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PRIMER
ON ETHICS
A
PRIMER
ON ETHICS
By Tibor R. Machan
LIBRARY OF CONGRESS
CATALOGING-IN-PUBLICATION DATA
Machan, Tibor R.
A primer on ethics / by Tibor R. Machan.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 0-8061-2946-8 (cloth: alk. paper)
1. Ethics. I. Title.
BJI012.M324 1997
170-dc21
96-6502
CIP
Text design by Cathy Carney Imboden.
Text is set in New Century Schoolbook.
The paper in this book meets the
guidelines for permanence and durability
of the Committee on Production Guidelines
for Book Longevity of the Council on
Library Resources, Inc. @
Copyright 1997 by the University of
Oklahoma Press, Norman, Publishing
Division of the University. All rights
reserved. Manufactured in the U.S.A.
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CONTENTS
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
Preface
Acknowledgments
Preliminary Considerations
What Is Ethics?
Why Study Ethics?
How Is Ethics Possible?
Assumptions Made in Ethics
Free Will?
Moral Skepticism
The Best Theory Is As True As Can Be
Facts and Values
Metaethics and Criticism of Moral Theories
Metaethical Theories
Criticism of Moral Theories
Types of Moral Theories
What Is Morally Good and Right?
Ethical Positions
More Ethical Positions in Brief
Some Political Systems
Ethics as a Personal Concern
Ethics in Everyday Life
Commonsense Ethics
Theistic Ethics
Challenges to Ethics
Ethical Subjectivism
ix
xiii
3
5
7
10
11
13
23
27
29
33
33
36
37
39
39
63
65
78
78
79
80
90
91
viii
""" CONTENTS
Ethical Relativism
Nihilism
8. Rethinking the Fact/Value Dichotomy
A Value-Free Study of Human Life?
Are Ethical Judgments Bogus?
Facts, Values, and Reality
Goodness and Empiricism
Proving Values Knowable
9. Applying Ethics
One Convincing Moral Outlook
Some Ethical Quandaries
On Moral Challenges
10. Conclusion
Questions for Discussion
Notes
Recommended Reading
Index
96
101
107
108
110
111
112
115
118
119
127
158
161
171
173
179
181
PREFACE
PREFACE
ment about free will (for example) is one kind of ethical claim,
because it speaks to the issue of how we should use our minds
and presupposes that we can in fact decide-that we can make
the right choice in this area.
An ethical claim, however, must square with other aspects
of our lives: it must be both practical and capable of being made
operational without being mysterious. Ifit remains vague or incomprehensible, then it gives us an excuse to avoid considering
how we ought to behave from day to day. When we act without
thinking, we dodge taking responsibility for ourselves.
This book aims to set forth, succinctly, the basic elements
of ethical inquiry without suggesting that teachers or anyone
else can free students from the task of becoming good people.
I have tried to suggest the nature of the ongoing debate about
free will and other aspects of ethics. I do not pretend to complete
neutrality; some of the positions that I describe seem to me the
right ones. In these pages I sometimes explain where I stand
and why, and I also describe and appraise the ideas of critics.
The book is intended for use with at least one other text that
presents major ethical theories by central moral thinkers past
and present. I have listed some seminal works at the end. I have
also included questions to help students reflect on their reading,
although classroom teachers will be the most effective guides.
I should note at the outset that in philosophical studies of morality generally, how much support a given position
receives from individuals, groups, or society at large is unimportant. Even the most renowned philosopher may be wrong,
and the public sector as a whole is no less susceptible to error.
Respectability and popularity sometimes supplant independent judgment, especially when there is little time to study
the various competing ethical positions. By the same token,
individuals-you and I-must often act quickly on our moral
beliefs, without taking the time and intellectual energy to appraise them. And even if we found the time, what would we
PREFACE
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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
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PRIMER
ON ETHICS
1
PRELIMINARY
CONSIDERATIONS
. , A PRIMER ON ETHICS
PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS _
. . A PRIMER ON ETHICS
PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS
4IJII'
Few things in life are as pervasive as norms of conduct. Every day the news abounds with the problems ofliving and acting
properly. Politics and the law are the more public branches of
ethics. (In the classical sense, politics and the law concern themselves with how people should live in a community, or with the
basic governing principles of community life.) Not surprisingly,
controversy is almost the rule in this field. People argue about
right and wrong all the time. Philosophers disagree about the
best way of understanding ethics. Not everyone will agree with
the ideas in this book. Consequently you should approach the
statements that you read here as a starting point and reflect
on them carefully, without taking them as the last word by any
means.
WHY STUDY ETHICS?
10
need for knowledge remains controversial. Some observers argue that none is required. And some maintain that ethics is not
a valid discipline at all.
How Is
ETHICS POSSIBLE?
2
ASSUMPTIONS
MADE IN ETHICS
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A PRIMER ON ETHICS
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We must first determine whether we have free will-not necessarilyall of us all of the time but rather most of us normally, as a
rule. In other words, are human beings, as they have appeared
throughout history (though again not when intellectually incapacitated or significantly damaged) capable of initiating the
behavior in which they engage?
As we saw in chapter 1, if we cannot choose whether or not
to do something, there is no sense in praising or blaming us
for what we do. Consider the insanity plea in criminal trials. If
you have no power over your actions, you cannot be regarded
as guilty: you did not intend to do what you did.
Similarly, if you are not responsible for the work that is
being praised, then you cannot take credit for it. Many women
do not like to have men constantly call attention to their looks.
The women believe that their figures and features are not of
their own making, and they wish the men would pick something
over which they had had greater influence. (Liking someone's
looks is another matter, of course.) Still, if people have no power
over their own actions, praise and blame are forever irrelevant,
inapplicable.
Do human beings have free will? Let us begin our inquiry by
considering some objections. Afterward we will return to arguments that demonstrate both the possibility and the existence
of free will.
Against Free Will
14
A PRIMER ON ETHICS
15
But is the cause of a musical composition-the composeralso the effect of a prior cause, so that the composer may
not be said to have made an original contribution?2 According
to this argument, then, nature exhibits innumerable different
domains that differ in complexity and organization.
"Causal" reasoning does not necessarily rule out the possibility that a thing may cause some of its own behavior ("agent," or
"original," causation). Causal interactions depend on the nature
ofthe beings that interact. We need to investigate the capacity
of the beings before ruling out agent causation.
As we have seen, then, there may be in nature a form of
existence that exhibits free will. The possibility is something
to be determined and is not precluded by a narrow worldview
or metaphysics that assigns everything just one set of causal
features. Nature, which seems to comprise many types and
kinds of things, may encompass free will.
Having established the possibility offree will, we will shortly
consider whether or not it actually exists.
16
universe, including criminal guilt, are detected without eyewitnesses but by means of theories that seem to explain our
observations best. This statement is true even in the natural sciences. Much of our wisdom in biology, astrophysics, subatomic
physics, botany, and chemistry, not to mention psychology, consists not of observable data but of theoretical inference. The
theory that best accounts for things is the one that consistently
permits the fullest, most accurate predictions.
We may find that free will belongs to this category of theories. In other words, free will may be something that we cannot
directly observe but that has considerable explanatory value.
It might, for example, account for the relatively large number
of mistakes that human beings make by comparison with other
animals. Free will might also illuminate the odd things that
people do which do not fit into the theory of mechanical causation associated with physics. We know, for instance, that some
people with bad childhoods tum into decent citizens, while others become crooks. In this area empiricism would clearly not
help us.
Free will is weird. Thinkers sometimes object to the notion of
free will because nonhuman beings in nature do not exhibit it.
It is argued that because dogs, cats, lizards, fish, and frogs have
no free will, we are being arbitrary when we impute it to human
beings. Why should people be regarded as free to do things when
the rest of nature is not? Opponents of the free will idea who
advance this argument include the behaviorist psychologist B.
F. Skinner. 3
Free will is natural. As I suggested above, free will could be just
another attribute, one of many encompassed by the tremendous
variety of nature. Determinism seems to dictate how things
can be (determinism seems to entail a very specific ontology),
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We often know we are free. In many areas of our lives, introspective knowledge is taken very seriously. Let us say that you
go to the doctor complaining of pain, and she asks you where
it is. If you say, "It's in my knee," the doctor doesn't say, "Why,
you can't know. This is not public evidence. I will now find out
directly and verifiably where you hurt." In fact your evidence
is very good. Witnesses at trials are asked for the same kind of
evidence when they are told to report what they have seen. The
demand for such testimony calls for evidence that is in one sense
introspective. That is, it requires us to look within and to affirm:
"This is indeed what I have seen or heard." The demand forces
us to refer to a memory, a source of information to which others
are not privy without our reports. Introspective evidence is also
involved in the various sciences when people describe what they
have read on surveys or have seen on gauges or instruments.
We tend to regard introspective evidence as reasonably
reliable. How, then, should we react when someone says, "Damn
it, I didn't make the right choice" or "I should have done x, and
I failed to do it"? People often speak of having made different
choices and of having intended one thing but not another.
Furthermore, they often accuse themselves of having failed to
act in some way-and as we have seen, the act of blaming
implies awareness of the power to choose (and also invokes the
notion of personal responsibility).
In short, people all around us, drawing on their experience,
provide abundant evidence regarding their free choices. If we
simply disregarded this evidence, we would also invalidate
much other information from such sources that we treat as
decisive.
Science discovers free will. The existence of free will, finally,
is also supported by the fact that humans apparently have
the capacity to self-monitor. The structure of the human brain
allows us, so to speak, to govern ourselves. We are able to
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Let us now turn to the second assumption: can we identify principles of conduct? Otherwise stated, is there any basis for our
ethical or moral judgments? When a politician is denounced,
or when a newspaper is criticized for its reporting, can we
discern any underlying standards? What justifies the derogatory judgments? How do we know that the aggrieved child was
mistreated by its parents-or that the patient's physician engaged in malpractice? Is ethics a realm in which claims can be
established as right without reference to any standards?lo
Constraints of space make it possible here only to lay the
foundation for inquiry and to outline considerations involved in
the debate.
Against Morality
The arguments advanced against the existence of moral standards have several different grounds.
Moral diversity versus objectivity. As we noted above, people
frequently differ in their views regarding right and wrong.
24
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PRIMER ON ETHICS
Given that there are very many moral opinions, how can there
be one true moral standard applicable to all? Some thinkers
argue that cross-cultural and historical diversity precludes any
single objective standard governing human action. It is mostly
cultural anthropologists who advance this view-for example,
Ruth Benedict. ll
25
Diversity is more apparent than real. Three subarguments address apparent diversity. First, it is said that moral opinions
tend to differ about details, not basics. Then, too, the appearance of diversity is sometimes fostered by individuals who want
to obscure moral standards to avoid charges of wrongdoing.
Finally, some people, acting as professional devil's advocates,
promote skepticism (and the appearance of diversity) by continually testing, questioning, and seeking to verify (these people
may avoid acting like skeptics with their children, friends, and
political representatives, however).
Perceptual knowledge is not all. We have seen that direct
observation--evidence of the senses-is often invoked to prove
a point. In complicated areas, though-for example, in astrophysics, particle physics, psychology, and crime detection, to
name just a few-sensory evidence is insufficient, and complex theories and definitions are used for verification. It is
the same with moral judgments (for example, we may need
to use a definition of "good" or "morally right" for purposes
of verification)-and ethics in fact proposes such theories and
definitions.
How not to deduce but to derive "ought" from "is." When
Hume wrote about the is/ought gap, he was arguing against
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ETHICS
3
FACTS
AND VALUES
HE CONCEPT of value is used to mean, generally, anything that people strive for-what a person seeks out or
pursues. Ethics takes as one of its concerns the identification of
values that are fundamental for human existence. It seeks to
define those that humans ought to pursue, those that we should
choose, and how we should rank them. Otherwise stated, ethics
is concerned with moral virtues or principles, with the distinctively human good, or (again) with basic right conduct in human
life. The standards that it seeks to delineate are those that we
should use in deciding how to conduct ourselves.
Our decisions in this realm may be explicit or implicit, nearly
subconscious. We may not reflect on them at length. Yet unless
these decisions conform to basic guidelines, they will not fit into
a consistent, workable life plan. Ethical principles supposedly
steer us toward a good human life, which is the first goal of
everyone.
The principles of ethics involve basic moral values. The concept of value, however, is often used at moments when morality
is not involved, for example when we speak of valuables, the
truth of a statement, or something's aesthetic or economic
worth. We sometimes also speak of values in a specific context.
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4
METAETHICS
AND CRITICISM OF
MORAL THEORIES
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and thousands of years. When we call ethical principles "society's basic edicts," we are suggesting that they are not so
much discoveries as agreed-upon formulations. The agreement
is sometimes thought to be worldwide and sometimes to be specific to particular cultures or societies (or ethnic groups or even
gender groups). Conventionalism is a form of noncognitivism,
since it treats ethics not as discoverable or provable but rather
as having evolved and having become entrenched over time.
Thomas Hobbes and David Hume were prominent metaethical
conventionalists.
Pragmatism
We use the term "pragmatic" in daily life to mean practical,
expedient, and realistic, as in "President George Bush had a
pragmatic foreign policy." The philosophical pragmatist holds
that moral principles should afford effective means of helping
us reach practical goals. Someone can be pragmatic in personal
matters (small scale) or in social matters (large scale). Either
way, the guidelines focus on the way things work to further some
interest. John Dewey, Sidney Hook, and Richard Rorty are all
metaethical pragmatists, although they do not see eye to eye on
many issues.
Intuitionism
Intuitionism, a somewhat odd form of cognitivism, holds that
moral principles arise from deeply held convictions or beliefs
known to be true not because of argument or analysis but
because of gut feelings. We all have moral intuitions, and we
should trust them. Even people who have never explored ethics
have moral sentiments. These feelings furnish our best guide
to how we should conduct ourselves. The basic idea here is the
same as that in the old saw about woman's intuition: we should
base our morality on the innate wisdom that we all have and
not on the dictates of some fancy theory. Sir David Ross and
John Rawls are two intuitionists.
36
Mysticism
Mystics regard moral principles as basically mysterious revelations from God or from some other supernatural source. As the
utterances of superior beings, far beyond the reach ofour faculty
for understanding, moral principles cannot be apprehended rationally and must be accepted on faith. (I will return to this
point later.) St. Augustine's metaethics seems to fit this view,
as do some views derived from various Western and Eastern
theologies.
CRITICISM OF MORAL THEORIES
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A consequentialist ethical theory, on the other hand, is concerned solely with effecting valued results, regardless of the
motivation. To do the morally right thing is to produce what is
good or valuable, whatever the person may intend by the action. An everyday expression that perhaps captures this sense
is "The proof of the pudding is in the eating." Hedonists and
some utilitarian moral theorists best exemplify the consequentialist type of ethical theorizing. Some of them might better be
considered value theorists in that they are less interested in an
agent's moral character or nature than in the behavior that will
contribute to a better world.
Teleological moral theories are often confused with consequentialist types, but there is a difference between the two. A
teleological ethics, such as that of Aristotle, considers worthwhile goals or objectives of central importance in making
actions morally good and demands, in addition, that actions
succeed in achieving the goal. In a way this type of morality
combines the features of the two described above: it must be
intended because of a valued goal, and it must accomplish its
purpose. The effort alone will not make the act fully worthy.
The category into which a moral theorist fits will have much
to do with the philosophical framework underlying the ethical
position being advanced. In some schools of philosophy, or
branches thereof, it is nearly impossible to speak of intentionmaterialism and even empiricism are examples. In others it is
impossible to identify an action's consequences for certain. In
still others both intentions and results are accepted as quite
natural. A detailed, advanced study of ethical theories would
evaluate each position in light of the overall philosophical
approach.
5
WHAT
Is
MORALLY
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in evidence), welfare is closely tied to the achievement of desired goals-the satisfaction of preferences, wants, and wishes.
Utilitarians maintain that whenever someone's desires are satisfied, that person is well off, and that person's welfare has
arguably been attained. As utilitarians realize, however, some
desires conflict with others and may harm the individual or
society. Qualifications are therefore needed to make the theory plausible. Some theorists hold that desires or preferences
that interfere with others' realization of their preferences do
not count as significant in our understanding of welfare and
what we should do to achieve it. Others construe welfare as
depending on healthful or natural desires or preferences.
Utilitarian welfare or happiness is frequently identified
with physical and psychological well-being (as defined by the
medical and psychological scientists in a community) rather
than being left for subjective determination on the basis of
desires, preferences, and so forth. The health and economic
well-being of a community's members are frequently regarded
as indicators. (In political theory this goal comes to the fore
in the doctrine of the welfare state.) With these initial points
in mind, we can now ask why we should think of the good
as utilitarians do. Why should we all strive for the greatest
happiness of the greatest number?
Utilitarianism, like many other ethical theories, is tied to
broader philosophical positions. One key point in utilitarian
ethics is the idea that the good must be identifiable by means of
observation. We could not otherwise know what is good-that is,
what human beings are supposed to achieve. Ifwe cannot know
what is good, and thus cannot learn how to achieve it, then we
cannot hold ourselves and others responsible for doing so. Only
the things in the world that are perceivable can be known. If
there is a good we should strive for, then it must be perceivable.
This view of human knowledge provides a background for our
discussion of utilitarianism.
Now that we know how to identify the good, we might con-
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Act and rule utilitarianism. Ethical discussions usually consider two forms of utilitarianism. Act utilitarianism is the
position that on each separate occasion when we decide to do
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Critics and defenders. The critics have much to say about the
egoist's position. They fault it for its allegedly naive view of
human nature-the idea that we are born without destructive
impulses and that we should simply proceed to achieve our
natural goals. They say that egoism leads to self-centeredness,
egotism, and the ruthless pursuit of gain, wealth, and power,
prompted by the complex and often destructive motives that lie
deep within us. (In a way, altruism is the ultimate criticism of
egoism!)
On a more formal note, some critics fault egoism as a moral
theory on the ground that it cannot be implemented universally.
Suppose someone asks you what he or she should do, and suppose that it would in fact be in his or her interest to marry the
person whom you also want to marry. Could you as a consistent
egoist advise this person correctly? If you do, you will undermine your own self-interest; if you do not, you demonstrate that
egoism cannot be universalized to everyone. In general, when
human interests conflict, egoism appears to set people on a war
path, because it lacks a coordinating principle that transcends
the competing claims. Critics therefore accuse egoism of generating contradictory plans of action: people both should and
should not do certain things. Any ethical position caught in
this dilemma must fail because it suggests that what a person
should do cannot be done.
WHAT
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A further objection is that all the talk about happiness really leaves us with very little to go on. Just what exactly should
we pursue? By saying that happiness consists in the awareness
of ourselves as living successfully-that is, rationally-egoism
asserts that rational living will lead to something that we ought
to achieve. But is it not possible that something other than
this happiness (which seems very self-indulgent anyway) might
be worth pursuing? Could there not perhaps be more important goals-political liberty, social justice, being a productive
member of society-that overshadow happiness?
Finally, it does not even appear likely that rationality
can produce happiness for a person. Many rational peoplescholars, artists, scientists, lawyers, and writers-have been
notably unhappy. Then, too, some of the most irrational, whimsical, and haphazard people retire in luxury to Miami Beach to
live out their lives in bliss.
The ethical egoist will have answers to these objections.
Again, the reader will need to assess both the objections and
the answers. In response to the charge that he is naive about
human nature, the egoist could reply that he is concerned only
with the essentials. What the critic sees as naivete in reality
amounts to focusing on only the morally relevant aspects of
every person, the capacity freely to choose to think. The misery,
neurosis, cruelty, and self-destruction that characterize some
human life may often be explained in terms of people's refusal
to ponder the requirements of their lives and their willingness
to meddle in the lives of others (always for others' good). Were
people to focus first of all on doing good for themselves, much
of the disarray would disappear. Moreover, such factors do not
prove that conflict is inherent in human nature. If some wellintegrated people attain peace of mind and happiness, it is at
least theoretically possible for everyone to do so.
The case about conflicts of interest, usually a conflict of
desires and wishes, begs an important question, or so the egoist
would say. If rationality is the first principle or virtue of egoism,
62
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Stoicism
The Stoics held that although we should strive to be happy and
fulfilled, we should seek this goal by not desiring anything at
all. Ifwe do so, we will never be disappointed, disillusioned, or
unhappy. Stoicism contends that true happiness is best attained
by dissociating ourselves from temporal, fleeting pleasures. A
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human nature can be identified and God does not exist. It holds
that if we approach living with a feeling of love, of authentic
devotion, this spirit will steer us in the only meaningful right
course, especially in our relationship with others.
Environmentalism
Environmental ethics is sometimes derived from one or another of the major ethical theories. A utilitarian may argue
for reducing automobile exhaust fume emission, for example,
to enhance the general welfare. There are, however, schools
of environmental ethics that derive an entire morality from
certain views about nature, the wilderness, or God (or Gaia)
as Nature. Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778) captured this
outlook: "The more we depart from the state of nature, the
more we lose our natural tastes." "All is good coming from the
hand of the Author of all things; all degenerates in the hands
of man."lO Concomitants of this moral position include frugality, restraint, moderation, and conservation rather than growth
and abundance. Personal conduct and public policy directives
stress recycling, the preservation of wilderness, restrictions on
energy consumption, and comparable measures.
SOME POLITICAL SYSTEMS
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than are these others. Roughly, it stands for the view that
human beings are necessarily or essentially parts of distinct
human groups (communities) with diverse values, histories,
priorities, practices, laws, and cultures. The organizing principles of these different groups themselves vary. There is no one
true social and political order nor even any universal ethics.
Rather, the particular character of the communities tells members how to live, what laws to enact, and what aesthetic and
religious values to embrace.
Some communities may be Spartan, others Stoic, yet others bohemian, and so forth. Each may have its peculiar way of
life without condemning a different way. Yet despite popular
opinion to the contrary, individuals do not consent to participate in the community's form of life. Such an idea derives from
a mistake: a transcendent or general principle of human nature requires every community to adhere to certain minimal
standards of justice. No such transcendent principle exists, according to many communitarians, and so communities that, say,
grant individuals certain rights are simply different from, and
not superior to, those that do not. 15
Actually, little else can be said here about communitarianism, because there are simply too many types, each with its own
framework and priorities. The main point is that rules, laws,
and ideals all result from the evolving consensus or collective
practices of the community's membership. Just as socialism
considers humanity the whole to which individuals belong,
communitarianism identifies different ethnic, national, racial,
gender, cultural, and professional groups as the whole to which
the individual member belongs. We might consider, for example, that languages developed in part to fit the circumstances
of different linguistic communities, with no language superior
to (or even fully translatable into) any other.
Communitarians often unite in criticizing bourgeois society and liberal capitalism, which stress individuality, privacy,
WHAT
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A PERSONAL CONCERN
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Guiding Principles
Most people who think about morality or ethics associate these
areas of concern with religion, and yet in the discussions above,
I did not mention religion. The reason is that an ethical system must be shown to be sound without reliance on things
that cannot be rationally apprehended. Most religions are essentially supernaturalistic, or mystical. The few that are not
tend to identify God with nature, with the universe as a whole.
For them the discussion of ethical issues given above could suffice. Other religions base their moral codes not on arguments
but on faith. Still other religions hold that even though God is
supernatural or transcends reality, rational investigation can
discover the moral or ethical code that God designed for human
beings. These religions, too, would allow for the possibility of
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tence, including laws to govern humanity-principles describing the good life for all people. They therefore thought that they
could identify, without reference to God, the moral principles
by which we should conduct life, even though some of them believed that something like God exists. The God in which these
philosophers believed, however, was not the familiar Christian,
Moslem, or Hindu God, with an active will that keeps shaping
the world. Instead He was a necessary being-an indispensable,
immutable fact on which everything else depends but which
does nothing except support everything else. Such a God is the
foundation of morality in the limited sense that existence itself
is the basis for morality-and for everything else.
A different group of theists conceives of God as Someone
who created humanity without having any special plans for us.
According to these theists, how we ought to live is for us to
discover, not for God just to decide. These ways of viewing the
matter are, at best, a small minority position within theism.
Finally, a large segment of humanity does not view God
or ethics as a matter for rational understanding at all. For
many people God is a personal issue, something not open to
demonstration or proof. The existence of a divine being is not
like other features of reality that most of us consider knowable
by anyone with normal human capacities. A current expression
in modem theology is that God is dead. The saying may be
interpreted as meaning that the idea of God's independent
existence is no longer plausible. Instead, God must be defined
as the deepest concerns we have, our ultimate concerns. This
general idea figures in religious movements which preach that
God is whatever we think God is. God "exists" in one's heart,
soul, or consciousness, nothing more.
The ethical notions that emerge from such views are similarly perplexing. What is right and wrong is not universalizable.
Instead, right or wrong is a matter of personal conscience, with
no possible basis in reality that would enable all of us to discover
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These positions and their arguments are not simply philosophical exercises meant to sharpen our minds on the topic.
Everyone who tackles important questions seeks a sound foundation for answers. Skeptical questions are useful as means of
ascertaining that one's answers are the best that can be given.
We engage in this kind of discussion often, as when we debate
whether there are exceptions to hypothesized rules or when we
consider the need to reconcile contradictions. But sometimes
the questions do not sharpen the answers. Ethical skeptics are
those who argue not that a better answer is needed to the question of ethics but that no (correct) answers are possible, now or
ever.
ETHICAL SUBJECTIVISM
Principles
One well-known antiethical viewpoint will hardly be a novelty
to the reader of this book. This is the widespread idea that no
one can say what is right and wrong except the person or people
involved. To put it another way, ethical subjectivists hold that
whether some act is good or bad is a matter of how it appears
to the individual who is doing the evaluating. If the individual
regards it as the right course, then so it is; ifhe or she does not,
then it is not. All depends on the person concerned.
This concept has been expressed in all human societies. I
have perhaps expressed it here in a somewhat different fashion
from others, however. Fine distinctions are possible even within
this general viewpoint. Some would say that anything is right if
someone believes it to be right. Others would say that deciding
or choosing to do something makes that action right. Yet others
hold that right and wrong (or should and should not) are not
meaningful ideas-inasmuch as the terms denote no common,
identifiable object, principle, or topic-but instead are confused
ways of saying that a person wants what is said to be right or
does not want what is said to be wrong.
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is that the theory itself rejects any such denial. After all, when
we say that humans are the sort of beings who must create
themselves and that they are free to become what they want
to be, we say exactly what human nature is. (The theory may
attempt to argue that each person's character must be of his or
her own choosing-that none of us is made into a certain quality
of person. But the argument for individual character does not
deny that we are all human by virtue of some features that all
humans share.)
In objection to the subjectivists we could go on to claim
that the theory in fact proposes a standard of right and wrong,
however much this is denied. Because we human beings are
self-moved, free, and undetermined, it is our task to carry out
the activities we can freely engage in, to be creative as only
human beings can be. To be individuals true to the requirements of our human nature is to be creative, ever-growing,
ever-developing, never-stagnant beings coping with our own circumstances. Whatever our freedom consists in, whatever it is
that we are ultimately free to do, is just what we ought to do
and do well.
Even without leaving the theory itself, then, we can challenge some of the conclusions of subjectivism. Noting that this
standard applies to us all is not to say that we are all compelled to live by it, that we have no other choice. It is a simple
matter for us to defeat our unique freedom to be creative. We
need only to refrain from exercising our minds so as to learn
and from implementing the general standard acquired in our
individual situation. The standard does not supply the means
of implementation. We ourselves are responsible for devising
it. Consequently the failure of people in various cultures to adhere to particular moral principles does not prove that these
principles are inapplicable to them.
The subjectivist would probably respond that the reference
to human nature in the objection is misleading. Even if we are
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all free, we are not indeterminate (unless we understand "determinate" to mean "fixed or unchangeable in any respect"). If
we can change tomorrow, if we can reject our freedom by failing
to exercise it, if we can commit suicide, how then can we have a
determinate, exact nature? To use "indeterminacy" under these
circumstances would be to destroy the term's meaning in other
contexts.
What, then, do we mean when we say that we ought to exercise our freedom where this freedom manifests itself? Perhaps
we are free in thought, in emotional capacity, or in any or all
our behavior. All we know is that we are free. This is hardly
enough to generate some moral position. It amounts to confusing morality-a set of reasonably precise guidelines to human
conduct-with the mere realization that we are responsible for
acting and deciding. In the end we perhaps have nothing to go
on but our feelings. The possibility of escape from subjectivity
is an illusion. Self-delusion alone makes us think it possible.
As mentioned before, the subjectivism outlined here is
closely tied to the philosophy of existentialism. The existentialist view is best stated by its advocates, however, and many of
them are critical of the treatment given their ideas in lectures
and books. You should therefore treat the discussion here as
separate from the existentialist view, an independent challenge
to the possibility of ethics.
ETHICAL RELATIVISM
Principles
In one respect subjectivism is a variety of relativism: right and
wrong relate to our subjective, private, unique characteristics.
Egoism is also sometimes considered subjectivist, but in the
classical egoist position, right and wrong relate to us as human individuals, not as unique, isolated entities. As long as
there is a firm, stable basic core, we should not call an ethical
position relativist simply because it permits some variation to
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Principles
Unlike the skeptical positions concerning the very possibility of ethics, the viewpoint known as nihilism opposes values
explicitly.
The term "nihilism" originated in the Latin word nihil,
meaning "nothing." Basically the doctrine attacks the value of
values, or morality itself. Most nihilists are actually fervent
opponents of their culture's dominant values, although more
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N THIS chapter I will take a different approach to the problem at hand. Rather than present arguments for and against
various positions, I will defend particular answers to certain
questions in moral philosophy. This chapter will therefore be
more argumentative than its predecessors.
Ordinarily textbooks confine themselves to explaining work
done in the discipline of moral philosophy without defending
particular positions advanced. But it is tiresome to review an
endless sequence of ideas introduced by "on the one hand," "on
the other hand," "and then again," and so forth. At a certain
point the student reader is sufficiently familiar with the terrain
to be ready to encounter the views of the teacher author.
In class too, after an overview of the discipline's terms and
major schools, it is time to introduce some views and to defend them. By doing so we show, if nothing else, that we are
dealing with a subject in which argumentative, albeit friendly,
exchange is crucial, since we cannot perform experimental
research like that seen in most sciences. Let me start by discussing a metaethical issue, one that has preoccupied moral
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has considerable force. The idea is that the world, with human
beings in it, contains facts as well as values. While the former
are constants, matters upon which we can all agree, the latter
cannot be proved and do not elicit general agreement. At the
outset we discussed this issue in connection with the debate
about the possibility of morality. Now we will explore this issue
as it figures within prominent philosophies of our time.
The view that facts and values are fundamentally different has always had champions. The several social sciences
largely accept this view. Many scholars regard economics, sociology, psychology, and history as "value free." Economists,
for instance, attempt to understand human economic activities
without considering what people ought to do. If an economist is
asked how prices rise or fall, why inflation occurs, or what produces unemployment, the answers are not supposed to address
what might be right or wrong in the society. Economics eschews,
for example, the notions of exorbitant prices, token wages, and
excessive inflation, mainly because they involve evaluations. In
debates about whether women are paid as they deserve to be
in comparison with men, the economist tends to abstain. The
reason is that most economists believe that the kind of support
that is available for factual judgments is not available for value
judgments.
Sociologists, political scientists, and anthropologists often
treat values or claims about what we ought or ought not to
do as arbitrary, an expression of bias or ideology. As a matter
of policy they disregard values completely in scientific discussions (except as facts about people's beliefs, desires, and
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preferences, for example in opinion surveys). Even psychologists and psychiatrists, who deal with individuals directly in
a therapeutic situation, often proclaim that they can make no
moral judgments and that to impose their own moral views
upon their assessment of patients would introduce an arbitrary,
extraneous element. Nondirective therapy has a long tradition!
Although exceptions can be found, and in some respects
attitudes appear to be changing, our culture is committed to
a predominantly value-free, or amoralist, approach to human
affairs. The value-free stance also explains why only religion
should take morality into account in understanding human life:
it is generally accepted that, in the religious domain, matters
must be taken on faith without reliance on facts.
The value-free view of all science follows from the belief that
moral issues do not lend themselves to objective study and understanding. Within this position the phrase "That is a value
judgment" means "That is your bias-just a matter of how you
personally feel about it." As a feeling, a value judgment is neither right nor wrong. We simply have or lack feelings; they
are not formed by careful analysis and argument. Accordingly,
when value judgments are viewed as feelings, it is understood
that they do not contribute to an objective evaluation. If I say,
"Any president is wrong who lies to the citizenry in the course
of carrying out his executive responsibilities," I am assumed to
be expressing my own personal feeling or bias, conveying nothing that could be right or wrong and certainly not a claim that is
demonstrably true or false. Similarly, if the claim "It was wrong
for the United States government to enter the compound of the
Branch Davidians in Waco, Texas, or to veto the bill upholding
ownership rights for those with beachfront property" can be no
more than an expression of a feeling, then whether the government should or should not have taken such action will be
impossible to discuss rationally. Even such claims as "Honesty
is something we ought to practice," or "Injustice should be made
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illegal" are beyond rational, factual assessment and merely express someone's bias or some community's common but in the
last analysis arbitrary belief. In one school of jurisprudence,
theorists argue that laws cannot be based on any firm foundation because values reflect human will, the enacted desires of
the people with power, and cannot be determined to be right.
(This is the ancient debate between the natural law school of
legal theory and the realist or positivist school.)
ARE ETHICAL JUDGMENTS BOGus?
The idea we are here discussing is, then, the prominent notion
in some philosophical systems: beliefs about right and wrong,
about what we ought' or ought not to do, are not really judgments but convey feelings. The reason for voicing such feelings
may be to persuade others to feel as we do about something or
to articulate community norms. Values, however, have no objective, independent merit. Only within a certain community of
persons could they be defended on the basis of the attitude or
the form oflife practiced within the community. But such value
judgments or moral claims do not demonstrably hold for people
anywhere, anytime.
Some thinkers have claimed, similarly, that ethics, politics,
and other normative areas such as aesthetics are ineffable,
not open to meaningful rational examination. According to
many such philosophers, moral and political differences are
unresolvable except, perhaps, within groups that have already
agreed on certain basic norms that are, however, neither right
nor wrong. As Professor Richard Rorty noted, we "cannot say
that [e.g.] democratic institutions reflect a moral reality and
that tyrannical regimes do not refl.ect one, that tyrannies get
something wrong that democracies get right."l
No doubt many people disagree with this proposition. Ordinary human beings who do not concern themselves professionally with exploring the matter tend, also, to be divided
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First, the issue of values concerns ontology because we are asking how values might exist. Many different types of things exist.
Days are temporal existents (beings), distances are spatial,
ideas are mental, and tables are material. There may be a type
of being termed ethics or morality. It is thus vital for us to consider the ontological status ofvalues carefully before concluding
that values cannot be a feature of reality, a type of fact.
Second, the issue of values is also an epistemological issue,
because we are concerned with what kinds of facts we can
identifY, how we can know them. We do not attain knowledge
of the existence of every kind of thing in the same way. The
things that we know share some common features-attributes
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us nothing about whether the view is correct. Indeed, more recently, in late twentieth-century moral philosophy, two other
possibilities have gained greater popularity among philosophers and, more slowly, in the culture in general. One is
the position that a moral truth is a powerful, undislodgeable
intuition, an unshakably firm belief regarding rightness or
wrongness, that is not capable of objective demonstration. The
other is the not entirely unrelated position that no one's ideas
about anything can be proved true or false, whether about moral
or nonmoral matters, and "truth" itself can be reinforced by our
communities but not objectively established.
Both views leave the central questions of ethics and politics
unresolved. Both hold that it is impossible to reach agreements
on ethics, or even on scientific matters, that can be grounded
in objective reality and shown to be binding for human beings
generally.
While many thinkers disagree with these views, they are
embraced by some prominent thinkers and are perhaps the
most widely embraced in our era. Richard Rorty, as we have
seen, would argue that there are no correct answers in these areas but only views that have been embraced by the community.
Indeed, "correct" or "true" merely denotes such endorsement.
No objective truth is possible. Truth comes only from one's community. We should thus aim for solidarity, not objectivity, when
we search for answers.
I will not consider objections at the present time. The criticisms discussed in connection with empiricism and pragmatism
will permit the reader to assess the merits of these views. In
short, the fact/value dichotomy rests largely upon the empiricist view of knowledge. The denial, then, of our capacity to
know things in reality, including values, derives support from
the view that our knowledge cannot be founded on any independent, objectively ascertainable facts, because when we know
something, we necessarily inf:l.uence it. 3 If these positions are
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The problems associated with our ability to know moral principles do not end when we disprove empiricism. Even if we could
show that empiricism is false, or at least only partly truethat is, if we could know things in other ways than by sensory
evidence-we have not settled the issue of moral knowledge. A
successful, sound, positive theory is required. The various moral
positions we have considered, in combination with foundations
laid in other branches of philosophy, suggest such positive theories. The reader will now be able to pursue the search for an
answer to the main questions of morality. Starting with the discussions presented here, we will be able to undertake the search
with some hope of success.
The search itself is not easy to conduct. The various arguments that dispute the very possibility of morality are not the
only ones with which we must contend. Other, more complicated
objections are evident from some of the challenges addressed to
the specific moral positions covered here. For example, thinkers
sometimes object to a moral theory on the ground that it cannot be applied in many situations. If true, this charge would
mean that such a morality is inadequate. As we have seen, to
be genuine a moral position must be capable of being applied
universally. People must be able to do what they ought to do. If
virtue or moral excellence requires the impossible, then virtue
or moral excellence is itself impossible.
One way of testing moral positions is to confront them with
hypothetical situations. If a moral theorist advances provisions
(for example, as just or right) that lead to incompatible, contradictory requirements, then again the morality is invalid
because it requires the impossible.
But hypothetical examples are often not acceptable. Some
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what unites us with all past, present, and future members of the
human race. On many other counts-concerning matters that
are more specialized-we differ tremendously. Our age, physical constitution, sexual identity, economic background, national
origin, natural environment, and so forth sort us human beings
into many different groups. Our humanity unites us, however,
and also confronts us with some very basic common tasks.
Now, Aristotle's definition of a "human being" as a rational
animal-a biological entity that is able to and needs to think
with ideas-still works best. It does not require a human to
be an intellectual who does a lot of deliberate, theoretical
thinking and verbalizing, as Aristotle felt inclined to do. Only
some people will share this inclination. If we take "rational
animal" to mean needing to guide oneself in life by the use of
ideas, thoughts, theories, principles, notions, conceptions, and
so forth, we have a description that every human being fits.
We are all of us beings of this sort unless we are crucially
incapacitated and thus essentially defective as people, so that
others must care for us.
It is not possible to defend this view extensively here. We
may nonetheless note, in its support, that we pronounce someone dead when his or her brain-the seat of reasoning or the
soul-has permanently ceased to function. The part of the brain
at issue is the cerebral cortex, where thinking is performed.
Lower mental functions may remain. Breathing, for example,
may continue under the guidance of automatic brain processes,
but a p~rson stops being human because he or she cannot think
and will never be able to do so again. At the other end of the
life span, at the start, the human being emerges with the development in the fetus of a capacity to form some minimal ideas,
a development that probably occurs in about the twenty-fifth
week of life.
Some thinkers contend that a human being begins at conception, but this assertion rests not on evidence from natural
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science but on faith or basic convictions concerning, for example, the mysterious event of ensoulment. While people are free
to hold this belief, the event cannot be inspected publicly, remains inherently mysterious, and thus has no place in a theory
designed to serve all human beings, whatever their religious
persuasion. Here we are concerned to make, however briefly, a
more naturalistic, universally accessible case for morality along
lines advanced by some ancient and recent philosophers. 2
Why is our basic capacity to think of such fundamental
importance in our search for basic moral principles? Because we
are unique in that we may both use rationality in our lives and
fail to do so: we must initiate the thought process and cannot be
compelled. True, we may be encouraged to keep thinking. Or we
may be physically prevented from engaging in thought. But the
decision to initiate and sustain the effort is uniquely in our own
power. Indeed, ifit were not, as we have seen, the occurrence or
nonoccurrence of rational activity would be morally and legally
irrelevant.
Yet our choice to think clearly is relevant. Charges of malpractice, or more generally negligence, all make sense because
they involve the agent's failure to attend, to think, and to be
thoughtful when the agent had a responsibility to do so. There
cannot be a penalty for being tall or short or blond or male or
born to such and such parents in this or that country, because
these matters do not lie within our control. Whether we use
our heads, however, is up to us. It is perhaps the only activity common to all members of the human race, past, present,
and future. It remains for human beings to use their heads well
rather than badly.
The discussion above should illustrate a moral position that
can compete with others advanced by major thinkers whose
work is studied in courses in mornl philosophy. Let us now
consider several issues in personal, social, and public ethics.
Some verge strongly in the direction of law and public policy.
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Abortion
Most of us see the abortion controversy in terms of the prolife
and the prochoice positions. The central issue dividing the two
sides is disagreement about the point at which a human being
comes into existence, whether at conception or later, sometime
between birth and about the twenty-fourth week of pregnancy.
Ifthe being that emerges at conception is a human infant, then
aborting it would in most cases be homicide.
Some people argue about the moment at which life begins
during pregnancy. But this cannot be the real question, since
most prolife advocates are perfectly willing to end life-for example, they accept killing animals for food-and some prochoice
advocates support animal rights.
So the problem with abortion is not whether something that
has a heartbeat or even feels pain may be killed with impunity.
The problem is, rather, the point at which a human being comes
into existence. Human beings ordinarily have a right to their
lives, and so homicide or killing them, except in extraordinary
circumstances, should be prohibited and severely punished.
Thus-according to most prolifers-most abortions should also
be prohibited, since they involve "murdering unborn babies."
Those who take the prochoice side in this debate tend to
believe that a potential human being, not an infant, emerges
at conception or shortly thereafter. Only later does this being
qualify as an infant, either when the fetus has developed considerably (for example, by acquiring its cerebral cortex or higher
brain capacity, or when it is born and is recognized as a young
person) or when the fetus becomes viable, or capable of living
outside the uterus. Prochoice advocates generally argue that
early abortions amount to the killing of a potential human being, not of an actual one-as killing a caterpillar would not be
killing a butterfly.
The terms "prolife" and "prochoice" are obviously shorthand.
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Some feminists who are prochoice hold this view. Even when
women consent to such treatment, they tend to do so because
they lack political and economic power.
As the discussion so far makes clear, one difficulty with
the abortion debate is that the various sides approach it from
drastically different philosophical or theological viewpoints.
They have already committed themselves to very controversial
ideas about the nature of God, human sexuality, and the nature
of personhood. These more basic views largely inform their
ideas about abortion and many other matters.
For example, one position on abortion arises from the more
basic view that a human being is most fundamentally a rational
animal, an ethical primate, to use Mary Midgley's term. 4 As
such, a zygote, embryo, or fetus is but a potential human being,
at least until its higher brain functions develop. Until that time
abortion may be morally objectionable on many grounds, but it
is not homicide. This view rests on a secular approach to dealing
with ethical and, especially, public policy or legal problems.
In a multicultural country in particular, the secular approach
ensures that all citizens have some common ground on which
to judge a case. Ensoulment, being too closely tied to religious
faith, cannot be discussed across religious and cultural groups,
as legal policies should be. Law needs to be based on factors
and principles that are accessible to all persons not crucially
incapacitated (for example, mentally retarded).
The slippery slope argument is possibly too cautious. We
differentiate between adolescents and adults all the time, for
example in deciding when people may sign contracts, vote,
and buy cigarettes. We are therefore clearly able to make
crucial distinctions even when they are murky rather than
sharp. In many other spheres we deal with gray areas. We
feel comfortable distinguishing mules from donkeys, mountains
from hills, lakes from oceans, and planets from meteors. At
the end of life, moreover, people pronounced brain dead often
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that no one may kill it. The foundation of such a basic right is
itself a major source of dispute in ethics and political philosophy.
Still, in the abortion debate it does not occasion disagreement
among most participants. Most people in the debate accept that
if something is a human being, it has the (negative) right to
life-that is, the right not to be killed.
Advertising
A frequent object of scorn in our culture is advertising. Indeed,
business in general is not held in very high esteem. One reason
is that people engaged in trade are often looking for profitseeking to satisfy personal economic goals. The idea of trying
to increase benefits for oneself, in turn, has often been morally
suspect. Certainly some ethical systems treat such a goal as
morally undignified or base if not downright evil. For instance,
altruism teaches that we ought to help other people. In business
this is hardly the first goal that most people pursue.
Advertising, in particular, is an important means of attracting customers. Business owners often use all sorts of gimmickry,
polemics, and jingles or whatever to improve their chances of
making a sale. This is so clearly self-promoting that it earns
moral respect only from an ethical egoist perspective. Yet even
if egoism is questionable, most moral theories recognize the
virtue of prudence. Aristotle stressed it, and it is listed as the
first of the cardinal virtues. Advertising could be seen as a form
of prudence, at least when we consider this virtue in relation to
economics.
Yet advertising has been criticized by some prominent intellectuals, including the economist John Kenneth Galbraith. 6
His objection is that advertising helps companies create new
desires in us for things that we could easily do without. The
acquisitive impulse permits companies to continue to produce
their wares in the belief that we will continue to purchase them.
As a result society's resources are wasted on trivial pursuits,
while important social endeavors are underfunded.
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who are in extreme physical pain, who want to die but do not feel
competent to end their lives decisively and relatively peacefully.
Such persons want help in committing suicide. Many believe
that they have the right to seek out such help without exposing
would-be assistants to possible criminal charges. Opponents of
assisted suicide tend to believe that no one has the right to
help another person hasten death, either because suicide itself,
being morally wrong, should be legally wrong, or because the
assistance is itself a form of homicide, the killing of another,
and no law ought to sanction it.
The reasons given in support of the right to seek assistance
may be summarized as follows: everyone has the right to decide
whether to live or die. Having any right amounts to having
exclusive authority to choose-for example, a person who has
the right to speak may decide whether or not to do so, and no
one may command this right on behalf of this person. The right
to life, accordingly, means that we may each decide whether or
not to continue to live. We also have the right to free association.
And we have the right to mutual terms-that is, if I want
to associate with another person in some endeavor who also
wants to assciate with me in it, and no third party's rights are
in jeopardy, no one is justified in coming between us. Indeed,
the right of free association is simply a special right derived
from the basic rights to life and liberty. To seek assistance in
committing suicide, therefore, is the exercise of (a) the right to
life and (b) the right to freedom of association among consenting
adults.
Usually, however, the right to assisted suicides is defended
on somewhat narrower grounds, with the extreme nature of
the situation as an added premise of the argument. In other
words, defenders do not usually argue that just anyone has
the right to commit suicide. (Suicide is, indeed, banned in most
societies, even in the United States, where the law is supposed
to secure everyone's right to life. The Constitution does not
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punishment are likely to devalue human life as they become inured to execution. Some argue merely that executions are cruel
and unusual, in that the state, acting dramatically, pompously,
and publicly, inflicts more serious injury on a person than that
person inflicted upon others relatively privately.
Capital punishment is also criticized because it is irrevocable and because there is the possibility of human error. The
courts especially, which rely on hindsight and the more or less
thorough examination of a case, should arguably refrain from
imposing capital punishment, since it is easy to kill the wrong
person. Even if a criminal deserves the most severe punishment, for our own sake, out of prudence, we should not impose a
sentence that cannot be altered if we prove to have been wrong.
According to this reasoning, which is probably most likely to
emerge from classical egoism, members of a society should concern themselves with their own well-being rather than with the
punishment of others, whether or not they deserve it.
To this last position some reply that capital punishment
should be reserved for cases in which we are certain of the
verdict. If someone were convicted merely on circumstantial
evidence, we would not administer irrevocable punishment. In
some cases, however, no one can doubt the guilt of the accused.
One example is Jack Ruby's televised killing of Lee Harvey
Oswald, himself in custody because he was charged with the
assassination of John F. Kennedy. In these cases, surely, we
would not need to worry about the possibility that we had made
a mistake.
Yet even in such apparently open and shut cases we might
worry-for example, about whether the perpetrator was competent to be a bona fide culprit. Perhaps the person couldn't help
himself and modem medical knowledge was not sophisticated
enough to diagnose his or her mental aftliction. While this may
be rare enough, capital punishment, being final, would make
any form of redress impossible in any case.
So the debate continues.
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"have the right to gamble and are prohibited from doing so. It
is fair to say, furthermore, that society's overall stance is not
clear: is gambling recreation or an immoral indulgence?
Opponents of gambling argue that it is generally corrupting.
To gamble is to pursue unearned income and thereby to flout
the time-honored connection between work and wealth. Gamblers learn to trust not the effort to produce but the throw of the
dice, something that is random, a function of chance. Since such
trust is often disappointed, gamblers are emotionally volatile
and swing from euphoria to deep depression. Furthermore,
gambling tends to make a person dependent on worldly pleasures, which great wealth can achieve, rather than on sensible
moderation, which stresses life's spiritual dimensions.
Supporters maintain that gambling now and then is entertainment, recreation, toying with risk, rather like going to an
amusement park. According to the argument, gambling affords
a sense of risk and adventure without requiring the gambler to
take big chances. That some people suffer harm from gambling
merely demonstrates a given of ethics, namely that a person
can choose to live well or badly, approaching life with decency
and good sense or with deviousness and recklessness.
From a utilitarian perspective we could defend gambling as
a source of state funds in this country and abroad. Gambling, at
least in limited measure, can also improve a community's wellbeing, without the need for coercive taxation, by bringing more
business into the area.
People who travel to Monte Carlo or Vegas may not always
be levelheaded about gambling, but people who travel to work
or eat out are not always careful and cautious either. Work and
play alike are subject to abuse. Gambling is play, and abusers
should be told that they are going overboard, not that they are
doing something inherently wrong. Moreover, the fact that some
people are immoderate does not prove that everyone is out of
control.
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150
ApPLYING ETHICS
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152
A PRIMER ON ETHICS
ApPLYING ETHICS _
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154
A PRIMER ON ETHICS
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156
A PRIMER ON ETHICS
ApPLYING ETHICS.IJ/I.If
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158
APPLYING ETHICS _
159
160
10
CONCLUSION
preceding chapters we have focused mainly on alternative ethical systems and the problem of identifying one
that is universally binding, that is, true. We have also discussed
some substantive ethical issues in line with my own ethical
position, which is classical egoism.
I have touched upon other issues, but I have by no means
considered all the problems that emerge within this one branch
of philosophy. Aside from the question of which ethical system is
right, what the true principles of morality are, and the like, for
example, philosophers often examine the character or structure
of moral principles. That is, if moral principles can be identified,
what do they look like? Are they principles of a tactical or strategic sort, so that by involving them we are better able to achieve
certain goals? Or are they more likely to be principles such as
those found in "formal systems" (for example, mathematics)binding on grounds of what might be called internal necessity?
Perhaps neither-or maybe both? As we saw earlier, the former
conception of moral principles is usually called consequentialist or teleological (which means roughly "forward directed"),
whereas the latter is called formalist or deontological (which
means roughly "inherently compelling"). Some argue that such
divisions are artificial and that moral principles are both forward directed and formal, both consequentialist (identified by
N THE
162
CONCLUSION _
163
164
A PRIMER ON ETHICS
requirements must be met. Any ethical system must be internally consistent, must contain sufficiently precise terms, must
be capable of universalization, and must be practicable. The
system must also, generally speaking, accommodate ordinary
moral precepts. No genuine ethical system, for example, could
sanction wanton killing, cruelty to innocent people, rampant
dishonesty, or blatant cowardice. Even after these requirements have been met, the ethical system that best answers our
moral concerns will demonstrate its superiority to others by being comprehensive, complete, and realistically defensible (that
is, it will not rely on anything unbelievable or fundamentally
incomprehensible to prove it right).
Several phrases, bordering onjargon, have developed within
professional philosophical circles in relation to ethics (for example, "supererogatory" or "indefeasible" principles). No one
outside the community of professional philosophers needs to
learn these terms. It is more important to grasp the ideas that
are captured by the shorthand references.
As with all fields of inquiry, in ethics there are many important technicalities. Specialists develop fine distinctions and
nuances. These are not trivial within technical philosophy, just
as legal niceties are crucial for those dealing with the finer
points oflaw. But they are not central for purposes of acting decently and of acquainting oneself with moral theory, one of the
key branches of philosophy.
It remains for us to consider, in conclusion, one question that
is asked with particular frequency: "Who is to say what is right
or wrong?" The reasons for asking this question are not always
the same, but the implications are very interesting.
Many people believe that some authority figure (a father, a
mother, the church, or the state) decides what is right and what
is wrong. But we may ask: is it correct to think of morality as a
matter of authority? In a sense there is no harm in doing so, at
least initially.
CONCLUSION
IIf'
165
166
CONCLUSION.IJIif
167
168
CONCLUSION'"
169
QUESTIONS
FOR DISCUSSION
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
172
."
NOTES
PREFACE
174
J!IIi'
NOTES TO PAGES
23-42
4.
WHAT
RIGHT?
NOTES TO PAGES
42-58 8/11
175
the theory being examined fails because it does not accommodate this
assumption. This approach is highly debatable, however, since it assumes that we "know intuitively" which moral principles are primary.
Although we may know, from our ordinary experiences and learning,
that certain principles are morally important, it is not possible, without
further systematic reflection, to determine which of these principles is
primary, which secondary, and so forth. Moral dilemmas arise from situations that appear to pit our moral principles against one another, so
we need to rank the principles. Philosophical ethics becomes important
in this area.
2. See W. G. Maclagan, "Self and Others: A Defense of Altruism,"
Philosophical Quarterly 4 (1954): 109-10.
3. "To explain" can be used narrowly, to mean "to provide external or prior causes for," or more broadly, "to render understandable,
meaningful." The former excludes ethics, and the latter does not.
4. Most altruists subscribe to the religious doctrine of original sin as
well as to the more secular view that we are all naturally inclined to be
callous toward others. One good place to find a statement on original
sin is in Russell Kirk's The Conservative Mind (Chicago: Regnery,
1953), while Thomas Hobbes's Leviathan (Baltimore: Penguin Books,
1968) includes a statement on callousness.
5. For more on this point, see Tibor R. Machan, "Egoism, Psychological Egoism, and Ethical Egoism," in P. H. Werhane and R. F. Freedman,
eds., The Blackwell Companion to Business Ethics (London: Basil
Blackwell, 1996). I am also a proponent of what I call "classical egoism or individualism." See, for example, Tibor R. Machan, Capitalism
and Individualism (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990).
6. If an ethical system provided an individual with step-by-step
instructions for living-a blueprint, as it were, rather than a general
set of guidelines-ethical behavior would in a sense be passive, not the
result ofthe individual's initiative.
7. Ethical egoism is a view that has been developed by several
philosophers, including (some would argue) Aristotle, Bishop Butler,
Ayn Rand, Jesse Kalin, Eric Mack, and myself. See Tibor R. Machan,
"Recent Work on Ethical Egoism," in K. J. Lucey and T. R. Machan,
eds., Recent Work in Philosophy (Totowa, N.J.: Rowman and Allenheld,
1983). See also W. D. Falk, "Morality, Self, and Others," in Ought,
176
NOTES TO PAGES
58-86
NOTES TO PAGES
86-135 _
177
9. APPLYING ETHICS
1. Ralph Waldo Emerson, "Fate" and "Intellect," The Complete
Writings (New York: William H. Wise &Co., 1929), 527, 224.
2. I have in mind Aristotle, Spinoza, Locke, Ayn Rand, and Mary
Midgley, among others.
3. See, for example, Catherine A. MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1987), 93ff.
4. Mary Midgley, The Ethical Primate.
5. Some of these matters are discussed in the applied ethics texts
listed at the end of this book. There is also a very balanced discussion
of this topic in Alissa Rubin, "Partial Truths: The Late-Term Abortion
Saga," The New Republic, March 4,1996,27-29.
6. John Kenneth Galbraith, "The Dependence Effect," in Milton
Snoeyenbos, Robert Almeder, and James Humber, eds., Business
Ethics (Buffalo, N.Y.: Prometheus Books, 1983),425-30.
7. Burton Leiser, "Deceptive Practices in Advertising," in Tom L.
Beauchamp and Norman E. Bowie, eds., Ethical Theory and Business
(Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1983), 334-43.
178
IJ!II1
NOTES TO PAGES
135-166
RECOMMENDED
READING
INDEX
Abortion, 130-34
Advertising, 134-35
Altruism, 60, 175n; business and,
134; criticism of, 53-56; goals
and principles, 51-53; religion
and, 82, 83-84, 86; selfishness
and, 52-54; welfare statism
and,75
Animal rights, 149-51
Aristotle, 27, 32, 34, 38, 125, 134,
160
Asceticism, 64
Assisted suicide, 135-37
Authoritarianism, moral, 100
Ayer, A. J., 34
Benedict, Ruth, 24
Bentham, Jeremy, 40, 44
Brain and free will, 19-20
Branden, Nathaniel, 18
Buddha, 165, 166
Capitalism, 70-74
Capital punishment, 137-40
Gato's Letters, 68
Child-parent relations, 141-47
182
J!JIfIf
INDEX
INDEX.IJIfI
183
Moore, G. E., 34
Moral paternalism, 48, 50
Moral principles (moral
standards): arguments against
existence of, 23-25; arguments
for existence of, 25-28; choice
and, 124; empiricism and, 24,
25; fundamental and basic,
123-126; primary, 174-75n;
stabilityof,121-22
Moral skepticism, 23-27, 90-106
Moral theory, 36-38
Mysticism, 36
Kalin,Jesse,57
Kant, ImD1anuel, 18, 34, 37,
102-103
Kennedy, John F., 140
King, Martin Luther, 165
King Lear, 105
Nagel, 11lomas, 51
Naturalism, 34
Natural law: free will and,
13-14; religion and, 87-88
Nietzsche, Friedrich, 102-105
Nihilism: criticism of, 103-106;
principles of, 101-103
NoncognitivisD1, 34, 35
Nonnaturalists,34
Libertarianism, 70-74
Lincoln, AbrahaD1, 165
Locke, John, 160
Logical positivists, 34
Ontology, 111
Original sin, 83
Oswald, Lee Harvey, 140
"Ought implies can," 11, 163
Mack, Eric, 57
Mackie, John, 25
Mandeville, Bernard, 73
Marx, Karl, 68-69, 160
MarxisD1, 21,160
Metaethics, 33-36
Midgley, Mary, 27, 132
Mill, John Stuart, 44, 160
184
J!IIiI'
INDEX
157-58,178n
Prolife, 130-34
Racial discrimination, 151-56
Rand,Ayn, 34-57
Rationality: child rearing and,
142, 144--45; egoism and, 58,
59, 61-63; fideism and, 89;
human beings defined by, 124,
125-26, 132
Rawls, John, 35
Reasoning, deductive versus
inferential, 26
Relativism. See Ethical
relativism
Religion: abortion and, 131-133;
child rearing and, 144; elitism
and, 85-86; ethics and, 80-89;
natural law and, 87-88
Rights: animal, 149-51;
children's, 141-47; negative
versus positive, 74-75
Right to life, 133-34, 136-37
Rorty, Richard, 35, 110, 114
Ross, Sir David, 35
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, 65
Ruby, Jack, 140
Saint Augustine, 36, 52
Sartre,Jean-Paul,34
Selfishness: altruism and, 52, 54;
egoism and, 59
Sexual harrassment, 156-58
Shakespeare, William, 105, 165
Sidgwick, Henry, 44
Situationism, 64-65
Skinner, B. F., 16
Smith, Adam, 160
Social contract theory, 162
Socialism, 68-70, 160
Social science, free will and,
22-23; value and, 108-109, 113
Socrates, 20, 32, 165, 166
Stoicism, 63-64
Subjectivism. See Ethical
subjectivism
Suicide, 135-37
Teleological ethics, 38, 145
Teleology, 161
Theistic ethics, 80-89, 176-77n
Theory, purpose of, 162-63
Utilitarianism, 21, 38, 41; act
versus rule, 46-47; animal
rights and, 150; capital
punishment and, 138; criticism
of, 47-51; environmentalism
and, 65; gambling and, 148;
goals and principles, 44--46;
welfare statism and, 75
Values, 29-32; epistemology
and, 111-12; as facts, 31-32,
117; nihilism and, 101-104;
proving knowable, 115-17;
social sciences and, 108-109,
113; subjectivism and, 93
Washington, Cieorge, 165
Welfare, 44-51
Welfare statism, 74-75