Dynamic Planning for COIN in Afghanistan

Potential
Fractiousness
of Society

Support for Neutral Support for HN

Insurgency Populace Government

COIN operations must accomplish three tasks

simultaneously:
• Influence insurgent-minded individuals to adopt a neutral
disposition.
• Influence neutral-minded individuals to adopt a
supportive disposition.
• Retain supportive individuals.
These operations are conducted in an environment where
tensions and hostilities between groups may destabilize a
society and provide opportunities for insurgents
• This environment may suggest courses of action aimed
at reinforcing or widening seams
• An increase in Coalition funding will influence Coalition
economic investment and development. Funding

• A strengthened economy will influence movement

from the insurgent- and neutral-minded groups Economic
toward the supportive group. Investment

Potential
Fractiousness Economic
of Society Development

Support for Neutral Support for HN

Insurgency Populace Government
 Coalition
Satisfaction with Funding
Breakdown of Essential Services
Developing and Essential Services
Restoring Essential
Services Economic
Expectations for
Essential Essential Services Investment
Services
Time to Develop
Essential Services Potential
Fractiousness Economic
of Society Development

Support for Neutral Support for HN

Insurgency Populace Government

• An increase in Coalition funding will significantly

impact the restoration of essential services.
• Improvements in the provision of essential services
will influence movement from the insurgent- and
neutral-minded groups toward the supportive
group.
 Coalition
Satisfaction with Funding
Breakdown of Essential Services Time to Develop
Developing and Essential Services Governance
Restoring Essential
Services Economic
Expectations for
Essential Essential Services Investment
Services Governance
Time to Develop
Essential Services Potential
Psychological
Operations Fractiousness Economic
Effectiveness of Society Development

Support for Neutral Support for HN

Insurgency Populace Government

Available
Perceived Workforce
Security
External Material
A government that is established, Support
recognized, and that maintains a secure Insurgent Acts
environment is in a position to of Violence
• Send a positive, credible message of
success to the populace.
• Provide an environment that enhances
stable employment of the workforce.
• Persuade insurgents and neutrals to
consider becoming supporters.
 Coalition
An appropriate
Satisfaction with force mix, and correct operational
Funding
Breakdown of Essential Services Time to Develop
tempo, timing, and synchronization
Governance
will have very
Developing and Essential Services
Restoring Essential significant impacts on
Services
Expectations The restoration of essential services. Economic
• for
Essential Essential Services Investment
Services Governance
• The populace’s perception of security.
Time to Develop
Essential Services • The Government’s and COIN forces’ credibility in
Potential
Psychological their communications efforts with the populace.
Operations Fractiousness Economic
Effectiveness of Society Development

Impact of Support for Neutral Support for HN

Illegitimate Actions Insurgency Populace Government

Appropriate Mix of
Effort and Use of Force Available
Perceived Workforce
Security Information
Individual Competence, External Material
Judgment, and Ability Support
to Execute Time to Develop HN
Insurgent Acts Security Forces
Appropriate
Strategic Emphasis of Violence

Total Force Host Nation

Insurgent to Force Density Security Forces
Density Ratio Understanding and
Knowledge of Social
Structures
Coalition Force Host Nation
Density Force Density
 Coalition
Satisfaction with Funding
Breakdown of Essential Services Time to Develop
Developing and Essential Services Governance
Restoring Essential
Services Economic
Expectations for
Essential Essential Services Investment
Services Governance
Time to Develop
Essential Services Potential
Psychological
Operations Fractiousness Economic
of Society
Effectiveness Development

Impact of Support for Neutral Support for HN

Illegitimate Actions Insurgency Populace Government

Appropriate Mix of
Effort and Use of Force Available
Perceived Workforce
Security Information
Individual Competence, External Material
Judgment, and Ability Support
to Execute Time to Develop HN
Insurgent Acts Security Forces
Appropriate
Strategic Emphasis of Violence

Total Force Host Nation

Insurgent to Force Density Security Forces
Density Ratio Understanding and
Knowledge of Social
Structures
Coalition Force Host Nation
Density Force Density
The Logical Lines of Operations from FM 3-24
 Coalition
Satisfaction with Funding
Breakdown of Essential Services Time to Develop
Developing and Essential Services Governance
Restoring Essential
Services Economic
Expectations for
Essential Essential Services Investment
Services Governance
Time to Develop
Essential Services Potential
Psychological
Operations Fractiousness Economic
Effectiveness of Society Development

Impact of Support for Neutral Support for HN

Illegitimate Actions Insurgency Populace Government

Appropriate Mix of
Effort and Use of Force Available
Perceived Workforce
Security Information
Individual Competence, External Material
Judgment, and Ability Support
to Execute Time to Develop HN
Insurgent Acts Security Forces
Appropriate
Strategic Emphasis of Violence

Total Force Host Nation

Insurgent to Force Density Security Forces
Density Ratio Understanding and
Knowledge of Social
Structures
Coalition Force Host Nation
Density Force Density
The Basic Information Ops Loop
 Popular Support – Sympathizers and Active Supporters

Relative
Popular
Support/
/Tolerance
Govt vs
Insurgents

Population Population Neutral/On Population Population

Actively Sympathizing the Fence Sympathizing Actively
Supporting w/ Gov’t w/ Insurgents Supporting
Gov’t & SF Insurgency

POPULAR Potential
Attractiveness
of Govt vs.
SUPPORT Insurgent Path

© PA Knowledge Limited 2009 Page 9

 Population Conditions, Beliefs, & Structures
Perceived Damages/Use
of Force by Insurgents

Perceived Damages/Use Perception of Insurgent

of Force by Gov’t and CF Strength and Intent

Fear of Ins.
Attack,
Relative WOM Message
Repercussions
Amplification Gov’t vs Ins

Perception of Coalition
Intent & Commitment
Perception of Gov’t
Strength of Strength and Intent
Religious Ability to
Ideology & Tribal Reconcile Satisfaction w/ Gains
Structures Religious in Security, Services &
Ideology, Employment
Cultural Erosion/ Tribal
Displacement Structures w/ Visible Gains
Expectations
Gov’t Path In Security,
for Security,
Services & Services &
Employment Employment
Perceived
Ethnic/Tribal Average
Security
Rivalry Connectedness
of Population

© PA Knowledge Limited 2009 Page 10

 Population Conditions, Beliefs, & Structures

Perceived
Damages &
Use of Force
by Ins.

Perceived Relative
Damages/Use Popular
of Force by Support/
Gov t & Coalition Perception of /Tolerance
Insurgent Govt vs
Insurgents
Strength &
Intent
POPULATION
Population
CONDITIONS Actively
Supporting
Population
Sympathizing
w/ Gov’t
Neutral/On
the Fence
Population
Sympathizing
w/ Insurgents
Population
Actively
Supporting
Gov’ t & SF
& BELIEFS
Relative WOM
Message
Fear of Ins.
Attack/
Insurgency

Amplification Repercussions
Gov’t vs Ins
POPULAR
POPULAR Potential
Attractiveness
of Gov t vs.
Perception of
Coalition Intent
SUPPORT Insurgent Path

& Commitment Perception

Of Govt
Strength
Strength of & Intent
Religious
Ideology &
Tribal Satisfaction
Structures Cultural Erosion/ Ability to w/ Gains in
Displacement Reconcile Security, Services
Religious & Employment Visible Gains
Ideology, In Security,
Ethnic/Tribal Tribal Services &
Rivalry Structures Employment
w/ Gov’t Expectations
Path for Security,
Average Services, &
Connectedness Employment
Perceived
of Population Security

© PA Knowledge Limited 2009 Page 11

 Insurgent Capacity, Outside Support/ Enablement of Insurgents, Narcotics

Outside
Fear of Gov’t / Support /
ANSF / Coalition Enablement Insurgent
Insurgent Repercussions Havens / of Ins. Terrain
Damages & Ability to
1 Advantage
Casualties Operate
Insurgent Coordination Insurgent
Offensives & Among Ins Leadership Insurgent
Territory Not Presence Factions Training, Skill Recruiting,
Under Gov’t (Clear & Hold) & Exper Retention, Criminal/
Control 2 Manpower, Trafficking
Ins Strategic
Ins Provision Insurgent & ISR Capability &
Comm/IO & Ties to
of Gov’t & Capacity, Coercion
Affiliation w/ Narcotics
Services Priorities &
Population & Other Funding &
Effectiveness Material
Ins Targeted Criminal
Attacks on Funding Support to Likelihood
Insurgents Narcotics &
Progress/ of Crime/
Criminal
Support for Gov’t Violence/
Activity Levels
Ins Support
for Payment
Illegit Agric
Production
Trade &
Feedback Loop Examples: Employment
1. Insurgent expansion: Insurgent factions with havens as base can expand their
presence and influence, further increasing their operating base territory.
(Permissive population contribution to Havens / Ability to Operate input from
separate sector).
2. Alignment of criminal and insurgent interests: Weakly governed / policed Terrain
territory may support insurgents, terrorists and criminals alike. Often interests Harshness
align and lines blur with criminal activity and funding contributing to insurgent & Breadth
operations and expansion, further increasing the weakly governed terrority and
© PA Knowledge Limited 2009 Page 12
ability to operate
 Insurgent Capacity, Outside Support/ Enablement of Insurgents, Narcotics

OUTSIDE SUPPORT
TO INSURGENT
Ins. Damages
& Casualties
Fear of FACTIONS
Gov’ t/ANSF/
Coalition
Repercussions
Outside
Havens / Ability to Support/
Operate Enablement
of Ins.
Ins. Coordination
Offensives & Among Ins. Insurgent
Territory Not Presence Factions Ins. Terrain
Under Gov’t (Clear & Hold) Insurgent Advantage
Control (Afghan Leadership, Recruiting,
& Pakistan) Training, Skill Retention,
& Experience Manpower Criminal/
Ins. Provision & ISR Trafficking
Of Gov’t &
Services
Insurgent
Capacity,
INSURGENTS
Ties to
Capability &
Coercion
Perceived Priorities &
Ins. Strategic Damages & Effectiveness Narcotics &
Commun/IO Use of Force Other Criminal
Ins. Targeted
& Affiliation w/
Population
by Ins. Attacks on
Progress/
Funding Funding &
Material
Support to
NARCOTICS
Perceived Support Relative Insurgents Likelihood of
Damages/Use for Gov’t Popular Crime/Violence
of Force by Support/ /Ins. Support
Gov t & Coalition Perception of /Tolerance for Payment
Insurgent Govt vs Narcotics
Insurgents & Criminal
Strength &
Intent Activity
POPULATION
POPULATION Population Population
Levels

Population Neutral/On Population

CONDITIONS
CONDITIONS
Actively
Supporting
Gov’ t & SF
Sympathizing
w/ Gov’t
the Fence Sympathizing
w/ Insurgents
Actively
Supporting
Insurgency IllegitAgric
Relative WOM Fear of Ins. Production,
& BELIEFS
& BELIEFS
Message
Amplification
Attack/
Repercussions
Trade &
Employment
Gov’t vs Ins
POPULAR
POPULAR Potential
Attractiveness
of Gov t vs.
Terrain
Harshness
Perception of
Coalition Intent
SUPPORT
SUPPORT
Insurgent Path & Breadth

& Commitment Perception

Of Gov t
Strength
Strength of & Intent
Religious
Ideology &
Tribal Satisfaction
Structures Cultural Erosion/ Ability to w/ Gains in
Displacement Reconcile Security, Services
Religious & Employment Visible Gains
Ideology, In Security,
Ethnic/Tribal Tribal Services &
Rivalry Structures Employment
w/ Gov’t Expectations
Path for Security,
Average Services, &
Connectedness Employment
of Population Perceived
Security

© PA Knowledge Limited 2009 Page 13

 Infrastructure, Services, & Economy
Feedback Loop Examples:
1. Agricultural production and markets: Investment and spending
enables agricultural production. Production can boost economic
activity and trade which feeds back into private sector re-investment.
(Public policy and investment in infrastructure, workforce, financial
markets, etc helps start / maintain private sector momentum.)
2. Making legit agriculture more attractive: Improved legit agricultural
opportunities may make illegit agricultural options less attractive which
further increases legit agricultural production, trade, and markets.
(Other inputs to decisions related to legit vs illegit from other sectors.)

Legit Agric
Production Fraction of
Workforce
and Agric.
2 Legit vs Illegit
Private Sector
Workforce Population
Skill & Avail Basic Needs
Service Levels
& Employment
Infrastructure Civilian
Legit vs Illegit
Dev. Adequacy Legit Other Services
Relative
& Sustainment Production (SWET,
Economic
& Services Healthcare,
Opportunity
Non-Agric Education)
1
Ability to Move Private Sector
Infr. Services, Econ, Legit Economic
People & Capital Mgmt,
Policy & Execution/ Activity, Trade &
Goods Rapidly Investment &
Perceived Fairness Employment
Spending

© PA Knowledge Limited 2009 Page 14

 Infrastructure, Services, & Economy

OUTSIDE SUPPORT
TOTO
INSURGENT
INSURGENT
Ins. Damages
& Casualties
Fear of
Gov’ t/ANSF/
FACTIONS
FACTIONS
Coalition
Repercussions
Outside
Havens / Ability to Support/
Operate Enablement
of Ins.
Ins. Coordination
Offensives & Among Ins. Insurgent
Territory Not Presence Factions Ins. Terrain
Under Gov’t (Clear & Hold) Insurgent Advantage
Control (Afghan Leadership, Recruiting,
& Pakistan) Training, Skill Retention,
& Experience Manpower Criminal/
Ins. Provision & ISR Trafficking
Of Gov’t &
Services
Insurgent
Capacity,
INSURGENTS
Ties to
Capability &
Coercion
Perceived Priorities &
Ins. Strategic Damages & Effectiveness Narcotics &
Commun/IO Use of Force Other Criminal
Ins. Targeted
& Affiliation w/
Population
by Ins. Attacks on
Progress/
Funding Funding &
Material
Support to
NARCOTICS
Perceived Support Relative Insurgents Likelihood of
Damages/Use for Gov’t Popular Crime/Violence
of Force by Support/ /Ins. Support
Gov t & Coalition Perception of /Tolerance for Payment
Insurgent Govt vs Narcotics
Insurgents & Criminal
Strength &
Intent Activity
POPULATION
POPULATION Population Population
Levels

Population Neutral/On Population

CONDITIONS
CONDITIONS
Actively
Supporting
Gov’ t & SF
Sympathizing
w/ Gov’t
the Fence Sympathizing
w/ Insurgents
Actively
Supporting
Insurgency Illegit Agric
Relative WOM Fear of Ins. Production,
& BELIEFS
& BELIEFS Message
Amplification
Attack/
Repercussions
Trade &
Employment
Gov’t vs Ins
POPULAR
POPULAR Potential
Attractiveness
of Gov t vs.
Terrain
Harshness
Perception of
Coalition Intent
SUPPORT
SUPPORT
Insurgent Path & Breadth

& Commitment Perception Fraction of

Of Gov t Workforce
Strength And Agric.
Strength of & Intent Legit vs
Religious Legit Agric Illegit
Ideology &
Tribal Private Sector Production
Satisfaction Workforce
Structures Cultural Erosion/ Ability to w/ Gains in Infrastructure
Displacement Reconcile Skill & Avail
Security, Services Dev. Adequacy Population
Religious & Employment Visible Gains & Sustainment
Ideology, Basic Needs
In Security, Service Levels
Ethnic/Tribal Tribal Services &
Rivalry Structures & Employment
Employment
w/ Gov’t Expectations Legit vs.Illegit
Path Legit Other Civilian
for Security, Production Services Relative
Average Services, & & Services (SWET, Economic
Connectedness Employment Non- Agric Healthcare, Opportunity
of Population Perceived
Security Education)

INFRASTRUCTURE,
Ability to
Move
People
Private Sector Legit Economic
Infr, Services, Econ.
Policy & Execution
SERVICES & Rapidly
Capital Mgmt.,
& Goods Investment &
Spending
Activity,
Trade &
Employment
/Perceived Fairness
ECONOMY

© PA Knowledge Limited 2009 Page 15

 Governance – Central Government Development & Capacity; Engagement /
Empowerment of Tribal Governance; Overall Governance Capacity & Impacts
Gov’t Security
Policy Quality Relative
& Investment Message
Central Gov’t
Institutional Quality
& Execution Gov’t vs Ins
Capacity

Gov’t Gov’t / ANSF

Funding Gov’t Training, Gov’t
Integration of StratCom/IO
Adequacy Mentoring, Gov’t Relative
Vetting, and Workforce Local Tribal Message ’
Hiring Skill & Avail Structures Impact
Gov’t vs Ins

Transparency of Gov’t
Professionalism, ’
Gov’t Processes
& Investments Policy Quality &
Fairness
Overall Gov’t
Reach,
Execution,
Gov’t/Contractor Recognition/
Capacity &
Corruption & Engagement to
Investment
Tribal Favoritism Integrate Tribal
Structures &
Tax Beliefs
Revenues
Feedback Loop Example:
Informal learning and mentoring: Formal training and vetting (enabled by institutional capacity) can
improve and maintain Government workforce skill and professionalism. However, as you build a
skilled, professional workforce base and culture, informal learning and expectations for behavior is
also very powerful (and can contribute to institutional development as well…another key loop)
© PA Knowledge Limited 2009 Page 16
 Governance – Central Government Development & Capacity; Engagement /
Empowerment of Tribal Governance; Overall Governance Capacity & Impacts
OUTSIDE SUPPORT
TOTO
INSURGENT
INSURGENT
Ins. Damages
& Casualties
Fear of
Gov’ t/ANSF/
FACTIONS
FACTIONS
Coalition
Repercussions
Outside
Havens / Ability to Support/
Operate Enablement
of Ins.
Ins. Coordination
Offensives & Among Ins. Insurgent
Territory Not Presence Factions Ins. Terrain
Under Gov’t (Clear & Hold) Insurgent Advantage
Control (Afghan Leadership, Recruiting,
& Pakistan) Training, Skill Retention,
& Experience Manpower Criminal/
Ins. Provision & ISR Trafficking
Of Gov’t &
Services
Insurgent
Capacity,
INSURGENTS
Ties to
Capability &
Coercion
Perceived Priorities &
Ins. Strategic Damages & Effectiveness Narcotics &
Commun/IO Use of Force Other Criminal
Ins. Targeted
& Affiliation w/
Population
by Ins. Attacks on
Progress/
Funding Funding &
Material
Support to
NARCOTICS
Perceived Support Relative Insurgents Likelihood of
Gov't Damages/Use for Gov’t Popular Crime/Violence
Security of Force by Support/ /Ins. Support
Policy Relative Gov t & Coalition Perception of /Tolerance for Payment
Quality & Message Insurgent Govt vs Narcotics
Investment Quality Insurgents & Criminal
Strength &
Gov’t ’vs Ins. Intent Activity

OVERALL Gov't/ANSF
POPULATION
POPULATION Population Population
Levels

Strategic Population Neutral/On Population

Central Gov't
Institutional &
Execution
GOVERNMENT Commun/
IO
CONDITIONS
CONDITIONS
Actively
Supporting
Gov’ t & SF
Sympathizing
w/ Gov’t
the Fence Sympathizing
w/ Insurgents
Actively
Supporting
Insurgency Illegit Agric
Fear of Ins. Production,
Gov't
Capacity
CAPACITY Relative
Message
& BELIEFS
& BELIEFS Relative WOM
Message
Amplification
Attack/
Repercussions
Trade &
Employment
Funding
Adequacy
Gov't Training
Gov't
Integration of
Impact Gov’t
vs Ins
Gov’t vs Ins
POPULAR
POPULAR Potential
Attractiveness
of Gov t vs.
Terrain
Harshness
Mentoring,
Vetting, and
Hiring
Gov't
Workforce
Local Tribal
Structures Perception of
Coalition Intent
SUPPORT
SUPPORT
Insurgent Path & Breadth

Skill & Avail & Commitment Perception Fraction of

Of Gov t Workforce
Transparency Strength
of Gov’t Gov't And Agric.
Overall Gov't Strength of & Intent Legit vs
Processes & Professionalism Reach,
Investments Policy Quality Execution Religious Legit Agric Illegit
& Fairness Capacity & Ideology & Production
Tribal Private Sector
Investment Satisfaction Workforce
Structures Cultural Erosion/ Ability to w/ Gains in Infrastructure
Displacement Reconcile Skill & Avail
Security, Services Dev. Adequacy
Gov't/ TRIBAL Recognition/
Engagement to
Ethnic/Tribal
Religious
Ideology,
Tribal
& Employment Visible Gains
In Security,
& Sustainment
Population
Basic Needs
Service Levels
Contractor Services &
Corruption &
Tribal Favoritism
GOVERNANCE Integrate
Tribal
Structures&
Rivalry Structures
w/ Gov’t
Path Expectations
Employment
Legit Other Civilian
& Employment
Legit vs. Illegit
Beliefs for Security, Production Services Relative
Average Services, & & Services (SWET, Economic
Tax Connectedness Employment Non- Agric Healthcare, Opportunity
Revenues of Population Perceived
Security Education)

INFRASTRUCTURE,
Ability to
Move
People
Private Sector
Capital Mgmt.,
Legit Economic
Activity,
Infr, Services, Econ.
Policy & Execution
/Perceived Fairness
SERVICES & &
SERVICES
& Goods
Rapidly
Investment &
Spending
Trade &
Employment

ECONOMY
ECONOMY

© PA Knowledge Limited 2009 Page 17

 Coalition Resources, Actions, & Impacts and Homeland Support
Coalition Coalition
Knowledge & Coalition Adjustment
Understanding COIN Support of Approach
of Social Strategy & to Fit Afghan
Structures Unity

Duration of Coalition
Operation Appropriate
Coalition Balance of
Avg COIN Coalition Dev.
Effort & Force
Experienc Ops-ANSF
e & Skill Advisory & Coalition
Coalition
Aid Visibility to
Execution
Resource Population
Capacity &
Levels (Mil. & Western
Priorities
Civ. Forces Affiliation
and Levels) Backlash
Coalition Coalition Dev.
Ops-Gov’t Coalition/Homeland
StratComm/IO
Advisory & Acceptance of
US Gov’t
Afghan Methods
Support for Breadth of Aid
Operation Coalition
& Support
US Domestic
Perceived
Cost/Benefit
US Domestic/
& Support
Int’l StratComm
& Diplomacy
Coalition Dev. Ops-
Media
Infrastructure,
Sensationalism
Services, Econ
Bias Advisory & Aid Provide
Humanitarian
Relief

© PA Knowledge Limited 2009 Page 18

 Coalition Resources, Actions, & Impacts and Homeland Support

OUTSIDE SUPPORT
TOTO
INSURGENT
INSURGENT
Ins. Damages
& Casualties
Fear of
Gov’ t/ANSF/
FACTIONS
FACTIONS
Coalition
Coalition Repercussions
Knowledge Outside
Coalition Havens / Ability to Support/
& Underst Operate Enablement
of Social COIN
Structures Support of Ins.
Strategy & Ins. Coordination
Duration of Unity Coalition Offensives & Among Ins. Insurgent
Operation Territory Not Presence Factions Ins. Terrain
Adjustment Under Gov’t Insurgent
Coalition of Approach (Clear & Hold) Leadership, Advantage
Control (Afghan Recruiting,
Appropriate to Fit Afghan & Pakistan) Training, Skill Retention,
Balance of & Experience Manpower Criminal/
Effort & & ISR Trafficking
Ins. Provision
Force
Coalition
Of Gov’t &
Services
Insurgent
Capacity,
INSURGENTS
Ties to
Capability &
Coercion
Coalition Dev. Ops- Perceived Priorities &
Coalition Ins. Strategic Damages & Effectiveness Narcotics &
Avg COIN ANSF Other Criminal
Experience Execution Advisory Commun/IO Use of Force Ins. Targeted
& Skill Capacity &
Priorities
& Aid & Affiliation w/
Population
by Ins. Attacks on
Progress/
Funding Funding &
Material
Support to
NARCOTICS
Perceived Support Relative Insurgents Likelihood of
COALITION Coalition
Visibility to
Population
Gov't
Security
Policy Relative
Damages/Use
of Force by
Gov t & Coalition
for Gov’t Popular
Support/
/Tolerance
Crime/Violence
/Ins. Support
for Payment
Perception of
CAPACITY &
Resource Coalition
Levels Strategic
Coalition
Dev. Ops- Coalition/Homeland
Quality &
Investment
Message
Quality
Gov’ t ’vs Ins.
Insurgent
Strength &
Govt vs
Insurgents Narcotics
& Criminal
(Mil. & Civ. Commun./IO Gov’t Acceptance of Intent Activity
PRIORITIES
Forces, Advisory Afghan Methods
POPULATION Levels
Aid Levels) & Aid
OVERALL
OVERALL Gov't/ANSF
Strategic
POPULATION Population Population Neutral/On Population Population
Central Gov't
Institutional &
Execution GOVERNMENT
Commun/
IO
CONDITIONS
CONDITIONS
Actively
Supporting
Gov’ t & SF
Sympathizing
w/ Gov’t
the Fence Sympathizing
w/ Insurgents
Actively
Supporting
Insurgency Illegit Agric
US Gov't Relative WOM Fear of Ins. Production,
Support for
Operation Gov't
Capacity
CAPACITY
CAPACITY
Relative
Message
& BELIEFS
& BELIEFS Message
Amplification
Attack/
Repercussions
Trade &
Employment

Breadth of
Funding
Adequacy
Gov't Training
Gov't
Integration of Western
Impact Gov’t
vs Ins
Gov’t vs Ins
POPULAR
POPULAR Potential
Attractiveness
of Gov t vs.
Terrain
Harshness
US Domestic Coalition & Duration
Perceived
Cost/Benefit
Support Mentoring,
Vetting, and
Hiring
Gov't
Workforce
Local Tribal
Structures Affiliation
Backlash Perception of
Coalition Intent
SUPPORT
SUPPORT
Insurgent Path & Breadth of
Operation
& Support Skill & Avail & Commitment Perception Fraction of
Of Gov t Workforce
US Domestic/ Transparency Strength
of Gov’t Gov't And Agric.
Int'l Strategic Overall Gov't Strength of & Intent Legit vs
Commun. Processes & Professionalism Reach, Illegit
Investments Policy Quality Execution Religious Legit Agric
& Diplomacy Ideology &
COALITION
Media
& Fairness Capacity &
Investment Tribal
Structures Cultural Erosion/ Ability to
Satisfaction
w/ Gains in Infrastructure
Private Sector
Workforce
Skill & Avail
Production

Sensationalism
DOMESTIC
Bias
TRIBAL
Displacement Reconcile
Religious
Security, Services
& Employment Visible Gains
Dev. Adequacy
& Sustainment
Population

SUPPORT Gov't/
Contractor
TRIBAL Recognition/
Engagement to
Integrate Ethnic/Tribal
Ideology,
Tribal
Structures
In Security,
Services &
Basic Needs
Service Levels
& Employment
Coalition
Dev.Ops-
Infrastructure,
Corruption &
Tribal Favoritism GOVERNANCE Tribal
Structures&
Beliefs
Rivalry
w/ Gov’t
Path Expectations
for Security,
Employment
Legit Other
Production
Civilian
Services
Legit vs. Illegit
Relative
Services, Average Services, & & Services (SWET, Economic
Econ. Tax Connectedness Employment Non- Agric Healthcare, Opportunity
Advisory Revenues of Population Perceived
Security Education)
& Aid
INFRASTRUCTURE,
Ability to
Move
People
Private Sector
Capital Mgmt.,
Legit Economic
Activity,

Provide
Infr, Services, Econ.
Policy & Execution
/Perceived Fairness
SERVICES & &
SERVICES
& Goods
Rapidly
Investment &
Spending
Trade &
Employment
Humanitarian
Relief ECONOMY
ECONOMY

© PA Knowledge Limited 2009 Page 19

 ANSF Development, Capacity & Impacts – Tactical & Institutional
ANSF &
Coalition
Counter Narcotics
Damages/ ISR / Open /Crime Ops
Casualties Source Ops Total Security Targeted
Force Capacity Strikes
& focus Sweep Ops
ANSF Unit (Clear)
ANSF & Leadership Policing &
ANSF Unit
Manpower & Tactical Security
Capacity,
Recruiting & Capacity Ops (Hold)
1 1 Priorities &
Retention Effectiveness

ANSF Avg ANSF

ANSF
Professionalism, Appropriate
ANSF Training &
Skill, Discipline Use of Force
Institutional Mentoring
& Morale
& Execution 2
Capacity \
ANSF
Corruption R.O.L. Policy,
& Tribal Execution &
ANSF Favoritism Perceived
Funding Fairness
Adequacy

Feedback Loop Examples:

1. ANSF success and informal momentum: ANSF professionalism and skill contributes to
tactical capacity which enables effective operations. Success and experience feeds back into
professionalism, skill and morale which further reinforces both leadership & tactical capacity
and recruiting / retention.
2. ANSF institutional capacity: Institutional capacity and processes enable manpower, formal
training, logistics, planning & budgeting, etc that reinforce informal gains support ANSF
capacity over time.
© PA Knowledge Limited 2009 Page 20
 ANSF Development, Capacity & Impacts – Tactical & Institutional

ANSF &
Coalition
Damages/
Casualties OUTSIDE SUPPORT
OUTSIDE SUPPORT
ISR / Open
Total
ANSF Source Ops
Security
Force
Targeted
Strikes
TOTO INSURGENT
INSURGENT Counter Narcotics/
Crime Ops
Capacity &
TACTICAL ANSF Unit
Focus Sweep Ops
(Clear)
Ins. Damages
& Casualties
Fear of
Gov’ t/ANSF/
Coalition
FACTIONS
FACTIONS
Coalition Leadership ANSF Policing & Repercussions
Knowledge & Tactical Capacity, Security Ops Outside
Coalition Capacity Priorities & (Hold) Havens / Ability to Support/
& Underst Operate Enablement
of Social COIN Effectiveness
Support ANSF of Ins.
Structures Manpower
Strategy & ANSF Avg. Ins. Coordination
Duration of Unity Recruiting & Offensives & Among Ins. Insurgent
Coalition Retention Professionalism Territory Not
Operation Adjustment Skill, Discipline, Presence Factions Ins. Terrain
Under Gov’t (Clear & Hold) Insurgent Advantage
Coalition of Approach & Morale ANSF Control (Afghan Leadership, Recruiting,
Appropriate to Fit Afghan Training, Skill Retention,
Balance of
Effort & ANSF
ANSF
Training & ANSF Appropriate
Use of Force
& Pakistan)
Ins. Provision
& Experience Manpower Criminal/
& ISR Trafficking
Force Institutional &
Execution
Coalition Capacity
Mentoring
INSTITUTIONAL
ANSF
Of Gov’t &
Services
Insurgent
Capacity,
INSURGENTS
Ties to
Capability &
Coercion
Coalition Dev. Ops- Perceived Priorities &
Coalition Corruption & Ins. Strategic Damages & Effectiveness Narcotics &
Avg COIN ANSF Tribal Other Criminal
Experience Execution Advisory R.O.L. Policy, Commun/IO Use of Force Ins. Targeted
& Skill Capacity &
Priorities
& Aid
Favoritism Execution &
Perceived
& Affiliation w/
Population
by Ins. Attacks on
Progress/
Funding Funding &
Material
Support to
NARCOTICS
ANSF Fairness Perceived Support Likelihood of
Relative Insurgents
COALITION
COALITION
Coalition
Population
Funding
Visibility to Adequacy
Gov't
Security
Policy Relative
Damages/Use
of Force by
Gov t & Coalition
for Gov’t Popular
Support/
/Tolerance
Crime/Violence
/Ins. Support
for Payment
Perception of
CAPACITY
CAPACITY &
Levels &
Resource Coalition
Strategic
Coalition
Dev. Ops- Coalition/Homeland
Quality &
Investment
Message
Quality
Gov’ t ’vs Ins.
Insurgent
Strength &
Govt vs
Insurgents Narcotics
& Criminal
(Mil. & Civ. Commun./IO Gov’t Acceptance of Intent Activity
PRIORITIES
PRIORITIES
Forces, Advisory Afghan Methods
POPULATION Levels
Aid Levels) & Aid
OVERALL
OVERALL Gov't/ANSF
Strategic
POPULATION Population Population Neutral/On Population Population
Central Gov't
Institutional &
Execution GOVERNMENT
Commun/
IO
CONDITIONS
CONDITIONS
Actively
Supporting
Gov’ t & SF
Sympathizing
w/ Gov’t
the Fence Sympathizing
w/ Insurgents
Actively
Supporting
Insurgency Illegit Agric
US Gov't Relative WOM Fear of Ins. Production,
Support for
Operation Gov't
Capacity
CAPACITY
CAPACITY
Relative
Message
& BELIEFS
& BELIEFS
Message
Amplification
Attack/
Repercussions
Trade &
Employment

Breadth of
Coalition &
Funding
Adequacy
Gov't Training
Gov't
Integration of Western
Impact Gov’t
vs Ins
Gov’t vs Ins
POPULAR
POPULAR Potential
Attractiveness
of Gov t vs.
Terrain
Harshness Duration
US Domestic
Perceived
Cost/Benefit
Support Mentoring,
Vetting, and
Hiring
Gov't
Workforce
Local Tribal
Structures Affiliation
Backlash Perception of
Coalition Intent
SUPPORT
SUPPORT
Insurgent Path & Breadth of
Operation
& Support Skill & Avail & Commitment Perception Fraction of
Of Gov t Workforce
US Domestic/ Transparency Strength
of Gov’t Gov't And Agric.
Int'l Strategic Overall Gov't Strength of & Intent Legit vs
Commun. Processes & Professionalism Reach, Illegit
Investments Policy Quality Execution Religious Legit Agric
& Diplomacy Ideology & Production
Media COALITION
Sensationalism
& Fairness Capacity &
Investment Tribal
Structures Cultural Erosion/ Ability to
Satisfaction
w/ Gains in Infrastructure
Private Sector
Workforce
Skill & Avail
Displacement Reconcile
Bias
DOMESTIC Gov't/ TRIBAL
TRIBAL Recognition/
Engagement to
Religious
Ideology,
Security, Services
& Employment Visible Gains
In Security,
Dev. Adequacy
& Sustainment
Population
Basic Needs
Tribal Service Levels
SUPPORT
SUPPORT
Contractor Integrate Ethnic/Tribal
Structures Services & & Employment
Coalition
Dev.Ops-
Corruption &
Tribal Favoritism
Infrastructure,
GOVERNANCE Tribal
Structures&
Beliefs
Rivalry
w/ Gov’t
Path Expectations
for Security,
Employment
Legit Other
Production
Civilian
Services
Legit vs. Illegit
Relative
Services, Average Services, & & Services (SWET, Economic
Econ. Tax Connectedness Employment Non- Agric Healthcare, Opportunity
Advisory Revenues of Population Perceived
Security Education)
& Aid
INFRASTRUCTURE,
Ability to
Move
People
Private Sector
Capital Mgmt.,
Legit Economic
Activity,

Provide
Infr, Services, Econ.
Policy & Execution
/Perceived Fairness
SERVICES & &
SERVICES
& Goods
Rapidly
Investment &
Spending
Trade &
Employment
Humanitarian
Relief ECONOMY
ECONOMY

© PA Knowledge Limited 2009 Page 21

 Afghanistan Stability / COIN Dynamics =
Significant
Delay
Population/Popular Support
Infrastructure, Economy, & Services
Government
Afghanistan Security Forces
Insurgents
Crime and Narcotics
Coalition Forces & Actions
Physical Environment

ANSF &
Coalition
Damages/
Casualties OUTSIDE SUPPORT
ANSF
ISR / Open
Source Ops Total
Security Targeted
TO INSURGENT Counter- Narcotics/
Crime Ops
Force
Capacity &
Strikes
Ins. Damages FACTIONS
TACTICAL ANSF Unit
Focus Sweep Ops
(Clear) & Casualties
Fear of
Gov’ t/ANSF/
Coalition
Coalition Leadership ANSF Policing & Repercussions
& Tactical Capacity, Security Ops Outside
Knowledge Havens / Ability to Support/
& Underst. Coalition Capacity Priorities & (Hold)
‘COIN Effectiveness Operate Enablement
of Social ANSF of Ins.
Structures Support’
Strategy & Manpower Ins. Coordination
Recruiting & ANSF Avg. Offensives & Among Ins.
Duration of Unity Coalition Professionalism Insurgent
Operation Retention Territory Not Presence Factions Ins. Terrain
Adjustment Skill, Discipline, Under Gov’t Insurgent
Coalition of Approach & Morale (Clear & Hold) Leadership, Advantage
ANSF Control (Afghan Recruiting,
Appropriate to Fit Afghan Training, Skill Retention,
Balance of
Effort & ANSF
ANSF
Training & ANSF Appropriate
Use of Force
& Pakistan)

Ins. Provision
& Experience Manpower Criminal/
& ISR Trafficking
Force Institutional &
Execution
Coalition Capacity
Mentoring
INSTITUTIONAL Of Gov’t &
Services
Insurgent
Capacity,
INSURGENTS
Ties to
Capability &
Coercion
Dev. Ops- ANSF Perceived Priorities &
Coalition Corruption & Damages & Narcotics &
Avg COIN Coalition ANSF Ins. Strategic Effectiveness
Tribal Other Criminal
Experience Execution Commun/IO Use of Force
& Skill Capacity &
Priorities
Advisory
& Aid
Favoritism
R.O.L. Policy,
Execution &
Perceived
& Affiliation w/
Population
by Ins.
Ins. Targeted
Attacks on
Progress/
Funding Funding &
Material
NARCOTICS
Fairness Support to
ANSF Perceived Support Relative Insurgents Likelihood of
COALITION Coalition Funding
Visibility to Adequacy
Population
Gov't
Security
Policy Relative
Damages/Use
of Force by
Gov’ t & Coalition
for Gov’t Popular
Support/
/Tolerance
Crime/Violence
/Ins. Support
for Payment
Perception of
CAPACITY &
Resource Coalition
Levels Strategic
Coalition
Dev. Ops- Coalition/Homeland
Quality &
Investment
Message
Quality
Gov’t ’vs Ins.
Insurgent
Strength &
Gov’t vs
Insurgents Narcotics
& Criminal
Activity
(Mil. & Civ. Commun./IO Gov’t Acceptance of Intent
PRIORITIES
Forces,
Aid Levels)
Advisory Afghan Methods
& Aid
OVERALL POPULATION Levels
Gov't/ANSF Population
Central Gov't
GOVERNMENT
Strategic
Commun/ CONDITIONS Actively
Supporting
Population
Sympathizing
Neutral/On
the Fence
Population
Sympathizing
Population
Actively
Supporting
US Gov't
CENTRAL Institutional &
Execution
IO
& BELIEFS Fear of Ins.
Gov’t & SF w/ Gov’t w/ Insurgents
Insurgency IllegitAgric
Production,
Support for
Operation GOV’T
Gov't
Capacity
CAPACITY Relative
Message
Relative WOM
Message
Amplification
Attack/
Repercussions
Trade &
Employment

Breadth of
Funding
Adequacy
Gov't Training
Gov't
Integration of
Impact Gov’t
vs Ins
Gov’t vs Ins POPULAR Potential
Attractiveness
of Gov’t vs.
Terrain
Western Harshness
US Domestic Coalition &
Perceived
Cost/Benefit
Support Mentoring,
Vetting, and Gov't
Workforce
Local Tribal
Structures Affiliation
Backlash Perception of
Coalition Intent
SUPPORT Insurgent Path & Breadth
Duration
of
Operation
Hiring
& Support Skill & Avail & Commitment Perception Fraction of
Of Gov’t Workforce
US Domestic/ Transparency Strength
of Gov’t Gov't And Agric.
Int'l Strategic Overall Gov't Strength of & Intent Legit vs
Commun. Processes & Professionalism Reach, Illegit
Investments Policy Quality Execution Religious Legit Agric
& Diplomacy Ideology &
COALITION
Media
& Fairness Capacity &
Investment Tribal
Structures Cultural Erosion/ Ability to
Satisfaction
w/ Gains in Infrastructure
Private Sector Production
Workforce
Skill & Avail
Sensationalism
DOMESTIC
Bias
TRIBAL
Recognition/
Displacement Reconcile
Religious
Ideology,
Security, Services Dev. Adequacy
& Employment Visible Gains & Sustainment Population
Basic Needs
Gov't/ In Security,
SUPPORT
Coalition
Contractor
Corruption &
Engagement to
GOVERNANCE
Integrate
Tribal
Ethnic/Tribal
Rivalry
Tribal
Structures
w/ Gov’t
Services &
Employment
Service Levels
& Employment
Dev.Ops- Tribal Favoritism Structures& Expectations Legit Other Civilian Legit vs.Illegit
Path for Security, Relative
Infrastructure, Beliefs Production Services
Services, Average Services, & & Services (SWET, Economic
Econ. Tax Connectedness Employment Non- Agric Healthcare, Opportunity
Advisory Revenues Perceived
of Population Security Education)
& Aid
INFRASTRUCTURE,
Ability to
Move
People
Private Sector Legit Economic
Infr, Services, Econ.
Policy & Execution
SERVICES & Rapidly
Capital Mgmt.,
& Goods Investment &
Spending
Activity,
Trade &
Employment
Provide
Humanitarian
Relief
/Perceived Fairness
ECONOMY

WORKING DRAFT – V3

© PA Knowledge Limited 2009 Page 22

 Key Feedback Loop: Securing and Empowering the Population

ANSF &
Coalition
Damages/
Casualties
ISR / Open
Source Ops Total
Security Targeted
Force Strikes
2 1 Capacity & Ins. Damages Fear of
Focus Sweep Ops & Casualties
(Clear) Gov’ t/ANSF/
ANSF Unit Coalition
Leadership ANSF Policing & Repercussions
& Tactical Capacity, Security Ops Outside
Capacity Priorities & (Hold) Havens / Ability to Support/
Effectiveness Operate Enablement
ANSF of Ins.
Manpower Ins. Coordination
Recruiting & ANSF Avg. Offensives & Among Ins.
Coalition Retention Professionalism Territory Not Presence Factions
Adjustment Skill, Discipline, Under Gov’t Ins.
of Approach & Morale (Clear & Hold) Leadership,
ANSF Control (Afghan Training, Skill
to Fit Afghan Appropriate & Pakistan)
ANSF Use of Force & Experience
ANSF Training & Ins. Provision
Institutional & Mentoring Insurgent
Execution Of Gov’t &
Coalition Capacity Services Capacity,
ANSF Perceived Priorities & Ties to
Dev. Ops- Corruption & Narcotics &
ANSF Ins. Strategic Damages & Effectiveness
Tribal R.O.L. Policy, Commun/IO Use of Force Other Criminal
Advisory Favoritism Ins. Targeted Funding
& Aid Execution & & Affiliation w/ by Ins. Attacks on
Perceived Population Progress/
ANSF Fairness Perceived Support
Coalition Relative
Funding Gov't Damages/Use for Gov’t Popular
Visibility to Adequacy Security of Force by Support/
Population Policy Relative Gov’ t & Coalition /Tolerance
Quality & Perception of Gov’t vs
alition Message Insurgent
Investment Quality Insurgents
Ops- Coalition/Homeland Strength &
ov’t Acceptance of Gov’t ’vs Ins. Intent
visory Afghan Methods
Aid Fear is a key mechanism for insurgent factions to prevent the
population from engaging and Gov't/ANSF
Central Gov't
actively
Strategic supporting the Population
Actively Population
Sympathizing
Neutral/On
the Fence S
Commun/ Supporting
Government.
Institutional & IO Gov’ t & SF w/ Gov’t w
Execution
Securing populated territory (clear and hold
Capacity
Relative
ops) can reduce
Relative
Message
WOM Fear of Ins.
Attack/
t
ng
insurgent ability to target and intimidate the
Message population
Impact Gov’t
such
Amplification
Gov’t vs Ins
Repercussions
Potential
acy that Gov’t sympathizers Integration ofare willing
Gov't to be vsactiveIns supporters. Attractiveness
of Gov’t vs.
•
Gov't Training Western
HUMINT:
Mentoring,
Vetting, and Gov't
The population
Local Tribal
Structures
will be more
Affiliation willing to provide intel
Perception of
Insurgent Path
Backlash
if they Skill
Hiring do&not
Workforce
Avail
fear insurgent repercussions. Coalition Intent
Perception
sparency• ANA & ANP Development: ANSF recruiting and development
& Commitment
Of Gov’t
Strength
Gov’t
cesses & isProfessionalism
facilitated byGov't
the expansion Strength of secure regions. (ANA and
Gov't Overall of & Intent
Reach, Religious
stments ANP Policyleaders,
Quality families,
Execution facilities, etc less likely to be targeted or
& Fairness Capacity & Ideology &
Tribal Private
Satisfaction
overrun. Investment Structures Cultural Erosion/ Ability to w/ Gains in Infrastructure
Workf
Skill &
Displacement Reconcile Security Services Dev Adequacy

© PA Knowledge Limited 2009 Page 23

 Key Feedback Loop: Government Engagement and Integration of Tribal Governance

han Appropriate & Pakistan) Training, Skill Retention,

ANSF Use of Force & Experience Manpower Criminal/
ANSF Training & Ins. Provision & ISR Trafficking
Institutional & Mentoring Insurgent Capability &
Execution Of Gov’t &
tion Capacity Services Capacity, Coercion
ANSF Perceived Priorities & Ties to
Ops- Corruption & Narcotics &
SF Ins. Strategic Damages & Effectiveness
Tribal R.O.L. Policy, Commun/IO Use of Force Other Criminal
sory Favoritism Ins. Targeted Funding
Aid Execution & & Affiliation w/ by Ins. Attacks on Funding &
Perceived Population Progress/ Material
Fairness Support to
Coalition Critical for
ANSF
Funding Gov't
the Government to recognize and make the
Perceived
Damages/Use
Support
for Gov’t
Relative
Popular
Insurgents Likelihood of
Crime/Violence
opulation effort toSecurity
sibility to Adequacy
engage
Policy existing tribal structures
Relative
and of Force by
Gov’ t & Coalition
Support/
/Tolerance
/Ins. Support
for Payment
Perception of
Governance
alition/Homeland
Quality & if they are to be accepted
Investment
Message
Quality
by the population. Insurgent
Strength &
Gov’t vs
Insurgents
N
&
Acceptance ofTies to local governance can Gov’ gain popular
t ’vs Ins. support and Intent
fghan Methods
rapidly expand the Government’s Gov't/ANSF
overall capacity and Population Population
Population Neutral/On Population
‘reach’
Central Gov't which further increases
Strategic
Commun/ their capacity and ability Actively
Supporting Sympathizing the Fence Sympathizing Actively
Supporting
Institutional & w/ Gov’t w/ Insurgents
to engage the population.
Execution
IO
Relative WOM Fear of Ins.
Gov’t & SF Insurgency Illegit A
Produc
Capacity Attack/ Trad
Relative Message
Message Amplification Repercussions Employ
Gov't Impact Gov’t Gov’t vs Ins Potential
Integration of vs Ins Attractiveness Terrain
Training Local Tribal Western of Gov’t vs. Harshness
oring, Structures Affiliation Insurgent Path & Breadth
g, and Gov't Backlash Perception of
ring Workforce Coalition Intent
Skill & Avail & Commitment Perception Fraction of
Of Gov’t Workforce
Strength And Agric.
Gov't Overall Gov't Strength of & Intent Legit vs
Professionalism Reach, Illegit
Policy Quality Execution Religious Legit Agric
& Fairness Capacity & Ideology & Production
Tribal Private Sector
Investment Satisfaction Workforce
Structures Cultural Erosion/ Ability to w/ Gains in Infrastructure
Displacement Reconcile Skill & Avail
Security, Services Dev. Adequacy Population
Religious & Employment Visible Gains & Sustainment
Recognition/ Ideology, Basic Needs
v't/ Engagement to In Security, Service Levels
ractor Ethnic/Tribal Tribal Services &
Integrate Structures & Employment
ption & Tribal Rivalry Employment
avoritism w/ Gov’t Expectations Legit vs
Structures& Path Legit Other Civilian
Beliefs for Security, Production Services Rela
Average Services, & & Services (SWET, Econo
Tax Connectedness Employment Non- Agric Healthcare, Opport
Revenues of Population Perceived Education)
Security
Ability to
Move Private Sector Legit Economic
People Capital Mgmt., Activity,
Infr, Services, Econ. & Goods Investment & Trade &
Policy & Execution Rapidly Spending Employment
Provide /Perceived Fairness
Humanitarian
Relief

© PA Knowledge Limited 2009 Page 24

 Afghanistan Stability / COIN Dynamics – SECURITY
Population/Popular Support
Infrastructure, Economy, & Services
Government
Afghanistan Security Forces
Insurgents
Crime and Narcotics
Coalition Forces & Actions
ANSF & Physical Environment
Coalition
Damages/
Casualties
ISR / Open
Source Ops Total
Security Targeted Counter- Narcotics/
Force Strikes Crime Ops
Capacity & Ins. Damages Fear of
Focus Sweep Ops & Casualties
(Clear) Gov’ t/ANSF/
ANSF Unit Coalition
Coalition Leadership ANSF Policing & Repercussions
& Tactical Capacity & Security Ops Outside
Knowledge Havens / Ability to Support/
& Underst. Coalition Capacity Priorities (Hold)
‘ COIN Operate Enablement
of Social ANSF of Ins.
Structures Support’
Strategy & Manpower Ins. Coordination
Recruiting & ANSF Avg. Offensives & Among Ins.
Duration of Unity Coalition Professionalism Insurgent
Operation Retention Territory Not Presence Factions Ins. Terrain
Adjustment Skill, Discipline, Under Gov’t (Clear & Hold) Insurgent
Coalition of Approach & Morale Leadership, Recruiting, Advantage
Appropriate ANSF Control (Afghan Training, Skill
to Fit Afghan Appropriate & Pakistan) Retention,
Balance of ANSF Use of Force & Experience Manpower Criminal/
Effort & ANSF Training & & ISR Trafficking
Force Institutional & Mentoring Ins. Provision
Of Gov’t & Insurgent Capability &
Execution Services Capacity, Coercion
Coalition Capacity ANSF Perceived Ties to
Coalition Dev. Ops- Priorities & Narcotics &
Coalition Corruption & Ins. Strategic Damages & Effectiveness
Avg COIN ANSF Tribal Other Criminal
Experience Execution Advisory R.O.L. Policy, Commun/IO Use of Force Ins. Targeted
Capacity & Favoritism Execution & & Affiliation w/ by Ins. Funding Funding &
& Skill & Aid Attacks on Material
Priorities Perceived Population Progress/
Fairness Support to
ANSF Perceived Support Relative Insurgents Likelihood of
Coalition Funding Gov't Damages/Use for Gov’t Popular Active Ins.
Visibility to Adequacy Security of Force by Support/ Support for
Population Policy Relative Gov’ t & Coalition Tolerance Payment
Quality & Perception of Gov’t vs
Resource Coalition Coalition Message Insurgent Narcotics
Levels Investment Quality Insurgents & Criminal
Strategic Dev. Ops- Coalition/Homeland Strength &
(Military Commun./IO Gov’t Acceptance of Gov’ t ’vs Ins. Intent Activity
Forces, Advisory Afghan Methods Levels
Civilian & Aid
Forces, Gov't/ANSF Population Population
Aid Levels) Strategic Population Neutral/On Population
Central Gov't Actively Sympathizing the Fence Sympathizing Actively
Commun/ Supporting Supporting
Institutional & IO w/ Gov’t w/ Insurgents
Gov’ t & SF Insurgency Illegit Agric
US Gov't Execution Fear of Ins. Production,
Capacity Relative WOM
Support for Relative Message Attack/ Trade &
Operation Gov't Message Amplification Repercussions Employment
Funding Impact Gov’t Gov’t vs Ins Potential
Breadth of Adequacy Gov't vs Ins Attractiveness Terrain
Gov't Training Integration of Western of Gov’t vs. Harshness
US Domestic Coalition & Local Tribal Duration
Support Mentoring, Affiliation Insurgent Path & Breadth of
Perceived Vetting, and Gov't Structures Backlash Perception of
Cost/Benefit Workforce Operation
Hiring Coalition Intent
& Support Skill & Avail & Commitment Perception Fraction of
Of Gov’t Workforce
US Domestic/ Transparency Strength
of Gov’t Gov't And Agric.
Int'l Strategic Overall Gov't Strength of & Intent Legit vs
Commun. Processes & Professionalism Reach,
Investments Policy Quality Religious Legit Agric Illegit
& Diplomacy Execution Ideology &
& Fairness Capacity & Private Sector Production
Investment Tribal Satisfaction
Media Structures Cultural Erosion/ Ability to Workforce
Sensationalism w/ Gains in Infrastructure Skill & Avail
Displacement Reconcile Security, Services Dev. Adequacy
Bias Religious & Employment Visible Gains & Sustainment Population
Recognition/ Ideology, Basic Needs
Gov't/ Engagement to In Security, Service Levels
Contractor Ethnic/Tribal Tribal Services &
Integrate Structures & Employment
Coalition Corruption & Tribal Rivalry Employment
Tribal Favoritism w/ Gov’t Expectations Legit vs. Illegit
Dev.Ops- Structures& Path Legit Other Civilian
Infrastructure, Beliefs for Security, Production Services Relative
Services, Average Services, & & Services (SWET, Economic
Econ. Tax Connectedness Employment Non- Agric Healthcare, Opportunity
Advisory Revenues of Population Perceived
Security Education)
& Aid
Ability to Private Sector
Move Capital Legit Economic
People Management, Activity,
Infr., Services, Econ. & Goods Investment & Trade &
Policy & Execution Rapidly Spending Employment
Provide /Perceived Fairness
Humanitarian
Relief

WORKING DRAFT

© PA Knowledge Limited 2009 Page 26

 Population/Popular Support
Afghanistan Stability / COIN Dynamics – GOVERNANCE Infrastructure, Economy, & Services
Government
Afghanistan Security Forces
Insurgents
Crime and Narcotics
Coalition Forces & Actions
Physical Environment
ANSF &
Coalition
Damages/
Casualties
ISR / Open
Source Ops Total
Security Targeted Counter- Narcotics/
Force Strikes Crime Ops
Capacity & Ins. Damages Fear of
Focus Sweep Ops & Casualties
(Clear) Gov’ t/ANSF/
ANSF Unit Coalition
Coalition Leadership ANSF Policing & Repercussions
& Tactical Capacity & Security Ops Outside
Knowledge Havens / Ability to Support/
& Underst. Coalition Capacity Priorities (Hold)
‘ COIN Operate Enablement
of Social ANSF of Ins.
Structures Support’
Strategy & Manpower Ins. Coordination
Recruiting & ANSF Avg. Offensives & Among Ins.
Duration of Unity Coalition Professionalism Insurgent
Operation Retention Territory Not Presence Factions Ins. Terrain
Adjustment Skill, Discipline, Under Gov’t Insurgent
Coalition of Approach & Morale (Clear & Hold) Leadership, Advantage
ANSF Control (Afghan Recruiting,
Appropriate to Fit Afghan Appropriate & Pakistan) Training, Skill Retention,
Balance of ANSF Use of Force & Experience Manpower Criminal/
Effort & ANSF Training & & ISR Trafficking
Force Institutional & Mentoring Ins. Provision
Of Gov’t & Insurgent Capability &
Execution Services Capacity, Coercion
Coalition Capacity ANSF Ties to
Coalition Dev. Ops- Perceived Priorities &
Coalition Corruption & Ins. Strategic Damages & Effectiveness Narcotics &
Avg COIN ANSF Tribal Other Criminal
Experience Execution Advisory R.O.L. Policy, Commun/IO Use of Force Ins. Targeted
Capacity & Favoritism Execution & & Affiliation w/ by Ins. Funding Funding &
& Skill & Aid Attacks on
Priorities Perceived Population Progress/ Material
Fairness Support to
ANSF Perceived Support Relative Insurgents Likelihood of
Coalition Funding Gov't Damages/Use for Gov’t Popular Crime/Violence
Visibility to Adequacy Security of Force by Support/ /Ins. Support
Population Policy Relative Gov’ t & Coalition /Tolerance for Payment
Quality & Perception of Gov’t vs
Resource Coalition Coalition Message Insurgent Narcotics
Investment Quality Insurgents & Criminal
Levels Strategic Dev. Ops- Coalition/Homeland Strength &
(Mil. & Civ. Commun./IO Gov’t Acceptance of Gov’ t ’vs Ins. Intent Activity
Forces, Advisory Afghan Methods Levels
Aid Levels) & Aid
Gov't/ANSF Population Neutral/On Population
Strategic Population Population
Actively Sympathizing the Fence Sympathizing Actively
Central Gov't Commun/ Supporting
Institutional & w/ Gov’t w/ Insurgents Supporting
IO Gov’ t & SF Insurgency Illegit Agric
US Gov't Execution Fear of Ins. Production,
Capacity Relative WOM
Support for Relative Message Attack/ Trade &
Operation Gov't Message Amplification Repercussions Employment
Funding Impact Gov’t Gov’t vs Ins Potential
Breadth of Adequacy Gov't vs Ins Attractiveness Terrain
Gov't Training Integration of Western of Gov’t vs. Harshness
US Domestic Coalition & Local Tribal Duration
Support Mentoring, Affiliation Insurgent Path & Breadth of
Perceived Vetting, and Gov't Structures Backlash Perception of
Cost/Benefit Workforce Operation
Hiring Coalition Intent
& Support Skill & Avail & Commitment Perception Fraction of
Of Gov’t Workforce
US Domestic/ Transparency Strength
of Gov’t Gov't And Agric.
Int'l Strategic Overall Gov't Strength of & Intent Legit vs
Commun. Processes & Professionalism Reach, Illegit
Investments Policy Quality Execution Religious Legit Agric
& Diplomacy Ideology &
& Fairness Capacity & Private Sector Production
Investment Tribal Satisfaction Workforce
Media Structures Cultural Erosion/ Ability to w/ Gains in Infrastructure
Sensationalism Displacement Reconcile Skill & Avail
Bias Security, Services Dev. Adequacy Population
Religious & Employment Visible Gains & Sustainment
Recognition/ Ideology, Basic Needs
Gov't/ Engagement to Tribal In Security, Service Levels
Contractor Integrate Ethnic/Tribal Services & & Employment
Corruption & Rivalry Structures Employment
Coalition Tribal w/ Gov’t
Dev.Ops- Tribal Favoritism Structures& Path Expectations Legit Other Civilian Legit vs. Illegit
Infrastructure, Beliefs for Security, Production Services Relative
Services, Average Services, & & Services (SWET, Economic
Econ. Tax Connectedness Employment Non- Agric Healthcare, Opportunity
Advisory Revenues Perceived
of Population Security Education)
& Aid
Ability to Private Sector
Move Legit Economic
People Capital Mgmt., Activity,
Infr., Services, Econ. & Goods Investment & Trade &
Policy & Execution Rapidly Spending Employment
Provide /Perceived Fairness
Humanitarian

WORKING DRAFT
Relief

Reconciliation
Effectiveness

© PA Knowledge Limited 2009 Page 27

 Afghanistan Stability / COIN Dynamics – DEVELOPMENT
Population/Popular Support
Infrastructure, Economy, & Services
Government
Afghanistan Security Forces
Insurgents
Crime and Narcotics
Coalition Forces & Actions
Physical Environment
ANSF &
Coalition
Damages/
Casualties
ISR / Open
Source Ops Total
Security Targeted Counter- Narcotics/
Force Strikes Crime Ops
Capacity & Ins. Damages Fear of
Focus Sweep Ops & Casualties
(Clear) Gov’ t/ANSF/
ANSF Unit Coalition
Coalition Leadership ANSF Policing & Repercussions
& Tactical Capacity & Security Ops Outside
Knowledge Havens / Ability to Support/
& Underst. Coalition Capacity Priorities (Hold)
‘ COIN Operate Enablement
of Social ANSF of Ins.
Structures Support’
Strategy & Manpower Ins. Coordination
Recruiting & ANSF Avg. Offensives & Among Ins.
Duration of Unity Coalition Professionalism Insurgent
Operation Retention Territory Not Presence Factions Ins. Terrain
Adjustment Skill, Discipline, Under Gov’t Insurgent
Coalition of Approach & Morale (Clear & Hold) Leadership, Advantage
ANSF Control (Afghan Recruiting,
Appropriate to Fit Afghan Appropriate & Pakistan) Training, Skill Retention,
Balance of ANSF Use of Force & Experience Manpower Criminal/
Effort & ANSF Training & & ISR Trafficking
Force Institutional & Mentoring Ins. Provision
Of Gov’t & Insurgent Capability &
Execution Services Capacity, Coercion
Coalition Capacity ANSF Ties to
Coalition Dev. Ops- Perceived Priorities &
Coalition Corruption & Ins. Strategic Damages & Effectiveness Narcotics &
Avg COIN ANSF Tribal Other Criminal
Experience Execution Advisory R.O.L. Policy, Commun/IO Use of Force Ins. Targeted
Capacity & Favoritism Execution & & Affiliation w/ by Ins. Funding Funding &
& Skill & Aid Attacks on
Priorities Perceived Population Progress/ Material
Fairness Support to
ANSF Perceived Support Relative Insurgents Likelihood of
Coalition Funding Gov't Damages/Use for Gov’t Popular Crime/Violence
Visibility to Adequacy Security of Force by Support/ /Ins. Support
Population Policy Relative Gov’ t & Coalition /Tolerance for Payment
Quality & Perception of Gov’t vs
Resource Coalition Coalition Message Insurgent Narcotics
Investment Quality Insurgents & Criminal
Levels Strategic Dev. Ops- Coalition/Homeland Strength &
(Mil. & Civ. Commun./IO Gov’t Acceptance of Gov’ t ’vs Ins. Intent Activity
Forces, Advisory Afghan Methods Levels
Aid Levels) & Aid
Gov't/ANSF Population Neutral/On Population Population
Strategic Actively Population
Central Gov't Sympathizing the Fence Sympathizing Actively
Commun/ Supporting Supporting
Institutional & IO w/ Gov’t w/ Insurgents
Gov’ t & SF Insurgency Illegit Agric
US Gov't Execution Fear of Ins. Production,
Capacity Relative WOM
Support for Relative Message Attack/ Trade &
Operation Gov't Message Amplification Repercussions Employment
Funding Impact Gov’t Gov’t vs Ins Potential
Breadth of Adequacy Gov't vs Ins Attractiveness Terrain
Gov't Training Integration of Western of Gov’t vs. Harshness
US Domestic Coalition & Local Tribal Duration
Support Mentoring, Affiliation Insurgent Path & Breadth of
Perceived Vetting, and Gov't Structures Backlash Perception of
Cost/Benefit Workforce Operation
Hiring Coalition Intent
& Support Skill & Avail & Commitment Perception Fraction of
Of Gov’t Workforce
US Domestic/ Transparency Strength
of Gov’t Gov't And Agric.
Int'l Strategic Overall Gov't Strength of & Intent Legit vs
Commun. Processes & Professionalism Reach, Illegit
Investments Policy Quality Execution Religious Legit Agric
& Diplomacy Ideology &
& Fairness Capacity & Private Sector Production
Investment Tribal Satisfaction
Media Structures Cultural Erosion/ Ability to Workforce
Sensationalism w/ Gains in Infrastructure Skill & Avail
Displacement Reconcile Security, Services Dev. Adequacy
Bias Religious & Employment Visible Gains & Sustainment Population
Recognition/ Ideology, Basic Needs
Gov't/ Engagement to In Security, Service Levels
Contractor Ethnic/Tribal Tribal Services &
Integrate Structures & Employment
Coalition Corruption & Tribal Rivalry Employment
Tribal Favoritism w/ Gov’t Expectations Legit vs. Illegit
Dev.Ops- Structures& Path Legit Other Civilian
Infrastructure, Beliefs for Security, Production Services Relative
Services, Average Services, & & Services (SWET, Economic
Econ. Tax Connectedness Employment Non- Agric Healthcare, Opportunity
Advisory Revenues Perceived
of Population Security Education)
& Aid
Ability to Private Sector
Move Legit Economic
People Capital Mgmt., Activity,
Infr., Services, Econ. & Goods Investment & Trade &
Policy & Execution Rapidly Spending Employment
Provide /Perceived Fairness
Humanitarian
Relief

WORKING DRAFT
© PA Knowledge Limited 2009 Page 28
 Afghanistan Stability / COIN Dynamics
Claim the Information Initiative: “Message” quality and availability impact who
– Claim the Information Initiative is relatively more effective in influencing the population. Government message
quality has been stronger relative to insurgent factions (who have typically not
made the effort or been effective in aligning with civilian beliefs), but lack of
progress has undermined message credibility.
ANSF &
Coalition Message availability is constrained by low “average connectedness” (rural
Damages/
Casualties populations spread across harsh terrain, low literacy rates, limited radio) and
ISR / Open
Source Ops Total
Security
most message propagation / amplification is by word of mouth (WOM).
Targeted Counter-WOM
Narcotics/
Crime Ops
Force
Capacity & tends
Strikes
Sweep Ops
to
Ins. amplify
Damages negative
Fear of
messages more strongly than positive, but also tends to
Focus
(Clear)be biased towards
& Casualties
current sentiments.
Gov’ t/ANSF/
ANSF Unit Coalition
Coalition Leadership ANSF Policing & Repercussions
& Tactical Capacity & Security Ops Outside
Knowledge
& Underst. Coalition
‘ COIN
Capacity Priorities (Hold) “Western affiliation backlash” may undermine OperateGovernment
Havens / Ability to Support/
Enablement
messages if they are
of Social
Structures Support’
Strategy &
ANSF
Manpower
ANSF Avg.
seen as puppets who lack Ins. the strength to
Coordination deliver progress
of Ins. or have taken an
Recruiting &
Duration of
Operation
Unity Coalition
Adjustment
Retention Professionalism
Skill, Discipline,
overly Western posture
Territory Not
Under Gov’t
Offensives &
Presence
Among Ins.
Factions Ins. Insurgent
Insurgent
Terrain
Coalition of Approach & Morale (Clear & Hold) Leadership, Advantage
ANSF Control (Afghan Recruiting,
Appropriate to Fit Afghan Appropriate & Pakistan) Training, Skill Retention,
Balance of ANSF Use of Force & Experience Manpower Criminal/
Effort & ANSF Training & & ISR Trafficking
Force Institutional & Mentoring Ins. Provision
Of Gov’t & Insurgent Capability &
Execution Services Capacity, Coercion
Coalition Capacity ANSF Perceived Ties to
Coalition Dev. Ops- Priorities & Narcotics &
Coalition ANSF Corruption & Ins. Strategic Damages & Effectiveness
Avg COIN Tribal Other Criminal
Experience Execution Advisory R.O.L. Policy, Commun/IO Use of Force Ins. Targeted
Capacity & Favoritism Execution & & Affiliation w/ by Ins. Funding Funding &
& Skill & Aid Attacks on
Priorities Perceived Population Progress/ Material
Fairness Support to
ANSF Perceived Support Relative Insurgents Likelihood of
Coalition Funding Gov't Damages/Use for Gov’t Popular Active Ins.
Visibility to Adequacy Security of Force by Support/ Support for
Population Policy Relative Gov’ t & Coalition Tolerance Payment
Quality & Perception of Gov’t vs
Resource Coalition Coalition Message Insurgent Narcotics
Levels Investment Quality Insurgents & Criminal
Strategic Dev. Ops- Coalition/Homeland Strength &
(Military Commun./IO Gov’t Acceptance of Gov’ t ’vs Ins. Intent Activity
Forces, Advisory Afghan Methods Levels
Civilian & Aid
Forces, Gov't/ANSF Population Population
Aid Levels) Strategic Population Neutral/On Population
Actively Sympathizing the Fence Sympathizing Actively
Central Gov't Commun/ Supporting
Institutional & w/ Gov’t w/ Insurgents Supporting
IO Gov’ t & SF Insurgency Illegit Agric
US Gov't Execution Fear of Ins. Production,
Capacity Relative WOM
Support for Relative Message Attack/ Trade &
Operation Gov't Message Amplification Repercussions Employment
Funding Impact Gov’t Gov’t vs Ins Potential
Breadth of Adequacy Gov't vs Ins Attractiveness Terrain
Gov't Training Integration of Western of Gov’t vs. Harshness
US Domestic Coalition & Local Tribal Duration
Support Mentoring, Affiliation Insurgent Path & Breadth of
Perceived Vetting, and Gov't Structures Backlash Perception of
Cost/Benefit Workforce Operation
Hiring Coalition Intent
& Support Skill & Avail & Commitment Perception Fraction of
Of Gov’t Workforce
US Domestic/ Transparency Strength
of Gov’t Gov't And Agric.
Int'l Strategic Overall Gov't Strength of & Intent Legit vs
Commun. Processes & Professionalism Reach,
Investments Policy Quality Religious Legit Agric Illegit
& Diplomacy Execution Ideology &
& Fairness Capacity & Private Sector Production
Investment Tribal Satisfaction
Media Structures Cultural Erosion/ Ability to Workforce
Sensationalism w/ Gains in Infrastructure Skill & Avail
Displacement Reconcile Security, Services Dev. Adequacy
Bias Religious & Employment Visible Gains & Sustainment Population
Recognition/ Ideology, Basic Needs
Gov't/ Engagement to In Security, Service Levels
Contractor Ethnic/Tribal Tribal Services &
Integrate Structures & Employment
Coalition Corruption & Tribal Rivalry Employment
Tribal Favoritism w/ Gov’t Expectations Legit vs. Illegit
Dev.Ops- Structures& Path Legit Other Civilian
Infrastructure, Beliefs for Security, Production Services Relative
Services, Average Services, & & Services (SWET, Economic
Econ. Tax Connectedness Employment Non- Agric Healthcare, Opportunity
Advisory Revenues of Population Perceived
Security Education)
& Aid
Ability to Private Sector
Move Capital Legit Economic
People Management, Activity,
Infr., Services, Econ. & Goods Investment & Trade &
Policy & Execution Rapidly Spending Employment
Provide /Perceived Fairness
Humanitarian
Population/Popular Support Relief
Infrastructure, Economy, & Services
Government
Afghanistan Security Forces
Insurgents
Crime and Narcotics Significant WORKING DRAFT
Coalition Forces & Actions
Physical Environment
= Delay

© PA Knowledge Limited 2009 Page 29

 Afghanistan Stability / COIN Dynamics
– Claim the Information Initiative

h & Morale ANSF Control (Afghan Leadership,

n Appropriate & Pakistan) Training, Skill
ANSF Use of Force & Experience
ANSF Training & Ins. Provision
Institutional & Mentoring Of Gov’t & Insurgent
Execution Services Capacity,
n Capacity ANSF Perceived Ties to
s- Priorities & Narcotics &
Corruption & Ins. Strategic Damages & Effectiveness
Tribal R.O.L. Policy, Commun/IO Use of Force Other Criminal
y Favoritism Ins. Targeted Funding
Execution & & Affiliation w/ by Ins. Attacks on Fun
Perceived Population Progress/ Ma
Fairness Sup
ANSF Perceived Support Relative Insu
alition Funding Gov't Damages/Use for Gov’t Popular
bility to Adequacy Security of Force by Support/
ulation Policy Relative Gov’ t & Coalition Tolerance
Quality & Perception of Gov’t vs
Message Insurgent
Investment Quality Insurgents
on/Homeland Strength &
ceptance of Gov’ t ’vs Ins. Intent
an Methods
Gov't/ANSF Population Neutral/On
Strategic Population Popu
Central Gov't Actively Sympathizing the Fence Sympa
Commun/ Supporting
Institutional & IO w/ Gov’t w/ Insu
Gov’ t & SF
Execution Fear of Ins.
Capacity Relative WOM
Relative Message Attack/
Message Amplification Repercussions
Impact Gov’t Gov’t vs Ins Potential
Gov't vs Ins Attractiveness T
ining Integration of Western of Gov’t vs.
Local Tribal Ha
ng, Affiliation Insurgent Path &
and Gov't Structures Backlash Perception of
g Workforce Coalition Intent
Skill & Avail & Commitment Perception
Of Gov’t
Strength
Gov't Overall Gov't Strength of & Intent
Professionalism Reach, Religious
Policy Quality
& Fairness
Execution
Capacity & Ideology & Claim the Information Initiative: “Message” quality and
Tribal Private Sector
Investment Structures Cultural Erosion/ Ability to
availability impact who is relatively more effective in
Satisfaction influencing
Workforce
w/ Gains in Infrastructure
Displacement Reconcile the population. Government message
Security, Services Dev. Adequacy quality hasSkill & Avail
been
Religious & Employment & Sustainment
Recognition/ Ideology, stronger relative to insurgent factions (who have typically not
Visible Gains
Engagement to In Security,
tor Integrate Ethnic/Tribal Tribal made the effort or been effective
Services & in aligning with civilian
on & Rivalry Structures Employment
oritism
Tribal w/ Gov’t beliefs), but
Expectations
lack of progress has undermined message
Structures& Path Legit Other Civilia
Beliefs credibility.
for Security, Production Servic
Average Services, & & Services (SWE
Tax Connectedness Employment
Message availability is constrained by low “average
Non- Agric Healthc
Revenues of Population Perceived
Educat
Security connectedness” (rural populations spread across harsh terrain,
low literacy rates, limited radio) and most message propagation
Ability to Private Sector
/ amplification is by word of mouth (WOM). Move WOM Capital
tends to
People Management,
amplify negative messages more strongly
Infr., Services, Econ. & Goodsthan positive,
Investment & but
Policy & Execution Spending
Provide also tends
/Perceived Fairness to be biased towards current sentiments.
Rapidly
Humanitarian
Relief “Western affiliation backlash” may undermine Government
messages if they are seen as puppets who lack the strength to
deliver progress or have taken an overly Western posture
© PA Knowledge Limited 2009 Page 30
 Afghanistan Stability / COIN Dynamics
– Population Security
p ANSF g p
cal Capacity & Security Ops Outsid
ty Priorities (Hold) Havens / Ability to Suppor
Operate Enablem
of Ins.
ANSF Avg. Ins. Coordination
Professionalism Offensives & Among Ins.
Territory Not Presence Factions Ins.
Skill, Discipline, Under Gov’t (Clear & Hold)
& Morale ANSF Control (Afghan Leadership,
Appropriate & Pakistan) Training, Skill
Use of Force & Experience
Ins. Provision
Of Gov’t & Insurgent
Services Capacity, Ties to
ANSF Perceived Priorities &
Corruption & Ins. Strategic Damages & Effectiveness Narcotics &
Tribal R.O.L. Policy, Commun/IO Use of Force Other Criminal
Favoritism Ins. Targeted Funding
Execution & & Affiliation w/ by Ins. Attacks on
Perceived Population Progress/
Fairness Perceived Support
for Gov’t Relative
Damages/Use Popular
ty of Force by Support/
y Relative Gov’ t & Coalition Perception of Tolerance
& Message Insurgent Gov’t vs
ent Quality Insurgents
Strength &
Gov’ t ’vs Ins. Intent

Gov't/ANSF Population Neutral/On

Strategic Actively Population
Commun/ Sympathizing the Fence
Supporting w/ Gov’t
IO Gov’ t & SF
Relative WOM Fear of Ins.
Relative Message Attack/
Message Amplification Repercussions
Impact Gov’t Gov’t vs Ins Potential
Population Security: Security is a function
Gov't of day to day conditions vs Ins Attractivenes
tegration
and also perception of ‘who will win’ocal
over of
longer term: Western of Gov’t vs.
Tribal Affiliation Insurgent Pa
Structures
• Actual damages by both the Insurgents and ANSF /Backlash Coalition Perception of
Coalition Intent
forces impact perceived security. & Commitment Perception
Of Gov’t
• Insurgents rely targeted “attacks on progress”Strengthto generate
of
fear Strength
& Intent
and intimidation to limit sympathizers moving towards active
Religious
supporters. They often threaten or target civilian andIdeology &
security force Priv
Tribal Satisfaction W
individuals who are visibly supporting the government – the Cultural
Structures fear this
Erosion/ Ability to w/ Gains in Infrastructure Ski
Displacement Reconcile Security, Services Dev. Adequacy
generates is powerful in slowing or reversing positive momentum. Religious & Employment Visible Gains & Sustainment
ecognition/ Ideology,
• In addition to near term security concerns,
gagement to the population is
Ethnic/Tribal Tribal In Security,
Services &
Integrate Structures
assessing ‘who will win’ over the long Tribal term by comparing
Rivalry
w/ Gov’t
Employment
perception of Insurgent strength to perception
tructures& of Government Path Expectations Legit Other
Beliefs for Security, Production
strength and also considering perceived Coalition commitment. (A Average Services, & & Services
Connectedness Employment
key input to perceived strength is how much of the population lives of Population Perceived Non-Agric
in region secured by the Government.) They will hesitate to actively Security
support the government if they feel they will fail, particularly if they Ability to Private Se
Capita
have been witness to “clear and leave” operations. Move
Managem
People Investme
I f S i E

© PA Knowledge Limited 2009 Page 31