Part 12 - Incident Management and Critical Alliances:

How developing these two disciplines allows an operator to

more efficiently manage a blowout
John W. Wright , Blowout Advisor, John Wright Company, Boots & Coots,
Houston, Texas
L. Flak, former Wright, Boots & Coots employee.
This concluding article of the 12-part series discusses reasons why
operators need to establish some type of Well Control Incident
Management System (WCIMS). A proposed system is presented, including five
major subsystems. For operators who find these intimidating, a "minimum"
program is suggested.
The section on blowout control alliances discusses the evolution of oilwell
firefighting and how it has become extremely competitive while the number of
incidents is less than it used to be. It is suggested that this situation is "diluting"
the experience level within the oilwell fire fighting industry and is, thus,
generating a need for alliances between operators, contractors and
subcontractors-even between operators-where one company's problem could
involve other operators.

INTRODUCTION
Today's oil and gas operator must be prepared to adequately manage a well
control incident. Due to increased liability of health, safety and environmental
(HSE) issues, procrastination is quickly becoming a non option. Though
catastrophic blowouts happen less frequently, potential consequences for an
unprepared operator are higher than ever.
Recent events have shown that even blowout incidents that happen to other
operators can by causing implementation of restrictive and costly government
regulations. If fatalities or oil spills occur, the whole industry may be indirectly
affected by negative public exposure, closing of sensitive environmental areas to
leasing and increased insurance premiums. Therefore, it is in the interest of the
industry as a whole, that all operators maintain acceptable levels of preparedness
and critical resources to effectively manage an incident.

Not even a major oil company can justify having equipment and full time
experienced blowout control and associated personnel on staff. However, every
operator expects to easily con tract such resources when a situation arises or to
assist in developing contingency plans. Strategic alliances assure effective
planning, and resources will be readily available as required. Strategic alliances
establish relations with critical contractors, other local operators if necessary and
local and federal governmental agencies with jurisdiction in the area.
A primary HSE objective for all operators is to provide a working methodology to
safely and effectively manage, respond to and recover from a well control
incident. The complexity of this methodology will vary with operation size and
operator as well as risk and vulnerability associated with the area. A standardized
"all risk" system of procedures and terminology should be used by all operators
regard less of their size and operational complexity. Standards become especially
critical when outside assistance and complex communication is required in a
severe emergency. The fires of Kuwait closed a chapter in the oilwell firefighting
business traditionally associated with a few pioneering individuals.

WELL CONTROL INCIDENT

MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
Fig. 35. Complicated blowout control
projects can be more effectively managed
by alliances between operator,
firefighter, blowout control advisor and
critical support contractor.
The National Inter-Agency Incident
Management System (NIMS) and the Incident Command System (ICS) were
developed in the U.S. as a consequence of fires that consumed a large portion of
Southern California in 1970.1 As a result of those fires, a need was identified to
develop a system whereby diverse groups could work together toward a common
goal under emergency conditions. This basic model has since been adopted by
many industries to more effectively manage emergency incidents for all types of
hazards ranging from oil spills to hostage situations. Fig. 34 (button) above is an
example ICS organizational chart.
Proposed system. Based on NIMS and basic hazard control models, a
management system is proposed that consists of five major subsystems which

collectively provide a total system approach to well control incident management.

These include:
1. Hazard management. Identifies well control hazards and assesses risk and
impact of the hazards. It identifies: 1) current controls to minimize hazards,
2) ability to respond to and mitigate an incident, 3) controls to minimize
incident escalation, and 4) ability to recover from an incident. Based on this
vulnerability assessment, additional controls are put in place to manage
risk at an acceptable level.
2. Incident management. Customizes ICS for the operator and area. It
combines: facilities, equipment, personnel, procedures and
communications operating within a common organization to respond to a
well control incident. To function properly, its users utilize eight underlying
components of organization: common terminology, modular organization,
integrated communications, unified command structure, consolidated
action plans, manageable span of control, pre-designated incident facilities
and comprehensive resource management. This system manages incident
effects as well as source control and is designed for an all-risks response.
Complexity of this modular system would depend on out come of the
hazard/risk assessment and individual incident nature.
3. Qualification management. Deals with: pre-qualification and training of
critical personnel and con tractors; training on, for example, procedures
and policies, well control, safety and emergency response, risk and hazard
management; development and implementation of emergency drills; and
certification of critical jobs. This subsystem is designed to assure that
critical personnel and contractors are trained and qualified to perform
assigned duties.
4. Information management. Deals with identifying and having rapid access to
critical information, that it is up-to-date and accurate and that QA/QC
procedures are in-place for critical control and response operations. It
assures that information gained in associated subsystems is available in a
usable format.
5. Technology management. Assures that proper procedures and critical
equipment exist for responding to and mitigating the incident. This would
include spill containment, fire fighting, surface intervention on land,
surface intervention offshore, subsea intervention, drilling relief well(s),
planning and executing kill operations and final P&A or well recovery.
Procedures and equipment do not necessarily exist for all possible blowout
control operations. This discovery would be made through hazard
assessment and contingency plans.

Due diligence. What is reasonably expected of an operator in the normal or

logical course of events with respect to being prepared to respond to a well
control incident? Unless governed by local or federal regulations, preparedness
degree is largely left to the individual operator. This works fine until a blowout
control effort results in fatalities, severe injury or major pollution. The degree of
preparedness may then be contested in a court; or a regulatory agency may
automatically assume the local industry as a whole is not sufficiently prepared
and introduce compliance regulations on the rest.(2) If all operators were to
voluntarily follow the basic steps outlined in the pro posed WCIMS, or similar
system, catastrophic incidents and compliance regulations could be minimized.
A minimum system. At first glance, expansion of the five subsystems in the
proposed WCIMS appears as if it could overwhelm many operators. Complete
expansion, however, is generally only justified when working in very high risk
areas, such as an H2S or high-pressure gas field near populated areas, or
extremely sensitive environmental areas. Therefore, if an operator is starting
from scratch, or wishes to assess its current preparedness level against a
proposed system, the following describes a minimum guideline.
Hazard management. An operator must have a reasonable idea of basic blowout
hazards associated with a given field or planned drilling activity, and likely
consequences, where it operates. This hazard assessment is generally going to be
subjective as industry statistics on blowout incidents are generally unreliable due
to small sample size and the large number of independent variables associated
with each. The assessment should be documented, with reasons to back up the
opinion. Based on this initial judgment, an operator will decide whether
additional detailed hazard assessment and control evaluation is warranted
beyond acceptable standard operating/design practices. If justified, hazard
analysis expansion should be continued until cost effectiveness based on total
field investment and potential liability begins to diminish.
Incident management. Based on the amount of risk associated with the operating
area, an Incident Management System should be devised and documented. This
should include details on how the operator is going to ramp-up from normal
operations to a blowout response, depending on severity level. Usually no more
than three levels of response are justified. For example, a kick might be classified
as a Level 1 incident, a suspected under ground cross flow Level 2 and an
uncontrolled surface or underground blowout as Level 3. A Level 3 incident may
escalate as a Level 1 ramp-up or may happen suddenly. Detailed procedures
should be documented for implementing the ramp-up for each level, for example:
who calls whom?; who is in charge of what?; what is each person's
responsibilities?; what field supervisory personnel should/should not do during

each level?; what equipment and outside personnel should be mobilized and so
forth?
The ICS is the recommended structure on which to build this system as it is
designed to expand and contract from a single Incident Commander to handle a
small problem, to a large, multi-disciplined organization to handle a large-scale
disaster. At a mini mum, it should include time frame for the initiating incident,
escalation to blowout and response team(s) placement. Systems for higher-risk
areas should expand the time frame through source control planning/execution
and final blowout recovery.
Qualification management. Each person in the ICS should have basic training and
job descriptions. Critical contractors, such as oilwell firefighting companies and
blowout advisors, should be pre-qualified. For example, some personnel may
have considerable experience in capping Kuwait wells but no experience in
capping a well while burning, drilling a relief well, subsea intervention, or planning
and executing a complicated kill operation. Call-off contracts should be placed
with at least two oilwell firefighters, as one company may not have the required
personnel avail able when called. Critical support con tractors should know what
their job responsibility is and where they fit into the operator's ICS structure.
Failure to do this prior to the incident will cause individuals in the project to work
out their own "pecking order" within the structure, hindering effective teamwork.
Information management. An operator should be able to immediately gather
whatever information is required to implement ramp-up for blowout response.
This includes an emergency response plan with documents located at field
locations and offices, as well as with all responsible managers in the ICS structure.
Any additional information that blowout control teams may need based on
incident type should be capable of being compiled within 8-24 hours of the
emergency. If this is not currently possible, action should be taken to assure that
required information is compiled and updated.
Technology management. For source control, the operator should confer with its
chosen firefighter con tractor and blowout engineering advisor. This decision
would be made based on initial hazard assessment. Situations that should trigger
further evaluation include: deep HPHT wells; geothermal wells; subsea wells in
deep water; unique platform designs; unique tree, wellhead or BOP designs;
remote locations; environmentally sensitive areas; wells near population centers
or H2S wells; high flowrate gas wells, multiple-well congested plat forms; and
other unique or unusual situations. Following this format, an operator with a
relatively low-risk well or field could assemble a minimum SCIMS in a relatively
short time and on a tight budget.

BLOWOUT CONTROL ALLIANCES

Changing operating company philosophies in the last few years resulted in more
long-term alliances being formed between drilling contractors, service companies
and vendors, to reduce costs and increase efficiency. This trend is logically
expanding to blowout control. The first call-off contracts designed specifically for
blowout control services were developed during pre-planning operations prior to
the Kuwait fires in late 1990. These contracts covered fire fighters as well as
critical support services. Speed and efficiency at which the wells were controlled
demonstrates pre-planning effectiveness and close working relationship
developed between various oilwell firefighting companies, support contractors
and operators.
Since blowout control operations are relatively rare events, formation of an
alliance between operator, fire fighter and critical support contractors makes
good strategic sense-a contingency plan on the shelf is not enough! An operator
with a catastrophic blowout needs to develop and test procedures, acquire
confidence and build a team with the critical con tractors, Fig. 35.
Oilwell firefighters. Blowouts and fires have followed our industry from its
earliest days. H. S. Patton and M. M. Kinley are credited as being the first
dedicated oilwell firefighters; their careers started in the 1920s-30s. The next
generation included Red Adair, Boots Hansen and Coots Matthews, all starting
initially with Kinley and later forming their own companies. It was with that
generation that the firefighting aspects of their job description became secondary
to controlling the blowout flow.
For many years, only one or two companies could be supported by the available
blowout demand. While this did not allow for tremendous competition, an
operator knew the people working on their well had a broad experience base. At
the time of this writing, some 10 privately held companies exist worldwide, plus
additional national teams, all competing for less work than existed when there
were only two companies. Most of these companies came into existence during
and after the Kuwait fires of 1991.
Too many firms sharing too little work means not only immediate problems for
the firefighting companies, but potentially for the industry in general. The net
effect is a dilution of experience base in all individual companies. Coupled with
increased consequences, this makes operators more vulnerable than ever to a
catastrophic blowout. Market forces will eventually correct this problem, but that

will also change forever the business traditionally associated with a few
pioneering individuals. Surviving companies will have to be more diversified "one
stop shops" offering full general contracting services with strong engineering
component resources. This will include, for example: traditional fire
fighting/blowout control services, snubbing, hot tapping, valve drilling, freezing,
cold cutting, relief well planning and supervision, kill planning and supervision,
development of WCIMS, training, field inspections, audits, engineering support,
etc.
The full service oilwell firefighting company will be the hub alliance with the
operator for blowout control. In some cases, it will be more efficient for support
services to be sub contracted by the firefighter than for the operator to juggle
various con tractors during an emergency. In other situations with larger
operators who already have contracts with major service companies, the fire
fighter will primarily play the part of expert advisor. All operators should prequalify the oilwell firefighting companies they plan to use in an incident, set up
call-off contracts, and jointly evaluate their current vulnerability level, area by
area.
Blowout engineering advisors. In 1990, major international operators began
using blowout engineering advisors to help advise their personnel on blowout
contingency plans as well as actual blowouts. Their strategy was to help develop
engineering expertise in the blowout-control industry to sup port oilwell
firefighters and service companies, and to better prepare their internal
management to handle a blowout control operation. This has led to development
of engineering divisions or engineering alliances with most of the firefighting
companies. This is a historical change from the traditional hands-on approach
used by past firefighters. This development is probably more significant than any
new technology in the innovation and refinement of blowout control, response
and management.
As stated in Part 1 of this series, blowout control management and engineering
has always relied on a few experienced individuals. These individuals worked for
operating companies and gained experience in an era where blowouts were more
common. All of these men have retired, or will shortly, leaving an experience gap.
Combined with the diluted experience base within the firefighting companies, this
leaves a gap that will eventually be bridged by blowout engineering advisors.
The future role of blowout engineering advisors will be mutifaceted. Of course
they must be available to respond to a blowout crisis and assist an operator or
firefighting team on control options and kill procedures, but the more important
role will be filled in preplanning, documenting procedures, adapting technology

and developing new techniques. This will require joint efforts between operators,
service companies and fire fighters.
Emphasis on HSE will eventually put blowout control on every operator's list of
hazards to manage. Blowout advisors will assist in identifying blowout hazards in
existing fields and future drilling projects. Once identified, hazards must be
assessed as to risk of occurrence, consequence and ultimate impact. Depending
on the impact, specific contingency plans may be justified to help reduce risk to
acceptable levels and identify short falls in equipment, techniques and emergency
management procedures. Additionally, the advisor will perform audits on
emergency response plans, inspect platforms and rigs, assist in conducting
simulated emergency response drills for blowout control and eventually become
involved in design of facilities before they are built.
Support contractors. Depending on type and location of the control operation,
various support contractors will be required. These might include con tractors for:
drilling, pumping, drilling fluids, drilling/fishing tools, directional drilling and
MWD, wireline logging, safety and toxic gas detection, civil works and heavy lift,
airlift, crane barges, support vessels, diving and specialty blowout control
equipment. Services that may be required include: choke manifolds and diverters,
capping stacks, abrasive and explosive jet cutters, demolition explosives, cold
cutters, snubbing units, coiled tubing units, production separators, inflatable
packers, perforating guns, specialty kill fluids and electromagnetic ranging
equipment.
The type of operations (drilling, production, workovers, other), operating area
(land, offshore, remote), and size and organization of the operator (major, large
or small independent, emergency management centralized or decentralized) will
dictate which contractors are considered critical. If a firefighting company is
under call-off contract for a particular area, most specialty blowout control
equipment can be subcontracted or coordinated through that company. The
remaining major service contractors will generally be readily available in a
developed operating area. If the area is remote, the operator will probably have
con tracts in place for most required services.
The operator's WCIMS should clearly indicate which services are critical for an
area and whether direct con tracts should be in place and which should be
subcontracted through the firefighter.
Other operators, government agencies. As previously mentioned, it is in the best
interest of all operators to minimize blowout effects in their area whether it is
their well or not. Alliances between operators to share non-confidential

information, critical equipment and supplies during a blowout or on contingency

should be evaluated in certain high-risk, remote, or sensitive operating areas.
Incident management plans should address the role of any government agencies
with jurisdiction in the area. These should be spelled out in the ICS and confirmed
with representatives of such agencies. In some cases, where severe pollution is
occurring or possible, or population centers could be affected, these agencies
have authority to stop actions, even take over operations and proceed as they see
fit-the operator, of course, maintaining all financial liability.

CONCLUSIONS
This article concludes the 12-part series on blowout
control, response, intervention and management.
The purpose of the series was to help operators
better understand and manage well control incidents
today and into the future. The industry has changed,
blowout control engineering and management
experience has been redistributed, and conclusion of
the fires of Kuwait closed a chapter on traditional
oilwell firefighting companies' modes of operation.
These changes, along with increased HSE liability
makes it imperative for operators to develop WCIMS
and create critical alliances.

Acknowledgement
The principal authors of this series want to thank the many co-authors and their
companies for their excellent input and assistance.

Literature Cited
1. Anon., "Incident command system," Fire Protection Publications, Oklahoma State University, October 1983.
2. Cullen, Honorable Lord, The Public Inquiry into the Piper Alpha Disaster HMSO, London, November 1991.

The authors

John W. Wright is president of John Wright Company, an engineering firm

providing blowout intervention and control services; relief well planning, services;
and general contracting for well aban donment or re-entry. He joined
Schlumberger Offshore Services in 1979 and later managed Eastman-Christensen
relief-well teams from 1986 to 1989 before forming his own company. He has
authored numerous papers on relief-well, precision directional drilling and
ranging. Mr. Wright has a BS in mechanical engineering from Texas A&M
University.