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IAC
Criselda Cheesman without the knowledge of her husband
whom she had been separated sold to Padilla a property
which Criselda alleged to have bought from her own funds
during their marriage. Hence, the tax declarations for the
property were issued in her name only and she assumed
exclusive management and administration of said property.
Thirty days after the sale, Thomas brought against his wife
and Padilla, praying for the annulment of the sale on the
ground that the transaction had been executed without his
knowledge and consent. An answer was filed in the names of
both defendants, alleging that (1) the property said was
paraphernal, having been purchased by Criselda with funds
exclusively belonging to her ("her own separate money"); (2)
Thomas Cheesman, being an American, was disqualified to
have any interest or right of ownership in the land; and (3)
Estelita Padilla was a buyer in good faith. The parties
ultimately agreed on the rendition by the court of a summary
judgment declaring "the sale executed by . . . Criselda
Cheesman in favor of . . . Estelita Padilla to be valid,"
dismissing Thomas Cheesman's complaint and ordering him
"to immediately turn over the possession of the house and lot
subject of . . . (the) case to . . . Estelita Padilla . . . Thomas
Cheesman appealed to the Intermediate Appellate Court
assailing among others the declaration of the court that the
sale to Estelita Padilla was valid despite the lack of consent
thereto by him, and the presumption of the conjugal
character of the property in question pursuant to Article 160
of the Civil Code. His contention was found to be without
merit by the Appellate Tribunal and affirmed the summary
judgment. Once more, Thomas Cheesman availed of the
remedy of appeal, this time to this Court. Here, he argues
that it was reversible error for the Intermediate Appellate
Court 1)to find that the presumption that the property in
question is conjugal in accordance with Article 160 had been
Held:
Both the Trial court and the appellate court reached the same
conclusions: that (1) fraud, mistake or excusable negligence
existed in the premises justifying relief to Estelita Padilla
under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court, or (2) that Criselda
Cheesman had used money she had brought into her
marriage to Thomas Cheesman to purchase the lot and house
in question, or (3) that Estelita Padilla believed in good faith
that Criselda Cheesman was the exclusive owner of the
property that she (Estelita) intended to and did in fact buy
all of which are conclusions or findings of fact and these
determinations of fact will not be disturbed. Question of facts
as distinguished from a question of law which exists "when
the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a
certain state of facts" "there is a question of fact when the
doubt or difference arises as to the truth or the falsehood of
alleged facts;" Now, it is axiomatic that only questions of law,
distinctly set forth, may be raised in a petition for the review
on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals presented
to this Court. As everyone knows or ought to know, the
appellate jurisdiction of this Court is limited to reviewing
errors of law, accepting as conclusive the factual findings of
the lower court upon its own assessment of the evidence.
The creation of the Court of Appeals was precisely intended
to take away from the Supreme Court the work of examining
the evidence, and confine its task to the determination of
questions which do not call for the reading and study of
transcripts containing the testimony of witnesses. The rule
of conclusiveness of the factual findings or conclusions of the
Bugarin v Palisoc
The court in this ejectment case declared respondents as the
rightful possessors of the properties in dispute and ordered
the petitioners to vacate the premises and pay to private
respondents the rentals. Petitioners appealed to the RTC
while private respondents moved for execution pending
appeal. RTC affirmed the MeTC decision so petitioners filed a
Motion for Reconsideration with Opposition to the Issuance of
a Writ of Execution which was denied and granted instead
private respondents' motion for execution for failure of
petitioners to post a supersedeas bond. Petitioners then filed
a Motion to Defer Implementation of the Writ of Execution
while private respondents filed a Motion to Issue a Special
Order of Demolition since petitioners refused to vacate the
premises. The RTC declared the decision denying petitioners'
appeal final and executory, and remanded the records of the
case to the MeTC without acting on the motions. Petitioners
filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition. The court
granted the motion for Special order of demolition. Petitioner
filed a motion to quash but was denied. Hence, this petition
where petitioners raise the lone error that
Issue: Are the Orders of the MeTC proper?
Held: Under Section 19, 10 Rule 70 of the Revised Rules on
Civil Procedure, a judgment on a forcible entry and detainer
action is immediately executory to avoid further injustice to a
lawful possessor, and the court's duty to order the execution
Habaluyas v Japson
Respondents have filed a motion for reconsideration of the
Decision of the Second Division of the Court promulgated on
August 5, 1985 which granted the petition for certiorari and
prohibition and set aside the order of respondent Judge
granting private respondents' motion for new trial.
ISSUE
Whether the fifteen-day period within which a party may file
a motion for reconsideration of a final order or ruling of the
Regional Trial Court may be extended.
1.) Beginning one month after the promulgation of this
Resolution, the rule shall be strictly enforced that no motion
for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or
reconsideration may be filed with the Metropolitan or
Municipal Trial Courts, the Regional Trial Courts, and the
Intermediate Appellate Court. Such a motion may be filed
only in cases pending with the Supreme Court as the court of
last resort, which may in its sound discretion either grant or
deny the extension requested.
NYK v NLRC
Private respondent Publico was sewer of petitioner
corporation. On May 7, 1997, Publico went home early
despite refusal of petitioner because she was not feeling well.
The next day, she notified petitioner that she was still
recovering from her sickness. On May 9, 1997, however,
Publico was refused entry for work and later informed of her
dismissal. The Labor Arbiter and the NLRC both ruled the
dismissal illegal. A special civil action for certiorari was then