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CRIMINAL LAW
BOOK 1 (ARTICLES 1-99, RPC)
FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES
MALA IN SE AND MALA PROHIBITA
PADILLA v. DIZON
(158 SCRA 127)
The respondent-judge has shown gross ignorance of
the law in holding that to convict the accused for
violation of Central Bank Circular No. 960 i.e.,
smuggling of foreign currency out of the country, the
prosecution must establish that the accused had the
criminal intent to violate the law. The respondent ought
to know that proof of malice or deliberate intent (mens
rea) is not essential in offenses punished by special
laws, which are mala prohibita.
PEOPLE v ORANDE
(415 SCRA 699)
November 12, 2003
G.R. No. 141724
The trial court convicted the accused of frustrated rape
due to the fact that the latter did not succeed in inserting
his penis in the victims vagina. There is no such crime as
frustrated rape. Instead, the accused is guilty of
consummated rape since perfect penetration is not
essential for the consummation of rape.
IMPOSSIBLE CRIMES
INTOD ET. AL. v CA
(215 SCRA 52)
G.R. No. 103119
VALENZUELA v PEOPLE
(525 SCRA 306)
STAGES OF EXECUTION
PEOPLE v LAMAHANG
(91 Phil 703)
The accused was caught in the act of making an opening
with an iron bar on the wall of a store, and succeeded in
breaking one board and in unfastening another from the
wall. The crime committed was not attempted robbery but
only attempted trespass to dwelling, since based on the
facts established, his intention was to enter by means of
force into the said store against the will of its owner.
PEOPLE v CANTUBA
(183 SCRA 289)
G. R. No. 79811
CONTINUING CRIMES
PEOPLE v TUMLOS
(67 PHIL 320)
April 13, 1939
G.R. No. 46248
The theft of the thirteen (13) cows committed by the
defendant took place at the same time and in the same
place. Consequently, he performed but one act. The fact
that eight (8) of the said cows belong to one owner and
five (5) to another does not make him criminally liable for
two (2) distinct offenses for the reason that to be liable for
two (2) distinct offenses, the act must be divided into two
(2). In this case, the act is not susceptible of division. The
intention was likewise one, namely, to take for the
purpose of appropriating or selling the thirteen (13) cows
which he found grazing in the same place.
PEOPLE v COMADRE
(431 SCRA 366)
June 8, 2004
G.R. No. 153559
The accused dropped a hand grenade inside a house,
killing one and causing 4 others to suffer shrapnel
wounds on their bodies. The accused was found guilty of
the complex crime of murder with multiple attempted
murder under Article 48, and the penalty for the most
serious crime (murder) shall be imposed.
PEOPLE v JARANILLA
(55 SCRA 563)
February 22, 1974
G.R. No. L-28547
The taking of the six fighting cocks from their coop should
be characterized as a single offense of theft as the
assumption is that the accused were animated by a
single criminal impulse. The taking of the fighting cocks in
the same place and on the same occasion cannot give
rise to separate crimes of theft.
SANTIAGO v GARCHITORENA
(228 SCRA 214)
G.R. No. 109266
PEOPLE v BALOTOL
(84 Phil 289)
The accused stabbed the victim at the back with the use
of a bolo. The bolo pierced through the victim's
abdominal region which also wounded another person,
resulting to the death of both victims. The crime
committed was double murder, defined and penalized in
Article 248, in relation to Article 48, of the Revised Penal
Code.
PEOPLE v PATOTOY
(261 SCRA 37)
G.R. No. 102058
PEOPLE v BARBAS
(60 PHIL 241)
The defendant, a public officer, altered the duplicates of
the cedulas by erasing the names originally written on
them and replacing the same with new names for the
purpose of selling them to other people and
misappropriating the money. The falsification of public
documents was, therefore, the means which the
defendant availed himself of in committing the crime of
malversation.
PEOPLE V. BAUTISTA
(424 SCRA 63)
February 27, 2004
G.R. No. 139530
PEOPLE v ABRAZALDO
(397 SCRA 137)
While the accused admitted the commission of the crime
in order to preserve his own life, he maintained that the
victim accidentally stabbed himself while they were
grappling for the knife. The justifying circumstance of selfdefense cannot be appreciated considering the accusedappellants flight from the crime scene, his failure to
inform the authorities of the incident and his failure to
surrender the knife to the authorities. The aforesaid
circumstances are inconsistent with having a clean
conscience and, instead, indicate his culpability to the
crime charged.
PEOPLE v ESCARLOS
(410 SCRA 463)
September 10, 2003
G.R. No. 148912
Even assuming arguendo that there was an altercation
before the stabbing incident and that some danger did in
fact exist, the imminence of that danger had already
ceased the moment the accused disarmed the victim by
seizing the knife from the latter. After the accused had
successfully seized it, there was no longer any unlawful
aggression to speak of that would have necessitated the
need to kill the victim. Hence, the accused became the
unlawful aggressor when he stabbed the victim.
PEOPLE v TAC-AN
(182 SCRA 601)
G.R. Nos. 76338-39
The accused killed the victim but claimed self-defense.
The victim previously uttered some threatening words
against him. Assuming that the victim uttered those
words, such utterances cannot be regarded as the
unlawful aggression which is the first and most
fundamental requirement of self-defense, and such
statements could not reasonably inspire the "well
grounded and reasonable belief" claimed by Renato that
"he was in imminent danger of death or bodily harm."
PEOPLE v APOLINAR
C.A., 38 O.G. 2870
U.S. V. TANEDO
(15 PHIL 196)
The accused, while hunting fired a shot at wild chickens;
however, the slug recoiled and fatally hit another man. A
person who, while performing a legal act with due care,
causes some injury by mere accident without fault or
intention of causing it, is not criminally liable.
PEOPLE v FALLORINA
(428 SCRA ___)
May 4, 2004
G.R. No. 137347
PEOPLE v AYAYA
(52 PHIL 354)
The accused, in order to prevent the door from crushing
her son's head, jabbed her husband with her umbrella
which later led to her husband's death. The Court
concluded that in thrusting her umbrella in the opening of
the door in question, the accused did so to free her son
from the imminent danger of having his head crushed or
being strangled and if she consequently caused her
husband's injury, it was by a mere accident, without any
fault or intention to cause it.
EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCES
PEOPLE v DOMINGO
(580 SCRA 436)
PEOPLE V. GENITA
(425 SCRA 343)
March 11, 2004
G.R. No. 126171
LLAVE v PEOPLE
(488 SCRA 376)
April 26, 2006
G.R. No. 166040
PEOPLE v CASTILLO
(526 SCRA 215)
June 29, 2007
G.R. No. 172695
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES
PEOPLE v BANDIAN
(63 PHL 530)
September 30, 1936
G.R. No. 45186
PEOPLE v JAURIGUE
(C.A. NO. 384)
U.S. v AMPAR
(37 Phil 201)
The accused, a 70-year old man, killed the deceased for
telling him, "Come here and I will make roast pig of you."
The offense which the defendant was trying to vindicate
would be considered a mere trifle to the average person
but it was evidently a serious matter to be made the butt
of a joke for the old man. Hence, he was given the benefit
of a mitigating circumstance.
PEOPLE v MORENO
(77 PHIL 548)
The accused admitted to having killed the victim but
claimed that he should be exempted from liability
because he did so in obedience to an order given him by
Japanese officers of the navy. The latter informed him
that the victim was one of those who were encountered
by the Japanese in a mountain and wounded a Japanese
soldier. The accused was held guilty because the law
provides that to be exempted from criminal liability, it is
not enough to prove that the act was committed in
obedience to an order, it must also be established that
the order being followed is lawful.
PEOPLE v IGNAS
(412 SCRA 311)
September 30, 2003
G.R. No. 140514
The accused killed his wife's lover 2 weeks after he
discovered his wife's extramarital dalliance, but the court
did not consider the mitigating circumstance of passion
and obfuscation because for the same to be well
founded, the following requisites must concur: (1) there
should be an act both unlawful and sufficient to produce
such condition of mind; and (2) the act which produced
the obfuscation was not far removed from the
commission of the crime by a considerable length of time,
during which the perpetrator might recover his moral
equanimity. The period of two weeks between the
discovery of his wifes extramarital dalliance and the
killing of her lover was sufficient time for appellant to
reflect and cool off.
PEOPLE v BENITO
(74 SCRA 271)
December 17, 1976
G.R. No. L-38091
The accused (who had a pending case with the Civil
Service) contended that the victim insulted him when he
(the victim) remarked that a thief was loitering in the
premises of the Civil Service Commission and further
argued that that remark "was tantamount to kicking a
man already down and to rubbing salt into a raw wound"
and that, as it was made publicly and in a loud voice, he
was exposed to ridicule in the presence of his
officemates. Assuming that the remark was directed at
the accused, the Court did not apply the mitigating
circumstance of vindication for a grave offense for the
killing of the victim because the accused had more than
sufficient time to suppress his emotion over said remark if
he ever did resent it.
U.S. V. HICKS
(14 PHIL 217)
The accused and the victim illicitly lived together for 5
years. After they separated, the accused killed the victim
for living with another man. No mitigating circumstance
was considered in his favor, not even the loss of reason
and self-control produced by jealousy as alleged by the
defense, inasmuch as the only causes which mitigate the
criminal responsibility for the loss of self-control are those
which originate from legitimate feelings and not those
which arise from vicious, unworthy, and immoral
passions.
PEOPLE v ABOLIDOR
(423 SCRA 260)
February 18, 2004
G.R. No. 147231
The accused surrendered to the authorities more than
one year after the incident in order to disclaim
responsibility for the killing of the victim. The Court did
not consider the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender because: (1) the facts of the case do not show
repentance or acknowledgment of the crime nor intention
to save the government the trouble and expense
necessarily incurred in his search and capture; and (2) at
the time of his surrender, there was a pending warrant of
arrest against him.
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES
PEOPLE v CALISO
(58 PHIL 283)
July 1, 1933
G.R. No. L-37271
PEOPLE v RABAO
(67 PHIL 255)
April 10, 1939
G.R. No. L-46530
PEOPLE v LORA
(113 SCRA 366)
March 30, 1982
G.R. No. L-49430
The accused was charged for the crime of serious illegal
detention with murder for illegally detaining a 3-year old
child, and attacking the same, which resulted to the
child's death. There are three aggravating circumstances
in this case, namely: (1) lack of respect due to the tender
age of the victim; (2) cruelty, for gagging the victim's
mouth with stockings thereby causing slow suffocation;
and (3) abuse of confidence since the main duty of the
accused in the household was to take care of the minor
child.
PEOPLE v DAWATON
(389 SCRA 277)
September 17, 2002
G.R. No. 146247
In trying to avail of the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender, the accused argues that he was not
arrested but "fetched" as he voluntarily went with the
policemen when they came for him. That he did not try to
escape or resist arrest after he was taken into custody by
the authorities did not amount to voluntary surrender and
it is also settled that voluntary surrender cannot be
appreciated where the evidence adduced shows that it
was the authorities who came looking for the accused.
PEOPLE v LAGUARDIA
(148 SCRA 133)
February 27, 1987
G.R. No. L-63243
The following aggravating circumstances were present in
this case of robbery with homicide: (1) despoblado or
uninhabited place since evidence shows that the accused
lay in wait for the truck being driven by the victim at an
isolated portion of the highway, choosing that particular
spot where they could commit the crime without
disturbance or discovery and with easy opportunity for
escape; and (2) use of motor vehicles because the
PEOPLE v VIERNES
(372 SCRA 231)
December 13, 2001
G.R. No. 136733
Going to the police station to clear his name does not
show any intent of the accused to surrender
unconditionally to the authorities. The act of surrender
PEOPLE v ZETA
(549 SCRA 541)
March 27, 2008
G.R. No. 178541
After his son had fatally hacked the victim with a bolo and
was about to strike the victim a second time, the accused
shouted: "You kill him." The accused is not guilty as
principal by inducement because in determining whether
the utterances of an accused are sufficient to make him
guilty as co-principal by inducement, it must appear that
the inducement was of such nature and was made in
such a way as to become the determining cause of the
crime and that such inducement was uttered with the
intention of producing the result.
PEOPLE v DUMANCAS
(320 SCRA 584)
December 13, 1999
G.R. No. 13352728
The accused cannot be held guilty as principal by
inducement when she told the policemen to "take care of
the two" victims, who were later killed by the said
policemen. There are 2 ways of directly inducing another
to commit a crime, namely: (i) by giving a price, or
offering reward or promise, and (ii) by using words of
command and in this case, there is no evidence that the
accused offered any price or reward should they kill the
victims, nor can the remark of the accused be deemed as
a command required by law to justify a finding that she is
guilty as a principal by inducement.
ACCESSORIES
PEOPLE v ORTIZ AND ZAUSA
(55 PHIL 993)
August 27, 1986
G.R. No. L-3507
Ortiz and Zausa were charged with conspiracy to kill the
victim but Ortiz contends that he should be acquitted
because he did not take part in the attack. The Court
ruled that Ortiz cannot be convicted either as principal or
as accessory, for it has been shown that there was
neither plan nor agreement between him and Zausa to
commit the crime, and that he took no part in the latter's
attack with the spear.
CARINO v PEOPLE
(7 SCRA 900)
April 30, 1963
G.R. No. L-14752
The accused cannot be held guilty as an accomplice in
the crime of rebellion through his acts of sending or
furnishing cigarettes and food supplies to a famous Huk,
as well as changing $6,000 to Philippine money or in
helping Huks to open accounts (which were said to be
part of his functions as an employee of a bank). These
acts by themselves do not and cannot carry or prove any
criminal intent of helping the Huks in committing the
crime of insurrection or rebellion and they cannot be said
to constitute acts of cooperation in the execution of the
act of overthrowing the government.
VINO v PEOPLE
(178 SCRA 626)
October 19, 1989
G.R. No. 84163
The information was correct. An accused can be validly
convicted as an accomplice or accessory under an
information charging him as a principal. Also, the trial of
an accessory can proceed without awaiting the result of
the separate charge against the principal for the
corresponding responsibilities of the principal, accomplice
and accessory are distinct from each other.
PEOPLE v FERNANDEZ
(183 SCRA 511)
March 22, 1990
G.R. No. L-62116
The accused furnished the gun that was used to kill the
victim Casiano, however, he cannot be held liable as an
accomplice because he merely conspired with the
principal to kill another victim, Rafael. The accused here
was not aware that the principal would use the gun to kill
Casiano. Hence, for other acts done outside the
DURATION OF PENALTIES
MEJORADA v SANDIGANBAYAN
(151 SCRA 399)
June 30, 1987
G.R. Nos. L-51065-72
PEOPLE v ALVARADO
(275 SCRA 727)
July 21, 1997
G.R. No. 117402
PEOPLE v ESCARES
(102 PHIL 677)
December 23, 1957
G.R. Nos. L-11128-33
FRANCISCO v CA
(243 SCRA 384)
April 6, 1995
G.R. No. 108747
SORIANO v CA
(304 SCRA 231)
March 4, 1999
G.R. No. 123936
CABATINGAN v SANDIGANBAYAN
(102 SCRA 187)
January 22, 1981
G.R. No. L-55333
PADUA v PEOPLE
(559 SCRA 519)
July 23, 2008
G.R. No. 168546
YAPDIANGCO v BUENCAMINO
(122 SCRA 713)
June 24, 1983
G.R. No. L-28841
REMIENDO v PEOPLE
(603 SCRA 274)
October 9, 2009
G.R. No. 184874
PEOPLE v BAYOTAS
(236 SCRA 239)
September 2, 1994
G.R. No. 102007
SERMONIA v CA
(233 SCRA 155)
June 14, 1994
G.R. NO. 109454
Petitioner, in contending that his criminal liability for
bigamy has been obliterated by prescription, insists that
since the second marriage contract was duly registered
with the Office of the Civil Registrar in 1975, such fact of
registration makes it a matter of public record and
constitutes notice to the whole world. Hence, the
offended party is considered to have had constructive
notice of the subsequent marriage as of 1975 and that
prescription commenced to run on the day the marriage
contract was registered. The Supreme Court held that
unlike in the case of real property, the principle of
constructive notice should not be applied in regard to the
crime of bigamy as judicial notice may be taken of the
10
PRESCRIPTION OF PENALTIES
DEL CASTILLO v TORRECAMPO
(394 SCRA 221)
December 18, 2002
G.R. No. 139033
10 years after the petitioner was found guilty for violating
the Election Code (whereby he was never apprehended
and remained at large), he filed before the trial court a
motion to quash the warrant issued for his arrest on the
ground of prescription of the penalty imposed upon him.
He based his claims on Article 93 of the Revised Penal
Code which provides that the period of prescription shall
commence to run from the date when the culprit should
evade the service of his sentence. The petition must be
denied since under Article 93, prescription shall
commence to run from the date the felon evades the
service of his sentence, which is inapplicable in the case
at bar since the petitioner was never brought to prison
and cannot be said to have escaped therefrom.
CABRAL V. PUNO
(70 SCRA 606)
April 30, 1976
G.R. No. L-41692
Petitioner was charged with the crime of falsification (with
a prescriptive period of 10 years) for allegedly forging a
document that was registered in the Register of Deeds on
August 26, 1948. The complaint of respondent, filed on
September 24, 1974, was dismissed on the ground of
prescription since the respondent had actual if not
constructive notice of the alleged forgery upon its
registration in the Register of Deeds.
Act No. 3326, As Amended
PANGAN v GATBALITE
(449 SCRA 144)
January 21, 2005
G.R. No. 141718
ZALDIVIA v REYES
(211 SCRA 277)
July 3, 1992
G.R. No. 102342
PCGG v DESIERTO
(527 SCRA 61)
July 9, 2007
G.R. No. 140231
PEOPLE v TADULAN
(271 SCRA 233)
April 15, 1997
G.R. No. 117407
11
PEOPLE v PEREZ
(83 PHIL 314)
PEOPLE v SALLE
(250 SCRA 581)
December 4, 1995
G.R. No. 103567
The accused was granted conditional pardon, but for the
said pardon to take effect, he must first withdraw his
appeal. The conditional pardon granted the said appellant
shall be deemed to take effect only upon the grant of
such withdrawal and in case of non-compliance with this
Resolution, the Director of the Bureau of Corrections
must exert every possible effort to take back into his
custody the said accused, for which purpose he may
seek the assistance of the Philippine National Police or
the National Bureau of Investigation.
PEOPLE v ADRIANO
(78 PHIL 561)
Adriano was convicted for the crime of treason for being
a member of the Makapili, a military organization
established and designed to assist and aid militarily the
Japanese Imperial forces in the Philippines in the said
enemy's war efforts and operations against the United
States and the Philippines. The Supreme Court in
upholding the conviction held that the mere fact of having
joined a Makapili organization is evidence of both
adherence to the enemy and giving him aid and comfort
and that being a Makapili is in itself constitutive of an
overt act. Hence, it is not necessary, except for the
purpose of increasing the punishment, that the defendant
actually went to battle or committed nefarious acts
against his country or countrymen.
PEOPLE v BACANG
(260 SCRA 44)
July 30, 1996
G.R. NO. 116512
The conditional pardons were granted to accusedappellants during the pendency of their appeal. The Court
held that such conditional pardons are void since the
conviction by final judgment limitation under Section 19,
Article VII of the present Constitution prohibits the grant
of pardon, whether full or conditional, to an accused
during the pendency of his appeal from his conviction by
the trial court and any application therefor, if one is made,
should not be acted upon or the process toward its grant
should not be begun unless the appeal is withdrawn.
PEOPLE v MANAYAO
(78 PHIL 721)
ARBITRARY DETENTION
UMIL v RAMOS
(187 SCRA 311)
Subversion is a continuing crime. As such, authorities,
upon determination of probable cause may execute a
valid arrest pursuant to Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure.
PEOPLE v BURGOS
(144 SCRA 1)
When the accused is arrested on the sole basis of a
verbal report, the arrest without a warrant under Section
6(a) of Rule 113 is not lawful and legal since the offense
12
UMIL v RAMOS
(187 SCRA 85)
July 9, 1990
G.R. 81567
Being a member of the New Peoples Army, an outlawed
organization, is punishable. Subversion like rebellion or
insurrection is perceived as a continuing offense and
unlike other so called common offenses i.e. adultery,
murder, arson, etc. which generally end upon their
commission, subversion and rebellion are anchored on
an ideological base which compels the repetition of the
same acts of lawlessness and violence until the
overriding objective of overthrowing organized
government is attained.
PEOPLE v LOVERDIORO
(250 SCRA 389)
November 29, 1995
G.R. 112235
In deciding if the crime committed is rebellion, not
murder, it becomes imperative for the courts to ascertain
whether or not the act was done in furtherance of a
political end. The political motive of the act should be
conclusively demonstrated as it is not enough that the
overt acts of rebellion are duly proven otherwise if no
political motive is established and proved, the accused
should be convicted of the common crime and not of
rebellion.
PEOPLE v GERONIMO
(100 PHIL 90)
October 23, 1956
G.R. L-8936
Not every act of violence is deemed absorbed in the
crime of rebellion solely because it was committed
simultaneously with or in the course of the rebellion. If the
killing, robbing, etc. were done for private purposes or
profit, without any political motivation, the crime would be
separately punishable and would not be absorbed by the
rebellion and the individual misdeed could not be taken
with the rebellion to constitute a complex crime, for the
constitutive acts and intent would be unrelated to each
other. The individual crime would not be a means
necessary for committing the rebellion, as it would not be
done in preparation or in furtherance of the latter.
SEDITION
PEOPLE v UMALI
(96 PHIL 185)
November 29, 1954
G.R. L-5803
13
PEOPLE v CABRERA
(43 PHIL 64)
March 6, 1922
G.R. 17748
Seventy-seven members of the Philippine Constabulary
who rose publicly and tumultuously in order to attain by
force and outside of legal methods the object of inflicting
an act of hate or revenge upon the police of the City of
Manila were found guilty of the crime of sedition as
defined and punished by Act No. 292 of the Philippine
Commission.
MENDOZA v PEOPLE
(90 PHIL 524)
December 17 1951
G.R. L-2990
PEOPLE v HADJI
(9 SCRA 252)
October 24, 1963
G.R. L-12686
INCITING TO SEDITION
US v TOLENTINO
(5 PHIL 682)
March 6, 1906
G.R. L-1451
The manifest, unmistakable tendency of the play, in view
of the time, place, and manner of its presentation, was to
inculcate a spirit of hatred and enmity against the
American people and the Government of the United
States. The principal object and intent of its author was to
incite the people of the Philippines to open armed
resistance to the constituted authorities, and to induce
them to conspire together for the secret organization of
armed forces, to be used when the opportunity present
itself, for the purpose of overthrowing the present
Government and the setting up another in its stead. The
manner and form in which the drama was presented at
such a time and under such conditions renders absurd
the pretense that it was merely or even principally a
literary or artistic production.
ILLEGAL ASSOCIATION
PEOPLE v EVANGELISTA
(57 PHIL 372)
October 26, 1932
G.R. L-36277
The principal defense that the Communist Party of the
Philippines is not an illegal association in that it preaches
only a social but not an armed revolution is obviously
useless, since a mere reading of the constitution of the
Communist Party will show that the purpose of such
association is to incite class struggle and to overthrow the
present government by peaceful means or by armed
revolution. Therefore, the purpose of such association is
to alter the social order and to commit the crimes of
rebellion and sedition. An association having such an
object must necessarily be illegal.
ESPUELAS v PEOPLE
December 17, 1951
G.R. L-2990
A published writing which calls our government one of
crooks and dishonest persons ("dirty") infested with Nazis
and Fascists i.e. dictators, and which reveals a tendency
to produce dissatisfaction or a feeling incompatible with
14
PEOPLE v RODIL
(109 SCRA 306)
November 20 1981
G.R. L-35156
While the evidence definitely demonstrated that the
appellant knew because the victim, who was in civilian
clothing, told him that he was an agent of a person in
authority, he cannot be convicted of the complex crime of
homicide with assault upon an agent of a person in
authority for the simple reason that the information does
not allege the fact that the accused then knew that,
before or at the time of the assault, the victim was an
agent of a person in authority. Such knowledge must be
expressly and specifically averred in the information,
otherwise, in the absence of such allegation, the required
knowledge, like a qualifying circumstance, although
proven, would only be appreciated as a generic
aggravating circumstance.
DIRECT ASSAULT
PEOPLE v BELTRAN
(138 SCRA 521)
September 13, 1985
G.R. L-37168-69
Shooting the mayor and a policeman on duty is
attempted murder with assault. Considering that Mayor
Quirolgico is a person in authority and Pat. Rolando
Tolentino is a policeman who at the time was in his
uniform, and both were performing their official duties to
maintain peace and order in the community, appellants
are guilty of attempted murder with direct assault.
PEOPLE v TAC-AN
(182 SCRA 601)
February 26, 1990
G.R. 76338-39
PEOPLE v DOLLANTES
(151 SCRA 592)
June 30, 1987
G.R. 70639
PEOPLE v QUIJADA
(259 SCRA 191)
July 24, 1996
G.R. 115008-09
The killing of a person with the use of an unlicensed
firearm cannot serve to increase the penalty for homicide
or murder but rather, by express provision of P.D. No.
1866, shall increase the penalty for illegal possession of
firearm. When an accused is prosecuted for homicide or
murder and for aggravated illegal possession of firearm,
the constitutional bar against double jeopardy will not
apply since these offenses are quite different from one
another, with the first punished under the Revised Penal
Code and the second under a special law.
CELINO v CA
(526 SCRA 195)
June 29, 2007
G.R. 170562
PEOPLE v RECTO
(367 SCRA ___)
October 17, 2001
G.R. 129069
15
VYTIACO v CA
(19 SCRA 744)
April 24, 1967
G.R. L-20246-48
QUASI-RECIDIVISM
PEOPLE v DIOSO
October 23, 1964
G.R. L-38346-47
FORGERY
DEL ROSARIO v PEOPLE
(3 SCRA 650)
PEOPLE v ABILONG
(82 PHIL ___)
November 26, 1948
G.R. L-1960
Although destierro does not constitute imprisonment, it is
a deprivation of liberty, though partial, in the sense that
as in the present case, the appellant by his sentence of
destierro was deprived of the liberty to enter the City of
Manila. Thus, if a person sentenced to destierro by virtue
of final judgment and prohibited from entering the City of
Manila enters said city within the period of his sentence,
he is guilty of evasion of sentence under Article 157 of
the Revised Penal Code.
FALSIFICATION
SIQUIAN v PEOPLE
(171 SCRA 223)
Falsification of public document is committed when the
accused issues a certification which states that funds are
available for the position to which a person is appointed
16
LUAGUE v CA
(112 SCRA 97)
If the accused acted in good faith when she signed her
spouse's name to the checks and encashed them to pay
for the expenses of the spouses last illness and burial
upon the belief that the accused is entitled to them and
considering that the government sustained no damage
due to such encashment, criminal intent may not be
ascribed, and the accused should be acquitted to such
crime.
PEOPLE v VILLALON
(192 SCRA 521)
PEOPLE VS SENDAYDIEGO
(81 SCRA 120)
US v CAPULE
(24 PHIL 12)
January 2, 1913
G.R. L-7447
US v CASTILLO
(6 PHIL 453)
September 19, 1906
G.R. 2829
PEOPLE v MANANSALA
(58 PHIL 796)
November 18, 1933
G.R. L-38948
The Court held that the unexplained fact that the accused
altered a forged check which is strong evidence tending
to prove that the accused either forged the check himself
or caused it to be forged when accompanied by proof of
other facts, which render it difficult to understand how the
check could have been forged without the intervention of
the accused, is sufficient to sustain a conviction for
forgery.
DAVA v PEOPLE
(202 SCRA 62)
G.R. 73
BERADIO VS CA
(103 SCRA 567)
17
LEGAMIA v IAC
(131 SCRA 478)
MARTINEZ v PEOPLE
(652 SCRA ___)
June 15, 2011
G.R. 194367
PERJURY
DIAZ v PEOPLE
(191 SCRA 86)
USURPATION
GIGANTONI v PEOPLE
(162 SCRA 158)
It is incumbent upon the prosecution to establish by
positive evidence the allegation that an accused falsely
represents himself. It is essential to present proof that
one actually knows at the time of the alleged commission
of the offense that he is already dismissed from the
service.
An argument that it makes no difference whether the
accused was suspended or dismissed from the service,
for both imply the absence of power to represent oneself
as vested with authority to perform acts pertaining to an
office to which he knowingly was deprived of is correct
only when an accused is charged with Usurpation of
Official Function but not if one is charged with Usurpation
of Authority.
ESTRADA v DESIERTO
(445 SCRA 655)
December 9, 2004
GR 156160
When a person who issued a notice has obtained an
authority to issue the same, for instance being an officerin-charge of a Philippine Government or agency, a
charge for Usurpation of Official Function does not apply.
In order for one to be held liable for Usurpation of Official
Function, there must be a clear showing that the person
being charged had performed an act pertaining to any
person in authority or public officer of the Philippine
Government or any agency thereof, under pretense of
official position, and without being lawfully entitled to do
so.
PEOPLE v BONGCARAWAN
(384 SCRA 525)
The possession of dangerous drugs must be with
knowledge of the accused, or that animus possidendi
existed together with the possession or control of such
articles but the possession of dangerous drugs
constitutes prima facie evidence of knowledge or animus
possidendi sufficient to convict an accused in the
absence of a satisfactory explanation of such possession.
Another is that the things in possession of a person are
presumed by law to be owned by him and that to
overcome this presumption, it is necessary to present
clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.
PEOPLE v APARICI
(52 OG 249)
In a dark theater with stage dimly lit where a person is
swaying to and fro with the middle part of her body, and
dancing with her hips swaying and sometimes raising her
feet, the Court provided that the test whether a particular
act is obscene is its tendency to deprave or corrupt those
whose minds are open to such immoral influences, be
they cultured or not.
PEOPLE v SUZUKI
(414 SCRA 43)
October 23, 2003
G.R. 120670
PEOPLE v PADAN
(101 PHIL 749)
In an actual exhibition of a sexual act, preceded by acts
of lasciviousness, there can be no redeeming features; in
it there is no room for art. It is clear and an unmitigated
obscenity, indecency and an offense to public morals and
causing as it does, nothing but lust and lewdness, and
exerting a corrupting influence especially on the youth of
the land.
FERNANDO v CA
(510 SCRA 351)
December 6, 2006
G.R. No. 159751
PEOPLE v CHUA
(396 SCRA 657)
MEJORADA v SANDIGANBAYAN
(151 SCRA 399)
PEOPLE v KOTTINGER
(45 PHIL 352)
19
MALVERSATION
LABATAGOS v SANDIGANBAYAN
(183 SCRA 415)
When a collecting officer of a government institution
assigns his or her work to another without the former
being the one to misappropriate a government fund or
property malversation may still be at hand. Malversation
consists not only in misappropriation or converting public
funds or property to ones personal use but also by
knowingly allowing others to make use of them.
PEOPLE V JUMAWAN
(116 SCRA 739)
September 23, 1982
G.R. No. L-50905
ILOGON v SANDIGANBAYAN
(218 SCRA 766)
PEOPLE v TOMOTORGO
(136 SCRA 238)
April 30, 1985
G.R. No. L-47941
The fact that the appellant intended to maltreat the victim
only or inflict physical injuries does not exempt him from
liability for the resulting and more serious crime of
parricide. Appellant is only entitled to the mitigating
circumstance of lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong
(Article 13 (3 Id).)
PEOPLE V GENOSA
(419 SCRA 537)
January 15, 2004
G.R. No. 135981
To appreciate battered woman syndrome (BWS) as selfdefense, appellant must prove the following: (1) each of
the phases of the cycle of violence must be proven to
have characterized at least two battering episodes
between the appellant and her intimate partner; (2) the
final acute battering episode preceding the killing of the
batterer must have produced in the battered person's
mind an actual fear of an imminent harm from her
batterer and an honest belief that she needed to use
force in order to save her life; and (3) at the time of the
killing, the batterer must have posed probable -- not
necessarily immediate and actual -- grave harm to the
accused, based on the history of violence perpetrated by
the former against the latter. Under the existing facts of
the present case, however, not all of these elements
were duly established.
20
MUTILATION
AGUIRRE v SECRETARY OF JUSTICE
(547 SCRA 431)
March 3, 2008
G.R. No. 170723
Mutilation under the first paragraph of Article 262 of the
Revised Penal Code requires (1) that there be a
castration, that is, mutilation of organs necessary for
generation and (2) that the mutilation is caused purposely
and deliberately to deprive the offended party of some
essential organ for reproduction. In this present petition,
the bilateral vasectomy done on Larry could not have
amounted to the crime of mutilation because though
undeniably, vasectomy denies a man his power of
reproduction, such procedure does not deprive him,
"either totally or partially, of some essential organ for
reproduction."
PEOPLE v OYANIB
(354 SCRA 196)
March 12, 2001
G.R. Nos. 130634-35
To be relieved of any criminal liability, the accused having
admitted the killing must prove that the death caused is
the proximate result of the outrage overwhelming him
after chancing upon his spouse in the act of infidelity.
Further, he must have not promoted or facilitated the
prostitution of his wife nor consented to her infidelity.
RAPE
MURDER
PEOPLE v ORITA
(184 SCRA 105)
March 3, 2008
G.R. No. 170723
PEOPLE v CASTRO
(196 SCRA 679)
May 6, 1991
G.R. No. 91490
HOMICIDE
PEOPLE v PUGAY
(167 SCRA 439)
November 17, 1988
G.R. No. 74324
PEOPLE v ACHAS
(595 SCRA 341)
August 4, 2009
G.R. No. 185712
The absence of external signs or physical injuries on the
complainants body does not necessarily negate the
commission of rape. This is because hymenal laceration
is not an element of the crime of rape, albeit a healed or
fresh laceration is a compelling proof of defloration.
UNINTENTIONAL ABORTION
PEOPLE v SALUFRANIA
(159 SCRA 401)
March 30, 1988
G.R. No. L-50884
PEOPLE v CRUZ
(595 SCRA 411)
August 4, 2009
G.R. No. 186129
21
PEOPLE v MANGALINO
(182 SCRA 329)
February 15, 1990
G.R. No. 79011
PEOPLE v MIRANDILLA
(654 SCRA 761)
July 27, 2011
G.R. No. 186417
PEOPLE v ERINIA
(50 PHIL 998)
January 20, 1927
G.R. No. L-26298
PEOPLE v MADSALI
(611 SCRA 596)
February 4, 2010
G.R. No. 179570
PEOPLE V ATENTO
(196 SCRA 357)
April 26, 1991
G.R. No. 84728
The accused was held guilty under paragraph 3 of Article
335 of the Revised Penal Code even if the circumstances
of force and intimidation or of the victim being deprived of
reason or otherwise unconscious are absent. If sexual
intercourse with a victim under twelve years of age is
rape, then it should follow that carnal knowledge with a
seventeen-year old girl whose mental capacity is that of a
seven year old child would constitute rape.
PEOPLE v PORAS
(612 SCRA 624)
February 16, 2010
G.R. No. 177747
PEOPLE v MUIT
(568 SCRA 251)
October 8, 2008
G.R. No. 181043
DE CASTRO v FERNANDEZ
(515 SCRA 682)
February 14, 2007
G.R. No. 155041
PEOPLE v GUTTIEREZ
(658 SCRA ___ )
October 3, 2011
G.R. No. 168552
PEOPLE v FUNESTO
(655 SCRA 357)
August 3, 2011
G.R. No. 182237
Jurisprudence firmly holds that the force or violence
required in rape cases is relative; it does not need to be
overpowering or irresistible; it is present when it allows
22
PEOPLE V TOMIO
(202 SCRA 77)
September 30, 1991
G.R. No. 74630
GRAVE THREATS
REYES v PEOPLE
(27 SCRA 686)
March 28, 1969
G.R. Nos. L-21528 and L-21529
PEOPLE V LIM
(190 SCRA 706)
The fact of detention which is an essential element in the
kidnapping was not clearly established as there was no
showing that there was actual confinement or restriction
on the person of the offended party. The two minors
voluntarily entered the appellant's residence and there is
no indication that one of the minors was locked up,
physically restrained of her liberty or unable to
communicate with anyone.
PEOPLE V PADICA
(221 SCRA 362)
CALUAG v PEOPLE
(580 SCRA 575)
March 4, 2009
G.R. No. 171511
PEOPLE v RAMOS
(297 SCRA ___ )
October 12, 1998
G.R. No. 118570
GRAVE COERCION
TIMONER v PEOPLE
(125 SCRA 830)
November 25, 1983
G.R. No. L-62050
PEOPLE v TY
(263 SCRA 754)
May 12, 1978
G.R. No. L-32529
LEE v CA
(201 SCRA 405)
September 6, 1991
G.R. No. 90423
23
UNJUST VEXATION
PEOPLE v CALIXTO
(123 SCRA 369)
PEOPLE v REYES
(60 PHIL 369)
PEOPLE v QUINONES
(183 SCRA 747)
March 28, 1990
G.R. No. 80042
There is no crime of robbery with multiple homicide under
the Revised Penal Code thus the charge should have
been for robbery with homicide only regardless of the fact
that three persons were killed in the commission of the
robbery. In this special complex crime, the number of
persons killed is immaterial and does not increase the
penalty prescribed in Article 294 of the said Code.
PEOPLE v BIRUAR
(130 SCRA 513)
July 25, 1984
G.R. Nos. L-32202-04
In this case, the accused, after committing the crime of
robbery in band in the house of Gorgonio Mosende, went
to the neighboring house of George Kalitas where they
committed the crimes of Arson and Robbery with
Homicide and Physical Injuries. Obviously, the rule
enunciated in People v De Leon cannot be made
applicable since the herein accused performed different
acts with distinct purposes which resulted in juridically
independent crimes.
PEOPLE v MORENO
(220 SCRA 292)
January 25, 2002
G.R. No. 140033
Accused Juan Moreno, who took no part in the rape, is
guilty of robbery only under Article 294, No. 5 of the
Revised Penal Code but as to appellant Reynaldo
Maniquez, who had raped Mary Ann Galedo, he should
be guilty of the special complex crime of robbery with
rape, under Article 294, No. 2 of the Revised Penal Code.
24
ROBBERY IN BAND
PEOPLE v APDUHAN
(24 SCRA 798)
August 30, 1968
G.R. No. L-19491
IZON v PEOPLE
(107 SCRA ___)
August 31, 1981
G.R. No. L-51370
THEFT
DIZON-PAMINTUAN v PEOPLE
(234 SCRA 63)
July 11, 1994
G.R. No. 111426
VALENZUELA v PEOPLE
(525 SCRA __ )
June 21, 2007
G.R. No. 160188
25
SANTOS v PEOPLE
(181 SCRA ___ )
January 29, 1990
G.R. No. 77429
PEOPLE v ONG
(204 SCRA ___)
December 20, 1991
G.R. No. 93849
QUALIFIED THEFT
EMPELIS v IAC
(132 SCRA ___ )
September 28, 1984
G.R. No. L-66136
DOMAGSANG v CA
(347 SCRA 75)
December 5, 2000
G.R. No. 139292
NIERRAS v DACUYCUY
(181 SCRA 1)
January 11, 1990
G.R. Nos. 59568-76
VACA v CA
(298 SCRA ___ )
November 16, 1998
G.R. No. 131714
PEOPLE v MONTANER
(656 SCRA ___ )
August 31, 2011
G.R. No. 184053
26
PEOPLE v NITAFAN
(207 SCRA ___)
April 6, 1992
G.R. Nos. 81559-60
MALICIOUS MISCHIEF
TAGUINOD v PEOPLE
(659 SCRA ___)
October 12, 2011
G.R. 185833
The elements of the crime of malicious mischief under
Article 327 of the Revised Penal Code are: (1) That the
offender deliberately caused damage to the property of
another; (2) That such act does not constitute arson or
other crimes involving destruction; (3) That the act of
damaging anothers property be committed merely for the
sake of damaging it.
LIM LAO v CA
(274 SCRA 472)
June 20, 1997
G.R. No. 119178
The fact that petitioner was a signatory to the checks that
were subsequently dishonored merely engenders the
prima facie presumption that she knew of the
insufficiency of funds, but it does not render her
automatically guilty under B.P. 22. The trial court itself
found that no personal notice of dishonor to petitioner
Lina Lim Lao was made by the drawee bank hence, the
prima facie presumption that she knew about the
insufficiency of funds cannot apply.
CABALLES V DAR
(168 SCRA 247)
December 5, 1988
G.R. No. 78214
The private respondent cannot be held criminally liable
for malicious mischief in cutting the banana trees
because, as an authorized occupant or possessor of the
land, and as planter of the banana trees, he owns said
crops including the fruits thereof. Thus, an essential
element of the crime of malicious mischief, which is
"damage deliberately caused to the property of another,"
is absent because the private respondent merely cut
down his own plantings.
IDOS v CA
(296 SCRA ___)
September 25, 1998
G.R. No. 110782
When there was no consideration whatsoever for the
issuance of the check such as when the subject check
was issued merely to evidence complainant's interest in
the partnership and was not intended to apply on account
or for value and when the check was issued without
actual knowledge of the insufficiency of funds, there is no
violation of BP 22. Further, the failure of the complainant
or by the drawee bank to send a notice of dishonor to the
petitioner precludes any finding of prima facie evidence of
knowledge of insufficiency of funds.
WONG v CA
(351 SCRA 100)
February 2, 2001
G.R. No. 117857
When private respondent deposited the checks 157 days
after the date of the checks, the presumption of
knowledge of insufficiency of funds was lost. But such
knowledge could still be proven by direct or circumstantial
evidence such as in this case, the trial court found that
petitioner made reassurance that he would issue new
checks but failed to do so, was duly notified of the
dishonour of the checks and failed to make arrangements
for full payment within five (5) banking days thereof.
BABANTO v ZOSA
(120 SCRA 834)
February 28, 1983
G.R. No. L-32895
OTHER DECEITS
VILLAFLOR V CA
(192 SCRA 680)
27
PEREZ v CA
(168 SCRA 236)
November 29, 1988
G.R. No. L-80838
BIGAMY
TEVES v PEOPLE
(656 SCRA 307)
August 24, 2011
G.R. No. 188775
PEOPLE v ALBURO
(184 SCRA 655)
April 26, 1990
G.R. No. 85822
The Court is not persuaded by the theory that appellant
and Evelyn were sweethearts because if they were,
surely, Evelyn would not have jeopardized their
relationship by accusing him of having deflowered her
and, on top of it all, filing a criminal charge against him.
Moreover, appellant was not able to present any
convincing evidence to substantiate his claim like love
letters, notes and other symbols of affection.
PEOPLE v ARAGON
(100 PHIL 103)
February 28, 1957
G.R. No. L-10016
A subsequent marriage contracted by any person during
the lifetime of his first spouse is illegal and void from its
performance, and no judicial decree is necessary to
establish its invalidity, as distinguished from mere
annullable marriages.
PEOPLE v GODINES
(196 SCRA 765)
May 7, 1991
G.R. No. 93410
A medical examination is not an indispensable element in
a prosecution of rape. Further, the defense of alibi cannot
prosper because the distance between the alleged
whereabouts of the appellants at the time of the
commission of the crime and the scene of the crime itself
may be easily negotiated by ordinary means and in light
of the positive identification of the accused as the authors
of the crime.
MERCADO V TAN
(337 SCRA ___ )
August 1, 2000
G.R. No. 137110
The fact that petitioner subsequently obtained a judicial
declaration of the nullity of the first marriage after having
contracted the second marriage was already immaterial
since the crime had already been consummated. By
contracting a second marriage while the first was still
subsisting, he committed that acts punishable under
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.
MORIGO v PEOPLE
(422 SCRA 376)
February 6, 2004
G.R. No. 145226
28
GONZALES v ARCILLA
(203 SCRA 609)
November 18, 1991
G.R. No. L-27923
TENEBRO v CA
(422 SCRA ___ )
February 18, 2004
G.R. No. 150758
SAZON v CA
(255 SCRA 692)
March 29, 1996
G.R. No. 120715
MARRIAGE CONTRACTED
AGAINST PROVISION OF THE LAW
COSCA v PALAYPAYON
(237 SCRA 249)
September 30, 1994
A.M. No. MTJ-92-721
VASQUEZ v CA
(314 SCRA 460)
September 15, 1999
G.R. No. 118971
ALCANTARA v PONCE
(517 SCRA 74)
February 28, 2007
G.R. No. 156183
The crime of libel, as defined in Article 353 of the Revised
Penal Code, has the following elements: (1) imputation of
a crime, vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act,
omission, condition, status or circumstance; (2) publicity
or publication; (3) malice; (4) direction of such imputation
at a natural or juridical person, or even a dead person
and (5) tendency to cause the dishonor, discredit, or
contempt of the person defamed.
BRILLANTE v CA
(440 SCRA 541)
October 19, 2004
G.R. Nos. 118757 & 121571
In the cases at bar, it was proven that Brillante uttered
defamatory statements during the press conference
attended by some fifty journalists and caused the open
letter which explicitly referred to reprehensible acts
allegedly committed by Binay, Prudente and their
associates, such as the use of goons to threaten Binay's
opponents in the election and the plotting of Syjuco's
assassination, to be published in several newspapers.
DIAZ v PEOPLE
(523 SCRA 194)
May 25, 2007
G.R. No. 159787
For an imputation to be libelous, the following requisites
must be present: (a) it must be defamatory; (b) it must be
malicious; (c) it must be given publicity; and (d) the
victims must be identifiable. Absent one of these
elements, a case for libel will not prosper.
29
ALONZO v CA
(241 SCRA 51)
February 1, 1995
G.R. No. 110088
SANTOS v CA
(203 SCRA 110)
October 21, 1991
G.R. No. L-45031
BUATIS v PEOPLE
March 24, 2006
G.R. No. 142509
BORJAL v CA
January 14, 1999
G.R. No. 126466
FLOR v PEOPLE
(454 S 440)
March 31, 2005
G.R. No. 139987
NEWSWEEK v IAC
(142 SCRA 171)
May 30, 1986
G.R. No. L-63559
AGUSTIN v PAMINTUAN
(467 SCRA 601)
August 22, 2005
G.R. No. 164938
Under the old rule, the offended party could harass the
accused in a libel case by laying the venue of the criminal
action in a remote or distant places. To obviate
controversies as to the venue of the criminal action from
written defamation, the complaint or Information should
contain allegations as to whether the offended party was
a public officer or a private individual at the time the
offense was committed, and where he was actually
residing at that time. Whenever possible, the place where
the written defamation was printed and first published
should likewise be alleged.
FERMIN v PEOPLE
March 28, 2008
G.R. No. 157643
Proof adduced during the trial showed that accused was
the manager of the publication without the corresponding
evidence that, as such, he was directly responsible for
the writing, editing, or publishing of the matter contained
in the said libelous article. Article 360 of the Revised
30
SLANDER
GONZALES v ARCILLA
(203 SCRA 609)
November 18, 1991
G.R. No. L-27923
Slander is oral defamation while libel is defamation in
writing. In both, there is a public and malicious imputation
of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any
act, omission, condition, status, or circumstance tending
to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural
or juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one who
is dead.
BALITE v PEOPLE
(18 SCRA 280)
September 30, 1966
G.R. No. L-21475
REYES v PEOPLE
(27 SCRA 686)
March 28, 1969
G.R. Nos. L-21528 and L-21529
The words, "Agustin, putang ina mo" is a common
enough expression in the dialect that is often employed,
not really to slander but rather to express anger or
displeasure. In the instant case, it should be viewed as
part of the threats voiced by appellant against Agustin
Hallare, evidently to make the same more emphatic.
PEOPLE v FALLER
(67 Phil. 529)
Under an information for malicious damage to anothers
property, the accused may be convicted of the crime of
damage through reckless imprudence.
VICTORIO V CA
(173 SCRA 645)
May 3, 1989
G.R. Nos. L-32836-37
31
32