Вы находитесь на странице: 1из 2

7. People vs.

Obsania
[23 SCRA 1249; G.R. L-24447; 29 June 1968]
Facts: The accused was charged with Robbery with Rape before the Municipal Court of
Balungao, Pangasinan. He pleaded not guilty. His counsel moved for the dismissal of the charge for failure
to allege vivid designs in the info. Said motion was granted. From this order of dismissal the prosecution
appealed.
Issue: Whether or Not the present appeal places the accused in Double Jeopardy.
Held:
In order that the accused may invoke double jeopardy, the following requisites must have
obtained in the original prosecution, a) valid complaint, b) competent court, c) the defendant had pleaded to
the charge, d) defendant was acquitted or convicted or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise
terminated
without
his
express consent.
In the case at bar, the converted dismissal was ordered by the Trial Judge upon the defendant's motion to
dismiss. The doctrine of double jeopardy as enunciated in P.vs. Salico applies to wit when the case is
dismissed with the express consent of the defendant, the dismissal will not be a bar to another prosecution
for the same offense because his action in having the case is dismissed constitutes a waiver of his
constitutional right/privilege for the reason that he thereby prevents the Court from proceeding to the trial
on
the
merits
and
rendering
a
judgment
of conviction against
him.
In essence, where a criminal case is dismissed provisionally not only with the express consent of the
accused but even upon the urging of his counsel there can be no double jeopardy under Sect. 9 Rule 113, if
the indictment against him is revived by the fiscal.
People vs. Jabinal
February 27, 1974
Facts:
On September 5, 1964, the accused was found to be in possession of a revolver without the requisite license
or permit. He claimed to be entitled to exoneration because, although he had
no license or permit, he had appointments
as Secret Agent from theProvincial Governor of Batangas and as Confidential Agent from the PC Provincial
Commander, and the said appointments expressly carried with them the authority topossess and carry the
said firearm. The accused further contended that in view of his appointments, he was entitled to acquittal on
the basis of the Supreme Courts decisions in People vs. Macarandang and in People vs. Lucero. The trial
court found the accused criminally liable for illegal possession of firearm andammunition on the ground that
the rulings in Macarandang* and in Lucero* were reversed and abandoned in People vs. Mapa. The case
was elevated to the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether or not the appellant should be acquitted on the basis of the Supreme Courts rulings in the cases of
Macarandang and of Lucero.
Ruling:
The appellant was acquitted. Decisions of the Supreme Court, although in themselves not laws, are
nevertheless evidence of what the law means; this is the reason why Article 8 of the New Civil Code
provides that, Judicial decisions applying and interpreting the laws or the constitution shall form part of the
legal system. The interpretation upon a law by the Supreme Court constitutes in a way a part of the law as
of the date the law was originally passed, since the courts construction merely establishes the
contemporaneous legislative intent that the law thus construed intends to effectuate. The settled rule
supported by numerous authorities is a restatement of the legal maxim
legis interpretatio legis vim obtinet the interpretation placed upon the written law by a competent court
has the force of law. The doctrine laid down in Lucero and in Macarandang was part of the jurisprudence,
hence, of the law of the land, at the time appellant was found in possession of the firearm and when he was
arraigned by the trial court. It is true that the doctrine was overruled in Mapa case in 1967,but when a
doctrine of the Supreme Court is overruled and a different view is adopted, the new doctrine should be
applied prospectively, and should not apply to parties who had relied on the old doctrine and acted on the
faith
thereof.Considering that the appellant possessed a firearm pursuant to the prevailingdoctrine
enunciated in Macarandang and in Lucero, under which no criminal liability would attach to his possession
of said firearm, the appellant should be absolved. The appellant may not be punished for an act which at
the time it was done was held not to be punishable

PEOPLE VS. BRACAMONTE


G.R. No. 95939; June 17, 1996
Hermosisima, Jr.
FACTS: Appellants Florentino Bracamonte, Manuel Reginaldo, and Ernie Lapan stand charged with the
crime of Robbery with Double Homicide. Lapan was tried and convicted and his case is on appeal.
Reginaldo is at large. Bracamonte had been at large for more than two years until his arrest. He was
convicted and was sentenced to RECLUSION PERPETUA. Hence, this appeal by Bracamonte.
ISSUE: WON death penalty should be imposed
HELD: NO. The Court noted that appellant, together with his 2 co-accused, were charged and convicted of
robbery with double homicide. The charge and the corresponding conviction should have been for robbery
with homicide only although two persons were killed. In this complex crime, the penalty prescribed in
Article 294(1) of the Revised Penal Code is not affected by the number of killings accompanying the
robbery. The multiplicity of the victims slain is appreciated as an aggravating circumstance.
Although Republic Act No. 7659 reimposed the death penalty for certain heinous crimes, including robbery
with homicide, the capital punishment could not be imposed in the case at bench. The crime here was
committed way back in September 23, 1987, while R.A. No. 7659 took effect only on December 31, 1993.
To impose upon appellant the death penalty would violate the basic rule in criminal law that, if the new law
imposes a heavier penalty, the law in force at the time of the commission of the offense shall be applied,
which in this case is Article 294 (1) of the Revised Penal Code sans the death penalty clause by virtue of
Section 19 (1), Article III of the 1987 Constitution .
TUPAZ VS ULEP
G.R. No. 127777. October 1, 1999
FACT:
On June 8, 1990, State Prosecutor Esteban A. Molon, Jr. filed with the MeTC, Quezon City an
information against accused Petronila C. Tupaz and her late husband Jose J. Tupaz. On January 10, 1991, SP
Molon filed with the RTC, QC Brach 81 two informations, against accused and her late husband, for the
same alleged nonpayment of deficiency corporate income tax for the year 1979. In response, accused filed a
motion to dismiss/quash such information for the reason that it was exactly the same as the information
against the accused pending before RTC, QC, Branch 105
Later, Prosecutor Agcaoili filed with the RTC, Quezon City, Branch 105, a motion to reinstate
information in the second criminal case stating that the motion to withdraw information was made through
palpable mistake, and was the result of excusable neglect as he thought that the criminal cases were similar.
ISSUE: WON double jeopardy is present.
HELD:
AFFIRMATIVE. The reinstatement of the information would expose her to double jeopardy. An
accused is placed in double jeopardy if he is again tried for an offense for which he has been convicted,
acquitted or in another manner in which the indictment against him was dismissed without his consent. In
the instant case, there was a valid complaint filed against petitioner to which she pleaded not guilty. The
court dismissed the case at the instance of the prosecution, without asking for accused-petitioners consent.
This consent cannot be implied or presumed. Such consent must be expressed as to have no doubt as to the
accuseds conformity. As petitioners consent was not expressly given, the dismissal of the case must be
regarded as final and with prejudice to the re-filing of the case. Consequently, the trial court committed
grave abuse of discretion in reinstating the information against petitioner in violation of her constitutionally
protected right against double jeopardy.