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Admin Law | Case Bank Week 5 | Additional Cases for Chapters 3, 4 & 5

G.R. No.L45685
November 16, 1937
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS
and HONGKONG & SHANGHAI BANKING
CORPORATION,petitioners,
vs.
JOSE O. VERA, Judge . of the Court of First
Instance of Manila, and MARIANO CU UNJIENG,
respondents.

In 1934, Mariano Cu Unjieng was convicted in a


criminal case filed against him by the Hongkong
and Shanghai Banking Corporation (HSBC). In
1936, he filed for probation. The matter was
referred to the Insular Probation Office which
recommended the denial of Cu Unjieng's petition
for probation. A hearing was set by Judge Jose
Vera concerning the petition for probation. The
Prosecution opposed the petition. Eventually,
due to delays in the hearing, the Prosecution filed
a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court
alleging that courts like the Court of First Instance
of Manila (which is presided over by Judge Vera)
have no jurisdiction to place accused like Cu
Unjieng under probation because under the law
(Act No. 4221 or The Probation Law), probation
is only meant to be applied in provinces with
probation officers; that the City of Manila is not a
province, and that Manila, even if construed as a
province, has no designated probation officer hence, a Manila court cannot grant probation.
Meanwhile, HSBC also filed its own comment on
the matter alleging that Act 4221 is
unconstitutional for it violates the constitutional
guarantee on equal protection of the laws. HSBC
averred that the said law makes it the prerogative
of provinces whether or nor to apply the probation
law - if a province chooses to apply the probation
law, then it will appoint a probation officer, but if it
will not, then no probation officer will be appointed
- hence, that makes it violative of the equal
protection clause.
Further, HSBC averred that the Probation Law is
an undue delegation of power because it gave the
option to the provincial board to whether or not to
apply the probation law - however, the legislature

did not provide guidelines to be followed by the


provincial board.
Further still, HSBC averred that the Probation
Law is an encroachment of the executive's power
to grant pardon. They say that the legislature, by
providing for a probation law, had in effect
encroached upon the executive's power to grant
pardon. (Ironically, the Prosecution agreed with
the issues raised by HSBC - ironic because their
main stance was the non-applicability of the
probation law only in Manila while recognizing its
application in provinces).
For his part, one of the issues raised by Cu
Unjieng is that, the Prosecution, representing the
State as well as the People of the Philippines,
cannot question the validity of a law, like Act
4221, which the State itself created. Further, Cu
Unjieng also castigated the fiscal of Manila who
himself had used the Probation Law in the past
without question but is now questioning the
validity of the said law (estoppel).
ISSUE:
1. May the State question its own laws?
2. Is Act 4221 constitutional?
HELD:
1. Yes. There is no law which prohibits the State,
or its duly authorized representative, from
questioning the validity of a law. Estoppel will also
not lie against the State even if it had been using
an invalid law.
2. No, Act 4221 or the [old] Probation Law is
unconstitutional.
Violation of the Equal Protection Clause
The contention of HSBC and the Prosecution is
well taken on this note. There is violation of the
equal protection clause. Under Act 4221,
provinces were given the option to apply the law
by simply providing for a probation officer. So if a
province decides not to install a probation officer,
then the accused within said province will be
unduly deprived of the provisions of the Probation
Law.

Undue Delegation of Legislative Power

Admin Law | Case Bank Week 5 | Additional Cases for Chapters 3, 4 & 5

There is undue delegation of legislative power.


Act 4221 provides that it shall only apply to
provinces where the respective provincial boards
have provided for a probation officer. But
nowhere in the law did it state as to what standard
(sufficient standard test) provincial boards should
follow in determining whether or not to apply the
probation law in their province. This only creates
a roving commission which will act arbitrarily
according to its whims.
Encroachment of Executive Power
Though Act 4221 is unconstitutional, the
Supreme Court recognized the power of
Congress to provide for probation. Probation
does not encroach upon the President's power to
grant pardon. Probation is not pardon. Probation
is within the power of Congress to fix penalties
while pardon is a power of the president to
commute penalties.

Admin Law | Case Bank Week 5 | Additional Cases for Chapters 3, 4 & 5

MATIENZO V ABELLERA
G.R. No. L-45839 June 1, 1988
FACTS
Petitioners and private respondents are taxicab
operators in Metro Manila. The respondents,
however, admit to operate colorum or kabit taxis,
thus, they applied for legalization of their
unauthorized excess taxis citing PD 101.
Respondent Board set such applications for
hearing and granted provisional authority to
operate. Petitioners argue that the Board cannot
do this as the six month period in the Transitory
Provision has lapsed and has become functus
officio.
ISSUES
Whether the board can grant such permits.
RULING
YES. The power vested by PD 101 to BOT was
to grant special permits of limited term for the
operation of public utility motor vehicles as may,
in the judgment of the Board, be necessary to
replace or convert clandestine operators into
legitimate and responsible operators. Such
power remains even after the six months
prescribed in the law as such period merely
provides for the withdrawal of the States waiver
of its right to punish said colorum operators.
Notice and hearing are not required for the grant
of such temporary authority because of its
provisional nature and that the primary
application shall be given a full hearing.
To determine whether a Board or Commission
has power, it should be (1) liberally construed in
light of its purpose for which is was created and
(2) that incidentally necessary to a full
implementation of legislative intent as being
germane to the law. Thus, the BOR shall, from
time to time, re-study the public need for public
utilities in any area in the Phils for the purpose of
re-evaluating the policies.

Admin Law | Case Bank Week 5 | Additional Cases for Chapters 3, 4 & 5

VICTORIAS MILLING COMPANY v SOCIAL


SECURITY COMMISSION
G.R. No. L-16704 March 17, 1962
FACTS
In 1958, the SSC issued a circular (no. 22)
providing that bonuses and overtime pay shall be
included in the computation of the employers' and
employees'
respective
monthly
premium
contributions.
However, Victorias Milling protested such circular
and contended that it was contradictory to a
previous circular (no.7), which expressly
excluded bonuses and overtime from the
computation. Moreover, it challenged the validity
of the circular for lack of authority on the part of
SSC to promulgate it without the approval of the
President and for lack of publication in the Official
Gazette.
The SSC ruled that the circular is not a rule or
regulation that needed the approval of the
President and publication to be effective, but an
administrative interpretation of the statute, a mere
statement of general policy or opinion as to how
the law should be construed.

The SSC issued Circular No. 22 to apprise those


concerned
of
the
interpretation
and
understanding of the Commission of the law, as
amended, which it was its duty to enforce. It did
not add any duty or detail that was not already in
the law as amended. It merely stated and
circularized the opinion of the Commission as to
how the law should be construed--that the
exemption of bonuses, allowances and overtime
pay was deleted by the amendatory law. Circular
No. 22 merely advised employers-members of
the system of what they should include in the
determination of the monthly compensation of
their employees upon which the contributions are
based.

ISSUE
Whether Circular No. 22 is a rule or regulation
that requires presidential approval and
publication in the OG for its effectivity
HELD
NO. There is a distinction between an admin rule
or regulation and an admin interpretation of a law
whose enforcement is entrusted to an admin
body. When
an
administrative
agency
promulgates rules and regulations, it "makes" a
new law with the force and effect of a valid law,
while when it renders an opinion or gives a
statement of policy, it merely interprets a preexisting law. Rules and regulations when
promulgated in pursuance of the procedure or
authority conferred upon the administrative
agency by law, partake of the nature of a statute,
and compliance therewith may be enforced by a
penal sanction provided in the law. This is so
because statutes are usually couched in general
terms, after expressing the policy, purposes,
objectives, remedies and sanctions intended by
the legislature. The details and the manner of
carrying out the law are often times left to the
administrative agency entrusted with its
enforcement. In this sense, it has been said that
rules and regulations are the product of a
delegated power to create new or additional legal
provisions that have the effect of law.

Admin Law | Case Bank Week 5 | Additional Cases for Chapters 3, 4 & 5

Sy Man v. Jacinto | Montemayor, J.


October 31, 1953
FACTS
Respondents in the case are Alfredo Jacinto,
Commissioner of Customs (Commissioner), and
Melecio Fabros, Collector of Customs for the Port
of Manila (Collector). Collector ordered the
seizure of 2 shipments of textile and a number of
sewing machines imported by Sy Man. After due
hearing, the Collector rendered a decision that
those previously seized be delivered to importer
(Sy Man) after payment of customs duty, sales
tax and other charges, except the sewing
machines which are forfeited to the government.
Sys counsel sent a letter to the Collector asking
for the execution of the decision as it has become
final and could no longer be reviewed by the
Commissioner after the lapse of 15 days given to
Sy, who did not appeal the decision to the said
Commissioner. The Collector replied that Sys
letter had been forwarded to the Commissioner
requesting for information whether the
merchandise seized may be delivered to the
owner upon showing that the decision had
become final and executory but no reply had
been received from the Commissioner.
Under the theory that the Commissioner as head
of the Bureau of Customs and by virtue of sec.
1152 of the Revised Administrative Code he has
supervision and control over the Collector, the
Commissioner promulgated a Memorandum
Order:
o Collectors merely submit reports
of seizures but do not transmit
records of the proceedings and
decisions.
o As in protest cases, decisions of
Collectors in seizure cases,
whether appealed or not, are
subject to the review of the
Commissioner. Pending action
by
Commissioner,
final
disposition of good will not be
made except upon previous
authority from his office.
Sy Man filed a petition to declare null and void the
Memorandum Order and to order the Collector to
deliver the shipments of textile seized. Sy claims
that when a decision of the Collector in a seizure
case is not appealed by the importer to the
Commissioner within 15 days, as provided in the
Sec. 1380 RAC, the decision becomes final as to

the importer and the government. Thereafter,


nothing remains to be done but the release of the
goods seized. TC granted the petition and
ordered the Commissioner and the Collector to
execute the decision on the ground that it has
become final.
ISSUE
Whether the Commissioner of Customs has the
power to revise the unappealed decisions of the
Collector in seizure cases.
HELD
None. When merchandises are imported
through any of ports in the country, these
goods are assessed for the payment of
duties and fees. The importer pays the
amount assessed if he is satisfied with
the assessment. Failure to protest
renders the action of the Collector
conclusive on the importer.
Both under protest and seizure cases the
importer may appeal the decision of the
Collector to the Commissioner within 15
days (Sec. 1380 RAC).
The actions of the Commissioner cant
find support in the Memorandum Order
itself as it was never approved by the
department head and was never
published by in Official Gazette. Such
approval and publication are required for
the memorandum order to have legal
effect.
Moreover, a regulation promulgated
by a Bureau Chief must not be
inconsistent with law. If the law does
not give the Commissioner the power
to review and revise unappealed
decisions of the Collector of Customs
in
seizure
cases,
then
the
memorandum order even if duly
approved and published would
equally have no effect for being
inconsistent with law.
In cases involving assessment of duties,
the Commissioner has the supervisory
authority to order a reliquidation if he
believes that the decision of the Collector
was erroneous. (Sec. 1393 RAC). There
is no legal provision for seizure cases.
The logical inference is that the
lawmakers did not deem it necessary or
advisable to provide for this supervisory
authority or power of revision by the

Admin Law | Case Bank Week 5 | Additional Cases for Chapters 3, 4 & 5

Commissioner on unappealed seizure


cases.
Until the Memorandum Order was
issued, it was not the practice of the
Bureau to have Collectors decisions be
reviewed by the Commissioner. The
memo commented that Collectors only
submit reports and their final disposition
of seizure cases but not the records of
proceedings. If the right to review had
existed from the beginning, Collectors
would not have ignored such practice
necessitating a memo order to remind
them of such.
Sec. 1380 of the RAC provides that in a
seizure case, the Collector transmits all
the records to the Commissioner only
after the importer signifies his desire to
appeal. This section does not say that
without the notice of appeal, the Collector
still needs to transmit the records of the
case.
Sec. 1388 RAC provides that in a seizure
case the owner may pay the fine imposed
and the properties seized shall be
surrendered and all liability concerning
the seizure shall be discharged. It can be
concluded that it is within the power of
the importer or owner to end the case at
the office of the Collector.
Where payment is made and the owner
wishes to test the validity of the
proceedings, he may make a formal
protest at time of payment to appeal the
decision to the Commissioner. The
elevation of
the case to the
Commissioner is within the owners
power and discretion.
It is argued that if the Commissioner has
no power to revise or review unappealed
seizure cases then if the Collector
commits an error prejudicial to the
government, the latter cant protect itself.
The law presumes that in seizure cases
Collector of Customs act honestly and
correctly and as Government officials,
always with an eye to the protection of
the interests of the Government
employing them.
o In such exceptional cases, the
government is protected as in all
seizure cases Sec. 1373 RAC

SC noted a defect in this section as it fixes no period


within which automatic review or reliquidation must

requires
the
Collector
to
immediately inform the Auditor
General.
If the Government deems it necessary to
provide for review and revision by the
Commissioner
or
even
by
the
Department Head of the decisions of the
Collector of Customs in unappealed
seizure cases, the Legislature may be
requested to insert a section in the RAC
similar to Section 13931, which applies to
unprotested cases of assessment duties.

Conclusion:
The decision of the Collector of Customs in a
seizure case if not protested and appealed by the
importer to the Commissioner of Customs on
time, becomes final not only as to him but against
the Government as well, and neither the
Commissioner nor the Department Head has the
power to review, revise or modify such
unappealed decision.
The memorandum order is void and of no effect
for not being duly approved by the Dept Head and
duly published and also for being inconsistent
with law.

be effected upon order of the Commissioner.

Admin Law | Case Bank Week 5 | Additional Cases for Chapters 3, 4 & 5

DELEGATION
OF
POWERS
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES

TO

ALEGRE VS THE INSULAR COLLECTOR OF


CUSTOMS
FACTS:
Pursuant to Act 2380 providing for the inspection,
grading, and baling of abaca, maguey, sisal, and
other fibers, the Fiber Standardization Board was
created, in charge of the classification, baling,
and inspection of Philippine fibers. Alegre, a
businessman engaged in the production and
exportation of abaca, applied for certification with
said board which was denied. Consequently, the
Collector of Customs advised Alegre that he
would not be permittd such exportation absent
the certification from the board. Alegre then
questioned the certain provisions of the
Administrative Code relating to the exportation of
abaca et al as unconstitutional and void in
delegating legislative powers to the Board.
ISSUE:
Whether there was a valid delegation of
legislative powers to the Fiber Standardization
Board conferred by the Administrative Code
HELD:
No, there was no delegation of legislative powers.
Though legislative power cannot be delegated to
boards and commissions, the Legislature may
delegate to them administrative functions in
carrying out the purposes of a statute and various
governmental power for the more efficient
administration of the laws. What the law provided
was a detailed method in the process of abaca et
al classification, grading, inspection and baling
including details of exportation of such, that all the
Board had to do was to carry out the functions as
set out by the law itself.
PRINCIPLE:
The legislature may confer not only legislative
but also administrative powers to enforce and
carry out the intent of the law.

Admin Law | Case Bank Week 5 | Additional Cases for Chapters 3, 4 & 5

ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUDICATION--- Cardinal


Rights
VILLA VS LAZARO
FACTS:
Villa wanted to open a funeral parlor in General
Santos City, hence permits were applied for and
thereafter issued by the City Engineering Office,
certifying it as in consonance with the Zoning
Ordinance. Consequently, construction was
started. However, about 100 meters away is a
hospital whose owner Dr. Veneracion sought a
complaint to permanently enjoin the construction
of the funeral parlor.
Lower court dismissed the complaint due to
Veneracions submission of a falsified Zoning
Clearance, further adding that there was actually
no prohibition in the distance between funeral
parlor and hospital in said localitys Ordinances.
Veneracion, instead of appealing said judgment,
sought the Human Settlements Regulatory
Commission (HSRC) on substantially the same
grounds. HSRC ordered Villa to transmit proof of
Locational Clearance of the funeral parlor to
which she complied on three occasions. HRSC
issued orders against Villa. Villa then filed an
appeal with the Office of the President, who was
acted for and on behalf by the Presidential
Assistant for Legal Affairs Lazaro. Lazaros
resolution denied Villas appeal and motion for
extension of time to submit appeal. It is noted that
both HRSC Commissioner and Lazaro made no
mention on the proofs of Locational Clearance
submitted by Villa at different times.
ISSUE:
Whether Villa was accorded due process in her
quest for a permit to open a funeral parlor
business

(b) reasonable opportunity to appear and


defend his rights, introduce witnesses and
relevant evidence in his favor,
(c) a tribunal so constituted as to give him
reasonable assurance of honesty and
impartiality,
and
one
of
competent
jurisdiction; and
(d) a finding or decision by that tribunal
supported by substantial evidence presented
at the hearing, or at least contained in the
records or disclosed to the parties affected.
These Cardinal Rights of a person in an
administrative proceeding were not observed, to
wit:
for initiating what is held out as an
administrative proceeding against Villa without
informing her of the complaint which initiated the
case; for conducting that inquiry in the most
informal
manner
by
means
only
of
communications requiring submission of certain
documents, which left the impression that
compliance was all that was expected of her and
with which directives she promptly and religiously
complied; assuming that one of the documents
thus successively submitted had been received,
but given the fact that on at least two occasions,
their transmission had been preceded by
telegrams announcing that they would follow by
mail, for failing to call Villa's attention to their nonreceipt or to make any other attempt to trace their
whereabouts; for ruling against Villa on the
spurious premise that she had failed to submit the
documents required; and for maintaining to the
very end that pretense of lack of compliance even
after being presented with a fourth set of
documents and the decision in the court case
upholding her right to operate her funeral parlor
in its questioned location.

HELD:
No, she was not accorded due process.
Administrative proceedings are not exempt from
the operation of certain basic and fundamental
procedural principles, such as the due process
requirements in investigations and trials.
And this administrative due process is
recognized to include:
(a) the right to notice, be it actual or
constructive, of the institution of the
proceedings that may affect a person's legal
right;

Admin Law | Case Bank Week 5 | Additional Cases for Chapters 3, 4 & 5

PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS

it. The failure of respondent court, then, to pass

GRACILLA VS CIR

upon the monetary claims raised by petitioner,

FACTS:

amounted to a disregard of such a cardinal right

Gracilla filed a complaint with the CIR against


Republic Protection Agency and Fuller Paint
Manufacturing Co. (Phil.), Inc., holding them
jointly and severally liable for his dismissal,
seeking reinstatement, while also praying for paid
for his unpaid services for Sundays and legal
holidays during the whole period of his
employment, that he be given additional
compensation for night services, and that he be
credited with his earned vacation and sick leave
pay as well as back wages from the date of his
illegal dismissal up to the time he is actually
reinstated.

embraced in due process, namely, that the issues

Presiding judge dismissed his complaint for


monetary claims but added that :"For
humanitarian reasons, however, complainant
Gracilla should be afforded preferential
opportunity by respondent Republic Protective
Agency, for assignment [to] any place other than
the Fuller Paint Manufacturing Co. (Phil.), Inc.;
else, it is suggested that he be extended
separation fee.

Teng***

raised by a party should not be ignored or left


undecided. Especially so, should it be in this case
where the monetary claims were timely raised
and insisted upon at all stages of the proceeding.
====================================
*Just a principle lifted from Vivo vs PAGCOR (not
part of our cases though): *** thanks Nurse

In administrative proceedings, procedural due


process has been recognized to include the
following:
(1) The right to actual or constructive notice
of the institution of proceedings which
may affect a
respondents legal rights;

ISSUE:
Whether Gracilla was accorded procedural due
process.

HELD:
No. Procedural due process in administrative
proceedings require the decision be rendered on
the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least
contained in the record and disclosed to the
parties concerned. Consequently, the Court of
Industrial Relations should, in all controversial
questions, render its decision in such a manner

(2) A real opportunity to be heard


personally or with the assistance of
counsel, to present
witnesses and evidence in ones favor,
and to defend ones rights;
(3) A tribunal vested with competent
jurisdiction and so constituted as to afford
a person charged
administratively a reasonable guarantee
of honesty as well as impartiality; and
(4) A finding by said tribunal which is
supported by substantial evidence
submitted for consideration
during the hearing or contained in the
records or made known to the parties
affected.

that the parties to the proceeding can know the


various issues involved, and the reasons for the
decisions rendered. The performance of this duty
is inseparable from the authority conferred upon

Admin Law | Case Bank Week 5 | Additional Cases for Chapters 3, 4 & 5

ESTATE OF FLORENCIO P. BUAN, Petitioner,


vs. PAMPANGA BUS COMPANY AND LA
MALLORCA, Respondents.

FACTS:
The estate of Florencio P. Buan, herein
petitioner, is an authorized bus operator along
various lines in central and northern Luzon, with
authority to operate 8 auto-trucks along the
Manila-Bagac line and 11 along the Moron
Dinalupihan line. Allegedly in response to various
resolutions of municipal councils and on petition
of civic and labor groups in the province of Bataan
urging extension of its services to their respective
municipalities, petitioner applied in four cases in
the Commission for certificates of public
convenience to operate additional trips between
Manila and various municipalities and barrios in
Bataan.
The Pampanga Bus Company and La Mallorca
opposed these applications, both alleging that
they are authorized to operate and are actually
operating a fleet of auto-trucks on the lines
applied for and rendering adequate and
satisfactory service; that the additional services
applied for are superfluous, will not promote
public interest in a proper and suitable manner,
and will result in cut-throat and ruinous
competition. The Commission, after hearing the
parties and their evidence and having before it
the records of the authorized services on the lines
applied for, as well as the findings of two of its
agents who had been ordered by it to make an
on-the-spot survey of the passenger traffic along
those lines, rendered a joint decision in the four
cases, denying the applications on the grounds
that petitioner had not made a case for the grant
of the certificates applied for, that the service of
the oppositors was adequate and sufficient for the
actual needs of the public and that the grant of
the applications would only result in unnecessary
or wasteful competition.

HELD: Yes. The law, in investing the Public


Service Commission with the power of
supervision
and
control
over
public
transportation, has also clothed it with broad
discretion in the exercise of that power. With
that discretion this Court is not supposed to
interfere except in case of clear abuse. Such has
not been shown to be the case here. What
appears is that the Commission, faced with the
conflict of evidence on the adequacy or
inadequacy of the present service, has sought to
discover the truth through an on-the-ground
inspection and observation by its own agents and
has, on the basis of information thus obtained,
arrived at the conclusion that the additional
service applied for is uncalled for because there
is already amplitude, if not superabundance, in
the number of authorized trips.
That conclusion is amply supported by the record
and is far from being the product of partiality or
unfair discrimination. And it not clearly appearing
that discretion has been abused or that the
Commission has illegally used its powers, we
have to respect its judgment and not to try to
replace it with our own.

Reconsideration of this decision having been


denied, petitioner has sought a review.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Public Service
Commission has acted outside the scope of its
authority in the supervision and control of public
transportation?

Admin Law | Case Bank Week 5 | Additional Cases for Chapters 3, 4 & 5

G.S. WEIGALL,Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. W.


MORGAN SHUSTER, Collector of Customs of
the Philippine Islands,Defendant-Appellant.
FACTS:
Defendant Collector of Customs of the
Philippine Archipelago, officially imposed a fine of
$200 United States money, upon the plaintiff, the
captain of the British steamer Loonsang, for a
violation of the Chinese Exclusion Law, in
permitting the escape of an immigrant from his
ship, and asserted a lien upon her, refusing
clearance papers unless the master paid the fine.
Instead of paying it, the plaintiff brought this
action upon which an injunction was issued,
ordering the defendant to desist and refrain from
further proceeding in any way to levy upon or
collect from the plaintiff the fine of USD200
mentioned in the plaintiffs complaint.

x x

The defect of an argument is that it loses sight of


the incident that the fine was not imposed by the
court, but in the first instance by the Collector,
and it was to enforce his fine, already laid, and his
seizure, and that suit was brought in the Court of
Customs Appeals. The original administrative act
imposing the fine having, as we have already
seen, been invalid, the proceeding based upon it
cannot stand. This customs court might have
given power to enforce the provisions of the
Chinese Exclusion Act in accordance with the
law of Congress, but SUCH WAS NOT THE
SCOPE OF THE ACTS OF THE COMMISSION,
nor such the procedure attempted in this case.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Collector of Customs have
authority to impose a fine and seize the vessel in
question.
HELD:
No. The fine to be imposed upon the plaintiff and
his vessel in the present instance was not one for
the administrative action because it had to be
laid and enforced in accordance with the law
of Congress its being and which had authorized
no such action. The error of the defendant had
root in the notion, expressed in his testimony "that
the Act of Congress of April 29, had omitted to
provide machinery for the enforcement of the
laws thereby enacted." That notion overlooked
that fact that the usual machinery for the
enforcement of the laws is found in regularly
constituted courts and involved the strains
assumption that the status that the terms of the
Acts of Congress adequate to the home territory
of the United States where not specific enough to
be carried out in this Islands. Those acts did,
impliedly, if not explicitly, provide for the manner
of their enforcement, and in that respect were not
open for amendment for the Philippine
Commission, and we assume that it was no part
of intention of that Commission to amend them or
supplement them by any legislation at variance
with them.

Admin Law | Case Bank Week 5 | Additional Cases for Chapters 3, 4 & 5

FRANCISCO
S.
TATAD,
vs.
THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
ENERGY AND THE SECRETARY OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE G.R. No. 127867
November 5, 1997
Facts:

The petitions at bar challenge the


constitutionality of Republic Act No. 8180
entitled "An Act Deregulating the
Downstream Oil Industry and For Other
Purposes". 1 R.A. No. 8180 ends twenty
six (26) years of government regulation
of the downstream oil industry. Few
cases carry a surpassing importance on
the life of every Filipino as these petitions
for the upswing and downswing of our
economy materially depend on the
oscillation of oil.
Prior to 1971, there was no government
agency regulating the oil industry other
than those dealing with ordinary
commodities. Oil companies were free to
enter and exit the market without any
government interference. There were
four (4) refining companies (Shell,
Caltex, Bataan Refining Company and
Filoil Refining) and six (6) petroleum
marketing companies (Esso, Filoil,
Caltex, Getty, Mobil and Shell), then
operating in the country.
In G.R. No. 124360, petitioner Francisco
S. Tatad seeks the annulment of section
5(b) of R.A. No. 8180. Section 5(b)
provides:
b)
Any
law
to
the
contrary
notwithstanding and starting with the
effectivity of this Act, tariff duty shall be
imposed and collected on imported crude
oil at the rate of three percent (3%) and
imported refined petroleum products at
the rate of seven percent (7%), except
fuel oil and LPG, the rate for which shall
be the same as that for imported crude
oil: Provided, That beginning on January
1, 2004 the tariff rate on imported crude
oil and refined petroleum products shall
be the same: Provided, further, That this
provision may be amended only by an
Act of Congress.

Issues:
(1) Whether or not the petitions raise a justiciable
controversy
(2) Whether or not the petitioners have the
standing to assail the validity of the law
(3) Whether or not Sec. 5(b) of RA 8180 violates
the one title one subject requirement of the
Constitution
(4) Whether or not Sec. 15 of RA 8180 violates
the constitutional prohibition on undue delegation
of
power
(5) Whether or not RA 8180 violates the
constitutional prohibition against monopolies,
combinations in restraint of trade and unfair
competition
Held:
As to the first issue, judicial power includes not
only the duty of the courts to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, but also the duty to
determine whether or not there has been grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the government. The courts, as
guardians of the Constitution, have the inherent
authority to determine whether a statute enacted
by the legislature transcends the limit imposed by
the fundamental law. Where a statute violates the
Constitution, it is not only the right but the duty of
the judiciary to declare such act as
unconstitutional
and
void.
The effort of respondents to question the legal
standing of petitioners also failed. The Court has
brightlined its liberal stance on a petitioners locus
standi where the petitioner is able to craft an
issue of transcendental significance to the
people. In the case, petitioners pose issues which
are significant to the people and which deserve
the
Courts
forthright
resolution.
It is also contended that Sec. 5(b) of RA 8180 on
tariff differential violates the provision of the
Constitution requiring every law to have only one
subject which should be expressed in its title. The
Court did not concur with this contention. The title
need not mirror, fully index or catalogue all
contents and minute details of a law. A law having
a single general subject indicated in the title may
contain any number of provisions, no matter how

Admin Law | Case Bank Week 5 | Additional Cases for Chapters 3, 4 & 5

diverse they may be, so long as they are not


inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject,
and may be considered in furtherance of such
subject by providing for the method and means of
carrying out the general subject. The Court held
that Sec. 5 providing for tariff differential is
germane to the subject of RA 8180 which is the
deregulation of the downstream oil industry.
Petitioners also assail Sec. 15 of RA 8180 which
fixes the time frame for the full deregulation of the
downstream oil industry for being violative of the
constitutional prohibition on undue delegation of
power. There are two accepted tests to determine
whether or not there is a valid delegation of
legislative power: the completeness test and the
sufficient standard test. Under the first test, the
law must be complete in all its terms and
conditions when it leaves the legislative such that
when it reaches the delegate the only thing he will
have to do is to enforce it. Under the sufficient
standard test, there must be adequate guidelines
or limitations in the law to map out the boundaries
of the delegates authority and prevent the
delegation from running riot. Section 15 can
hurdle both the completeness test and the
sufficient standard test. Congress expressly
provided in RA 8180 that full deregulation will
start at the end of March 1997, regardless of the
occurrence of any event. Full deregulation at the
end of March 1997 is mandatory and the
Executive has no discretion to postpone it for any
purported reason. Thus, the law is complete on
the question of the final date of full deregulation.
The discretion given to the President is to
advance the date of full deregulation before the
end of March 1997. Section 15 lays down the
standard to guide the judgment of the President.
He is to time it as far as practicable when the
prices of crude oil and petroleum products in the
world market are declining and when the
exchange rate of the peso in relation to the US
dollar
is
stable.
Petitioners also argued that some provisions of
RA 8180 violate Sec. 19, Art. XII of the
Constitution. Section 19, Art. XII of the
Constitution
espouses
competition.
The
desirability of competition is the reason for the
prohibition against restraint of trade, the reason
for the interdiction of unfair competition, and the
reason for regulation of unmitigated monopolies.

Competition is thus the underlying principle of


Sec. 19, Art. XII of the Constitution which cannot
be violated by RA 8180. Petron, Shell and Caltex
stand as the only major league players in the oil
market. As the dominant players, they boast of
existing refineries of various capacities. The tariff
differential of 4% on imported crude oil and
refined petroleum products therefore works to
their immense benefit. It erects a high barrier to
the entry of new players. New players that intend
to equalize the market power of Petron, Shell and
Caltex by building refineries of their own will have
to spend billions of pesos. Those who will not
build refineries but compete with them will suffer
the huge disadvantage of increasing their product
cost by 4%. They will be competing on an uneven
field. The provision on inventory widens the
balance of advantage of Petron, Shell and Caltex
against prospective new players. Petron, Shell
and Caltex can easily comply with the inventory
requirement of RA 8180 in view of their existing
storage facilities. Prospective competitors again
will find compliance with this requirement difficult
as
it
will entail
a
prohibitive
cost.
The most important question is whether the
offending provisions can be individually struck
down without invalidating the entire RA 8180. The
general rule is that where part of a statute is void
as repugnant to the Constitution, while another
part is valid, the valid portion, if separable from
the invalid, may stand and be enforced. The
exception to the general rule is that when the
parts of a statute are so mutually dependent and
connected, as conditions, considerations,
inducements or compensations for each other, as
to warrant a belief that the legislature intended
them as a whole, the nullity of one part will vitiate
the rest. RA 8180 contains a separability clause.
The separability clause notwithstanding, the
Court held that the offending provisions of RA
8180 so permeate its essence that the entire law
has to be struck down. The provisions on tariff
differential, inventory and predatory pricing are
among the principal props of RA 8180. Congress
could not have regulated the downstream oil
industry without these provisions. Unfortunately,
contrary to their intent, these provisions on tariff
differential, inventory and predatory pricing inhibit
fair competition, encourage monopolistic power
and interfere with the free interaction of market
forces.

Admin Law | Case Bank Week 5 | Additional Cases for Chapters 3, 4 & 5

ERNESTO
M.
MACEDA
vs.
ENERGY REGULATORY BOARD, CALTEX
(Philippines),
INC.,
PILIPINAS
SHELL
PETROLEUM CORPORATION AND PETRON
CORPORATION, respondents.
G.R. No. 96349 July 18, 1991
Facts:

In G.R. No. 96266, petitioner Maceda


seeks nullification of the Energy
Regulatory Board (ERB) Orders dated
December 5 and 6, 1990 on the ground
that the hearings conducted on the
second provisional increase in oil prices
did not allow him substantial crossexamination, in effect, allegedly, a denial
of due process.
On September 21, 1990, the ERB issued
an order granting a provisional increase
of P1.42 per liter. Petitioner Maceda filed
a petition for Prohibition on September
26, 1990 (E. Maceda v. ERB, et al., G.R.
No. 95203), seeking to nullify the
provisional increase. We dismissed the
petition on December 18, 1990,
reaffirming ERB's authority to grant
provisional increase even without prior
hearing, pursuant to Sec. 8 of E.O. No.
172.
In the same order of September 21,
1990, authorizing provisional increase,
the ERB set the applications for hearing
with due notice to all interested parties on
October 16, 1990. Petitioner Maceda
failed to appear at said hearing as well as
on the second hearing on October 17,
1990.
Petitioner Maceda maintains that this
order of proof deprived him of his right to
finish his cross-examination of Petron's
witnesses and denied him his right to
cross-examine each of the witnesses of
Caltex and Shell. He points out that this
relaxed procedure resulted in the denial
of due process.

Whether acted in grave abuse of discretion


amounting to lack of jurisdiction
Held:
The Solicitor General has pointed out:
. . . The order of testimony both with respect to
the examination of the particular witness and to
the general course of the trial is within the
discretion of the court and the exercise of this
discretion in permitting to be introduced out of the
order prescribed by the rules is not improper (88
C.J.S. 206-207).
Such a relaxed procedure is especially true in
administrative bodies, such as the ERB which in
matters of rate or price fixing is considered as
exercising a quasi-legislative, not quasi-judicial,
function As such administrative agency, it is not
bound by the strict or technical rules of evidence
governing court proceedings (Sec. 29, Public
Service Act; Dickenson v. United States, 346,
U.S. 389, 98 L. ed. 132, 74 S. St. 152). (Emphasis
supplied)
In fact, Section 2, Rule I of the Rules of Practice
and Procedure Governing Hearings Before the
ERB provides that
These Rules shall govern pleadings, practice and
procedure before the Energy Regulatory Board in
all matters of inquiry, study, hearing, investigation
and/or any other proceedings within the
jurisdiction of the Board. However, in the broader
interest of justice, the Board may, in any
particular matter, except itself from these rules
and apply such suitable procedure as shall
promote the objectives of the Order. (pp. 163164, Rollo)

Issue:
Whether ERB acted within its jurisdiction.

Admin Law | Case Bank Week 5 | Additional Cases for Chapters 3, 4 & 5

Lupangco, et al. v CA (GR No. 77372) April 29,


19882
Facts of the case:
The Professional Regulation Commission (PRC)
issued resolution No. 1053 for all those applying
for admission to take the licensure examinations
in accountancy. The purpose if the resolution is
to preserve the integrity and purity of licensure
examinations.
Lupo L. Lupangco and some of the affected
reviewees, representing themselves and other
reviewees similarly situated, filed a complaint for
injunction with a prayer for the issuance of writ
of preliminary injunction against respondent PRC
and to declare Resolution No. 105 as
unconstitutional.
RTC court ruled to continue to try the case,
denying PRCs motion to dismiss. On appeal, CA
ruled in favour of PRC that RTC court is without
jurisdiction to try the case, hence this appeal by
the petitioner.
Issue:
Whether or not Resolution No. 105 of the PRC is
unconstitutional.
Held:
Yes, resolution No. 105 is unconstitutional for
the following reasons:
1.) The issued resolution is unreasonable
on its face. More so applying the
reasonable connection test, although
the (a) purpose of the law is reasonable,
which is to preserve the integrity and
2

Case Digest
Topic: Liberal Interpretation of rules and regulation (p. 125,
Chapter 3, 2013 ed. Admin Law by De Leon)
3

x x x No examinee shall attend any review class, briefing,


conference or the like conducted by, or shall receive any hand-out,
review material, or any tip from any school, college or university,
or any review center or the like or any reviewer, lecturer, instructor

purity of licensure examination for


accountants, the (b) means employed,
which is to prevent reviewee-examinees
from taking any legal step to prepare 3
days before the examination, is
unreasonable. More so, the means
employed cannot even distinguish
between those who are taking legal
steps to prepare and those otherwise
(ie. Those who use leakages and like
materials) ergo the issued resolution is
arbitrary. The issued resolution is an
unlawful deprivation of liberty rights of
reviewee-examinees is their preparation
for the licensure examination for
accountants. (It is to be noted also that
the resolution hampers with the
academic freedom of schools)
2.) It is an axiom in administrative law that
administrative authorities should not act
arbitrarily and capriciously in the
issuance of rules and regulations. To be
valid, such rules and regulations must be
reasonable and fairly adapted to the end
in view. If shown to bear no reasonable
relation to the purposes for which they
are authorized to be issued, then they
must be held to be invalid.
3.) Resolution No. 105 is that it violates the
academic freedom of the schools
concerned. Respondent PRC cannot
interfere with the conduct of review that
review schools and centers believe
would best enable their enrolees to
meet the standards required before
becoming a full fledged public
accountant. Unless the means or
methods of instruction are clearly found
to be inefficient, impractical, or riddled
official or employee of any of the aforementioned or similars
institutions during the three days immediately proceeding every
examination day including examination day. Any examinee
violating this instruction shall be subject to the sanctions
prescribed by Sec. 8, Art. III of the Rules and Regulations of the
Commission.
xxx

Admin Law | Case Bank Week 5 | Additional Cases for Chapters 3, 4 & 5

with corruption, review schools and


centers may not be stopped from
helping out their students.
SC cited the case of Garcia v The Faculty
Admission Committee, Loyola School of
Theology, 24 regarding academic
freedom to wit:
... It would follow then that the school or
college itself is possessed of such a right.
It decides for itself its aims and
objectives and how best to attain them.
It is free from outside coercion or
interference save possibly when the
overriding public welfare calls for some
restraint. It has a wide sphere of
autonomy certainly extending to the
choice of students. This constitutional
provision is not to be construed in a
niggardly manner or in a grudging
fashion.
(Maker of this digest believes that the
limited/scarce application of the Liberal
interpretation of rules and regulation of
administrative agencies to this case
applies on a particular circumstance
where there is ambiguity on whether
there is in existence of any need to
interfere with the rights of private
persons through the execution of rules
and regulation, the court will rule
liberally in favour of the private person
and strictly against the implementing
authority.)

Admin Law | Case Bank Week 5 | Additional Cases for Chapters 3, 4 & 5

People v Maceren (G.R. No. L-32166) October


18, 19774

No, said law do not authorize the Secretary of


Agriculture and Natural Resources to penalize
electro fishing.

Facts of the case:


Jose Buenaventura, Godofredo Reyes, Benjamin
Reyes, Nazario Aquino and Carlito del Rosario
were caught and charged of the crime electro
fishing5 in violation of Fisheries Administrative
Order No. 84-1. by the Constabulary. Fisheries
Administrative Order No. 84-1 is promulgated by
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources,
upon the recommendation of the Fisheries
Commission.
Both the municipal court and court and the court
of first instance dismissed the case.
The lower court held that, since the law does not
clearly prohibit electro fishing, the executive and
judicial departments cannot consider it unlawful.
As legal background, it should be stated that
section 11 of the (old) Fisheries Law prohibits
"the use of any obnoxious or poisonous
substance" in fishing.
It is noteworthy that the Prosecution defends its
side by citing section 11 AND section 83 of the
Fisheries Law. Section 83 of the pertinent law
provides penalty for: "any other violation of"
the Fisheries Law or of any rules and regulations
promulgated thereunder. The prosecution
contends that any other violation should
include electro fishing and is sufficient to cover
the defendants in the case.
Issue:
Whether or not the Order No. 84-1 covers
electro fishing under Section 11 and/or Section
84 of the (old) Fisheries Law.
Held:

The reason is that the Fisheries Law does not


expressly prohibit electro fishing. As electro
fishing is not banned under that law, the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
and the Commissioner of Fisheries are powerless
to penalize it. In other words, Administrative
Orders Nos. 84 and 84-1, in penalizing electro
fishing, are devoid of any legal basis. Had the
lawmaking body intended to punish electro
fishing, a penal provision to that effect could
have been easily embodied in the old Fisheries
Law.
(Principles. Reading matter)
The lawmaking body cannot delegate to an
executive official the power to declare what acts
should constitute an offense. It can authorize the
issuance of regulations and the imposition of the
penalty provided for in the law itself
Administrative agent are clothed with rulemaking powers because the lawmaking body
finds it impracticable, if not impossible, to
anticipate and provide for the multifarious and
complex situations that may be encountered in
enforcing the law. All that is required is that the
regulation should be germane to the defects and
purposes of the law and that it should conform
to the standards that the law prescribes
Administrative regulations adopted under
legislative authority by a particular department
must be in harmony with the provisions of the
law, and should be for the sole purpose of
carrying into effect its general provisions. By
such regulations, of course, the law itself cannot
be extended
The rule-making power must be confined to
details for regulating the mode or proceeding to

Case Digest Topic: Penal Rules and Regulation (p. 129, Chapter 3,
2013 ed. Admin Law by De Leon)

devices which may be battery or generator-operated and from and


available source of electric current.)

(*Electro Fishing. Electro fishing is the catching of fish with the


use of electric current. The equipment used are of many electrical

Admin Law | Case Bank Week 5 | Additional Cases for Chapters 3, 4 & 5

carry into effect the law as it has been enacted.


The power cannot be extended to amending or
expanding the statutory requirements or to
embrace matters not covered by the statute.
Rules that subvert the statute cannot be
sanctioned.
"Rules and regulations when promulgated in
pursuance of the procedure or authority
conferred upon the administrative agency by
law, partake of the nature of a statute, and
compliance therewith may be enforced by a
penal sanction provided in the law. This is so
because statutes are usually couched in general
terms, after expressing the policy, purposes,
objectives, remedies and sanctions intended by
the legislature. The details and the manner of
carrying out the law are oftentimes left to the
administrative agency entrusted with its
enforcement. In this sense, it has been said that
rules and regulations are the product of a
delegated power to create new or additional
legal provisions that have the effect of law." The
rule or regulation should be within the scope of
the statutory authority granted by the legislature
to the administrative agency
A penal statute is strictly construed. While an
administrative agency has the right to make
ranks and regulations to carry into effect a law
already enacted, that power should not be
confused with the power to enact a criminal
statute. An administrative agency can have only
the administrative or policing powers expressly
or by necessary implication conferred upon it

Admin Law | Case Bank Week 5 | Additional Cases for Chapters 3, 4 & 5

US v Tupasi Molina (G.R. No. L-9878) December


24, 19146
Facts of the case:
Frank Tupasi Molina was convicted in the court
of first instance in the municipality of Tayum in
Ilocos Sur for the crime of Perjury. It was
adduced among the facts that Molina was in the
process of submitting requirement for the
examination for admission for police service in
the province of Ilocos. One of the requirements
is to submit a statement under oath that he had
never been indicted, tried, or sentenced for the
violation of any law, ordinance, or regulation in
any court, where in this particular case he was in
fact convicted three (3) times prior to his
application for examination.
The defendant, appealed the case to the SC with,
among others, the assignment of error to the
court of first instance that:
1. The trial court erred in holding section 37
of Act No. 1697 to be applicable in this
case
Issue:
Whether or not the defendant can be convicted
of perjury under section 3 of Act No. 1697 where
the law (Act No. 2169), from which section 3 of
Act No. 1697 relates to, did not expressly grant
penalty of perjury.
Held:
Yes, there can be penalty of perjury imposed
since the Law (Act No 2169). The penalty of
perjury is an indispensable element in order to
require or force to require all those who will
apply for police service to faithfully comply with
its requirement notwithstanding it is not

Case Digest Topic: Penal Rules and Regulation (p. 129, Chapter 3,
2013 ed. Admin Law by De Leon)
7

Xxx Any person who, having taken an oath before a competent


tribunal, officer, or person, in any case in which a law of the
Philippine Islands authorizes an oath to be administered, that he
will testify, declare, depose, or certify truly, or that any written

expressly provided for in the law to which the


rules and regulation in this case relates.
(Attaching
pertinent
proviso
in
the
aforementioned law)
xxx
Act No. 2169 of the Philippine Legislature, which
is an Act to provide for the reorganization,
government, and inspection of municipal police
of the municipalities or provinces and
subprovinces organized under Act No. 83,
provides for the reorganization of the municipal
police of the municipalities or provinces and
subprovinces organized under Act No. 83.
Said Act further provides that, subject to the
approval of the Secretary of Commerce and
Police, the Director of Constabulary shall prepare
general regulations for the good government,
discipline, and inspection of the municipal
police, "compliance wherewith shall be
obligatory for all members of the organization."
Said Act further provides for an examining board
for the municipal police. It further provides that,
subject to the approval of the Secretary of
Commerce and Police, the Director of
Constabulary shall prepare an examination
manual, prescribing, at the same time, suitable
rules for the conduct of the examination.
Said Act (No. 2169) also provides for the time
and place for holding said examinations.
Section 9 of said Act provides that: "To be eligible
for examination, a candidate shall have the
following requirements: . . . (6) Have no criminal
record."
In accordance with the requirements of said law,
the Director of Constabulary prepared an
examination manual, prescribing at the same
testimony, declaration, deposition or certificate by him subscribed
is true, willfully and contrary to such oath states or subscribes any
material matter which he does not believe to be true, is guilty or
perjury, and shall be punished, etc. xxx

Admin Law | Case Bank Week 5 | Additional Cases for Chapters 3, 4 & 5

time rules for conducting examinations, which


examination manual was approved by the
Secretary of Commerce and Police, and thereby
was given the force of law.
xxx
The regulations adopted under legislative
authority by a particular department must be in
harmony with the provisions of the law, and for
the sole purpose of carrying into effect its
general provisions. By such regulations, of
course, the law itself can not be extended. So
long, however, as the regulations relate solely to
carrying into effect the provisions of the law,
they are valid. A violation of a regulation
prescribed by an executive officer of the
Government in conformity with and based upon
a statute authorizing such regulation, constitutes
an offense and renders the offender liable to
punishment in accordance with the provisions of
law

Admin Law | Case Bank Week 5 | Additional Cases for Chapters 3, 4 & 5

G.R. No. L-47178

November 25, 1940

PETITIONER:
THE
INTERNATIONAL
HARDWOOD AND VENEER COMPANY (IHVC)
RESPONDENT: THE PAGIL FEDERATION
OF LABOR (PFL)
PONENTE: LAUREL, J
FACTS:
The Secretary of Labor certified to the Court of
Industrial Relations that an Industrial dispute
existed between the petitioner and certain of its
employees who are members of respondent
union, and that the controversy was a proper one
to be dealt with by said Court in the public interest
under section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 103.
Among the demands made in the dispute were
setting the minimum daily wage of the laborers,
devising a proper schedule of rate of wages and
the rate of wages for the mountain camps should
be higher than those given in town. A judgment8
was thereafter rendered. However, the petitioner
prayed for reconsideration of the Decision
Adicional. While said petition was pending, the
petitioner filed a motion alleging (1) that the Court
of Industrial Relations has no authority to
determine minimum wages for an individual
employer in connection with a particular and
specific industrial dispute under the provisions of
section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 103; (2) that
such authority would constitute an undue
delegation of legislative power to the Court of
Industrial Relations and would deny the petitioner
the equal protection of the laws, thus rendering
said section unconstitutional and void

function, and that Section 4 of Commonwealth


Act No. 103 does not indicate in that manner, by
what standards, or in accordance with what rules,
the Court of Industrial Relations shall determine
minimum wages under said section.
Section 20 of the Commonwealth Act 103
prescribes that in the hearing, investigation and
determination of any question or controversy and
in exercising any duties and powers under the
Act, the court shall act according to justice and
equity and substantial merits to the case, without
regard to technicalities of legal forms.
Issue:
Has the National Assembly, by this Section 20,
furnished sufficient standard by which the court
will be guided in exercising its discretion in the
determination of any question or controversy
before it?
Held:
Yes. (1) Discretionary power conferred
judicial in character. The National Assembly, by
Section 20, has furnished sufficient standard by
which the court will be guided in exercising its
discretion in the determination of any question or
controversy before it . The discretionary power
thus conferred is judicial in character and does
not infringe upon the principle of separation of
powers and prohibition against the delegation of
legislative function, and the equal protection
clause of the Constitution

The Petitioner IHVS claims that if Section 4 of


Commonwealth Act No. 103 is held to empower
the Court of Industrial Relations to determine
minimum wages in connection with an industrial
dispute, the section is unconstitutional as
constituting undue delegation of legislative power
to the court, depriving the petitioner of the equal
protection of the laws.
In support of this claim, petitioner argues that the
determination of minimum wages is a legislative
8

in decision adicional of September 19, 1939 (decision is written


in Spanish)

Admin Law | Case Bank Week 5 | Additional Cases for Chapters 3, 4 & 5

G.R. No. L-24489 (SCRA 242) September


28, 1968
PETITIONER: AUGUSTIN GRACILLA
RESPONDENT: COURT OF INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS,
FULLER
PAINT
MANUFACTURING CO., (PHIL.), INC. and
REPUBLIC PROTECTIVE AGENCY (FPM)
PONENTE: FERNANDO, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner, Agustin Gracilla, objecting to his
dismissal as security guard of and seeking
reinstatement, filed a complaint against
private respondent, FPM with respondent
CIR. The presiding judge dismissed his
complaint for lack of merit and for
humanitarian reasons it was ordered that he
be extended with separation pay. He then
filed motion for reconsideration. It was again
denied it stating: After a close perusal of the
records as well as the written arguments in
support of said motion, the Court en banc
fails to find sufficient justification for altering
or modifying the aforesaid decision.
Hence, the appeal by certiorari, petitioners
monetary claims apparently having been
overlooked in the decision.
Issue: Did the failure to rule on the above
monetary claims constitute a denial of due
process?
Held:
Yes. It was a denial of due process. (1) CIR
more of an administrative board with
functions more active and extensive than
ordinary courts. So it must be deference
paid to the holding in Ang Tibay v Court of
Industrial Relations, where, as Justice
Laurel correctly noted:
The court of Industrial Relations is a
special court whose functions are
specifically stated in the law of its
creation. It is more of an

administrative board than a part of


the integrated judicial system of the
nation. It is not intended to be a mere
reception organ of the Government.
Unlike a court of justice which is
essentially passive, acting only when
its jurisdiction is invoked and deciding
only cases that are presented to it by
the parties-litigants, the function of
the Court of Industrial Relations, as
will appear from perusal of its organic
law, is more active, affirmative and
dynamic, It not only exercises judicial
or quasi-judicial functions in the
determination of disputes between
employers and employees but its
functions
are
far
more
comprehensive and extensive.
(2) Fundamental requirements of due
process, nevertheless, not be ignored or
disregarded. Nevertheless, he was
careful to point out that, freed as respondent
court from rigidity of certain procedural
requirements, it cannot ignore or disregard
the fundamental and essential requirements
of due process in trial and investigations of
an administrative character. He mentioned
what he considered cardinal primary rights
which must be respected, otherwise, the
dictates of due process are not complied
with. One of such due process requirements
is relevant here: the Court of Industrial
Relations should, in all controversial
questions, render its decision in such a
manner that the parties proceeding can
know the various issues involved, and the
reasons for the decisions rendered. The
performance of this duty is inseparable from
the authority conferred upon it.
(3) Due process violated by the failure to
pass upon monetary claims timely raised.
The failure or respondent court, then to
pass upon the monetary claims raised by the
petitioner, amounted to a disregard of such a
cardinal right embraced in due process, or
left undecided. Especially so, should it be in
this case, where the monetary claims were
timely raised and insisted upon at all stages
of the proceeding

Admin Law | Case Bank Week 5 | Additional Cases for Chapters 3, 4 & 5

Admin Law | Case Bank Week 5 | Additional Cases for Chapters 3, 4 & 5