Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 84811 August 29, 1989
SOLID HOMES, INC., petitioner,
vs.
TERESITA PAYAWAL and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

CRUZ, J.:
We are asked to reverse a decision of the Court of Appeals sustaining the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City over a complaint filed by a buyer, the herein private respondent, against the petitioner, for delivery of
title to a subdivision lot. The position of the petitioner, the defendant in that action, is that the decision of the trial
court is null and void ab initio because the case should have been heard and decided by what is now called the
Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board.
The complaint was filed on August 31, 1982, by Teresita Payawal against Solid Homes, Inc. before the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City and docketed as Civil Case No. Q-36119. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant contracted
to sell to her a subdivision lot in Marikina on June 9, 1975, for the agreed price of P 28,080.00, and that by
September 10, 1981, she had already paid the defendant the total amount of P 38,949.87 in monthly installments
and interests. Solid Homes subsequently executed a deed of sale over the land but failed to deliver the
corresponding certificate of title despite her repeated demands because, as it appeared later, the defendant had
mortgaged the property in bad faith to a financing company. The plaintiff asked for delivery of the title to the lot
or, alternatively, the return of all the amounts paid by her plus interest. She also claimed moral and exemplary
damages, attorney's fees and the costs of the suit.
Solid Homes moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the court had no jurisdiction, this being vested in
the National Housing Authority under PD No. 957. The motion was denied. The defendant repleaded the objection
in its answer, citing Section 3 of the said decree providing that "the National Housing Authority shall have exclusive
jurisdiction to regulate the real estate trade and business in accordance with the provisions of this Decree." After
trial, judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff and the defendant was ordered to deliver to her the title to
the land or, failing this, to refund to her the sum of P 38,949.87 plus interest from 1975 and until the full amount
was paid. She was also awarded P 5,000.00 moral damages, P 5,000.00 exemplary damages, P 10,000.00 attorney's
1
fees, and the costs of the suit.
2

Solid Homes appealed but the decision was affirmed by the respondent court, which also berated the appellant
for its obvious efforts to evade a legitimate obligation, including its dilatory tactics during the trial. The petitioner
was also reproved for its "gall" in collecting the further amount of P 1,238.47 from the plaintiff purportedly for
realty taxes and registration expenses despite its inability to deliver the title to the land.
In holding that the trial court had jurisdiction, the respondent court referred to Section 41 of PD No. 957 itself
providing that:
SEC. 41. Other remedies.-The rights and remedies provided in this Decree shall be in addition to
any and all other rights and remedies that may be available under existing laws.

and declared that "its clear and unambiguous tenor undermine(d) the (petitioner's) pretension that the court a
quo was bereft of jurisdiction." The decision also dismissed the contrary opinion of the Secretary of Justice as
impinging on the authority of the courts of justice. While we are disturbed by the findings of fact of the trial court
and the respondent court on the dubious conduct of the petitioner, we nevertheless must sustain it on the
jurisdictional issue.
The applicable law is PD No. 957, as amended by PD No. 1344, entitled "Empowering the National Housing
Authority to Issue Writs of Execution in the Enforcement of Its Decisions Under Presidential Decree No. 957."
Section 1 of the latter decree provides as follows:
SECTION 1. In the exercise of its function to regulate the real estate trade and business and in
addition to its powers provided for in Presidential Decree No. 957, the National Housing
Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of the following nature:
A. Unsound real estate business practices;
B. Claims involving refund and any other claims filed by subdivision lot or condominium unit
buyer against the project owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman; and
C. Cases involving specific performance of contractuala statutory obligations filed by buyers of
subdivision lot or condominium unit against the owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman.
(Emphasis supplied.)
The language of this section, especially the italicized portions, leaves no room for doubt that "exclusive
jurisdiction" over the case between the petitioner and the private respondent is vested not in the Regional Trial
3
Court but in the National Housing Authority.
The private respondent contends that the applicable law is BP No. 129, which confers on regional trial courts
jurisdiction to hear and decide cases mentioned in its Section 19, reading in part as follows:
SEC. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases.-Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction:
(1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation;
(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest
therein, except actions for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original
jurisdiction over which is conferred upon Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts;
xxx xxx xxx

(8) In all other cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest and cost or the value of the
property in controversy, amounts to more than twenty thousand pesos (P 20,000.00).
It stresses, additionally, that BP No. 129 should control as the later enactment, having been promulgated in 1981,
after PD No. 957 was issued in 1975 and PD No. 1344 in 1978.

This construction must yield to the familiar canon that in case of conflict between a general law and a special law,
the latter must prevail regardless of the dates of their enactment. Thus, it has been held thatThe fact that one law is special and the other general creates a presumption that the special act
is to be considered as remaining an exception of the general act, one as a general law of the land
4
and the other as the law of the particular case.
xxx xxx xxx
The circumstance that the special law is passed before or after the general act does not change
the principle. Where the special law is later, it will be regarded as an exception to, or a
qualification of, the prior general act; and where the general act is later, the special statute will
be construed as remaining an exception to its terms, unless repealed expressly or by necessary
5
implication.
It is obvious that the general law in this case is BP No. 129 and PD No. 1344 the special law.
The argument that the trial court could also assume jurisdiction because of Section 41 of PD No. 957, earlier
quoted, is also unacceptable. We do not read that provision as vesting concurrent jurisdiction on the Regional Trial
Court and the Board over the complaint mentioned in PD No. 1344 if only because grants of power are not to be
lightly inferred or merely implied. The only purpose of this section, as we see it, is to reserve. to the aggrieved
party such other remedies as may be provided by existing law, like a prosecution for the act complained of under
6
the Revised Penal Code.
On the competence of the Board to award damages, we find that this is part of the exclusive power conferred
upon it by PD No. 1344 to hear and decide "claims involving refund and any other claims filed by subdivision lot or
condominium unit buyers against the project owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman." It was therefore
erroneous for the respondent to brush aside the well-taken opinion of the Secretary of Justice thatSuch claim for damages which the subdivision/condominium buyer may have against the owner,
developer, dealer or salesman, being a necessary consequence of an adjudication of liability for
non-performance of contractual or statutory obligation, may be deemed necessarily included in
the phrase "claims involving refund and any other claims" used in the aforequoted subparagraph
C of Section 1 of PD No. 1344. The phrase "any other claims" is, we believe, sufficiently broad to
include any and all claims which are incidental to or a necessary consequence of the claims/cases
specifically included in the grant of jurisdiction to the National Housing Authority under the
subject provisions.
The same may be said with respect to claims for attorney's fees which are recoverable either by
agreement of the parties or pursuant to Art. 2208 of the Civil Code (1) when exemplary damages
are awarded and (2) where the defendant acted in gross and evident bad faith in refusing to
satisfy the plaintiff 's plainly valid, just and demandable claim.
xxx xxx xxx
Besides, a strict construction of the subject provisions of PD No. 1344 which would deny the HSRC
the authority to adjudicate claims for damages and for damages and for attorney's fees would
result in multiplicity of suits in that the subdivision condominium buyer who wins a case in the
HSRC and who is thereby deemed entitled to claim damages and attorney's fees would be forced
to litigate in the regular courts for the purpose, a situation which is obviously not in the
7
contemplation of the law. (Emphasis supplied.)

As a result of the growing complexity of the modern society, it has become necessary to create more and more
administrative bodies to help in the regulation of its ramified activities. Specialized in the particular fields assigned
to them, they can deal with the problems thereof with more expertise and dispatch than can be expected from the
legislature or the courts of justice. This is the reason for the increasing vesture of quasi-legislative and quasijudicial powers in what is now not unreasonably called the fourth department of the government.
Statutes conferring powers on their administrative agencies must be liberally construed to enable them to
8
discharge their assigned duties in accordance with the legislative purpose. Following this policy in Antipolo Realty
9
Corporation v. National Housing Authority, the Court sustained the competence of the respondent administrative
body, in the exercise of the exclusive jurisdiction vested in it by PD No. 957 and PD No. 1344, to determine the
rights of the parties under a contract to sell a subdivision lot.
It remains to state that, contrary to the contention of the petitioner, the case of Tropical Homes v. National
10
Housing Authority is not in point. We upheld in that case the constitutionality of the procedure for appeal
provided for in PD No. 1344, but we did not rule there that the National Housing Authority and not the Regional
Trial Court had exclusive jurisdiction over the cases enumerated in Section I of the said decree. That is what we are
doing now.
It is settled that any decision rendered without jurisdiction is a total nullity and may be struck down at any time,
11
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even on appeal before this Court. The only exception is where the party raising the issue is barred by estoppel,
which does not appear in the case before us. On the contrary, the issue was raised as early as in the motion to
dismiss filed in the trial court by the petitioner, which continued to plead it in its answer and, later, on appeal to
the respondent court. We have no choice, therefore, notwithstanding the delay this decision will entail, to nullify
the proceedings in the trial court for lack of jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, the challenged decision of the respondent court is REVERSED and the decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-36119 is SET ASIDE, without prejudice to the filing of the appropriate
complaint before the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Gancayco, Gri;o-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 110120 March 16, 1994
LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. MANUEL JN. SERAPIO, Presiding Judge RTC, Branch 127, Caloocan City, HON.
MACARIO A. ASISTIO, JR., City Mayor of Caloocan and/or THE CITY GOVERNMENT OF CALOOCAN, respondents.
Alberto N. Hidalgo and Ma. Teresa T. Oledan for petitioner.
The City Legal Officer & Chief, Law Department for Mayor Macario A. Asistio, Jr. and the City Government of
Caloocan.

ROMERO, J.:
The clash between the responsibility of the City Government of Caloocan to dispose off the 350 tons of garbage it
collects daily and the growing concern and sensitivity to a pollution-free environment of the residents of Barangay

Camarin, Tala Estate, Caloocan City where these tons of garbage are dumped everyday is the hub of this
controversy elevated by the protagonists to the Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) for adjudication.
The instant case stemmed from an earlier petition filed with this Court by Laguna Lake Development Authority
(LLDA for short) docketed as G.R.
No. 107542 against the City Government of Caloocan, et al. In the Resolution of November 10, 1992, this Court
referred G.R. No. 107542 to the Court of Appeals for appropriate disposition. Docketed therein as CA-G.R. SP
1
No. 29449, the Court of Appeals, in a decision promulgated on January 29, 1993 ruled that the LLDA has no power
and authority to issue a cease and desist order enjoining the dumping of garbage in Barangay Camarin, Tala Estate,
Caloocan City. The LLDA now seeks, in this petition, a review of the decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts, as disclosed in the records, are undisputed.
On March 8, 1991, the Task Force Camarin Dumpsite of Our Lady of Lourdes Parish, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan
2
City, filed a letter-complaint with the Laguna Lake Development Authority seeking to stop the operation of the
8.6-hectare open garbage dumpsite in Tala Estate, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City due to its harmful effects on
the health of the residents and the possibility of pollution of the water content of the surrounding area.
On November 15, 1991, the LLDA conducted an on-site investigation, monitoring and test sampling of the leachate
3
that seeps from said dumpsite to the nearby creek which is a tributary of the Marilao River. The LLDA Legal and
Technical personnel found that the City Government of Caloocan was maintaining an open dumpsite at the
Camarin area without first securing an Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) from the Environmental
Management Bureau (EMB) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, as required under
4
5
Presidential Decree No. 1586, and clearance from LLDA as required under Republic Act No. 4850, as amended by
6
Presidential Decree No. 813 and Executive Order No. 927, series of 1983.
After a public hearing conducted on December 4, 1991, the LLDA, acting on the complaint of Task Force Camarin
Dumpsite, found that the water collected from the leachate and the receiving streams could considerably affect
the quality, in turn, of the receiving waters since it indicates the presence of bacteria, other than coliform, which
7
may have contaminated the sample during collection or handling. On December 5, 1991, the LLDA issued a Cease
8
and Desist Order ordering the City Government of Caloocan, Metropolitan Manila Authority, their contractors,
and other entities, to completely halt, stop and desist from dumping any form or kind of garbage and other waste
matter at the Camarin dumpsite.
The dumping operation was forthwith stopped by the City Government of Caloocan. However, sometime in August
1992 the dumping operation was resumed after a meeting held in July 1992 among the City Government of
Caloocan, the representatives of Task Force Camarin Dumpsite and LLDA at the Office of Environmental
Management Bureau Director Rodrigo U. Fuentes failed to settle the problem.
After an investigation by its team of legal and technical personnel on August 14, 1992, the LLDA issued another
order reiterating the December 5, 1991, order and issued an Alias Cease and Desist Order enjoining the City
Government of Caloocan from continuing its dumping operations at the Camarin area.
On September 25, 1992, the LLDA, with the assistance of the Philippine National Police, enforced its Alias Cease
and Desist Order by prohibiting the entry of all garbage dump trucks into the Tala Estate, Camarin area being
utilized as a dumpsite.
Pending resolution of its motion for reconsideration earlier filed on September 17, 1992 with the LLDA, the City
Government of Caloocan filed with the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City an action for the declaration of nullity
of the cease and desist order with prayer for the issuance of writ of injunction, docketed as Civil Case No. C-15598.
In its complaint, the City Government of Caloocan sought to be declared as the sole authority empowered to

promote the health and safety and enhance the right of the people in Caloocan City to a balanced ecology within
9
its territorial jurisdiction.
On September 25, 1992, the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City issued a temporary
restraining order enjoining the LLDA from enforcing its cease and desist order. Subsequently, the case was raffled
to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 126 of Caloocan which, at the time, was presided over by Judge Manuel Jn.
Serapio of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 127, the pairing judge of the recently-retired presiding judge.
The LLDA, for its part, filed on October 2, 1992 a motion to dismiss on the ground, among others, that under
Republic Act No. 3931, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 984, otherwise known as the Pollution Control Law,
the cease and desist order issued by it which is the subject matter of the complaint is reviewable both upon the
10
law and the facts of the case by the Court of Appeals and not by the Regional Trial Court.
On October 12, 1992 Judge Manuel Jn. Serapio issued an order consolidating Civil Case No. C-15598 with Civil Case
No. C-15580, an earlier case filed by the Task Force Camarin Dumpsite entitled "Fr. John Moran, et al. vs. Hon.
Macario Asistio." The LLDA, however, maintained during the trial that the foregoing cases, being independent of
each other, should have been treated separately.
On October 16, 1992, Judge Manuel Jn. Serapio, after hearing the motion to dismiss, issued in the consolidated
11
cases an order denying LLDA's motion to dismiss and granting the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
enjoining the LLDA, its agent and all persons acting for and on its behalf, from enforcing or implementing its cease
and desist order which prevents plaintiff City of Caloocan from dumping garbage at the Camarin dumpsite during
the pendency of this case and/or until further orders of the court.
On November 5, 1992, the LLDA filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction with prayer for restraining
order with the Supreme Court, docketed as G.R. No. 107542, seeking to nullify the aforesaid order dated October
16, 1992 issued by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 127 of Caloocan City denying its motion to dismiss.
12

The Court, acting on the petition, issued a Resolution on November 10, 1992 referring the case to the Court of
Appeals for proper disposition and at the same time, without giving due course to the petition, required the
respondents to comment on the petition and file the same with the Court of Appeals within ten (10) days from
notice. In the meantime, the Court issued a temporary restraining order, effective immediately and continuing
until further orders from it, ordering the respondents: (1) Judge Manuel Jn. Serapio, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial
Court, Branch 127, Caloocan City to cease and desist from exercising jurisdiction over the case for declaration of
nullity of the cease and desist order issued by the Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA); and (2) City Mayor
of Caloocan and/or the City Government of Caloocan to cease and desist from dumping its garbage at the Tala
Estate, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City.
Respondents City Government of Caloocan and Mayor Macario A. Asistio, Jr. filed on November 12, 1992 a motion
for reconsideration and/or to quash/recall the temporary restraining order and an urgent motion for
reconsideration alleging that ". . . in view of the calamitous situation that would arise if the respondent city
government fails to collect 350 tons of garbage daily for lack of dumpsite (i)t is therefore, imperative that the issue
be resolved with dispatch or with sufficient leeway to allow the respondents to find alternative solutions to this
garbage problem."
13

On November 17, 1992, the Court issued a Resolution directing the Court of Appeals to immediately set the case
for hearing for the purpose of determining whether or not the temporary restraining order issued by the Court
should be lifted and what conditions, if any, may be required if it is to be so lifted or whether the restraining order
should be maintained or converted into a preliminary injunction.

The Court of Appeals set the case for hearing on November 27, 1992, at 10:00 in the morning at the Hearing Room,
14
3rd Floor, New Building, Court of Appeals. After the oral argument, a conference was set on December 8, 1992 at
10:00 o'clock in the morning where the Mayor of Caloocan City, the General Manager of LLDA, the Secretary of
DENR or his duly authorized representative and the Secretary of DILG or his duly authorized representative were
required to appear.
It was agreed at the conference that the LLDA had until December 15, 1992 to finish its study and review of
respondent's technical plan with respect to the dumping of its garbage and in the event of a rejection of
respondent's technical plan or a failure of settlement, the parties will submit within 10 days from notice their
respective memoranda on the merits of the case, after which the petition shall be deemed submitted for
15
resolution. Notwithstanding such efforts, the parties failed to settle the dispute.
On April 30, 1993, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision holding that: (1) the Regional Trial Court has no
jurisdiction on appeal to try, hear and decide the action for annulment of LLDA's cease and desist order, including
the issuance of a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction in relation thereto, since appeal
therefrom is within the exclusive and appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals under Section 9, par. (3), of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129; and (2) the Laguna Lake Development Authority has no power and authority to issue a
cease and desist order under its enabling law, Republic Act No. 4850, as amended by P.D. No. 813 and Executive
Order
No. 927, series of 1983.
The Court of Appeals thus dismissed Civil Case No. 15598 and the preliminary injunction issued in the said case was
set aside; the cease and desist order of LLDA was likewise set aside and the temporary restraining order enjoining
the City Mayor of Caloocan and/or the City Government of Caloocan to cease and desist from dumping its garbage
at the Tala Estate, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City was lifted, subject, however, to the condition that any future
dumping of garbage in said area, shall be in conformity with the procedure and protective works contained in the
proposal attached to the records of this case and found on pages 152-160 of the Rollo, which was thereby adopted
by reference and made an integral part of the decision, until the corresponding restraining and/or injunctive relief
is granted by the proper Court upon LLDA's institution of the necessary legal proceedings.
Hence, the Laguna Lake Development Authority filed the instant petition for review on certiorari, now docketed as
G.R. No. 110120, with prayer that the temporary restraining order lifted by the Court of Appeals be re-issued until
after final determination by this Court of the issue on the proper interpretation of the powers and authority of the
LLDA under its enabling law.
16

On July, 19, 1993, the Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the City Mayor of Caloocan and/or
the City Government of Caloocan to cease and desist from dumping its garbage at the Tala Estate, Barangay
Camarin, Caloocan City, effective as of this date and containing until otherwise ordered by the Court.
It is significant to note that while both parties in this case agree on the need to protect the environment and to
maintain the ecological balance of the surrounding areas of the Camarin open dumpsite, the question as to which
agency can lawfully exercise jurisdiction over the matter remains highly open to question.
The City Government of Caloocan claims that it is within its power, as a local government unit, pursuant to the
17
general welfare provision of the Local Government Code, to determine the effects of the operation of the
dumpsite on the ecological balance and to see that such balance is maintained. On the basis of said contention, it
questioned, from the inception of the dispute before the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, the power and
authority of the LLDA to issue a cease and desist order enjoining the dumping of garbage in the Barangay Camarin
over which the City Government of Caloocan has territorial jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeals sustained the position of the City of Caloocan on the theory that Section 7 of Presidential
Decree No. 984, otherwise known as the Pollution Control law, authorizing the defunct National Pollution Control
Commission to issue an ex-parte cease and desist order was not incorporated in Presidential Decree No. 813 nor in
Executive Order No. 927, series of
1983. The Court of Appeals ruled that under Section 4, par. (d), of Republic Act No. 4850, as amended, the LLDA is
instead required "to institute the necessary legal proceeding against any person who shall commence to
implement or continue implementation of any project, plan or program within the Laguna de Bay region without
previous clearance from the Authority."
The LLDA now assails, in this partition for review, the abovementioned ruling of the Court of Appeals, contending
that, as an administrative agency which was granted regulatory and adjudicatory powers and functions by Republic
Act No. 4850 and its amendatory laws, Presidential Decree No. 813 and Executive Order No. 927, series of 1983, it
is invested with the power and authority to issue a cease and desist order pursuant to Section 4 par. (c), (d), (e), (f)
and (g) of Executive Order No. 927 series of 1983 which provides, thus:
Sec. 4. Additional Powers and Functions. The authority shall have the following powers and
functions:
xxx xxx xxx
(c) Issue orders or decisions to compel compliance with the provisions of this Executive Order
and its implementing rules and regulations only after proper notice and hearing.
(d) Make, alter or modify orders requiring the discontinuance of pollution specifying the
conditions and the time within which such discontinuance must be accomplished.
(e) Issue, renew, or deny permits, under such conditions as it may determine to be reasonable,
for the prevention and abatement of pollution, for the discharge of sewage, industrial waste, or
for the installation or operation of sewage works and industrial disposal system or parts thereof.
(f) After due notice and hearing, the Authority may also revoke, suspend or modify any permit
issued under this Order whenever the same is necessary to prevent or abate pollution.
(g) Deputize in writing or request assistance of appropriate government agencies or
instrumentalities for the purpose of enforcing this Executive Order and its implementing rules
and regulations and the orders and decisions of the Authority.
The LLDA claims that the appellate court deliberately suppressed and totally disregarded the above provisions of
Executive Order No. 927, series of 1983, which granted administrative quasi-judicial functions to LLDA on pollution
abatement cases.
In light of the relevant environmental protection laws cited which are applicable in this case, and the
corresponding overlapping jurisdiction of government agencies implementing these laws, the resolution of the
issue of whether or not the LLDA has the authority and power to issue an order which, in its nature and effect was
injunctive, necessarily requires a determination of the threshold question: Does the Laguna Lake Development
Authority, under its Charter and its amendatory laws, have the authority to entertain the complaint against the
dumping of garbage in the open dumpsite in Barangay Camarin authorized by the City Government of Caloocan
which is allegedly endangering the health, safety, and welfare of the residents therein and the sanitation and
quality of the water in the area brought about by exposure to pollution caused by such open garbage dumpsite?

The matter of determining whether there is such pollution of the environment that requires control, if not
prohibition, of the operation of a business establishment is essentially addressed to the Environmental
Management Bureau (EMB) of the DENR which, by virtue of Section 16 of Executive Order No. 192, series of 1987,
18
has assumed the powers and functions of the defunct National Pollution Control Commission created under
Republic Act No. 3931. Under said Executive Order, a Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB) under the Office of the
DENR Secretary now assumes the powers and functions of the National Pollution Control Commission with respect
19
to adjudication of pollution cases.
As a general rule, the adjudication of pollution cases generally pertains to the Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB),
except in cases where the special law provides for another forum. It must be recognized in this regard that the
LLDA, as a specialized administrative agency, is specifically mandated under Republic Act No. 4850 and its
20
amendatory laws to carry out and make effective the declared national policy of promoting and accelerating the
development and balanced growth of the Laguna Lake area and the surrounding provinces of Rizal and Laguna and
21
the cities of San Pablo, Manila, Pasay, Quezon and Caloocan with due regard and adequate provisions for
environmental management and control, preservation of the quality of human life and ecological systems, and the
prevention of undue ecological disturbances, deterioration and pollution. Under such a broad grant and power and
authority, the LLDA, by virtue of its special charter, obviously has the responsibility to protect the inhabitants of
the Laguna Lake region from the deleterious effects of pollutants emanating from the discharge of wastes from the
surrounding areas. In carrying out the aforementioned declared policy, the LLDA is mandated, among others, to
pass upon and approve or disapprove all plans, programs, and projects proposed by local government
offices/agencies within the region, public corporations, and private persons or enterprises where such plans,
22
programs and/or projects are related to those of the LLDA for the development of the region.
In the instant case, when the complainant Task Force Camarin Dumpsite of Our Lady of Lourdes Parish, Barangay
Camarin, Caloocan City, filed its letter-complaint before the LLDA, the latter's jurisdiction under its charter was
validly invoked by complainant on the basis of its allegation that the open dumpsite project of the City
Government of Caloocan in Barangay Camarin was undertaken without a clearance from the LLDA, as required
under Section 4, par. (d), of Republic Act. No. 4850, as amended by P.D. No. 813 and Executive Order No. 927.
While there is also an allegation that the said project was without an Environmental Compliance Certificate from
the Environmental Management Bureau (EMB) of the DENR, the primary jurisdiction of the LLDA over this case was
recognized by the Environmental Management Bureau of the DENR when the latter acted as intermediary at the
meeting among the representatives of the City Government of Caloocan, Task Force Camarin Dumpsite and LLDA
sometime in July 1992 to discuss the possibility of
re-opening the open dumpsite.
Having thus resolved the threshold question, the inquiry then narrows down to the following issue: Does the LLDA
have the power and authority to issue a "cease and desist" order under Republic Act No. 4850 and its amendatory
laws, on the basis of the facts presented in this case, enjoining the dumping of garbage in Tala Estate, Barangay
Camarin, Caloocan City.
The irresistible answer is in the affirmative.
The cease and desist order issued by the LLDA requiring the City Government of Caloocan to stop dumping its
garbage in the Camarin open dumpsite found by the LLDA to have been done in violation of Republic Act No. 4850,
23
as amended, and other relevant environment laws, cannot be stamped as an unauthorized exercise by the LLDA
of injunctive powers. By its express terms, Republic Act No. 4850, as amended by P.D. No. 813 and Executive Order
No. 927, series of 1983, authorizes the LLDA to "make, alter or modify order requiring the discontinuance or
24
pollution." (Emphasis supplied) Section 4, par. (d) explicitly authorizes the LLDA to make whatever order may be
necessary in the exercise of its jurisdiction.
To be sure, the LLDA was not expressly conferred the power "to issue and ex-parte cease and desist order" in a
language, as suggested by the City Government of Caloocan, similar to the express grant to the defunct National

Pollution Control Commission under Section 7 of P.D. No. 984 which, admittedly was not reproduced in P.D. No.
813 and E.O. No. 927, series of 1983. However, it would be a mistake to draw therefrom the conclusion that there
is a denial of the power to issue the order in question when the power "to make, alter or modify orders requiring
the discontinuance of pollution" is expressly and clearly bestowed upon the LLDA by Executive Order No. 927,
series of 1983.
Assuming arguendo that the authority to issue a "cease and desist order" were not expressly conferred by law,
25
there is jurisprudence enough to the effect that the rule granting such authority need not necessarily be express.
While it is a fundamental rule that an administrative agency has only such powers as are expressly granted to it by
law, it is likewise a settled rule that an administrative agency has also such powers as are necessarily implied in the
26
exercise of its express powers. In the exercise, therefore, of its express powers under its charter as a regulatory
and quasi-judicial body with respect to pollution cases in the Laguna Lake region, the authority of the LLDA to issue
a "cease and desist order" is, perforce, implied. Otherwise, it may well be reduced to a "toothless" paper agency.
27

In this connection, it must be noted that in Pollution Adjudication Board v. Court of Appeals, et al., the Court
ruled that the Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB) has the power to issue an ex-parte cease and desist order when
there is prima facie evidence of an establishment exceeding the allowable standards set by the anti-pollution laws
of the country. The ponente, Associate Justice Florentino P. Feliciano, declared:
Ex parte cease and desist orders are permitted by law and regulations in situations like that here
presented precisely because stopping the continuous discharge of pollutive and untreated
effluents into the rivers and other inland waters of the Philippines cannot be made to wait until
protracted litigation over the ultimate correctness or propriety of such orders has run its full
course, including multiple and sequential appeals such as those which Solar has taken, which of
course may take several years. The relevant pollution control statute and implementing
regulations were enacted and promulgated in the exercise of that pervasive, sovereign power to
protect the safety, health, and general welfare and comfort of the public, as well as the
protection of plant and animal life, commonly designated as the police power. It is a
constitutional commonplace that the ordinary requirements of procedural due process yield to
the necessities of protecting vital public interests like those here involved, through the exercise
of police power. . . .
The immediate response to the demands of "the necessities of protecting vital public interests" gives vitality to the
statement on ecology embodied in the Declaration of Principles and State Policies or the 1987 Constitution. Article
II, Section 16 which provides:
The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in
accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.
As a constitutionally guaranteed right of every person, it carries the correlative duty of non-impairment. This is but
in consonance with the declared policy of the state "to protect and promote the right to health of the people and
28
instill health consciousness among them." It is to be borne in mind that the Philippines is party to the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and the Alma Conference Declaration of 1978 which recognize health as a
29
fundamental human right.
The issuance, therefore, of the cease and desist order by the LLDA, as a practical matter of procedure under the
circumstances of the case, is a proper exercise of its power and authority under its charter and its amendatory
laws. Had the cease and desist order issued by the LLDA been complied with by the City Government of Caloocan
as it did in the first instance, no further legal steps would have been necessary.

The charter of LLDA, Republic Act No. 4850, as amended, instead of conferring upon the LLDA the means of
directly enforcing such orders, has provided under its Section 4 (d) the power to institute "necessary legal
proceeding against any person who shall commence to implement or continue implementation of any project, plan
or program within the Laguna de Bay region without previous clearance from the LLDA."
Clearly, said provision was designed to invest the LLDA with sufficiently broad powers in the regulation of all
projects initiated in the Laguna Lake region, whether by the government or the private sector, insofar as the
implementation of these projects is concerned. It was meant to deal with cases which might possibly arise where
decisions or orders issued pursuant to the exercise of such broad powers may not be obeyed, resulting in the
thwarting of its laudabe objective. To meet such contingencies, then the writs of mandamus and injunction which
are beyond the power of the LLDA to issue, may be sought from the proper courts.
Insofar as the implementation of relevant anti-pollution laws in the Laguna Lake region and its surrounding
provinces, cities and towns are concerned, the Court will not dwell further on the related issues raised which are
more appropriately addressed to an administrative agency with the special knowledge and expertise of the LLDA.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The temporary restraining order issued by the Court on July 19, 1993
enjoining the City Mayor of Caloocan and/or the City Government of Caloocan from dumping their garbage at the
Tala Estate, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City is hereby made permanent.
SO ORDERED.
Feliciano, Bidin, Melo and Vitug, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 137473. August 2, 2001]
ESTELITO V. REMOLONA, petitioner, vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, respondent.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
The present petition seeks to review and set aside the Decision rendered by the Court of Appeals dated July 31,
1998i[1] upholding the decision of the Civil Service Commission which ordered the dismissal of petitioner Estelito
V. Remolona (Remolona) from the government service for dishonesty, and the Resolution dated February 5,
1999ii[2] denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
Records show that petitioner Estelito V. Remolona is the Postmaster at the Postal Office Service in Infanta,
Quezon, while his wife Nery Remolona is a teacher at the Kiborosa Elementary School.
In a letteriii[3] dated January 3, 1991, Francisco R. America, District Supervisor of the Department of Education,
Culture & Sports at Infanta, Quezon, inquired from the Civil Service Commission (CSC) as to the status of the civil
service eligibility of Mrs. Remolona who purportedly got a rating of 81.25% as per Report of Rating issued by the
National Board for Teachers.iv[4] Mr. America likewise disclosed that he received information that Mrs. Remolona
was campaigning for a fee of P8,000.00 per examinee for a passing mark in the teacher's board examinations.
On February 11, 1991, then CSC Chairman Patricia A. Sto. Tomas issued an Order directing CSC Region IV Director
Bella Amilhasan to conduct an investigation on Mrs. Remolona's eligibility, after verification from the Register of
Eligibles in the Office for Central Personnel Records revealed "that Remolona's name is not in the list of passing
and failing examinees, and that the list of examinees for December 10, 1989 does not include the name of

Remolona. Furthermore, Examination No. 061285 as indicated in her report of rating belongs to a certain Marlou
C. Madelo, who took the examination in Cagayan de Oro and got a rating of 65.00%."v[5]
During the preliminary investigation conducted by Jaime G. Pasion, Director II, Civil Service Field Office, Lucena
City, Quezon, only petitioner Remolona appeared. He signed a written statement of factsvi[6] regarding the
issuance of the questioned Report of Rating of Mrs. Remolona, which is summarized in the Memorandumvii[7]
submitted by Director Pasion as follows:
"3.1 That sometime in the first week of September, 1990, while riding in a Kapalaran Transit Bus from Sta. Cruz,
Laguna on his way to San Pablo City, he met one Atty. Hadji Salupadin (this is how it sounded) who happened to be
sitting beside him;
3.2 That a conversation broke out between them until he was able to confide his problem to Atty. Salupadin about
his wife having difficulty in acquiring an eligibility;
3.3 That Atty. Salupadin who represented himself as working at the Batasan, offered his help for a fee of
P3,000.00;
3.4 That the following day they met at the Batasan where he gave the amount of P2,000.00, requirements,
application form and picture of his wife;
3.5 That the following week, Thursday, at around 1:00 P.M., they met again at the Batasan where he handed to
Atty. Salupadin the amount of P1,000.00 plus P500.00 bonus who in turn handed to him the Report of Rating of
one Nery C. Remolona with a passing grade, then they parted;
3.6 That sometime in the last week of September, he showed the Report of Rating to the District Supervisor,
Francisco America who informed her (sic) that there was no vacancy;
3.7 That he went to Lucena City and complained to Dr. Magsino in writing x x x that Mr. America is asking for
money in exchange for the appointment of his wife but failed to make good his promise. He attached the
corroborating affidavits of Mesdames Carmelinda Pradillada and Rosemarie P. Romantico and Nery C. Remolona x
x x;
3.8 That from 1986 to 1988, Mr. America was able to get six (6) checks at P2,600.00 each plus bonus of Nery C.
Remolona;
3.9 That Mr. America got mad at them. And when he felt that Mr. America would verify the authenticity of his
wife's Report of Rating, he burned the original."
Furthermore, Remolona admitted that he was responsible in acquiring the alleged fake eligibility, that his wife has
no knowledge thereof, and that he did it because he wanted them to be together. Based on the foregoing,
Director Pasion recommended the filing of the appropriate administrative action against Remolona but absolved
Mrs. Nery Remolona from any liability since it has not been shown that she willfully participated in the commission
of the offense.
Consequently, a Formal Charge dated April 6, 1993 was filed against petitioner Remolona, Nery C. Remolona, and
Atty. Hadji Salupadin for possession of fake eligibility, falsification and dishonesty.viii[8] A formal hearing ensued
wherein the parties presented their respective evidence. Thereafter, CSC Regional Director Bella A. Amilhasan
issued a Memorandum dated February 14, 1995ix[9] recommending that the spouses Estelito and Nery Remolona
be found guilty as charged and be meted the corresponding penalty.

Said recommendation was adopted by the CSC which issued Resolution No. 95-2908 on April 20, 1995, finding the
spouses Estelito and Nery Remolona guilty of dishonesty and imposing the penalty of dismissal and all its accessory
penalties. The case against Atty. Hadji Salupadin was held in abeyance pending proof of his identity.x[10] In its
Resolution No. 965510xi[11] dated August 27, 1996, the CSC, acting on the motion for reconsideration filed by the
spouses Remolona, absolved Nery Remolona from liability and held that:
"Further, a review of the records and of the arguments presented fails to persuade this Commission to reconsider
its earlier resolution insofar as Estelito Remolona's culpability is concerned. The evidence is substantial enough to
effect his conviction. His act of securing a fake eligibility for his wife is proved by substantial evidence. However,
in the case of Nery Remolona, the Commission finds her innocent of the offense charged, for there is no evidence
to show that she has used the fake eligibility to support an appointment or promotion. In fact, Nery Remolona did
not indicate in her Personal Data Sheet that she possesses any eligibility. It must be pointed out that it was her
husband who unilaterally worked to secure a fake eligibility for her.
WHEREFORE, the instant Motion for Reconsideration is hereby denied insofar as respondent Estelito Remolona is
concerned. However, Resolution No. 95-2908 is modified in the sense that respondent Nery Remolona is
exonerated of the charges. Accordingly, Nery Remolona is automatically reinstated to her former position as
Teacher with back salaries and other benefits."
On appeal, the Court of Appeals rendered its questioned decision dismissing the petition for review filed by herein
petitioner Remolona. His motion for reconsideration and/or new trial was likewise denied. Hence, this petition for
review.
Petitioner submits that the Court of Appeals erred:
1. in denying petitioner's motion for new trial;
2. in holding that petitioner is liable for dishonesty; and
3. in sustaining the dismissal of the petitioner for an offense not work connected in relation to his official position
in the government service.
The main issue posed for resolution is whether a civil service employee can be dismissed from the government
service for an offense which is not work-related or which is not connected with the performance of his official
duty. Remolona likewise imputes a violation of his right to due process during the preliminary investigation
because he was not assisted by counsel. He claims that the extra-judicial admission allegedly signed by him is
inadmissible because he was merely made to sign a blank form. He also avers that his motion for new trial should
be granted on the ground that the transcript of stenographic notes taken during the hearing of the case before the
Regional Office of the CSC was not forwarded to the Court of Appeals. Finally, he pleads that the penalty of
dismissal with forfeiture of all benefits is too harsh considering the nature of the offense for which he was
convicted, the length of his service in government, that this is his first offense, and the fact that no damage was
caused to the government.
The submission of Remolona that his alleged extrajudicial confession is inadmissible because he was not assisted
by counsel during the investigation as required under Section 12 paragraphs 1 and 3, Article III of the 1987
Constitution deserves scant consideration
The right to counsel under Section 12 of the Bill of Rights is meant to protect a suspect in a criminal case under
custodial investigation. Custodial investigation is the stage where the police investigation is no longer a general
inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect who had been taken into custody by
the police to carry out a process of interrogation that lends itself to elicit incriminating statements. It is when

questions are initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise
deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. The right to counsel attaches only upon the start of such
investigation. Therefore, the exclusionary rule under paragraph (2), Section 12 of the Bill of Rights applies only to
admissions made in a criminal investigation but not to those made in an administrative investigation.xii[12]
While investigations conducted by an administrative body may at times be akin to a criminal proceeding, the fact
remains that under existing laws, a party in an administrative inquiry may or may not be assisted by counsel,
irrespective of the nature of the charges and of the respondent's capacity to represent himself, and no duty rests
on such body to furnish the person being investigated with counsel. In an administrative proceeding, a respondent
has the option of engaging the services of counsel or not. This is clear from the provisions of Section 32, Article VII
of Republic Act No. 2260 (otherwise known as the Civil Service Act) and Section 39, paragraph 2, Rule XIV (on
discipline) of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292 (otherwise known as the
Administrative Code of 1987). Thus, the right to counsel is not always imperative in administrative investigations
because such inquiries are conducted merely to determine whether there are facts that merit disciplinary measure
against erring public officers and employees, with the purpose of maintaining the dignity of government service.
As such, the hearing conducted by the investigating authority is not part of a criminal prosecution.xiii[13]
In the case at bar, Remolona was not accused of any crime in the investigation conducted by the CSC field office.
The investigation was conducted for the purpose of ascertaining the facts and whether there is a prima facie
evidence sufficient to form a belief that an offense cognizable by the CSC has been committed and that Remolona
is probably guilty thereof and should be administratively charged. Perforce, the admissions made by Remolona
during such investigation may be used as evidence to justify his dismissal.
The contention of Remolona that he never executed an extra-judicial admission and that he merely signed a blank
form cannot be given credence. Remolona occupies a high position in government as Postmaster at Infanta,
Quezon and, as such, he is expected to be circumspect in his actions specially where he is being administratively
charged with a grave offense which carries the penalty of dismissal from service.
Remolona insists that his dismissal is a violation of his right to due process under Section 2(3), Article XI (B) of the
Constitution which provides that no officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be removed or suspended except
for cause. Although the offense of dishonesty is punishable under the Civil Service law, Remolona opines that
such act must have been committed in the performance of his function and duty as Postmaster. Considering that
the charge of dishonesty involves the falsification of the certificate of rating of his wife Nery Remolona, the same
has no bearing on his office and hence, he is deemed not to have been dismissed for cause. This proposition is
untenable.
It cannot be denied that dishonesty is considered a grave offense punishable by dismissal for the first offense
under Section 23, Rule XIV of the Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292. And the rule is that
dishonesty, in order to warrant dismissal, need not be committed in the course of the performance of duty by the
person charged. The rationale for the rule is that if a government officer or employee is dishonest or is guilty of
oppression or grave misconduct, even if said defects of character are not connected with his office, they affect his
right to continue in office. The Government cannot tolerate in its service a dishonest official, even if he performs
his duties correctly and well, because by reason of his government position, he is given more and ample
opportunity to commit acts of dishonesty against his fellow men, even against offices and entities of the
government other than the office where he is employed; and by reason of his office, he enjoys and possesses a
certain influence and power which renders the victims of his grave misconduct, oppression and dishonesty less
disposed and prepared to resist and to counteract his evil acts and actuations. The private life of an employee
cannot be segregated from his public life. Dishonesty inevitably reflects on the fitness of the officer or employee
to continue in office and the discipline and morale of the service.xiv[14]

The principle is that when an officer or employee is disciplined, the object sought is not the punishment of such
officer or employee but the improvement of the public service and the preservation of the publics faith and
confidence in the government.xv[15]
The general rule is that where the findings of the administrative body are amply supported by substantial
evidence, such findings are accorded not only respect but also finality, and are binding on this Court.xvi[16] It is
not for the reviewing court to weigh the conflicting evidence, determine the credibility of witnesses, or otherwise
substitute its own judgment for that of the administrative agency on the sufficiency of evidence.xvii[17] Thus,
when confronted with conflicting versions of factual matters, it is for the administrative agency concerned in the
exercise of discretion to determine which party deserves credence on the basis of the evidence received.xviii[18]
The rule, therefore, is that courts of justice will not generally interfere with purely administrative matters which
are addressed to the sound discretion of government agencies unless there is a clear showing that the latter acted
arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion or when they have acted in a capricious and whimsical manner such
that their action may amount to an excess of jurisdiction.xix[19]
We have carefully scrutinized the records of the case below and we find no compelling reason to deviate from the
findings of the CSC and the Court of Appeals. The written admission of Remolona is replete with details that could
have been known only to him. No ill-motive or bad faith was ever imputed to Director Pasion who conducted the
investigation. The presumption that official duty has been regularly performed remains unrebutted.
The transmittal of the transcript of stenographic notes taken during the formal hearing before the CSC is entirely a
matter of discretion on the part of the Court of Appeals. Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95 of this Court
clearly states that in resolving appeals from quasi-judicial agencies, it is within the discretion of the Court of
Appeals to have the original records of the proceedings under review transmitted to it.xx[20] Verily, the Court of
Appeals decided the merits of the case on the bases of the uncontroverted facts and admissions contained in the
pleadings filed by the parties.
We likewise find no merit in the contention of Remolona that the penalty of dismissal is too harsh considering that
there was no damage caused to the government since the certificate of rating was never used to get an
appointment for his wife, Nery Remolona. Although no pecuniary damage was incurred by the government, there
was still falsification of an official document that constitutes gross dishonesty which cannot be countenanced,
considering that he was an accountable officer and occupied a sensitive position.xxi[21] The Code of Conduct and
Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees enunciates the State policy of promoting a high standard of
ethics and utmost responsibility in the public service.xxii[22]
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-29274 November 27, 1975
SEC. QUIRICO P. EVANGELISTA, in his capacity as Secretary of the Presidential Agency on Reforms and
Government Operations, and the PRESIDENTIAL AGENCY ON REFORMS AND GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS
(PARGO), petitioner,
vs.
HON. HILARION U. JARENCIO, as Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XXIII, and FERNANDO
MANALASTAS, Assistant City Public Service Officer of Manila, and ALL OTHER CITY OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES
SIMILARLY SITUATED, respondents.
Office of the Solicitor General Antonio P. Barredo, Ist. Assistant Solicitor General Esmeraldo Umali and Solicitor
Bernardo P. Pardo for petitioners.

Gregorio A. Ejercito and Felix C. Chavez for respondents.

MARTIN, J.:
This is an original action for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction, under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, seeking to annul and set aside the order of respondent Judge, the Honorable Hilarion J. Jarencio, Presiding
Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, dated July 1, 1968, in Civil Case No. 73305, entitled "Fernando
Manalastas vs. Sec. Ramon D. Bagatsing, etc.", which reads as follows:
IT IS ORDERED that, upon the filing of a bond in the amount of P5,000.00, let the writ of
preliminary injunction prayed for by the petitioner [private respondent] be issued restraining the
respondents [petitioners], their agents, representatives, attorneys and/or other persons acting in
their behalf from further issuing subpoenas in connection with the fact-finding investigations to
the petitioner [private respondent] and from instituting contempt proceedings against the
petitioner [private respondent] under Section 580 of the Revised Administrative Code. (Stress
supplied).
1

Pursuant to his special powers and duties under Section 64 of the Revised Administrative Code, the President of
the Philippines created the Presidential Agency on Reforms and Government Operations (PARGO) under Executive
2
Order No. 4 of January 7, 1966. Purposedly, he charged the Agency with the following functions and
3
responsibilities:
b. To investigate all activities involving or affecting immoral practices, graft and corruptions,
smuggling (physical or technical), lawlessness, subversion, and all other activities which are
prejudicial to the government and the public interests, and to submit proper recommendations
to the President of the Philippines.
c. To investigate cases of graft and corruption and violations of Republic Acts Nos. 1379 and
3019, and gather necessary evidence to establish prima facie, acts of graft and acquisition of
unlawfully amassed wealth ... .
h. To receive and evaluate, and to conduct fact-finding investigations of sworn complaints
against the acts, conduct or behavior of any public official or employee and to file and prosecute
the proper charges with the appropriate agency.
For a realistic performance of these functions, the President vested in the Agency all the powers of an investigating
committee under Sections 71 and 580 of the Revised Administrative Code, including the power to summon
witnesses by subpoena or subpoena duces tecum, administer oaths, take testimony or evidence relevant to the
4
investigation.
Whereupon, on June 7, 1968, petitioner Quirico Evangelista, as Undersecretary of the Agency, issued to
respondent Fernando Manalastas, then Acting City Public Service Officer of Manila, a subpoena ad testificandum
commanding him "to be and appear as witness at the Office of the PRESIDENTIAL AGENCY ON REFORMS AND
GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS ... then and there to declare and testify in a certain investigation pending therein."
Instead of obeying the subpoena, respondent Fernando Manalastas filed on June 25, 1968 with the Court of First
Instance of Manila an Amended Petition for prohibition, certiorari and/or injunction with preliminary injunction
and/or restraining order docketed as Civil Case No. 73305 and assailed its legality.

On July 1, 1968, respondent Judge issued the aforementioned Order:

IT IS ORDERED that, upon the filing of a bond in the amount of P5,000.00, let the writ of
preliminary injunction prayed for by the petitioner [private respondent] be issued restraining the
respondents [petitioners], their agents, representatives, attorneys and/or other persons acting in
their behalf from further issuing subpoenas in connection with the fact-finding investigations to
the petitioner [private respondent] and from instituting contempt proceedings against the
petitioner [private respondent] under Section 530 of the Revised Administrative Code. (Stress
supplied).
Because of this, petitioners 5 elevated the matter direct to Us without a motion for reconsideration first filed on
6
the fundamental submission that the Order is a patent nullity.
As unfurled, the dominant issue in this case is whether the Agency, acting thru its officials, enjoys the authority to
issue subpoenas in its conduct of fact-finding investigations.
It has been essayed that the life blood of the administrative process is the flow of fact, the gathering, the
7
organization and the analysis of evidence. Investigations are useful for all administrative functions, not only for
rule making, adjudication, and licensing, but also for prosecuting, for supervising and directing, for determining
general policy, for recommending, legislation, and for purposes no more specific than illuminating obscure areas to
8
find out what if anything should be done. An administrative agency may be authorized to make investigations, not
only in proceedings of a legislative or judicial nature, but also in proceedings whose sole purpose is to obtain
information upon which future action of a legislative or judicial nature may be taken 9 and may require the
attendance of witnesses in proceedings of a purely investigatory nature. It may conduct general inquiries into evils
10
calling for correction, and to report findings to appropriate bodies and make recommendations for actions.
We recognize that in the case before Us, petitioner Agency draws its subpoena power from Executive Order No. 4,
para. 5 which, in an effectuating mood, empowered it to "summon witness, administer oaths, and take testimony
11
relevant to the investigation" with the authority "to require the production of documents under a subpoena
duces tecum or otherwise, subject in all respects to the same restrictions and qualifications as apply in judicial
12
proceedings of a similar character." Such subpoena power operates in extenso to all the functions of the Agency
as laid out in the aforequoted sub-paragraphs (b),(e), and (h). It is not bordered by nor is it merely exercisable, as
respondents would have it, in quasi-judicial or adjudicatory function under sub-paragraph (b). The functions
enumerated in all these sub-paragraphs (b), (e), and (h) interlink or intertwine with one another with the principal
aim of meeting the very purpose of the creation of the Agency, which is to forestall and erode nefarious activities
and anomalies in the civil service. To hold that the subpoena power of the Agency is confined to mere quasijudicial or adjudicatory functions would therefore imperil or inactiviate the Agency in its investigatory functions
under
sub-paragraphs (e) and (h). More than that, the enabling authority itself (Executive Order No. 4, para. 5) fixes no
distinction when and in what function should the subpoena power be exercised. Similarly, We see no reason to
depart from the established rule that forbids differentiation when the law itself makes none.
Nor could We impress upon this subpoena power the alleged strictures of a subpoena issued under the Rules of
13
Court to abridge its application. The seeming proviso in Section 580 of the Revised Administrative Code that the
right to summon witnesses and the authority to require the production of documents under a subpoena duces
tecum or otherwise shall be "subject in all respects to the same restrictions and qualifications as apply in judicial
proceedings of a similar character" cannot be validly seized upon to require, in respondents' formulation, that, as
in a subpoena under the Rules, a specific case must be pending before a court for hearing or trial and that the
14
hearing or trial must be in connection with the exercise of the court's judicial or adjudicatory functions before a
non-judicial subpoena can be issued by an administrative agency like petitioner Agency. It must be emphasized,
however, that an administrative subpoena differs in essence from a judicial subpoena. Clearly, what the Rules
speaks of is a judicial subpoena, one procurable from and issuable by a competent court, and not an administrative

subpoena. To an extent, therefore, the "restrictions and qualifications" referred to in Section 580 of the Revised
Administrative Code could mean the restraints against infringement of constitutional rights or when the subpoena
15
is unreasonable or oppressive and when the relevancy of the books, documents or things does not appear.
Rightly, administrative agencies may enforce subpoenas issued in the course of investigations, whether or not
16
adjudication is involved, and whether or not probable cause is shown and even before the issuance of a
17
complaint. It is not necessary, as in the case of a warrant, that a specific charge or complaint of violation of law
be pending or that the order be made pursuant to one. It is enough that the investigation be for a lawfully
18
authorized purpose. The purpose of the subpoena is to discover evidence, not to prove a pending charge, but
19
upon which to make one if the discovered evidence so justifies. Its obligation cannot rest on a trial of the value
of testimony sought; it is enough that the proposed investigation be for a lawfully authorized purpose, and that
20
the proposed witness be claimed to have information that might shed some helpful light. Because judicial power
is reluctant if not unable to summon evidence until it is shown to be relevant to issues on litigations it does not
follow that an administrative agency charged with seeing that the laws are enforced may not have and exercise
powers of original inquiry. The administrative agency has the power of inquisition which is not dependent upon a
case or controversy in order to get evidence, but can investigate merely on suspicion that the law is being violated
or even just because it wants assurance that it is not. When investigative and accusatory duties are delegated by
statute to an administrative body, it, too may take steps to inform itself as to whether there is probable violation
21
of the law. In sum, it may be stated that a subpoena meets the requirements for enforcement if the inquiry is (1)
within the authority of the agency; (2) the demand is not too indefinite; and (3) the information is reasonably
22
relevant.
There is no doubt that the fact-finding investigations being conducted by the Agency upon sworn statements
23
implicating certain public officials of the City Government of Manila in anomalous transactions fall within the
Agency's sphere of authority and that the information sought to be elicited from respondent Fernando
24
Manalastas, of which he is claimed to be in possession, is reasonably relevant to the investigations.
We are mindful that the privilege against self-incrimination extends in administrative investigations, generally, in
25
26
scope similar to adversary proceedings. In Cabal v. Kapunan, Jr., the Court ruled that since the administrative
charge of unexplained wealth against the respondent therein may result in the forfeiture of the property under the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, a proceeding criminal or penal in nature, the complainant cannot call the
respondent to the witness stand without encroaching upon his constitutional privilege against self-incrimination.
27
Later, in Pascual, Jr. v. Board of Medical Examiners, the same approach was followed in the administrative
proceedings against a medical practitioner that could possibly result in the loss of his privilege to practice the
medical profession. Nevertheless, in the present case, We find that respondent Fernando Manalastas is not facing
28
any administrative charge. He is merely cited as a witness in connection with the fact-finding investigation of
anomalies and irregularities in the City Government of Manila with the object of submitting the assembled facts to
29
the President of the Philippines or to file the corresponding charges. Since the only purpose of investigation is to
30
discover facts as a basis of future action, any unnecessary extension of the privilege would thus be unwise.
Anyway, by all means, respondent Fernando Manalastas may contest any attempt in the investigation that tends
to disregard his privilege against self-incrimination.
A question of constitutional dimension is raised by respondents on the inherent power of the President of the
31
Philippines to issue subpoena. More tersely stated, respondents would now challenge, in a collateral way, the
validity of the basic authority, Executive Order No. 4, as amended in part by Executive Order No. 88. Unfortunately,
for reasons of public policy, the constitutionality of executive orders, which are commonly said to have the force
32
33
and effect of statutes cannot be collaterally impeached. Much more when the issue was not duly pleaded in
34
the court below as to be acceptable for adjudication now. The settled rule is that the Court will not anticipate a
35
question of constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding it.
Nothing then appears conclusive than that the disputed subpoena issued by petitioner Quirico Evangelista to
respondent Fernando Manalastas is well within the legal competence of the Agency to issue.

WHEREFORE, the aforequoted order of respondent Judge, dated July 1, 1968, is hereby set aside and declared of
no force and effect.
Without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Castro, Antonio, Esguerra, Muoz Palma and Aquino, JJ., concur.
Makalintal, C.J., concurs in the result.
Barredo, Makasiar, and Concepcion, Jr., JJ, took no part.

Separate Opinions

FERNANDO, J., concurring:

The opinion of the Court, ably penned by Justice Martin, is both learned and comprehensive. It reflects the current
state of doctrinal pronouncements in American Administrative Law, which up to now possesses worth in this
jurisdiction. It is in accordance with the views expressed in two authoritative American treatises that of
1
2
3
Davis and that of Jaffe. The compact but highly useful text of Parker yields the same conclusion. A similar
4
5
approach may be discerned in the casebooks of Katz, and McFarland and Vanderbelt. A concurrence is thus
called for. That for me does not conclude matters though. The constitutional rights of a person who may be
involved in such administrative investigation, call for respect. A recognition of the expanded reach of the
administrative process in order to assure that the objectives of a regulatory statute be attained cannot obscure the
protection that the Constitution affords a person who may find himself in the position of a respondent. It is
worthwhile to my mind that there be a reference, even if far from detailed, to such an aspect. Hence this separate
opinion.
1. The right to be protected against unreasonable search and seizure should not fall by the wayside. 6 The broad
sweep of the administrative power of investigation cannot, consistently with the Constitution, go so far as to
render it meaningless. It is with such a reading in mind that I view the pronouncement in United States v. Morton
Salt
7
Co., on which reliance is placed in the opinion of Justice Martin. The doctrine formulated in such American case
by Justice Jackson reads thus: "Of course a governmental investigation into corporate matters may be of such a
sweeping nature and so unrelated to the matter properly under inquiry as to exceed the investigatory power.
Federal Trade Comm. v. American Tobacco Co., ... . But it is sufficient if the inquiry is within the authority of the
agency, the demand is not too indefinite and the information sought is reasonably relevant. "The gist of the
8
protection is in the requirement, expressed in terms, that the disclosure sought shall not be unreasonable."" It
has been given approval in an impressive number of subsequent adjudications. 9 It suffices, however, to call
attention to the words of Justice Jackson in the two paragraphs preceding the excerpts cited to remove any doubt
as to its lending itself to the construction that an inroad into the right of search and seizure is now permissible:
"The Commission's order is criticized upon grounds that the order transgresses the Fourth Amendment's

proscription of unreasonable searches and seizures and the Fifth Amendment's due process of law clause. It is
unnecessary here to examine the question of whether a corporation is entitled to the protection of the Fourth
Amendment. ... Although the "right to be let alone the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued
by civilized men," ... is not confined literally to searches and seizures as such, but extends as well to the orderly
taking under compulsion of process, ... neither incorporated nor unincorporated associations can plead an
unqualified right to conduct their affairs in secret. ... While they may and should have protection from unlawful
demands made in the name of public investigation, ... corporations can claim no equality with individuals in the
enjoyment of a right to privacy . ... They are endowed with public attributes. They have a collective impact upon
society, from which they derive the privilege of acting as artificial entities. The Federal Government allows them
the privilege of engaging in interstate commerce. Favors from government often carry with them an enhanced
measure of regulation. ... Even if one were to regard the request for information in this case as caused by nothing
more than official curiosity, nevertheless law-enforcing agencies have a legitimate right to satisfy themselves that
10
corporate behavior is consistent with the law and the public interest." Thus is rendered clear that the landmark
Boyd decision which warned against the use of the subpoena power to trench upon this guarantee still speaks
11
authoritatively. This Court has spoken to the same effect, Boyd having been cited in a number of cases. I would,
therefore, read the opinion of my brethren as not departing from but precisely adhering to its command.
Whatever relaxation of its compelling force may be allowable in case of corporations should not apply where an
individual is concerned. That should reassure respondent Manalastas that if he could demonstrate a failure to
abide by the constitutional mandate on search and seizure, he is not without a remedy.
2. Nor can I fully reconcile myself to the implications lurking in this observation in the opinion of the Court: "Since
the only purpose of investigation is to discover facts as a basis of future action, any unnecessary extension of the
12
13
privilege would thus be unwise." The right not to incriminate oneself is equally deserving of the utmost
deference and respect. What is more, the present Constitution by the adoption of the Miranda doctrine has
14
vitalized it even further. There is, happily, the last sentence of such paragraph: "Anyway, by all means,
respondent Fernando Manalastas may contest any attempt in the investigation that tends to disregard his privilege
against self15
incrimination." When read in connection with the earlier reference to the fact that the respondent is called as a
16
witness not as the party proceeded against, it cannot be said, in the light of the ruling in Planas v. Gil, that it
offends against this constitutional guarantee. As of now then, with the question of any modification of the Planas
doctrine not being properly before us, I can yield my concurrence. Candor compels the statement, however, that
for me a reexamination of such a pronouncement is desirable. A distinction between a witness and a respondent
may be too tenuous if the realities of the situation be fully considered. I am bothered by the thought that the force
17
18
of the Cabal and the Pascual, Jr. decisions may be eroded if the prospective respondent is first called as a
witness and is thus compelled to testify. For the present, it may suffice if I express my misgivings. At any rate,
concurrence is not ruled out in view of the aforementioned caveat in the able opinion of Justice Martin.
TEEHANKEE, J., dissenting:
I am constrained to dissent from the main opinion of Mr. Justice Martin which grants the petition and sets aside
respondent court's order and writ of preliminary injunction of July 1, 1968 and would therefore require
respondent Fernando Manalastas as assistant city public service officer of Manila (and all other city officials
similarly situated) to comply with the PARGO subpoena "to testify to matters relevant to the investigation of
1
anomalies and sworn statements involving or implicating certain City officials or other public officers."
2

While the subpoena commands respondent Manalastas to appear as witness before the PARGO, on the basis
whereof the main opinion finds that said respondent "is not facing any administrative charge" and that "he is
merely cited as witness in connection with the fact-finding investigation of anomalies and irregularities in the City
Government of Manila with the object of submitting the assembled facts to the President of the Philippines or to
3
file the corresponding charges", it is a fact shown by the very petition at bar itself and its Annexes B and B-1 that
respondent Manalastas is in fact and for all intents and purposes subpoenaed as a respondent or one directly

implicated with alleged bribery and graft in the said sworn statements that concededly as per the petition itself
4
initiated the PARGO's alleged "fact-finding investigation."
Thus Annex B of the petition which is a sworn statement of one Edilberto Arguelles, investigated by the PARGO on
the overpricing of eight steam cleaners sold through him as commission agent to the City of Manila, sets forth the
detailed allegations of said declarant that respondent Manalastas and a number of other city officials named and
unnamed got the lion's share of the overpricing. Annex B-1 of the petition is the sworn statement of one Carlos
Montaez with reference to some overpriced equipment sold by him to the City of Manila wherein he likewise
narrated in detail the modus operandi and specifically named respondent Manalastas and five other officials to
whom he allegedly gave: "due monetary consideration."
All claims of PARGO to the contrary notwithstanding, the very petition and said annexed sworn statements (which
were not shown to respondent judge in spite of his expressly asking for them during the course of the hearing 5)
show that respondent Manalastas (and others similarly situated) are indeed not merely witnesses but in reality
respondents (subject to administrative and criminal charges.)
6

Respondent has therefore correctly invoked Cabal vs. Kapunan, wherein the Court through then Chief Justice
Roberto Concepcion held that therein petitioner rightfully refused to take the witness stand as against the order of
the Presidential Committee investigating the complaint against him for alleged unexplained wealth (since such
proceedings were in substance and effect a criminal one and his position was virtually that of an accused on trial
and he therefore had the right to remain silent and invoke the privilege against self-incrimination in support of a
blanket refusal to answer any and all questions) and ordered the dismissal of the criminal contempt charge against
him.
7

Pascual Jr. vs. Bd. of Examiners is equally in point, wherein the Court sustained the lower court's writ of injunction
against the respondent board's order compelling therein petitioner to take the witness stand in a malpractice case
(wherein he was respondent) in view of the penal nature of the proceedings and the right of the accused to refuse
8
"not only to answer incriminatory questions, but also to take the witness stand." The Court therein stressed that
"the constitutional guarantee, along with other rights granted an accused, stands for a belief that while crime
should not go unpunished and that the truth must be revealed, such desirable objectives should not be
accomplished according to means or methods offensive to the high sense of respect accorded the human
personality. More and more in line with the democratic creed, the deference accorded an individual even those
suspected of the most heinous crimes is given due weight. To quote from Chief Justice Warren, "the constitutional
foundation underlying the privilege is the respect a government ... must accord to the dignity and integrity of its
citizens."" and that "while earlier decisions stressed the principle of humanity on which this right is predicated,
precluding as it does all resort to force or compulsion, whether physical or mental, current judicial opinion places
equal emphasis on its identification with the right to privacy. Thus according to Justice Douglas: "The Fifth
Amendment in its Self-Incrimination clause enables the citizen to create a zone of privacy which government may
not force to surrender to his detriment."
That petitioner's investigation and subpoena against respondent Manalastas were in substance and effect criminal
in nature against him as a respondent (and not merely as witness) as indicated above, is borne out by the fact of
record in Sugay vs. Pamaran 9 (of which the Court can well take judicial notice) that on July 22, 1971 respondent
10
Manalastas as well as Carlos Montaez the trader (affiant in Annex B-1, petition, supra, ) and a number of other
city officials were charged by the city fiscal in the Circuit Criminal Court of Manila for violations of Republic Act
3019 (Anti-Graft Law) in connection with the alleged gross overpricing of the same equipment (steam cleaners and
air compressor) purchased for the City.
The main opinion's justification for upholding the subpoena, viz, that "since the only purpose of investigation is to
discover facts as a basis of future action, any unnecessary extension of the privilege (against self11
incrimination)would thus be unnecessary" thus appears to be flawed in fact and in law: respondent was in fact
being investigated as respondent-suspect and without submitting to the investigation was actually criminally

charged in court; as a pure matter of legal principle, the 1973 Constitution has recognized the necessity of
strengthening (and extending) the privilege against self-incrimination by expressly providing as a constitutional
mandate in the Bill of Rights that "Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the
right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right" (Article IV, section 20) and outlawing the
use of any confession obtained in violation of said section by declaring its inadmissibility in evidence.
Respondent Manalastas was therefore justified in invoking the privilege against self-incrimination and in securing
the respondent court's injunction against enforcement of petitioner's subpoena. Respondent was unquestionably
a party respondent who under the doctrine of Cabal and Pascual, supra, had the right to remain silent and invoke
the privilege against self-incrimination and refuse to take the witness stand. This legal and constitutional right may
not be defeated by the transparent expedient of citing respondent as a supposed witness in what was avowed to
be a general fact-finding investigation but obviously was a fishing expedition to ensnare respondent as a prime
suspect, as borne out by the sworn statements withheld from respondent court and now annexed to the very
petition at bar and petitioner's contention that "In effect, the injunction issued by the lower court is one to restrain
criminal prosecutions." This contention has of course been proven baseless by the events already cited above that
such criminal prosecutions were in fact filed in court against respondent and others without the need of
petitioner's "fact-finding investigation" and subpoenas.
The thrust of all this is that the State with its overwhelming and vast powers and resources can and must ferret out
and investigate wrongdoing, graft and corruption and at the same time respect the constitutional guarantees of
the individual's right to privacy, silence and due process and against self-incrimination and unreasonable search
and seizure. This means that leads and charges must be investigated and followed up through the assistance of the
12
corresponding police and law enforcement agencies as provided in the petitioner's executive charter and the
evidence secured by proper applications for search warrants, and as conceded in the petition itself, after the
corresponding report to the President "to file the corresponding charges against the persons who may appear
responsible or merely refer them to other appropriate offices such as the Fiscal's office, like what was done in
13
other cases."
There appears to be validity in respondent's contention that the subpoena power granted petitioner in its
14
executive charter does not apply to general fact-finding investigations conducted by it. I find no need, however,
of going further into this issue, since this dissent is based directly on the fundamental tenet that respondent
Manalastas was unquestionably being investigated by petitioner as respondent and a prime suspect (and not as a
mere witness) and accordingly, under settled doctrine, he had every right to remain silent and to invoke his right
against self-incrimination and to refuse to take the witness stand.
I therefore vote for upholding respondent court's injunction against enforcement of petitioner's subpoena.

Separate Opinions
FERNANDO, J., concurring:
The opinion of the Court, ably penned by Justice Martin, is both learned and comprehensive. It reflects the current
state of doctrinal pronouncements in American Administrative Law, which up to now possesses worth in this
jurisdiction. It is in accordance with the views expressed in two authoritative American treatises that of
1
2
3
Davis and that of Jaffe. The compact but highly useful text of Parker yields the same conclusion. A similar
4
5
approach may be discerned in the casebooks of Katz, and McFarland and Vanderbelt. A concurrence is thus
called for. That for me does not conclude matters though. The constitutional rights of a person who may be

involved in such administrative investigation, call for respect. A recognition of the expanded reach of the
administrative process in order to assure that the objectives of a regulatory statute be attained cannot obscure the
protection that the Constitution affords a person who may find himself in the position of a respondent. It is
worthwhile to my mind that there be a reference, even if far from detailed, to such an aspect. Hence this separate
opinion.
1. The right to be protected against unreasonable search and seizure should not fall by the wayside. 6 The broad
sweep of the administrative power of investigation cannot, consistently with the Constitution, go so far as to
render it meaningless. It is with such a reading in mind that I view the pronouncement in United States v. Morton
Salt
7
Co., on which reliance is placed in the opinion of Justice Martin. The doctrine formulated in such American case
by Justice Jackson reads thus: "Of course a governmental investigation into corporate matters may be of such a
sweeping nature and so unrelated to the matter properly under inquiry as to exceed the investigatory power.
Federal Trade Comm. v. American Tobacco Co., ... . But it is sufficient if the inquiry is within the authority of the
agency, the demand is not too indefinite and the information sought is reasonably relevant. "The gist of the
8
protection is in the requirement, expressed in terms, that the disclosure sought shall not be unreasonable."" It
has been given approval in an impressive number of subsequent adjudications. 9 It suffices, however, to call
attention to the words of Justice Jackson in the two paragraphs preceding the excerpts cited to remove any doubt
as to its lending itself to the construction that an inroad into the right of search and seizure is now permissible:
"The Commission's order is criticized upon grounds that the order transgresses the Fourth Amendment's
proscription of unreasonable searches and seizures and the Fifth Amendment's due process of law clause. It is
unnecessary here to examine the question of whether a corporation is entitled to the protection of the Fourth
Amendment. ... Although the "right to be let alone the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued
by civilized men," ... is not confined literally to searches and seizures as such, but extends as well to the orderly
taking under compulsion of process, ... neither incorporated nor unincorporated associations can plead an
unqualified right to conduct their affairs in secret. ... While they may and should have protection from unlawful
demands made in the name of public investigation, ... corporations can claim no equality with individuals in the
enjoyment of a right to privacy . ... They are endowed with public attributes. They have a collective impact upon
society, from which they derive the privilege of acting as artificial entities. The Federal Government allows them
the privilege of engaging in interstate commerce. Favors from government often carry with them an enhanced
measure of regulation. ... Even if one were to regard the request for information in this case as caused by nothing
more than official curiosity, nevertheless law-enforcing agencies have a legitimate right to satisfy themselves that
10
corporate behavior is consistent with the law and the public interest." Thus is rendered clear that the landmark
Boyd decision which warned against the use of the subpoena power to trench upon this guarantee still speaks
11
authoritatively. This Court has spoken to the same effect, Boyd having been cited in a number of cases. I would,
therefore, read the opinion of my brethren as not departing from but precisely adhering to its command.
Whatever relaxation of its compelling force may be allowable in case of corporations should not apply where an
individual is concerned. That should reassure respondent Manalastas that if he could demonstrate a failure to
abide by the constitutional mandate on search and seizure, he is not without a remedy.
2. Nor can I fully reconcile myself to the implications lurking in this observation in the opinion of the Court: "Since
the only purpose of investigation is to discover facts as a basis of future action, any unnecessary extension of the
12
13
privilege would thus be unwise." The right not to incriminate oneself is equally deserving of the utmost
deference and respect. What is more, the present Constitution by the adoption of the Miranda doctrine has
14
vitalized it even further. There is, happily, the last sentence of such paragraph: "Anyway, by all means,
respondent Fernando Manalastas may contest any attempt in the investigation that tends to disregard his privilege
against self15
incrimination." When read in connection with the earlier reference to the fact that the respondent is called as a
16
witness not as the party proceeded against, it cannot be said, in the light of the ruling in Planas v. Gil, that it
offends against this constitutional guarantee. As of now then, with the question of any modification of the Planas
doctrine not being properly before us, I can yield my concurrence. Candor compels the statement, however, that
for me a reexamination of such a pronouncement is desirable. A distinction between a witness and a respondent

may be too tenuous if the realities of the situation be fully considered. I am bothered by the thought that the force
17
18
of the Cabal and the Pascual, Jr. decisions may be eroded if the prospective respondent is first called as a
witness and is thus compelled to testify. For the present, it may suffice if I express my misgivings. At any rate,
concurrence is not ruled out in view of the aforementioned caveat in the able opinion of Justice Martin.
TEEHANKEE, J., dissenting:
I am constrained to dissent from the main opinion of Mr. Justice Martin which grants the petition and sets aside
respondent court's order and writ of preliminary injunction of July 1, 1968 and would therefore require
respondent Fernando Manalastas as assistant city public service officer of Manila (and all other city officials
similarly situated) to comply with the PARGO subpoena "to testify to matters relevant to the investigation of
1
anomalies and sworn statements involving or implicating certain City officials or other public officers."
2

While the subpoena commands respondent Manalastas to appear as witness before the PARGO, on the basis
whereof the main opinion finds that said respondent "is not facing any administrative charge" and that "he is
merely cited as witness in connection with the fact-finding investigation of anomalies and irregularities in the City
Government of Manila with the object of submitting the assembled facts to the President of the Philippines or to
3
file the corresponding charges", it is a fact shown by the very petition at bar itself and its Annexes B and B-1 that
respondent Manalastas is in fact and for all intents and purposes subpoenaed as a respondent or one directly
implicated with alleged bribery and graft in the said sworn statements that concededly as per the petition itself
4
initiated the PARGO's alleged "fact-finding investigation."
Thus Annex B of the petition which is a sworn statement of one Edilberto Arguelles, investigated by the PARGO on
the overpricing of eight steam cleaners sold through him as commission agent to the City of Manila, sets forth the
detailed allegations of said declarant that respondent Manalastas and a number of other city officials named and
unnamed got the lion's share of the overpricing. Annex B-1 of the petition is the sworn statement of one Carlos
Montaez with reference to some overpriced equipment sold by him to the City of Manila wherein he likewise
narrated in detail the modus operandi and specifically named respondent Manalastas and five other officials to
whom he allegedly gave: "due monetary consideration."
All claims of PARGO to the contrary notwithstanding, the very petition and said annexed sworn statements (which
were not shown to respondent judge in spite of his expressly asking for them during the course of the hearing 5)
show that respondent Manalastas (and others similarly situated) are indeed not merely witnesses but in reality
respondents (subject to administrative and criminal charges.)
6

Respondent has therefore correctly invoked Cabal vs. Kapunan, wherein the Court through then Chief Justice
Roberto Concepcion held that therein petitioner rightfully refused to take the witness stand as against the order of
the Presidential Committee investigating the complaint against him for alleged unexplained wealth (since such
proceedings were in substance and effect a criminal one and his position was virtually that of an accused on trial
and he therefore had the right to remain silent and invoke the privilege against self-incrimination in support of a
blanket refusal to answer any and all questions) and ordered the dismissal of the criminal contempt charge against
him.
7

Pascual Jr. vs. Bd. of Examiners is equally in point, wherein the Court sustained the lower court's writ of injunction
against the respondent board's order compelling therein petitioner to take the witness stand in a malpractice case
(wherein he was respondent) in view of the penal nature of the proceedings and the right of the accused to refuse
8
"not only to answer incriminatory questions, but also to take the witness stand." The Court therein stressed that
"the constitutional guarantee, along with other rights granted an accused, stands for a belief that while crime
should not go unpunished and that the truth must be revealed, such desirable objectives should not be
accomplished according to means or methods offensive to the high sense of respect accorded the human
personality. More and more in line with the democratic creed, the deference accorded an individual even those
suspected of the most heinous crimes is given due weight. To quote from Chief Justice Warren, "the constitutional

foundation underlying the privilege is the respect a government ... must accord to the dignity and integrity of its
citizens."" and that "while earlier decisions stressed the principle of humanity on which this right is predicated,
precluding as it does all resort to force or compulsion, whether physical or mental, current judicial opinion places
equal emphasis on its identification with the right to privacy. Thus according to Justice Douglas: "The Fifth
Amendment in its Self-Incrimination clause enables the citizen to create a zone of privacy which government may
not force to surrender to his detriment."
That petitioner's investigation and subpoena against respondent Manalastas were in substance and effect criminal
in nature against him as a respondent (and not merely as witness) as indicated above, is borne out by the fact of
record in Sugay vs. Pamaran 9 (of which the Court can well take judicial notice) that on July 22, 1971 respondent
10
Manalastas as well as Carlos Montaez the trader (affiant in Annex B-1, petition, supra, ) and a number of other
city officials were charged by the city fiscal in the Circuit Criminal Court of Manila for violations of Republic Act
3019 (Anti-Graft Law) in connection with the alleged gross overpricing of the same equipment (steam cleaners and
air compressor) purchased for the City.
The main opinion's justification for upholding the subpoena, viz, that "since the only purpose of investigation is to
discover facts as a basis of future action, any unnecessary extension of the privilege (against self11
incrimination)would thus be unnecessary" thus appears to be flawed in fact and in law: respondent was in fact
being investigated as respondent-suspect and without submitting to the investigation was actually criminally
charged in court; as a pure matter of legal principle, the 1973 Constitution has recognized the necessity of
strengthening (and extending) the privilege against self-incrimination by expressly providing as a constitutional
mandate in the Bill of Rights that "Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the
right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right" (Article IV, section 20) and outlawing the
use of any confession obtained in violation of said section by declaring its inadmissibility in evidence.
Respondent Manalastas was therefore justified in invoking the privilege against self-incrimination and in securing
the respondent court's injunction against enforcement of petitioner's subpoena. Respondent was unquestionably
a party respondent who under the doctrine of Cabal and Pascual, supra, had the right to remain silent and invoke
the privilege against self-incrimination and refuse to take the witness stand. This legal and constitutional right may
not be defeated by the transparent expedient of citing respondent as a supposed witness in what was avowed to
be a general fact-finding investigation but obviously was a fishing expedition to ensnare respondent as a prime
suspect, as borne out by the sworn statements withheld from respondent court and now annexed to the very
petition at bar and petitioner's contention that "In effect, the injunction issued by the lower court is one to restrain
criminal prosecutions." This contention has of course been proven baseless by the events already cited above that
such criminal prosecutions were in fact filed in court against respondent and others without the need of
petitioner's "fact-finding investigation" and subpoenas.
The thrust of all this is that the State with its overwhelming and vast powers and resources can and must ferret out
and investigate wrongdoing, graft and corruption and at the same time respect the constitutional guarantees of
the individual's right to privacy, silence and due process and against self-incrimination and unreasonable search
and seizure. This means that leads and charges must be investigated and followed up through the assistance of the
12
corresponding police and law enforcement agencies as provided in the petitioner's executive charter and the
evidence secured by proper applications for search warrants, and as conceded in the petition itself, after the
corresponding report to the President "to file the corresponding charges against the persons who may appear
responsible or merely refer them to other appropriate offices such as the Fiscal's office, like what was done in
13
other cases."
There appears to be validity in respondent's contention that the subpoena power granted petitioner in its
14
executive charter does not apply to general fact-finding investigations conducted by it. I find no need, however,
of going further into this issue, since this dissent is based directly on the fundamental tenet that respondent
Manalastas was unquestionably being investigated by petitioner as respondent and a prime suspect (and not as a

mere witness) and accordingly, under settled doctrine, he had every right to remain silent and to invoke his right
against self-incrimination and to refuse to take the witness stand.
I therefore vote for upholding respondent court's injunction against enforcement of petitioner's subpoena.