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Case 2:14-cv-02518-DDC-TJJ Document 102 Filed 03/06/15 Page 1 of 29

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT


FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS
KAIL MARIE and MICHELLE L. BROWN,
and KERRY WILKS, Ph.D., and DONNA
DITRANI, JAMES E. PETERS and GARY A.
MOHRMAN; CARRIE L. FOWLER and
SARAH C. BRAUN; and DARCI JO
BOHNENBLUST and JOLEEN M.
HICKMAN,
Plaintiffs,
v.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
) Case No. 14-CV-2518-DDC-TJJ
)
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SUSAN MOSIER, M.D., in her official capacity
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as Secretary of the Kansas Department of
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Health and Environment and
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DOUGLAS A. HAMILTON, in his official
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th
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Capacity as Clerk of the District Court for the 7
Judicial District (Douglas county), and
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BERNIE LUMBRERAS, in her official capacity
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as Clerk of the District Court for the 18th
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Judicial District (Sedgwick County),
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NICK JORDAN, in his official capacity as
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Secretary of the Kansas Department of Revenue, )
LISA KASPAR, in her official capacity as Director )
of the Kansas Department of Revenues Division )
of Vehicles, and MIKE MICHAEL, in his official )
capacity as Director of the State Employee
)
Health Plan,
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Defendants.
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_________________________________________ )

RESPONSE OF DEFENDANT MOSIER TO


PLAINTIFFS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Defendants Susan Mosier, Nick Jordan, Lisa Kaspar, and Mike Michael, named in their
respective official capacities, oppose plaintiffs motion for summary judgment. The motion for
summary judgment does not present a prima facie case and so would not be grantable even if no
defendant responded to it. The motion does not address any of the issues raised in the pending
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motions to dismiss. The motion contains no argument or authorities that discuss a plaintiffs
burden of proof in a case seeking to declare a wide array of laws, most of which are not
specified, facially unconstitutional. The facts offered in support of the motion affirmatively
establish that the Court has no subject matter jurisdiction to decide most if not all of the claims of
the various plaintiffs. The motion reinforces the propriety of granting the motions to dismiss
previously filed by all defendants. Defendants continue to press for a timely decision on those
motions and do not withdraw them by responding to plaintiffs motion for summary judgment.
The motion for summary judgment is no more than a laundry list of special privileges
desired by plaintiffs. None of the defendants is preventing any plaintiff from marrying a spouse
of choice in Kansas. There is no present case or controversy between the original four plaintiffs
and any defendant, because the only reason these plaintiffs are not already married is their own
decision to forego marriage until after the lawsuit has been fully and finally concluded. There is
no present case or controversy against Susan Mosier, whose office is not a participant in any
grievance described in the First Amended Complaint. There is no justiciable claim for allegedly
discriminatory paperwork burdens in the operation of the Kansas personal income tax selfassessment process due to the Tax Injunction Act, and even if the Court had jurisdiction to
entertain that claim it would fail on the merits. There is no constitutional right to obtain a driver
license using an alias of choice, and no Kansas law prohibiting that result is being
discriminatorily applied to any plaintiff. There is no constitutional right to be insured under a
spouses employment-related health insurance policy, and no Kansas law relating to that subject
is being discriminatorily applied to any plaintiff by any defendant. Any claim seeking an order
compelling delivery of insurance benefits is barred by the Eleventh Amendment.
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RESPONSE TO STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS


These defendants object to the employment of hearsay affidavits in support of the motion
for summary judgment. The only evidentiary matters offered in support of the motion are the
declarations of plaintiffs themselves, who are not competent to testify to most of what the
declarations contain. The hearsay statements set out in the declarations were not made by
defendants nor are the speakers identified by name, date, and details of the alleged conversation.
District Court Rule 56.1(d) requires that all declarations offered in support of a motion for
summary judgment must be made on personal knowledge and by a person competent to testify
to the facts stated that are admissible in evidence. Both the Court and opposing parties are free
to deem any matter that is supported solely by incompetent declarations filled with inadmissible
hearsay as wholly unsupported. See McCleary v. Nat'l Cold Storage, Inc., 67 F. Supp. 2d 1288,
1299 (D. Kan. 1999) at footnote 3.
These defendants respectfully request leave to submit additional factual authorities in
opposition to the motion in accordance with their motion seeking that relief, documents 93 and
99, and incorporate by reference their arguments and authorities in support of that relief pursuant
to F.R.C.P. 10(c).
RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS ENUMERATED FACTS
1. Controverted. Paragraph one is not a statement of fact, but a legal argument concerning the
sufficiency of the First Amended Complaint to state claims that are so broadly described. The
First Amended Complaint relates exclusively to declaratory and injunctive relief grantable
against the six named defendants, not universal relief addressed to every unidentified practice
of anyone and everyone employed by the State of Kansas.
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2. Controverted in part. The first sentence of paragraph two is not material to any issue
addressed in the motion for summary judgment. Because it is not yet known to this defendant
what sex was declared for each of these plaintiffs on their respective birth certificates, it is
not possible to determine whether they are a same sex couple for purposes of Kansas law.
The second sentence is controverted by the second declarations of Marie and Brown, who
state that they have no present intention of seeking a Kansas marriage license and will not
seek any such license during the pendency of this litigation. (Second Declaration of Marie,
7; Second Declaration of Brown, 7.) Both Marie and Brown are free to obtain marriage
licenses from Kansas court clerks at any time during the pendency of this litigation,
according to the affidavits of Hamilton and Lumbreras filed in support of those defendants
motion to dismiss. Additional factual support for the denial of this statement of fact will be
presented once plaintiffs Marie and Brown have given their depositions.
3. Controverted in part. The first sentence of paragraph three is not material to any issue
addressed in the motion for summary judgment. Because it is not yet known to this defendant
what sex is declared for each of these plaintiffs on their respective birth certificates, it is not
possible to determine whether they are a same sex couple for purposes of Kansas law. The
second sentence is controverted by the second declarations of Wilks and Ditrani, who state
that they have no present intention of seeking a Kansas marriage license and will not seek
any such license during the pendency of this litigation. (Second Declaration of Wilks, 7;
Second Declaration of DiTrani, 7). Wilks and DiTrani are free to obtain marriage licenses
from Kansas court clerks at any time during the pendency of this litigation, according to the
affidavits of Hamilton and Lumbreras filed in support of those defendants motion to dismiss.
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Additional factual support for the denial of this statement of fact will be presented once
plaintiffs Wilks and DiTrani have given their depositions.
4. Uncontroverted.
5. Uncontroverted.
6. Uncontroverted.
7. Uncontroverted.
8. Because paragraphs 8 through 20 relate to the claims against defendants Hamilton and
Lumbreras, these defendants defer to their response to the statement of facts and will
incorporate by reference whatever responses defendants Hamilton and Lumbreras choose to
make to these paragraphs, as permitted by F.R.C.P. 10(c).
9. Because paragraphs 8 through 20 relate to the claims against defendants Hamilton and
Lumbreras, these defendants defer to their response to the statement of facts and will
incorporate by reference whatever responses defendants Hamilton and Lumbreras choose to
make to these paragraphs, as permitted by F.R.C.P. 10(c).
10. Because paragraphs 8 through 20 relate to the claims against defendants Hamilton and
Lumbreras, these defendants defer to their response to the statement of facts and will
incorporate by reference whatever responses defendants Hamilton and Lumbreras choose to
make to these paragraphs, as permitted by F.R.C.P. 10(c).
11. Because paragraphs 8 through 20 relate to the claims against defendants Hamilton and
Lumbreras, these defendants defer to their response to the statement of facts and will
incorporate by reference whatever responses defendants Hamilton and Lumbreras choose to
make to these paragraphs, as permitted by F.R.C.P. 10(c).
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12. Because paragraphs 8 through 20 relate to the claims against defendants Hamilton and
Lumbreras, these defendants defer to their response to the statement of facts and will
incorporate by reference whatever responses defendants Hamilton and Lumbreras choose to
make to these paragraphs, as permitted by F.R.C.P. 10(c).
13. Because paragraphs 8 through 20 relate to the claims against defendants Hamilton and
Lumbreras, these defendants defer to their response to the statement of facts and will
incorporate by reference whatever responses defendants Hamilton and Lumbreras choose to
make to these paragraphs, as permitted by F.R.C.P. 10(c).
14. Because paragraphs 8 through 20 relate to the claims against defendants Hamilton and
Lumbreras, these defendants defer to their response to the statement of facts and will
incorporate by reference whatever responses defendants Hamilton and Lumbreras choose to
make to these paragraphs, as permitted by F.R.C.P. 10(c).
15. Because paragraphs 8 through 20 relate to the claims against defendants Hamilton and
Lumbreras, these defendants defer to their response to the statement of facts and will
incorporate by reference whatever responses defendants Hamilton and Lumbreras choose to
make to these paragraphs, as permitted by F.R.C.P. 10(c).
16. Because paragraphs 8 through 20 relate to the claims against defendants Hamilton and
Lumbreras, these defendants defer to their response to the statement of facts and will
incorporate by reference whatever responses defendants Hamilton and Lumbreras choose to
make to these paragraphs, as permitted by F.R.C.P. 10(c).
17. Because paragraphs 8 through 20 relate to the claims against defendants Hamilton and
Lumbreras, these defendants defer to their response to the statement of facts and will
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incorporate by reference whatever responses defendants Hamilton and Lumbreras choose to


make to these paragraphs, as permitted by F.R.C.P. 10(c).
18. Because paragraphs 8 through 20 relate to the claims against defendants Hamilton and
Lumbreras, these defendants defer to their response to the statement of facts and will
incorporate by reference whatever responses defendants Hamilton and Lumbreras choose to
make to these paragraphs, as permitted by F.R.C.P. 10(c).
19. Because paragraphs 8 through 20 relate to the claims against defendants Hamilton and
Lumbreras, these defendants defer to their response to the statement of facts and will
incorporate by reference whatever responses defendants Hamilton and Lumbreras choose to
make to these paragraphs, as permitted by F.R.C.P. 10(c).
20. Because paragraphs 8 through 20 relate to the claims against defendants Hamilton and
Lumbreras, these defendants defer to their response to the statement of facts and will
incorporate by reference whatever responses defendants Hamilton and Lumbreras choose to
make to these paragraphs, as permitted by F.R.C.P. 10(c).
21. Controverted in part. It is uncontroverted that these four plaintiffs have not applied for and
have no intention to apply for marriage licenses from any Kansas court clerk during the
pendency of this litigation. Plaintiffs do not allege that they intend to apply to any named
defendant in this case for a marriage license at any time. (Second declarations of Marie,
Brown, Wilks, and DiTrani at paragraph 7; Plaintiffs response to Stipulations #116 and
#123).
22. Uncontroverted but not material. In this lawsuit plaintiffs are not challenging the
constitutionality of the federal law that allows a state to give no effect to another states
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recognition of a same-sex marriage, 28 U.S.C. 1738C (1996). (Plaintiffs response to


Stipulation #1)
23. Uncontroverted but not material. In this lawsuit plaintiffs are not challenging the
constitutionality of the federal law that allows a state to give no effect to another states
recognition of a same-sex marriage, 28 U.S.C. 1738C (1996). (Plaintiffs response to
Stipulation #1)
24. Uncontroverted.
25. Uncontroverted but not material.
26. Uncontroverted but not material.
27. Uncontroverted.
28. Uncontroverted but not material. No plaintiffs making a claim against defendant Jordan
allege that they filed a joint income tax return or that they plan to file a joint income tax
return.
29. Controverted. Same sex married couples who file their federal income tax returns separately
are not required to submit any more state tax forms than a similarly situated heterosexual
married couple file. The tax notice relied upon by plaintiffs would not impose any paperwork
burden on plaintiffs in addition to what a similarly situated heterosexual couple would
provide. (Plaintiffs responses to Stipulations #52 and 53; affidavit of Richard Cram)
30. Controverted. Same sex married couples who file their federal income tax returns separately
are not required to submit any more state tax forms than a similarly situated heterosexual
married couple file. The tax notice relied upon by plaintiffs would not impose any paperwork

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burden on plaintiffs in addition to what a similarly situated heterosexual couple would


provide. (Plaintiffs responses to Stipulations #52 and 53; affidavit of Richard Cram)
31. Uncontroverted.
32. Controverted. Same sex married couples who file their federal income tax returns separately
are not required to submit any state tax forms in addition to those that a similarly situated
heterosexual married couple file. The tax notice relied upon by plaintiffs would not impose
any paperwork burden on plaintiffs in addition to what a similarly situated heterosexual
couple would provide. (Plaintiffs responses to Stipulations #52 and 53; affidavit of Richard
Cram)
33. Uncontroverted.
34. Uncontroverted.
35. Controverted. The paragraph misstates the substance of the referenced laws. Kansas law does
not require the issuance of a new driver license in any arbitrarily selected name, just because
a married person prefers to be known by that name. To the best knowledge and belief of
these defendants any Kansas driver license issued to any plaintiff in this case shows that
persons legal name as required by all relevant state and federal laws, and only additional
discovery could establish otherwise. No plaintiff in this case alleges facts that would trigger
an obligation to issue a new driver license pursuant to Kansas laws. (Affidavit of Timothy
Parks)
36. Controverted. The paragraph misstates the substance of the referenced laws. Kansas law does
not require the issuance of a new driver license in any arbitrarily selected name, just because
a married person prefers to be known by that name. To the best knowledge and belief of
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these defendants any Kansas driver license issued to any plaintiff in this case shows that
persons legal name as required by all relevant state and federal laws, and only additional
discovery could establish otherwise. No plaintiff in this case alleges facts that would trigger
an obligation to issue a new driver license pursuant to Kansas laws. (Affidavit of Timothy
Parks)
37. Controverted. The paragraph misstates the substance of the referenced laws. Kansas law does
not require the issuance of a new driver license in any arbitrarily selected name, just because
a married person prefers to be known by that name. To the best knowledge and belief of
these defendants any Kansas driver license issued to any plaintiff in this case shows that
persons legal name as required by all relevant state and federal laws, and only additional
discovery could establish otherwise. No plaintiff in this case alleges facts that would trigger
an obligation to issue a new driver license pursuant to Kansas laws. (Affidavit of Timothy
Parks)
38. Controverted. The paragraph misstates the substance of the referenced laws. Kansas law does
not require the issuance of a new driver license in any arbitrarily selected name, just because
a married person prefers to be known by that name. To the best knowledge and belief of
these defendants any Kansas driver license issued to any plaintiff in this case shows that
persons legal name as required by all relevant state and federal laws, and only additional
discovery could establish otherwise. No plaintiff in this case alleges facts that would trigger
an obligation to issue a new driver license pursuant to Kansas laws. (Affidavit of Timothy
Parks)
39. Controverted. Plaintiffs Fowler, Bohenblust, and Hickman have filed this lawsuit using these
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surnames, which is prima facie evidence that their legal names are the ones appearing in the
case caption rather than the pseudonyms they allege they would now prefer to employ. Only
additional discovery could establish whether these plaintiffs were able to obtain federal
documents using their pseudonyms of choice.
40. Controverted. K.S.A. 23-2506 permits issuance of a driver license in a new name acquired by
marriage only if the marriage is performed under Kansas law.
41. Controverted in part. It is uncontroverted that plaintiffs Bohnenblust and Hickman seek to
restore their premarital birth names by misusing the provisions of K.S.A. 23-2506. This
technique is not permitted by Kansas law, which allows only the adoption of a new name, not
reversion to an old name previously used by the applicant. Neither a heterosexual couple nor
a homosexual couple would be allowed to achieve the result sought by these plaintiffs.
(Affidavit of Timothy Parks)
42. Controverted. Plaintiffs Fowler, Bohenblust, and Hickman have filed this lawsuit using these
surnames, which is prima facie evidence that their legal names are the ones appearing in the
case caption rather than the pseudonyms they allege they would prefer to employ. Only
additional discovery could establish whether these plaintiffs have ever applied to some
unspecified motor vehicle office seeking documents issued in their pseudonyms of choice.
43. Controverted. Plaintiffs Fowler, Bohenblust, and Hickman have filed this lawsuit using these
surnames, which is prima facie evidence that their legal names are the ones appearing in the
case caption rather than the pseudonyms they allege they would prefer to employ. Only
additional discovery could establish whether these plaintiffs have ever applied to some
unspecified motor vehicle office seeking documents issued in their pseudonyms of choice.
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44. Controverted. Plaintiffs Fowler, Bohenblust, and Hickman have filed this lawsuit using these
surnames, which is prima facie evidence that their legal names are the ones appearing in the
case caption rather than the pseudonyms they allege they would prefer to employ. Only
additional discovery could establish whether plaintiff Fowler ever placed the described
telephone calls. K.S.A. 23-2506 permits issuance of a driver license in a new name acquired
by marriage only if the marriage is performed under Kansas law.
45. Controverted. Plaintiffs Fowler, Bohenblust, and Hickman have filed this lawsuit using these
surnames, which is prima facie evidence that their legal names are the ones appearing in the
case caption rather than the pseudonyms they allege they would prefer to employ. Only
additional discovery could establish whether plaintiff Fowler ever placed the described
telephone calls. K.S.A. 23-2506 permits issuance of a driver license in a new name acquired
by marriage only if the marriage is performed under Kansas law.
46. Controverted. Plaintiffs Fowler, Bohenblust, and Hickman have filed this lawsuit using these
surnames, which is prima facie evidence that their legal names are the ones appearing in the
case caption rather than the pseudonyms they allege they would prefer to employ. Only
additional discovery could establish whether plaintiff Fowler ever placed the described
telephone calls. K.S.A. 23-2506 permits issuance of a driver license in a new name acquired
by marriage only if the marriage is performed under Kansas law.
47. Controverted. The paragraph misstates the substance of the controlling regulation,
K.A.R.108-1-1, as amended effective January 2, 2015. The regulation requires that the status
of dependent spouse be determined under Kansas law, not the law of any other state. The
regulation has no language expressly determining whether a spouse can or cannot be a person
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of the same sex as the employee requesting to add the dependent spouse. (Mike Michael
affidavit)
48. Uncontroverted.
49. Uncontroverted.
50. Controverted. Employee dependent eligibility is controlled by the provisions of K.A.R.1081-1, as amended effective January 2, 2015. The regulation requires that the status of
dependent spouse be determined under Kansas law, not the law of any other state. The
regulation has no language expressly determining whether a spouse can or cannot be a person
of the same sex as the employee requesting to add the dependent spouse. (Mike Michael
affidavit)
51. Uncontroverted.
52. Uncontroverted.
53. Uncontroverted.
54. Controverted. Peters alleges he was married in Iowa, not in Kansas, so his purported spouse
could not qualify as an insurable dependent under Kansas law as authorized by 28 U.S.C.
1738C. Plaintiffs are not challenging the constitutionality of the federal law that allows a
state to give no effect to another states recognition of a same-sex marriage, 28 U.S.C.
1738C (1996). (Plaintiffs response to Stipulation #1)
55. Controverted. Peters alleges he was married in Iowa, not in Kansas, so his purported spouse
could not qualify as an insurable dependent under Kansas law as authorized by 28 U.S.C.
1738C. Plaintiffs are not challenging the constitutionality of the federal law that allows a
state to give no effect to another states recognition of a same-sex marriage, 28 U.S.C.
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1738C (1996). (Plaintiffs response to Stipulation #1)


56. Controverted. Neither Defendant Michael nor anyone employed in his agency has authority
to decide constitutional challenges to Kansas laws or administrative regulations. Any state
employee who wishes to challenge the constitutionality of a statute or regulation would need
to obtain a judgment from a court of competent jurisdiction. (Mike Michael affidavit)
57. Controverted. Neither Defendant Michael nor anyone employed in his agency has authority
to decide constitutional challenges to Kansas laws or administrative regulations. Any state
employee who wishes to challenge the constitutionality of a statute or regulation would need
to obtain a judgment from a court of competent jurisdiction. (Mike Michael affidavit)
58. Controverted. Neither Defendant Michael nor anyone employed in his agency has authority
to decide constitutional challenges to Kansas laws or administrative regulations. Any state
employee who wishes to challenge the constitutionality of a statute or regulation would need
to obtain a judgment from a court of competent jurisdiction. (Mike Michael affidavit)
LOCAL RULE 56.1(b)(2) STATEMENT OF ADDITIONAL MATERIAL FACTS
THAT APPEAR WITHOUT CONTROVERSY
FACTS RELATING TO ALL CLAIMS
1. In this lawsuit plaintiffs are not challenging the constitutionality of the federal law that
allows a state to give no effect to another states recognition of a same-sex marriage, 28
U.S.C. 1738C (1996). (Plaintiffs response to Stipulation #1)
2. The marriage laws of Kansas have never permitted any person to marry any other person
without restriction. (Plaintiffs response to Stipulation #10)

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3. There is a rational basis for the Kansas statutory prohibition on underage marriages, and
that prohibition is constitutionally valid. (Plaintiffs response to Stipulations #11 and
#12).
4. There is a rational basis for the Kansas statutory prohibition on incestuous marriages, and
that prohibition is constitutionally valid. (Plaintiffs response to Stipulations #13 and
#14).
5. There is a rational basis for the Kansas statutory prohibition on bigamous marriages, and
that prohibition is constitutionally valid. (Plaintiffs response to Stipulations #15 and
#16).
FACTS RELATING TO DEFENDANT MOSIER
6. Neither the Secretary of the Kansas Department of Health and Environment nor any other
KDHE employee participates in evaluating the qualifications of applicants to determine
whether they are lawfully entitled to the issuance of a marriage license consistent with the
statutory limitations set forth in K.S.A. 2014 Supp 23-2501 et seq. Decisions to issue
marriage licenses to same-sex couples or to refuse to issue licenses to those couples are
made by court personnel, without participation by the Secretary or by any KDHE
employee. (Robert Moser affidavit)
7. K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 23-2507 requires the registration of all marriages under the
supervision of the secretary of health and environment as provided in K.S.A. 65-102.
K.S.A. 65-102 directs the KDHE secretary to prepare the blank forms used to gather vital
statistics related to marriages that have already been performed. It gives the KDHE
secretary no supervisory authority over decisions concerning denial of applications based
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on the sex of the applicants. (Robert Moser affidavit)


8. K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 23-2509 directs the secretary of health and environment to supply
marriage certificate forms and describes how the forms are to be used in recording
marriages. This statute gives the KDHE secretary no supervisory authority over court
personnel in deciding whether to issue marriage licenses. (Robert Moser affidavit)
9. K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 23-2512 directs the KDHE secretary to maintain indexed records of
marriages once they have been performed and to provide certified copies when requested.
It gives the KDHE secretary no authority over court personnel in deciding whether to
issue marriage licenses. (Robert Moser affidavit)
10. Any guidance provided by KDHE employees to court personnel is limited to helping
them fill out the forms to report information to the Office of Vital Statistics. None of the
advice provided by KDHE employees relates to the performance by court personnel of
their role in assuring that marriage licenses are not issued to persons who are not legally
entitled to be married. (Robert Moser affidavit)
11. Prior to the filing of the First Amended Complaint in the above captioned matter, new
marriage license forms were distributed to Kansas district court clerks that delete all
references to men, women, husbands, wives, brides or grooms. These new forms are
intended for use when applicants of the same sex present themselves to apply for
marriage licenses, and the court clerks have been advised to employ the new forms for
that purpose. (Tim Keck affidavit)

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12. The Kansas State Employees Health Care Commission is an independent agency of the
State of Kansas that is not subordinate to the Kansas Department of Health and
Environment. See K.S.A. 75-6502.
FACTS RELATED TO DEFENDANT MICHAEL
13. Health insurance for state employees and certain of their dependents is regulated by
statute and administrative regulations. K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 75-6501(c) gives to the Kansas
State Employees Health Care Commission the authority to define what persons may or
may not qualify for insurance benefits under the plan. Eligibility rules are not made by
the Director of the Kansas State Employee Health Benefits Plan. (Mike Michael
affidavit)
14. Participation in the states health care benefits program is voluntary. Employees decide
whether to seek to add a dependent to an employees health insurance coverage. An
employees dependents have no right to apply for coverage themselves. (Mike Michael
affidavit)
15. The current categories of dependent persons who are potentially eligible for coverage if
an employee chooses to apply for that coverage are set forth in K.A.R. 108-1-1. This
regulation was amended effective January 2, 2015. The regulation requires that the status
of dependent spouse be determined under Kansas law, not the law of any other state. The
regulation has no language expressly determining whether a spouse can or cannot be a
person of the same sex as the employee requesting to add the dependent spouse. (Mike
Michael affidavit)

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16. Defendant Michael has not participated in any communications with plaintiffs Peters,
Mohrman, Bohnenblust, and Hickman concerning their alleged attempts to obtain
dependent spouse coverage. Neither Defendant Michael nor anyone employed in his
agency has authority to decide constitutional challenges to Kansas laws or administrative
regulations. Any state employee who wishes to challenge the constitutionality of a statute
or regulation would need to obtain a judgment from a court of competent jurisdiction.
(Mike Michael affidavit)
FACTS RELATED TO DEFENDANT JORDAN
17. For taxpayers who use the filing status on their federal personal income tax returns of
married filing separately, there is no additional preparatory work needed to fill out their
state personal income tax returns using single filing status other than transferring the
information from the federal forms to the state forms. (Richard Cram affidavit)
18. Kansas imposes the same personal income tax rates on residents who file as single
unmarried persons or as married residents filing separately. (Richard Cram affidavit)
19. Kansas' Form K-40 personal income tax return is a "self-assessment" tax document. Once
the return is filed, and assuming that the same is not adjusted or audited by the
Department, the amount of tax shown on the return becomes the assessment of the filer's
Kansas personal income tax. (Richard Cram affidavit)
20. For same-sex taxpayers submitting a federal return as married filing separately, their
income would already be separated on the federal income tax return, and those numbers
could be used to submit the Kansas return. (Plaintiffs response to Stipulation #52)

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21. No Notice 13-18 worksheet is needed for couples filing federal returns under the status
married filing separately as their income is already separated. (Plaintiffs response to
Stipulation #53)
22. Plaintiffs Peters and Mohrman have not submitted a Kansas state income tax return for
2014. (Plaintiffs response to Stipulation #56)
FACTS RELATED TO DEFENDANT KASPAR
23. K.S.A. 23-2506 does not provide a method for obtaining restoration of a premarital
surname that was used prior to an earlier marriage.
24. K.S.A. 23-2506 is normally relied upon by the drivers license examiner to make changes
expressed in the Kansas marriage license that are associated with couples middle names
and/or surnames. Other legal procedures that do not involve Kansas Department of
Revenues Division of Vehicles should be employed to initiate a restoration. An example
of another legal procedure would be a name restoration order resulting from a divorce.
25. Any applicant who wishes to obtain a driver license using the applicants name as shown
on his or her birth certificate will be required to provide additional documentation (i.e. a
name change order) if the applicant has an existing record with the Kansas Department of
Revenues Division of Vehicles with a name that deviates from the applicants name on
the birth certificate.
26. The above described policies concerning the names that are permissible under K.S.A. 232506 are applied the same to both men and women, whether they are heterosexual
couples or otherwise.

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ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES


1. THE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT FAILS TO SET FORTH A
PRIMA FACIE RIGHT TO THE RELIEF REQUESTED.
The First Amended Complaint alleges that plaintiffs are entitled to permanent injunctions
against any . . . sources of state law that exclude same-sex couples from marriage and that
prohibit the recognition of same-sex marriages performed in Kansas and elsewhere. Plaintiffs
contend that sources of state law that exclude same-sex couples from marrying and that prohibit
recognition of same-sex marriages performed in Kansas and elsewhere are facially
unconstitutional and unconstitutional in all their applications, including as applied to Plaintiffs . .
. See document 52 at pages 29-30. The motion for summary judgment fails to present the
minimal factual and legal basis for any of the relief requested.
A facial attack on the constitutionality of a statute that does not regulate speech can only
succeed by establish[ing] that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be
valid, i.e., that the law is unconstitutional in all of its applications. See Washington State
Grange v. Washington State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 449, 128 S.Ct. 1184, 1191, 170
L.Ed.2d 151 (2008). The motion does not discuss the standard for a facial attack, nor does it
discuss the substance or content of the challenged laws that do not apply to homosexual couples.
The Kansas marriage laws that plaintiffs attack do not just prohibit marriage between two
persons of the same sex. They also prohibit polygamy, polyandry, incestuous marriages,
underage marriages, and other purported marriages that would not be enforceable as ordinary
contracts. Neither the state constitutional provisions nor the state statutes that address these other
social issues are addressed in the motion for summary judgment. Plaintiffs have agreed to
stipulate that these aspects of Kansas law pose no constitutional problems. So the challenged
20

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laws cannot be facially invalid, because they may be constitutionally applied in some
circumstances.
Plaintiffs also articulate no facial challenge to any Kansas law that refuses to give effect
in Kansas to a homosexual marriage entered into in another state. Such laws are facially valid by
reason of 28 U.S.C. 1738C; Williams v. State of N.C., 325 U.S. 226, 65 S. Ct. 1092, 89 L. Ed.
1577 (U.S. 1945); and In re Estate of Gardiner, 29 Kan. App. 2d 92, 22 P.3d 1086 (2001), aff'd
in part, rev'd in part, 273 Kan. 191, 42 P.3d 120 (2002).
The motion fails to present a prima facie case that any Kansas law is being applied to any
of them unconstitutionally by any of the defendants, either to prevent them from marrying or to
deny them equal treatment of the law without rational purpose. The four original plaintiffs are
not being prevented from marrying by anyone at all, let alone any of the defendants in this case.
The motion offers neither argument nor factual support for any grievance against Susan Mosier,
whose sole role has been to continue to distribute gender neutral standard forms. The motion
does not establish a plausible inference of an ongoing violation of any plaintiffs constitutional
rights by any defendant, or any justiciable challenge to Kansas laws as they are now being
applied to the plaintiffs, let alone an uncontrovered right to a permanent injunction.
The motion assumes without argument or factual support that every Kansan except
homosexuals has the right to change his or her name to anything at all just by endorsing the new
name on a marriage certificate. This is a mistaken conclusion both as a matter of law and as a
matter of fact. Plaintiffs Fowler and Braun allege that defendants Jordan and Kaspar refuse to let
them rely on Illinois marriage papers to accomplish a name change. But again there is no
evidence offered that a heterosexual couple from Illinois would be treated differently under
21

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Kansas law. K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 23-2506 plainly limits the procedure they sought to invoke for
change of name to marriages performed in the State of Kansas pursuant to K.S.A. 2014 Supp.
23-2511. No unequal application of the law is threatened with regard to Fowler and Braun.
Plaintiffs Bohnenblust and Hickman allege that they were not allowed to restore their
premarital surnames appearing on their respective birth certificates by presenting a marriage
license that purported to legitimize those changes. But they do not establish that a heterosexual
couple would have been permitted to achieve name restoration in this manner. The statute relied
upon, K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 23-2506, only permits certain new names to be approved, and does not
authorize restoration of a former name using this method. No unequal treatment of similarly
situated persons occurs in the application of these laws.
Not every claim of discrimination invalidates state regulations under a strict scrutiny
analysis, just because the plaintiffs claim to be same-sex partners. Alleged discrimination based
on sexual orientation is subject only to a rational basis analysis in the context of law enforcement
and employment rights. See Price-Cornelison v. Brooks, 524 F.3d 1103 (10th Cir. 2008); Walmer
v. U.S. Dep't of Defense, 52 F.3d 851, 854 (10th Cir.1995), cert. denied 516 U.S. 974, 116 S. Ct.
474, 133 L. Ed. 2d 403 (1995); and Jantz v. Muci, 976 F.2d 623, 630 (10th Cir.1992), cert.
denied 508 U.S. 952, 113 S. Ct. 2445, 124 L. Ed. 2d 662 (1993). No Tenth Circuit case has
concluded that statutes applying traditional marriage definitions violate the rational basis test.
See Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193, 1223 (10th Cir. 2014) at footnote 11; Bishop v. Smith,
760 F.3d 1070, 1114 (10th Cir. 2014) separate opinion of Judge Kelly at footnote 2.
There is no federal constitutional right to be taxed as a married person rather than as a
single person. No right to equality of taxation under the Fourteenth Amendment has ever been
22

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recognized, and states are allowed more freedom in crafting tax laws than they are permitted in
other areas of the law. See Madden v. Commonwealth of Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83, 87-88, 60 S.
Ct. 406, 408, 84 L. Ed. 590 (1940). The discriminatory state income tax laws of Kansas meet the
rational basis test imposed by the Fourteenth Amendment. See Peden v. State, 261 Kan. 239, 930
P.2d 1 (1996).
Not every grievance concerning deprivation of an alleged right gives rise to a federal civil
rights lawsuit. See DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 196-97,
109 S. Ct. 998, 1003-04, 103 L. Ed. 2d 249 (1989). The First Amended Complaint assumes that
there is a constitutional right to receive state-supported medical insurance. This assumption is
legally mistaken. There is no valid federal statutory right to obtain spousal health insurance
benefits from a nonconsenting state. See discussion in Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius,
132 S. Ct. 2566, 183 L. Ed. 2d 450, (2012). The mechanics of the KSEHCP are set forth in
K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 75-6501, et seq., including the fact that it is funded by the State of Kansas.
The plan is obviously a governmental plan that is exempt from ERISA. The motion does not
assert that the Plan is not being administered in accordance with its black letter provisions, or in
violation of any applicable state and federal statute or regulation.
No federal statute or constitutional provision requires a state to give effect to marriages
entered into in another state. States are expressly authorized to deny effect to out-of-state
marriages under 28 U.S.C. 1738C. The marriage laws of Kansas violate no constitutional
principle by refusing to give effect to the domestic relations laws of other states, according to In
re Estate of Gardiner, 29 Kan. App. 2d 92, 22 P.3d 1086 (2001), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 273
Kan. 191, 42 P.3d 120 (2002), cert. denied sub nom Gardiner v. Gardiner, 537 U.S.825, 123
23

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S.Ct. 113, 154 L.Ed.2d 36 (2002). If a constitutional right to full faith and credit is to be found, it
will be announced by the United States Supreme Court this term. See DeBoer v. Snyder, 83
USLW 3315, 2015 WL 213650 (U.S. Jan. 16, 2015).
There is no federal right, whether statutory or constitutional, to the issuance of a drivers
license in the name of the licensees preference. See Jorgensen v. Larsen, 930 F.2d 922, 1991
WL 55457 (10th Cir. 1991); Brown v. Cooke, 362 F. App'x 897, 2010 WL 227574 (10th Cir.
2010). Recognition of a constitutional right to select a name of choice to appear on a drivers
license would require invalidation of the Real ID Act, 49 U.S.C. 30301, et seq.
In the context of insurance coverage, even apparently arbitrary distinctions among classes
of potential beneficiaries are not considered per se irrational or arbitrary, and similar laws have
repeatedly been held to pass constitutional scrutiny. See for example Weinberger v. Salfi, 422
U.S. 749, 95 S. Ct. 2457, 45 L. Ed. 2d 522 (1975); Califano v. Boles, 443 U.S. 282, 99 S. Ct.
2767, 61 L. Ed. 2d 541 (1979); Astrue v. Capato ex rel. B.N.C., __U.S.__, 132 S. Ct. 2021, 182
L. Ed. 2d 887, (2012); Johnson v. Califano, 656 F.2d 569 (10th Cir. 1981).
2. THERE IS NO CASE OR CONTROVERSY, AND PLAINTIFFS LACK
STANDING TO PURSUE GENERAL RELiEF FOR EVERY HOMOSEXUAL
COUPLE IN KANSAS.
The court would be doing plaintiffs a favor by dismissing this lawsuit without prejudice
for lack of standing and absence of a case or controversy. This lawsuit was filed in haste on
behalf of four plaintiffs who did not really want to take advantage of the relief the Court has
granted to them. Whatever grievance these four plaintiffs may have considered pursuing in
October of 2014 is no longer a live controversy because Kansas court clerks have been issuing
same sex marriage licenses since mid November of 2014 with the blessing of the Kansas
24

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Supreme Court. The six additional plaintiffs were not selected wisely, and have no justiciable
grievances to state either. Perhaps if other plaintiffs with real claims decide to sue other
defendants, the declaratory relief might still be available to those potential plaintiffs, depending
upon what happens in the United States Supreme Court this spring. But continued insistence on
pressing a lawsuit pursuing misguided claims challenging inoffensive state practices is likely to
result in nothing more than a waste of effort for all concerned.
The Eleventh Amendment bars federal court lawsuits against a state or its officials acting
within their official capacities, with a narrow exception allowing for prospective injunctive relief
against individual officials for their ongoing violations of federal rights. See Ex parte Young,
209 U.S. 123, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908). When a claim for injunctive relief is brought
against a state official who is not involved in the enforcement of an allegedly unconstitutional
statute, Eleventh Amendment immunity applies and requires dismissal of the claim. See Peterson
v. Martinez, 707 F.3d 1197, 1205-1206 (10th Cir. 2013).
A federal court has no power to answer abstract questions posed by litigants who have no
personal stake in the interpretation or application of a challenged law. Jurisdictional limits
imposed by Article III require that a plaintiff present a case or controversy that the parties have
standing to litigate. To establish Article III standing, an injury must be concrete, particularized,
and actual or imminent; fairly traceable to the challenged action; and redressable by a favorable
ruling. See Clapper v. Amnesty Intern. USA, __US__, 133 S.Ct. 1138, 1147, 185 L.Ed.2d 264
(2013):
To establish Article III standing, an injury must be concrete, particularized, and actual
or imminent; fairly traceable to the challenged action; and redressable by a favorable
ruling. Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139, , 130 S.Ct. 2743,
2752, 177 L.Ed.2d 461 (2010); see also Summers, supra, at 493, 129 S.Ct. 1142;
25

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Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S., at 560561, 112 S.Ct. 2130. Although imminence is
concededly a somewhat elastic concept, it cannot be stretched beyond its purpose, which
is to ensure that the alleged injury is not too speculative for Article III purposesthat the
injury is certainly impending. Id., at 565, n. 2, 112 S.Ct. 2130 (internal quotation marks
omitted). Thus, we have repeatedly reiterated that threatened injury must be certainly
impending to constitute injury in fact, and that [a]llegations of possible future injury
are not sufficient. Whitmore, 495 U.S., at 158, 110 S.Ct. 1717 (emphasis added; internal
quotation marks omitted); see also Defenders of Wildlife, supra, at 565, n. 2, 567, n. 3,
112 S.Ct. 2130; see DaimlerChrysler Corp., supra, at 345, 126 S.Ct. 1854; Friends of the
Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 190, 120 S.Ct.
693, 145 L.Ed.2d 610 (2000); Babbitt v. Farm Workers, 442 U.S. 289, 298, 99 S.Ct.
2301, 60 L.Ed.2d 895 (1979). (Clapper, 133 S.Ct at p. 1147)
See also Summers v. Earth Island Institute, 555 U.S. 488, 129 S.Ct. 1142, 173 L.Ed.2d 1
(2009); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 34 ERC 1785, 119
L.Ed.2d 351 (1992); City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 103 S.Ct. 1660, 75 L.Ed.2d 675
(1983). The American Civil Liberties Union has not filed suit in its own name, and has instead
chosen to provide legal representation to ten persons who do not have individual standing to
obtain the relief that the lawyers seem sure that the Court would grant to other same sex couples
who are not parties. Assuming some of these ten plaintiffs could possibly establish standing to
challenge what is left of the federal Defense of Marriage Act, that claim has been forfeited for no
apparent reason, and is not in issue in this litigation.
Plaintiffs lack standing to sue Secretary Mosier, who is not a proper party defendant in
this lawsuit under the analysis followed in Bishop v. Oklahoma, 333 Fed. Appx. 361, 2009 WL
1566802 (10th Cir. 2009) and Bishop v. Smith, 760 F.3d 1070 (2014). As an executive officer
appointed as per K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 75-5601, Secretary Moser has no supervisory authority over
the judicial officials who would be called upon in appropriate cases to enforce the asserted rights
of same-sex couples. As the records custodian for marriage certificates, she has insufficient
involvement in the issuance of marriage licenses to be a defendant amenable to suit under the
26

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Eleventh Amendment. See Peterson v. Martinez, 707 F.3d 1197 (10th Cir. 2013) and American
Tradition Institute v. Colorado, 876 F.Supp.2d 1222 (10th Cir. 2012). Judicial officers are not
employees, agents, or subordinates of the Kansas Department of Health and Environment, an
executive agency, but rather are part of the Kansas Judicial Branch and subject to its supervision
and control. Neither is the Kansas State Employees Health Care Commission subordinate to
KDHE. Plaintiffs own affidavits establish that KDHE is handling same-sex marriage certificates
routinely as vital statistics records.
Defendants Kaspar and Jordan are also not proper defendants in this litigation, which can
involve only the legal rights and grievances of these ten plaintiffs. No federal question has been
presented with respect to driver licensing, and the Court has no subject matter jurisdiction to
entertain a challenge to the tax assessment methods employed by the Kansas Department of
Revenue. See Direct Mktg. Ass'n v. Brohl, No. 13-1032, 2015 WL 867663 (U.S. Mar. 3, 2015).
Because the only plaintiffs who complain about income taxation have filed their federal returns
separately rather than jointly, there is no grievance against Secretary Jordan to litigate on that
account. No cognizable federal question is raised with respect to driver licensing, whether the
claim is directed at defendant Kaspar or at Secretary Jordan.
The Eleventh Amendment would restrict any otherwise proper litigation to prospective
declaratory and injunctive relief that is not merely a disguised demand for payments out of the
state treasury. Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. Lack of jurisdiction is presumed.
The burden of establishing federal court jurisdiction falls on the party asserting that jurisdiction
exists. See Devon Energy Production Co., L.P. v. Mosaic Potash Carlsbad, Inc., 693 F.3d 1195,
1201 (10th Cir. 2012); Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 511 U.S. 375, 377, 114
27

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S. Ct. 1673, 1675, 128 L. Ed.2d 391 (1994). Invocation of the remedy of declaratory judgment
does not itself provide a basis for federal jurisdiction. See Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League
Baseball Players Ass'n, 95 F.3d 959, 964 (10th Cir.1996). The Eleventh Amendment bars federal
court lawsuits against a state or its officials acting within their official capacities, with a narrow
exception allowing for prospective injunctive relief against individual officials for their ongoing
violations of federal rights. See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S. Ct. 441, 52 L. Ed. 714
(1908). The claim against defendant Michael clearly seeks financial relief, and the declaratory
relief relates solely to events that occurred in 2014 rather than anything continuing to day under
current Kansas laws and policies.
3. THE DEFENSES RAISED IN OPPOSITION TO THE PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION AND IN THESE DEFENDANTS MOTIONS TO DISMISS ALSO
PREVENT THE ENTRY OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF
DEFENDANTS.

The federal rules of civil procedure allow parties to incorporate the contents of another
pleading by reference. See F.R.C.P. 10(c). To avoid placing undue burdens on the Court these
defendants would incorporate the contents of all defendants previous submissions in opposition
to the preliminary injunction motion, including documents 7, 14, 15, 23, and 24, as well as any
attachments to those documents. These defendants would also incorporate by reference the
motions to dismiss previously filed by any defendants, including documents 57, 58, 59, 60, 77,
78, 79, 89, 90, and 99, together with any attachments to those documents.
CONCLUSION
The motion for summary judgment should be denied, either upon the factual showing or
upon the more complete factual showing that will be made possible by the completion of
28

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discovery. The motions to dismiss previously filed by these defendants should be granted instead.
Respectfully submitted,
OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GENERAL
DEREK SCHMIDT

s/ Steve R. Fabert
Steve R. Fabert, #10355
Assistant Attorney General
Memorial Bldg., 2nd Floor
120 SW 10th Avenue
Topeka, Kansas 66612-1597
Tel: (785) 368-8420; Fax: (785) 296-6296
Email: Steve.Fabert@ag.ks.gov
Attorney for Defendants Mosier, Jordan, Kaspar
and Michael
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
This is to certify that on this 6th day of March, 2015, a true and correct copy of the above
and foregoing was filed and served via the Courts electronic filing system upon Plaintiffs
counsel of record, Stephen Douglas Bonney, ACLU Foundation of Kansas, 3601 Main Street,
Kansas City, MO 64111, Mark P. Johnson, Dentons US, LLP, 4520 Main Street, Suite 1100,
Kansas City, MO 64111, dbonney@aclukansas.org and Mark.johnson@dentons.com and Joshua
A. Block, American Civil Liberties Foundation, 125 Broad Street, 18th Floor, New York, NY
100004, jblock@aclu.org.
s/Steve R. Fabert
Steve R. Fabert
Attorney for Defendants Mosier, Jordan, Kaspar
and Michael

29

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT


FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS
KANSAS CITY DIVISION
KAIL MARIE, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
SUSAN MOSIER, M.D., in her official
capacity as Interim Secretary of the Kansas
Department of Health and Environment, et
al.,
Defendants.

)
)
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Case No. 14-cv-02518-DDC/TJJ

Plaintiffs Responses to Defendants Requested Stipulations of Fact


On January 9, 2015, Defendants served requests for stipulations of fact as

permitted by the Courts order. See Doc. 75. Plaintiffs now respond to the
stipulations of fact requested by Defendants as follows:

1. Plaintiffs are not challenging the constitutionality of the federal law that allows a
state to give no effect to another states recognition of a same-sex marriage, 28 U.S.C.
1738C (1996).
Response: Plaintiffs do not stipulate. 28 U.S.C. 1738C speaks for itself but has no
application to this case. Plaintiffs do not concede the statutes constitutionality.
Plaintiffs do not challenge the statute in this litigation.
2. Persons who have not entered into a marriage in Kansas have no constitutional
right to be afforded the legal status of married persons in Kansas.
Response: Plaintiffs do not stipulate

3. No Kansas statute, rule, regulation, executive order, or action of the named


defendants in this case prevents any of the plaintiffs from marrying one another at
this time.

Response: Plaintiffs do not stipulate. This is a conclusion of law rather than a


statement of fact. Kansass marriage bans have not been repealed, and some district
courts including but not limited to the 25th, 28th, and 31st judicial districts
continue to enforce the bans on same-sex marriage by refusing to issue marriage

Case 2:14-cv-02518-DDC-TJJ Document 102-1 Filed 03/06/15 Page 2 of 18

licenses to same-sex couples. Although other district courts are currently not
enforcing the same-sex marriage bans, they are doing so because of the preliminary
injunction entered by the Court in this case on November 4, 2014.

4. No Kansas statute, rule, regulation, executive order, or action of the named


defendants in this case prevents any of the plaintiffs from receiving equal protection
of the law under the 14th Amendment with respect to distinctions based on marital
status.

Response: Plaintiffs do not stipulate. This is a conclusion of law rather than a


statement of fact. Kansass marriage bans have not been repealed, and some district
courts including but not limited to the 25th, 28th, and 31st judicial districts
continue to enforce the bans on same-sex marriage by refusing to issue marriage
licenses to same-sex couples. But for the preliminary injunction entered by the
Court in this case on November 4, 2014, Kansas law denies Plaintiffs and all samesex couples equal protection. Moreover, Kansass prohibitions on recognizing the
marriages of same-sex couples, which continue to be enforced, deny plaintiffs equal
protection.
5. No Kansas statute, rule, regulation, executive order, or action of the named
defendants in this case prevents any of the plaintiffs from obtaining insurance
coverage or insurance benefits on the same terms and conditions as other persons.

Response: Plaintiffs do not stipulate. Kansass prohibition on recognizing the


marriages of same-sex couples, which continue to be enforced, prevents plaintiffs
from receiving spousal health care coverage on the same terms and conditions as
other legally married spouses under the state health insurance plan, among others.

6. No Kansas statute, rule, regulation, executive order, or action of the named


defendants in this case controls the social attitudes of members of the general public
toward any of the plaintiffs.
Response: Plaintiffs do not stipulate. The right to marry provides a dignity and
status of immense import and provides recognition, dignity, and protection of the
class in their own community. United States v. Windsor, 133 S.Ct. 2675, 2692
(2013). Kansass marriage bans instruct all persons with whom same-sex couples
interact, including their own children, that their marriage is less worthy than the
marriages of others. Id. at 2696.
7. No Kansas statute, rule, regulation, executive order, or action of the named
defendants in this case prevents any of the plaintiffs from obtaining a change of
name in accordance with procedures established by law.

Response: Plaintiffs do not stipulate. Plaintiffs may not use the same procedures
established by law that are available to different-sex married couples.
2

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8. No Kansas statute, rule, regulation, executive order, or action of the named


defendants in this case prevents any of the plaintiffs from filing Kansas individual
income tax returns that conform to their federal income tax returns for the same tax
year.
Response: Plaintiffs do not stipulate that individual state tax returns would
conform to their federal ones.

9. At the time the present marriage laws of Kansas were enacted there was no
judicial precedent suggesting that their adoption would violate the United States
Constitution.

Response: Plaintiffs do not stipulate. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 586
(2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that majority decision suggested that state
marriage bans are unconstitutional)
10. The marriage laws of Kansas have never permitted any person to marry any
other person without restriction.
Response: Stipulated

11. There is a rational basis for the Kansas statutory prohibition on underage
marriages.
Response: Plaintiffs stipulate that they Plaintiffs are not challenging the
constitutionality of such laws.

12. The Kansas statutory prohibition on underage marriages is constitutionally


valid.
Response: Plaintiffs stipulate that they are not challenging the constitutionality of
such laws.
13. There is a rational basis for the Kansas statutory prohibition on incestuous
marriages.

Response: Plaintiffs stipulate that they are not challenging the constitutionality of
such laws.
14. The Kansas statutory prohibition on incestuous marriages is constitutionally
valid.

Response: Plaintiffs stipulate that they are not challenging the constitutionality of
such laws.
3

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15. There is a rational basis for the Kansas statutory prohibition on bigamous
marriages.

Response: Plaintiffs stipulate that they are not challenging the constitutionality of
such laws.
16. The Kansas statutory prohibition on bigamous marriages is constitutionally
valid.

Response: Plaintiffs stipulate that they are not challenging the constitutionality of
such laws.

17. The factual statements appearing in the case of In re Estate of Gardiner, 29


Kan.App.2d 92, 22 P.3d 1086 (2001), affirmed 273 Kan. 191, 42 P.3d 120 (2002) are
true and correct.
Response: Plaintiffs do not stipulate.

18. In the Matter of the Estate of Marshall G. Gardiner, 273 Kan. 191, 42 P.3d 120
(2002) determined that Kansas is not required to recognize the marriage-related
laws and orders of other states.
Response: The case speaks for itself.

19. A petition for certiorari was filed in response to the decision in In the Matter of
the Estate of Marshall G. Gardiner, 273 Kan. 191, 42 P.3d 120 (2002) refusing to give
effect to the law of another state, and was denied by the United States Supreme
Court.

Response: Stipulated that the Court denied certiorari in Gardner. Plaintiffs do not
stipulate to the defendants characterization of the holding in that case because the
case speaks for itself.
20. The factual statements appearing in the separate opinions of Judge Kelly in
Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193 (10th Cir.2014) and Bishop v. Smith, 760 F.3d
1070 (10th Cir. 2014) are true and correct.
Response: Plaintiffs do not stipulate

21. The factual statements appearing in the separate opinions of Judge Sutton in
DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 2014) are true and correct.
Response: Plaintiffs do not stipulate.

22. The Kansas Department of Revenue is an agency of the State of Kansas.


4

Case 2:14-cv-02518-DDC-TJJ Document 102-1 Filed 03/06/15 Page 5 of 18

Response: Stipulated

23. The State of Kansas is one of the fifty states to the United States, having been
admitted to the Union as a sovereign state.

Response: Stipulated

24. The Secretary of Revenue is an official of the State of Kansas, appointed by the
Governor of the State of Kansas as per K.S.A. 75-5101.
Response: Stipulated

25. The Secretary of Revenue is not personally involved in income tax


administration and has no direct responsibilities in that area.

Response: Plaintiffs do not stipulate. Among other things, the terms personally and
direct responsibilities are vague and undefined.
26. The Division of Taxation is responsible for administration and compliance of a
variety of Kansas taxes, including but not limited to individual state income tax.
Response: Stipulated

27. The Division of Taxation is supervised by a Director of Taxation. The current


Director of Taxation is Steve Stotts.
Response: Stipulated

28. To avoid interest or penalty, taxpayers filing state income tax returns within the
State of Kansas are required to file on or before April 15.
Response: Stipulated.

29. For the tax year 2014, state income tax returns are not required to be filed until
April 15, 2015.
Response: Stipulated.

30. Under current law for tax year 2014, resident taxpayers filing under the status of
married filing jointly are taxed as follows: taxable income not over $30,000: 2.7%:
(K.S.A. 79-32,110); taxable income over $30,000: $810 plus 4.8% of excess over
$30,000 (K.S.A. 79-32,110).
Response: K.S.A. 79-32,110 speaks for itself.
5

Case 2:14-cv-02518-DDC-TJJ Document 102-1 Filed 03/06/15 Page 6 of 18

31. Under current law for tax year 2014, resident taxpayers not filing under the
status of married filing jointly, including married not filing joint and unmarried
taxpayers are taxed as follows: taxable income not over $15,000: 2.7% (79-32,110);
taxable income over $15,000: $405 plus 4.8% of excess over $15,000 (K.S.A. 7932,110).
Response: K.S.A. 79-32,110 speaks for itself.

32. The current standard deduction is $3000 for single, $4500 for single head of
household, $3750 for married filing separately, and $7500 for married filing jointly.
K.S.A. 79-32, 119.
Response: K.S.A. 79-32,119 speaks for itself.

33. Tax rates are determined by the Legislature and are subject to change.
Response: The Kansas tax laws speak for themselves.

34. Receipts from state income tax revenues are remitted to the State General Fund.
Response: The Kansas tax laws speak for themselves.

35. The State of Kansas operates on a fiscal year which begins July 1 of each year.

Response: Stipulated.

36. A taxpayer may apply for and receive a tax refund if he or she has overpaid taxes
for a tax year in accordance with the time frames set forth in K.S.A. 79-3230(c).
Response: K.S.A. 79-3230(c) speaks for itself.

37. A taxpayer claiming to be married, filing joint, as a result of common law


marriage can claim married status on his or her return.
Response: The Kansas tax laws speak for themselves.

38. The Director of Taxation does not require a certificate of marriage to be


submitted with a tax return to document marital status.
Response: The Kansas tax laws speak for themselves.

39. If a taxpayers return were to be adjusted or a claim for refund were denied by
the Director of Taxation, the taxpayer is notified by notice as per K.S.A. 79-3226.

Response: K.S.A. 79-3226 speaks for itself

Case 2:14-cv-02518-DDC-TJJ Document 102-1 Filed 03/06/15 Page 7 of 18

40. As per K.S.A 79-3226, the taxpayer has 60 days from the notice in which to
request an informal conference with the secretary of revenue or the secretarys
designee.
Response: K.S.A. 79-3226 speaks for itself

41. The purpose of the informal conference is to review and reconsider all facts and
issues that underlie the proposed liability or proposed denial of refund. The
Secretary of Revenue or his designee shall hold an informal conference with the
taxpayer and shall issue a written final determination thereon.

Response: K.S.A. 79-3226 speaks for itself

42. The Secretary of Revenue or the Secretarys designee shall issue a written final
determination within 270 days of the date of the request for informal conference
unless the parties agree in writing to extend the time for issuing such final
determination.
Response: K.S.A. 79-3226 speaks for itself

43. A final determination issued within or after 270 days constitutes final agency
action subject to administrative review by the state board of tax appeals.
Response: K.S.A. 79-3226 speaks for itself

44. In the event that a written final determination is not rendered within 270 days,
the taxpayer may appeal to the state board of tax appeals at any time provided that
a written extension of time is not in effect.
Response: K.S.A. 79-3226 speaks for itself

45. A taxpayer is encouraged to take advantage of the states e-filing system, called
KSWebtax, which eliminates paper returns.
Response: The Kansas tax laws speak for themselves.

46. The states e-filing system requires only that the taxpayer input data into the
system, which allows the system to compute the tax due.
Response: The Kansas tax laws speak for themselves.

47. The states e-filing system is designed so that taxpayers may utilize it without
the need for accountants, lawyers or other income tax preparers.
Response: The Kansas tax laws speak for themselves.
7

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48. The states e-filing system is free for use by taxpayers.


Response: The Kansas tax laws speak for themselves.

49. Taxpayers needing help with taxes are also encouraged to utilize tax assistance
available on KDORs website, call the Kansas Taxline at 1-785-368-8222, or visit the
Docking State Office Building in Topeka at 915 Southwest Harrison during office
hours.
Response: The Kansas tax laws speak for themselves.

50. The State does not require submission of a copy of a federal return with the state
income tax return.
Response: The Kansas tax laws speak for themselves.

51. Notice 13-18, along with a worksheet, was issued in October 2013.
Response: Stipulated

52. For same-sex taxpayers submitting a federal return as married filing separately,
their income would already be separated on the federal income tax return, and
those numbers could be used to submit the Kansas return.
Response: Stipulated

53. No Notice 13-18 worksheet is needed for couples filing federal returns under the
status married filing separately as their income is already separated.

Response: Stipulated

54. Notice 13-18 is not a Kansas statute or regulation.


Response: Stipulated

55. A lawsuit is presently pending in the District Court of Shawnee County entitled
Nelson v. Kansas Dept. of Revenue, 2013 C 1,465, challenging Notice 13-18 on
grounds that the Notice violates Kansas statutes and that the Notice was enacted
without compliance with statutorily required procedure.
Response: Plaintiffs do not stipulate as phrased above. The pleadings in Nelson v.
Kansas Dept. of Revenue speak for themselves. Plaintiffs would stipulate to the
authenticity of the pleadings as an exhibit.
56. Plaintiffs Peters and Mohrman have not submitted a Kansas state income tax
return for 2014.
8

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Response: Stipulated

57. Kansas law provides a plain, speedy, and efficient remedy for challenge to its
taxes within the meaning of the Tax Injunction Act.

Response: Plaintiffs do not stipulate

58. Douglas A. Hamilton is currently serving as Clerk of the District Court for
Douglas County, Kansas.

Response: Stipulated

59. Douglas County, Kansas is in the Seventh Judicial District of Kansas.


Response: Stipulated

60. The Douglas County District Court sits in Lawrence, Kansas.


Response: Stipulated

61. Bernie Lumbreras is currently serving as the Clerk of the District Court in
Sedgwick County, Kansas.
Response: Stipulated

62. Sedgwick County is in the 18th Judicial District of Kansas.


Response: Stipulated

63. The Sedgwick County District Court sits in Wichita, Kansas.


Response: Stipulated

64. Chief Judge Robert Fairchild is the current Chief Judge of the 7th Judicial District,
having been appointed by the Supreme Court to that position.
Response: Stipulated

65. Chief Judge James Fleetwood is the current Chief Judge of the 18th Judicial
District, having been appointed to that position.

Response: Stipulated

66. As Clerks, Mr. Hamilton and Ms. Lumbreras are officers of the State of Kansas,
appointed by and subject to supervision by the Chief Judges of their respective
9

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judicial districts. K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 20-343.


Response: Stipulated

67. Appointed clerks, their deputies and assistants have such powers, duties and
functions as are prescribed by law, prescribed by rules of the supreme court or
assigned by the chief judge. K.S.A. 20-343.
Response: Stipulated

68. The clerks of the district court shall do and perform all duties that may be
required of them by law or the rules and practice of the courts. . .. K.S.A. 20-3102.

Response: Stipulated

69. Hamilton and Lumbreras statutory functions do not include administration of


Kansas income tax laws.
Response: Stipulated

70. Hamilton and Lumbreras do not have a role in determining whether a person is
entitled to inherit property through intestate succession in Kansas.
Response: Stipulated

71. Hamilton and Lumbreras do not file out-of-state marriage licenses in their
respective offices.
Response: Stipulated

72. Hamilton and Lumbreras do not determine eligibility requirements for who is
considered married for insurance purposes.
Response: Stipulated

73. Hamilton and Lumbreras do not authorize persons to perform marriage rites.
Response: Stipulated

74. Hamilton and Lumbreras have no role in the function set forth in K.S.A. 23-2504.
Response: Stipulated

75. Kansas is a unified court system. K.S.A. 20-101, Kan. Const. Art. 3, 1 ([t]he
supreme court shall have general administrative authority over all courts in this
state); K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 20-318, K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 20-319.
10

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Response: Stipulated

76. In Kansas, the district courts are organized into thirty-one (31) judicial districts.
Kan. Const., Art. 3, 6; K.S.A. 4-202, et seq.
Response: Stipulated

77. Chief Judges, including Judge Fairchild and Judge Fleetwood, are subject to
appointment by and supervision of the Kansas Supreme Court. See, e.g., K.S.A. 2014
Supp. 20-329.
Response: Stipulated

78. Clerks of the District Court Hamilton and Lumbreras, are Kansas Judicial Branch
officers, appointed by their respective Chief Judges and are Judicial Branch
employees. K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 20-343, K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 20-345.
Response: Stipulated

79. Under the Kansas Constitution, the Judicial Branch is constitutionally separate
from the Executive and Legislative Branches in Kansas. 80. As of June 30, 2013,
there were 246 district judges in Kansas

Response: Stipulated

81. The State of Kansas is one of the 50 sovereign States.

Response: Stipulated; however, this paragraph is nearly identical to 23.

82. In Kansas, marriage licenses may be issued by judges or district court clerks.

Response: Stipulated

83. By statute, district court clerks are prohibited from giving legal advice.
Response: Stipulated

84. In administering the marriage license issuance function, district court clerks act
as aides to the judges of their judicial districts who would otherwise be performing
this function.
Response: Stipulated

85. In the Seventh Judicial District, there are currently six (6) judges.
11

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Response: Stipulated

86. In the 18th Judicial District, there are currently twenty-eight (28) judges.
Response: Stipulated

87. If there is a question about whether a person is legally entitled to a marriage


license, the applicant is referred to a judge for determination.

Response: Stipulated

88. As of at least October 7, 2013, clerks had been given the legal advice of the Office
of Judicial Administration for judges to make the determination of whether a samesex applicant for marriage license was legally entitled to the issuance of such
license.
Response: Plaintiffs do not stipulate. The meaning of this sentence is unclear.

89. On October 8, 2014, Kail Marie appeared in person at the Office of the Clerk of
the District Court of Douglas County, Kansas, requested and was given an
application which was returned to the deputy clerk who then gave her a marriage
license worksheet along with the instruction to return no sooner than Tuesday,
October 14, 2014, absent a waiver of the three-day statutory waiting period, or
words to that effect.
Response: Stipulated

90. Neither Kail Marie nor Michelle Brown returned to the Clerks Office on or after
October 14, 2014, as instructed.

Response: Plaintiffs do not stipulate. Plaintiffs Marie and Brown returned to the
clerks office on October 16, 2014, were denied a marriage license, and were given a
copy of Administrative Order 14-13.

91. The only claim in the Amended Complaint against Clerks Hamilton and
Lumbreras is an official capacity claim by Plaintiffs Marie, Brown, DiTrani and Wilks
for injunctive and declaratory relief.

Response: Stipulated

92. The claims in the Amended Complaint against Clerks Hamilton and Lumbreras
are based upon events pled in the Amended Complaint which occurred on or before
October 9, 2014.
Response: Stipulated

12

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93. As of November 13, 2014, Hamilton and his office have been operating under
Administrative Order 14-17.
Response: Stipulated

94. Administrative Order 14-17 instructs the Clerk of the District Court to issue
marriage licenses to all otherwise qualified applicants without regard to the gender
of each applicant.
Response: Stipulated

95. Administrative Order 14-17 was issued by Chief Judge Fairchild.

Response: Stipulated

96. Administrative Order 14-17 rescinds Administrative Order 14-13, which is no


longer in effect.
Response: Stipulated

97. Since Administrative Order 14-17 was entered, Hamilton and his subordinates
have been issuing marriage licenses to applicants without regard to gender.
Response: Stipulated

98. Except for recognized holidays, Hamiltons office is open for business, including
but not limited to accepting applications for marriage licenses and issuing licenses
every week day from 8 a.m. to 12 noon and 1 p.m. to 4 p.m.
Marie and Brown have not tendered to Hamiltons office the required fee for a
marriage license.
Response: Stipulated

99. On October 10, 2014, the Kansas Supreme Court issued a stay of a Tenth Judicial
District Administrative Order authorizing same-sex marriages citing the need for
uniformity among judicial districts.
Response: Stipulated

100. Any determination as to whether a same-sex couple is entitled to a marriage


license in Douglas County was made by Chief Judge Robert Fairchild.

Response: Plaintiffs do not stipulate. The meaning of this sentence is unclear.

101. Administrative Order 14-13 was file-stamped 4:51 p.m. on October 8, 2014.
13

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Response: Stipulated

102. On November 13, 2014, Chief Judge James R. Fleetwood issued Administrative
Order No. 14-08 for the 18th Judicial District.
Response: Stipulated

103. Administrative Order 14-08 directs the clerk of the court and her staff to issue
marriage licenses without consideration of gender of the applicants in accordance
with existing court orders and to otherwise comply with all requirements relating to
issuing said marriage licenses generally.
Response: Stipulated

104. Since November 13, 2014, Lumbreras and her Office have been issuing
marriage licenses without regard to the gender of the applicant.

Response: Stipulated

105. On October 7, 2014, a person identifying herself as Kerry Wilks appeared in the
Office of the Clerk of the District Court for the 18th Judicial District in Wichita,
Kansas seeking to apply for a marriage license and, on the express direction of Chief
Judge James Fleetwood, did not receive an application on that date.
Response: Stipulated. Plaintiffs request that the words a person identifying herself
as be dropped since Kerry Wilks so appeared.
106. On October 7, 2014, Chief Judge Fleetwood conveyed the substance of his legal
determination to Wilks.

Response: Plaintiffs do not stipulate that Chief Judge Fleetwood made a legal
determination but stipulate that he informed Wilks on October 7, 2014 that a
marriage license would not be issued.
107. On October 7, 2014, Wilks dealt with Chief Judge Fleetwood in his official
judicial capacity, in the Sedgwick County Courthouse.

Response: Plaintiffs do not stipulate. This is a conclusion of law. Wilks dealt with
Chief Judge Fleetwood in his official administrative capacity.

108. On October 9, 2014, persons identifying themselves as Kerry Wilks and Donna
DiTrani appeared in the Office of the Clerk of the District Court for the 18th Judicial
District and sought to apply for a marriage license.

Response: Stipulated. Plaintiffs request that the words persons identifying


themselves as be dropped since Kerry Wilks and Donna DiTrani so appeared.
14

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109. On direction of Chief Judge Fleetwood, Wilks and DiTrani were given an
application which was filled out and returned to the deputy clerk.
Response: Stipulated

110. On direction of Judge Eric Yost, the Clerk informed Wilks and DiTrani of his
legal determination that same-sex persons were not legally entitled to marriage
licenses in Kansas as of that date.

Response: Plaintiffs do not stipulate that Judge Yost made a legal determination, but
they stipulatie that at the direction of Judge Yost, the Clerk informed Wilks and
DiTrani that same-sex persons were not legally entitled to marriage licenses in
Kansas as of that date.
111. Lumbreras Office accepted Wilks and DiTranis application even though they
had not checked a box on the form for Bride or Groom.
Response: Plaintiffs do not stipulate that the application was accepted.

112. Marriage license applications in the 18th Judicial District are kept on file for a
year.
Response: Stipulated

113. Since October 9, 2014, neither Wilks nor DiTrani returned to Lumbreras Office
to submit a completed worksheet.
Response: Stipulated

114. Since October 9, 2014, neither Wilks nor DiTrani returned to Lumbreras Office
to pay the required fee.

Response: Stipulated

115. Except for recognized holidays, Lumbreras Office is open for business
including but not limited to accepting applications for marriage licenses and issuing
licenses, every week day from 8 a.m. to 5 p.m. for regular business, 8 a.m. to 4 p.m.
for applications for marriage licenses.

Response: Stipulated

116. Since October 9, 2014, neither Wilks nor DiTrani has returned to Lumbreras
Office to pick up a marriage license.
Response: Stipulated

15

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117. By Order dated November 18, 2014, the Kansas Supreme Court lifted the stay
on issuance of same-sex marriage licenses in the Tenth Judicial District in State ex
rel. Schmidt v. Moriarty, case number 112,590.

Response: Stipulated

118. In its November 18, 2014 Order, the Kansas Supreme Court determined that
Chief Judge Moriarty of the Tenth Judicial District was engaged in a judicial function
when he issued his Administrative Order.
Response: Plaintiffs do not stipulate. The Order speaks for itself.

119. Since November 18, 2014, marriage licenses have been available to same-sex
couples in Johnson County, Kansas.
Response: Stipulated

120. Neither Kail Marie nor Michelle Brown have sought to receive a marriage
license from Johnson County, Kansas.
Response: Stipulated

121. Neither Kerry Wilks nor Donna DiTrani have sought to receive a marriage
license from Johnson County, Kansas.
Response: Stipulated

122. Marriage licenses are presently available to same-sex couples in several


counties in Kansas.
Response: Stipulated

123. Neither Marie, Brown, Wilks nor DiTrani have sought a marriage license from
any Kansas county since November 13, 2014.
Response: Stipulated

124. Plaintiffs Wilks and DiTrani told a newspaper reporter in October of 2014 that
they are already married.
Response: If defendants provide a copy of the article, Plaintiffs will determine
whether they will stipulate to its authenticity and accuracy.

125. Plaintiffs Wilks, DiTrani, Marie and Brown are considered married at common
law.
16

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Response: Plaintiffs do not stipulate.

126. Kail Marie told Peter Hancock in an article published by the Lawrence Journal
World on November 12, 2014 that she and plaintiff Brown have chosen not to
proceed with their marriage plans at this time.

Response: Plaintiffs do not stipulate. Kail Marie never spoke to Peter Hancock. If
defendants provide a copy of the article, however, Plaintiffs will determine whether
they will stipulate to the authenticity and accuracy of any purported quote of or
statement attributed to Kail Marie.
127. Kerry Wilks was previously married in Iowa.

Response: Plaintiffs do not stipulate. Plaintiff Kerry Wilks has never been married.

128. Donna DiTrani was previously married.

Response: Plaintiffs do not stipulate. Plaintiff Donna DiTrani has never been
married.
129. Kail Marie was previously married.

Response: Plaintiffs do not stipulate. Plaintiff Kail Marie has never been married.
130. Michelle Brown was previously married.

Response: Plaintiffs do not stipulate. Plaintiff Michelle Brown has never been
married.
Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Stephen Douglas Bonney


Stephen Douglas Bonney, KS Bar No. 12322
ACLU Foundation of Kansas
3601 Main Street
Kansas City, MO 64111
Tel. (816) 994-3311
dbonney@aclukansas.org
ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFFS
Certificate of Service

I certify that, on January 20, 2015, the foregoing document was served by e-mail
on the following: Steve R. Fabert, Assistant Attorney General (counsel for Defendant
Mosier), Steve.Fabert@ag.ks.gov; M.J. Willoughby, Assistant Attorney General (counsel
17

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for Defendant Douglas A. Hamilton, Clerk of the Douglas County District Court,; and
Defendant Bernie Lumbreras, Clerk of the Sedgwick County District Court),
MJ.Willoughby@ag.ks.gov.
/s/ Stephen Douglas Bonney

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Application for Certified Copy of Kansas Marriage Certificate

Form VS-237 rev 11/14

* PLEASE NOTE MARRIAGE CERTIFICATES ARE ON FILE FROM May 1, 1913 TO PRESENT

Today's Date:

Name of Requestor:
(person requesting the certificate)

Address:

City/State:

Zip:

Email:

Reason for Request (PLEASE BE SPECIFIC):

Phone Number:

Requestor's Signature:

*IMPORTANT: The person requesting the vital record must submit a copy of their identification. See list on reverse side.

Requestor's relationship to person on the Certificate? (Check one)


Maternal Grandparent
Father
Paternal Grandparent
Brother
Legal Guardian(submit custody order)
Son
Other (specify)
Daughter

Self
Mother
Sister
Current Spouse

Paternal Uncle
Maternal Uncle
Paternal Aunt
Maternal Aunt

Fees

K.A.R. 28-17-6 requires the following fee(s).


The correct fee must be submitted with the request. The fee for certified copies of birth certificates is $15.00 for one certified copy and $15.00 for
each additional certified copy of the same record ordered at the same time. This fee allows a 5-year search of the records, including the year
indicated plus two years before and two years after, or you may indicate the consecutive 5-year period you want searched. You may specify more
than one 5-year span, but each search will cost $15.00.
* IF THE CERTIFICATE IS NOT LOCATED, A $15.00 FEE MUST BE RETAINED BY THIS DEPARTMENT FOR THE RECORD SEARCH.
Make checks or money orders payable to Kansas Vital Statistics. For your protection, do not send cash.

Marriage Information
Party A
Name of Record:

Date of Birth:
FIRST

MIDDLE

MO/DAY/YEAR

LAST

Check one: Bride______ Groom______ Spouse _______

Party B
Name of Record:

Date of Birth:
FIRST

MIDDLE

LAST(maiden or previous married surname )

MO/DAY/YEAR

Check one: Bride______ Groom______ Spouse _______

Date of Marriage:
MONTH

DAY

YEAR

County that issued license:


City that Marriage took place:
Number of Copies Ordered:

COUNTY

$15 per Certified Copy

STATE(MUST BE KANSAS)

$Total:

0.00

*Requirements-Read before turning in application


1)
2)
3)
4)
5)

This request form must be completed.


Enclose a copy of both front and back of a current legal photo ID (see back for list of acceptable ID's)
Enclose appropriate fees
Person requesting to receive a birth certificate must sign above.
If submitting by mail, enclose a self-addressed stamped envelope
*Request will be returned if the above steps are not completed correctly.

Walk-in Hours:
9:00a.m.-4:00 p.m.
Monday-Friday

Kansas Office of Vital Statistics


1000 SW Jackson Suite 120
Topeka, KS 66612-2221

Office hours:(live phones)


Mon-Fri 8:00a.m.-5:00 p.m.
Phone: 785-296-1400

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Detailed Information
Identification
Requestor's current ID required To Get a Certificate:

Who's Eligible to Obtain Most Certificates: Must provide ID and proof of direct interest

ONE form of Primary Documentation required from list below

Eligibility

Please make a copy of one of the following documents and send


with the application. All documents MUST be signed, current By State law, vital records filed with this office are not open for public inspection
and valid. All Identification must have both sides and be able to and the requestor must meet eligibility requirements -- must be named on the
be read.
record, an immediate family member, or someone who can provide legal proof
the record is necessary for the determination of personal or property rights.
Photocopy of Government Issued Driver's License, Military ID,
[K.S.A. 65-2422d]
State ID card, Valid Passport and Visa's. (Not the credit/debit
card)
Permanent resident card
Alien registration receipt card
Employment authorization card
Re-entry permit
Refugee Travel Document
VA Card (with intact photo)
Voter's registration card (Countries outside of the U.S.)
Certificate of Naturalization (with intact photo)
Concealed Carry handgun license
Resident Alien card
* PLEASE NOTE MATRICULAS ARE NOT AN ACCEPTABLE FORM OF
ID

Parents
Current Spouse
Adult Children
Grandparents
Siblings
Aunts/Uncles
Niece/Nephew
Must be age 18 or older
If legal guardianship has been established through the courts, please provide a
copy of the guardianship papers.

If you do not have a government issued photo ID, you must send photocopies of any two of the following: *Photocopies must be
of the complete document, able to be read and be the Requestor's with current address

Temporary Driver's License


Social Security card (must be signed by card holder)
Bank Statement with Requestor's current address
Car Registration or Title with Requestor's current address
Utility Bill with current address of Requestor and company letterhead with company name and address; not handwritten
Current Pay Stub (must include your name, social security number plus name and address of business; not handwritten)
Valid insurance card or policy of Requestor
Valid health insurance card or policy of Requestor
Parole document (book sheet) of Requestor
Bureau of Indian Affairs Tribal ID card of Requestor
Inmate ID of Requestor(along with a memo completed and signed by a counselor or parole officer)
Filed Income Tax of Requestor with current address
Letter to Requestor from Social Service Agency/Health Department or other government agency with current address
Hospital or Health agency bill (with current address) of Requestor
Court Documents of Requestor
W-2 from Employer (with Requestor's current address)
Letter from employer (with Requestor's current address)
U.S. Voters registration card of Requestor

Read: IMPORTANT MISCELLANEOUS INFORMATION


1) FEES EXPIRE 12 MONTHS FROM THE DATE OF THE REQUEST.
2) MULTIPLE REQUESTS FOR DIFFERENT RECORDS MAY BE HANDLED AND MAILED SEPARATELY.

WARNING: COPYING, ALTERING, or FRAUDULENT ACTIVITY PROHIBITED


Except as authorized by the Uniform Vital Statistics Act, no person shall prepare or issue any certificate (vital record) which purports to be an
original, certified copy or abstract or copy of a certificate [K.S.A. 652422d.(g)]. Vital records identity theft related to obtaining certificates or
making, counterfeiting, altering, amending any certified copy of a vital record with the intent to sell or obtain for any purpose of deception a certified
copy of a vital record is a severity level 8, nonperson felony. [K.S.A. 21-3830a (d) and K.S.A 21-3830a (e)].

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KANSAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENT
Office of Vital Statistics

Worksheet for Marriage Registration


This worksheet is to be completed by the couple and returned to the district court before the marriage license can be issued. This information will be used to
complete the official marriage license form.

License number (court use only) _________________________

Check One: Groom

PARTY A:

Bride

Spouse (This is the label that will appear on the marriage license.)

1. LEGAL NAME FIRST

MIDDLE

LAST

2. LAST NAME PRIOR TO FIRST MARRIAGE (If different)

3. DATE OF BIRTH (Month, Day, Year)

4. BIRTHPLACE (State or Foreign Country)

5.

RESIDENCE STATE OR FOREIGN COUNTRY

6.

COUNTY OR PROVINCE

7.

8.

FATHER/PARENT NAME PRIOR TO FIRST MARRIAGE


(First, Middle, Last)

9.

BIRTHPLACE (State or
Foreign Country)

Check One: Groom

PARTY B:

Bride

SUFFIX

CITY OR TOWN

10. MOTHER/PARENT NAME PRIOR TO FIRST MARRIAGE


(First, Middle, Last)

11. BIRTHPLACE (State or


Foreign Country)

Spouse (This is the label that will appear on the marriage license.)

12. LEGAL NAME- FIRST

MIDDLE

LAST

13. LAST NAME PRIOR TO FIRST MARRIAGE (If different)

14. DATE OF BIRTH (Month, Day, Year)

15. BIRTHPLACE (State or Foreign Country)

16. RESIDENCE STATE OR FOREIGN COUNTRY

17. COUNTY OR PROVINCE

18. CITY OR TOWN

19. FATHER/PARENT NAME PRIOR TO FIRST MARRIAGE


(First, Middle, Last)

21. BIRTHPLACE (State or


Foreign Country)

SUFFIX

22. MOTHER/PARENT NAME PRIOR TO FIRST MARRIAGE


(First, Middle, Last)

23. BIRTHPLACE (State or


Foreign Country)

If one or both applicants are under 18, this information is required:


24a. PARTY A - MOTHER/PARENT OR GUARDIAN CONSENTING (If applicable)

24c. PARTY B - MOTHER/PARENT OR GUARDIAN CONSENTING (If applicable)

24b. PARTY A - FATHER/PARENT OR GUARDIAN CONSENTING (If applicable)

24d. PARTY B - FATHER/PARENT OR GUARDIAN CONSENTING (If applicable)

24e. HAVE ALL LIVING PARENT(S) OR GUARDIAN(S) CONSENTED?


PARTY A

PARTY B

Yes

Yes

No

Emancipated

Parent(s) Deceased

24f. NAME OF CONSENTING JUDGE (If applicable)


(Court use only)

No

Emancipated

Parent(s) Deceased

The ceremony is expected to be performed by:


25. NAME OF PERSON PERFORMING CEREMONY (Please type or print)

26. TITLE

27. ADDRESS OF PERSON PERFORMING CEREMONY (Street and No. or Rural Route, City or Town, State, Zip Code)

This section is to be completed if either party desires to designate a new legal name at the time of marriage.
28. PARTY A: NAME- FIRST

MIDDLE

LAST

29. PARTY B: NAME- FIRST

MIDDLE

LAST

COMPLETE ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON BACK AND PROVIDE SIGNATURE


VS244 Rev. 11/12/2014

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This information is strictly confidential and is not released in identifiable form.


30. NUMBER OF THIS MARRIAGE First, Second,
etc. (Specify below)

31. IF PREVIOUSLY MARRIED, LAST MARRIAGE ENDED


SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBERS

By Death, Divorce, or Annulment (Specify below)

Date (Month, Day, Year)

30a. PARTY A

31a. PARTY A

31b PARTY A

32. PARTY A - SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER

30b. PARTY B

31c. PARTY B

31d. PARTY B

33. PARTY B - SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER

34. COUPLES HISPANIC ORIGIN (Check the box or boxes that


best describes whether you are Spanish, Hispanic, or Latino.
Check the no box if you are not Spanish, Hispanic or Latino.)
34a. PARTY A

34b. PARTY B

No, not Spanish/


Hispanic/Latino
Yes, Mexican/Mexican
American/Chicano
Yes, Puerto Rican
Yes, Cuban
Yes, Central American
Yes, South American
Yes, other Spanish/
Hispanic/Latino

No, not Spanish/


Hispanic/Latina
Yes, Mexican/Mexican
American/Chicana

35a. PARTY A

Yes, Puerto Rican

White
Black or
African American
American Indian or
Alaska Native
(Name of the enrolled
or principal tribes)

Yes, Cuban
Yes, Central American
Yes, South American
Yes, other Spanish/
Hispanic/Latina

(Specify)

(Specify)

Unknown

35. COUPLES RACE (Check one or more boxes to indicate what race(s) you consider yourself to be.)

Unknown

Asian Indian
Chinese
Filipino

Japanese

Other (Specify)

35b. PARTY B

Vietnamese

Other Asian (Specify)

Korean

White
Black or
African American
American Indian or
Alaska Native
(Name of the enrolled
or principal tribes)

Samoan
Other Pacific Islander
(Specify)

Native Hawaiian
Guamanian or Chamorro

Asian Indian
Chinese
Filipino

Japanese

Other (Specify)

Unknown

Korean
Vietnamese
Other Asian (Specify)

Native Hawaiian
Guamanian or Chamorro
Samoan
Other Pacific Islander
(Specify)

Unknown

36. EDUCATION (Check the box that best describes the highest degree or level of school completed.)
36a. PARTY A - EDUCATION

Unknown

36b. PARTY B - EDUCATION

Unknown

8th grade or less


Some College credit, but no degree
Masters degree (e.g., MA, MS, MEng, MEd, MSW, MBA)
8th grade or less
Some College credit, but no degree
Masters degree (e.g., MA, MS, MEng, MEd, MSW, MBA)

9th - 12th grade; no diploma


Associate degree (e.g., AA,AS)

High school graduate or GED


Bachelors degree (e.g., BA, AB, BS)

Doctorate (e.g., PhD, EdD) or Professional degree (e.g., MD, DDS, DVM, LLB, JD)
9th - 12th grade; no diploma
Associate degree (e.g., AA,AS)

High school graduate or GED


Bachelors degree (e.g., BA, AB, BS)

Doctorate (e.g., PhD, EdD) or Professional degree (e.g., MD, DDS, DVM, LLB, JD)

PARTY A GENDER

PARTY B GENDER

Male

Male

Female

Female

The information provided by:

The information provided by:

PARTY A SIGNATURE

PARTY B SIGNATURE

Party A Current Address and Daytime Telephone Number

Party B Current Address and Daytime Telephone Number

Page 2 of 2

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STATE OF KANSAS
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENT
Office of Vital Statistics

Marriage License
State File number
1.

GROOM

LEGAL NAME FIRST

MIDDLE

LAST/SUFFIX

2. LAST NAME PRIOR TO FIRST MARRIAGE (If different)

3. DATE OF BIRTH (Month, Day, Year) RESIDENCE STATE


OR FOREIGN COUNTRY

4. BIRTHPLACE (State or Foreign Country)

5.

RESIDENCE STATE OR FOREIGN COUNTRY

6.

COUNTY OR PROVINCE

7.

8.

FATHER/PARENT NAME PRIOR TO FIRST MARRIAGE


(First, Middle, Last)

9.

BIRTHPLACE (State or
Foreign Country)

12. BRIDE

LEGAL NAME- FIRST

CITY OR TOWN

10. MOTHER/PARENT NAME PRIOR TO FIRST MARRIAGE


(First, Middle, Last)

MIDDLE

11. BIRTHPLACE (State or


Foreign Country)

LAST/SUFFIX

13. LAST NAME PRIOR TO FIRST MARRIAGE (If different)

14. DATE OF BIRTH (Month, Day, Year)

15. BIRTHPLACE (State or Foreign Country)

16. RESIDENCE STATE OR FOREIGN COUNTRY

17. COUNTY OR PROVINCE

18. CITY OR TOWN

19. FATHER/PARENT NAME PRIOR TO FIRST MARRIAGE


(First, Middle, Last)

20. BIRTHPLACE (State or


Foreign Country)

21. MOTHER/PARENT NAME PRIOR TO FIRST MARRIAGE


(First, Middle, Last)

22. BIRTHPLACE (State or


Foreign Country)

23a. GROOM

MOTHER/PARENT OR GUARDIAN CONSENTING (If applicable, type or print)

23c. BRIDE

MOTHER/PARENT OR GUARDIAN CONSENTING (If applicable, type or print)

23b. GROOM

FATHER/PARENT OR GUARDIAN CONSENTING (If applicable, type or print)

23d. BRIDE

FATHER/PARENT OR GUARDIAN CONSENTING (If applicable, type or print)

23e. HAVE ALL LIVING PARENT(S) OR GUARDIAN(S) CONSENTED?


GROOM

Yes

No

Emancipated

BRIDE

Parent(s) Deceased

Yes

No

Parent(s) Deceased

Emancipated

23f. NAME OF CONSENTING JUDGE (If applicable, please type or print)

Completed marriage license is to be returned to Issuing District Court within 10 days after marriage:
24. DISTRICT COURT OF ISSUANCE
25. DATE LICENSE ISSUED (Month, Day, Year)

26. EXPIRATION DATE (Month, Day, Year)

27. ISSUING OFFICIAL

29. DATE RECEIVED BY COURT OFFICIAL

28. TITLE OF ISSUING OFFICIAL

This License Authorizes the Marriage in This State of the Parties Named Above By Any Person Duly Authorized to Perform a Marriage Ceremony Under the Laws of the State of Kansas.
30. I CERTIFY THAT THE ABOVE NAMED PERSONS
31. WHERE MARRIED COUNTY
32. CITY OR TOWN
WERE MARRIED ON: (Month, Day, Year)
33. SIGNATURE OF PERSON PERFORMING CEREMONY

34. NAME AND PHONE NO. OF PERSON PERFORMING CEREMONY (Please type or print)

35. TITLE

36. ADDRESS OF PERSON PERFORMING CEREMONY (Street and No. or Rural Route, City or Town, State, Zip Code)

37. WITNESS NAME TO CEREMONY (Print or Type)

38. WITNESS NAME TO CEREMONY (Print or Type)

Designated new legal name pursuant to K.S.A. 23-2506. (If applicable)


38. GROOM
NAME FIRST

MIDDLE

LAST

39.

MIDDLE

LAST

BRIDE

NAME FIRST

VS229 SML Rev. 11/12/2014

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