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Terrymanila, Inc. filed a petition for voluntary insolvency with the RTC of Bataan on February 13, 1991. One of its
creditors was petitioner with which it had an obligation of P3 Million that was secured by a chattel mortgage
executed on February 16, 1989. Royal Cargo, another creditor of Terrymanila, filed before the RTC of for collection
of sum of money and preliminarily attached some of Terrymanilas personal properties on March 5, 1991 to secure
the satisfaction of a judgment award of P296,662.16. On April 1991, the Bataan RTC declared Terrymanila
insolvent. The Manila RTC rendered judgment in the collection case in favor of respondent. In the meantime,
petitioner sought in the insolvency proceedings at the Bataan RTC permission to extra-judicially foreclose the
chattel mortgage. At the auction sale, petitioner, the sole bidder of the properties, purchased them for P1.5 Million.
Respondent later filed for annulment of the auction sale.
Issue: Who should be given preference over the subject properties?
Despite its window of opportunity to exercise its equity of redemption, however, respondent chose to be technically
shrewd about its chances, preferring instead to seek annulment of the auction sale, which was the result of the
foreclosure of the mortgage, permission to conduct which it had early on opposed before the insolvency court. Its
negligence or omission to exercise its equity of redemption within a reasonable time, or even on the day of the
auction sale, warrants a presumption that it had either abandoned it or opted not to assert it.

It bears noting that the chattel mortgage in favor of petitioner was registered more than two years before the issuance
of a writ of attachment over some of Terrymanilas chattels in favor of respondent Since the registration of a chattel
mortgage is an effective and binding notice to other creditors of its existence and creates a real right or lien that
follows the property wherever it may be, the right of respondent, as an attaching creditor or as purchaser, had it
purchased the mortgaged chattel at the auction sale, is subordinate to the lien of the mortgagee who has in his favor
a valid chattel mortgage.

On or about October 16, 1972, Celerino Delgado (Delgado) and Conrad Leviste (Leviste) entered into a loan
agreement which was evidenced by a promissory note. On the same date, Delgado executed a chattel mortgage 2
over a Willy's jeep owned by him. And acting as the attorney-in-fact of herein petitioner, Manolo P. Cerna
(petitioner), he also mortgage a "Taunus' car owned by the latter.The period lapsed without Delgado paying the loan.
This prompted Leviste to a file a collection suit CFI of Rizal against Delgado and petitioner as solidary debtors.
Petitioner claimed that the claim should be filed in the proceedings for the settlement of Delgado's estate as the
action did not survive Delgado's death. Moreover, he also stated that since Leviste already opted to collect on the
note, he could no longer foreclose the mortgage. CA and TC: Denied the Motion to Dismiss
Whether or not a third party, who is not a debtor under the note but mortgaged his property to secure the payment of
the loan of another is solidarily liable with the principal debtor.
Whether or not a mortgagee who opted to collect may still foreclose the mortgage.
There is also no legal provision nor jurisprudence in our jurisdiction which makes a third person who secures the
fulfillment of another's obligation by mortgaging his own property to be solidarily bound with the principal obligor.
A chattel mortgage may be "an accessory contract" to a contract of loan, but that fact alone does not make a thirdparty mortgagor solidarily bound with the principal debtor in fulfilling the principal obligation that is, to pay the
loan.The signatory to the principal contract loan remains to be primarily bound. It is only upon the default of
the latter that the creditor may have been recourse on the mortgagors by foreclosing the mortgaged properties in lieu
of an action for the recovery of the amount of the loan. And the liability of the third-party mortgagors extends only

to the property mortgaged. Should there be any deficiency, the creditors has recourse on the principal debtor.- The
Special Power of Attorney did not make petitioner a mortgagor. All it did was to authorized Delgado to mortgage
certain properties belonging to petitioner .Hence, Leviste having chosen to file the collection suit, could not now run
after petitioner for the satisfaction of the debt. This is even moretrue in this case because of the death of the principal
debtor, Delgado. Leviste was pursuing a money claim against a deceased person.