Neoplatonic Exegeses of Plato's Cosmogony ( Timaeus 27C-28C)

John F. Phillips

Journal of the History of Philosophy, Volume 35, Number 2, April 1997,

pp. 173-197 (Article)
Published by The Johns Hopkins University Press
DOI: 10.1353/hph.1997.0037

For additional information about this article

http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/hph/summary/v035/35.2phillips.html

Access provided by RMIT University Library (10 Oct 2013 10:35 GMT)

Neoplatonic Exegeses of Plato's

Cosmogony (Timaeus 27C-28C)
JOHN

F. P H I L L I P S

AMONGTHE MANYCONTROVERSIESto which the long history of interpretation of

Plato's Timaeus has given rise, that concerning the eternity of the cosmos is one
of the most e n d u r i n g and complex, and the source of almost continuous
debate from the time of Xenocrates to the present. T h e importance to all
Platonists o f a doctrinally consistent answer to the question of whether or not
the universe had a beginning in time is made amply clear in the statement
attributed to Iamblichus by Proclus (In Tim. I 219, 90) that proper understanding of the creation of the world is crucial for the entire theory of Nature.
Iamblichus here refers obliquely to the orthodox Platonist position that the
universe is not a temporal being subject to decay and destruction. T h e principal problem for all of them, of course, was that, taken literally, Plato's account
of the creation in the Timaeus, particularly the passage 27C-a8C, appears to
be an unequivocal affirmation of a temporal beginning to the cosmos. Especially troublesome was Plato's use of the verb y~yovev in Timaeus 28b 7, which
seems to be an explicit claim for an &QX1]in time. T h a t this passage did indeed
refer to a temporal beginning was a point that was made repeatedly and
forcefully by the chief opponents of the Platonists on this issue, the Peripatetics, who, following Aristotle, read the Timaeus creation account literally.' To
counter such opposition, and to enhance their respective positions in their
own internecine struggles centered on this question, various Platonists took
ever more subtle interpretive approaches, some of the most contentious involving explanations of how Plato's use of y~yovev in 28B 7 could be seen to be
compatible with the orthodox position that the creation of the universe was
nontemporal. Most notable in this regard is the list, compiled by the Middle
Platonist Calvenus T a u r u s in the second century A.D., of all the possible
' For the argument of Alexander Aphrodisias, see Simplicius In De Caelo I ao, pp. ~96ff.
Reimer.
[173]

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n o n t e m p o r a l i s t s e n s e s o f t h e w o r d ' c r e a t e d ' (yewl~6v) w h i c h t h e b e s t e f f o r t s o f

t h e P l a t o n i c e x e g e t i c a l t r a d i t i o n h a d p r o d u c e d . A c c o r d i n g to t h e C h r i s t i a n
Neoplatonist John Philoponus, Taurus identified four such meanings2:
M1) T h a t which is not actually created, but is o f the same genus as things that are
created (zb ~d] yev61xevov Ix~v, ~v 6~ ~ cdJx~, 6v y~vet xo~g yev'q~o~g).
M~) T h a t which is conceptually composite, even if it has never in fact been combined
(~6 ~mvo~q o~v0e~ov, xa~ et M1 ovwe0,fi).
M3) T h a t which is perpetually in the process of becoming (6e~ ~v t 0 y~veo0ctt).
M4) T h a t which has the cause o f its existence in a higher source external to it (~b etvctt
c t ~ &D.ox60ev ~o'r~v ~aQh ~o~ 0eo~).
T h i s list o f m e a n i n g s was f o r c e n t u r i e s t h e s t a n d a r d r e s o u r c e f o r P l a t o n i s t
exegeses o f Timaeus 2 7 C - 2 8 C , with the d i f f e r e n t schools a r g u i n g for one or
m o r e o f t h e m as t h e s e n s e o r s e n s e s in w h i c h P l a t o ' s u s e o f t h e t e r m was to b e
u n d e r s t o o d . O f t h e s e m a n y a n d v a r i e d i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s , s all o f w h i c h w e r e
a t t e m p t s to r e a d a n o n t e m p o r a l i s t a c c o u n t i n t o w h a t is c e r t a i n l y o n a p r i m a
facie r e a d i n g a t e m p o r a l i s t d e s c r i p t i o n o f t h e c r e a t i o n o f t h e u n i v e r s e , I wish to
consider several which incorporate one or more of the meanings on Taurus'
list, s p e c i f i c a l l y M2, w h i c h h o l d s t h a t t h e u n i v e r s e is c r e a t e d in t h e s e n s e o f
b e i n g a c o m p o s i t e o f m a t t e r a n d f o r m ; M 3, w h a t M a t t h i a s Baltes4 t e r m s t h e
" p h y s i c a l i s t " i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , a c c o r d i n g to w h i c h t h e r e was n o m o m e n t w h e n
t h e c o s m o s c a m e to be; it is r a t h e r p e r p e t u a l l y b e c o m i n g , or, to give it t h e
c o m m o n e x p r e s s i o n o f a n t i q u i t y , it has its b e i n g in its b e c o m i n g ; a n d M 4, t h e
2De Aet. Mundi VI 8, pp. 145, 13--147, 6 Rabe. Taurus' list was later expanded by Porphyry
(ibid. VI 8, p. 148, 7ft.). These attempts to establish nontemporalist definitions of yevrlx6v were in
part inspired by Aristotle's own list of meanings in De Caelo 28ob15ff. Cf. Proclus In Tim. I 28o, l
Diehl, and Philoponus, ibid. VI 8, p. 145, 15ff. For discussions of Taurus' list, see R. Sorabji, Time,
Creation and the Continuum: Theories in Antiquity and the Early Middle Ages (Ithaca, 1983), 274ff.; P. P.
Matter, Zum Einfluss des Platonischen "Timaios" auf das Denken Plotins (Winterthur, 1964), 188ff.; J.
Dillon, The Middle Platonists: A Study of Platonism from 8o B.C. to A.D. 22o (London, 1977), 242ff.
nOne of the earliest Platonic responses to this dilemma, identified with Speusippus and
Xenocrates, and, later, with Crantor, asserts that Plato attributes a temporal beginning to the
cosmos only "for the sake of instruction" (6L6ctoxctks XdtQtv) or "for the sake of clarity"
(octqrrlves ikve his true belief being that the cosmos is eternal and never subject to becoming.
Plato proffers his creation account, then, only as a methodological tool and is motivated by the
idea that the nature of the universe can best be explained by analyzing it theoretically into its
constituent parts.
4Baltes's book, Die Weltentstehung des Platonischen Timaios nach den Antiken Interpreten (Leiden,
1976), is an excellent study of the history of this controversy in antiquity and includes sections on
each of the Neoplatonists considered here. But due to the scope of his study, his treatment of the
Neoplatonic exegeses is necessarily selective. A more thorough look at the peculiarly Neoplatonic
interpretations of what was certainly one of the central problems of textual exegesis in later
antiquity will give us clearer insight into the reception of the Platonic tradition in Neoplatonism as
well as the doctrinal relationships among the Neoplatonists themselves.

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"metaphysical-ontological" interpretation, which maintains that Plato is saying

that the universe has an &Q~(~I,not in the sense o f a b e g i n n i n g in time, but as a
principle or p r i o r cause on which the cosmos is entirely d e p e n d e n t for its
existence.5 My focus will be on the views o f the p r i m a r y e x p o n e n t s o f orthod o x Platonist exegesis in late antiquity, the Neoplatonists, in particular
Plotinus, P o r p h y r y , a n d Proclus, a n d how their interpretations o f Timaeus
2 7 C - 2 8 C are to be u n d e r s t o o d in the context o f the Platonic tradition. Such
an e x a m i n a t i o n is worthwhile for a n u m b e r o f reasons, the most i m p o r t a n t
b e i n g that, first, very little attention has b e e n paid to the Neoplatonic r e s p o n s e
to the c o n t r o v e r s y s u r r o u n d i n g this passage o f the Timaeus and, second, what
little c o m m e n t a r y t h e r e has b e e n on these philosophers is on certain critical
doctrinal m a t t e r s mistaken or misleading.
A n y a t t e m p t to recover the outlines o f these Neoplatonic exegeses m u s t
begin with the w o r k o f Proclus, the sole m e m b e r o f the g r o u p whose c o m m e n tary on the Timaeus is extant a n d who is the principal source for o u r knowle d g e o f the lost c o m m e n t a r i e s o f P o r p h y r y and Iamblichus. It will be necessary, t h e r e f o r e , to begin with a detailed analysis o f his exegesis o f Timaeus
2 7 C - 2 8 C , which can then serve as the basis f r o m which to assess the ideas o f
his N e o p l a t o n i c predecessors. In the process, however, we shall discover that
Proclus' a c c o u n t presents p r o b l e m s o f its own.
At the outset o f his discussion o f Plato's investigation in Timaeus 28B into
the question o f w h e t h e r the universe has existed always with no b e g i n n i n g o f
g e n e r a t i o n or w h e t h e r it c a m e to be f r o m s o m e arche (In Tim. I 276, 8ft.),
Proclus notes that the way in which Plato posed the question is m e a n t to suggest that the universe is actually neither o f these ontological e x t r e m e s , but
belongs to a level o f being i n t e r m e d i a t e between t h e m , p a r t a k i n g to s o m e
d e g r e e in both, i.e., the universe b o t h has some b e g i n n i n g o f g e n e r a t i o n a n d
exists always. F u r t h e r , he says, that it is such an i n t e r m e d i a t e b e i n g b e c o m e s
clear later on in 34 B w h e r e Plato shows that the universe is created (yevTIx6v)
only with respect to its body, while it is u n c r e a t e d (&y~arqxov) insofar as it is also
a god. A n d as an i n t e r m e d i a t e being, he continues, the universe resembles
soul (277, 18ff.; cf. 235, 21ft.). 6
5See also the analysis of these interpretations in Sorabji, Time, Creation and the Continuum,
268ff. As evidence for their view, proponents of the physicalist interpretation referred to the
phrase x~ ~6 ytyv6~tevovix~v dte~, 6v i5~ oa36~xoxe in Tim. 97D6. But J. Whittaker, "Timaeus
27D5ff.," Phoenix 23 0969): 181-85, has given good reasons to believe that this is a corruption of
the original text, &e~having been added in later antiquity to support the nonliteral interpretation
of creation begun by Xenocrates.
6The same explanation for the intermediate nature of the universe is picked up again later
(29a, 25ff. ) and elaborated, where the fact that the cosmos possesses a body which is completely
yeVrlX6Vwhile also possessing divine soul and intellect, which are dty~vqxct,induces Proclus to
proffer an explanation as to why we might not just as well say that the universe is uncreated as that

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This concept o f the intermediate status o f the cosmos is shaped by two key
formal principles which are to be f o u n d in the Elements of Theology. First, it is
clearly Proclus' view that Plato in Tiraaeus 28B is applying a precept stated in
Proposition 29 o f his Elements: since all procession is t h r o u g h like terms, between two terms which are in themselves unlike and so represent opposite
extremes there must be something intermediate exhibiting characteristics o f
both o f the e x t r e m e terms. So intermediate between wholly eternal beings and
wholly created beings,7 which have their existence in some part o f time (a
concept the m e a n i n g o f which will become clear later), there is necessarily-necessarily, that is, if procession is to take p l a c e - - a class o f beings which are in
one respect eternal but in a n o t h e r m e a s u r e d by time (Prop. lo6), i.e., they
both exist always a n d come to be (Prop. lo7). 8
Secondly, those propositions in the Elements which concern the n a t u r e o f
soul reveal what Proclus means when he says in his analysis o f Timaeus ~8B
that soul and the cosmos are similar as intermediate beings. Souls which are
participated by bodies are intermediate between indivisible and divisible principles (Prop. 19o ) by virtue o f the fact that they are eternal in substance
(o~3os but t e m p o r a l in activity (~v~oyetet) (Prop. 191). Participated souls thus
to a d e g r e e belong to both spheres but to neither completely, surpassing what
wholly comes to be in that they are part o f the realm o f things eternal, but
inferior to what is wholly eternal in that they are also part o f the realm o f
things which come to be (yewlxdt).
T h e same strata o f these spheres o f being which Proclus has in mind in his
c o m m e n t a r y on the Timaeus and in the Elements are s u m m a r i z e d in De Provi-

dentia 9, P. 1 15 (Boese):
There are therefore certain entities that have their essence [substantiam] in eternity,
while others have it in time--by the former I mean those entities whose activity [operatio] is eternal along with their essence, and by the latter those entities whose essence
/s not, but perpetually becomes, albeit in infinite time--; still other entities are intermediate between these two kinds; their essence is stable and superior to becoming, but
their activity is perpetually becoming and is measured by both eternity and time . . . . It
remains then to make this intermediate kind eternal in essence but temporal in activity.
it is created. His answer is that the entire cosmos is "characterized" whollyby its form and not its
underlying nature. For the same reason, he continues, we say that Socrates is mortal even though
he has an immortal soul, since the ~Oovin him is mortal.
7As we shall see shortly in our discussion of De Providentia 9, P. 115 Boese (below, 18off.),
Proclus means by whollyeternal beings those beings which are eternal in both essence and activity
and by wholly created beings those which have both their essence and activities in becoming.
8Cf. also Prop. 55, where Proclus asserts that the twofold distinction between eternals and
beings which come to be in a part of time (i.e., the latter are both in process and bound by
temporal limits) makes necessary a mediate order of beings which are like eternals in one of these
respects but unlike them in the other.

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And so we say that these three levels of entities have been demonstrated for you: the
intellectual, the psychic, and the corporeal. I mean by intellectual what is entirely in
eternity and entirely being and intelligent; by corporeal, what perpetually becomes
either in infinite time or in some part of time; by psychic, what is eternal according to
its essence, but employing temporal activities.
Let us summarize the natures o f these three entium ordines as described by
Proclus:
a) Intellectual order:
eternal substantia (= o+os
eternal operatio (= ~v~0yetc0
b) Psychic order:
eternal substantia
operatio always becoming (in time)9
c) Corporeal order:
substantia always becoming (either in infinite time or in some part of time)
operatio always becoming (in time)
H e r e again soul is said to mediate between the intellectual and corporeal
orders, partaking as it does in both eternity and time. Soul is inferior to
eternals insofar as with respect to its activity it comes to be in time and is therefore a y~vqx6v, but it enjoys primacy a m o n g y~v~l~ insofar as it participates
time only in this one respect (cf. E.T. Prop. x9e). Moreover, in its always (&rs
coming to be it imitates the eternal o r d e r in a way that other yrv~lx6t (with the
exception o f the cosmos) do not (cf. E.T. Prop. 55). In other words, soul's
activity is not limited by time, as are beings which are generated, as Proclus
puts it, in some part o f time, but is perpetual. In light o f this Proclus distinguishes two senses o f perpetuity (&~St6~Vlg): (a) one which is eternal (c~cbvtog),
a p e r p e t u a l steadfastness having its existence concentrated in a simultaneous
whole and entire in itself; and (b) the o t h e r in time, a perpetual becoming,
diffused and u n f o l d e d in temporal extension 0rctOdrctoLg), and c o m p o s e d o f
parts each existing separately in succession.'~
T h e first o f these forms o f perpetuity is p r o p e r to soul, while the second,
t e m p o r a l perpetuity, pertains to the cosmos in its creation. At first glance this
differentiation may be puzzling, for, as we have seen, Proclus is at pains to show
that the cosmos is like soul both in its being intermediate between being and
becoming and insofar as its becoming is in limitless time (~tzt~tpov Xp6vov)
oCf. E.T., Prop. Lo6: the principle intermediate between eternity and temporality must be
eternal in essence and temporal in activity. It follows from this (Prop. 1o7)that what is eternal in
one respect and temporal in another is both a Being and a coming-to-be.
'~ R. Dodds, Elementatio theologica (Oxford, 1963), 299, notes that the idea of temporal
perpetuity as a "mean term" was suggested by Timaeus37D.

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rather than in some part of time. But there are crucial differences between the
two which justify Proclus' distinction with regard to their perpetuity. As the
schema of De Providentia shows, soul's participation in becoming is restricted to
its activity, which appears to consist in the creative act of the perpetual
ensouling of body (cf. dt~Lct~6 VvXoL E.T. Prop. 196 ) and it is self-generating.
The cosmos, by contrast, while possessing both a divine and immortal soul and
Intellect, is "characterized" by its physical form H and thus receives its essence
from another, higher source. Unlike soul, then, the hypostasis of the cosmos is
coextensive with time and it is entirely dependent for its existence upon the
everlasting creative activity of its creator; its being consists entirely in its becoming. As the Demiurge must always create, so there must be that which is always
being created (6Tl~tOVQyo~itevov de~: In Tim. I 288, 16ff.) and ordered
(xool~o~p.evov &e~: In Tim. I 279, 22) as an image (eiS0~.ov: u8o, 29) of the
creator, this process, again, taking place in limitless time and, in keeping with
the Neoplatonic theory of cosmic creation, without preconceived plan or intention. So the temporal perpetuity of the cosmos is its continually receiving emanations from above (~mvct6~tevov). 1-5 deL ,/tyv6~tevov, then, means for Proclus
that which comes to be by a cause external to it (In Tim. I 279, 24f.) and is in a
process of everlasting creation through the unending activity of that cause.
This relationship to its higher cause makes the cosmos a special sort of
YeWl~6V to which the concepts of the natural sciences do not apply. We noted
previously that the resemblance of the intermediate souls to the eternals is at
least in part predicated on the ancient notion, found in Timaeus 37 D, that the
temporal perpetuity of the intermediate souls is an image of the eternity of
the eternals. In general Proclus employs the same explanation to account for
the manner in which the cosmos is the image (e[6~.ov) of the Demiurge. In
doing so, Proclus both seeks to counter those who might tend to treat the
perpetual coming-to-be of the cosmos according to Aristotelian categories
and explains away a seeming contradiction in Plato's use of different tenses
of the verb ytyv~o0(xLin reference to the cosmos in Timaeus 28B-C. In a long
excursus in his commentary on the Timaeu~ (In Tim. I 281, 15ff.-~82), he
maintains that the complete dependence of the cosmos on Being for its
illumination guarantees that if it were separated from its eternal cause it
would be rendered ipsofacto incomplete, as would all things in the process of
coming to be. But this everlasting dependence on its source does not render
it less complete ( o ~ . . . &~eX~oxepov) than those beings whose process of
generation runs its course over a limited segment of time and which therefore have reached, over time, their ~Xog of becoming. For, insofar as in its
perpetual becoming it has no temporal termini, the cosmos in its coming to be
llI~ Tim. I 291, 25ff.; cf. also 282, lff. and 293, 1off.

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does not p r o c e e d f r o m incompletion to completion according to the Aristotelian t h e o r y o f natural process; it is r a t h e r "whole at once, perfect, a n d perpetually comes to be, because its perpetuity [T6 ~tes and its perfection are in
the wholeness o f time" (In Tim. I 281, 22f.). 1' T h e cosmos thus has a beginning and an end, not in some portion o f time, but in all time, by which
Proclus means that its beginning and end are not two temporally discrete
moments, but are one and the same in the fullness o f time. It constitutes no
contradiction, then, to say, as Plato does, both that the cosmos "has come to
be" (u
and that it "is c o m i n g to be" (~,~v~xett) since it is at once p e r p e t u ally beginning and perpetually complete, so that the two are one. Put ano t h e r way, the cosmos has b e c o m e what it is always becoming. In its perpetual becoming, then, it is everlastingly complete, and in this it imitates the
perfection o f its m a k e r (294, 2xf.). Its dtQ)~rI and ~ , o ~ are, however, conceptually distinct: o n the o n e hand, the cosmos has a beginning and so " p e r p e t u ally becomes" d u e to its corporeal nature; on the other, it reaches a x~kog o f
g e n e r a t i o n and so "has become" d u e to its creating Intellect (282, 13-15). 13
Although Proclus thus emphasizes the i n d e p e n d e n c e o f the genesis o f the
cosmos f r o m the Aristotelian categories as they apply to natural processes, he
h e r e employs these same categories in a m a n n e r which fits the unique m o d e
o f g e n e r a t i o n he is describing, for it is clear that the cosmic body and the
creator-Intellect r e p r e s e n t in a formal sense, respectively, the material and
final causes o f the coming-to-be o f the cosmos. And he feels that this interpretation is c o n s o n a n t with Aristotle's assertion (Meteor. 339a26) that the
m o v e m e n t o f the heavens is "always in completion" (&e~ ~v ~ . e t : 29o, 27ff.;
cf. 282, 2of., 294, ]8f.). T h u s , instead o f contradicting Aristotle, Proclus
p u r p o r t s to be i n t e r p r e t i n g him.
Such, then, is an outline o f Proclus' exegesis o f Timaeus 2 7 C - a 8 C . His acc o u n t in his c o m m e n t a r y on the Timaeus, together with others which supplem e n t it, brings to light three major issues o f particular concern to him and
o t h e r Neoplatonists in their exegeses and the problems both he and m o d e r n
i n t e r p r e t e r s have had in u n d e r s t a n d i n g and relating the Neoplatonic response to them: (1) the question o f the precise sense or senses in which we are
to u n d e r s t a n d Plato's use o f ~,~yovev in 28B 7, (2) the problem o f arriving at a
clear and consistent explanation o f which beings are to be classified as belonging to the realm o f the intermediates, and (3) the relevance to the Neoplatonic
exegeses o f the concept o f the eternal activity o f the creator o f the cosmos. As
~*The concept of the "wholeness of time" is derived from Tirnae~ 38B where Plato says that
time was generated with the heaven, and this is not a portion of time but the wholeness of time.
Cf. Proclus In Tim. I 281, 23ff., 294, ~9ff., and Plotinus Enn. 1.5.7.3o.
,3On the Proclan senses of tkQXT
] and x~kogwhen pertaining to the cosmos, see Beierwaltes,
Proklos. GrundziigeseinerMetaphysik (Frankfurt, 1979), 139.

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we look at these issues in m o r e depth, it will b e c o m e obvious that Proclus'

analysis, valuable as it is as a source o f so m u c h o f what we know a b o u t the
c o n t r o v e r s y o v e r this passage in later antiquity, is in some respects p r o b l e m a t i c
or even inaccurate a n d t h e r e f o r e requires closer e x a m i n a t i o n b e f o r e we pass
j u d g m e n t on its reliability as an historical record. A n d the same scrutiny m u s t
be applied to m o d e r n assessments o f the Neoplatonic exegeses.
1.

THE

COSMOS

AS

yf.V~156~

a. Proclus

At the b e g i n n i n g o f his discussion o f Timaeus 28B Proclus presents what h a d

b e f o r e h i m b e e n o p p o s i n g views on the question o f w h e t h e r or not the cosmos
was created. T h e first is that o f C r a n t o r and his followers who, he says, held
that the cosmos was ),eVVl'c6g insofar as it originated f r o m an external cause
a n d was t h e r e f o r e neither self-created n o r self-determined (i.e., it was yevBTbg
~o.T' O.tT(~(lV)'4; the o t h e r is the stance which he attributes to Plotinus, Porphyry, a n d I a m b l i c h u s that Plato refers to the cosmos as a created b e i n g
because it is a c o m p o u n d (o13v0e-cov), its derivation f r o m a n o t h e r cause b e i n g a
sense which ~ o ~ . . .
ovvv~dQXetv (In Tim. I 277, 8ft.). Proclus t h e n elaborates his own position on the matter:
We say that these [~a~a; by which I take him to mean either (a) both the positions of
Crantor and his followers on the one hand and Plotinus, Porphyry, and Iamblichus on
the other, or (b) the two meanings of yeVVl~6V he has just outlined] are the most
accurate of all, and that the universe is generated [yev'q~6v] both as a compound and as
requiring other causes for its existence [ e[vat yevvl~bv ~bv
tbg 013v0e~ov
~bg (xk~.tova ~ . ~ v e~g xb e~vat 8e6p.evov]. (In Tim. I 277, 14-16)
Now, essential to a g r a s p o f Proclus' point h e r e is an u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f what he
m e a n s by the w o r d ovvvzcdtQXetv. T h e r e are two possibilities, each with its own
p r o p o n e n t a m o n g m o d e r n c o m m e n t a t o r s . O n the one h a n d , we can with
Baltes'5 take the words ~ o 1 3 ~ . . . o~vvz~dtQXetv to m e a n that M 4 is " c o n n e c t e d "
( " z u s a m m e n h a n g e n " ) to M~, so that the o n e m e a n i n g implies the other. Acc o r d i n g to Baltes, Proclus is not contrasting the Neoplatonists' position to that
o f C r a n t o r a n d his followers, but is r a t h e r g r o u p i n g both o f these schools o f
t h o u g h t t o g e t h e r as, in general, o p p o n e n t s o f the temporalist exegesis o f Plutarch a n d Atticus (cf. 276, 31 ff.). T h e a d v a n t a g e o f so translating ovvvz~d~;tetv
is that the first sentence o f Proclus' own exegesis t h e r e b y follows m o r e naturally: the Neoplatonists, Proclus is saying, are correct, for M2 a n d M 4 t a k e n
t o g e t h e r are sufficient to explain the n a t u r e o f the g e n e r a t i o n o f the cosmos in
,4 On Crantor, cf. Plutarch Moral. aol3A; Phiioponus De Aet. Mundi p. 147, 13ff.; Baltes, Die
Weltentstehung, 83-95.
,sDie Weltentstehung,Teil I, 143f. and Teil II, p. 9-

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the Timaeus. O r , o n the o t h e r h a n d , we can with J o h n Dillon '6 take these w o r d s

to m e a n t h a t M 4 is " p r e s e n t as a o v v a ~ t o v , " o r s e c o n d a r y reason, to M2, such
that, a c c o r d i n g to t h e Neoplatonists, M 4 is only a s e c o n d a r y sense o f yevq-~6v as
Plato uses it, M2 b e i n g the p r i m a r y sense. A p o i n t in f a v o r o f this t r a n s l a t i o n is
that it a g r e e s with w h a t J o h n P h i l o p o n u s tells us a b o u t the view o f P o r p h y r y ,
t h a t h e c l a i m e d t h e p r i m a r y m e a n i n g o f yevqz6v to be "the c o m p o u n d o f
m a t t e r a n d f o r m . " ' 7 F o r Dillon, Proclus' p u r p o s e in the passage q u o t e d a b o v e
is n o t to m a k e a b r o a d s t a t e m e n t a b o u t the d o c t r i n a l o p p o s i t i o n b e t w e e n the
t e m p o r a l i s t s a n d n o n t e m p o r a l i s t s , b u t m o r e specifically to e x p r e s s his p r e f e r e n c e f o r the N e o p l a t o n i c definition o v e r that o f C r a n t o r a n d his followers.
R e g a r d l e s s o f w h i c h translation f o r o v v v ~ d Q ) ~ t v is accurate, Dillon is certainly c o r r e c t t h a t P r o c l u s ' i n t e n t is to c o n t r a s t C r a n t o r ' s position with t h a t o f
the Neoplatonists. H e p r e s e n t s the c o r e a r g u m e n t o f the l o n g e x c u r s u s t h a t
follows this p a s s a g e at 99o, ~7ff.: it is n o t e n o u g h , he asserts, to say t h a t t h e
c o s m o s is c r e a t e d b e c a u s e it derives f r o m an e x t e r n a l cause, f o r e v e n Intellect
c o m e s f r o m a c a u s e - - t h e first c a u s e - - b u t it a n d o t h e r intelligible beings dep e n d e n t u p o n t h e O n e are n o n e t h e l e s s u n g e n e r a t e d . T h i s seems o n the face
o f it to be a n o u t r i g h t rejection o f C r a n t o r ' s view. B u t Dillon i n c o r r e c t l y
c o n c l u d e s f r o m t h a t s t a t e m e n t t h a t Proclus has t h e r e f o r e p r e s e n t e d a " s o m e w h a t e l a b o r a t e d " version o f the position o f I a m b l i c h u s et al.'8 F o r if Proclus
m e a n t by ovvv~dQ~etv w h a t Dillon says that he does, t h e n clearly he is n o t at
all a d v o c a t i n g his fellow N e o p l a t o n i s t s ' position as an alternative to that o f
C r a n t o r a n d his followers. T h e definition o f yrvq~6v that Proclus does end o r s e is o n e t h a t s u p p l e m e n t s M 4 with b o t h M2 a n d M3, so that n o t only is the
c o s m o s g e n e r a t e d in the sense o f b e i n g d e p e n d e n t o n a p r i o r cause, b u t also
"as s o m e t h i n g w h i c h at o n c e p e r p e t u a l l y b e c o m e s a n d has b e c o m e " a n d as
w h a t " c o m e s to be as a o~3vO~og.",0 A l t h o u g h certainly he c o u l d n o t accept,
~61amblichi Chalcidensis. In Platonis Dialogos Commentariorum Fragmenta (Leiden, 1973), 303 .

,7 ~:~t 5/~ /I ~.~tg ~5~ q~'qp~,"co~vvv, 6"~t

"~6 xvQ&0g~q~' /l~t~v 6Et~(Obvyem]~bv ~QooayoQev6~ewov,"rov't~errtv"c6o'6v0E'rov~ ~.Tig xai, ~[6ovg... : DeAet. Mundi VI lo, p. 154, 23ff.; cf.
also VI, p. 122f.; VI 8, p. 149, 16ff.; VI 14, p. 164, 12ff.; VI 17, p. 172. Philoponus says nothing
about Plotinus and Iamblichus.
,s Part of the problem with Dillon's analysis is his misreading of this passage as meaning that
Proclus is endorsing M2 and M3 inplace of M 4. He fails, I think, to appreciate the full sense of d~.r
in the phrase o130'6~t 6a-~'a ~ a g &~.cbg, by which Proclus means that M4 alone will not distinguish
the generated cosmos from the ungenerated eternals; M2 and M3 are needed in addition.
~9Dillon, lamblichi Chalcidensis, 3o6, notes that Proclus in In Tim. I 291, 2ft. refers to M2 and
M3 as meanings that are cn3vbQo~tot(= something like "connected"). Although this is not exactly
what Proclus says there (what he is saying is that ~b y~yovtwis cr6vbQo~tovwith ~6 ytyv6~tevovin
Plato), some such relationship between M~ and M3 is what he is getting at. On the virtual
synonymity between M3 and M4, see 279, 24f. Of course, M4 implies M3 only in the case of
generated beings, this implication being the means by which we are to distinguish the application
of M4 to generated beings from its application to the eternals.

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for the reason stated above, any view which claimed that Plato used ?~yovev in
the sense o f M 4 alone, he did not t h e r e f o r e reject M 4 as one o f the possible
meanings o f the word, n o r did he, as the Neoplatonists before him did, relegate it to the status o f secondary meaning; indeed, his comments in the passage q u o t e d indicate that he favored M2 and M4 o n equal grounds. It makes
m o r e sense to r e a d this discussion as Proclus' attempt, not to a r g u e for one
position over another, but to meld the competing views into a single, consistent interpretation which gives p r o m i n e n c e to neither alone. Like most
Platonists, he was well aware that the t e r m yewl*dg had by his time taken on a
n u m b e r o f d i f f e r e n t meanings and was t h e r e f o r e quite careful to delimit
exactly the p r o p e r senses in which it is applicable to the cosmos. Beings generated in time have, as he terms it, "all the geneses" (T6 IX~Vxet~& ZQ6vov yeV~l~bV
~doctg tXet xhg yev~oetg), by which he means that (a) they derive f r o m a cause,
(b) they are c o m p o u n d s , and (c) they have a generative nature (i.e., they are
g e n e r a t e d in some part o f time). T h e cosmos differs f r o m such beings in
possessing only the first two o f these kinds o f genesis (with (b) implying its
p e r p e t u a l becoming). Its p e r p e t u a l becoming places it on an ontological level
above beings temporally created. H e n c e the cosmos is yt'vq~6g in the senses
c o r r e s p o n d i n g to M2, M 3, and M 4, with n o n e o f these meanings being in any
way primary. ~~
It should be a d d e d that what J o h n Philoponus says r e g a r d i n g both Proclus
and P o r p h y r y supports this analysis o f Proclus' views. Several times in his
polemic against Proclus, Philoponus mentions the interpretation which
Proclus attributes to Plotinus, Porphyry, and Iamblichus, but on each occasion
he identifies it with P o r p h y r y alone. '' O n the o t h e r hand, he credits Proclus
with a quite d i f f e r e n t view, that he accepted a combination o f M 3 and M 4,
p r e s u m a b l y as c o m p l e m e n t a r y senses, and does not include him at all a m o n g
those who a r g u e d for M~. ~ So by implication Philoponus separates Proclus
f r o m P o r p h y r y (and t h e r e f o r e f r o m Plotinus and Iamblichus) on this point.
We may t h e r e f o r e conclude that, if we are to accept Dillon's r e n d e r i n g o f
ovw0~dQXe~v, t h e n Proclus is not simply following his Neoplatonic forbears in
his interpretation o f the sense o f yewlT6v in T i m a e u s 28B 7, but adopts a notably i n d e p e n d e n t a p p r o a c h . ' s

'~

In Tim. I 279, 3o-28~, ~2.

2~De Aet. Mundi VI, p. a22, ~7ff.; VI 8, p. 149, 16ff.; VI 14, p. 164, l~ff.; VI 17, p. 172.

22VI 7, P- ~38, 24ff.; 15, pp. a66, 26-168, ~.; ~7, P. 171, 24-172, 5; ~9, PP. ~38, 6-24 o, 9; cf.
also VI, p. a2z, 2off. and VI 8, p. 147, ~5ff.
2~There was nothing unusual in giving such compound senses to ~,evvlx6v.Similar positions
can be found in the long tradition of orthodox Platonist exegesis of the Timaeus. We know that
Taurus himself accepted a combination of Ms and M4 on his list; and Proclus tells us that Albinus
took a position virtually identical to his own (In Tim. I e19, 2ff.).

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b. Porphyry

W e h a v e seen that, a c c o r d i n g to Proclus, P o r p h y r y a c c e p t e d M2 as the prim a r y d e f i n i t i o n o f y~'tovev as it o c c u r s in Timaeus 28B 7. As is the case with all
the N e o p l a t o n i s t s , P o r p h y r y ' s stance o n this q u e s t i o n is g r o u n d e d in a strict
h i e r a r c h y o f creation. T h e m o s t interesting a n d historically significant o f Porp h y r y ' s discussions o f this h i e r a r c h y c o m e s in Sententiae 14 (p. 6 L a m b e r z ) :
Every generated thing has the cause of its generation from something external to it, if,
that is to say, nothing comes to be without a cause. But of generated things, those that
possess their being through composition [&& ovv0~oe0~g] would be for this reason
dissoluble and perishable, while those that, being simple and incomposite [&~.&
&o6v0exct], possess their being in the simplicity of their existence, being indissoluble
and imperishable, are said to be generated not by virtue of their being composite [t 0
evbvOexa e[vctt], but by their being dependent on some cause [ ~ &Tt' et[z~ov xtvbg
&vrlpxClo0ett]. So bodies are generated in two senses, both as being dependent on a
cause which brings them into existence and as being composite [
ebg &zt' ct~rs
r
t~ct Xr ~ctoctYoa3ovlg xct~ dog o6v0exet], while soul and intellect are generated
solely in the sense o f being dependent on a cause [tbg &st' ct[x~ctgr
~t6vov], and
not in the sense of being composite. Therefore some things are generated insofar as
they are both dissoluble and perishable, while others are, on the one hand, ungenerated insofar as they are incomposite and thus indissoluble and imperishable, and,
on the other, generated insofar as they are dependent on a cause. ~4
T o a p p r e c i a t e t h e i m p o r t a n c e o f w h a t P o r p h y r y asserts here, it will be h e l p f u l
to c o m p a r e it to w h a t Proclus has to say a b o u t the g e n e r a t i o n o f soul (In Tim.
I I 117, 1 lff.):
Creation as it pertains to soul is not temporal creation (for he [Plato] showed in the
Phaedrus that soul is uncreated and indestructible), but is the procession of its essence
from the noetic causes. For of things that are, some are noetic and uncreated [voTlx&

&y~wlxct], others perceptible and created [et[oOTlr&

yevrlT6], and there are
others between these two kinds Ix& ~exct~3] that are noetic and created [VO~lX&
y~WlX&]. Entities of the first kind are entirely incomposite [&oa3vOexcqand without parts
and therefore uncreated [&y~rqxa]; those of the second kind are composite [~r6vOexct]
and partitive and therefore created [ytw'qx&]; those intermediate between these kinds
are noetic and created, being both without parts and partitive in their nature, and both
simple and composite [&~.& ~e o'6v0exct] in another manner.
A t first glance, t h e two passages s e e m to be perfectly c o m p a t i b l e a c c o u n t s o f
the g e n e r a t i o n o f soul.~5 P r o c l u s ' s t a t e m e n t that we a r e to u n d e r s t a n d the
,4 Denis O'Brien, Plotinus on the Origin of Matter (Naples, 1991), 36, note 7, correctly maintains
that Porphyry here is rejecting the principle that "indestructible" implies "ungenerated," although this is by no means his primary point.
9s As the following discussion indicates, I am not overlooking the problems involved in Porphyry's identifying the mode of generation of soul with that of intellect. Elsewhere (e.g., Sent. 5
and In Tim. frgs. XXXI, pp. 2of. and LXI, pp. 45 f. Sodano) he makes it clear that soul is intermediate between intellect and bodies and thus partakes of everlasting becoming, so that it must be

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creation o f soul as the procession o f its essence f r o m the noetic causes is

consistent with Porphyry's assertion in that soul and intellect are g e n e r a t e d
solely insofar as they are d e p e n d e n t for their existence on a cause; that is, both
are saying that soul is a y~wqxov in the sense o f M 4. But, as we have already
seen, this c a n n o t be correct in the case o f Proclus, for the same objection to
e m p l o y i n g M 4 exclusively as the sense in which the cosmos is to be u n d e r s t o o d
as g e n e r a t e d applies h e r e in the case o f the generation o f soul: d e p e n d e n c e o n
a prior cause simpliciter will not suffice to define any being as generated, since
even the u n g e n e r a t e d intelligibles are so d e p e n d e n t . And a closer look at
Proclus' account bears this out. As is always the case in Proclus' descriptions o f
the intermediates, we are to take the opposing sets o f their properties as
parallel and p r o p o r t i o n a t e to one another; what he is saying here, then, is that
soul, as an intermediate being, is g e n e r a t e d also in the sense o f being composite [cr6v0~zcz] and partitive, just as it is u n g e n e r a t e d insofar as it is simple and
without parts. So Proclus defines the generation o f the soul, h e r e as always in
his exegesis classified as an intermediate, by employing both M2 and M 4.
Porphyry's use o f the word "solely" (Ix6vov), however, leaves little d o u b t that
he rejects any such combination o f meanings. Indeed, he makes it explicit that
soul and intellect are ~,~vqxa "not by virtue o f o f their being composite, but by
their being d e p e n d e n t on some cause." But perhaps this is to be explained by
the fact that P o r p h y r y is for some reason h e r e ranking soul above the intermediates and with eternal intellect as a being which is to be u n d e r s t o o d as generated only in an extremely restricted sense o f that term. Yet it is precisely
because he is speaking o f the eternals that we should realize that P o r p h y r y in
this passage is r e p u d i a t i n g one o f the basic principles o f o r t h o d o x Platonism
o f which Proclus was a strong p r o p o n e n t : whereas for P r o c l u s - - a n d we may
take as f u r t h e r evidence the passage quoted a b o v e - - s i m p l e d e p e n d e n c e on a
h i g h e r cause does not d e t e r m i n e the eternals as g e n e r a t e d beings insofar as
"incomposite" always implies " u n g e n e r a t e d , " P o r p h y r y in this passage recognizes a class o f beings that are in all respects incomposites and t h e r e f o r e
intelligible and nonetheless are g e n e r a t e d exclusively in the sense o f M 4. T h u s
intelligible reality, although comprising eternal Beings, is said by P o r p h y r y to
be subject to genesis, albeit in a strictly limited sense. We shall have m o r e to say
about this h e t e r o d o x a p p r o a c h shortly, for, as we are about to see, it is not
original to P o r p h y r y .
As for Porphyry's objection to the meaning o f yeWlX6V put forward by
regarded as generated in the sense of M3 as well as of M4 and not, as he claims here, in the sense
of M4 exclusively.This anomaly should be seen as part of the larger question of whether or not
Porphyry confused soul with intellect, on which see Andrew Smith, Porphyry's Place in the
Neoplatonic Tradition: A Study in Post-Plotinian Neoplatonism (The Hague, 1974), 47-5 o.

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Crantor and his followers, he may well have claimed that by so defining the
word in its application to the cosmos, they were inappropriately situating the
cosmos on the same ontic level as soul and intellect. What is not clear, however, is precisely how Porphyry classified soul in the hierarchy of creation and,
if soul is an intermediate, in what relation it stands to the cosmos, for, on the
basis of what is said in the passage quoted above and elsewhere, 26 the cosmos
does not belong strictly to the level occupied by soul nor strictly to the level of
perceptibles. We shall return to this ambiguity in Porphyry's exegesis later.
c. Plotinus
That Proclus links Plotinus with Porphyry and Iamblichus in the dispute over
the meaning of yevlqz6v should be the cause for considerable puzzlement, for,
although there is no extended discussion of Timaeus 28B in the Enneads, it is
clear from several passages that, to the extent that similarities can be found,
his views on this issue are more in line with those of Proclus than those of
Porphyry and Iamblichus. There are three passages of particular significance:
(1) Enneads II.4.5.24ff.: "For they [the intelligibles] are created [yev~lxdt]in
that they have a beginning [6OX~lV], but uncreated because they do not have a
beginning in time, but always come from something else, not as always coming
to be [ytv6~teva dte~], as in the case of the cosmos, but as always being [6v~a
dteC], as in the case of the cosmos There."
(2) Enneads III.7.6.49ff.: "The phrase 'He was good' brings us back to the
notion of the All; he [Plato] implies that because of the transcendent All it has
no temporal origin. So also the universe has no temporal beginning since the
cause of its existence provides it with its 'prior'."
(3) Enneads II.9. 3.11ft.: "Necessarily, then, all things are always in fixed
relation of succession with each other, while those other [than the One] are
generated by virtue of their being from external causes. Those things that are
said to be generated were not generated [at some point in time], but were and
will be in the process of coming to be."27
These passages, brief as they are, nonetheless reveal a remarkably complex
schematization of created beings that is in many respects markedly different
from that of Plotinus' Neoplatonist successors:
96 For example, according to Proclus, In Tim. 1 382, 12ff. (= frg. XLVII Sodano), Porphyry
distinguished the generation of the cosmos from the generation of body insofar as there are
different principles for eoch. Yet in Sent. 14 the sense of "generated" pertaining to intellect and
soul would certainly not apply to the cosmos either. Perhaps Porphyry differentiated the level
occupied by soul from that occupied by the cosmos along the lines discussed by Proclus in in Tim. I
235, lff. If so, then both may have further subdivided the intermediates.
27Cf. also III. l.l; Ill.2.1; III.7.4.24f.

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(1) All beings below the One are generated (yevTIx&)insofar as they all have
~tQXct6 above them.
(~) O f these yev~l~&, (a) some are temporal insofar as their &9X(t6 are in the
form o f temporal causes and (b) the rest are atemporal insofar as their &QX~t6
are not in time, but are paradigmatic principles outside of time, upon which
they are eternally d e p e n d e n t and which, in their eternal activity, they eternally
imitate. These latter beings are thus both yewp;dt and ~ty~v'qz~t a n d in this
respect correspond to the Porphyrean and Proclan intermediates.
(3) O f (2b) atemporal yevrl~dt, (i) there are those (the intelligibles) for which
their eternal d e p e n d e n c e on their &QX~I(= ~6 ~v) is to be understood as their
eternal Being (6vTct ~te6) and (ii) there are others (e.g., the cosmos) for which
their perpetual d e p e n d e n c e on their &QXfi (= vo~g) is to be understood as
their perpetual becoming (ytv6~tevct ~te0.
Plotinus' categorization reflects a very careful, although extraordinarily
innovative formulation of the relationship between the T i m a e u s exegesis and
his own theory of hypostasization. To be sure, concepts which will be fundamental to later Neoplatonic interpretations are present here, in particular the
ideas (1) that d e p e n d e n c e on an external cause is not sufficient to distinguish
the cosmos as a yewlT6v from superior beings which are also so d e p e n d e n t but
exist eternally; (2) that there are levels of intermediate beings which exhibit
characteristics of the levels above and below them and are therefore to be
classified as in some respects &,/Ocvl~et and in others yev'qTdt; (3) that what
separates the cosmos from the eternals is its perpetual becoming, although it is
t h r o u g h this that the cosmos imitates the eternal being of the intelligibles; (4)
that therefore we must distinguish between the eternality of the intelligibles
and the perpetuity of the cosmos; (5) that acceptance of the creatio c o n t i n u a of
the cosmos precludes acceptance of a theory of its temporal creation~8; and (6)
that the sense o f y~yovev in T i m a e u s ~8B incorporates some combination o f
different meanings on T a u r u s ' list. As for the last point, in II.4.5.~4ff.
Plotinus clearly commits himself to a definition of y~yovev that combines M 3
and M4: the cosmos' derivation directly from Nous and not from the One
determines it as a being perpetually generated. Moreover, despite what
Proclus says, there is no evidence in these passages or elsewhere that he
claimed oa3v0exov to be the primary definition of yeVrlX6V; indeed, if anything
Plotinus' emphasis is on M 4 as the primary sense in which we are to understand the cosmos as created. It may well be that Plotinus, as did Proclus and
others after him, saw in T a u r u s ' M 3 the implication that all beings in a perpet9s In both II.4. 5 and III.2.1 Plotinus makes the standard Platonic distinction in the senses of
the word 6QXfi as either (1) a beginning in time or (2) a principle of timeless becoming. On this
distinction in Platonic interpretations of the term, see Baltes,Die Weltentstehung, ~ 1 I.

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18 7

ual process o f b e c o m i n g are necessarily c o m p o u n d s ; that is, like Proclus he

r e g a r d e d T a u r u s ' M2 a n d M 3 as mutually implicative. Even so, Proclus' inclusion o f Plotinus in the P o r p h y r e a n c a m p with its emphasis on M2 is puzzling
a n d it is difficult to surmise which treatises o f the Enneads he m i g h t have h a d
in m i n d in m a k i n g this connection.
I n two i m p o r t a n t respects, however, Plotinus' classification diverges significantly f r o m the Middle Platonic a n d later Neoplatonic exegeses. First o f all, in
II.4. 5 h e - - a n d h e r e he was j o i n e d by P o r p h y r y alone a m o n g later P l a t o n i s t s - m a d e the eternal intelligibles m e m b e r s o f the class o f beings that are created
(yevrlX6t), if only in a qualified sense29; a n d it is to this classification that we are
to trace the source f o r P o r p h y r y ' s Sententiae 14. T o reiterate, for Proclus,
b e i n g d e p e n d e n t u p o n a h i g h e r principle a n d being &y~vTIx~xare fully c o m p a t i ble attributes o f the eternals; t h e r e f o r e M 4 is insufficient in itself to differentiate yevTIxdt f r o m ~y~WlXCt. For Plotinus a n d P o r p h y r y , on the o t h e r h a n d , M 4
alone is sufficient to define as created all incomposite beings thus d e p e n d e n t
on a h i g h e r cause, that is, the intelligibles. I f we c o m p a r e II.4. 5 with Proclus'
discussion o f the d i f f e r e n t senses o f M 4 applicable to the cosmos, soul, a n d the
beings s u p e r i o r to soul in I n Tim. I ~35, 92ff., for e x a m p l e , it becomes evident
that Proclus' claim that what is above soul does not come to be f r o m an exterior
cause, as does the cosmos, b u t / s f r o m such a cause, is virtually a r e s t a t e m e n t o f
Plotinus' contrast between the intelligibles a n d the cosmos a n d the relationship o f each to its h i g h e r principle described here.SO T h e crucial d i f f e r e n c e
b e t w e e n the two, however, lies in what each infers f r o m this fact. For Proclus,
derivation f r o m an external cause does not t h e r e f o r e in itself d e t e r m i n e a
b e i n g as either created or u n c r e a t e d , so that a l t h o u g h all beings derive f r o m
the O n e , those that t r a n s c e n d the r e a l m o f b e c o m i n g are nonetheless
u n g e n e r a t e d ; in Plotinus' m i n d such derivation does in fact at least in o n e
,9 Much the same point has been made by O'Brien in several published pieces; see "Piotinus
and the Gnostics on the Generation of Matter," in Neoplatonism and Early Christian Thought: Essays
m Honor ofA. H. Armstrong, ed. H.J. Biumenthal and R. A. Markus (London, 198 a), a 11 and note
17, Plotinus on the Origin of Matter, Chapter 3, and Th~odic(e plotinienne, th~odic~egnostique (Leiden,
a993), 36ff. and 61ff. Both II.9.3 and II.4.5 are key passages for O'Brien, the latter especially in
his arguments in the last two works cited above against both H.-R. Schwyzer and K. Corrigan
concerning the questions whether or in what sense(s) matter is generated. O'Brien rightly maintains that Schwyzer and Corrigan have misunderstood this crucial passage, but proper appreciation of Plotinus' meaning here requires our taking into account that he is speaking the traditional
language of exegesis of the Timaeus. However, O'Brien does recognize that Plotinus is referring to
the generation of the ideas as well as of intelligible matter (Plotinus, 37 and Th~odic~e 61) and that
he is distinguishing between the timelessness of intelligible matter and that of the matter of the
sensible world (Plotinus, 38, note t6 and Th(odic~e, 6t, note 2). Cf. also Lloyd P. Gerson, Plotinus
(London, 1994), 263, note 23,
30... x0t[ ~t~tv~6 ~tq6 a~xflg [sc. ap~JXflg] oa3y(,vexcttIx~vdt.~'ct~,T~0tg,~oxt 5~ dt.~x'a~T(,ctg(In Tim. I
235, 24-25).

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r e s p e c t c o n s t i t u t e as c r e a t e d e v e n those beings that are b e y o n d all m o d e s o f

b e c o m i n g . A n d P o r p h y r y evidently a g r e e d with his teacher.
Secondly, b e c a u s e f o r h i m d e r i v a t i o n f r o m a cause was n o t in itself sufficient to d i f f e r e n t i a t e yevrl'c6 f r o m &y~vqza, Proclus, w h e n i n t e r p r e t i n g the
sense in w h i c h Plato says t h a t the c o s m o s is yeV~l~6g in the Timaeus, was in
effect a r g u i n g t h a t M2 a n d / o r M 3 m u s t be a d d e d as definientia c o m p l e m e n tary to M4, since o n l y by so a u g m e n t i n g M 4 c o u l d the c o s m o s be a d e q u a t e l y
d i s t i n g u i s h e d as a g e n e r a t e d b e i n g f r o m the u n g e n e r a t e d eternals. Plotinus,
we n o w see, a p p r o a c h e s these m e a n i n g s quite differently. F o r h i m M 4 is to be
u n d e r s t o o d in two ways w h e n r e f e r r i n g to beings g e n e r a t e d a t e m p o r a l l y : (1)
as d e r i v a t i o n f r o m the u l t i m a t e source, the O n e o r (9) as d e r i v a t i o n f r o m
vo~g.s~ Sense (l) a m o u n t s to an e x t e n s i o n o f the possible applications o f
yevrl~6v to i n c l u d e the e t e r n a l intelligibles, w h o s e o n l y c o n t i n g e n c y is u p o n the
O n e , while sense (~) indicates e i t h e r (a) that T a u r u s ' M 3 is to be r e g a r d e d as
coextensive with M 4 - - t o be d e p e n d e n t o n vo~3g as &0;0] j u s t is to be p e r p e t u a l l y
generated,3~ j u s t as to be directly d e p e n d e n t o n the O n e j u s t is to exist
e t e r n a l l y - - o r (b) M 3 is s o m e t h i n g like a mode o f M 4. I f Plotinus m e a n t the
latter, t h e n b o t h e t e r n a l b e i n g a n d p e r p e t u a l b e c o m i n g - - a n d , we w o u l d ass u m e , t h e p r o p e r t y o f h a v i n g a t e m p o r a l o r i g i n - - a r e v a r y i n g instances o r
m a n n e r s o f d e p e n d e n c e o n an a n t e r i o r principle.33 While it is t r u e t h a t
Plotinus is c o n c e r n e d h e r e principally with the g e n e r a t i o n o f intelligible matter, h e expressly includes all constituents o f the intelligible w o r l d in this strat u m o f his s c h e m a , evidently seeing n o t h i n g p r o b l e m a t i c in classing the intelligibles with t h e c o s m o s as YeWlXdt, d i s t i n g u i s h i n g t h e m ontologically r a t h e r by
their respective i m m e d i a t e dtpXed, w h i c h a r e f o r h i m w h a t we are to l o o k to in
d e t e r m i n i n g t h e m o d e o f their g e n e r a t i o n as e i t h e r that o f an entity w h i c h
possesses e t e r n a l b e i n g o r that o f an entity subject to p e r p e t u a l b e c o m i n g . I n
d o i n g so, he d i s p e n s e s with the long-established practice a m o n g Platonists o f
d i f f e r e n t i a t i n g c r e a t e d f r o m u n c r e a t e d beings by e x a m i n i n g the n a t u r e s o f
s, Such I take to be the meaning of r in 11.4.5.27: we may understand timeless dependence
on a prior cause in two ways, either (a) as eternal being or (2) as perpetual becoming. Whatever
precise sense we are to give to this passage, it is clear enough that Plotinus is establishing a close
relationship between M3 and M4.
s2 1 am assuming that Intellect is to be considered the ct0XrI of the universe in this context
insofar as Plotinus, like Proclus, adhered to the concept that the creatio continua of the world is the
image of the eternity of the intelligible world; cf. III.3. 7. loft. and III.2.15; see also II.4.4.8.
33Gerson, Plotinus, 264, note 2 3, sees in this passage three distinct senses of y~veotg: (t)
"having an dtQ;O]eternally," (2) "having an dt0X~] in time," and (3) "that of undergoing change." (l)
is equivalent to Taurus' M4, while (3) is his version of M3, the ereatiocontinua (ytv6~t~vadie0 of the
universe. While such a distinction in meanings holds true for most other Platonists (although
Gerson would do well to emphasize that his (1) and (e) indicate an equivocation in the use of the
term dtQX/Iby Plotinus, a common characteristic of Platonist exegeses), Plotinus certainly appears
in II.4. 5 to be conflating (3) with (1) in one of the two manners I suggest here.

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the entities themselves, and instead looks first to the distinctive natures of
their principles.a4
These aspects of Plotinus' interpretation are more than just minor points
of divergence from the fundamental principles of received doctrine and from
what was to become, after Porphyry, a standard Neoplatonic ontological classification.35 Given their importance, it is surprising to find Proclus silent concerning what for him, if he was aware of it, would have been a most egregious
departure from what he must have considered conventional Platonic exegesis,
Plotinus' and Porphyry's inclusion of the intelligibles within the class of generated beings.a6 The absence in Proclus' account of any criticism of either
Plotinus or Porphyrya7 on this point, as well as his unwarranted association of
Plotinus with Porphyry and Iamblichus on the question of the meaning of
y~yovev in Timaeus 28B7, are more than a little curious. We might well question how extensively he consulted the works of his predecessors in determining their positions on any of the issues surrounding the interpretation of that
passage.

d. Albinus
We should note here another problem regarding Porphyry's and Proclus'
treatment of the Middle Platonist Albinus. Proclus includes him among a
group of "older exegetes" (o[ ~ttl~ctt6~eOot "c(ov ~TIYrll:63v) who interpreted
Plato to be saying in the Timaeus that the cosmos was in one sense created and
in another uncreated and adds that, according to Albinus, by ascribing these
two terms to the cosmos Plato meant that it both exists always and has a
principle of generation (~,ev~oet0g ~:Xovxog &QZClV:In Tim. I ~19, 2ff.). The
latter terminology is to be understood as referring, not to generation in time,
but to the cosmos' possession of a principle (k6yog) of generation by virtue of
the fact that it is a compound (o'6v0eotv) of many dissimilar parts and any
compound must be dependent upon a higher cause for its existence. So in
Proclus' assessment Albinus found the cosmos' derivation from an external
cause implied in its nature as a compound, thus combining M2 and M4 on
s4 Note again that in each of the passages discussed here Plotinus' emphasis is clearly on
Taurus' M4, not, as we would expect from what Proclus says, on M2.
35It should be added that one effect of Plotinus' classification, in stark contrast to those of
Porphyry and Produs, is that it assigns the cosmos a very precise and clearly demarcated status
relative to the other intermediates and to beings temporally created.
s6 For Proclus, the use of the terminology of generation in the context of divine beings is
always just a figurative way of describing their differentiation from their causes (In Tim. I 28o,

19ff.).

a7 It is of course possible that Proclus consulted Porphyry's Timaeus commentary exclusively

and that Porphyry did not there introduce this controversial notion. It is, however, difficult to
imagine Porphyry expunging so important an idea from his interpretation of Plato's cosmogony.

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T a u r u s ' list.ss But a d i f f e r e n t version o f his position is f o u n d in a n o t h e r w o r k

which until relatively recently h a d b e e n attributed to Albinus, the Didaskalikos
(14.3): " W h e n e v e r he [Plato] says that the cosmos is g e n e r a t e d , we m u s t not
u n d e r s t a n d h i m to m e a n that t h e r e ever was a time w h e n the cosmos did not
exist, b u t r a t h e r that it is p e r p e t u a l l y in the process o f c o m i n g to be a n d
reveals s o m e m o r e original cause o f its own existence." T h e a u t h o r o f the
Didaskalikos, then, seems to limit the n o n t e m p o r a l senses o f yev~T6g vis-a-vis
the cosmos to p e r p e t u a l genesis a n d d e p e n d e n c e on a m o r e ultimate cause,
that is, a c o m b i n a t i o n o f M 3 a n d M 4 f r o m T a u r u s ' list; there is no r e f e r e n c e to
the relevance o f the c o m p o s i t e n a t u r e o f the universe. Several scholars, m o s t
recently J o h n Dillon, have cited this discrepancy as evidence against the view
that Albinus is the a u t h o r o f the Dida, kalikos. Even if we assume that Proclus
was d r a w i n g f r o m a Timaeus c o m m e n t a r y by Albinus or f r o m the lectures o f
his m a s t e r Gaius, a n d not the Didaskalikos, Dillon concludes, the discrepancy is
too g r e a t to ignore.s9 This a r g u m e n t has considerable p r e s u m p t i v e weight,
but its p r o p o n e n t s have o v e r l o o k e d o n e possible way o f explaining away the
a p p a r e n t distinction between the two texts: Albinus (or p e r h a p s Gaius) m a y
have closely associated the p e r p e t u a l b e c o m i n g o f the cosmos with its n a t u r e as
a c o m p o u n d or with its d e p e n d e n c e on a h i g h e r cause. T h a t is to say, he m a y
have assimilated M 3 to M2 or M 4, or to both, the reasons for this assimilation
m o s t likely h a v i n g b e e n set out at length only in a m o r e extensive Timaeus
c o m m e n t a r y o r in the lectures o f Gaius, r a t h e r t h a n in an e p i t o m e such as the
Didaskalikos. We have already n o t e d that Proclus in his own account closely
linked these t h r e e m e a n i n g s a n d so it would have b e e n quite n a t u r a l f o r him,
as it could well have b e e n for Albinus, to assume that, w h e n e v e r he describes
the senses in which the cosmos can be r e g a r d e d as y~vTIT6g, r e f e r e n c e to any
would carry f o r his r e a d e r s the implication o f one or a n o t h e r o f the others. T o
be sure, if we were to e x c e r p t Proclus' i n t r o d u c t o r y r e m a r k s in I n Tim. I 277
f r o m t h e i r p r o p e r context, m u c h as Proclus himself does in his c o m m e n t s on
Albinus, t h e n we would be left with the e r r o n e o u s impression that Proclus
e n d o r s e d M2 a n d M 4 exclusively, a l t h o u g h we know f r o m o u r analysis o f his
s u b s e q u e n t discussion that the claim for either implies a claim for M 3 as well.
Let us look at a n o t h e r e x a m p l e , o n e which parallels in a n u m b e r o f ways
the case o f Proclus: J o h n Philoponus' account o f Proclus' own definition o f
38See also in Baltes, Die Weltentstehung, 96ff., the discussion of Albinus, in particular the
comments on In Tim. ~ t8, 2ff. in which Baltes points to similarities in the positions of Albinus and
Porphyry.
a9Cf. Alcinous: The Handbook of Platonism (Oxford, t993), Introduction, x-xi and la3ff.,
where Dillon sides with Giusta and Whittaker in the controversy over the authorship of the D/daskalikos. Cf. also Dillon, Middle Platonists, a87. On the possibility that Albinus wrote a Timaeus
commentary and that Proclus had access to it, see also Baltes, Die Weltentstehung, loo.

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yeWlT6g. W h e n e v e r P h i l o p o n u s speaks o f Proclus' definition o f the w o r d , he

asserts o n l y t h a t Proclus a c c e p t e d a c o m b i n a t i o n o f senses M 3 a n d M 4 a n d
n o w h e r e states o r implies that M2 is p a r t o f that definition.4O T h e r e is a simple
e x p l a n a t i o n f o r this d i s c r e p a n c y : in writing against Proclus' a c c o u n t o f the
" e t e r n i t y " o f the w o r l d P h i l o p o n u s d i d n o t consult Proclus' exegesis in his
Timaeus c o m m e n t a r y , b u t a n o t h e r lost treatise entitled de Aeternitate M u n d i
contra Christianos, in w h i c h d i f f e r e n t c o n c e r n s m o s t likely led Proclus to e m p h a size d i f f e r e n t senses o f the g e n e r a t i o n o f the universe.4~ I n s o f a r as Proclus
held t h a t M 3 a n d M 4 i m p l y M2, t h e r e w o u l d be n o c o n t r a d i c t i o n in the
a c c o u n t s in his Timaeus c o m m e n t a r y a n d this lost work. A n d t h e r e is indication
that, w e r e P h i l o p o n u s h i m s e l f a w a r e o f the d i s c r e p a n c y , he w o u l d n o t h a v e
seen a n e e d to c o m m e n t o n it, since like Proclus he w o u l d have u n d e r s t o o d
t h a t to say t h a t t h e c o s m o s is g e n e r a t e d in the sense o f b e i n g in a p e r p e t u a l
state o f c o m i n g to be o r in the sense o f d e r i v i n g f r o m a s u p e r i o r cause is in
effect n o m o r e n o r less t h a n to say that it is g e n e r a t e d in the sense o f b e i n g a
c o m p o u n d , a n d conversely; a full e n u m e r a t i o n o f these m e a n i n g s w o u l d t h e r e f o r e h a v e b e e n u n n e c e s s a r y , especially in an e p i t o m e o r prrcis o f a n o t h e r
p h i l o s o p h e r ' s views.42 F o r v e r y similar reasons, then, it is quite plausible t h a t
P r o c l u s ' s t a t e m e n t s r e g a r d i n g A l b i n u s are n o t at all inconsistent with the position o f t h e a u t h o r o f t h e Didaskalikos. I f so, t h e n we m u s t c o n c l u d e t h a t a
d i v e r g e n c e b e t w e e n the two a c c o u n t s does not, as Dillon m a i n t a i n s it does,
constitute a n a r g u m e n t against Albinus' a u t h o r s h i p o f t h e Didaskalikos.43
2.

THE INTERMEDIATES

T h e N e o p l a t o n i s t s c o u l d look to b o t h the d e s c r i p t i o n o f the g e n e r a t i o n o f Soul

in Timaeus 34Bff. a n d the a r g u m e n t that soul is s e l f - m o v e d a n d u n g e n e r a t e d
in Phaedrus 945Cff. f o r e v i d e n c e that Plato gave p r i m a r y place to souls a m o n g

40CL above, ~82, n. 22 and references cited there.

41Phiioponus' information concerning Proclus' definition of y~eotg in the Timaeus seems to
have come for the most part from what may have been a separate work (Philoponus refers to it as
a kryog) entitled "Inquiry into Aristotle's Objections to the Timaeus of Plato" (~:xs
xr~v ~t0bg
xbv Flkrxttwog T~l~atova3~'A0toxoT~kovghvxetpTl~t~vt0v;cf. VI 15, p. 167, 3f. and 29, p. 238, 3ff.).
4~Philoponus says in VI 29, p. 238, 24ff. that according to Proclus M3 and M4 are implicative
of one another; thus in those passages where he links Proclus with M3 alone (e.g., in VI 7, P. 138,
94ff. and VI 15, p. 166, 26ff.) he is implicitly linking him with M4 as well. And the same, we may
surmise, may be true of M2.
43The apparent discrepancy was for Whittaker, "Parisinus Graecus 1962 and Albinus," Phoen/x 28 (1974) (reprinted in Studies in Platonism and Patristic Thought [London, 1984], 453), not so
important an issue, for, as he quite rightly points out, "even if these doctrines [sc. those discussed
in the Didaskalikos and by Proclus] had been identical, this alone (in view of the commonplace
nature in the relevant period of the nonliteral interpretation of the Timaeus ) would in no way
prove, or even render it probable, that Albinus was the author of the Didaskalikos."

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the intermediates.44 Being self-generated and bodiless, soul is the last of the
eternals and the first of the generated beings and so partakes of both levels of
existence but belongs to neither completely. As such, it takes ontological precedence to the cosmos, whose dependence on an external cause for its existence
renders it subject to perpetual generation.45 But there are problems with this
classification, and the lines of demarcation between the various levels are
sometimes not drawn with consistent clarity. Post-Plotinian Neoptatonists appear to have had some ambivalence about which of the ontological levels are to
be classified as intermediates. It has already been noted that in his Sententiae
Porphyry apparently contradicts himself in ranking soul both with intellect as
an intelligible and as intermediate between the incomposite essence of vo~,g
and the composite nature of bodies. Further complicating the issue, in his
commentary on the Timaeus he also distinguished between two sorts of intermediates, one which is at once being and becoming and is proper to the "plane
of the souls," and another which is conversely becoming and being and refers
to the "summit of created beings"--by which he seems to mean the World
Soul, which is created insofar as its nature is divided among bodies but uncreated as being wholly bodiless itself (In Tim. I 257, 2-8). Nowhere does he
make clear where the cosmos is to fit into this schema, although there is little
doubt that he regards it as intermediate by nature.
For his part, Proclus divides his discussion of the ontological status of the
cosmos into two sections, concentrating first on the cosmos as a corporeal
entity (~6 or
under which perspective it seems to belong more
properly to the realm of the "simply generated," that is, to the sphere of the
perceptibles (x& ctto0T]~r than to the level of mediaries.46 Only later (276ff.)
does he consider its aspect as ungenerated and divine, and there, as we have
seen, its intermediate nature is unqualifiedly affirmed. Depending upon
which of these aspects of the cosmos' nature is emphasized, then, the cosmos
may either be regarded as a constituent of the corporeal order or be classed
44 Cf. Proclus In Tim. I 235, 13ff. and 256, 33ff.
45 See Proclus' a r g u m e n t in In Tim. I 235, 8ff. T h e ontological status o f the cosmos relative to
that o f the soul seems to have been a matter o f some debate a m o n g later Platonists and their
critics. Plutarch, De Procr. An. lo12D-lo13C , in an attempt to clear up whatever misunderstandings might arise from what he u n d e r s t a n d s to be Crantor's view that soul is a mixture o f intelligible nature and the opinable nature o f perceptibles, cautions that we must not confuse soul with
the cosmos, since, although the cosmos also possesses both intelligible and corporeal elements, it is
tangible and visible, while soul is above sense perception. Numenius and Harpocration may have
gone f u r t h e r than most in making the cosmos a third god. Cf. also Plotinus, Enn. IV.8.7, and
Proclus, In Tim. II 153f.
46Cf. In Tim. I 253, 4 - 1 6 and 256, 13-22. We should recall here Proclus' a r g u m e n t in 291,
25ff. to justify the practice o f characterizing the universe by its body (see above, note 6).

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with soul as an intermediate being.47 The difficulty with such imprecision of

categorization becomes most acute when we attempt to find a place for the
cosmos in the Proclan classification of De Providentia 9. For with respect to its
bodily nature it would appear to belong within the corporeal order, specifically among those beings whose substantia is infinitely generated; but it cannot,
because of its divine provenance, be a part of that order simpliciter. Yet it is
difficult to see how Proclus could justify its inclusion within the order of intermediates (souls) whose substantia is eternal, although this is exactly what he
does in his Timaeus commentary.48 But whatever the problems with the classification of these intermediates individually, Proclus makes it quite clear that
soul has more in common with the eternal being of the class of entities above it
than with the perpetual becoming of the universe and that this subdivision
within the class of intermediates is warranted by the fact that soul, and not the
cosmos, is self-caused.
3.

ETERNAL

ACTIVITY

OF T H E

DEMIURGE

a. Porphyry, Iamblichus, and Proclus

From the time of Philo it was common practice for Platonists to correlate M 3
with the well-known argument, found in both Plato and Aristotle, that the
activity of the creator of the universe must be eternal.49 The Neoplatonists also
employ this argument as a kind of correlate to M4 and this informs their
interpretation of the Paradigm-image relationship between the Demiurge and
the universe described by Plato in the Timaeus. The basic formulation of the
Neoplatonic version of the argument is that if the Demiurge is perfect in both
goodness and power, then he necessarily creates what is good eternally, and if
he creates what is good eternally, then his creation and image, the cosmos,
must perpetually become good.5o Within this logical framework the Neo47According to Proclus, such was the attitude of Plato himself; cf. In Tim. I 292, 7 ft.
48According to In Tim. I 291, 3off., the bodily aspect of the cosmos is its form (e~fog), while its
divine aspect is its underlying nature (a3no
tp6ot~). If the latter is to be identified with the
o~of.ct o f the cosmos, then Proclus is saying that the substance of the cosmos is eternal.
49Aristotle, De Phil. 19C Ross, and Plato, Laws 9olA-9o3 A. For Proclus, see De Prov. #7; Cf.
also Bakes, Die Weltentstehung, 92, and Sorabji, Time, Creation and the Continuum, 25of. and 28o.
50Cf. Proclus In Tim. I 367, 2off. Philoponus, De Aet. Mundi IV t t, p. 82, 1ft., attributes a very
similar argument to Produs which emphasizes that if the Demiurge is not eternally active, then he
was at some time only potentially a demiurge and is therefore imperfect. Proclus is no doubt
drawing this form of the argument from Porphyry and Iamblichus. According to Proclus, Porphyry made the related-assertion that if god always creates (6rllx~ovQy~), then he has the
demiurgic power by nature (o61aq~v~ov); if not, he has this power as an addition (~x6
(In
Tim. I 393, 11-12 [Porphyry In Tim. frg. 5 l, p. 36, a2ff. Sodano]). Porphyry and Iamblichus
apparently used the argument to prove that the Demiurge did not, as some of their opponents
had claimed, bring order out of an initial state of disorder.

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platonists e m p l o y e d various strategies to d e m o n s t r a t e the creatio continua o f

the cosmos. We find t h e m arguing both (1) that because the Demiurge's creative activity is eternal, that u p o n which it is active must always be active as
well,5' and (2) that because the Demiurge, as Paradigm, exists eternally and is
eternally active, t h e n its image, the universe, must have some share in that
eternal activity.5~ P o r p h y r y , and Iamblichus and Proclus after him, c o n s t r u e d
the universe's share in eternity as its perpetual generation "over all time"; the
cosmos fulfills its role as image o f what/s always by its becoming always.53 H e n c e
it is not, like its creator, good by its nature, but is everlastingly being m a d e
good in the image o f that eternal goodness.
b. P l o t i n u s

Plotinus' distinctive t r e a t m e n t o f the Paradigm-image a r g u m e n t deserves separate c o m m e n t . In the E n n e a d s the creatio continua o f the cosmos derives ultimately f r o m the eternal activity o f Intellect, but only mediately, the immediate
cause o f its p e r p e t u a l becoming being r a t h e r the direct effect o f Intellect's
activity, the p e r p e t u a l efflux o f reason-principles (k6yot) f r o m the intelligible
world into the material world. We find this idea expressed very clearly at the
beginning o f his treatise O n Providence (III.2.1-2), where Plotinus explains in
some detail the sense in which we are to u n d e r s t a n d that Intellect is the cause o f
the cosmos. Intellect, as the "true and first cosmos," is the a r c h e t y p e and paradigm o f the visible cosmos and it is by virtue o f this relationship that the visible
cosmos "perpetually comes into existence" (a37tooxdv~og &e(~: III.1.26ff.).54
Plotinus thus subscribes to the a r g u m e n t attributed by Proclus to P o r p h y r y and
Iamblichus that the creatio continua o f the cosmos is the image o f the eternal
being o f the Demiurge, although its n e v e r e n d i n g genesis is not directly the
o u t c o m e o f the eternal creative activity o f Intellect, but is due immediately to
the creative p o w e r o f rational principles which themselves perpetually flow out
( d ~ &too0e~) f r o m Intellect into the world, constantly generating o r d e r and
harmony.55 Later in the same treatise he illustrates this process by means o f an
5, Cf. Philoponus De Aet. Mundi IV 1t, p. 82, 15ff. on Proclus.
5, Philoponus, ibid. VI 27, p. 224, a8-225, 1~, finds this tactic in Proclus who, he says, took it
from Porphyry. The later Neoplatonists also associated the Demiurge's eternal creative activity
with his perfectly good will; cf. Iamblichus In Tim. frg. 37, P. 141 Dillon (= Proclus In Tim. I 382,
12ff.).

53Cf. Proclus In Tim. I 366, 13ft. (= Porphyry In Tim. frg. 46 Sodano). Proclus In Tim. I 253,
14-254, 18, traces the idea of generation over all time to Aristotle, who wished to distinguish the
perpetuity of the cosmos from eternity (cf. De Gen. et Corr. 336b 25ff.).
54In a peculiar turn of phrase, Plotinus refers to the cosmos in I!.3.17.17 as "an image always
being made an image" (~
~e~ e~
5sBut cir. Proclus In Tim. I 195, 22ff., who attributes to Iamblichus the notion that the memory
of children indicates the perpetual creation of the reason principles (k6yot).

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analogy designed to illustrate how many individual things can come f r o m a

single creative principle (III.3. 7. lOft.):
And individual things proceed from this principle while it remains within; they come
from it as from a single root which remains static in itself, but they flower out into a
divided multiplicity, each one bearing an image of that higher reality, but when they
reach this lower world one comes to be in one place and one in another, and some
are close to the root and others advance farther and split up to the point of becoming, so to speak, branches and twigs and fruits and leaves; and those that are closer to
the root remain for ever, and the others come into being for ever [~?s
&es the
fruits and leaves; and those which come into being for ever have in them the rational
forming principles of those above them, as if they wanted to be little trees. (Armstrong's translation)
For Plotinus, then, all things subject to genesis at the level below the intelligibles are perpetually g e n e r a t e d as t h o u g h in imitation o f the eternal existence
o f those entities closer to the "root" o f Being (cf. III.2.15). T h e cosmos is like a
leaf which is perpetually being f o r m e d at the end o f a branch d u e to the
eternal generative powers e x t e n d i n g f r o m the plant's single root. Speaking
elsewhere o f the relationship o f time to becoming (III.7. 4.18ff.), he says that
those things which come to be can never cease to "be about to be," since they
are "always acquiring" (~tt
&el) being; and the cosmos, in its circular
motion, is "continually drawing being to itself," " h u r r y i n g to everlasting existence by means o f the future." In this way Plotinus somewhat peculiarly expresses his allegiance to the long-accepted Platonic view, f o u n d also in Proclus,
that the being o f the universe is its becoming and that the creatio continua o f all
g e n e r a t e d beings is the necessary consequence o f the universe's unqualified
d e p e n d e n c e u p o n its archetype/cause. O f course, Plotinus, and Proclus after
him, eschew what for o t h e r Platonists, with their far different conception o f
Providence, is an u n q u e s t i o n e d implication o f this view, that the universe is
u n d e r the supervision o f a creator who governs according to his perfectly
good will.
Plotinus' well-known differentiation between the two levels o f Providence,
the hallmark o f which is his a r g u m e n t against the notion that the cosmos was
created according to some rational plan, is tied directly to his interpretation o f
the creatio continua. In his attempt in the treatise On the Forms and the Good
(VI.7) to explain away what appears to be an account o f the purposive creation
o f the material cosmos in Plato's Timaeus, he invokes the phrase 7tyv6~tevov &el
o f Timaeus 28A1 as evidence that Plato had rejected the idea that the creator
used reasoning and deliberation in the generation o f the cosmos, arguing that
there can be no reasoning (~.oyto~t6g) concerning anything to which the term
" p e r p e t u a l " (&e~) applies (VI.7.3.5ff.). His thinking h e r e is that deliberation
about how best to create the cosmos would require on the part o f the creator a

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r e - c o g n i t i o n o f h o w things w e r e b e f o r e the c o n t e m p l a t e d creation, a state o f

affairs impossible f o r a D e m i u r g e w h o s e eternal activity, as Plotinus u n d e r stands it, is to be c o n s t r u e d as everlastingly c o n t i n u o u s g e n e r a t i o n . Essentially
the s a m e r e a s o n i n g lies b e h i n d the o p e n i n g c h a p t e r s o f his treatise O n Providence56 c o n s i d e r e d a b o v e : d e l i b e r a t i o n a b o u t p r o d u c t i o n implies t h a t t h e
p o w e r to p r o d u c e is s o m e t h i n g a c q u i r e d by the c r a f t s m a n , i.e., s o m e t h i n g
l e a r n e d , while t h e r e c i p r o c a l r e l a t i o n s h i p which Plato establishes b e t w e e n t h e
D e m i u r g e a n d t h e universe, the f o r m e r always c r e a t i n g a n d the latter always
b e i n g c r e a t e d , can o n l y obtain if the c r a f t s m a n has the p o w e r o f p r o d u c t i o n as
p a r t o f his n a t u r e , i.e., if he can create w i t h o u t t h i n k i n g a b o u t it ( I I I . 2 . 1 - 2 ) .
T h u s t h e s t a n d a r d Platonic a c c o u n t o f the creatio continua is a p p r o p r i a t e d by
Plotinus as a conclusive a r g u m e n t f o r a t t r i b u t i o n o f a h i g h e r level o f Provid e n c e to Intellect.57
It is n o t at all s u r p r i s i n g to find these N e o p l a t o n i s t s m o d i f y i n g a n d refining aspects o f the received tradition o f exegesis o f the Timeaus while staying
firmly within its b r o a d b o u n d a r i e s ; such modifications a n d r e f i n e m e n t s w e r e
t h e m s e l v e s a n inevitable a n d vital p a r t o f that tradition. Yet even t h o u g h in
their exegeses the N e o p l a t o n i s t s f o r the m o s t p a r t stayed well within the
m a i n s t r e a m , t h e willingness o n the p a r t o f P o r p h y r y a n d Proclus to e x p a n d
T a u r u s ' list o f m e a n i n g s o f y~v~]Tog a n d their c o n c e r t e d a t t e m p t to o p p o s e ,
c o r r e c t , o r e x p a n d o n C r a n t o r a n d o t h e r s in the tradition reveal s o m e e f f o r t to
b r i n g c e r t a i n e l e m e n t s o f the tradition in line with N e o p l a t o n i c d o c t r i n e . A n d
it is p e r h a p s to be e x p e c t e d that, o f all the Neoplatonists, the m o s t extensive
a n d r e m a r k a b l e i n n o v a t i o n s in the tradition are to be f o u n d in Plotinus, who,
a l t h o u g h p r o v i d i n g n o e x t e n d e d exegesis o f the Timaeus c o s m o g o n y , exploits
v a r i o u s f e a t u r e s o f o t h e r Platonists' strategies f o r his o w n p u r p o s e s , a n d in
56Cf. also references to the perpetual creative activity in the universe in Ill.2.13-14.
57Although there is nothing in the Timaeus that would even suggest a conceptual association
between the creatio continua and Plato's doctrine of Providence, Plotinus is well within the Platonist
tradition in bringing the question of Providence into prominent play in his interpretation of the
creation of the cosmos in the Timaeus. A number of Middle Platonist texts bear witness to this (cf.
Apuleius De Plat. 2o5-~o6 and Ps. Plut. De Fato 573A-C), particularly in relation to interpretation
of the Demiurge's speech in Timaeus 41A-B. A good case in point is Philo, who like Plotinus sees
the creatio continua as the result of God's Providence and for whom, again in a manner with at least
a formal resemblance to Plotinus', God's limitless providential activity is by necessity mediated by a
Logos whose activity in the material cosmos is the extention of God's eternally creative activity. In
contrast to Plotinus, however, Philo held that God creates by eternally thinking the noetic cosmos,
situated in the Logos, and in this creative act simultaneously creates the material cosmos out of a
preexistent disorderly matter, thereby initiating time. Moreover, he believed that creation is the
result of God's deliberation. Cf. D. Runia, Philo of Alexandria and the "Timaeus" of Plato (Leiden,
1986), t54 and 441ff. Given the significance he attaches to the proper conception of divine
Providence, it is small wonder that Plotinus felt it necessary to put his own signature on what was
by his time a well-established relationship of originally independent ideas.

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doing so makes it amply clear that he was quite knowledgeable about the fine
points of the debate.
We are left to ponder how it could be that Proclus both failed either to
recognize or at least to acknowledge the heterodoxy of Plotinus and Porphyry
in their rejection of the principle that all incomposites are ungenerated, and
apparently completely misrepresented Plotinus' interpretation of Timaeus
28B 7. It is certainly worth noting that these are likely not the only examples of
errors in Proclan doxography.58 Such mistakes or omissions may reveal more
about the accuracy of Proclus' source or sources--often Iamblichus--than
about his own scholarly diligence. In any case, it behooves us henceforth to
regard with a more critical eye Proclus' accounts of his predecessors' exegeses
of the Timaeu~.59

University of Tennessee at Chattanooga

58See the comments of Whittaker, "The Historical Background of Proclus' Doctrine of the
AYOYI-IOZTATA," in DeJamblique g~Proclus. Entretiens sur I' Antiquit~ classique XXI (VandoevresGeneva, 1975) , 2ooff.
59An earlier version of this paper was presented to a session of the Society for Ancient Greek
Philosophy. My thanks to the referees of this journal for their helpful comments.