Egypts Foreign Policy

EGYPTS FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS
Egypts Foreign Policy Analysis: From Nasser to Morsi

Noor-ul-Ain Khawaja
Introduction
The unprecedented uprising in Egypt has come to a decisive end with the
emergence of the Islamist group, the Muslim Brotherhood, in power and
Mohamed Morsi has become the first democratic ruler of the country. The
change is considered as a turning point in the history of Egypt, as the
oldest Islamist group1 has succeeded in overthrowing the three-decade
old, pro-West, regime of Hosni Mubarak. This change has appeared as if
the history of the country is repeating itself with the distinguished rulers
and their systems. In 1952, military commander Gamal Abdel Nasser
launched a Free Officers Movement and revolted against the then proBritish king, Farouk I. He imposed a military dictatorship that lasted for
six decades.
From Nasser till the present government, Egyptian foreign policy has
mainly revolved around the following issues: security, economic stability,
relations with influential states and the Arab and regional states.
Different methods were adopted to deal with these issues according to the
changing international circumstances. In the 21 st century, Islamist
extremism has become a growing concern for the world, while Islamist
movements are gaining momentum in North Africa and enjoying western
support and it seems that a paradigm shift is taking place once again in
world politics. Differences among the world powers on the problem of
extremism and their willingness to work with Islamist governments show
that the world is moving to the creation of many power centres with
diverse interests.
The purpose of this paper is to examine foreign policy goals and
decisions under Nasser, Sadat and Mubarak. It also presents a thorough
analysis of the way these administrations dealt with the regional and
global challenges. The second part of the paper focuses on the present
1
Sydney Nettleton Fisher, The Middle East: A History (London: Routledge &
Kegan Paul, 1971), pp.690-691.
Noor-ul-Ain Khawaja is a Research Officer in The Pakistan Institute of

International Affairs.
42
PAKISTAN HORIZON
foreign policy challenges and prospects under the leadership of Morsi.

This part can help assess how Morsi sets his foreign policy goals. It also
describes how the decisions have been made so far and what difference
these decisions can make in the future.
Foreign policy survey in historical perspective
Under Nassers rule
Egyptian politics took a radical turn when the military coup overthrew
king Farouk I in 1952. The defeat of the Egyptian forces in the ArabIsrael war in 1948 was one of the major reasons for the revolt against the
monarchy. Since then, the Palestinian issue has been on top of Egypts
foreign policy agenda..2
Nasser is regarded as the first Egyptian ruler who laid the foundation
of an independent and bold foreign policy. Before him, Egypt, due to
British influence, could not pursue independent foreign relations. He
received credit for emancipating his country from British domination. 3 An
accord in 1954 with Britain formally ended the chapter of British
influence in Egypt and Egypt emerged as a significant political actor on
the world horizon.4
Nasser adopted an anti-West approach due to western imperialist
policies. Egypt was frustrated by the pro-Israel policy of the West and it
had condemned the Israeli occupation of Palestine after the end of the
British mandate in 1948.5 Egypt regarded Israel as a grave threat to its
security and western support for Israel made the Egyptian leaders more
4
5
Mustafa al-Faki, Egypt Is Poised to Resume Role In Regional and World

Affairs, Al-Monitor, 6 October 2012.
http://kenzayousfi.wordpress.com/2011/05/07/egypt%E2%80%99s-foreignpolicy-the-era-of-gamal-abdel-nasser/. Also see Derek Hopwood, Egypt Politics
and Society 1945-1981(London: George Allen & Unwin, 1982), pp. 34-36.
Derek Hopwood, op.cit., p. 41.
Hani Eman, The Arab-American Relations: A historical perspective, Arab
News, 4 August 2002. See also Laurie Milner, The Suez Crisis, 3 March 2011,
http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/british/modern/suez_01.shtml
uncomfortable. Therefore, from the onset, Egypt focused on strengthening

its armed forces to counterbalance Israels military might.
To develop military ties, Egypt gave preference to its ties with the
Soviet Union over relations with the US. It rejected the US offer of
supplying weapons and signed an arms treaty with the Soviet Union and
started military training and equipment through Czechoslovakia. To
strengthen its economy, it signed trade pacts with Romania, Hungary,
East Germany and China. Moreover, its recognition of the Peoples
Republic of China, opposition to the French occupation of Algeria and
refusal to join the Baghdad Pact, an anti-Communist alliance proposed by
the US and Britain, were viewed suspiciously by the West. 6
Despite Egypts anti-West policies, the US and Britain did not stop
persuading Egypt to join their camp. They came up with the offer of an
economic assistance programme for the construction of the Aswan High
Dam on the Nile River. Egypt considered the project significant for its
ailing economy. But that initiative failed to end the trust deficit between
Egypt and the West.7 Meanwhile, Nassers plan, along with India and
Indonesia, to launch the Non-Align Movement (NAM) again frustrated
the US and it pressured Egypt to step back from the alliance. Finally,
both Egypt and the US reached the point of no return. Egypt was
determined to stand by its position and, as a result, the US held back its
promised economic assistance for the dam. The USSR took that situation
as an opportunity to further enhance its influence in Egypt and pledged
to finance the dam.8
The withdrawal of US aid offer built up domestic pressure on Nasser
and he ordered the nationalization9 of the Anglo-French Suez Canal
Company, abrogating the treaty signed between Egypt and Britain.
6
7
8
Sydney Nettleton Fisher, op.cit., p. 709.

Sydney Nettleton Fisher, op.cit., pp. 709-710.
Asit K. Biswas & Cecilia Tortajada, Development and Large Dams: A Global
Perspective, Water Resource Development, Vol. 17, No.1, pp. 9-21. See also The
Arab-American Relations: A historical perspective, op.cit.
http://www.suezcanal.gov.eg/Files/Suez%20Canal%20Company%20
Nationalization%20Law.pdf
44
PAKISTAN HORIZON
Nasser decided to use the revenues of the Canal to build the dam.
Nationalization of the Canal made the situation worse. Britain and
France, using Israel as a frontline state, attacked Egypt. The US,
probably for fear of Soviet intervention, pressurized Britain, France and
Israel into a ceasefire. The Baghdad Pact members also condemned the
attack. Finally, the war ended with a ceasefire. 10
Egypt agreed to open the Canal and Britain agreed to pay tolls in
sterling. The frozen funds had been released and Israel had to withdraw
its forces from the Sinai Peninsula and the UN Emergency Force (UNEF)
was deployed there. Though after the Suez crisis, Nasser emerged as a
hero in the Arab world and a key player in Middle East politics, it had put
Egypt more at risk. 11 The US, under the Eisenhower Doctrine, started
supplying highly advanced and sophisticated weapons to Israel, for its
security, ignoring Egypts criticism. On the other hand, Egypt faced
disappointment when the Soviet Union refused to provide Egypt with a
nuclear arsenal, however, it had guaranteed Egypts nuclear protection in
case of an attack by Israel.
Broadening the horizon of Egypts foreign policy, Nasser moved to the
Arab world. He promoted Arab unity against Israeli aggression and
launched a campaign of Arab nationalism. Under the strategy, he
exported Egypts revolution to other Arab states. In this connection,
Egypt sent its army to Yemen to fight against pro-West government
forces.12
Egypt formed a unified military command with the Arab League in
1964 and with Syria in 1966. In 1967, it formed a joint defence command
with Jordan. UNEFs troops, on the request of Nasser, were withdrawn
from Sinai and Egypt closed the Straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping. Israel
already considered the aforementioned defence pacts as a threat to its
existence. Therefore, Israel took the withdrawal of the UN forces as an
opportunity and launched a surprise attack on the Sinai Peninsula. 13 The
10
11
12
13
Sydney Nettleton Fisher, op.cit., p.711. See also Laurie Milner, op.cit.
Derek Hopwood, op.cit., pp.54-56.
Derek Hopwood, op.cit., pp.64-65.
Ibid., pp.72-73.
Egyptian army had wanted to launch a first strike but could not do so
under strong advice from the Soviet Union. It had urged both Egypt and
Syria to restrain from first strike against Israel. However, Sadat later
claimed that the US double-crossed Egypt, as on the one hand it
restrained Egypt from attacking Israel and, on the other hand, it
encouraged Israel to do so against Egypt.14
The war ended with a UN-sponsored ceasefire and the Security
Council passed Resolution 242. The failure in the war exhibited four
major shortcomings of Nassers foreign policy. First, military intervention
in Yemen drained Egypt financially, trapped around 65,000 to 70,000 of
its troops at the time of war with Israel and lost the Arab worlds
support, especially from Saudi Arabia.15 Second, due to the withdrawal of
the UNEF, a large portion of the Egyptian army had to be deployed
hastily at the Sinai that caused supply difficulties and administrative
chaos.16 More importantly, Nasser overlooked the advice of his military
officers and the War Minister who pushed him to go for first strike.
Instead, Nasser greatly relied on Soviet advice to restrain from making a
pre-emptive strike against Israel.17
Although UN Resolution 242 created a ceasefire, in real terms Israel
did not withdraw its forces from the territories occupied during the war.
Sinai, a large piece of territory of Egypt was still under Israeli occupation
and the Suez Canal was closed to shipping. Israel had built strong
fortifications along the Bar Lev Line. While Egypt was determined to
regain what it had lost during the war. Nasser announced that the
ceasefire agreement with Israel was null and void and ordered his army
to open a heavy barrage along the entire Canal length in March 1969. 18 It
led to the outbreak of a war of attrition which lasted from July 1967 to
August 1970. But the war shattered his confidence yet again, as no Arab
state was capable enough to fight against Israel or side with Egypt. On
the one hand, Nasser decided to work within the framework of the UN
14
15
16
17
18
Ibid., p.73-74.
Ibid., pp. 64-67.
Ibid., p.75.
Ibid., p.73.
http://www.palestinefacts.org/pf_1967to1991_warofattrition.php
46
PAKISTAN HORIZON
resolution which demonstrated, somehow, his intention to recognize

Israel and on the other hand, he avoided annoying the Arab world. But
his life did not give him time to take decisive measures to achieve these
ends.19
Under Sadats rule
After assuming power as in 1970, Anwar Sadat opened a new chapter in
foreign policy. He soon realized that the restoration of Egypts political
position, after defeat in the 1967 war, could not be achieved without US
support. Meanwhile, in the 1970s, the US made a dramatic policy shift
and launched dtente and rapprochement with the Soviet Union. Under
that policy, both superpowers signed disarmament treaties, for instance,
Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT) and Anti-Ballistic Missile
Treaty (ABMT).20
The conciliation between the superpowers had a significant impact on
Middle East politics and impelled Egypt to reassess its ties with the
Soviet Union. Sadat realized that military dependence on the Soviet
Union would not work anymore. Therefore, to create a favourable image
for the West, he introduced domestic reforms, contrary to Nassers
policies. These reforms included reinstitution of the multi-party system
and a liberalized economic system. He called his reforms strategy as
Revolution of Rectification. These measures were widely hailed by the
West.21
Meanwhile, Sadat accused the Soviet Union of not supplying up-todate weapons to Egypt. This frustration became evident when, in May
1971, a few of his opponents were arrested and accused of being Moscows
agents. Nonetheless, he was a far-sighted and shrewd statesman and was
not hasty to completely break up ties with the Soviet Union.22
Maintaining security at the border with Israel had become a huge
19
20
21
22
Ibid., pp. 81-83.

Mark R. Amstutz, International Conflict and Cooperation: An Introduction to
World Politics (Madison: Brown & Benchmark,1995), p.128.
Derek Hopwood, op.cit., pp. 105-106.
Ibid. See also http://www.commentarymagazine.com/article/sadat-and-nasser/
burden on the Egyptian economy, as military rebuilding expenditures

mounted to about 25 per cent of the gross domestic product (GDP) of the
country. Assurance of security was essential for Egypts declining
economy, which could not be achieved without the help of the US, as
Sadat believed that the US was the only country which could effectively
pressurize Israel.23
In 1973, Egypt, along with Syria, took a decisive step and launched a
surprise attack on Israel. The Egyptian troops attacked the Israeli
fortifications on the East Bank while Syria invaded from the north. The
Yom Kippur War came to an end with a UN-sponsored ceasefire. To build
more pressure on the US to modify its pro-Israeli policy, the Arab states,
led by Saudi Arabia, declared an oil embargo on the West. Sadat wanted
to shock Israel and the world powers, and he succeeded in achieving his
goal.24
The war and the oil embargo urged the US to seek a permanent
solution to the Middle East conflict. The then US Secretary of State
Henry Kissinger, under shuttle diplomacy, strived for a rapprochement
between Israel and Egypt. Hence, Egypt restored its ties with the US that
had been broken after the 1967 Arab-Israel war. After three years of
immense diplomatic efforts by the US, in 1979 Egypt and Israel signed a
peace treaty as a result of the Camp David Peace Accords, under which
the Sinai Peninsula was returned to Egypt and the Suez Canal was opened for
Israeli trade.25 In this way, Sadat succeeded in achieving two foreign policy
goals: restoration of ties with the US and the end of the security threat
from Israel. Though it led to a new era of US financial support for Egypt,
it isolated Egypt in the Arab world. Egypt lost its Arab League
membership and Sadat was branded as a traitor. 26
The restoration of ties with the US greatly helped Egypt to boost its
economy. Under the peace treaty with Israel, Egypt received a total of 7.3
23
24
25
26
Jeremy M. Sharp, Egypt: Background and US Relations, CRS Report for the
Congress, 12 August 2008, p.5.
Derek Hopwood, op.cit., pp. 107-8.
Ibid.
Ibid.
48
PAKISTAN HORIZON
billion dollars in US aid in 1979. Under the Special International Security

Assistance Act of 1979, the US provided both military and economic grants
to Israel and Egypt at a ratio of 3 to 2, respectively. An annual two billion
dollar aid was supplied for subsidizing Egypts defence budget and
modernizing the countrys infrastructure. Hence, after the developments
of 1979, Egypt became the second-largest recipient of US aid. The treaty
moved Egypt out of the Soviet camp and entered it into the US sphere. 27
Under Mubaraks rule
Hosni Mubarak assumed power as after the assassination of Sadat in
1981 and pursued a passive policy towards Israel. For instance, he did not
oppose Israeli aggression in Iraq in 1981, Lebanon in 1982 and Tunis in
1986. However, he made a number of attempts to serve as a broker for
Israeli-Palestinian peace talks. 28
In 1983, support for Yasser Arafat in the fight with Syria developed a
soft corner in the Arab world for Egypt. On the other hand, the Iranian
revolution engendered fear and insecurity among the Arab states and
they looked towards Egypt for counterbalance. Mubarak ensured Egypts
support for the Arabs. These circumstances led to the readmission of
Egypt into the Arab League.29 However, relations with the Soviet Union
were at a low ebb, as Egypt provided military support to Afghan militants
(Mujahideen) via Pakistan, against the Soviet forces. 30
Regarding African affairs, Mubarak took some important and bold
decisions. He rejected US pressure to take joint military action against
Libya in 1985 and 1986. He also played a leading role in African economic
integration and joined the Common Market for Eastern and Southern
Africa (COMESA) in 1998.31
27
28
29
30
31
Ibid. See also CRS Report for the Congress, op.cit.

http://countrystudies.us/egypt/125.htm
http://countrystudies.au/egypt/125.htm
Asif Haroon Raja, Egypt under Anwar al-Sadat and Hosni Mubarak (19702011), Asian Tribune, 6 March 2011.
http://countrystudies.us.egypt/125.htm. See also Mohamed Kadry Said,
Egypt's Foreign Policy in Global Change: The Egyptian Role in Regional and
Differences between the US and Egypt emerged in 2008. After 9/11,

the US, under the policy of promoting democracy, built pressure on
Mubaraks regime to introduce necessary domestic reforms. When the
protests broke out in 2011, the US supported the revolutionaries and
welcomed the change.32 This proved that the US was an unreliable
partner for Mubaraks regime. The immediate reasons of the revolution
were: ban on political and civil rights, corruption, increasing
unemployment, inflation and low income rates. Mubarak took the least
interest in the socio-economic well-being of the people which turned the
population against him. A major portion of US aid was spent to
strengthen the military establishment and made the whole system
corrupt. 33 Apart from domestic reasons, Egypts pro-West and inactive
policies towards the Palestinian issue were the causes of frustration
among the people against Mubarak. Moreover, the Tunisian bloodless
coup also inspired the people to take to the streets and stand up against
the government.34
Present foreign policy challenges and prospects
The present Egyptian government is facing complex challenges on the
domestic and foreign fronts. Morsi needs to formulate wide-ranging and
comprehensive foreign policy objectives. The situation has entirely
changed. On the domestic front, socially and economically, Egypt stands
at a low ebb. It has also lost the status of an influential player, regionally
and globally, which it had enjoyed during Nassers and Sadats eras. At
present, the image of the Islamist group, Muslim Brotherhood, is still a
big cause of concern because Islamic extremism has become a source of
growing concern for the world community.
Ties with Hamas, Israel and US
32
33
34
International Politics, Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies, 5

December 2006.
Jeremy M. Sharp, Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations, CRS Report for
Congress, 13 September 2012.
http://countrystudies.au/egypt/125.htm
http://www.guardian.co.uk/global-development/povertymatters/2011/feb/17/what-caused-egyptian-revolution
50
PAKISTAN HORIZON
To meet contemporary challenges, Morsi will first have to reshape his own
image because of his affiliation with an Islamist group. The members of
this group were involved in the killing of the then Egyptian prime
minister Nukrashi, who was held responsible for Egyptian defeat in the
Palestinian war. Moreover, Hamas was declared as an offshoot of the
Muslim Brotherhood and it is termed as a terrorist organization by the
West, despite being in the government since 2006.35
Therefore, Egypts role in the Middle East, particularly with respect to
the ties with Hamas, is being examined vigilantly by Israel and the
West.36 However, Morsis rejection to amend the peace treaty with Israel
is viewed in a positive light by the West, especially the US and Israel. 37
Moreover, Morsis government also successfully maintained their position
as a moderate and a rational player in halting the bloody confrontation
between Hamas and Israel in November last year. The Egypt-brokered
ceasefire between Hamas and Israel reflects its clear line of direction
towards regional politics. It also reflects that the government does not
intend to launch an aggressive policy in future. 38
The security of the Sinai Peninsula is another area of serious concern
for the new Egyptian government. The Sinai Peninsula is a vast deserted
area and a demilitarized buffer zone under the peace treaty between
Egypt and Israel. The Rafah border crossing, which is located at the
northeast of the peninsula, serves as a gateway for the supply of fuel and
power to the people of Gaza. It is the only non-Israeli controlled entry/exit
point from Gaza to the outside world. A militant attack on the Peninsula
in August last year left 16 Egyptian soldiers dead. Resultantly, the Rafah
border and smuggling tunnels were closed,39 which were later reopened at
35
36
37
38
39
Hamas Palestinian Movement, 6 December 2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk/

news/world-middle-east-13331522
Sydney
Nettleton
Fisher,
op.cit.,
pp.
690-691.
See
also
http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/mb.htm
No Need to Amend Treaty With Israel, Associated Press, 26 September 2012.
Israel and Hamas Agree to a Ceasefire After a U.S.-Egypt Push, The New
York Times, 21 November 2012.
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/d8ffc2cc-e0ab11e1-b46500144feab49a.html#axzz28tU3rYJu. See also Benedetta Berti, Egypt
the request of Hamas, which offered help to the Egyptian government in

the crackdown on smuggling tunnels. 40 In retaliation of the militant
attack on the Sinai, the Egyptian government launched airstrikes against
the militants.41 But, when its military tanks entered the area, Israel
raised concerns and demanded their withdrawal. 42 This incident
demonstrates that demilitarization of the Sinai may further aggravate
the situation for Egypt in future, therefore, the present government
should work to amend the military aspect of the peace treaty with Israel.
In this connection, Morsi could ask the UN to deploy more international
forces, along with the combined Egyptian and Palestinian forces, in the
troubled area.
It is also noteworthy that the stance of the Islamist Egyptian
government and Hamas on the Syrian crisis is also considered as a
noticeable shift, which has brought the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas
on the same page and is helpful in earning western support. 43
Ties with the Arab world
In the past, Nassers policy of Arab unity, launched after the secession of
Syria from Egypt in 1962, earned wide-spread criticism from the Arab
states, as they perceived it as a grave threat to their own regimes, but the
ties with the Arab world remained intact. 44 Sadats peace treaty with
Israel led the Arab world to cut off ties with Egypt. Under Mubarak,
40
41
42
43
44
launches airstrikes in Sinai after troop massacre, 9 August 2012,

www.CNN.com
Egypt reopens Rafah crossing after Sinai attack, 10 August 2012,
http://rt.com/news/egypt-opens-rafah-crossing-574/
Ibid. See also Back to its Roots: Hamas and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood,
Diplomatic Courier Magazine, 31 August 2012.
Israel Asks Egypt to Remove Tanks From Sinai, The New York Times, 22
August 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/22/world/middleeast/israel-asksegypt-to-remove-tanks-from-sinai.html?_r=0
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/d8ffc2cc-e0ab11e1-b46500144feab49a.html#axzz28tU3rYJu. See also Benedetta Berti, op.cit.
http://www.socialismtoday.org/147/nasser.html. See also Hans E. Tutsch, From
Ankara to Marrakesh: Turks and Arabs in a Changing World (London: George
Allen and Unwin Ltd), pp. 125-126.
52
PAKISTAN HORIZON
Egypts support for Yasser Arafat and opposition to the Iranian revolution
and support to the invasion of Iraq in the Gulf War, opened the Arab doors
for Egypt. Despite the restoration of ties with the Arab states, Egypt has
not been able to restore its influential status in the Gulf region.
At present, Egypt is facing tough economic challenges. Political and
economic stability guarantees an effective foreign policy. Egypts economy
is largely dependent on the annual US aid. Egypt's external debt reached
34.9 billion dollars in 2011 and its GDP growth rate stands at 1.5 per
cent. For Morsi, achieving economic stability will be a key task for
internal peace without which he could not pursue an effective policy
regionally and globally. Gulf countries, which are economically viable, can
help Egypt in getting out of its debt problem. Morsi needs to focus on
strengthening ties with the Arab states and take initiatives, which can
lead Egypt to become a part of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). 45 The
GCC nations own 25 per cent of total world crude oil exports and preserve
17 per cent of world gas reserves. Their share in the world oil reserves is
predicted to rise from the current 45 per cent to 70 per cent in future. 46
The hydrocarbon wealth in the GCC is about 47 times their GDP and 93
per cent of the worlds GDP. 47
Last year, a former Kuwaiti minister proposed to the GCC to design an
economic recovery programme similar in nature to the Marshall Plan 48 to
help Egypt recover from the economic impact of its revolution and
establish a unified GCC army, which could reduce the GCCs burden of
arms expenditures.49 Nonetheless, the security of the Gulf region has
45
46
47
48
49
Egypt's External Debt Climbs to $34.9 billion, EU is largest creditor, Ahram

Online, 27 January 2012,
http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/3/0/32931/Business/0/Egyptsexternal-debt-climbs-to--billion,-EU-is-lar.aspx
Ibid.
http://www.emirates247.com/business/economy-finance/gcc-has-65trn-in-oilgas-wealth-2012-03-12-1.447991
Marshall Plan was a European Recovery plan proposed by the US to help
build European economies hit in WWII.
Kareem Shaheen, Kuwaiti ex-official asks GCC for Egypts economic recovery
plan, The National, 23 March 2011, http://www.thenational.ae/news/uae-
been historically linked with that of Egypt because it possesses the

biggest army in the Arab world.
Egypts military role cannot be overlooked, especially after the regime
change in Iraq and the increasing Iranian support for the governments of
Iraq, Syria and Hezbollah in Lebanon.50 Moreover, the withdrawal of
US/NATO forces from Iraq and, now, Afghanistan in 2014, may create a
vacuum that needs to be filled. It may boost religious extremist forces like
al Qaeda and the Taliban in the region. Military alliance with Egypt
could be a great support for the security of the Arab states. The combined
Gulf forces, along with Egypt, could be used to ensure collective security
against any extra-regional attack, such as an attack from Israel. It may
also reduce dependence on US military support of some countries in the
region, as the US has major military bases in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, UAE
and Qatar.
GCCs economic support for Egypt is of considerable importance. Saudi
Arabia was among the first regional countries that pledged to provide
over 4.5 billion dollars to Egypt. Being a major shareholder in the Islamic
Development Bank (IDB), it signed a one billion dollar agreement with
Egypt to support its food and energy sectors. 51
Moreover, Qatar announced a two billion dollar loan to the Central
Bank of Egypt. However, the Qatari government had already announced
plans to invest 18 billion dollars over five years in Egypt. Economic ties
with Qatar are of great significance, as its per capita income is the
highest in the world. The Qatari Emir, Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al
Thanis entrance in the Gaza Strip through the Rafah border crossing
demonstrates Qatars support to Egypt for opening the border for Hamas.
Qatar has expressed its wishes to support the Muslim Brotherhood. On
the contrary, in Mubaraks era, the two nations were at loggerheads. 52
50
51
news/kuwaiti-ex-official-asks-gcc-for-egypt-economic-recovery-plan
Egypt could be the next GCC member state, 29 September 2011, Al Arabia News,
http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2011/09/29/169297.html
Margaret Besheer, Egypt's Morsi to Make Saudi Arabia His First Foreign
Visit, Voice of America, 8 July 2012.
54
PAKISTAN HORIZON
Mubarak closed the Rafah border crossing and facilitated the Israeli
economic blockade of the Gaza Strip under the rule of Hamas. 53
Despite the support of the Arab states, some of the regional states
consider the Muslim Brotherhoods activism as a grave threat for their
survival. Egypt also needs to address their reservations. The UAE
considers that the Muslim Brotherhood may undermine the regimes of
the region because it does not believe in the nation state. However, Morsi
had already ensured during his election campaign that Egypt has no
intention to export its uprising in the Arab states. 54 It illustrates that
Egypt will have to work hard to earn confidence of the UAE if it intends to
gain full support of the GCC. It is worth mentioning here that in August,
a former member of the Qatari Brotherhood, Jasim Sultan, appealed to
the Islamists to move towards partnership thought instead of
concentrating on infiltrating the society to control it 55 Morsis
government needs to prompt Islamic scholars and party members to work
on clarifying Arab doubts. Without the UAEs conciliation, Egypt can
neither get membership in the GCC nor can Kuwaits proposal of an
economic recovery be approved.
Ties with non-Arab states
Reviving ties with extra-regional countries, including China, Iran, Turkey
and the EU cannot only be helpful for economic gains, but also for gaining
diplomatic leverage at international forums.
52
53
54
55
Simeon Kerr and Vita Bekker, Qatar Amir in landmark trip to Gaza,
Financial Times, 23 October 2012, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/0d0bb8de1cf5-11e2-a17f-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2AIsn7upP. See also Ian Black and
Harriet Sherwood, Qatari emir's visit to Gaza is a boost for Hamas, 23 October
2012, guardian.co.uk
Egypt under Anwar al-Sadat and Hosni Mubarak (1970-2011), op.cit.
http://dawn.com/2012/10/08/gulf-states-must-tackle-muslim-brotherhoodthreat-uae/
Ahmed Azem, Qatar's ties with the Muslim Brotherhood affect entire region,
The National, 18 May 2012,
http://www.thenational.ae/thenationalconversation/comment/qatars-ties-withthe-muslim-brotherhood-affect-entire-region#page1
Ties with Iran

During Nassers term, ties between Iran and Egypt remained strained
when Reza Shah Pahlavi assumed power, toppling Irans prime minister
Mohammad Mossadegh with the help of the US and later he recognized
Israel. While, later on, Sadats recognition of Israel bridged their
distances, the Islamic revolution in Iran and Egypts support for Iraq
during the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988) pulled them apart again. Following
Khomeinis death, Iran moved to mend its ties with Egypt, but so far,
sufficient progress has not been made.56
However, Morsis visit to Iran is considered a milestone vis--vis the
revival of ties between the two countries. It was the first visit to Iran by
any Egyptian ruler in 30 years. The diplomatic relations between the
countries were cut off in 1979 after Egypts recognition of Israel. Though
the visit demonstrated that Egypt does not want to be under US
influence, it also seems difficult to get rid of its control in the near future
unless Egypt becomes economically independent.57
In the present-day situation, where Iran is facing tough economic
sanctions, Egypt is being considered as a potential buyer of its oil
reserves. In September 2012, Iranian Minister of Petroleum Rostam
Qasemi announced that Iran would sell two million barrels of oil (worth
approximately 200 million dollars) to Egypt. But the decision could not
work due to the US threat to impose sanctions against those countries
which intend to do business with Irans energy sector. Egypt was not in a
position to put Egypt-US ties at risk due to US-offered debt relief
amounting to one billion dollars. It is not easy for Egypt to strengthen its
ties with Iran by ignoring US interests in the region.58
56
57
58
Dina Esfandiary, Iran and Egypt: a complicated tango?, Institute of Security

Studies, 18 October 2012,
http://www.iss.europa.eu/publications/detail/article/iran-and-egypt-acomplicated-tango/
Egypt could be the next GCC member state, op.cit.
Iran and Egypt: a complicated tango?, op.cit.
56
PAKISTAN HORIZON
However, Egypt wishes to play a diplomatic role to resolve regional

disputes. With regard to the Syrian crisis, Morsi presented a proposal to
form a group of four states: Saudi Arabia, Iran, Turkey and Egypt to
collectively sort out their problem. It demonstrates that Egypt has
acknowledged the fact that Irans importance for achieving peace in the
region cannot be denied. It also reflects Morsis pragmatic and robust
foreign policy objectives. Unlike Mubarak, he is focusing on promoting
regionalism for solving regional issues in a peaceful and negotiable
manner.59
Ties with Turkey
The ties between Turkey and Egypt were not friendly during Nassers
era. At that time, Egypt followed anti-West, anti-Israel and pro-Arab
policies and Turkey was perceived by the Arab world as an agent of the
West due to its membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO). Even a radical change in Egyptian foreign policy under Sadat
could not bridge the gap. The reason was Cairos desire to maintain its
domination in Middle Eastern affairs and it was cautious about Turkish
efforts to influence regional politics. However, Turkey entered the realm
of Middle Eastern affairs after the Gulf War in 1990-1991. Hitherto,
Mubarak had been suspicious of Turkeys growing ties with Israel and
his opposition party, the Muslim Brotherhood. 60
A new chapter in the relationship between these two countries
opened when the Justice and Development Party assumed power in
Turkey. It introduced new Turkeys Middle East policy, the Strategic
59
60
Ibid. See also Egypt regains its role in region, The National, 20 August 2012,
http://www.thenational.ae/thenationalconversation/comment/egypt-regains-itsrole-in-region#page2.
Justyna Gogowska, Future Perspectives of Turkey-Egypt Relations, Wise
Men Center for Strategic Studies, 10 November 2011,
http://www.bilgesam.org/en/index.php?
option=com_content&view=article&id=430:future-perspectives-of-turkey-egyptrelations&catid=77:ortadogu-analizler&Itemid=147. Paul Salem, Turkey-Egypt
Relations, World Politics Review, Carnegie Middle East Center, 5 August 2010,
http://carnegie-mec.org/publications/?fa=41360
Depth Doctrine. As a result, the following significant developments took

place: a free trade agreement was signed in 2005, which raised trade
exchanges between the countries three-fold; Mubarak visited Turkey in
2007 and a memorandum for Framework for Turkish-Egyptian Strategic
Dialogue was signed in 2007. Moreover, the downfall of Saddams
government in Iraq, that boosted Irans role in the region, also prompted
Egypt and other Arab states to approach Turkey to counterbalance
Tehrans growing influence in the region. 61
During the Egyptian uprising in 2011, Turkey openly criticized
Mubaraks government. The Turkish president and prime minister
visited Egypt after the resignation of Mubarak. Their visits were noticed
by the western world as they were representing a country whose
population was predominantly Muslim. Moreover, their tough stance
towards Israel during these visits reflected their support for the Islamist
forces, particularly the Muslim Brotherhood. Turkey had changed its
policy towards Israel after the Gaza war of December 2008 and the
Flotilla incident of June 2010. Its ties with Mubarak became strained due
to his passive response to the Flotilla incident.62
Now, Egypt under the Muslim Brotherhood, and Turkey under the
Islamist Justice and Development Party, are emerging with the same
vision. Both countries are strongly in favour of the settlement of the ArabIsrael issue, seeking a non-nuclear Iran and demanding that the Syrian
government step down. It may be assessed that the Syrian crisis
prompted Turkey to approach Egypt to maintain its influence in the
Middle East. Both states intend to improve economic ties with the Arab
world and seek benefits from the significant economic developments in
Iraq. They also seek good ties with the West.63
Keeping in view the emerging and significant role of Turkey in the
international arena, Morsis decision to strengthen ties with Turkey
represents his visionary and far-sighted approach. He succeeded in
61
62
63
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
58
PAKISTAN HORIZON
getting a Turkish aid package of two billion dollars as support for Egypts
ailing economy.64
This rapprochement could result in a significant geopolitical shift in
the Middle East, as both states are seeking to lift visa restrictions after
completing joint naval exercises in the Mediterranean Sea. Their military
ties can be viewed as a threat by Israel and the West, because Egypt is
purchasing newly developed arms from Turkey. It may boost defence
cooperation between the countries in future and may lead to the
establishment of a joint military alliance. 65 Though the Islamist
connection between the Turkish and Egyptian governments also offers
prospects for the emergence of a new Sunni Islamic bloc in the region, the
goal seems distant and difficult to realize due to Islams secular tone in
Turkey and conservative tone in Egypt.66
Nevertheless, the new government of Egypt needs to evaluate and
analyze its ties with Turkey and Iran. Although neither Turkey nor Iran
is an Arab country, both have shown a strong desire to claim regional
leadership. Turkey has been the leading supporter of the Arab uprisings
and secular democracies and is very popular in the region. While Iran is
attempting to take advantage of the change in the region and assert its
own influence, calling the uprisings an Islamic awakening. 67 Indeed,
Turkey and Iran have the capability to assert their influence in the
region, because Turkey and Iran (despite the sanctions) have much larger
economies than Egypt. Both possess militaries of a comparable size to
Egypts. There has been a significant decline in Egyptian military
capabilities since Mubaraks era. In contrast, Turkey has modern and
64
65
66
67
http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/after-erdogan-meeting-morsydemands-end-israeli-aggression
Future Perspectives of Turkey-Egypt Relations, op.cit.
Tim Arango, Turkey and Egypt Seek Alliance Amid Regions Upheaval, The
New York Times, 18 October 2012,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/19/world/middleeast/turkey-and-egypt-look-toteam-up-amid-tumult.html?_r=0
Sungtae Jacky Park, A Reality Check on Egypts Regional Aspirations,
International Affairs Review, 29 October 2012, http://www.iar-gwu.org/node/443
experienced forces, and Iran possesses a technologically inferior but

ideologically driven military.68
Ties with China
Egypt was the first Arab and African state that recognized the Peoples
Republic of China in 1956. It has been a vocal supporter of the one China
principle with respect for the status of Taiwan and Tibet. During the eras
of Sadat and Mubarak, Egypt could not pursue a more effective policy to
strengthen the bonds of friendship due to US influence. Now, Morsi needs
to revive historic bonds with China. His visit to China, instead of the US,
marked Egypts intention to revive and preserve decades old ties with
China.69
Economically, Egypt provides China, with a huge lucrative consumer
market with nearly 85 million population. In 2011, Chinese exports to
Egypt reached 7.28 billion dollars, leaving behind US exports that stood
at 6.18 billion dollars. On the other hand, China can use the Suez Canal
to sail warships in the Mediterranean and Black Sea. It can hold huge
investments there which can be a challenge for the US in the future
China may emerge as a strong ally of Egypt and supply it with advanced
weapons. From 1989 to 2008, Egypt was the biggest market in Africa for
Chinese weapons.70 Enhancing ties with China has also helped to boost
Egypts diplomatic position to negotiate with the US, the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) and other forums. However, following Morsis visit
to China, the Obama administration intensified efforts to relieve Egypt of
its debt crisis and threw its weight behind a 4.8 billion dollar loan from
the IMF.71
New directions in diplomatic relations between China and Egypt can
bring a vibrant change in international politics in the future. Their
68
69
70
71
Ibid.
Chris Zambelis, Egypt gains balance and leverage in China, Asia Times, 26
September 2012, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/NI26Ad02.html. See also
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs//2012/ga11317.doc.htm
http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/middleeast/egypt/120905/china-egypt-us-economy-aid-debt-morsi
Ibid.
60
PAKISTAN HORIZON
support for an independent Palestinian state may change the dynamics of

Middle East politics. Their votes in favour of Palestinian membership in
the UN was evidence of their unanimous policy approach towards a
significant international issue, despite US opposition. 72
Ties with the Europe Union
Egypts unique geographical location and influential role in the Middle
East have brought European states close to Egypt. Their partnership
further strengthened and developed in the framework of EuroMediterranean Partnership (EMP) established in 1995 and then EUEgypt Association Agreement was signed in 2001, which entered into
force in 2004.73
At present, economic well-being is on top of the agenda for Morsis
government. An effective foreign policy cannot be pursued without
domestic peace, which links directly to economic stability. Therefore, the
Egyptian government has focused on reviving its ties with partners with
whom its economic interests are associated. The EU has approved a five
billion euros (6.4 billion dollars) financial support package for the present
government. The IMF has also agreed to pay 4.8 billion dollars as loan on
the condition of domestic reforms and peace. These achievements connote
Egypts foreign policy successes so far.74
Ties with African states

72
73
74
Egypt gains balance and leverage in China, op.cit.

http://eeas.europa.eu/egypt/index_en.htm. See also
http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/action_plans/egypt_enp_ap_final_en.pdf
EU 'approves $6.4bn Egypt financial aid package, 14 November 2012,
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-20322407.
See
also
Claire
Rosemberg, Fruitful visit: EU offers Egypt's Morsi 1.0 bn euros aid, Middle
East Online, 13 September 2012, http://www.middle-east-online.com /english/?
id=54361. Egypt's IMF loan deal postponed after Mohamed Morsi scraps tax
increases, 11 December 2012, www.guardian.co.uk
In 1979, Sadat stated that, the only matter that could take Egypt to war
again is water.75 After 30 years, his warning seems to be coming true. In
the African region, the Nile waters issue has emerged as the most
provocative issue. It is a pressing need for the present government to seek
an immediate solution, as Egypts economy cannot survive without the
waters of the Nile.
During the British colonial era, Egypt and Sudan were granted the
bulk of the Niles flow. At that time, Egypt and Sudan were a single
state.76 In May 1929, the Nile Waters Agreement 77 was signed between
Egypt and Britain, under which Egypt was granted veto rights over any
upper river Nile development projects, such as irrigation. The reason was
that the Nile was the only source of water for Egypt, while the Nile basin
countries, including Ethiopia, Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania, had
seasonal rains and other water sources.78
Now, African upstream countries, particularly Ethiopia, from where
the river originates79, are demanding that the treaty be rewritten to
allow them to use the river water in equal shares. In 2010, the Nile
Basin states formed a Cooperative Framework Agreement to seek more
water from the Nile, abrogating the treaty. Ethiopia also decided to build
the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, Africas largest hydroelectricity
project over the river, which is expected to cost 4.8 billion dollars and
could reduce the rivers flow to Egypt by 25 per cent. According to Egypt,
the project may cause a humanitarian catastrophe. 80
75
76
77
78
79
80
Jeffrey Fleishman, The Nile, Egypt's lifeline in the desert, comes under threat,
Los Angeles Times, 11 November 2012.
Sydney N. Fisher, op.cit., pp.700-701.
Patrick Loch Otieno Lumumba, The Interpretation of the 1929 Treaty and its
Legal Relevance and Implications for the Stability of the Region, African
Sociological Review 11 January 2007, pp.12-13.
Nabil Fahmy, Egypt in the World, The Cairo Review of Global Affairs,
http://www.aucegypt.edu/gapp/cairoreview/pages/articleDetails.aspx?aid=222
Bradley Hope, Morsi visits Ethiopia to seek unity in Nile nations over water,
The National, 16 July 2012, http://www.thenational.ae/news/world/morsi-visitsethiopia-to-seek-unity-in-nile-nations-over-water
Ibid.
62
PAKISTAN HORIZON
In the past, Mubarak could not take comprehensive measures to

resolve the issue. In fact, he did not visit Ethiopia after the assassination
attempt in 1995, in which he narrowly escaped. However, he had been
warned that the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam would cause
political, economic and social instability in Egypt. 81 If the issue is not
amicably resolved it would cause economic death for Egypt, as the Nile
provides 95 per cent water to its farmlands.
The issue has become the most pressing foreign policy test for Egypts
new government. Describing the situation, an expert from Al Ahram
Center for Political and Strategic Studies in Cairo warned that, if the
dam is completed this will mean Ethiopia will turn into an enemy for
Egypt because it will essentially threaten the country's safety,
development and livelihood of its people.82
The Egyptian government should formulate a comprehensive policy on
different African issues to raise Egypts political status to that of a
regional leader. During the 1950s and 1960s, Nasser assigned great
importance to African affairs and supported its political causes, such as
decolonization and the anti-apartheid movement. 83 As part of its
military role in regional stability, Egypt has participated in a large
number of UN peacekeeping operations in Africa. 84
Egypt had played a noteworthy role to get the African states rid of
their debt crisis. It played a vital role to persuade Germany in 2000 to
cancel all its commercial debts and France to write off 90 per cent of its
loans.85 Analyzing Egypts role in the African continent shows that it has
great potential to lead the region.
81
82
83
84
85
Ibid.
The Nile, Egypt's lifeline in the desert, comes under threat, op.cit.
Derek Hopwood, op.cit., pp.59-60,63-64. See also Sydney Nettleton Fisher,
op.cit., p. 724. See also http://www.socialismtoday.org/147/nasser.html
Mohamed Kadry Said, Egypt's Foreign Policy in Global Change: The Egyptian
Role in Regional and International Politics, 5 December 2006,
http://acpss.ahram.org.eg/eng/ahram/2004/7/5/STUD21.HTM. See also Sydney
Nettleton Fisher, op.cit., p. 724.
Ibid.
At present, Morsis remarks during the UN General Assembly session

also reflected that Egypt intends to play a leading role in the continent,
as he emphasized, . ... It's no longer acceptable, to continue the historic
injustice done to Africa, with no representation in the permanent
membership category in the Security Council, and only weak
representation in the nonpermanent membership category, even though
many of the issues on the agenda of the Council concern the states of the
African continent. 86
In order to bridge the economic gap among African states, Morsi has
urged them to form a stronger African market. However, Egypt itself is
the largest market in the continent. African states need to realize that
their economic development is directly related to Egypts economic
stability.87 Apart from that, his government should contact regional and
international actors/donors to persuade them to stop financing and
providing assistance for the construction of the dam in Ethopia and
disseminate the adverse impact of that dam on the Egyptian economy. 88
Conclusion
Morsis predecessors adjusted their foreign policy goals to changing
circumstances and adopted diverse methods to achieve them. Nasser
adopted an anti-West, anti-Israel and pro-Soviet policy. He succeeded in
maintaining ties with the Arab world. While Sadat, sensing the
weakening position of the Soviet Union, compromised with the West and
pursued friendly relations with Israel. Consequently, the Arab world cut
off ties with Egypt. Mubarak followed the same pro-West policy, but he
succeeded in restoring ties with the Arab world. He failed to control
corruption at home. This led to the economic downfall of Egypt which
resulted in the uprising in the Arab Spring.
Morsis revival of ties with China, Turkey, the EU and Saudi Arabia
instead of the US, which is the largest aid donor to Egypt, has made the
86
87
88
Egypt Leader's Speech, The New York Times, 31 August 2012.

Egypt's Foreign Policy in Global Change: The Egyptian Role in Regional and
International Politics, op.cit.
Morsi visits Ethiopia to seek unity in Nile nations over water, op.cit.
64
PAKISTAN HORIZON
US uncomfortable. However, this changing discourse made the US flexible

in its decision to continue its annual grant to Egypt, which it had
withheld after eruption of anti-US sentiments in Egypt over a
blasphemous video.
Egypts role in attempting to resolve the Hamas-Israeli conflict shows
that it has no intention to compromise its relations with Israel. The
militants attack on Sinai underscores the need to seek an amendment in
the military aspect of the peace treaty with Israel. The opening of the
Rafah border crossing for Hamas and Qatars Emir to visit Palestine
illustrates that the Egyptian government will pursue a soft policy
towards its Islamist offshoot, Hamas, and can win the hearts of the Arab
world.
Setting aside US criticism, Morsis visit to Tehran demonstrates
Egypts robust, fearless and bold foreign policy. For resolving the crisis,
Morsis aforementioned proposal of forming a group of four regional
countries, including Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Egypt, exhibits that
Egypt encourages regionalism and discourages non-interference of extraregional forces. The present governments attention towards the African
continent demonstrates its seriousness to resolve the water problem,
which its predecessor had overlooked for decades.

Egypts Foreign Policy

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Egypts Foreign Policy

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EGYPTS FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS