PROPERTY (RIGHT OF ACCESSION) CASE DIGESTS

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (DIRECTOR OF

LANDS) vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, BENJAMIN
TANCINCO, AZUCENA TANCINCO REYES, MARINA
TANCINCO IMPERIAL and MARIO C. TANCINCO

for they are not made through the effects of the current
of river waters.

FACTS

To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers

belong the accretion which they gradually receive
from the effects of the current of waters. (Emphasis
mine.)

Benjamin Tancinco, Azucena Tancinco Reyes, Marina

Tancinco Imperial, and Mario C. Tancinco (herein
respondents) are the registered owners of a parcel of
land, which is a fishpond property and covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 89709. In 1973, they
applied for the registration of three lots (Labeled as 1PSU-131892 2-PSU-131892, AND 3-PSU-131892,
respectively), which are adjacent to their fishpond
property, under their name before the Court of First
Instance of Bulacan. Evidence would reveal that the said
lots are surrounded by dikes and are under river waters,
which are approximately two (2) meters deep. In 1974,
the Director of Lands opposed the respondents
application for registration. In 1975, and upon the
recommendation of the Commissioner appointed by the
trial court, respondents withdrew their application for
registration on the third lot. In 1976, the trial court
granted the application for registration of the remaining
two (2) lots, stating that said lots are accretions to the
fishpond property owned by the respondents.
Aggrieved, Bureau of Lands elevated the case to the
Supreme Court averring that there was no accretion to
speak of under Article 457 of the New Civil Code
because what actually happened is that the private
respondents simply transferred their dikes further
down the river bed of the Meycauayan River, and this, if
there is any accretion to speak of, it is man-made and
artificial, and not the result of the gradual and
imperceptible sedimentation by the waters of the
rivers.
ISSUE
Whether or not the lots adjacent to the fishpond
property of private respondents, which are the subject
matter of this dispute, are accretions within the purview
of Article 457 of the New Civil Code?
HELD
No. The two lots adjacent to private respondents
fishpond property are not accretions under Article 457

As provided for under Article 457:

The Honorable Court held that the above-quoted

provision requires the concurrence of three (3)
requisites namely:
(1) That the deposit be gradual and imperceptible;
(2) That such deposit be made through the effects
of the current of water; and
(3) That the land where accretion takes place is
adjacent to the banks of the rivers.
According to the Court the reason behind the law giving
the riparian owner the right to any land or alluvion
deposited by a river is to compensate him for the danger
of loss that he suffers because of the location of his land.
If estates bordering on rivers are exposed to floods and
other evils produced by the destructive force of the
waters and if by virtue of lawful provisions, said estates
are subject to incumbrances and various kinds of
easements, it is proper that the risk or danger which
may prejudice the owners thereof should be
compensated by the right of accretion. (Cortes v. City of
Manila, 10 Phil. 567). Hence, the riparian owner does
not acquire the additions to his land caused by special
works expressly intended or designed to bring about
accretion.
In this case, the Supreme Court agrees with the
submission of the Bureau of Lands that the alleged
accretions were man-made and not the exclusive result
of the currents of the Meycauayan and Bocaue river
waters. Evidence supports the conclusion that
respondents built dikes surrounding their property for
reclamation purposes and NOT to protect such from the
destructive force of the river waters. Ergo, according to
the court, the only conclusion that may be deduced is
that the alleged alluvial deposits came about only
because of the transfer of dikes towards the river.
The purported accretion was in reality an

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PROPERTY (RIGHT OF ACCESSION) CASE DIGESTS

encroachment of a portion of the Meycauayan river
bed by reclamation1
Premises considered, the Court held that said lots may
not be open to registration under the Land Registration
Act for they are classified as property of public domain
under paragraph 1 of Article 420 of the New Civil Code.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The
decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The private respondents are ordered to move
back the dikes of their fishponds to their original
location and return the disputed property to the river to
which it belongs.
SO ORDERED.

The conversion of wasteland into land suitable for use of habitation

or cultivation (Wordweb)

|BY: TINA SIUAGAN

PROPERTY (RIGHT OF ACCESSION) CASE DIGESTS

FRANCISCO DEPRA VS. AGUSTIN DUMLAO

HELD

FACTS

No. Depra may not resort to the remotion or the

removal of the kitchen built over the 34 sq. meter
portion without exercising any of the options provided
from him under Article 448 of the New Civil Code.

Francisco Depra, the petitioner in this case is the owner

of a land registered under Transfer Certificate of Title
No. T3087, known as Lot No 685, located in the
Municipality of Dumangas, Iloilo, and has a land area of
8,870 sq. meters. On the other hand, private respondent
Agustin Dumlao owns an a lot adjoining that of Depras,
known as Lot 683, with an approximate area of 231 sq.
meters. In 1972, when Dumlao constructed his house on
his lot, his kitchen had encroached on an area of 34 sq.
meters of Depras property. After Depras mother found
out of the same during a relocation survey in the same
year, she filed an action for Unlawful Detainer in 1973
against Dumlao with the Municipal Trial Court of
Dumagans. This complaint was later on amended in
order to include Francisco Depra as a party plaintiff.
After trial, the Municipal Court held that the Dumlao is a
builder in good faith under Article 448 of the New Civil
Code. Applying said provision of law, the Municipal
Court ordered a forced lease between the Depra and
Dumlao over the disputed area the 34 sq. meter
encroachment upon Depras lot. Neither of the parties
appealed against the said judgment until the latter had
become final and executory. Also, Depra did not accept
payment of rentals in lieu of the ordered forced lease so
that Dumlao deposited such rentals with the Municipal
Court.
In 1974, Depra filed a complaint for Quieting of Title
against Dumlao before the then Court of Instance (CFI)
of Iloilo. The complaint involved the same 34-sq. meter
lot. In lieu of Depras refusal to either appropriate the
kitchen (improvement) built upon the 34 sq. meter
portion after payment of indemnification to Dumlao or
sell said portion of the land to the latter, CFI rendered a
decision that granted Depra the possess of the disputed
area and have the kitchen built thereon removed.
Aggrieved, Dumlao filed a petition before the Honorable
Supreme Court.

ISSUE
Whether or not Depra may take possession of the
disputed lot area and have the kitchen thereon removed.

Article 448 of the New Civil Code provides:

The owner of the land on which anything has been
built, sown or planted in good faith, shall have the right
to appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting,
after payment of the indemnity provided for in articles
546 and 548, or to oblige the one who built or planted to
pay the price of the land, and the one who sowed, the
proper rent. However, the builder or planter cannot be
obliged to buy the land if its value is considerably more
than that of the building or trees. In such case, he shall
pay reasonable rent, if the owner of the land does not
choose to appropriate the building or trees after proper
indemnity. The parties shall agree upon the terms of the
lease and in case of disagreement, the court shall fix the
terms thereof.
Applying the aforementioned provision of law, the
Honorable Supreme Court in this case ruled:
Pursuant to the foregoing provision, DEPRA has the
option either to pay for the encroaching part of
DUMLAO's kitchen, or to sell the encroached 34 square
meters of his lot to DUMLAO. He cannot refuse to pay
for the encroaching part of the building, and to sell
the encroached part of his land, as he had manifested
before the Municipal Court. But that manifestation is
not binding because it was made in a void proceeding.
However, the good faith of DUMLAO is part of the
Stipulation of Facts in the Court of First Instance. It was
thus error for the Trial Court to have ruled that DEPRA
is "entitled to possession," without more, of the disputed
portion implying thereby that he is entitled to have the
kitchen removed. He is entitled to such removal only
when, after having chosen to sell his encroached land,
DUMLAO fails to pay for the same. In this case,
DUMLAO had expressed his willingness to pay for the
land, but DEPRA refused to sell.
The owner of the building erected in good faith on a
land owned by another, is entitled to retain the
possession of the land until he is paid the value of his

|BY: TINA SIUAGAN

PROPERTY (RIGHT OF ACCESSION) CASE DIGESTS

building, under article 453 (now Article 546). The
owner of the land, upon the other hand, has the option,
under article 361 (now Article 448), either to pay for the
building or to sell his land to the owner of the building.
But he cannot as respondents here did refuse both to
pay for the building and to sell the land and compel
the owner of the building to remove it from the land
where it erected. He is entitled to such remotion only
when, after having chosen to sell his land. the other
party fails to pay for the same.
We hold, therefore, that the order of Judge Natividad
compelling defendants-petitioners to remove their
buildings from the land belonging to plaintiffsrespondents only because the latter chose neither to pay
for such buildings nor to sell the land, is null and void,
for it amends substantially the judgment sought to be
executed and is. furthermore, offensive to articles 361
(now Article 448) and 453 (now Article 546) of the Civil
Code. (Ignacio vs. Hilario, 76 Phil. 605, 608[1946]).
(Emphases mine.)
The Honorable Court went on in explaining the rationale
behind and the fairness of the rule laid down in Article
448. Thus:
Where the builder, planter or sower has acted in good
faith, a conflict of rights arises between the owners, and
it becomes necessary to protect the owner of the
improvements without causing injustice to the owner of
the land. In view of the impracticability of creating a
state of forced co-ownership, the law has provided a just
solution by giving the owner of the land the option to
acquire the improvements after payment of the proper
indemnity, or to oblige the builder or planter to pay for
the land and the sower to pay for the proper rent. It is
the owner of the land who is authorized to exercise the
option, because his right is older, and because, by the
principle of accession, he is entitled to the ownership of
the accessory thing. (3 Manresa 213; Bernardo vs.
Bataclan, 37 Off. Gaz. 1382; Co Tao vs. Chan Chico, G.R.
No. 49167, April 30, 1949; Article applied: see Cabral, et
al vs. Ibanez [S.C.] 52 Off. Gaz. 217; Marfori vs. Velasco,
[C.A.] 52 Off. Gaz. 2050).

WHEREFORE, the judgment of the trial Court is hereby

set aside, and this case is hereby ordered remanded to
the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo for further proceedings

consistent with Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil Code, as

follows:
1. The trial Court shall determine
a) the present fair price of DEPRA's 34 square meter
area of land;
b) the amount of the expenses spent by DUMLAO for the
building of the kitchen;
c) the increase in value ("plus value") which the said
area of 34 square meters may have acquired by reason
thereof, and
d) whether the value of said area of land is considerably
more than that of the kitchen built thereon.
2. After said amounts shall have been determined by
competent evidence, the Regional, Trial Court shall
render judgment, as follows:
a) The trial Court shall grant DEPRA a period of fifteen
(15) days within which to exercise his option under the
law (Article 448, Civil Code), whether to appropriate the
kitchen as his own by paying to DUMLAO either the
amount of tile expenses spent by DUMLAO f or the
building of the kitchen, or the increase in value ("plus
value") which the said area of 34 square meters may
have acquired by reason thereof, or to oblige DUMLAO
to pay the price of said area. The amounts to be
respectively paid by DUMLAO and DEPRA, in
accordance with the option thus exercised by written
notice of the other party and to the Court, shall be paid
by the obligor within fifteen (15) days from such notice
of the option by tendering the amount to the Court in
favor of the party entitled to receive it;
b) The trial Court shall further order that if DEPRA
exercises the option to oblige DUMLAO to pay the price
of the land but the latter rejects such purchase because,
as found by the trial Court, the value of the land is
considerably more than that of the kitchen, DUMLAO
shall give written notice of such rejection to DEPRA and
to the Court within fifteen (15) days from notice of
DEPRA's option to sell the land. In that event, the parties
shall be given a period of fifteen (15) days from such
notice of rejection within which to agree upon the terms
of the lease, and give the Court formal written notice of
such agreement and its provisos. If no agreement is
reached by the parties, the trial Court, within fifteen
(15) days from and after the termination of the said
period fixed for negotiation, shall then fix the terms of
the lease, provided that the monthly rental to be fixed
by the Court shall not be less than Ten Pesos (P10.00)

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PROPERTY (RIGHT OF ACCESSION) CASE DIGESTS

per month, payable within the first five (5) days of each
calendar month. The period for the forced lease shall not
be more than two (2) years, counted from the finality of
the judgment, considering the long period of time since
1952 that DUMLAO has occupied the subject area. The
rental thus fixed shall be increased by ten percent
(10%) for the second year of the forced lease. DUMLAO
shall not make any further constructions or
improvements on the kitchen. Upon expiration of the
two-year period, or upon default by DUMLAO in the
payment of rentals for two (2) consecutive months,
DEPRA shall be entitled to terminate the forced lease, to
recover his land, and to have the kitchen removed by
DUMLAO or at the latter's expense. The rentals herein
provided shall be tendered by DUMLAO to the Court for
payment to DEPRA, and such tender shall constitute
evidence of whether or not compliance was made within
the period fixed by the Court.
c) In any event, DUMLAO shall pay DEPRA an amount
computed at Ten Pesos (P10.00) per month as
reasonable compensation for the occupancy of DEPRA's
land for the period counted from 1952, the year
DUMLAO occupied the subject area, up to the
commencement date of the forced lease referred to in
the preceding paragraph;
d) The periods to be fixed by the trial Court in its
Precision shall be inextendible, and upon failure of the
party obliged to tender to the trial Court the amount due
to the obligee, the party entitled to such payment shall
be entitled to an order of execution for the enforcement
of payment of the amount due and for compliance with
such other acts as may be required by the prestation
due the obligee.
No costs,
SO ORDERED.

|BY: TINA SIUAGAN

PROPERTY (RIGHT OF ACCESSION) CASE DIGESTS

TECNOGAS
PHILIPPINES
MANUFACTURING
CORPORATION vs. COURT OF APPEALS (FORMER
SPECIAL SEVENTEENTH DIVISION) and EDUARDO UY
FACTS
Tecngas Philippines Manufacturing Corporation (herein
petitioner) is a corporation which happens to be the
registered owner of a certain parcel of land located in
Barrio San Dionisio, Paranaque, Metro Manila, and is
known as LOT 4351-A of Lot 4531 of the Cadastral
Survey of Paranaque. In 1970, Tecnogas purchased said
land, together with the buildings and wall built thereon,
from Pariz Industries, Inc. Meanwhile, Eduardo Uy
(herein private respondent) is the owner of a piece of
land, known as LOT 4351-B of the same Cadastral
Survey, and one which is adjacent to that of Tecnogas
lot. Uy purchased LOT 4351-B from a certain Enrile
Antonio in 1970. A year after such purchase, Uy bought
another lot that also adjoins Tecnogas lot from a certain
Miguel Rodriguez.
In 1971, Eduardo Uy, after purchasing his second lot,
hired a surveyor to survey all his newly acquired lots.
This is when he discovered that a portion of his land,
with an area of 770 square meters, was occupied by the
buildings and wall owned by Tecnogas. Having been
apprised of the same, Tecnogas offered to buy the
portion of land encroached. However, Uy declined such
offer. In 1980, Eduardo Uy caused the digging of a canal
over Tecnogas wall, a portion of which collapsed.
Tecnogas filed with the Regional Trial Court a complaint
compelling Eduardo Uy to sell to the former the 770sq.meter of encroached portion of the latters lot. The
collapse of Tecnogas wall, however, let to the filing of a
supplemental complaint against Uy, as well as a
separate criminal complaint for malicious mischief. With
regard to the civil case filed, the Trial Court ordered
Eduardo Uy to sell to Tecnogas the portion of land
occupied by portions of the latters buildings and wall.
Appeal was made by Uy to the Court of Appeals, which
rendered a decision setting aside and reversing that of
the Trial Courts and requiring the removal of the
structures and surrounding walls over the encroached
area of Uys lot. According to the respondent appellate
court, Tecnogas was a builder in bad faith. Aggrived,
Tecnogas interposed a petition before the Honorable
Supreme Court.

Tecnogas avers, among other things, that the

encroached land be sold to it since the first option given
to the landowner under Article 448 of the New Civil
Code is not absolute because an exception thereto, once
it would be impractical for the landowner to choose to
exercise the first alternative, i.e. buy that portion of the
house standing on his land, for the whole building might
be rendered useless. The workable solution is for him
[landowner] to select the second alternative, namely to
sell to the builder that part of his land on which
constructed a portion of the house.
ISSUES
(1) Whether or not Article 448 of the New Civil
Code may apply in this case since Tecnogas is
not the builder of the offending structures but
merely possesses them as a buyer (and thus,
successor-in-interest of Pariz Industries, Inc.)
(2) And if so, whether or not Tecnogas is a builder
in bad faith; and
(3) Whether or not Tecnogas may compel Uy to sell
the encroached area of the latters lot;
HELD
(1) The Honorable Supreme Court held that this
case falls within the purview of Article 448 of
the New Civil Code, notwithstanding the fact
that Tecnogas was not the builder of the
offending structures. The Court appreciated the
fact that records do not reveal clearly who
actually built the buildings and wall. However,
it may be well assumed that Pariz Industries,
Inc, Tecnogas predecessor-in-interest did so. So
much so that when Tecnogas acquired LOT
4351-B, together with the buildings and wall
built thereon, from Pariz Industries, Inc.,
petitioner is deemed to have stepped into the
latters shoes in regard to all the rights of
ownership over the immovable sold. Such right
includes the right to compel Eduardo Uy to
exercise either of the two options provided
under Article 448.
(2) As mentioned above, it is assumed that Pariz
Industries Inc. was the one that built the
buildings and wall on LOT 4351-B, so much so
that when Tecnogas bought such lot and

|BY: TINA SIUAGAN

PROPERTY (RIGHT OF ACCESSION) CASE DIGESTS

improvements thereon, the latter is deemed to
have stepped in to the shoes of the former.
According to the Court, nothing on record
would reveal that the offending structures were
not built in good faith. Hence, Paris Industries is
presumed to have built such structures in good
faith. In addition, on the part of Tecnogas, there
is no clear showing that it was aware of the
encroachment in question. In fact, evidence
would point to such lack of awareness by the
petitioner. Even Eduardo Uy was not aware of
the intrusion until 1971 when the survey of his
two lots was done. And finally, upon being
apprised of the said encroachment, Tecnogas
even offered to buy the area occupied. All these
considered, the Court gave credence to the good
faith on the part of Tecnogas.
(3) However, even though the application of Article
448 is in order, the Honorable Court held that
Tecnogas cannot compel Eduardo Uy to sell the
land to the former, for the right to choose
between the options laid down in the said
provision of law is given only to the landowner.
Hence, the Supreme Court held in the case of
Depra vs. Dumlao, speaking through Madame
Justice Melencio-Herrera, It is the owner of
the land who is authorized to exercise the
option, because his right is older, and
because, by the principle of accession, he is
entitled to the ownership of the accessory
thing. (Emphasis mine.)
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is
hereby GRANTED and the assailed Decision and the
Amended Decision are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. In
accordance with the case of Depra vs. Dumlao, this case
is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City,
Branch 117, for further proceedings consistent with
Articles 448 and 546 43 of the Civil Code, as follows:
The trial court shall determine:
a) the present fair price of private respondent's 520
square-meter area of land;
b) the increase in value ("plus value") which the said
area of 520 square meters may have acquired by reason
of the existence of the portion of the building on the
area;

c) the fair market value of the encroaching portion of

the building; and
d) whether the value of said area of land is considerably
more than the fair market value of the portion of the
building thereon.
2. After said amounts shall have been determined by
competent evidence, the regional trial court shall render
judgment as follows:
a) The private respondent shall be granted a period of
fifteen (15) days within which to exercise his option
under the law (Article 448, Civil Code), whether to
appropriate the portion of the building as his own by
paying to petitioner its fair market value, or to oblige
petitioner to pay the price of said area. The amounts to
be respectively paid by petitioner and private
respondent, in accordance with the option thus
exercised by written notice of the other party and to the
court, shall be paid by the obligor within fifteen (15)
days from such notice of the option by tendering the
amount to the trial court in favor of the party entitled to
receive it;
b) If private respondent exercises the option to oblige
petitioner to pay the price of the land but the latter
rejects such purchase because, as found by the trial
court, the value of the land is considerably more than
that of the portion of the building, petitioner shall give
written notice of such rejection to private respondent
and to the trial court within fifteen (15) days from
notice of private respondent's option to sell the land. In
that event, the parties shall be given a period of fifteen
(15) days from such notice of rejection within which to
agree upon the terms of the lease, and give the trial
court formal written notice of the agreement and its
provisos. If no agreement is reached by the parties, the
trial court, within fifteen (15) days from and after the
termination of the said period fixed for negotiation, shall
then fix the terms of the lease provided that the monthly
rental to be fixed by the Court shall not be less than two
thousand pesos (P2,000.00) per month, payable within
the first five (5) days of each calendar month. The
period for the forced lease shall not be more than two
(2) years, counted from the finality of the judgment,
considering the long period of time since 1970 that
petitioner has occupied the subject area. The rental thus
fixed shall be increased by ten percent (10%) for the
second year of the forced lease. Petitioner shall not
make any further constructions or improvements on the
building. Upon expiration of the two-year period, or
upon default by petitioner in the payment of rentals for

|BY: TINA SIUAGAN

PROPERTY (RIGHT OF ACCESSION) CASE DIGESTS

two (2) consecutive months, private respondent shall be
entitled to terminate the forced lease, to recover his
land, and to have the portion of the building removed by
petitioner or at latter's expense. The rentals herein
provided shall be tendered by petitioner to the trial
court for payment to private respondent, and such
tender shall constitute evidence of whether or not
compliance was made within the period fixed by the
said court.
c) In any event, petitioner shall pay private respondent
an amount computed at two thousand pesos
(P2,000.00) per month as reasonable compensation for
the occupancy of private respondent's land for the
period counted from October 4, 1979, up to the date
private respondent serves notice of its option to
appropriate the encroaching structures, otherwise up to
the actual transfer of ownership to petitioner or, in case
a forced lease has to be imposed, up to the
commencement date of the forced lease referred to in
the preceding paragraph;
d) The periods to be fixed by the trial court in its
decision shall be non-extendible, and upon failure of the
party obliged to tender to the trial court the amount due
to the obligee, the party entitled to such payment shall
be entitled to an order of execution for the enforcement
of payment of the amount due and for compliance with
such other acts as may be required by the prestation
due the obligee.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

|BY: TINA SIUAGAN

PROPERTY (RIGHT OF ACCESSION) CASE DIGESTS

LEONOR GRANA AND JULIETA TORALBA vs. THE
COURT OF APPEALS, AURORA BONGATO and
JARDENIO SANCHEZ

FACTS
Records reveal that the 87 square meter parcel of
land, which is the subject of dispute in this case, is
included as part of the 295-square meter lot belonging
to Gregorio Bongato and Clara Botcon by virtue of a
cadastral survey conducted in 1909 by the Bureau of
Lands in Butuan, Agusan. Such land was registered
under Original Certificate of Title No. RO-72 (138)
issued in favor of Bongato and Botcon in 1923. In 1933,
this lot was purchased by spouses Marcos Bongato and
Eusebia More, and was inherited by their children (who
are half-siblings), Aurora Bongato and Jardenio Sanchez,
upon their death. On this lot, a portion of the
petitioners house was constructed.

of P10.00 from the filing of the complaint until they

actually vacate the same, plus attorneys fees and costs.
Aggrieved, Grana and Torralba elevated the case to the
Court of Appeals. Consequently, the appellate court
affirmed the decision of the RTC, with the only
modification that the award of attorneys fees be
deleted. It also held that while the petitioners do not
have a legal and valid claim over the disputed lot,
they were builders in good faith. With that,
petitioners interposed the present petition before the
Honorable Supreme Court.

ISSUE
Whether or not the rule under Article 448 of the New
Civil Code may be applied to this case.

HELD

On the other hand, petitioners Grana and Torralba

assert their claim over the disputed lot as successors-ininterest of one Isidaria Trillo.According to the
petitioners, the lands in Butuan were subsequently
resurveyed due to the presence of overlapping
boundaries. By virtue of this resurvey, the petitioners
claim that the disputed lot is included in the property of
one Isidaria Trillo, which was designated as Lot no. 310.
Since Trillo is petitioners predecessor-in-interest, they
now assert their claim of ownership over the land.
However, the records of this case reveal that the
petitioners did not present proof to support the
existence of said resurvey. Noteworthy as well is the fact
that by virtue of the alleged subsequent resurvey, the lot
claimed to be part of the lot of the petitioners
predessor-in-interest has an area of only 65 square
meters, which is different from the 87-square meter lot
supported by the Torrens Title held by the private
respondents.

Yes. The Honorable Court ruled that private

respondents, as the owners of the land, may choose to
either (1) appropriate the portion of petitioners house,
which was constructed on the portion of their land,
upon payment of the proper indemnity to the former; or
(2) sell to that portion of the land encroached upon by
the petitioners house.

Aurora Bongato and Jardenio Sanchez filed a complaint

against Lenor Grana and Julieta Torralba for the
recovery of the 87 square meter residential land before
the Regional Trial Court of Butuan. The Trial Court held
that Bongato and Sanchez were the lawful owners of the
land in controversy and ordered Grana and Torralba to
vacate and deliver to former the land. The Trial Court
also ordered Grana and Torralba to pay a monthly rental

In view of the foregoing, the appealed decision is

modified in the sense that respondents are hereby
directed to exercise within 30 days from this decision

However, in this case, the Court saw that choosing the

first option under Article 448 may be impractical. Thus:
It may here be pointed out that it would be impractical
for respondents to choose to exercise the first
alternative, i.e., buy that portion of the house standing
on their land, for in that event the whole building might
be rendered useless. The more workable solution, it
would seem, is for respondents to sell to petitioners that
part of their land on which was constructed a portion of
the latter's house.2

Note that in the Tecnogas case supra, the same opinion was quoted and
used as an argument by petitioner Tecnogas in order to support its
position to compel the sale of the encroached portion of Eduardo Uys
lot. The Supreme Court in said case ruled that the workable solution
enunciated in Grana and Torralba vs. Court of Appeals may be applied
only to the latter case.

|BY: TINA SIUAGAN

PROPERTY (RIGHT OF ACCESSION) CASE DIGESTS

their option to either buy the portion of the petitioners'
house on their land or sell to said petitioners the portion
of their land and petitioners are unwilling or unable to
buy, then they must vacate the same and must pay
reasonable rent of P10.00 monthly from the time
respondents made their choice up to the time they
actually vacate the premises. But if the value of the
eland is considerably more than the value of the
improvement, then petitioners may elect to rent the
land, in which case the parties shall agree upon the
terms of a lease. Should they disagree, the court of origin
is hereby instructed to intervene and fix the terms
thereof. Petitioners shall pay reasonable rent of P10.00
monthly up to the time the parties agree on the terms of
the lease or until the curt fixes such terms.
So ordered without pronouncement as to costs.

|BY: TINA SIUAGAN

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