1.Concerning ERGA OMNES: (A) what is its literal meaning?

(b) What does it mean

within the context of international law? (c) Give two examples of erga omnes.
a. Erga omnes is a Latin phrase which literally means "towards all" or "towards everyone". In
legal terminology, erga omnes rights or obligations are owed toward all. For instance a property
right is an erga omnes entitlement, and therefore enforceable against anybody infringing that
right. An erga omnes right (a statutory right) can here be distinguished from a right based on
contract, which is only enforceable against the contracting party.
b. In international law it has been used as a legal term describing obligations owed by states
towards the community of states as a whole. An erga omnes obligation exists because of the
universal and undeniable interest in the perpetuation of critical rights (and the prevention of their
breach). Consequently, any state has the right to complain of a breach.
c. Examples of erga omnes norms include piracy, genocide, slavery, torture, and racial
discrimination. The concept was recognized in the International Court of Justice's decision in the
Barcelona Traction case [(Belgium v Spain) (Second Phase) ICJ Rep 1970 3 at paragraph 33]:

2. Explain the principle of clausula rebus sic stantibus. What is its literal meaning? As a
legal doctrine, what does it mean? What are the two justifications for its invocation?
In public international law, clausula rebus sic stantibus (Latin for "things thus standing") is the
legal doctrine allowing for treaties to become inapplicable because of a fundamental change of
circumstances. It is essentially an "escape clause" that makes an exception to the general rule of
pacta
sunt
servanda
(promises
must
be
kept).
Because the doctrine poses a risk to the security of treaties as its scope is relatively unconfined, it
requires strict regulations as to the conditions in which it may be invoked.
The doctrine is part of customary international law, but is also provided for in the 1969 Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties under Article 62 (Fundamental Change of Circumstance),
although the doctrine is never mentioned by name. Article 62 provides the only two justifications
of the invocation of rebus sic stantibus: first, that the circumstances existing at the time of the
conclusion of the treaty were indeed objectively essential to the obligations of treaty (subparagraph A) and the instance wherein the change of circumstances has had a radical effect on
the
obligations
of
the
treaty
(sub-paragraph
B).
If the parties to a treaty had contemplated for the occurrence of the changed circumstance the
doctrine does not apply and the provision remains in effect. Clausula rebus sic stantibus only
relates to changed circumstances that were never contemplated by the parties. This principle is
clarified in the Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (United Kingdom v. Iceland, 1973).
Although it is clear that a fundamental change of circumstances might justify terminating or
modifying a treaty, unilateral denunciation of a treaty is prohibited; a party does not have the
right to denounce a treaty unilaterally.

3.What do you understand by the modern international law of the acquisition (or
attribution) of territory?
The modern international law of the acquisition (or attribution) of territory generally requires
that there be: an intentional display of power and authority over the territory, by the exercise of
jurisdiction and state functions, on a continuous and peaceful basis. The latter two criteria are
tempered to suit the nature of the territory and size of its population, if any.2
In the 1931 award in the dispute between Mexico and France over the sovereignty of Clipperton
Island, located in the Pacific Ocean 1280 km (about 690 nautical miles) southwest of Acapulco,
Mexico, the King of Italy as sole arbitrator had previously stated the rules this way:
It is beyond doubt that by immemorial usage having the force of law, besides the animus
occupandi, the actual, and not the nominal, taking of possession is a necessary condition of
occupation. This taking of possession consists in the act, or series of acts, by which the
occupying state reduces to its possession the territory in question and takes steps to exercise
exclusive authority there. Strictly speaking, and in ordinary cases, that only takes place when the
state establishes in the territory itself an organization capable of making its laws respected. But
this step is, properly speaking, but a means of procedure to the taking of possession, and,
therefore, is not identical with the latter. There may also be cases where it is unnecessary to have
recourse to this method. Thus, if a territory, by virtue of the fact that it was completely
uninhabited, is, from the first moment when the occupying state makes its appearance there, at
the absolute and undisputed disposition of that state, from that moment the taking of possession
must be considered as accomplished, and the occupation is thereby completed.

4. Explain the concept of association of states in international law. In international

practice, what is the use of these associative states? Is concept of association recognized
under the 1987 Constitution? Explain.
The nature of the "associative" relationship may have been intended to be defined more precisely
in the still to be forged Comprehensive Compact. Nonetheless, given that there is a concept of
"association" in international law, and the MOA-AD - by its inclusion of international law
instruments in its TOR- placed itself in an international legal context, that concept of association
may be brought to bear in understanding the use of the term "associative" in the MOA-AD.
Keitner
and
Reisman
state
that
[a]n association is formed when two states of unequal power voluntarily establish durable links.
In the basic model, one state, the associate, delegates certain responsibilities to the other, the
principal, while maintaining its international status as a state. Free associations represent a
middle
ground
between
integration
and
independence.
x
x
x150
For purposes of illustration, the Republic of the Marshall Islands and the Federated States of
Micronesia (FSM), formerly part of the U.S.-administered Trust Territory of the Pacific

Islands,151 are associated states of the U.S. pursuant to a Compact of Free Association. The
currency in these countries is the U.S. dollar, indicating their very close ties with the U.S., yet
they issue their own travel documents, which is a mark of their statehood. Their international
legal status as states was confirmed by the UN Security Council and by their admission to UN
membership.
According to their compacts of free association, the Marshall Islands and the FSM generally
have the capacity to conduct foreign affairs in their own name and right, such capacity extending
to matters such as the law of the sea, marine resources, trade, banking, postal, civil aviation, and
cultural relations. The U.S. government, when conducting its foreign affairs, is obligated to
consult with the governments of the Marshall Islands or the FSM on matters which it (U.S.
government)
regards
as
relating
to
or
affecting
either
government.
X
X
X
In international practice, the "associated state" arrangement has usually been used as a
transitional device of former colonies on their way to full independence. Examples of states that
have passed through the status of associated states as a transitional phase are Antigua, St. KittsNevis-Anguilla, Dominica, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and Grenada. All have since become
independent
states.153
xxxx
These provisions of the MOA indicate, among other things, that the Parties aimed to vest in the
BJE the status of an associated state or, at any rate, a status closely approximating it.
The concept of association is not recognized under the present Constitution

5. Palmas, also referred to as Miangas, is an island of little economic value or strategic

location. It is two miles in length, three-quarters of a mile in width, and had a population of
about 750 when the decision of the arbitrator was handed down. The island is located
between Mindanao, Philippines and the northern most island, known as Nanusa, of what
was the former Netherlands East Indies. In 1898, Spain ceded the Philippines to the United
States in the Treaty of Paris (1898) and Palmas sat within the boundaries of that cession to
the U.S. In 1906, the United States discovered that the Netherlands also claimed
sovereignty over the island, and the two parties agreed to submit to binding arbitration by
the
Permanent
Court
of
Arbitration.
The question the arbitrator was to resolve was whether the Island of Palmas (Miangas), in
its entirety, was a part of the territory of the United States or the Netherlands.
The legal issue presented was whether a territory belongs to the first discoverer, even if
they do not exercise authority over the territory, or whether it belongs to the state which
actually
exercises
sovereignty
over
it.
How was the issue resolved? In short, what country is the real owner of the territory?
Discovery alone, without any subsequent act, cannot at the present time suffice to prove
sovereignty over the Island of Palmas (or Miangas); and in so far as there is no sovereignty, the
question of an abandonment properly speaking of sovereignty by one State in order that the

sovereignty

of

another

may

take

its

place

does

not

arise.

If on the other hand the view is adopted that discovery does not create a definitive title of
sovereignty, but only an inchoate title, such a title exists, it is true, without external
manifestation. However, according to the view that has prevailed at any rate since the 19th
century, an inchoate title of discovery must be completed within a reasonable period by the
effective occupation of the region claimed to be discovered. This principle must be applied in the
present case, for the reasons given above in regard to the rules determining which of successive
legal systems is to be applied (the so-called intertemporal law). Now, no act of occupation nor,
except as to a recent period, any exercise of sovereignty at Palmas by Spain has been alleged.
But even admitting that the Spanish title still existed as inchoate in 1898 and must be considered
as included in the cession under Article III of the Treaty of Paris, an inchoate title could not
prevail over the continuous and peaceful display of authority by another State; for such display
may prevail even over a prior, definitive title put forward by another State. This point will be
considered, when the Netherlands argument has been examined and the allegations of either
Party as to the display of their authority can be compared

6. In an 1892 revolution, General Jos Manuel "Mocho" Hernndez expelled the existing
Venezuelan government and took control of Ciudad Bolivar, where plaintiff Underhill lived
and ran a waterworks system for the city. Underhill, an American citizen, repeatedly
applied to Hernandez for an exit passport, but his requests were refused, and Underhill
was forced to stay in Ciudad Bolivar and run the waterworks. Hernandez finally relented
and allowed Underhill to return to the United States, where he instituted an action to
recover damages for his detention in Venezuela. In finding for the Defendant, a New York
Court determined that Hernandez had acted in his official capacity as a military
commander so his actions were those of the Venezuelan government. The Court therefore
refused
to
hear
Underhill's
claim
against
the
government.
Questions: Is the Court correct? What principle of international law is used in this
dispute? Explain.
ANSWER:based on the Act of State Doctrine. The Court reasoned, "Every sovereign state is
bound to respect the independence of every other sovereign state, and the courts of one country
will not sit in judgment on the acts of the government of another, done within its own territory.

7. The UN Secretary General sometimes to settle a dispute between two states, visits each,
and proposes a solution to their problem. He may do this either privately or publicly. What
is the international term for this mode of settling an international dispute?
Answer: The UN Secretary General uses what is termed his "good offices" (generally meaning
his prestige and the weight of the world community he represents) when he meets with world

leaders, either publicly or privately, in an effort to prevent international disputes from

developing, escalating, or spreading. For example, in 1998 Kofi Annan negotiated a settlement
of the dispute between Iraq and the U.S. over arms inspections in Iraq. He used the prestige of
his office and the threat of UN Security Council action if no agreement was reached to force
Saddam Hussein to allow continuation of UN inspections. Earlier examples include U Thant's
assistance during the Cuban Missile Crisis, and Javier Perez de Cuellar's mediation of the Soviet
withdrawal from Afghanistan

8. What is a thalweg? How is it used to solve a dispute on boundaries between two states?
The Thalweg Doctrine defines the border between two states separated by a watercourse or
flowing body of water as lying along the thalweg, which is the line of greatest depth of the
channel or watercourse.

9. Every statute is understood, x x x , to contain all such provisions as may be necessary to

effectuate its object and purpose, or to make effective rights, powers, privileges or
jurisdiction which it grants, including all such collateral and subsidiary consequences as
may be fairly and logically inferred from its terms.Ex necessitate elegis . . . .
What is the name of the doctrine exemplified by said statement?
the
doctrine
of
necessary
implication
which
holds
that:
No statute can be enacted that can provide all the details involved in its application. There is
always an omission that may not meet a particular situation. What is thought, at the time of
enactment, to be an all-embracing legislation may be inadequate to provide for the unfolding
events of the future. So-called gaps in the law develop as the law is enforced. One of the rules of
statutory construction used to fill in the gap is the doctrine of necessary implication. The doctrine
states that what is implied in a statute is as much a part thereof as that which is expressed. Every
statute is understood, by implication, to contain all such provisions as may be necessary to
effectuate its object and purpose, or to make effective rights, powers, privileges or jurisdiction
which it grants, including all such collateral and subsidiary consequences as may be fairly and
logically inferred from its terms. Ex necessitate legis. And every statutory grant of power, right
or privilege is deemed to include all incidental power, right or privilege. This is so because the
greater includes the lesser, expressed in the Maxim, in eo plus sit, simper inest et minus

10. Mr. X filed a case of Abuse of Authority against the Mayor. The Mayors Budget
Officer and Legal Officer were also included in the suit, as conspirators of said abuse.

Another criminal case was filed against the Mayor for Technical Malversation. The Mayor
won by a landslide vote in the next election. The mayor and his other coaccused/respondents
file
a
motion
to
have
all
the
cases
dismissed.
Question: As hearing officer/ judge, will you dismiss the above mentioned cases? Explain.
No, I will not dismiss the case. Under the principle of vox populi est suprema lex, the re-election
of a public official may, indeed, supersede a pending administrative case. Ingco v. Sanchez, et al.
[22] clarified that the condonation doctrine does not apply to a criminal case