Sixto Brillantes, Jr. vs. Haydee T. Yorac, G.R. No.

93867, December 18 1990

Brillantes vs. Yorac
G.R. 93867, 18 December 1990
FACTS:
In December 1989, a coup attempt occurred prompting the president to create a fact finding commission
which would be chaired by Hilario Davide. Consequently he has to vacate his chairmanship of the
COMELEC. Yorac was temporarily placed as his substitute. Brillantes then questioned such appointment
urging that under Art 10-C of the Constitution in no case shall any member of the COMELEC be
appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity:. Brillantes claimed that the choice of the acting
chairman should not be appointed for such is an internal matter that should be resolved by the members
themselves and that the intrusion of the president violates the independence of the COMELEC as a
constitutional commission.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the designation made by the president violates the constitutional independence of the
COMELEC.

HELD:
The Supreme Court ruled that although all constitutional commissions are essentially executive in nature,
they are not under the control of the president in the discharge of their functions. The designation made
by the president has dubious justification as it was merely grounded on the quote administrative
expediency to present the functions of the COMELEC. Aside from such justification, it found no basis on
existing rules on statutes. Yoracs designation is null and unconstitutional.

Sixto Brillantes, Jr. vs Haydee

Yorac
192 SCRA 358 Political Law Constitutional Law Constitutional Commissions The
Commission on Elections COMELECs Constitutional Independence
In December 1989, a coup attempt occurred prompting the president to create a fact finding
commission which would be chaired by Hilario Davide. Consequently he has to vacate his
chairmanship over the Commission on Elections (COMELEC). Haydee Yorac, an associate
commissioner in the COMELEC, was appointed by then President Corazon Aquino as a
temporary substitute, in short, she was appointed in an acting capacity. Sixto Brillantes, Jr.
then questioned such appointment urging that under Art 10-C of the Constitution in no case
shall any member of the COMELEC be appointed or designated in a temporary
or acting capacity.
Brillantes further argued that the choice of the acting chairman should not come from the
President for such is an internal matter that should be resolved by the members themselves
and that the intrusion of the president violates the independence of the COMELEC as a
constitutional commission.
ISSUE: Whether or not the designation made by the president violates the constitutional
independence of the COMELEC.
HELD: Yes. Yoracs designation as acting chairman is unconstitutional. The Supreme Court
ruled that although all constitutional commissions are essentially executive in nature, they
are not under the control of the president in the discharge of their functions. The designation
made by the president has dubious justification as it was merely grounded on the quote
administrative expediency to present the functions of the COMELEC. Aside from such
justification, it found no basis on existing rules on statutes. It is the members of the
COMELEC who should choose whom to sit temporarily as acting chairman in the absence
of Davide (they normally do that by choosing the most senior member).
But even though the presidents appointment of Yorac as acting president is void, the
members of COMELEC can choose to reinstate Yorac as their acting chairman the point
here is that, it is the members who should elect their acting chairman pursuant to the
principle that constitutional commissions are independent bodies.

Romulo
Macalintal
vs
Commission on Elections
Political Law Election Laws Absentee Voters Act Proclamation of Winners in a
National Elections
Romulo Macalintal, as a lawyer and a taxpayer, questions the validity of the Overseas
Absentee Voting Act of 2003 (R.A. 9189). He questions the validity of the said act on the
following grounds, among others:
1.

That the provision that a Filipino already considered an immigrant abroad can be
allowed to participate in absentee voting provided he executes an affidavit stating his intent
to return to the Philippines is void because it dispenses of the requirement that a voter must
be a resident of the Philippines for at least one year and in the place where he intends to
vote for at least 6 months immediately preceding the election;

2.

That the provision allowing the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to proclaim

winning candidates insofar as it affects the canvass of votes and proclamation of winning
candidates for president and vice-president, is unconstitutional because it violates the
Constitution for it is Congress which is empowered to do so.
ISSUE: Whether or not Macalintals arguments are correct.
HELD: No.

1.

There can be no absentee voting if the absentee voters are required to physically
reside in the Philippines within the period required for non-absentee voters. Further, as
understood in election laws, domicile and resident are interchangeably used. Hence, one is
a resident of his domicile (insofar as election laws is concerned). The domicile is the place
where one has the intention to return to. Thus, an immigrant who executes an affidavit
stating his intent to return to the Philippines is considered a resident of the Philippines for
purposes of being qualified as a voter (absentee voter to be exact). If the immigrant does
not execute the affidavit then he is not qualified as an absentee voter.

2.

The said provision should be harmonized. It could not be the intention of Congress to
allow COMELEC to include the proclamation of the winners in the vice-presidential and
presidential race. To interpret it that way would mean that Congress allowed COMELEC to
usurp its power. The canvassing and proclamation of the presidential and vice

presidential elections is still lodged in Congress and was in no way transferred to the
COMELEC by virtue of RA 9189.

Imelda
Marcos
Sandiganbayan

vs

Imelda was charged together with Jose Dans for Graft & Corruption for a
dubioustransaction done in 1984 while they were officers transacting business with the Light
Railway Transit. The case was raffled to the 1 st Division of the Sandiganbayan. The division
was headed by Justice Garchitorena with J Balajadia and J Atienza as associate justices.
No decision was reached by the division by reason of Atienzas dissent in favor of Imeldas
innocence. Garchitorena then summoned a special division of the SB to include JJ Amores
and Cipriano as additional members. Amores then asked Garchitorena to be given 15 days
to send in his manifestation. On the date of Amores request, Garchitorena received
manifestation from J Balajadia stating that he agrees with J Rosario who further agrees with
J Atienza. Garchitorena then issued a special order to immediately dissolve the special
division and have the issue be raised to the SB en banc for it would already be pointless to
wait for Amores manifestation granted that a majority has already decided on Imeldas
favor. The SB en banc ruled against Imelda.
ISSUE: Whether or not due process has been observed.
HELD: The SC ruled that the ruling of the SB is bereft of merit as there was no strong
showing of Imeldas guilt. The SC further emphasized that Imelda was deprived of due
process by reason of Garchitorena not waiting for Amores manifestation. Such procedural
flaws committed by respondent Sandiganbayan are fatal to the validity of its decision
convicting petitioner. Garchitorena had already created the Special Division of five (5)
justices in view of the lack of unanimity of the three (3) justices in the First Division. At that
stage, petitioner had a vested right to be heard by the five (5) justices, especially the new
justices in the persons of Justices Amores and del Rosario who may have a different view of
the cases against her. At that point, Presiding Justice Garchitorena and Justice Balajadia
may change their mind and agree with the original opinion of Justice Atienza but the
turnaround cannot deprive petitioner of her vested right to the opinion of Justices Amores
and del Rosario. It may be true that Justice del Rosario had already expressed his opinion
during an informal, unscheduled meeting in the unnamed restaurant but as aforestated, that
opinion is not the opinion contemplated by law. But what is more, petitioner was denied the
opinion of Justice Amores for before it could be given, Presiding Justice Garchitorena
dissolved the Special Division.

G.R. No. 124680-81

February 28, 2000

IMELDA
R.
vs.
THE
SANDIGANBAYAN
(First
THEPHILIPPINES, respondents.

MARCOS, petitioner,
Division)

and

THE PEOPLE

OF