto logicof practiceas 'so hardto think',he is notusingthetermin a
I believe
way thanAdorno(1999) uses 'totality'.More generally,
verydifferent
of
characterization
as
'an
name
for
'totality'
Jameson's(1990: 29)
indispensable
the infrastructural
dimensionof reasonand abstractthoughttoday'can very
well be appliedto 'logicof practice'.
A further
betweenBourdieuand Adorno concernsthe primacy
affinity
in theway
to
attribute
they
'society'.No doubt,thereis a certaindiscrepancy
While
Adorno's
this
'object'.
explorationmainlytargetsthat
theyapproach
in exposingtheways
whichis hiddenin society,Bourdieuis mostlyinterested
But once again, as bothsociologistswould
in whichthe social is 'forgotten'.
agree, these two typesof 'repression'are not entirelyunrelatedas 'social
repression'is inseparablefromthe 'repressionof the social'. In fact,both
cateAdornoand, in his recentworks,Bourdieumake use of psychoanalytic
If
'social
is
the
in
the
issue
of
repression'
tamingof
'repression'.
gories tackling
libidinal energyby social forces (Adorno et al., 1969; Horkheimerand
Adorno,1997), 'repressionof thesocial' is the'illusio'throughwhichsocially
desiresappear as 'natural'desires(Bourdieu,2000: 164-7). Both
constituted
sociologistsrecognizethis mutualinterplaybetweendesireand society,and
both seem to believe that sociologycan play a 'therapeutic'role against
seem'repression'- eitherby imaginingthe 'unimaginable',or by disturbing
and 'tastes'.
inglynaturaldistinctions
The contrastsI have drawnbetweenBourdieuand Adornoshouldthereforebe seenas two different
waysof tacklinga similarproblem.Atthepriceof
we mightstatethatBourdieu'ssocial critiqueis launchedfrom
simplification,
of practice:itslimitsare thelimitsof practice.Adorno'scritique
thestandpoint
itslimitsare thelimitsof imais launchedfromthestandpointof redemption:
gination.
In any case, we do not have to thinkof thesecontrasting
approachesin
whether
not
so
much
termsofan either/or
theoryis a tool
logic.The questionis
is
a
is
that
or an aim.Whatwe needto recognizeperhaps
theory toolwhichcan
and Foucault(1977)
Deleuze
also havea 'trasgressive'use,especiallywhen,as
affirm
the
potentialof theoryto go
put it, 'practice'seemsto hit a wall. To
to privilegetheoryoverpractice.Similarly,
beyondthegivenis not necessarily
is a meansor an end. Whatwe
it is somewhatfutileto ask whetherreflexivity

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Bourdieu
withAdorno Karakayali 365
Reading
needto takeseriouslyis thata theoretical
analysisdevoidof a senseof reflexbias'.
ivityis proneto whatBourdieuhas called 'intellectualist
More generally,
to theextentthatbringing
social realityand itsrepresentationsundercriticalscrutiny
constitutes
one of themajoraimsof sociological
and theoreticism
are likelyto remaintwo potentialdangers
practice,scientism
on the path of the sociologist.For 'scientism'involvesthe idea thatone can
of social realitybysimplyadheringto an
escapethe'fallacious'representations
and
'theoreticism'
epistemological
principle,
impliesthatone can graspsocial
without
it.
and Adornotogether
Bourdieu
reality
'touching' Reading
might,at
theveryleast,giveus a glimpseofthestruggles
oftwo sociologistson this'fundamentally
ambiguous'path.

Acknowledement
The authorwishesto thankPer Otnes,Michal Bodemann,AndrewMcKinnon,
fortheirvaluable
LesleyKenny,Maria D'Angeloand the anonymousreviewers
comments.

Notes
1 See,forexample,Robbins,1991: 67-84. In additionto thesourcescitedinthe
of Bourdieu's
worksinclude:Calhounet
text,someof thecriticaldiscussions
1999. Forgeneral
al., 1993; Fowler2000; Harkeret al., 1990; Schusterman,
see:Jenkins,
introductions,
1992; Lane,2000.
2 'The theoryof sociologicalknowledge,
understood
as a systemof rulesgovofall possiblesociologicalactsand discourses
... is the
erningtheproduction
ofthevariouspartialtheories
ofthesocial... and as such
generative
principle
itis theunifying
ofspecifically
discourse'(Bourdieu
etal.,
principle
sociological
1991: 30).
3 See also Ashmore
(1989) and Piatt(1989).
4 UnlikeBourdieu,
Adornowas a participant
in a largertradition
however,
(i.e.
'Frankfurt
School').
5 ForBourdieutoo,onemajordimension
ofreflexivity
is 'to putperspective
into
historical
2000: 22).
(Bourdieu,
perspective'
6 '[WJarnings
abdicationofempiricism
can neverlegitimate
againstthetheoretic
theterroristic
admonitions
ofthetheoreticians'
(Bourdieuet al., 1991: 30).
7 Adorno'swork,of course,does notcompletely
lack an empirical
dimension.
For an accountof his complicated
and yetpositiverelationship
to empirical
see:Rose (1978: 95-108).
research,
8 Adornooftendiscusses'scientism'
inthecontextofwhathecalls'thefetishizationofscience':'I understand
inscienceto meanthatscience,withits
fetishism
form
of
and
its
immanent
becomesan endin
specific
methods,
argumentation
without
to itssubjectmatter'(Adorno,2000: 128).
itself,
anyrelation
9 See forexample,Barnard,1990.

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366

38 Number
2 Aprl
2004
SociologyVolume
10 For a criticalsurveyof recentresponsesto Adorno'swork,see Hohendahl
(1995: 3-20); see also Gibsonand Rubin(2002). In additionto thesources
citedin the text,some of the major,sociologically
orienteddiscussionsof
Adorno'sworksincludeBrunkhorst
(1999), O'Neill (1976), and Wiggershaus
(1995).
11 See forexample,Cook (1996) andJarvis(1998: 72-89).
12 See forexample,
(1973, 1991) and
Jay(1984: 40, 111-60).See also: Benjamin
Blochet al. (1977).
13 ForBourdieu's
ofthispoint,see Bourdieu(1990a: 19).
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Significance.
Nedim Karakayali
Canada.He hascarat Dalhousie
ofsociology
Isassistant
Halifax,
University,
professor
culin
and
North
andonpopular
onmigrant
riedoutresearch
America,
youth Europe
in
heisinvolved
innon-Western
societies.
music
andsocialmovements
ture,
Currently,
in
of
20thof
'the
the
works
the
theme
on
a jointbookproject
early
stranger'
focusing
German
socialtheorists.
century
6 135
andSocialAnthropology,
ofSociology
Dalhousie
Address:
University,
Department
B3H4P9Canada.
NovaScotia,
RmI 128,Halifax,
Avenue,
University
E-mail:
nkarakay@dal.ca

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