G.R. No.

141529

June 6, 2001

FRANCISCO YAP, JR., aka EDWIN YAP, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
The right against excessive bail, and the liberty of abode and
travel, are being invoked to set aside two resolutions of the
Court of Appeals which fixed bail at P5,500,000.00 and
imposed conditions on change of residence and travel abroad.
For misappropriating amounts equivalent to P5,500,000.00,
petitioner was convicted of estafa by the Regional Trial Court of
Pasig City1 and was sentenced to four years and two months
of prision correctional, as minimum to eight years of prision
mayor as maximum, "in addition to one (1) year for each
additional P10,000.00 in excess of P22,000.00 but in no case
shall it exceed twenty (20) years."2 He filed a notice of appeal,
and moved to be allowed provisional liberty under the cash
bond he had filed earlier in the proceedings. The motion was
denied by the trial court in an order dated February 17,1999.
After the records of the case were transmitted to the Court of
Appeals, petitioner filed with the said court a Motion to Fix Bail
For the Provisional Liberty of Accused Appellant Pending
Appeal, invoking the last paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of
the 1997 Revised Rules of Court. Asked to comment on this
motion, the Solicitor General opined that petitioner may be
allowed to post bail in the amount of P5,500,000.00 and be
required to secure "a certification/guaranty from the Mayor of
the place of his residence that he is a resident of the area and
that he will remain to be so until final judgment is rendered or in
case he transfers residence, it must be with prior notice to the
court and private complainant."3 Petitioner filed a Reply,
contending that the proposed bail ofP5,500,000.00 was
violative of his right against excessive bail.

The assailed resolution of the Court of Appeals4, issued on

October 6, 1999, upheld the recommendation of the Solicitor
General; thus, its dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the "Motion to Fix
Bail For Provisional Liberty of Accused-Appellant
Pending Appeal" is hereby GRANTED. Accusedappellant Francisco Yap, Jr., a.k.a. Edwin Yap is hereby
ALLOWED TO POST BAIL in the amount of Five Million
Five Hundred Thousand (P5,500,000.00) Pesos, subject
to the following conditions, viz. :
(1)
He
(accused-appellant)
secures
a
certification/guaranty from the Mayor of the place
of his residence that he is a resident of the area
and that he will remain to be a resident therein
until final judgment is rendered or in case he
transfers residence, it must be with prior notice
to the court;
(2) The Commission of lmmigration and
Deportation (CID) is hereby directed to issue a
hold departure order against accused-appellant;
and
(3) The accused-appellant shall forthwith
surrender his passport to the Division Clerk of
Court for safekeeping until the court orders its
return;
(4) Any violation of the aforesaid conditions shall
cause the forfeiture of accused-appellant's bail
bond, the dismissal of appeal and his immediate
arrest and confinement in jail.
SO ORDERED.5
A motion for reconsideration was filed, seeking the reduction of
the amount of bail fixed by respondent court, but was denied in
a resolution issued on November 25, 1999. Hence, this petition.

Petitioner sets out the following assignments of error:

The respondent Court of Appeals committed grave
abuse of discretion in fixing the bail of the provisional
liberty of petitioner pending appeal in the amount of P5 .
5 million.
The respondent Court of Appeals committed grave
abuse of discretion in basing the bail for the provisional
liberty of the petitioner on his civil liability.
The respondent Court of Appeals unduly restricted
petitioner's constitutional liberty of abode and travel in
imposing the other conditions for the grant of bail.
Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals, by setting bail at
a prohibitory amount, effectively denied him his right to bail. He
challenges the legal basis of respondent court for fixing bail at
P5,500,000.00, which is equivalent to the amount of his civil
liability to private complainant Manila Mahogany Marketing
Corporation, and argues that the Rules of Court never intended
for the civil liability of the accused to be a guideline or basis for
determining the amount of bail. He prays that bail be reduced to
at least P40,000.00, citing the maximum amount of bail that can
be posted for the crime of estafa under the 1996 Bail Bond
Guide, or P20,000.00, equivalent to the amount of bail he
posted during the trial of the case.6
On the other hand, the Solicitor General maintains that no
grave abuse of discretion could be ascribed to the Court of
Appeals for fixing the amount of bail at P5,500,000.00
considering the severity of the penalty imposed, the weight of
the evidence against petitioner, and the gravity of the offense of
which petitioner was convicted by the RTC. He asserted that
the P5,500,000.00 not only corresponded to civil liability but
also to the amount of fraud imputed to petitioner. The Solicitor
General further pointed out the probability of flight in case
petitioner is released on bail, it having been established that
petitioner was in possession of a valid passport and visa and
had in fact left the country several times during the course of

the proceedings in the lower court. It was also shown that

petitioner used different names in his business transactions and
had several abodes in different parts of the country.
As for the conditions imposed by the bail bond, the Solicitor
General advanced that all that the Court of Appeals requires is
notice in case of change of address; it does not in any way
impair petitioner's right to change abode for as long as the court
is apprised of his change of residence during the pendency of
the appeal.
Petitioner's case falls within the provisions of Section 5, Rule
114 of the 1997 Rules of Court which states:
SEC. 5. Bail, when discretionary. -- Upon conviction by
the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, the
court, on application, may admit the accused to bail.
The court, in its discretion, may allow the accused to
continue on provisional liberty under the same bail bond
during the period to appeal subject to the consent of the
bondsman.
If the court imposed a penalty of imprisonment
exceeding six (6) years, but not more than twenty (20)
years, the accused shall be denied bail, or his bail
previously granted shall be cancelled, upon a showing
by the prosecution, with notice to the accused, of the
following or other similar circumstances:
(a) That the accused is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or
habitual delinquent, or has committed the crime
aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;
(b) That the accused is found to have previously
escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or
has violated the conditions of his bail without valid
justification;

(c) That the accused committed the offense while on

probation, parole, or under conditional pardon;
(d) That the circumstances of the accused or his case
indicate the probability of flight if released on bail; or
(e) That there is undue risk that during the pendency of
the appeal, the accused may commit another crime.
The appellate court may review the resolution of the
Regional Trial Court, on motion and with notice to the
adverse party.7
There is no question that in the present case the Court of
Appeals exercised its discretion in favor of allowing bail to
petitioner on appeal. Respondent court stated that it was doing
so for "humanitarian reasons", and despite a perceived high
risk of flight, as by petitioner's admission he went out of the
country several times during the pendency of the case, for
which reason the court deemed it necessary to peg the amount
of bail at P5,500,000.00.
The prohibition against requiring excessive bail is enshrined in
the Constitution.8 The obvious rationale, as declared in the
leading case of De la Camara vs. Enage,9 is that imposing bail
in an excessive amount could render meaningless the right to
bail. Thus, in Villaseor vs. Abano,10 this Court made the
pronouncement that it will not hesitate to exercise its
supervisory powers over lower courts should the latter, after
holding the accused entitled to bail, effectively deny the same
by imposing a prohibitory sum or exacting unreasonable
conditions.
xxx There is grim irony in an accused being told that he
has a right to bail but at the same time being required to
post such an exorbitant sum. What aggravates the
situation is that the lower court judge would apparently
yield to the command of the fundamental law. In reality,
such a sanctimonious avowal of respect for a mandate
of the Constitution was on a purely verbal level. There is

reason to believe that any person in the position of

petitioner would under the circumstances be unable to
resist thoughts of escaping from confinement, reduced
as he must have been to a state of desperation. In the
same breath as he was told he could be bailed out, the
excessive amount required could only mean that
provisional liberty would be beyond his reach. It would
have been more forthright if he were informed
categorically that such a right could not be availed of.
There would have been no disappointment of
expectations then. It does call to mind these words of
Justice Jackson, "a promise to the ear to be broken to
the hope, a teasing illusion like a munificent bequest in
a pauper's will." XXX11
At the same time, Section 9, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure advises courts to consider the following
factors in the setting of the amount of bail:
(a) Financial ability of the accused to give bail;
(b) Nature and circumstances of the offense;
(c) Penalty for the offense charged;
(d) Character and reputation of the accused;
(e) Age and health of the accused;
(f) Weight of the evidence against the accused;
(g) Probability of the accused appearing at the trial;
(h) Forfeiture of other bail;
(i) The fact that the accused was a fugitive from justice
when arrested; and
(j) Pendency of other cases where the accused is on
bail.
Thus, the court has wide latitude in fixing the amount of bail.
Where it fears that the accused may jump bail, it is certainly not
precluded from installing devices to ensure against the same.

Options may include increasing the bail bond to an appropriate

level, or requiring the person to report periodically to the court
and to make an accounting of his movements. 12 In the present
case, where petitioner was found to have left the country
several times while the case was pending, the Court of Appeals
required the confiscation of his passport and the issuance of a
hold-departure order against him.
Under the circumstances of this case, we find that appropriate
conditions have been imposed in the bail bond to ensure
against the risk of flight, particularly, the combination of the
hold-departure order and the requirement that petitioner inform
the court of any change of residence and of his whereabouts.
Although an increase in the amount of bail while the case is on
appeal may be meritorious, we find that the setting of the
amount at P5,500,000.00 is unreasonable, excessive, and
constitutes an effective denial of petitioner's right to bail.
The purpose for bail is to guarantee the appearance of the
accused at the trial,13 or whenever so required by the Court 14.
The amount should be high enough to assure the presence of
the accused when required but no higher than is reasonably
calculated to fulfill this purpose.15 To fix bail at an amount
equivalent to the civil liability of which petitioner is charged (in
this case, P5,500,000.00).is to permit the impression that the
amount paid as bail is an exaction of the civil liability that
accused is charged of; this we cannot allow because bail is not
intended as a punishment, nor as a satisfaction of civil liability
which should necessarily await the judgment of the appellate
court.
At the same time, we cannot yield to petitioner's submission
that bail in the instant case be set at P40,000.00 based on the
1996 Bail Bond Guide. (The current Bail Bond Guide, issued on
August 29, 2000, maintains recommended bail at P40,000.00
for estafa where the amount of fraud is P142,000.00 or over
and the imposable penalty 20 years of reclusion
temporal). True, the Court has held that the Bail Bond Guide, a

circular of the Department of Justice for the guidance of state

prosecutors, although technically not binding upon the courts,
"merits attention, being in a sense an expression of policy of
the Executive Branch, through the Department of Justice, in the
enforcement of criminal laws."16 Thus, courts are advised that
they must not only be aware but should also consider the Bail
Bond Guide due to its significance in the administration of
criminal justice.17 This notwithstanding, the Court is not
precluded from imposing in petitioner's case an amount higher
than P40,000.00 (based on the Bail Bond Guide) where it
perceives that an appropriate increase is dictated by the
circumstances.
It militates emphasis that petitioner is seeking bail on
appeal. Section 5, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure is clear that although the grant of bail on appeal is
non-capital offenses is discretionary, when the penalty imposed
on the convicted accused exceeds six years and circumstances
exist that point to the probability of flight if released on bail, then
the accused must be denied bail, or his bail previously granted
should be cancelled.18 In the same vein, the Court has held that
the discretion to extend bail during the course of the appeal
should be exercised with grave caution and for strong reasons,
considering that the accused had been in fact convicted by the
trial court.19 In an earlier case, the Court adopted Senator
Vicente J. Francisco's disquisition on why bail should be denied
after judgment of conviction as a matter of wise discretion; thus:
The importance attached to conviction is due to the
underlying principle that bail should be granted only
where it is uncertain whether the accused is guilty or
innocent, and therefore, where that uncertainty is
removed by conviction it would, generally speaking, be
absurd to admit to bail. After a person has been tried
and convicted the presumption of innocence which may
be relied upon in prior applications is rebutted, and the
burden is upon the accused to show error in the
conviction. From another point of view it may be

properly argued that the probability of ultimate

punishment is so enhanced by the conviction that the
accused is much more likely to attempt to escape if
liberated on bail than before conviction.xxx20
Petitioner is seeking bail on appeal. He was in fact declared
guilty beyond reasonable doubt by the RTC, and due to the
serious amount of fraud involved, sentenced to imprisonment
for twenty years --the maximum penalty for estafa by false
pretenses or fraudulent acts allowed by the Revised Penal
Code. Although it cannot be controverted that the Court of
Appeals, despite the foregoing considerations and the
possibility of flight still wielded its discretion to grant petitioner
bail, the setting of bail in the amount of P5,500,000.00 is
unjustified as having no legal nor factual basis. Guided by the
penalty imposed by the lower court and the weight of the
evidence against petitioner, we believe that the amount of
P200,000.00 is more reasonable.
Petitioner also contests the condition imposed by the Court of
Appeals that he secure "a certification/guaranty from the Mayor
of the place of his residence that he is a resident of the area
and that he will remain to be a resident therein until final
judgment is rendered or in case he transfers residence, it must
be with prior notice to the court", claiming that the same
violates his liberty of abode and travel.
Notably, petitioner does not question the hold-departure order
which prevents him from leaving the Philippines unless
expressly permitted by the court which issued the order.21 In
fact, the petition submits that "the hold-departure order against
petitioner is already sufficient guarantee that he will not escape.
Thus, to require him to inform the court every time he changed
his residence is already unnecessary."22
The right to change abode and travel within the Philippines,
being invoked by petitioner, are not absolute rights. Section 6,
Article III of the 1987 Constitution states:

The liberty of abode and of changing the same within

the limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired except
upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to
travel be impaired except in the interest of national
security, public safety, or public health, as may be
provided by law.
The order of the Court of Appeals releasing petitioner on bail
constitutes such lawful order as contemplated by the above
provision.23 The condition imposed by the Court of Appeals is
simply consistent with the nature and function of a bail bond,
which is to ensure that petitioner will make himself available at
all times whenever the Court requires his presence. Besides, a
closer look at the questioned condition will show that petitioner
is not prevented from changing abode; he is merely required to
inform the court in case he does so.
WHEREFORE, the
petition
is PARTIALLY
GRANTED.
Petitioner's bail pending appeal is reduced from P5,500,000.00
to P200,000.00. In all other respects, the resolutions of the
Court of Appeals, dated October 6, 1999 and November 25,
1999, respectively, are AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to
costs.
SO ORDERED. 1wphi1.nt
Melo, Vitug, Panganiban, and Sandova/-Gutierrez, JJ. , concur.
Footnotes
7

See also Section 5, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal

Procedure, effective December 1, 2000.
8

At Section 13, Article III (Bill of Rights), the 1987 Constitution

declares: "All persons except those charged with offenses
punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is
strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient
sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided
by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive
bail shall not be required." (Emphasis supplied).

21

SeeDefensor-Santiago vs. Vasquez, 217 SCRA 633 (1993),

where the Court held that the ex parteissuance of a holddeparture order was a valid exercise of the presiding court's
inherent power to preserve and to maintain the effectiveness of
its jurisdiction over the case and the person of the accused.
See alsoSilverio vs. Court of Appeals, 195 SCRA 760 (1991),
where the Court upheld the hold-departure order as a valid
restriction on the accused's right to travel, as to keep him within
the reach of the courts.

We affirm the conviction.

G.R. No. 122737 February 17, 1999

The prosecution recommended no bail for the provisional liberty

of the accused.

PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
SERGON MANES and RAMIL MANES, accused-appellants.
PARDO, J.:
The case before the Court is an appeal taken by accused
Sergon Manes and Ramil Manes from the judgment 1of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 25, 2 Iloilo City, convicting them of
murder and sentencing them to each "suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua with the accessory penalties as provided
in Article 41 of the Revised Penal Code" and "to indemnify the
family of their victim in the amount of P50,000.00 plus
P21.250.00 as expenses for the burial, wake and other related
matter and to pay the costs."

On July 12, 1991, the Provincial Prosecutor of Iloilo Province

filed with the Regional Trial Court, Iloilo City, an information
charging the accused with murder, as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
That on or about the 23rd of June, l991, in the
Municipality of Badiangan, Province of Iloilo, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable court, the
above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and
mutually helping one another to better realize their
purpose armed with a knife and a .38 caliber revolver
respectively,
with
treachery
and/or
evident
premeditation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and
feloniously assault, attack, stab and shut Nicanor
Tamorite with the knife and .38 caliber revolver with
which they were then provided, inflicting upon the said
Nicanor Tamorite stab wounds and gun shot wounds on
the different parts of his body which caused his death
immediately thereafter. 3

On July 22, 1991, the trial court issued a warrant of arrest

against the accused. On October 18, 1991, the trial court
ordered the case archived for failure to locate the two accused.
On June 24, 1992, or about a year after, accused Sergon and
Ramil Manes were arrested in Romblon, Romblon. On July 6,
1992, they were brought to Iloilo City.
Upon arraignment on September 17, 1992, both accused
pleaded not guilty to the information, and, thereafter, the court
proceeded to try the case.
Meantime, on August 25, 1992, the accused filed a petition for
bail, which was opposed by the prosecution. The trial court,

however, did not hear the petition for bail. Neither did the
accused invoke the right to bail at any stage of the trial.
The prosecution presented six witnesses, 4 two of whom were
eyewitnesses to the crime, while the defense presented
three, 5 two of whom were the accused themselves.
On January 13, 1995, the trial court rendered judgment
convicting the accused of murder, the dispositive portion of
which reads as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
Accordingly, finding the accused, Ramil Manes and
Sergon Manes, guilty of murder beyond reasonable
doubt, they are therefore sentenced to each suffer the
penalty of Reclusion Perpetuawith the accessory
penalties provided in Article 41 of the Revised Penal
Code and they are also ordered to indemnify the family
of the victim the amount of P50,000.00 plus P21,250.00
as expenses for the burial, wake and other related
matter and to pay the costs. 6
On February 10, 1995, both accused appealed to this Court. 7
In the appeal, accused questioned the trial court's failure (a) to
hear the petition for bail; (b) to consider defense of relative in
favor of Ramil Manes; and (c) to take note that Sergon Manes
was a mere victim of Tamorite's unlawful aggression.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
(a) According to the prosecution
On June 23, 1991, at about 5:00 in the afternoon, Alan
Catequista together with Nicanor Tamorite and Jose Cubita,
went to see a basketball game at the barangay plaza. When
the game was over, Alan approached and invited Nicanor
Tamorite to go home; at that time, he was still seated. Accused
Ramil Manes approached Nicanor Tamorite and pointed a .38
caliber revolver at him, saying "It is a bad luck you did not kill
me during the fiesta in Barangay Cabayugan. Now I will be the

one to kill you." Nicanor Tamorite ran to Alan Catequista and

used him as a shield from Ramil. 8 At that point, Alan Catequista
heard a thud and as he looked back, he saw accused Sergon
Manes with a gory knife and he also saw Nicanor Tamorite
running away, with blood on his back. Ramil Manes pursued
Nicanor Tamorite and shot him hitting him at the back, just
above the waistline. Both accused continued to chase Nicanor
Tamorite who ran towards the premises of the house of Ading
Ablado. Ramil Manes fired two more shots. It could not be
determined whether those shots hit Nicanor Tamorite as he and
the accused were already inside the premises of the fence of
Ading Ablado. 9 Jose Cubita who was near Nicanor Tamorite
when the two accused chased him did not render assistance to
him.10 After, Alan Catequista heard the two shots, he and Jose
Cubita ran home. Alan Catequista told his father and uncle that
Sergon Manes stabbed Nicanor Tamorite and that Ramil Manes
shot him. Alan Catequista, his father, uncle, Jose Cubita and
the mother of Nicanor Tamorite then went to where the body of
Nicanor was in the downhill portion of the premises of the
house of Ading Ablado. Nicanor was lying on his back with two
(2) wounds on the breast, one (1) gunshot wound and one (1)
stab wound. 11
(b) According to the accused
According to accused Ramil Manes, in the afternoon of June
23, 1991, he was at home cooking. At around 5:00 to 5:30, he
heard shouts coming from the direction of the barangay
basketball court, which was about ten (10) meters away from
his house. He went to the window to check what it was. He saw
his younger brother Sergon Manes lying on the concrete
pavement and several persons were ganging up on him, three
of whom he identified as Nicanor Tamorite, Alan Catequista and
Jose Cubita. They kept on boxing and kicking his brother
prompting him to come to the latter's aid. On his way out, he
saw a gun on top of the table and brought it with him to the
basketball court.

While on his way to the basketball court, Ramil fired a warning

shot to prevent Nicanor Tamorite from stabbing his brother
Sergon. Nicanor persisted in the pursuit of Sergon, with a knife
in his hand. Sergon was about three meters ahead of Nicanor
who was about ten meters ahead of the pursuing Ramil. Ramil
fired another shot that hit Nicanor who fell to the ground.
Meanwhile, Sergon managed to flee. Ramil also fled to the
direction of the sugarcane field as soon as he fired the second
shot because he saw the group of Alan Catequista
approaching, armed with guns. 12 Ramil and his brother Sergon
went into hiding and only surfaced a year later when they were
arrested in Romblon.

of the trial court at the earliest opportune time, appellants are

deemed to have waived their right to bail.

We find the facts as those established by the prosecution's

evidence.

The most essential of these elements is unlawful aggression on

the part of the victim. Ramil Manes contends that he came to
the defense of his younger brother, Sergon, who was being
attacked by Nicanor Tamorite, Alan Catequista and Jose
Cubita, together with several others. He claimed that these
persons boxed and kicked his brother in different parts of the
body.

The appeal has no merit. The trial court did not err in finding
appellants guilty of murder.
Appellants contend that the trial court committed a serious error
of law when it went on with the trial of the case without hearing
the petition for bail that was set for hearing several times.
Under the law, 13 in offenses punishable by reclusion
perpetua, life imprisonment or death, the accused has no right
to bail when evidence of guilt is strong. The court must hear a
petition for bail to determine whether the evidence of guilt is
strong before deciding to grant or deny bail to the
accused. 14
While the accused can apply for bail and have the court hear
his application summarily and promptly, such right may be
waived expressly or impliedly. 15
In this case, the trial court proceeded to try the case without
resolving the petition for bail that appellants filed. However, the
latter did not call the attention of the trial court to their
unresolved application for bail. It was only in the appeal that
they raised this issue. Thus, for failure to bring to the attention

What is more, the issue has been rendered academic by the

conviction of the accused. When an accused is charged with a
capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua,
or life imprisonment or death, and evidence of guilt is strong,
bail must be denied, as it is neither a matter of right nor of
discretion. 16
To exculpate himself, appellant Ramil claims defense of
relative. This must likewise fail. Article II or the Revised Penal
Code provides the requisites of defense of relative.

If, indeed, more than three persons attacked Sergon Manes, he

would have suffered injuries or even a scratch on his body.
There was none. In fact, prosecution witness Alan Catequista
testified that in no instance did he, Nicanor Tamorite and Jose
Cubita attack Sergon Manes.
The truth of the matter is that it was Ramil Manes who
approached the victim, pointed a .38 caliber revolver at him and
said "It is bad luck that you did not kill me during the fiesta in
Barangay Cabayugan. Now, I will be the one to kill you." While
Nicanor Tamorite tried to hide from Ramil, Sergon suddenly
appeared from behind and stabbed Nicanor Tamorite at the
back using a fan knife. Unlawful aggression clearly came from
accused-appellants, not from the victim Nicanor Tamorite.
Jose Cubita, another companion of the victim who witnessed
what transpired that fateful afternoon of June 23, 1991,
corroborated the testimony of Alan Catequista that the

accused-appellants were the aggressors. Despite the fact that

Nicanor Tamorite was unarmed and outnumbered, the brothers
Ramil and Sergon Manes persisted in executing their plan to
the point of chasing the fleeing victim.
Ramil Manes testified that while chasing Nicanor Tamorite who
was about ten meters away from him, he fired only two shots;
one in the air as warning shot and another in the direction of
Nicanor. The second shot hit the victim who fell to the ground.
Ramil fled the scene right after the second shot. The autopsy
report revealed, however, that Nicanor Tamorite sustained not
only one but three gunshot wounds. There were also stab
wounds, one at the right side of the chest and another at the
upper left back of the victim. 17
Assuming for the sake of argument that Nicanor Tamorite was
carrying a knife while pursuing Sergon, who was allegedly
unarmed, it is highly questionable how the victim sustained the
stab wounds considering their location. The accused Ramil
himself testified that no one approached Nicanor Tamorite as
soon as he fell to the ground so as to account for the presence
of the stab wounds. Neither did the accused adduce evidence
to explain how the victim could have sustained those stab
wounds.

the unlawful aggression of the deceased. He denies that he

stabbed the latter. This denial must fail in light of the positive
identification and testimony of prosecution witnesses, Alan
Catequista and Jose Cubita, that the unlawful aggression came
from accused appellants. Moreover, the autopsy report
conducted by Dr. Leticia Austria-Tobias on June 24, 1991
supports the prosecution's theory that accused shot and
stabbed the victim.
We need not tackle the remaining assignments of error which
obviously must fail in light of the foregoing discussion.
However, as pointed out by the solicitor general, the
prosecution failed to prove the aggravating circumstance of
evident premeditation. Evident premeditation exists when the
following requisites are present:
1. The time when the offender determined to commit the
crime;
2. An act manifestly indicating that the culprit has clung
to his determination; and
3. A sufficient lapse of time between the determination
and execution, to allow him to reflect upon the
consequences of his act. 19

The behavior of accused Ramil Manes subsequent to the killing

further negates his claim of defense of relative. If indeed he
acted in defense of his younger brother Sergon who was then
under attack, he would not harbor any fear in presenting
himself to the proper authorities. Instead, he made no such
report. Persons who act in legitimate defense of their persons
or rights invariably surrender themselves to the authorities and
describe fully and in all candor all that has happened with a
view to justify their acts. They lose no time in going to the
punong barangay, the municipal mayor or the police and lay
before them all the facts. 18

Evident premeditation, like other circumstances that would

qualify the killing to murder, must be established by clear and
positive evidence. Mere presumptions and inferences are
insufficient no matter how logical and probable they may
be. 20 The prosecution failed to satisfactorily establish the
existence of the requisites of evident premeditation. No direct
evidence was presented regarding the time the accused
planned to kill the victim. It was not established that the
appellants persistently and continuously clung to this resolution
despite the lapse of sufficient time for them to clear their minds
and overcome their determination to commit the same.

As regards Sergon Manes, he claims that he should not have

been convicted of murder because he was an innocent victim of

The trial court correctly considered treachery as qualifying the

killing of the victim to murder.

Treachery exists "when the offender commits any of the crimes

against person, employing means, methods, or forms in the
execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its
execution, without risk to himself arising from any defense
which the offended party might make." 21 Where the victim was
totally unprepared for the unexpected attack from behind and
had no weapon to resist it, the stabbing could not but be
considered as treacherous. 22In the instant case, Nicanor
Tamorite was seated when Ramil Manes approached him with
a .38 caliber revolver in his hand. Sergon Manes took
advantage of this preoccupation of the victim with Ramil Manes
by surreptitiously attacking and stabbing him at the back, while
he was not in position to defend himself against his aggressors.

SO ORDERED.

The manner by which Nicanor Tamorite was assaulted reveals

a concerted action towards the accomplishment of a single
criminal intent. Conspiracy may be inferred from the acts of the
appellants before, during and after the crime, which are
indicative of a joint purpose, concerted action and concurrence
of sentiments. 23

5 Ramil Manes and Sergon Manes, the accused-appellants;

and TeodolfoVasquez, a neighbor of the two accused at
Barangay Linaywan, Badiangan, Iloilo.

On the other hand, the trial court must not have appreciated the
aggravating circumstances of abuse of superior strength and
aid of armed men because these are in absorbed treachery. 24
Consequently, we sustain the trial court's conviction of the
accused, including the civil liability imposed against them.
However, the aggravating circumstances of evident
premeditation and abuse of superior strength and aid of armed
men are not to be appreciated.
WHEREFORE, We AFFIRM the judgment of the convicting
accused-appellants Sergon Manes and Ramil Manes of murder
and sentencing each of them to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua with the accessory penalties of the law and to
indemnify the heirs of the deceased Nicanor Tamorite in the
amount of P50,000.00 plus P21,250.00, as actual damages.
Costs against accused-appellants.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Melo and Kapunan, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1 dated January 13, 1995, Rollo, pp. 18-27.
2 Judge Bartolome M. Fanual, presiding.
4 Alan Catequista and Jose Cubita, the two eye-witnesses; Dr.
Leticia Tobias- Austria, the rural health physician who
conducted the autopsy; SPO1 Nicanor Adorable and SPO3
Ramon Porras, members of Badiangan police who went to
Romblon to fetch the two accused; and Rosa Tamorite, the
mother of the victim.

G.R. No. 114350 January 16, 1997

JOSE
T.
vs.
COURT
OF
APPEALS
PHILIPPINES, respondents.

OBOSA, petitioner,
and

PEOPLE

OF

THE

PANGANIBAN, J.:
The main issue in this case is whether petitioner Jose T. Obosa,
who was charged with two (2) counts of murder(a capital
offense) 1 for the ambush slaying of former Secretary of Interior
and Local Governments Jaime N. Ferrer and his driver Jesus
D. Calderon, but who was convicted only of two (2) counts of
homicide by the trial court, may be granted bail after such
conviction for homicide, a non-capital offense. The Regional
Trial Court of Makati answered in the affirmative but the Court
of Appeals ruled otherwise.
Petitioner thus asks this Court to resolve said issue in this
petition under Rule 65 assailing the two Resolutions 2 of the
respondent Court 3 promulgated on November 19, 1993 and

March 9, 1994, respectively. The first Resolution 4 of November

19, 1993 disposed as follows: 5
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the Solicitor
General's motion to cancel accused-appellant Jose T.
Obosa's bailbond. The Court NULLIFIES the lower
court's order dated May 31, 1990, granting bail to
accused Obosa.
Let warrant issue for the arrest of the accused-appellant
Jose T. Obosa.
On the same date, November 19, 1993, an Order of Arrest
against petitioner was issued under signature of then Court of
Appeals Associate Justice Bernardo P. Pardo. 6
On December 7, 1993, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash
Warrant of Arrest and to Set Aside and Reconsider Resolution
of
November
19,1993. 7 The
second
assailed
8
Resolution promulgated on March 9, 1994 denied the motion
as follows:
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court hereby DENIES
accused Obosa's "Motion to quash warrant of arrest and
to set aside and reconsider the resolution of November
19, 1993" dated December 4, 1993, for lack of merit.
Let a copy of this resolution be given to the Honorable,
the Secretary of Justice, Manila, so that he may issue
the appropriate directive to the Director, Bureau of
Corrections, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila, for the
rectification of the prison record of accused Jose T.
Obosa.
The Facts
Aside from the disagreement as to the date when notice of
appeal was actually filed with the trial court, 9 the facts
precedent to this petition are undisputed as set out in the first
assailed Resolution, thus: 10

On December 4, 1987, Senior State Prosecutor Aurelio

C. Trampe charged the accused Jose T. Obosa and
three others with murder on two counts, by separate
amended informations filed with the Regional Trial Court
of Makati, Branch 56, for the ambush-slaying of
Secretary of Local Governments Jaime N. Ferrer and
his driver Jesus D. Calderon, which occurred on August
2, 1987, at about 6:30 in the evening, at La Huerta,
Para()aque, Metro Manila, as Secretary Ferrer was
riding in his car, going to the St. Andrew Church near
the plaza of La Huerta, to hear Sunday mass.
Each information alleged that the killing was with the
attendance of the following qualifying/aggravating
circumstances, to wit: treachery, evident premeditation,
abuse of superior strength, nighttime purposely sought,
disregard of the respect due to the victim on account of
his rank and age (as to Secretary Ferrer), and by a
band. The Prosecutor recommended no bail, as the
evidence of guilt was strong.
During the trial of the two cases, which were
consolidated and tried jointly, the accused Obosa was
detained at Camp Bagong Diwa, Taguig, Metro Manila.
At the time of the commission of the two offenses, the
accused Obosa was a virtual "escapee" from the
National Penitentiary at Muntinlupa, Metro Manila,
particularly, at the Sampaguita Detention Station, where
he was serving a prison term for robbery as a maximum
security prisoner.
Indeed, by virtue of a subpoena illegally issued by a
judge of the Municipal Trial Court of Sariaya, Quezon,
accused Obosa was escorted out of prison to appear
before said judge on the pretext that the judge needed
his presence so that the judge could inquire about the
whereabouts of the accused therein. While accused
Obosa was out of prison, he was able to participate in

the commission of the double murder now charged

against him as principal for the ambush-slaying of
Secretary Ferrer and his driver (Lorenzo vs. Marquez,
162 SCRA 546, 553).

advantage of their combined strength, there is present

the qualifying circumstance of taking advantage of
superior strength (People vs. Baluyot, supra; People vs.
Malinao, 184 SCRA 148).

Witnesses positively identified accused Jose T. Obosa

as one of three assassins firing at a car near the
canteen at the corner of Victor Medina Street and
Quirino Avenue, Para()aque, Metro Manila. It was the
car of Secretary Ferrer. He sustained eight entrance
gunshot wounds on the right side of his head, neck and
body, while his driver sustained three entrance wounds
on the left temple, right side of the neck, right arm, chest
and right hip. They died on the spot.

On May 31, 1990, the lower court promulgated its

decision and on the same occasion, accused Obosa
manifested his intention to appeal and asked the Court
to allow him to post bail for his provisional liberty.
Immediately, the lower court granted accused Obosa's
motion and fixed bail at P20,000.00, in each case.

In its decision dated May 25, 1990, the lower court

found the accused Obosa guilty beyond reasonable
doubt
of
homicide
on
two
counts. 11 In ruling that the crime committed was
homicide, not murder as charged in the informations,
the lower court declared that there was no qualifying
circumstance attendant. In fact, however, the lower
court itself found that the accused shot the victims while
the latter were inside the car, unwary of any danger to
their lives, for unknown to them, were the assassins
lurking in the dark, firing their guns from behind, a
circumstance indubitably showing treachery (People vs.
Tachado, 170 SCRA 611, People vs. Juanga, 189 SCRA
226). There is treachery when the victims were attacked
without warning and their backs turned to the assailants,
as in this case (People vs. Tachado,supra). There is
treachery when the unarmed and unsuspecting victim
was ambushed in the dark, without any risk to his
assailants (People vs. Egaras, 163 SCRA 692).
Moreover, the crimes could be qualified by taking
advantage of superior strength and aid of armed men
(People vs. Baluyot, 170 SCRA 569). Where the
attackers cooperated in such a way to secure

On June 1, 1990, accused Obosa filed a written notice

of appeal, dated June 4, 1990, thereby perfecting
appeal from the decision (Alama vs. Abbas, 124 Phil.
1465). By the perfection of the appeal, the lower court
thereby lost jurisdiction over the case and this means
both the record and the person of the accusedappellant. The sentencing court lost jurisdiction or power
to do anything or any matter in relation to the person of
the accused-appellant (Director of Prisons vs. Teodoro,
97 Phil. 391, 395-396), except to issue orders for the
protection and preservation of the rights of the parties,
which do not involve any matter litigated by the appeal
(People vs. Aranda, 106 Phil. 1008).
On June 4, 1990, accused Obosa filed a bailbond in the
amount of P40,000.00, through Plaridel Surety and
Assurance Company, which the lower court approved.
On the same day, June 4, 1990, the lower court issued
an order of release. The prison authorities at the
National Penitentiary released accused Obosa also on
the same day notwithstanding that, as hereinabove
stated, at the time of the commission of the double
murder, accused Obosa was serving a prison term for
robbery.
The respondent Court likewise discoursed on the service of
sentence made by the accused. Thus, it extensively discussed

the following computation on the penalties imposed upon the

petitioner for his previous offenses, which all the more
convinced respondent Court that petitioner was not entitled to
bail on the date he applied therefor on May 31, 1990 and filed
his bailbond on June 4, 1990, as follows: 12
At the time the accused committed the crimes charged,
he was an inmate at the National Penitentiary, New
Bilibid Prisons, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila. He was in jail,
but was able to commit the Ferrer assassination. He
was serving imprisonment by final judgment in each of
three (3) cases, namely, (a) theft, for which he was
sentenced to eleven (11) months and fifteen (15) days
of prision correccional; (b) robbery in band, for which he
was sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of six (6)
months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as
minimum, to four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1)
day of prision correccional, as maximum, and (c)
evasion of service of sentence, for which he was
sentenced to six (6) months of arresto mayor. These
sentences are to be served successively not
simultaneously (Article 70, Revised Penal Code; People
vs. Reyes, 52 Phil. 538; Gordon vs. Wolfe, 6 Phil. 76;
People vs. Medina, 59 Phil. 134; United States vs.
Claravall, 31 Phil. 652; People vs. Olfindo, 47 Phil. 1;
People vs. Tan, 50 Phil. 660). In successive service of
sentences, the time of the second sentence did not
commence to run until the expiration of the first (Gordon
vs. Wolfe, supra).
He commenced service of sentence on October 11,1979
(with credit for preventive imprisonment) and was
admitted to the New Bilibid Prisons on January 5, 1980
(See prison record attached to Supplement, dated
January 31, 1994 of the Solicitor General; Cf. prison
record [incomplete] attached to Manifestation dated
February 2, 1994 of the Accused Appellant).

On December 25, 1980, he escaped from detention at

Fort Del Pilar, Baguio City, where he was temporarily
working on a prison project (See decision, Grim. Case
No. 4159-R, Regional Trial Court, Baguio City, People
vs. Jose Obosa y Tutaa). While a fugitive from justice,
he committed other crimes, in Quezon City, Makati, and
Muntinlupa, Metro Manila. The cases are pending (See
prison record, supra).
He was recaptured on August 27, 1986. Under prison
regulations, he forfeited his allowance for good conduct
prescribed by law (Article 97, Revised Penal Code; Act
2489 of the Philippine Legislature). In addition, he must
serve the time spent at large (TSAL) of five (5) years,
eight (8) months and two (2) days, and the unserved
portion of his successive sentences for robbery in band,
theft
and
evasion of
service of
sentence
aforementioned. In sum, he has to serve the balance of
his sentence for robbery in band of four (4) years, two
(2) months and one (1) day of prision correccional the
sentence for theft of eleven (11) months and fifteen (15)
days of prision correccional; and the sentence for
evasion of service of sentence of six (6) months
of arresto mayor, reaching a total of five (5) years,
seven (7) months and sixteen (16) days. Since his
commitment to jail on October 11, 1979, to the time he
escaped on December 25, 1980, he had served one (1)
year, two (2) months, and fourteen (14) days, which,
deducted from the totality of his prison term, would
leave a balance of four (4) years, five (5) months and
two (2) days. Thus, he must still serve this unserved
portion of his sentences in addition to the time spent at
large. Counting the time from his re-arrest on August 27,
1986, and adding thereto five (5) years, eight (8)
months and two (2) days (time spent at large), the result
is that he must serve up to April 29, 1992. To this shall
be added the remaining balance of his successive

sentences of four (4) years, five (5) months and two (2)
day(s). Consequently, he has to serve sentence and
remain in confinement up to October 1, 1996. Of
course, he may be given allowance for good conduct.
But good conduct time allowance can not be computed
in advance (Frank vs. Wolfe, 11 Phil. 466). This is
counted only during the time an accused actually served
with good conduct and diligence (Frank vs.
Wolfe, supra; See Aquino, The Revised Penal Code,
Vol. I, 1987 ed., pp. 803-804). However, accused Obosa
can not avail himself of this beneficent provision of the
law because, while he was at large, he committed
infraction of prison rules (escaping) and other crimes,
including the Ferrer assassination, and for which he was
placed under preventive imprisonment commencing on
December 4, 1987, the date the informations at bar
were filed against him. Because he was then under
custody, no warrant of arrest or commitment order need
be issued (Asuncion vs. Peralejo, G.R. No. 82915, June
22, 1988, minute resolution; Cf. People vs. Wilson, 4
Phil. 381; Umil vs. Ramos, 187 SCRA 311). Allowance
for good conduct does not apply to detention prisoners
(Baking vs. Director of Prisons, 28 SCRA 851).
Consequently, by all reckoning, accused Obosa could
not be released from prison on June 4, 1990, when he
was admitted to bail. His release was illegal. He still has
to serve the balance of his unserved sentences until
October 1, 1996.
On September 6, 1993, respondent People, through the Office
of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed with respondent Court an
urgent motion, 13 praying for cancellation of petitioner's bail
bond.
14

Petitioner promptly filed an opposition, to which respondent

People submitted a reply. 15 Thereupon, respondent Court
issued its first questioned Resolution dated November 19,
1993: 16 a) canceling petitioner's bail bond, b) nullifying the trial

court's order of May 31, 1990 which granted bail to petitioner,

and c) issuing a warrant for his immediate arrest.
Petitioner's twin motions for reconsideration 17 and quashal of
warrant of arrest proved futile as respondent Court, on March 9,
1994, after the parties' additional pleadings were submitted and
after hearing the parties' oral arguments, issued its second
questioned Resolution denying said motions for lack of merit.
The Issues
The petitioner worded the issue in this case as follows: 18
The principal constitutional and legal issues involved in
this petition is (sic) whether petitioner as accusedappellant before the respondent Honorable Court of
Appeals is entitled to bail as a matter of right and to
enjoy the bail granted by the Regional Trial Court, in
Makati, Metro Manila, pending appeal from the
judgment convicting him of Homicide on two (2) counts
though charged with Murder; and assuming that bail is a
matter of discretion, the trial court had already exercised
sound discretion in granting bail to accused-appellant,
now petitioner in this case, and respondent Court of
Appeals is devoid of jurisdiction in cancelling said
bailbond.
The Solicitor General stated the issues more clearly, thus: 19
I
Whether or not the trial court still have (sic) jurisdiction
over the case when it approved petitioner's bail bond on
June 4, 1990.
II
Considering that the murder charge against petitioner
still stands pending his appeal and strong evidence of
guilt actually exists based on respondent Court of
Appeals' own preliminary determination and the lower
court's initial finding as well, is petitioner entitled to bail

as a matter of right pending review of his conviction for

homicide?
III
How does petitioner's prison record affect his alleged
right to bail?
The Court's Ruling
First Issue: Trial Court's Jurisdiction
To decide the issue of whether the cancellation of bail bond by
the respondent Court was correct, we deem it necessary to
determine first whether the trial court had jurisdiction to grant
bail under the circumstances of this case.
Petitioner contends that the trial court was correct in allowing
him "to post bail for his provisional liberty on the same day, May
31, 1990 when the judgment of conviction of (sic) homicide was
promulgated and the accused-appellant (petitioner) manifested
his intention to appeal the judgment of conviction. At the time,
the lower court still had jurisdiction over the case as to
empower it to issue the order granting bail pending appeal.
Appellant filed his notice of appeal only on June 4, 1990, on
which date his appeal was deemed perfected and the lower
court lost jurisdiction over the case. Hence, the grant of bail on
May 31, 1990 cannot be validly attacked on jurisdictional
grounds." 20
Through its counsel, the Solicitor General, respondent People
admits that petitioner manifested his intention to appeal on May
31, 1990 and filed his written notice of appeal on June 1, 1990.
But the Solicitor General nevertheless contends that ". . . it was
only on June 4, 1990, or three (3) days after perfecting his
appeal that petitioner posted his bail bond in the amount of
P40,000.00 through Plaridel Surety and Assurance Company.
Clearly, when the lower court approved the bail bond on the
same day June 4, 1990), it no longer had Jurisdiction over the
case." 21

The respondent Court found that "(o)n June 1, 1990, accused

Obosa filed a written notice of appeal, dated June 4, 1990,
thereby perfecting appeal from the decision . . ." 22
We reviewed the page 23 cited by respondent Court, and found
that indeed, the written notice of appeal, although dated June 4,
1990, was made and actually served upon the trial court on
June 1, 1990. Such being the case, did the trial court correctly
approve the bail bond on June 4,1990? To answer this, there is
a need to revisit Section 3, Rule 122 of the Rules of Court:
Sec. 3. How appeal taken. (a) The appeal to the
Regional Trial Court, or to the Court of Appeals in cases
decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its
original jurisdiction, shall be taken by filing a notice of
appeal with the court which rendered the judgment or
order appealed from, and by serving a copy thereof
upon the adverse party.
xxx xxx xxx
Since petitioner did file the written notice of appeal on June 1,
1990, petitioner's appeal was, perforce, perfected, without need
of any further or other act, and consequently and ineluctably,
the trial court lost jurisdiction over the case, both over the
record and over the subject of the case. 24 As has been ruled: 25
The question presented for our resolution is: Did the
Court of First Instance that convicted respondent
Lacson have the power and authority to issue the writ of
preliminary injunction, prohibiting the transfer of said
Lacson from the provincial hospital of Occidental
Negros to the Insular Penitentiary at Muntinglupa,
Rizal? While there is no express provision on this point,
it is contrary to the generally accepted principles of
procedure for said court to be invested with said power
or authority. A necessary regard for orderly procedure
demands that once a case, whether civil or criminal, has
been appealed from a trial court to an appellate (sic)
court and the appeal therefrom perfected, the courta

quo loses jurisdiction over the case, both over the

record and over the subject of the case. Thus in civil
cases the rule is that after the appeal has been
perfected from a judgment of the Court of First Instance,
the trial court losses (sic) jurisdiction over the case,
except to issue orders for the protection and
preservation of the rights of the parties which do not
involve any matter litigated by the appeal (Rule 41, Sec.
9). The jurisdiction of the court over the matters involved
in the case is lost by the perfected appeal, save in those
cases which the rules expressly except therefrom.
(Emphasis supplied).

with the capital offense of murder on two (2) counts against

whom a strong evidence of guilt exists as initially found by the
trial court during the bail proceedings a quo." 27

But it should be noted that the bail was granted on May 31,
1990 by the trial Court. 26 The validity and effectivity of the
subsequent approval of the bail bond by the trial court on June
4, 1990 is therefore the matter at issue. We agree with
respondent Court and respondent People that, while bail was
granted by the trial court when it had jurisdiction, the approval
of the bail bond was done without authority, because by then,
the appeal had already been perfected and the trial court had
lost jurisdiction. Needless to say, the situation would have been
different had bail been granted and approval thereof given
before the notice of appeal was filed.

In this case, although the accused is charged with

murder on two counts, and evidence of guilt is strong,
the lower court found him guilty of homicide also on two
(2) counts. He has appealed. An appeal by the accused
throws the whole case open for review and this includes
the penalty, the indemnity and the damages awarded by
the trial court which may be increased (Quemuel vs.
Court of Appeals, 130 Phil. 33). The appellate court may
find the accused guilty of the original crime charged and
impose on him the proper penalty therefor (Linatoc vs.
People, 74 Phil. 586). By virtue of the appeal, the
conviction for the lesser offense of homicide is stayed in
the meantime. Hence, the accused is back to the
original situation as he was before judgment (Cf . Peo
vs. Bocar, 97 Phil. 398), that is, one charged with capital
offenses where evidence of guilt is strong. Bail must be
denied.

As the approval was decreed by the trial court in excess of

jurisdiction, then the bailbond was never validly approved. On
this basis alone, regardless of the outcome of the other issues,
it is indisputable that the instant petition should be dismissed.
Second
Issue:
Is
As A Matter of Right?

Petitioner

Entitled

To

Bail

The second issue, while no longer critical to the disposition of

this case, will nevertheless be tackled, in view of its importance.
The Solicitor General argues that "(f)or while petitioner was
convicted of the lesser offense of homicide, the fact that he has
appealed resultantly throws the whole case open for review and
reverts him back to his original situation as a person charged

Petitioner answers by saying that "once the accused who is

charged with a capital offense is convicted not of the offense for
which he is charged but for a lesser one which is not capital or
punished with reclusion perpetua, he is entitled to bail as a
matter of right because the fact that the evidence of his guilt of
a capital offense is not strong is necessarily to be inferred from
his conviction of the lesser offense." 28
On this point, respondent Court ratiocinated: 29

To resolve this issue, we refer to Section 13, Article III of the

1987 Constitution which provides:
Sec. 13. All persons, except those charged with
offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when
evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be
bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on
recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to

bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the

writ ofhabeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall
not be required.
In the case of De la Camara vs. Enage, 30 we analyzed the
purpose of bail and why it should be denied to one charge with
a capital offense when evidence of guilt is strong:
. . . Before conviction, every person is bailable except if
charged with capital offenses when the evidence of guilt
is strong. Such a right flows from the presumption of
innocence in favor of every accused who should not be
subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he would
be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be proved
beyond reasonable doubt. Thereby a regime of liberty is
honored in the observance and not in the breach. It is
not beyond the realm of probability, however, that a
person charged with a crime, especially so where his
defense is weak, would just simply make himself scarce
and thus frustrate the hearing of his case. A bail is
intended as a guarantee that such an intent would be
thwarted. It is, in the language of Cooley, a "mode short
of confinement which would, with reasonable certainty,
insure the attendance of the accused" for the
subsequent trial. Nor is there anything unreasonable in
denying this right to one charged with a capital offense
when evidence of guilt is strong, as the likelihood is,
rather than await the outcome of the proceeding against
him with a death sentence, an ever-present threat,
temptation to flee the jurisdiction would be too great to
be resisted. (Emphasis supplied).
The aforequoted rationale applies with equal force to an
appellant who, though convicted of an offense not punishable
by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, was
nevertheless originally charged with a capital offense. Such
appellant can hardly be unmindful of the fact that, in the
ordinary course of things, there is a substantial likelihood of his

conviction (and the corresponding penalty) being affirmed on

appeal, or worse, the not insignificant possibility and infinitely
more unpleasant prospect of instead being found guilty of the
capital offense originally charged. In such an instance, the
appellant cannot but be sorely tempted to flee.
Our Rules of Court, following the mandate of our fundamental
law, set the standard to be observed in applications for bail.
Section 3, Rule 114 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
procedure, 31 as amended, provides:
Sec. 3. Bail, a matter of right; exception. All persons in
custody shall, before final conviction, be entitled to bail
as a matter of right, except those charged with a capital
offense or an offense which, under the law at the time of
its commission and at the time of the application for bail,
is punishable by reclusion perpetua, when evidence of
guilt is strong. (Emphasis supplied).
In Borinaga vs. Tamin, 32 which was promulgated in 1993, this
Court laid down the guidelines for the grant of bail:
The 1987 Constitution provides that all persons, except
those charged with offenses punishable byreclusion
perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong shall, before
conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties or be
released on recognizance as may be provided by law.
Corollarily, the Rules of Court, under Section 3, Rule
114 thereof, provides that all persons in custody shall,
before final conviction, be entitled to bail as a matter of
right, except those charged with a capital offense or an
offense which, under the law at the time of its
commission and at the time of the application for bail, is
punishable by reclusion perpetua, when evidence of
guilt is strong.
As now revised in the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure
and provided in Rule 114 thereof, the rules on
availability of bail to an accused may be restated as
follows:

1. Admission to bail is a matter of right at any stage of

the action where the charge is not for a capital offense
or is not punishable by reclusion perpetua; [Sec. 3, Rule
114, 1985 Rules on Crim. Procedure].
2. Regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution,
no bail shall be allowed if the accused is charged with a
capital offense or of an offense punishable by reclusion
perpetua and the evidence of guilt is strong; [Idem].
3. Even if a capital offense is charged and the evidence
of guilt is strong, the accused may still be admitted to
bail in the discretion of the court if there are strong
grounds to apprehend that his continued confinement
will endanger his life or result in permanent impairment
of health, [De la Rama vs. People's Court, 43 O.G. No.
10, 4107 (1947)] but only before judgment in the
regional trial court; and
4. No bail shall be allowed after final judgment, unless
the accused has applied for probation and has not
commenced to serve sentence, [Section 21, Rule 114,
1985 Rules of Court] the penalty and offense being
within the purview of the probation law.
However, the above guidelines, along with Rule 114 itself, have
since been modified by Administrative Circular No. 12-94,
which was issued by this Court and which came into effect on
October 1, 1994. Verily, had herein petitioner made application
for bail after the effectivity of said circular, this case would have
been readily and promptly resolved against petitioner. For, quite
recently, in Robin Cario Padilla vs. Court of Appeals, et
al., 33 we held, making reference to said administrative circular:
Bail is either a matter of right, or of discretion. It is a
matter of right when the offense charged is not
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment. On the other hand, upon conviction by
the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, bail

becomes a matter of discretion. Similarly, if the court

imposed a penalty of imprisonment exceeding six (6)
years but not more than twenty (20) years then bail is a
matter of discretion, except when any of the
enumerated circumstances under paragraph 3 of
Section 5, Rule 114 is present then bail shall be denied.
But when the accused is charged with a capital offense,
or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, and evidence of guilt is strong, bail shall
be denied, as it is neither a matter of right nor a
discretion. If the evidence, however, is not strong bail
becomes a matter of right. (Citation omitted; emphasis
supplied).
And, as above adverted to, the circumstances mentioned in
paragraph 3 of Section 5, Rule 114 of the 1994 Revised Rules
on Criminal Procedure the presence of any of which could
preclude the grant of bail are as follows:
(a) That the accused is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or
habitual delinquent, or has committed the crime
aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;
(b) That the accused is found to have previously
escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or
has violated the conditions of his bail without valid
justification;
(c) That the accused committed the offense while on
probation, parole, or under conditional pardon;
(d) That the circumstances of the accused or his case
indicate the probability of flight if released on bail; or
(e) That there is undue risk that during the pendency of
the appeal, the accused may commit another crime.
It will be readily noted that, pursuant to the foregoing
amendments, not only does the conviction of petitioner for two
counts of homicide disqualify him from being admitted to bail as
a matter of right and subject his bail application to the sound

discretion of the court, but more significantly, the circumstances

enumerated in paragraphs a, b, d and e above, which are
present in petitioner's situation, would have justified and
warranted thedenial of bail, except that a retroactive application
of the said circular in the instant case is barred as it would
obviously be unfavorable to petitioner.
But be that as it may, the rules on bail at the time of petitioner's
conviction (i.e., prior to their amendment by Adm. Circular 1294) do not favor petitioner's cause either. In Quemuel vs. CA, et
al., 34 this Court held that the appeal in a criminal case opens
the whole case for review and this includes the penalty, which
may be increased. Thus, on appeal, as the entire case is
submitted for review, even factual questions may be increased.
Thus, on appeal, as the entire case is submitted for review,
even factual questions may once more be weighed and
evaluated. That being the situation, the possibility of conviction
upon the original charge is ever present. Likewise, if the
prosecution had previously demonstrated that evidence of the
accused's guilt is strong, as it had done so in this case, such
determination subsists even on appeal, despite conviction for a
lesser offense, since such determination is for the purpose of
resolving whether to grant or deny bail and does not have any
bearing on whether petitioner will ultimately be acquitted or
convicted of the charge.

that, although the grant of bail is discretionary in non-capital

offenses, nevertheless, when imprisonment has been imposed
on the convicted accused in excess of six (6) year and
circumstances exist (inter alia, where the accused is found to
have previously escaped from legal confinement or evaded
sentence, or there is an undue risk that the accused may
commit another crime while his appeal is pending) that point to
a considerable likelihood that the accused may flee if released
on bail, then the accused must be denied bail, or his bail
previously granted should be cancelled.
But the same rationale obtained even under the old rules on
bail (i.e., prior to their amendment by Adm. Circular 12-94).
Senator Vicente J. Francisco's 36 eloquent explanation on why
bail should be denied as a matter of wise discretion after
judgment of conviction reflects that thinking, which remains
valid up to now:
The importance attached to conviction is due to the
underlying principle that bail should be granted only
where it is uncertain whether the accused is guilty or
innocent, and therefore, where that uncertainty is
removed by conviction it would, generally speaking, be
absurd to admit to bail. After a person has been tried
and convicted the presumption of innocence which may
be relied upon in prior applications is rebutted, and the
burden is upon the accused to show error in the
conviction. From another point of view it may be
properly argued that the probability of ultimate
punishment is so enhanced by the conviction that the
accused is much more likely to attempt to escape if
liberated on bail than before conviction. . . .

We have previously held that, while the accused, after

conviction, may upon application be bailed at the discretion of
the court, that discretion particularly with respect to
extending the bail should be exercised not with laxity, but
with caution and only for strong reasons, with the end in view of
upholding the majesty of the law and the administration of
justice. 35

Third Issue: Petitioner's Record

And the grave caution that must attend the exercise of judicial
discretion in granting bail to a convicted accused is best
illustrated and exemplified in Administrative Circular No. 12-94
amending Rule 114, Section 5 which now specifically provides

Petitioner claims that respondent Court of Appeals erred in

concluding "that at the time the bail was granted and approved
by His Honor of the trial court, he has still to serve sentence
and remain in confinement up to October 1, 1996" and hence

was not entitled to bail. 37 Petitioner, citing Luis B.

Reyes, 38 maintains that the Bureau of Corrections properly
released him from prison on July 18, 1990.
We find it unnecessary to address this issue in the resolution of
the instant petition. Having already determined that the bail
bond was approved without jurisdiction and that the Court of
Appeals was correct in issuing the two questioned Resolutions,
we thus hold that, petitioner cannot be released from
confinement. The determination of whether or not petitioner
should still be imprisoned up to October 1, 1996, and only
thereafter may possibly be released on bail is no longer
material for the disposition of this case. Thus, we shall longer
burden ourselves with the resolution of this academic issue.
EPILOGUE

trial court's literal interpretation of the law on bail was forcefully

debunked by the appellate courts' excellent disquisition on the
rationale of the applicable rules. Truly, law must be understood
not by "the letter that killeth but by the spirit that giveth life."
Law should not be read and interpreted in isolated academic
abstraction nor even for the sake of logical symmetry but
always in context of pulsating social realities and specific
environmental facts. Truly, "the real essence of justice does not
emanate from quibblings over patchwork legal technicality. It
proceeds from the spirit's gut consciousness of the dynamic
role of law as a brick in the ultimate development of the social
edifice." 39
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the instant petition is hereby
DENIED and the two assailed Resolutions AFFIRMED.

In sum, we rule that bail cannot be granted as a matter of right

even after an accused, who is charged with a capital offense,
appeals his conviction for a non-capital crime. Courts must
exercise utmost caution in deciding applications for bail
considering that the accused on appeal may still be convicted
of the original capital offense charged and that thus the risk
attendant to jumping bail still subsists. In fact, trial courts would
be well advised to leave the matter of bail, after conviction for a
lesser crime than the capital offense originally charged, to the
appellate court's sound discretion.

SO ORDERED.

We also hold that the trial court had failed to exercise the
degree of discretion and caution required under and mandated
by our statutes and rules, for, aside from being too hasty in
granting bail immediately after promulgation of judgment, and
acting without jurisdiction in approving the bailbond, it
inexplicably ignored the undeniable fact of petitioner's previous
escape from legal confinement as well as his prior convictions.

3 Special Division of Five Members, composed of J. Bernardo

P. Pardo, ponente; JJ. Cezar D. Francisco and Ma. Alicia
Austria-Martinez, concurring; and JJ. Eubulo G. Verzola and
Salome A. Montoya, dissenting.

Upon the other hand, the respondent Court should be

commended for its vigilance, discretion and steadfastness. In
ruling against bail, it even scoured the records and found that
treachery attended the killing thereby justifying its action. The

"WHEREFORE, finding accused Jose Obosa guilty beyond

reasonable doubt of the commission of the offense of homicide
in two counts, as defined and penalized in Art. 249 of the
Revised Penal Code, there being no aggravating or mitigating

Narvasa, C.J., Davide, Jr., Melo and Francisco, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1 Section 4, Rule 114 of the 1994 Revised Rules of Court
provides:
"Sec. 4. Capital Offense, defined. A capital offense, as the
term is used in these Rules, is an offense which, under the law
existing at the time of its commission and at the time of the
application to be admitted to bail, may be punished with death."

11 The dispositive portion of the decision of the trial court

convicting petitioner reads (rollo, pp. 96-97):

circumstance that attended the commission of the offense, he is

hereby sentenced in each case to suffer an indeterminate
penalty of imprisonment from eight (8) years and one (1) day
of prision mayor medium as minimum to seventeen (17) years
and four (4) months of reclusion temporal medium as
maximum, to pay the heirs of Secretary Jaime Ferrer the sum
of P30,000.00 for the los(s) of his life and another sum of
P30,000.00 for moral damages and also to the heirs of Jesus
Calderon the sum of P30,000.00 for the los(s) of his life and
another P30,000.00 for moral damages, and to pay the costs of
the suit.
The preventive imprisonment accused Jose Obosa may have
undertaken shall be deducted from the term of imprisonment
imposed herein to its full extent if he signed an agreement to
abide by the same rules upon convicted prisoners while in
confinement (or) only four-fifths (4/5) thereof if he has not
signed said agreement, pursuant to Art. 29 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 6127.
xxx xxx xxx
31 The same section, as amended by Administrative Circular
No. 12-94 which amendments took effect on October 1, 1994,
is now renumbered as Section 4 of Rule 114 and reads as
follows:
"Sec. 4. Bail, a matter of right. All persons in custody shall:
(a) before or after conviction by the Metropolitan Trial Court,
Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities and
Municipal Circuit Trial Court, and (b) before conviction by the
Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, be admitted to
bail as a matter of right, with sufficient sureties, or be released
on recognizance as prescribed by law or this Rule."

and penalty to 'be inflicted'. It has nothing to do with the

imposition of proper penalty. Nowhere is it there envisioned that
the court should make a computation and, in its decision,
sentence the culprit to not more than three-fold the most severe
of the penalties imposable upon him. Computation is for the
prison authorities to undertake. (People vs. Salazar, et al., C.A.,
61 O.G. 5913)."
G.R. No. 79269 June 5, 1991
PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. PROCORO J. DONATO, in his official capacity as
Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch XII, Manila;
RODOLFO C. SALAS, alias Commander Bilog, respondents.
The People of the Philippines, through the Chief State
Prosecutor of the Department of Justice, the City Fiscal of
Manila and the Judge Advocate General, filed the instant
petition for certiorari and prohibition, with a prayer for
restraining order/preliminary injunction, to set aside the order of
respondent Judge dated July 7, 1987 granting bail to the
accused Rodolfo Salas alias "Commander Bilog" in Criminal
Case No. 86-48926 for Rebellion, 1 and the subsequent Order
dated July 30, 1987 granting the motion for reconsideration of
16 July 1987 by increasing the bail bond from P30,000.00 to
P50,000.00 but denying petitioner's supplemental motion for
reconsideration of July 17, 1987 which asked the court to allow
petitioner to present evidence in support of its prayer for a
reconsideration of the order of 7 July 1987.
The pivotal issues presented before Us are whether the right to
bail may, under certain circumstances, be denied to a person
who is charged with an otherwise bailable offense, and whether
such right may be waived.

38 Revised Penal Code, 1981 edition, Book I, p. 738:

The following are the antecedents of this petition:

"Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code is concerned exclusively

with the 'service' of sentence; it speaks of 'duration' of penalty

In the original Information 2 filed on 2 October 1986 in Criminal

Case No. 86-48926 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, later

amended in an Amended Information 3 which was filed on 24

October
1986,
private
respondent
Rodolfo
Salas, alias"Commander Bilog", and his co-accused were
charged for the crime of rebellion under Article 134, in relation
to Article 135, of the Revised Penal Code allegedly committed
as follows:
That in or about 1968 and for some time before said
year and continuously thereafter until the present time,
in the City of Manila and elsewhere in the Philippines,
the Communist Party of the Philippines, its military arm,
the New People's Army, its mass infiltration network, the
National Democratic Front with its other subordinate
organizations and fronts, have, under the direction and
control of said organizations' leaders, among whom are
the aforenamed accused, and with the aid, participation
or support of members and followers whose
whereabouts and identities are still unknown, risen
publicly and taken arms throughout the country against
the Government of the Republic of the Philippines for
the purpose of overthrowing the present Government,
the seat of which is in the City of Manila, or of removing
from the allegiance to that government and its laws, the
country's territory or part of it;
That from 1970 to the present, the above-named
accused in their capacities as leaders of the
aforenamed organizations, in conspiracy with, and in
support of the cause of, the organizations
aforementioned, engaged themselves in war against the
forces of the government, destroying property or
committing serious violence, and other acts in the
pursuit of their unlawful purpose, such as . . .
(then follows the enumeration of specific acts committed
before and after February 1986).
At the time the Information was filed the private respondent and
his co-accused were in military custody following their arrest on

29 September 1986 at the Philippine General Hospital, Taft

Ave., Manila; he had earlier escaped from military detention
and a cash reward of P250,000.00 was offered for his
capture. 4
A day after the filing of the original information, or on 3 October
1986, a petition for habeas corpus for private respondent and
his co-accused was filed with this Court 5 which, as shall
hereafter be discussed in detail, was dismissed in Our
resolution of 16 October 1986 on the basis of the agreement of
the parties under which herein private respondent "will remain
in legal custody and will face trial before the court having
custody over his person" and the warrants for the arrest of his
co-accused are deemed recalled and they shall be immediately
released but shall submit themselves to the court having
jurisdiction over their person.
On November 7, 1986 , private respondent filed with the court
below a Motion to Quash the Information alleging that: (a) the
facts alleged do not constitute an offense; (b) the Court has no
jurisdiction over the offense charged; (c) the Court has no
jurisdiction over the persons of the defendants; and (d) the
criminal action or liability has been extinguished, 6 to which
petitioner filed an Opposition 7 citing, among other grounds, the
fact that in the Joint Manifestation and Motion dated October
14, 1986, in G.R. No. 76009, private respondent categorically
conceded that:
xxx xxx xxx
Par. 2 (B) Petitioner Rodolfo Salas will remain
in legal custody and face trial before the court having
custody over his person.
In his Order of March 6, 1987, 8 respondent Judge denied the
motion to quash.
Instead of asking for a reconsideration of said Order, private
respondent filed on 9 May 1987 a petition for bail, 9which herein
petitioner opposed in an Opposition filed on 27 May 1987 10 on

the ground that since rebellion became a capital offense under

the provisions of P.D. Nos. 1996, 942 and 1834, which
amended Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code, by imposing
the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death on those who
promote, maintain, or head a rebellion the accused is no longer
entitled to bail as evidence of his guilt is strong.
On 5 June 1987 the President issued Executive Order No. 187
repealing, among others, P.D. Nos. 1996, 942 and 1834 and
restoring to full force and effect Article 135 of the Revised Penal
Code as it existed before the amendatory decrees. Thus, the
original penalty for rebellion, prision mayor and a fine not to
exceed P20,000.00, was restored.
Executive Order No. 187 was published in the Official Gazette
in its June 15, 1987 issue (Vol. 83, No. 24) which was officially
released for circulation on June 26, 1987.
In his Order of 7 July 1987 11 respondent Judge, taking into
consideration Executive Order No. 187, granted private
respondent's petition for bail, fixed the bail bond at P30,000.00
and imposed upon private respondent the additional condition
that he shall report to the court once every two (2) months
within the first ten (10) days of every period thereof. In granting
the petition respondent Judge stated:
. . . There is no more debate that with the effectivity of
Executive Order No. 187, the offense of rebellion, for
which accused Rodolfo Salas is herein charged, is now
punishable with the penalty ofprision mayor and a fine
not exceeding P20,000.00, which makes it now bailable
pursuant to Section 13, Article III, 1986 Constitution and
Section 3, Rule 114, 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Unlike the old rule, bail is now a matter of right in noncapital offenses before final judgment. This is very
evident upon a reading of Section 3, Rule 114,
aforementioned, in relation to Section 21, same rule. In
view, therefore, of the present circumstances in this
case, said accused-applicant is now entitled to bail as a

matter of right inasmuch as the crime of rebellion

ceased to be a capital offense.
As to the contention of herein petitioner that it would be
dangerous to grant bail to private respondent considering his
stature in the CPP-NPA hierarchy, whose ultimate and
overriding goal is to wipe out all vestiges of our democracy and
to replace it with their ideology, and that his release would allow
his return to his organization to direct its armed struggle to
topple the government before whose courts he invokes his
constitutional right to bail, respondent Judge replied:
True, there now appears a clash between the accused's
constitutional right to bail in a non-capital offense, which
right is guaranteed in the Bill of Rights and, to quote
again the prosecution, "the existence of the government
that bestows the right, the paramount interest of the
state." Suffice to state that the Bill of Rights, one of
which is the right to bail, is a "declaration of the rights of
the individual, civil, political and social and economic,
guaranteed by the Constitution against impairment or
intrusion by any form of governmental action. Emphasis
is placed on the dignity of man and the worth of
individual. There is recognition of certain inherent and
inalienable rights of the individual, which the
government is prohibited from violating" (QuisumbingFernando, Philippine Constitutional Law, 1984 Edition,
p. 77). To this Court, in case of such conflict as now
pictured by the prosecution, the same should be
resolved in favor of the individual who, in the eyes of the
law, is alone in the assertion of his rights under the Bill
of Rights as against the State. Anyway, the government
is that powerful and strong, having the resources,
manpower and the wherewithals to fight those "who
oppose, threathen (sic) and destroy a just and orderly
society and its existing civil and political institutions."
The prosecution's fear may or may not be founded that
the accused may later on jump bail and rejoin his

comrades in the field to sow further disorders and

anarchy against the duly constituted authorities. But,
then, such a fear can not be a reason to deny him bail.
For the law is very explicit that when it comes to bailable
offenses an accused is entitled as a matter of light to
bail.Dura est lex sed lex.
In a motion to reconsider 12 the above order filed on 16 July
1987, petitioner asked the court to increase the bail from
P30,000.00 to P100,000.00 alleging therein that per
Department of Justice Circular No. 10 dated 3 July 1987, the
bail for the, provisional release of an accused should be in an
amount computed at P10,000.00 per year of imprisonment
based on the medium penalty imposable for the offense and
explaining that it is recommending P100,000.00 because the
private respondent "had in the past escaped from the custody
of the military authorities and the offense for which he is
charged is not an ordinary crime, like murder, homicide or
robbery, where after the commission, the perpetrator has
achieved his end" and that "the rebellious acts are not
consummated until the well-organized plan to overthrow the
government through armed struggle and replace it with an alien
system based on a foreign ideology is attained."
On 17 July 1987, petitioner filed a supplemental motion for
reconsideration 13 indirectly asking the court to deny bail to the
private respondent and to allow it to present evidence in
support thereof considering the "inevitable probability that the
accused will not comply with this main condition of his bail to
appear in court for trial," a conclusion it claims to be buttressed
"by the following facts which are widely known by the People of
the Philippines and which this Honorable Court may have
judicial notice of:
1. The accused has evaded the authorities for thirteen
years and was an escapee from detention when
arrested;

2. He was not arrested at his residence as he had no

known address;
3. He was using the false name "Manuel Mercado
Castro" at the time of his arrest and presented a Driver's
License to substantiate his false identity;
4. The address he gave "Panamitan, Kawit, Cavite,"
turned out to be also a false address;
5. He and his companions were on board a private
vehicle with a declared owner whose identity and
address were also found to be false;
6. Pursuant to Ministry Order No. 1-A dated 11 January
1982 , a reward of P250,000.00 was offered and paid
for his arrest,
which "clearly indicate that the accused does not entertain the
slightest intention to appear in court for trial, if released."
Petitioner further argues that the accused, who is the Chairman
of the Communist Party of the Philippines and head of its
military arm, the NPA, together with his followers, are now
engaged in an open warfare and rebellion against this
government and threatens the existence of this very Court from
which he now seeks provisional release," and that while he is
entitled to bail as a matter of right in view of Executive Order
No. 187 which restored the original penalty for rebellion under
Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code, yet, when the interest of
the State conflicts with that of an individual, that of the former
prevails for "the right of the State of self-preservation is
paramount to any of the rights of an individual enshrined in the
Bill of Rights of the Constitution." Petitioner further invokes
precedents in the United States of America holding "that there
is no absolute constitutional barrier to detention of potentially
dangerous
resident
aliens
pending
deportation
proceedings, 14 and that an arrestee may be incarcerated until
trial as he presents a risk of flight; 15 and sustaining a detention
prior to trial of arrestee charged with serious felonies who are
found after an adversary hearing to pose threat to the safety of

individuals and to the community which no condition of release

can dispel. 16
On 30 July 1987 respondent Judge handed down the
Order 17 adverted to in the introductory portion of this decision
the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing
considerations, the Court finds the "supplemental"
motion for reconsideration to be without merit and
hereby denies it but finds the first motion for
reconsideration to be meritorious only insofar as the
amount of bail is concerned and hereby reconsiders its
Order of July 7, 1987 only to increase the amount of bail
from P30,000.00 to P50,000.00, subject to the approval
of this Court, and with the additional condition that
accused Rodolfo Salas shall report to the court once
every two (2) months within the first ten (10) days of
every period thereof (Almendras vs. Villaluz, et al., L31665, August 6, 1975, 66 SCRA 58).
In denying the supplemental motion for reconsideration the
respondent Judge took into account the "sudden turn-about" on
the part of the petitioner in that a day earlier it filed a motion for
reconsideration wherein it conceded the right of the private
respondent to bail but merely asked to increase the amount of
bail; observed that it is only a reiteration of arguments in its
opposition to the petition for bail of 25 May 1987; asserted that
the American precedents are not applicable since the cases
involved deportation of aliens and, moreover, the U.S. Federal
Constitution does not contain a proviso on the right of an
accused to bail in bailable offenses, but only an injunction
against excessive bail; and quoted the concurring opinion of the
late Justice Pedro Tuason in the cases of Nava, et al. vs.
Gatmaitan, L-4853, Hernandez vs. Montesa, L-4964 and
Angeles vs. Abaya, L-5108, October 11, 1951, 90 Phil, 172.
Unable to agree with said Order, petitioner commenced this
petition submitting therein the following issues:

THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT JUDGE PROCORO

J. DONATO ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION
AND
IN
EXCESS
OF
HIS
JURISDICTION, AND IN TOTAL DISREGARD OF THE
PREVAILING REALITIES, WHEN HE DENIED
PETITIONER'S SUPPLEMENTAL MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION WITH PRAYER TO BE GIVEN
THE OPPORTUNITY TO ADDUCE EVIDENCE IN
SUPPORT OF ITS OPPOSITION TO THE GRANT OF
BAIL TO THE RESPONDENT RODOLFO SALAS.
THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT JUDGE PROCORO
J. DONATO ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION
AND
IN
EXCESS
OF
HIS
JURISDICTION WHEN HE GRANTED BAIL TO THE
RESPONDENT RODOLFO SALAS.
in support of which petitioner argues that private respondent is
estopped from invoking his right to bail, having expressly
waived it in G.R. No. 76009 when he agreed to "remain in legal
custody and face trial before the court having custody of his
person" in consideration of the recall of the warrant of arrest for
his co-petitioners Josefina Cruz and Jose Concepcion; and the
right to bail, even in non-capital offenses, is not absolute when
there is prima facie evidence that the accused is a serious
threat to the very existence of the State, in which case the
prosecution must be allowed to present evidence for the denial
of bail. Consequently, respondent Judge acted with grave
abuse of discretion when he did not allow petitioner to present
all the evidence it may desire to support its prayer for the denial
of bail and when he declared that the State has forfeited its
right to do so since during all the time that the petition for bail
was pending, it never manifested, much less hinted, its
intention to adduce such evidence. And that even if release on
bail may be allowed, respondent judge, in fixing the amount of
bail at P50,000.00 (originally P30,000.00 only), failed to take
into account the lengthy record of private respondents' criminal

background, the gravity of the pending charge, and the

likelihood of flight. 18
In Our resolution of 11 August 1987 19 We required the
respondents to comment on the petition and issued a
Temporary Restraining Order ordering respondent Judge to
cease and desist from implementing his order of 30 July 1987
granting bail to private respondent in the amount of
P50,000.00.
In his Comment filed on 27 August 1987, 20 private respondent
asks for the outright dismissal of the petition and immediate
lifting of the temporary restraining order on the following
grounds:
I
RESPONDENT SALAS NEVER WAIVED HIS RIGHT
TO BAIL; NEITHER IS HE ESTOPPED FROM
ASSERTING SAID RIGHT. ON THE CONTRARY IT IS
PETITIONER WHO IS ESTOPPED FROM RAISING
THE SAID ISSUE FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL.
II
RESPONDENT SALAS ENJOYS NOT ONLY THE
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE PRESUMED
INNOCENT BUT ALSO THE RIGHT TO BAIL.
III
RESPONDENT SALAS IS NOT CHARGED WITH A
CAPITAL OFFENSE (RECLUSION PERPETUA),
HENCE HE HAS THE RIGHT TO BAIL AS MANDATED
BY THE CONSTITUTION.
IV
THE ORDER OF JULY 30, 1987 DENYING
PETITIONER
OPPORTUNITY
TO
PRESENT
EVIDENCE IS CORRECT. PETITIONER'S ALLEGED
RIGHT TO PRESENT EVIDENCE IS NON-EXISTENT
AND/OR HAD BEEN WAIVED.

V
THE ISSUANCE OF A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING
ORDER IN THIS CASE VIOLATES NOT ONLY
RESPONDENT SALAS' RIGHT TO BAIL BUT ALSO
HIS OTHER CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUE
PROCESS.
We required the petitioner to reply to the comment of private
respondent. 21 The reply was filed on 18 September 1987. 22
In Our resolution of 15 October 1987 23 We gave due course to
the petition and required the parties to file simultaneously their
memoranda within twenty days from notice.
In their respective manifestations and motions dated 5
November 24 and 23 November 1987 25 petitioner and private
respondents asked to be excused from filing their Memoranda
and that the petition and reply be considered as the
Memorandum for petitioner and the Comment as the
Memorandum for private respondent, which We granted in Our
resolution of 19 November 1987 26 and 1 December
1987, 27 respectively.
In Our resolution of 14 September 1989 We required the
Solicitor General to express his stand on the issues raised in
this petitions, 28 which he complied with by filing his
Manifestation on 30 May 1990 29 wherein he manifests that he
supports the petition and submits that the Order of respondent
Judge of July 7, July 17 and July 30, 1987 should be annulled
and set aside asserting that private respondent had waived the
light to bail in view of the agreement in G.R. No. 76009; that
granting bail to him is accepting wide-eyed his undertaking
which he is sure to break; in determining bail, the primary
consideration is to insure the attendance of the accused at the
trial of the case against him which would be frustrated by the
"almost certainty that respondent Salas will lump bail of
whatever amount"; and application of the guidelines provided
for in Section 10 of Rule 114, 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure on the amount of bail dictates denial of bail to

private respondent. The Solicitor General likewise maintains

that the right of the petitioner to hearing on the application of
private respondent for bail cannot be denied by respondent
Judge.
And now on the issues presented in this case.
I.
Unquestionably, at the time the original and the amended
Informations for rebellion and the application for bail were filed
before the court below the penalty imposable for the offense for
which the private respondent was charged was reclusion
perpetua to death. During the pendency of the application for
bail Executive Order No. 187 was issued by the President, by
virtue of which the penalty for rebellion as originally provided for
in Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code was restored. The
restored law was the governing law at the time the respondent
court resolved the petition for bail.
We agree with the respondent court that bail cannot be denied
to the private respondent for he is charged with the crime of
rebellion as defined in Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code to
which is attached the penalty ofprision mayor and a fine not
exceeding
P20,000.00. 30 It
is,
therefore,
a bailable
offense under Section 13 of Article III of the 1987 Constitution
which provides thus:
Sec. 13. All persons, except those charged with
offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when
evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be
bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on
recognizance as may be prescribed by law. The right to
bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall
not be required.
Section 3, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, as amended, also
provides:

Bail, a matter of right: exception. All persons in

custody shall, before final conviction, be entitled to bail
as a matter of right, except those charged with a capital
offense or an offense which, under the law at the time of
its commission and at the time of the application for bail,
is punishable by reclusion perpetua, when evidence of
guilt is strong.
Therefore, before conviction bail is either a matter of right or of
discretion. It is a matter of right when the offense charged is
punishable by any penalty lower than reclusion perpetua. 31 To
that extent the right is absolute. 32
And so, in a similar case for rebellion, People vs. Hernandez, et
al., 99 Phil. 515, despite the fact that the accused was already
convicted, although erroneously, by the trial court for the
complex crime of rebellion with multiple murders, arsons and
robberies, and sentenced to life imprisonment, We granted bail
in the amount of P30,000.00 during the pendency of his appeal
from such conviction. To the vigorous stand of the People that
We must deny bail to the accused because the security of the
State so requires, and because the judgment of conviction
appealed from indicates that the evidence of guilt of Hernandez
is strong, We held:
. . . Furthermore, individual freedom is too basic, too
transcendental and vital in a republican state, like ours,
to be derived upon mere general principles and abstract
consideration of public safety. Indeed, the preservation
of liberty is such a major preoccupation of our political
system that, not satisfied with guaranteeing its
enjoyment in the very first paragraph of section (1) of
the Bill of Rights, the framers of our Constitution
devoted paragraphs (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (11), (12),
(13), (14), (15), (16), (17), (18), and (21) of said section
(1) to the protection of several aspects of freedom.
The 1987 Constitution strengthens further the right to bail by
explicitly providing that it shall not be impaired even when the

privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. This

overturns the Court's ruling in Garcia-Padilla vs. Enrile, et
al., supra., to wit:
The suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus must, indeed, carry with it the suspension of the
right to bail, if the government's campaign to suppress
the rebellion is to be enhanced and rendered effective. If
the right to bail may be demanded during the
continuance of the rebellion, and those arrested,
captured and detained in the course thereof will be
released, they would, without the least doubt, rejoin
their comrades in the field thereby jeopardizing the
success of government efforts to bring to an end the
invasion, rebellion or insurrection.
Upon the other hand, if the offense charged is punishable
by reclusion perpetua bail becomes a matter of discretion. It
shall be denied if the evidence of guilt is strong. The court's
discretion is limited to determining whether or not evidence of
guilt is strong. 33 But once it is determined that the evidence of
guilt is not strong, bail also becomes a matter of right.
In Teehankee vs. Director of Prisons, supra., We held:

guilt is evident or the presumption thereof is

great! 34
Accordingly, the prosecution does not have the right to present
evidence for the denial of bail in the instances where bail is a
matter of right. However, in the cases where the grant of bail is
discretionary, due process requires that the prosecution must
be given an opportunity to present, within a reasonable time, all
the evidence that it may desire to introduce before the court
should resolve the motion for bail. 35
We agree, however, with petitioner that it was error for the
respondent court to fix the bond at P30,000.00, then later at
P50,000.00 without hearing the prosecution. The guidelines for
the fixing of the amount of bail provided for in Section 10 of
Rule 114 of the Rules of Court are not matters left entirely to
the discretion of the court. As We stated in People
vs. Dacudao, et al., 170 SCRA, 489, 495:
Certain guidelines in the fixing of a bailbond call for the
presentation of evidence and reasonable opportunity for
the prosecution to refute it. Among them are the nature
and circumstances of the crime, character and
reputation of the accused, the weight of the evidence
against him, the probability of the accused appearing at
the trial, whether or not the accused is a fugitive from
justice, and whether or not the accused is under bond in
other case. . . .

The provision on bail in our Constitution is patterned

after similar provisions contained in the Constitution of
the United States and that of many states of the Union.
And it is said that:
The Constitution of the United States and the
constitution of the many states provide that all
persons shall be bailable by sufficient sureties,
except for capital offenses, where the proof is
evident or the presumption of guilt is great, and,
under such provisions, bail is a matter of right
which no court or judge can properly refuse, in
all cases not embraced in the exceptions. Under
such provisions bail is a matter of right even in
cases of capital offenses, unless the proof of

In the instant case petitioner has sufficiently made out

allegations which necessitate a grant of an opportunity to be
heard for the purpose of determining the amount of bail, but not
for the denial thereof because aforesaid Section 10 of Rule 114
does not authorize any court to deny bail.
II.
It must, however, be stressed that under the present state of
the law, rebellion is no longer punishable by prision mayor and
fine not exceeding P20,000.00. Republic Act No. 6968

approved on 24 October 1990 and which took effect after

publication in at least two newspapers of general circulation,
amended, among others, Article 135 of the Revised Penal
Code by increasing the penalty for rebellion such that, as
amended, it now reads:
Article 135. Penalty for rebellion, insurrection or coup
d'etat. Any person who promotes, maintains, or
heads a rebellion or insurrection shall suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua.
Any person merely participating or executing the
commands of others in a rebellion or insurrection shall
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
xxx xxx xxx
This amendatory law cannot apply to the private respondent for
acts allegedly committed prior to its effectivity. It is not favorable
to him. "Penal laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as
they favor the person guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual
criminal, as this term is defined in Rule 5 of Article 62 of this
Code, although at the time of the publication of such laws a
final sentence has been pronounced and the convict is serving
the same. 36
III.
We agree with Petitioner that private respondent has, however,
waived his right to bail in G.R. No. 76009.
On 3 October 1986, or the day following the filing of the original
information in Criminal Case No. 86-48926 with the trial court, a
petition for habeas corpus for herein private respondent, and
his co-accused Josefina Cruz and Jose Concepcion, was filed
with this Court by Lucia Cruz, Aida Concepcion Paniza and
Beatriz Salas against Juan Ponce Enrile, Gen. Fidel Ramos,
Brig. Gen. Renato de Villa, Brig. Gen. Ramon Montao, and
Col. Saldajeno praying, among others, that the petition be given
due course and a writ of habeas corpus be issued requiring
respondents to produce the bodies of herein private respondent

and his co-accused before the Court and explain by what

authority they arrested and detained them. The following
proceedings took place thereafter in said case:
1. In a resolution of 7 October 1986 We issued a writ of habeas
corpus, required respondents to make a return of the writ on or
before the close of office hours on 13 October and set the
petition for hearing on 14 October 1986 at 10:00 o'clock in the
morning.
2. On 13 October 1986 respondents, through the Office of the
Solicitor General, filed a Return To The Writ ofHabeas
Corpus alleging therein that private respondent and Josefina
Cruz alias "Mrs.
Mercado",
and
Jose
Milo
Concepcion alias "Eugene Zamora" were apprehended by the
military on September 29, 1986 in the evening at the Philippine
General Hospital Compound at Taft Ave., Mangga being
leaders or members of the Communist Party of the Philippines,
New People's Army and National Democratic Front,
organizations dedicated to the overthrow of the Government
through violent means, and having actually committed acts of
rebellion under Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended. After their arrest they were forthwith charged with
rebellion before Branch XII of the Regional Trial Court, National
Capital Region in Criminal Case No. 86-48926 and on 3
October warrants for their arrest were issued and respondents
continue to detain them because of the warrants of arrest and
the pendency of the criminal cases against them. Respondents
further allege that, contrary to the allegation in the petition,
herein private respondent was not a member of the NDF panel
involved in peace negotiations with the Government; neither is
he and his companions Cruz and Concepcion covered by any,
safe conduct pass issued by competent authorities.
3. At the hearing on 14 October 1986 the parties informed the
Court of certain agreements reached between them. We issued
a resolution reading as follows:

When this case was called for hearing this morning,

Attorneys Romeo Capulong, Arno V. Sanidad, Efren H.
Mercado, Edgardo Pamin-tuan, Casiano Sabile, Ramon
Cura, and William Chua appeared for the petitioners
with Atty. Capulong arguing for the petitioners. Solicitor
General Sedfrey Ordonez, Assistant Solicitor General
Romeo C. de la Cruz and Trial Attorney Josue E.
Villanueva appeared for the respondents, with Solicitor
General Ordoez arguing for the respondents.

detainees Josefina Cruz and Jose Milo Concepcion

have agreed to subject themselves to the jurisdiction of
the trial court, the Court ordered their immediate
release.

Petitioners' counsel, Atty. Romeo Capulong, manifested

in open Court that in conformity with the agreement
reached with the government, the petition for habeas
corpus will be withdrawn with detainee Rodolfo Salas to
remain under custody, whereas his co-detainees
Josefina Cruz and Jose Milo Concepcion will be
released immediately.

4. At 3:49 o'clock in the afternoon of 14 October 1986 the

parties submitted a Joint Manifestation and Motion duly signed
by Atty. Romeo Capulong, counsel for petitioners, and Solicitor
General Sedfrey Ordoez, Assistant Solicitor General Romeo
C. de la Cruz and Trial Attorney Josue S. Villanueva, counsel
for respondents, which reads as follows:

Solicitor General Sedfrey Ordoez, also in open Court,

confirmed the foregoing statement made by petitioners'
counsel regarding the withdrawal of the petition
for habeas corpus, declaring that no objection will be
interposed to the immediate release of detainees
Josefina Cruz and Jose Milo Concepcion, and that no
bond will be required of them, but they will continue to
face trial with their co-accused, Rodolfo Salas; further,
that they will not be rearrested on the basis of the
warrants issued by the trial court provided that they
manifest in open Court their willingness to subject
themselves to the jurisdiction of the Court and to appear
in court when their presence is required.
In addition, he stated that he is willing to confer with
petitioners' counsel today relative to the compromise
agreement that they have previously undertaken to
submit.
Upon manifestation of petitioners' counsel, Atty. Romeo
Capulong, that on his oath as member of the Bar, the

Thereafter, the Court approved the foregoing

manifestations and statements and required both
parties to SUBMIT to the Court their compromise
agreement
by
4:00
o'clock
this
afternoon.
Teehankee, C.J., is on official leave.

COME NOW petitioners and the respondents, assisted

by their respective counsel, and to this Honorable
Tribunal respectfully manifest:
1. That in the discussion between Romeo Capulong,
petitioners' counsel, and Solicitor General Sedfrey A.
Ordoez on October 13, 1986 exploratory talks were
conducted to find out how the majesty of the law may be
preserved and human considerations may be called into
play.
2. That in the conference both counsel agreed to the
following terms of agreement:
a. The petition for habeas corpus will be
withdrawn by petitioners and Josefina Cruz and
Jose Milo Concepcion will be immediately
released but shall appear at the trial of the
criminal case for rebellion (People v. Rodolfo
Salas, et al., Criminal Case No. 4886 [should be
86-48926], Regional Trial Court, National Capital

Judicial Region) filed against them under their

personal recognizance.
b. Petitioner Rodolfo Salas will remain in legal
custody and face trial before the court having
custody over his person.
c. The warrant of arrest for the persons of
Josefina Cruz and Jose Milo Concepcion is
hereby deemed recalled in view of formal
manifestation before the Supreme Court that
they will submit themselves to the court having
jurisdiction over their person.
3. That on October 14, the Solicitor General was able to
obtain the conformity of the Government to the
foregoing terms which were likewise accepted by
petitioner (sic) and their counsel of record.
4. That the two counsel submitted their oral
manifestation during the hearing on October 14 and the
present manifestation in compliance with the resolution
announced in court this morning.
WHEREFORE, it is prayed that the petition for habeas
corpus be dismissed.
5. On 16 October 1986 We issued the following resolution:
G.R. No. 76009 [In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas
Corpus of Rodolfo Salas, Josefina Cruz and Jose Milo
Concepcion, et al. v. Hon. Juan Ponce Enrile, Gen. Fidel
V. Ramos, Brig. Gen. Renato de Villa, Brig. Gen.
Ramon Montao and Col. Virgilio Saldajeno]
considering the Joint Manifestation and Motion dated
October 14, 1986 filed by Attorneys Romeo Capulong,
Arno V. Sanidad, Efren H. Mercado and Ricardo
Fernandez, Jr. as counsel for petitioners and Solicitor
General Sedfrey A. Ordonez and Assistant Solicitor
General Romeo C. de la Cruz and Trial Attorney Josue
S. Villanueva as counsel for respondents which states

that they have entered into an agreement whereby: [a]

the petition for habeas corpus will be withdrawn by
petitioners, and Josefina Cruz and Jose Milo
Concepcion will be immediately released but shall
appear at the trial of the criminal case for rebellion
[People vs. Rodolfo Salas, et al., Criminal Case No.
4886, Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial
Region, Branch XII, Manila], filed against them, on their
personal recognizance; [b] petitioner Rodolfo Salas will
remain in legal custody and face trial before the court
having custody over his person; and [c] the warrant of
arrest for the person of Josefina Cruz and Jose Milo
Concepcion is hereby deemed recalled in view of the
formal manifestation before this Court that they will
submit themselves to the court having jurisdiction over
their person and in view of the said agreement, the
petition for habeas corpus be dismissed, the Court
Resolved to DISMISS the petition for habeas corpus but
subject to the condition that petitioners' lead counsel,
Atty. Capulong, upon his oath as member of the Bar,
shall abide by his commitment to ensure the
appearance of Josefina Cruz and Jose Milo Concepcion
at the trial of the criminal case for rebellion filed against
them. Teehankee,C.J., is on official leave.
It is the stand of the petitioner that private respondent, "in
agreeing to remain in legal custody even during the pendency
of the trial of his criminal case, [he] has expressly waived his
right to bail." 37 Upon the other hand, private respondent asserts
that this claim is totally devoid of factual and legal basis, for in
their petition for habeas corpus they precisely questioned the
legality of the arrest and the continued detention of Rodolfo
Salas, Josefina Cruz and Jose Milo Concepcion, which was not
resolved by this Court or by the compromise agreement of the
parties but left open for further determination in another
proceeding. Moreover, the matter of the right to bail was neither
raised by either party nor resolved by this Court, and the legal

steps promptly taken by private respondent after the agreement

was reached, like the filing of the motion to quash on 7
November 1986 and the petition for bail on 14 May 1987, were
clear and positive assertions of his statutory and constitutional
rights to be granted not only provisional but final and
permanent liberty. Finally, private respondent maintains that the
term "legal custody" as used in the Joint Manifestation and
Motion simply means that private respondent agreed to
continue to be in the custody of the law or in custodia legis and
nothing else; it is not to be interpreted as waiver.
Interestingly, private respondent admits that:
"Custody" has been held to mean nothing less than
actual imprisonment. It is also defined as the detainer of
a person by virtue of a lawful authority, or the "care and
possession of a thing or person." (Bouviers Law
Dictionary, Third Ed, Vol. I, pp. 741-742 citing Smith v.
Com. 59 Pa. 320 and Rolland v. Com. 82 Pa. 306)
He further admits that, in the light of Section 1 of Rule 114 of
the Rules of Court and settled jurisprudence, the "constitutional
right to bail is subject to the limitation that the person applying
for admission to bail should be in the custody of the law or
otherwise deprived of his liberty." 38
When the parties in G.R. No. 76009 stipulated that:
b. Petitioner Rodolfo Salas will remain in legal
custody and face trial before the court having custody
over his person.
they simply meant that Rodolfo Salas, herein respondent, will
remain in actual physical custody of the court, or in actual
confinement or detention, as distinguished from the stipulation
concerning his co-petitioners, who were to be released in view
of the recall of the warrants of arrest against them; they agreed,
however, "to submit themselves to the court having jurisdiction
over their persons." Note should be made of the deliberate care
of the parties in making a fine distinction between legal

custody and court having custody over the person in respect to

Rodolfo Salas and court having jurisdiction over the persons of
his co-accused. Such a fine distinction was precisely intended
to emphasize the agreement that Rodolfo Salas will not be
released, but should remain in custody. Had the parties
intended otherwise, or had this been unclear to private
respondent and his counsel, they should have insisted on the
use of a clearer language. It must be remembered that at the
time the parties orally manifested before this Court on 14
October 1986 the terms and conditions of their agreement and
prepared and signed the Joint Manifestation and Motion, a
warrant of arrest had already been issued by the trial court
against private respondent and his co-accused. The stipulation
that only the warrants of arrest for Josefina Cruz and Jose Milo
Concepcion shall be recalled and that only they shall be
released, further confirmed the agreement that herein petitioner
shall remain in custody of the law, or detention or confinement.
In defining bail as:
. . . the security given for the release of a person in
custody of the law, . . .
Section 1 of Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Court admits no
other meaning or interpretation for the term "in custody of the
law" than that as above indicated. The purpose of bail is to
relieve an accused from imprisonment until his conviction and
yet secure his appearance at the trial. 39 It presupposes that the
person applying for it should be in the custody of the law or
otherwise deprived of liberty. 40
Consequently, having agreed in G.R. No. 76009 to remain in
legal custody, private respondent had unequivocably waived his
right to bail.
But, is such waiver valid?
Article 6 of the Civil Code expressly provides:
Art. 6. Rights may be waived, unless the waiver is
contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, or

good customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a

right recognized by law.
Waiver is defined as "a voluntary and intentional relinquishment
or abandonment of a known existing legal right, advantage,
benefit, claim or privilege, which except for such waiver the
party would have enjoyed; the voluntary abandonment or
surrender, by a capable person, of a right known by him to
exist, with the intent that such right shall be surrendered and
such person forever deprived of its benefit; or such conduct as
warrants an inference of the relinquishment of such right; or the
intentional doing of an act inconsistent with claiming it." 41
As to what rights and privileges may be waived, the authority is
settled:
. . . the doctrine of waiver extends to rights and
privileges of any character, and, since the word "waiver"
covers every conceivable right, it is the general rule that
a person may waive any matter which affects his
property, and any alienable right or privilege of which he
is the owner or which belongs to him or to which he is
legally entitled, whether secured by contract, conferred
with statute,or guaranteed by constitution, provided
such rights and privileges rest in the individual, are
intended for his sole benefit, do not infringe on the rights
of others, and further provided the waiver of the right or
privilege is not forbidden by law, and does not
contravene public policy; and the principle is recognized
that everyone has a right to waive, and agree to waive,
the advantage of a law or rule made solely for the
benefit and protection of the individual in his private
capacity, if it can be dispensed with and relinquished
without infringing on any public right, and without
detriment to the community at large. . . .
Although the general rule is that any right or privilege
conferred by statute or guaranteed by constitution may
be waived, a waiver in derogation of a statutory right is

not favored, and a waiver will be inoperative and void if

it infringes on the rights of others, or would be against
public policy or morals and the public interest may be
waived.
While it has been stated generally that all personal
rights conferred by statute and guaranteed by
constitution may be waived, it has also been said that
constitutional provisions intended to protect property
may be waived, and even some of the constitutional
rights created to secure personal liberty are subjects of
waiver. 42
In Commonwealth vs. Petrillo, 43 it was held:
Rights guaranteed to one accused of a crime fall
naturally into two classes: (a) those in which the state,
as well as the accused, is interested; and (b) those
which are personal to the accused, which are in the
nature of personal privileges. Those of the first class
cannot be waived; those of the second may be.
It is "competent for a person to waive a right guaranteed by the
Constitution, and to consent to action which would be invalid if
taken against his will." 44
This Court has recognized waivers of constitutional rights such
as, for example, the right against unreasonable searches and
seizures; 45 the right to counsel and to remain silent; 46 and the
right to be heard. 47
Even the 1987 Constitution expressly recognizes a waiver of
rights guaranteed by its Bill of Rights. Section 12(l) of Article III
thereof on the right to remain silent and to have a competent
and independent counsel, preferably of his own choice states:
. . . These rights cannot be waived except in writing and
in the presence of counsel.
This provision merely particularizes the form and manner of the
waiver; it, nevertheless, clearly suggests that the other rights

may be waived in some other form or manner provided such

waiver will not offend Article 6 of the Civil Code.
We hereby rule that the right to bail is another of the
constitutional rights which can be waived. It is a right which is
personal to the accused and whose waiver would not be
contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, or good
customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized
by law.
The respondent Judge then clearly acted with grave abuse of
discretion in granting bail to the private respondent.

WHEREFORE, the Orders of respondent Judge of July 7, 1987

and July 30, 1987 in Criminal Case No. 86-48926 entitled
People
of
the
Philippines
vs.
Rodolfo
C.
Salas alias Commander Bilog/Henry, Josefina Cruz alias Mrs.
Mercado, and Jose Milo Concepcion alias Eugene Zamora, for
Rebellion, are hereby NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE.