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Qua Chee Gan v. Deportation


Board

country, and that the Board has no jurisdiction to entertain such


charges. This was denied and so Chee Gan et al. filed with the
court a petition for habeas corpus and/or prohibition. The court
also issued a writ of preliminary injunction restraining the
Deportation Board from hearing Deportation charges against
them until after the petition of habeas corpus was resolved.

September 30, 1963


Barrera, J.
Dave Anastacio

After trial, the court upheld the validity of the delegation


by the president to the Deportation Board of his power to
conduct investigations to determine the aliens presence in this
country would be injurious to the security, welfare and interest
of the State. The court also sustained the power of the
deportation Board to issue warrant of arrest and fix bonds for the
alien's temporary release pending investigation of charges
against him, since the power to arrest and fix the amount of the
bond of the arrested alien is essential to and complement the
power to deport aliens pursuant to Section 69 of the Revised
Administrative Code. Chee Gan et al. appealed.

SUMMARY: Aliens were charged with violating the prohibition


on purchasing dollars without proper license from the Central
Bank of the Phils. Warrants for their arrest were issued. They
sought to dismiss the charges against them on the grounds
that the Deportation Board did not have jurisdiction to try the
case. Lower court ruled that the Deportation Board had the
authority to issue warrants and deport aliens. SC held that the
Deportation Board has authority to deport, but not issue
warrants of arrest.
DOCTRINE: Under the express terms of our Constitution, it is
doubtful whether the arrest of an individual may be ordered by
any authority other than the judge if the purpose is merely to
determine the existence of a probable cause, leading to an
administrative investigation. The Constitution does not
distinguish between warrants in a criminal case and
administrative warrants in administrative proceedings. One
suspected of a violation of an administrative nature is entitled
to a determination of the probable cause against him, by a
judge.

ISSUES:
I. WON the charges constitute a ground to deport- YES
II. WON the President has the power to deport- YES
III. WON the President can delegate this power to the
Deportation Board- YES
IV. WON the Deportation Board has authority to issue
warrants of arrest- NO
RATIO:

FACTS: Special Prosecutor Emilio L. Galang charged Qua Chee


Gan, James Uy, Daniel Dy alias Dee Pac, Chan Tiong Yu, Chua
Chu Tian, Chua Lim Pao alias Jose Chua, and Basilio King before
the Deportation Board, with having purchased U.S. dollars in the
total sum of $130,000.00, without the necessary license from
the Central Bank of the Philippines, of remitting them to
Hongkong, and attempting to bribe officers of the Philippine and
US Governments to evade prosecution. Following the deportation
charges, a warrant for the arrest of said aliens was issued by the
presiding member of the Deportation Board. Upon filing bond,
Chee Gan et al. were provisionally set free.

I. WON the charges constitute a ground to deport- YES


The charges constitute an act of profiteering, hoarding or
blackmarketing of U.S. dollars, in violation of the Central Bank
regulations an economic sabotage which is a ground for
deportation under the provisions of Republic Act 503 amending
Section 37 of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940. The
President may order the deportation of these petitioners if after
investigation they are shown to have committed the act
charged.
II. WON the Deportation Board has the power to deportYES
Under Commonwealth Act No. 613 (Immigration Act of

Chee Gan et al. filed a joint motion to dismiss in the


Deportation Board based on the grounds that the charge does
not constitute legal ground for deportation of aliens from this

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1940), the Commissioner of Immigration was empowered to


effect the arrest and expulsion of an alien, after previous
determination by the Board of Commissioners of the existence of
ground or grounds therefor (Sec- 37). This law, however, did not
intend to delimit or concentrate the exercise of the power to
deport on the Immigration Commissioner alone, because in its
Section 52, it provides:.

the Board of Commissioners, under Section 37 of Commonwealth


Act No. 613.
III. WON the President can delegate this power to the
Deportation Board- YES
There is no doubt that the President's power of
investigation may be delegated. Section 69 of the Revised
Administrative Code provides for a "prior investigation,
conducted by said Executive (the President) or his authorized
agent." Executive Order No. 33 of President Quezon created the
Deportation Board to receive complaints against aliens charged
to be undesirable, to conduct investigation, and make the
corresponding recommendation. Since then, the Deportation
Board has been conducting the investigation as the authorized
agent of the President.

SEC. 52. This Act is in substitution for and supersedes all


previous laws relating to the entry of aliens into the Philippines,
and their exclusion, deportation, and repatriation therefrom,
with the exception of section sixty-nine of Act Numbered
Twenty-seven hundred and eleven which shall continue in force
and effect: ..." (Comm. Act No. 613).

reads:.

Section 69 of Act No. 2711 (Revised Administrative Code)

IV. WON the Deportation Board has authority to issue


warrants of arrest- NO
Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code, unlike
Commonwealth Act No. 613, does not provide the President with
specific power issue warrants of arrest. It must be why President
Roxas for the first time, saw it necessary to issue his Executive
Order No. 69, requiring the filing of a bond to secure appearance
of the alien under investigation. It did not authorize the arrest of
the respondent. It was only on when President Quirino
reorganized the Deportation Board by virtue of his Executive
Order No. 398, that the Board was authorized motu proprio or
upon the filing of formal charges by the Special Prosecutor of the
Board, to issue the warrant for the arrest of the alien complained
of and to hold him under detention during the investigation.

SEC. 69 Deportation of subject to foreign power. A


subject of a foreign power residing in the Philippines shall not be
deported, expelled, or excluded from said Islands or repatriated
to his own country by the President of the Philippines except
upon prior investigation, conducted by said Executive or his
authorized agent, of the ground upon which Such action is
contemplated. In such case the person concerned shall be
informed of the charge or charges against him and he shall be
allowed not less than these days for the preparation of his
defense. He shall also have the right to be heard by himself or
counsel, to produce witnesses in his own behalf, and to crossexamine the opposing witnesses."

While this did not expressly confer on the President the


authority to deport undesirable aliens, unlike the express grant
to the Commissioner of Immigration under Commonwealth Act
No. 613, the fact that a procedure was provided for the
Presidents deportation of an alien-which was expressly
exempted from the repealing effect of the Immigration Act of
1940-is a clear indication of the legislatures recognition of the
Executives power to deport. Many court decisions sanction this
executive power as well.

Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code, upon


which the President's power to deport relies, does not provide for
the power to arrest, but the Solicitor General argues that the law
could not have denied to the Chief Executive acts which are
absolutely necessary to carry into effect the power of
deportation.
In this connection, it must be remembered that the right
of an individual to be secure in his person is guaranteed by the
Constitution. (Sec 1, Art. III, Bill of Rights, Philippine
Constitution). Under the express terms of our Constitution, it is
doubtful whether the arrest of an individual may be ordered by
any authority other than the judge if the purpose is merely to

The deportation of an undesirable alien may be effected in


two ways: by order of the President, after due investigation,
pursuant to Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code, and
by the Commissioner of Immigration, upon recommendation by

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determine the existence of a probable cause, leading to an


administrative investigation. The Constitution does not
distinguish between warrants in a criminal case and
administrative warrants in administrative proceedings. One
suspected of a violation of an administrative nature is entitled to
a determination of the probable cause against him, by a judge.
The contention of the Solicitor General that the arrest of a
foreigner is necessary to carry into effect the power of
deportation is valid only when there is already an order of
deportation.

JBL Reyes
alycat
SUMMARY: The Calacday boys came to the Philippines from
Hong Kong, seeking Filipino citizenship. It was found that they
were the sons of one Isaac Calacday, a Filipino. However, Isaac
Calacday confessed that the boys were not his sons (although
such confession was later retracted). Commissioner Vivo issued
warrants of arrest against the Calacday boys, for them to be
brought before the Commissioner so they may show cause why
they should not be deported. The Calacday boys filed a civil
case before the CFI (with Hon. Montesa as judge) to prohibit
their deportation. The CFI ruled that the Commissioner could
not summarily order the arrest and deportation of the Calacday
boys without giving them a chance to be heard. The SC held
that the CFI is without jurisdiction to restrain the deportation
proceedings of the Calacday boys. Nevertheless, the issuance
of warrants of arrest conflicts with Sec. 1 of the Bill of Rights.

The fact that the Constitution itself, as well as the statute


relied upon, prescribe the manner by which the warrant may be
issued, conveys the intent to make the issuance of such warrant
dependent upon conditions the determination of the existence of
which requires the use of discretion by the person issuing the
same. The discretion of whether a warrant of arrest shall issue or
not is personal to the one upon whom the authority devolves.
And authorities are to the effect that while ministerial duties
may be delegated, official functions requiring the exercise of
discretion and judgment, may not be so delegated. Indeed, an
implied grant of power that would serve the curtailment or
limitation on the fundamental right of a person, such as his
security to life and liberty, must be viewed with caution.

DOCTRINE: The power to determine probable cause for


warrants of arrest is limited to judges exclusively. The
Commissioner of Immigration has no power to authorize the
arrest of the subjects of a deportation proceeding whose illegal
entry or offense has not yet been established.
FACTS:
Private respondents, seven males surnamed Calacday
(Lets call them the Calacday boys haha) arrived in the
Philippines from Hong Kong in 1959. Upon their arrival,
they sought admission as Filipino citizens.
A board of special inquiry found them to be the legitimate
sons of Isaac Calacday, a Filipino. The Calacday boys
were thus admitted into the country, the Bureau of
Immigration issuing each an identification certification as
a Filipino citizen.
Isaac Calacday confessed that the Calacday boys were
not his sons. However, he later retracted his confession,
claiming that he was only angry at them for not giving
him money.
Commissioner of Immigration Vivo issued warrants of
arrest against the Calacday boys, stating in their warrants
their deportability under the Philippine Immigration Act.
The warrants directed any immigration office/ officer to
bring the Calacday boys before the Commissioner, for

RULING: IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, Executive Order No. 398,


series of 1951, insofar as it empowers the Deportation Board to
issue warrant of arrest upon the filing of formal charges against
an alien or aliens and to fix bond and prescribe the conditions for
the temporary release of said aliens, is declared illegal. As a
consequence, the order of arrest issued by the respondent
Deportation Board is declared null and void and the bonds filed
pursuant to such order of arrest, decreed cancelled. With the
foregoing modification, the decision appealed from is hereby
affirmed. No costs. So ordered.

Commissioner Vivo v. Hon.


Montesa
July 29, 1968

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them to show cause why they should not be deported.


One was arrested (Manuel), the others remained at large.
The Calacday boys filed a civil case before the Court of
First Instance (with Hon. Montesa as judge) a civil case
praying for three principal reliefs: (1) to restrain the
arrest of those who have not been arrested; (2) to release
Manuel; (3) and to prohibit the deportation of the
Calacday boys, as they are Filipinos.
The Commissioner questioned the propriety of the
remedy of prohibition, insisting that habeas corpus is the
proper one.
The CFI invoked its general jurisdiction, which includes
prohibition, on the ground that habeas corpus would be
proper only as to Manuel, who had only been arrested,
but not the others.
The CFI ruled that the Commissioner could not summarily
order the arrest and deportation of the Calacday boys
without giving them a chance to be heard.

citizenship or alienage of the Calacday boys. Therefore, there is


nothing so far for the courts to review.
The CFI misapprehended the import of the warrants
issued. The warrants required that the Calacday boys be brought
to the immigration authorities to show cause why they should
not be deported, and not to be deported per se. There was no
case of summarily arresting and deporting.
The Calacday boys have submitted to the Court
documents in support of their claim to Philippine citizenship, but
the proper procedure would be for them to submit these
documents as evidence to show cause why they should not be
deported.
Nevertheless, the issuance of warrants conflicts of arrest
conflicts with Sec. 1 of the Bill of Rights. The power to determine
probable cause for warrants of arrest is limited to judges
exclusively.
Qua Chee Gan v. Deportation Board The EO prescribing
the procedure for deportation of aliens only required the filing of
a bond by an alien, but did not authorize his arrest.
Morano v. Vivo The Bill of Rights does not require
judicial intervention in the execution of a final order of
deportation.
There is no reason why the cautionary bond requirement
of the EO should not apply to deportation proceedings. Such
notice and bonds suffice to ensure the subjects appearance at
the hearings. But as long as illegal entry or offense of the
Calacday boys has not yet been established, their arrest upon
administrative warrant violates the provisions of the Bill of
Rights.

ISSUE:
1. Does the CFI have jurisdiction to restrain the deportation
proceedings of the Calacday boys? NO
2. May the Commissioner of Immigration issue warrants of
arrest? NO
RATIO:
The CFI is without jurisdiction to restrain the deportation
proceedings of the Calacday boys. These proceedings are within
the jurisdiction of the immigration authorities, due to the
Philippine Immigration Act.
Porta Perez v. Board of Special Inquiry This case was not
one where Philippine citizenship was admitted or conclusively
appeared, to respondents were allowed to continue proceedings
that had already begun by them until they have determined
whether or not petitioners were aliens.
Miranda v. Deportation Board A mere plea of citizenship
does not divest the Board of its jurisdiction over the case.
When the petition for certiorari and prohibition was filed,
deportation proceedings had already been started but not yet
completed. The Board of Commissioners had not yet rendered
any decision. The Calacday boys were then, not yet being
deported. Before the Board reaches a decision as to deportation,
it has to conduct a hearing where the main issue will be the

RULING: The writ prayed for is granted, and the order of the CFI
set aside.

Santos v. Commissioner
Bureau of Immigration
November 29, 1976
Fernando, J.
sai
SUMMARY: Lucio Santos filed petition for habeas corpus because he
was detained by virtue of the order of Commissioner. Lower Court
granted his release. Commissioner appealed stating that lower court is

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Commissioner also claimed that the lower Court is without


jurisdiction because the subject matter of the action which is the
deportation of Santos is vested by law upon the Board of
Commissioners after due hearing and determination of the
existence of grounds for deportation; and that petitioner failed to
exhaust available administrative remedies.
Lower Court however ordered the release Santos upon posting
of P5000 bond without passing on the issue of citizenship. The
deportation proceeding was still pending at the time of this order
and release was provisional.
Commissioner appealed

without jurisdiction because the subject matter of the action which is


the deportation of Santos is vested by law upon the Board of
Commissioners after due hearing and determination of the existence
of grounds for deportation
DOCTRINE: As in the case of Qua Chee Gan, Under the express terms
of our Constitution, it is doubtful whether the arrest of an individual
may be ordered by any authority other than the judge if the purpose is
merely to determine the existence of a probable cause, leading to an
administrative investigation. The Constitution does not distinguish
between warrants in a criminal case and administrative warrants in
administrative proceedings. . Commissioner could order the arrest of
an alien only after "there is already an order of deportation."

ISSUE: Whether the power of the President to conduct an


investigation leading to deportation carries with it the authority
to order an arrest.

FACTS:
Application for habeas corpus was filed by Lucio Santos, who
was detained under a warrant of arrest issued by Commissioner
of the Bureau of Immigration on the ground of his being a
Chinese citizen who entered the country illegally.
Lower Court issued a writ of habeas corpus commanding the
Commissioner of Immigration to produce before it on January 19,
1966 at 8:30 A.M. the person of Lucio Santos; to explain under
what circumstances he was arrested and is being detained; and
to show cause why he should not be set at liberty. Commissioner
asked the lower Court for 3 days within which to submit his
written return which was granted and the hearing was set anew
for January 25, 1966
January 21, 1966, Commissioner filed his return to the write of
habeas corpus which stated that Santos is not a Filipino citizen
but a Chinese subject whose real name is Ong Hiong King; that
petitioner illegally entered this country from Hongkong and was
detained by virtue of a warrant of arrest issued by the
Commissioner of Immigration; that deportation proceedings
against him were pending hearing before the Board of Special
Inquiry; that he had confessed that he was an illegal entrant to
this country; that based on his own application for registration
with the Philippine Consulate General in Hongkong for
documentation as a Filipino, it is evident that he is a Chinese
because, even if he was born of a Filipino mother and a Chinese
father, his election of Filipino citizenship was made much too
late and thus he was in estoppel to claim or elect Filipino
citizenship.

In the Qua Chee Gan whose ponente was Justice Barrera this was
answered in the negative. Thus: "Under the express terms of our
Constitution, it is therefore, even doubtful whether the arrest of
an individual may be ordered by any authority other than the
judge if the purpose is merely to determine the existence of a
probable cause, leading to an administrative investigation. The
Constitution does not distinguish between warrants in a criminal
case and administrative warrants in administrative proceedings.
And, if one suspected of having committed a crime is entitled to
a determination of the probable cause against him, by a judge,
why should one suspected of a violation of an administrative
nature deserve less guarantee? Of course it is different if the
order of arrest is issued to carry out a final finding of a violation,
either by an executive or legislative officer or agency duly
authorized for the purpose, as then the warrant is not that
mentioned in the Constitution which is issuable only on probable
cause. Such, for example, would be a warrant of arrest to carry
out a final order of deportation, or to effect compliance of an
order of contempt. The contention of the Solicitor General that
the arrest of a foreigner is necessary to carry into effect the
power of deportation is valid only when, as already stated, there
is already an order of deportation. To carry out the order of
deportation, the President obviously has the power to order the
arrest of the deportee But, certainly, during the investigation, it
is not indispensable that the alien be arrested."

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their suspicion of the activities of the three petitioners
that they are pedophiles, coupled with their association
with other suspected pedophiles, are not valid legal
grounds for their arrest and detention unless they are
caught in the act. They further allege that being a
pedophile is not punishable by any Philippine Law nor is it
a crime to be a pedophile.

It should not escape attention that under the present


Constitution, a warrant of arrest may issue on a showing of
"probable cause to be determined by the judge, or such other
responsible officer as may be authorized by law, This case,
however, is governed by the former Constitution. The conclusion
reached by the lower court, therefore, finds support in Qua Chee
Gan. Commissioner could order the arrest of an alien only after
"there is already an order of deportation." Such was not the case
here.

DOCTRINE: "The requirement of probable cause, to be


determined by a Judge, does not extend to deportation
proceedings." (Morano vs. Vivo, supra, citing Tiu Chun Hai
vs. Commissioner, infra). There need be no "truncated"
recourse to both judicial and administrative warrants in a
single deportation proceeding.

DISPOSITIVE: LC affirmed

The foregoing does not deviate from the ruling in Qua Chee
Gan vs. Deportation Board that "under the express terms of
our [1935] Constitution, it is therefore even doubtful
whether the arrest of an individual may be ordered by any
authority other than a judge if the purpose is merely to
determine the existence of a probable cause, leading to an
administrative investigation." For, as heretofore stated,
probable cause had already been shown to exist before the
warrants of arrest were issued.

Harvey v. Defensor-Santiago
June 28, 1988
Melencio-Herrera
Paolo Q. Bernardo

FACTS:

SUMMARY: Andrew Harvey, John Sherman, and Adrian Van

Petitioners Andrew Harvey, John Sherman (both American nationals


residing at Pagsanjan, Laguna), and Adrian Van Elshout, (Dutch citizen
also residing at Pagsanjan, Laguna) were apprehended from their
respective residences by agents of the Commission on Immigration and
Deportation (CID) by virtue of
orders issued by respondent Commissioner Miriam Defensor Santiago of
the CID.

Elshout were foreign naitonals who were apprehended from their


respective residences in Pagsanjan, Laguna by agents of the
Commission on Immigration and Deportation (CID) by virtue of
orders issued by Commissioner Miriam Defensor Santiago of the
CID.
In a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Harvey, Sherman and
Elshout question the validity of their detention on the following
grounds:
1) There is no provision in the Philippine Immigration Act of
1940 nor under Section 69 of the Revised Administrative
Code, which gives the Commissioner any authority to
arrest and detain the three petitioners pending
determination of the existence of a probable cause
leading to an administrative investigation.
2) Defensor-Santiago violated Section 2, Article III of the
1987 Constitution prohibiting unreasonable searches and
seizures since the CID agents were not clothed with valid
Warrants of arrest, search and seizure as required by the
said provision.
3) Mere confidential information made to the CID agents and

Harvey, Sherman, and Elshout were three among 22 suspected alien


pedophiles who were apprehended after three months of close
surveillance by CID agents in Pagsanjan, Laguna. Two days after
apprehension, the other 17 of the 22 arrested aliens opted for selfdeportation, leaving the country. One was released for lack of evidence;
another was charged not for being a pedophile but for working without
a valid working visa.
Seized were rolls of photo negatives and photos of the suspected child
prostitutes shown ing salacious poses as well as boys and girls engaged
in the
sex act. There were also posters and other literature advertising the
child prostitutes.

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ISSUES: WON the arrest of Harvey, Sherman, and Elshout


were valid.

Warrants of Arrest were issued by Defensor-Santiago against the three


for violation of Sections 37, 45 and 46 of the Immigration Act and
Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code On the same date, the
Board of Special Inquiry III commenced trial against the latter.

RATIO:

1. Yes. The arrest of Harvey, Sherman, and Elshout were


valid.
a. The right against unreasonable searches and seizures
guaranteed by Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution,
is available to all persons, including aliens, whether accused
of crime or not.
i. One of the constitutional requirements of a valid search
warrant or warrant of arrest is that it must be based
upon probable cause.

Probable cause has been defined as referring to


"such facts and circumstances antecedent to the
issuance of the warrant that in themselves are
sufficient to induce a cautious man to rely on them
and act in pursuance thereof."
ii. The 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedur further provides
that an arrest without a warrant may be effected by a
peace officer or even a private person (1) when such
person has committed, actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense in his presence; and
(2) when an offense has, in fact, been committed and
he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the
person to be arrested has committed it (Rule 113,
Section 5)
b. In this case, the arrest of petitioners was based on
probable cause determined after close surveillance
for three (3) months during which period their activities
were monitored. The existence of probable cause
justified the arrest and the seizure of the photo
negatives, photographs and posters without warrant.
i.
Those articles were seized as an incident to a lawful
arrest and, are therefore, admissible in evidence.
ii. Even assuming arguendo that the arrest of
petitioners was not valid at its inception, the
records show that prior formal deportation
charges have been filed against them, as
undesirable aliens. Warrants of arrest were
issued against them thereafter. A hearing is
presently being conducted by a Board of Special
Inquiry. The restraint against their persons,
therefore, has become legal.

That the three petitioners were not "caught in the


act" does not make their arrest illegal. They were
found with young boys in their respective rooms,
the ones with Sherman being naked. Under those
circumstances the CID agents had reasonable

The three petitioners filed an Urgent Petition for Release Under Bond
alleging that
their health was being seriously affected by their continuous detention.
Upon recommendation of the Board of Commissioners for their
provisional release, Defensor-Santiago ordered the CID doctor to
examine petitioners, who certified that the three petitioners were
healthy. A Petition for Bail filed by the three was denied by respondent
considering the certification by the CID physician that petitioners were
healthy.
Harvey filed a Manifestation/Motion stating that he had "finally agreed
to a self-deportation" and praying that he be "provisionally released for
at least 15 days and placed under the custody of Atty. Asinas before he
voluntarily departs the country." The Board of Special Inquiry allowed
provisional release of five days under certain conditions.
However, it appears that on the same date that the Manifestation/
Motion was filed, Harvey and his co-petitioners had already filed a
Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus.
In the petition, Harvey, Sherman and Elshout question the validity of
their detention on the following grounds:
4) There is no provision in the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940
nor under Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code, which
gives the Commissioner any authority to arrest and
detain the three petitioners pending determination of
the existence of a probable cause leading to an
administrative investigation.
5) Defensor-Santiago violated Section 2, Article III of the
1987 Constitution prohibiting unreasonable searches and
seizures since the CID agents were not clothed with valid
Warrants of arrest, search and seizure as required by the said
provision.
6) Mere confidential information made to the CID agents and
their suspicion of the activities of the three petitioners that they
are pedophiles, coupled with their association with other
suspected pedophiles, are not valid legal grounds for their
arrest and detention unless they are caught in the act. They
further allege that being a pedophile is not punishable by any
Philippine Law nor is it a crime to be a pedophile.

c.

d.

e.

f.

g.

h.

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grounds to believe that petitioners. had committed


"pedophilia."
iii. At any rate, the filing by the three petitioners of a
petition to be released on bail is considered a waiver of
any irregularity attending their arrest and estops them
from questioning its validity.
The Court noted that the specific constraints in both the
1935 and 1987 Constitutions contemplate prosecutions
essentially criminal in nature. Deportation proceedings, on
the other hand, are administrative in character. An order of
deportation is never construed as a punishment. It is
preventive, not a penal process. It need not be conducted
strictly in accordance with ordinary Court proceedings.
The ruling in Vivo vs. Montesa that "the issuance of
warrants of arrest by the Commissioner of Immigration,
solely for purposes of investigation and before a final order
of deportation is issued, conflicts with paragraph 3, Section I
of Article III of the [1935] Constitution" is not invocable
herein.
Commissioner Defensor-Santiago's Warrant of Arrest did not
order the three petitioners to appear and show cause why
they should not be deported. They were issued specifically
"for violation of Sections 37, 45 and 46 of the Immigration
Act and Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code."
Before that, prior deportation proceedings had been
commenced against them as undesirable aliens and the
arrest was a step preliminary to their possible deportation.
"The requirement of probable cause, to be
determined by a Judge, does not extend to
deportation proceedings." (Morano vs. Vivo, supra, citing
Tiu Chun Hai vs. Commissioner, infra). There need be no
"truncated" recourse to both judicial and administrative
warrants in a single deportation proceeding.
The foregoing does not deviate from the ruling in
Qua Chee Gan vs. Deportation Board that "under the
express terms of our [1935] Constitution, it is therefore
even doubtful whether the arrest of an individual may be
ordered by any authority other than a judge if the purpose
is merely to determine the existence of a probable cause,
leading to an administrative investigation." For, as
heretofore stated, probable cause had already been
shown to exist before the warrants of arrest were
issued.
What is essential is that there should be a specific charge
against the alien intended to be arrested and deported, that
a fair hearing be conducted (Section 37[c]) with the
assistance of counsel, if desired, and that the charge be
substantiated by competent evidence.

RULING: The Writ of Habeas Corpus is denied. The warrants of arrest


ordered by CID Commissioner Defensor-Santiago are valid.

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS


CORPUS OF: LUCIEN TRAN VAN NGHIA vs. HON.
RAMON J. LIWAG, Acting Commissioner of the
Commission on Immigration and Deportation
(CID) and JOHN DOES, agents of the CID
July 13, 1989
Fernan, C.J.
Borile

SUMMARY:
Lucien Tran Van Nghia, a French immigrant, was arrested
because of a complaint filed by his landlord accusing him of
being an undesirable alien for "committing acts inimical to
public safety and progress." Commissioner Liwag ordered his
arrest without a warrant of arrest. Nghia filed the case for
Habeas Corpus questioning the legality of his detention and his
arrest. SC ruled that his arrest was legal. Even if arrest was
illegal subsequent events cured the illegality of his arrest such
as his release and initiation of formal deportation proceedings.
DOCTRINE:
- The requirement of probable cause to be determined by a
Judge, does not extend to deportation proceedings.' (Morano
vs. Vivo, supra, citing Tiu Chun Hai vs. Commissioner, infra).
There need be no 'truncated' recourse to both judicial and
administrative warrants in a single deportation proceeding.
- What is essential is that there should be a specific charge
against the alien intended to be arrested and deported, that a
fair hearing be conducted (Section 37 [c] with the assistance of
counsel, if desired, and that the charge be substantiated by
competent evidence.
FACTS:
- Lucien Tran Van Nghia is a French national who came to the
Philippines as a temporary visitor, but his status was later
changed to that of an immigrant based on his representation
that he is financially capable and will invest in the Philippines.

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW | B2015

- On May 28, 1987, CID Commissioner Ramon Liwag received a


sworn complaint from a certain Dionisio G. Cabrera, Jr., allegedly
Nghia's landlord, accusing Nghia of being an undesirable alien
for "committing acts inimical to public safety and progress."
- Liwag issued a mission order to a team of 7 CID agents for
them "to locate and bring subject to Intelligence Division for
proper disposition" and "submit report."
- CID agents went to Nghia's residence in Sta. Ana to invite the
latter to the CID headquarters for verification of his status but
Nghia and his then lady companion reportedly locked
themselves inside their bedroom and refused to talk to the
agents.
- The immigration agents then sought the assistance of
members of the WPD. Once again Nghia adamantly refused to
be taken in and in the ensuing struggle, both petitioner and the
lawmen were injured. Finally, Nghia was subdued and
immediately taken to the CID Intelligence Office.
- A warrant of arrest was issued by respondent Commissioner on
the same day but there is nothing in the records to convince the
SC that said warrant was served on Nghia prior to his
apprehension.
- Nghia's counsel filed a petition for habeas corpus questioning
the validity of Nghias detention by respondent Commissioner
ISSUES:
1. WON the arrest and detention of Nghia by the
Immigration Commissioner preparatory to deportation
proceedings legal. YES
RATIO:
1. The SC held the arrest to be valid saying that the
requirement of probable cause to be determined by a
Judge, does not extend to deportation proceedings.
Argument of Nghia: Liwag has no power, authority or
jurisdiction to cause his arrest because under the 1987
Constitution, it is provided that "no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause
to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant
and the witnesses he may produce ... ."
SC Answer: (Note: Im directly quoting the SC decision since
the SC only quoted from another SC decision and Im
doubting the ratio of this case because its inconsistent with
other cases. Compare Qua Chee, Vivo and Salazar case vs
Harvey and this case.)

The aforesaid argument raised by petitioner has been


resolved in the case of Harvey vs. Defensor-Santiago,G.R.
No. 82544, June 28, 1988, where the Court, through
Madame Justice Melencio-Herrera, said:
o The requirement of probable cause to be
determined by a Judge, does not extend to
deportation proceedings.' (Morano vs. Vivo,
supra, citing Tiu Chun Hai vs. Commissioner,
infra). There need be no 'truncated' recourse to
both judicial and administrative warrants in a
single deportation proceeding.
o The foregoing does not deviate from the ruling in
Qua Chee Gan vs. Deportation Board (G.R. No.
10280, September 30,1963, 9 SCRA 27 [1963]
reiterated in Vivo vs. Montesa, supra, that 'under
the express terms of our Constitution (the 1935
Constitution)), it is therefore even doubtful
whether the arrest of an individual may be
ordered by authority other than a judge if the
purpose is merely to determine the existence of a
probable cause, leading to an administrative
investigation.
o What is essential is that there should be a specific
charge against the alien intended to be arrested
and deported, that a fair hearing be conducted
(Section 37 [c] with the assistance of counsel, if
desired, and that the charge be substantiated by
competent evidence. ... .
The particular circumstances obtaining in the case at bar
have seriously placed on doubt the legality and propriety
of
petitioner's
apprehension
by
respondent
Commissioner. For unlike in the Harvey case where the
warrantless capture of two suspected alien pedophiles
was based on probable cause ascertained only after close
surveillance for a three-month period during which their
activities were monitored, herein petitioner was "invited"
by a combined team of CID agents and police officers at
his apartment unit on the strength of a mission order
issued by the Commissioner on Immigration based on a
sworn complaint of a single individual. The essential
requisite of probable cause was conspicuously absent.

BUT even assuming that the arrest of Nghia was not legal at
the beginning, certain events have supervened to render his

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW | B2015

petition moot and academic or to otherwise cure whatever


defect there was at the inception of his arrest.
o Firstly, Nghia was no longer under confinement because
he was released upon the posting and approval of a
personal bailbond during the pendency of the
administrative proceedings by the CID or until further
orders of the Court.
The general rule in a number of cases is that the
release, whether permanent or temporary, of a
detained person renders the petition for habeas
corpus moot and academic, unless there are
restraints attached to his release which precludes
freedom of action, in which case the Court can still
inquire into the nature of his involuntary restraint
under the Villavicencio vs. Lukban rule.
This case is different from the case of Moncupa vs.
Enrile, supra, where the Court granted the writ of
habeas corpus inspite of the fact that petitioner
Moncupa had been temporarily released from
detention on orders of the defense minister because it
was shown that attached to his discharge was the
prohibition to travel, to change his abode and to grant
interviews to members of the mass media without
official permission. He was also ordered to report
regularly to the military authorities. There was still
restraint although not physically.
Nghia was not similarly restrained.
o Secondly, records show that formal deportation
proceedings have been initiated against Nghia before the
Board of Special Inquiry of the CID. 10 The restraint (if
any) against Nghia's person has therefore become legal.
The writ of habeas corpus has served its purpose.

license to operate a recruitment agency, its Administrator


Achacoso issued a Closure and Seizure Order. The team tasked
to implement said Order went to Salazars residence and
confiscated assorted costumes. Through a letter, Salazar was
asking for the return of the confiscated items, alleging that the
seizure was contrary to law for being a violation of her right to
privacy, and for being done without giving her prior notice and
hearing. Before the POEA could answer, Salazar filed a petition
for prohibition. The SC held that the POEA (or the Sec. of Labor)
may not validly issue search or arrest warrants.
DOCTRINE: The Secretary of Labor, not being a judge, may no
longer issue search or arrest warrants. Hence, the authorities
must go through the judicial process.
1. Under Article III, Section 2, of the l987 Constitution, it is only
judges, and no other, who may issue warrants of arrest and
search:
2. The exception is in cases of deportation of illegal and
undesirable aliens, whom the President or the Commissioner of
Immigration may order arrested, following a final order of
deportation, for the purpose of deportation.
FACTS: Rosalie Tesoro of Pasay City in a sworn statement filed
with the POEA, charged petitioner Hortencia Salazar with
illegal recruitment (Salazar was Tesoros manager. When she
returned to the Phil. from Japan, Salazar allegedly failed to give
her back her PECC Card.). Public respondent Atty. Ferdinand
Marquez sent Salazar a telegram directing him to appear to the
POEA regarding the complaint against him. On the same day,
after finding out that Salazar had no license to operate
a recruitment agency,
public
respondent
Administrator
Tomas Achacoso issued him the challenged Closure and Seizure
Order. The Order informed Salazar of the closure of his
recruitment agency and of the seizure of the documents and
paraphernalia being used or intended to be used as the means
of committing illegal recruitment, it having verified that Salazar
has (1) No valid license or authority from the DOLE
to recruit and deploy workers for overseas employment; (2)
Committed/are committing acts prohibited under Article 34 LC in
relation to Article 38 of the same code. A team was then tasked
to implement the said Order. The group, accompanied by
mediamen and Mandaluyong policemen, went to Salazars
residence (in Mandaluyong). They found that Salazar was
operating Hannalie Dance Studio. Before entering, they served
the order to a certain Mrs. Flora Salazar, who voluntarily let them

Dispositive:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

SALAZAR v. ACHACOSO
March 14, 1990
Sarmiento, J
Denn

SUMMARY: Tesoro, charged her manager Salazar with illegal


recruitment. When the POEA found out the Salazar had no

10

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in. Flora informed them that Hannalie was accredited with


Moreman Development. However, when required to show
credentials, she was unable to produce any. Inside the studio,
the team chanced upon twelve talent performers practicing a
dance number and saw about 20 more waiting outside. The
team confiscated assorted costumes, which were duly receipted
for. Salazar filed with POEA a letter requesting for the return of
the seized properties, on the ground that the seizure was
contrary to law and against the will of the owner. She alleged
that: (a) she was not given prior notice and hearing, (b) seizure
violated sec 2 of the Bill of Rights, and (c) the properties were
confiscated against her will and were done with unreasonable
force and intimidation. Before POEA could answer, Salazar filed
the instant petition (while the POEA filed a criminal complaint
against her).

PRESENT CASE: for prohibition; concerns the validity of the power of


the Sec. of Labor to issue warrants of arrest and seizure under Art. 38
LC (prohibiting illegal recruitment). Although the acts sought to be
barred are already fait accompli, thereby making prohibition too late,
the SC considered the petition as one for certiorari in view of the grave
public interest involved.

ISSUE: May the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration


(or the Secretary of Labor) validly issue warrants of search and
seizure (or arrest) under Article 38 of the Labor Code? - NO
RATIO:
- Under the new Constitution, it is only a judge who may
issue warrants of search and arrest. (Art. III, Sec.2)1
- Ponsica v. Ignalaga: mayors may not exercise this power.
This power which was previously given to mayors was
abrogated by the 1987 Constitution.
The constitutional proscription has thereby
been manifested that thenceforth, the
function of determining probable cause and
issuing, on the basis thereof, warrants of
arrest or search warrants, may be validly
exercised only by judges, this being
evidenced by the elimination in the present

SC RULING: The Secretary of Labor, not being a judge,


may no longer issue search or arrest warrants. Hence,
the authorities must go through the judicial process. To
that extent, SC declared Article 38(c) LC unconstitutional
and of no force and effect.

"no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon


probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the person or things to be seized."

Constitution of the phrase, "such other


responsible officer as may be authorized by
law" found in the counterpart provision of
said 1973 Constitution, who, aside from
judges,
might
conduct
preliminary
investigations and issue warrants of arrest
or search warrants.
Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force v. CA: neither
may it be done by a mere prosecuting body.
Art. 38(c) LC, as now written, was entered as an
amendment by PD Nos. 1920 and 2018 of Marcos, to PD
1693, in the exercise of his legislative powers.
o PD 1693: the then Minister of Labor merely
exercised
recommendatory
powers
(to
recommend the arrest and detention of any
person engaged in illegal recruitment).
o PD 1920 (May 1, 1984): with the avowed purpose
of giving more teeth to the campaign against
illegal recruitment, it gave the Minister of Labor
arrest and closure powers (to cause the arrest and
detention of such non-licensee or non-holder of
authority if after proper investigation it is
determined that his activities constitute a danger
to national security and public order or will lead to
further exploitation of job-seekers shall order the
closure of companies, establishment and entities
found to be engaged in illegal recruitment).
o PD 2018 (Jan. 26, 1986): gave the Labor Minister
search and seizure powers as well (to order the
search of the office or premises and seizure of
documents, paraphernalia, properties and other
implements used in illegal recruitment activities
and the closure of companies, establishment and
entities found to be engaged in illegal
recruitment).

On SolGen's reliance on the case of Morano v. Vivo

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SC: Reliance not well taken. Vivo involved a deportation case,


governed by the defunct Revised Administrative Code and by the
Immigration Law. SC has ruled that in deportation cases, an
arrest (of an undesirable alien) ordered by the President or his
duly authorized representatives, in order to carry out a final
decision of deportation is valid. It is valid, however, because of
the recognized supremacy of the Executive in matters involving
foreign affairs.
- The State has the inherent power to deport undesirable
aliens. That power may be exercised by the Chief
Executive "when he deems such action necessary for the
peace and domestic tranquility of the nation."
- Justice Johnson: when the Chief Executive finds that there
are aliens whose continued presence in the country is
injurious to the public interest, "he may, even in the
absence of express law, deport them".
- The right of a country to expel or deport aliens because
their continued presence is detrimental to public welfare
is absolute and unqualified.

respondents are ORDERED to return all materials seized as a


result of the implementation of Search and Seizure Order No.
1205.

The power of the President to order the arrest of aliens


for deportation is, obviously, exceptional. It (the power
to order arrests) can not be made to extend to other
cases, like the one at bar. Under the Constitution, it is
the sole domain of the courts.

But 17 years after being readmitted, the NBI charged him with
violations of the Immigration Act. Pursuant to this, the Commissioner
of Immigration and Deportation issued an order commanding the
arrest of Gatchalian. What is relevant in the SCs decision is the
propriety of the Commissioners issuance of the warrant of arrest. The
SC declared the issuance of the warrant of arrest as unconstitutional
and Gatchalian was declared a Filipino citizen.

BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS
v. DELA ROSA
May 31, 1991
Bidin, J
Diwata
SUMMARY:
William Gatchalians grandfather was recognized by the Bureau of
Immigration as a native born Filipino citizen. A year after, William
Gatchalian arrived in the Philippines. Upon his entry, there was an
issue as to his exclusion as a Filipino Citizen and an order of exclusion
and a warrant of arrest were issued. But not long after, his exclusion
was reversed and he was reaffirmed as a Filipino citizen.

On the nature of the seizure order


SC: The search and seizure order in question, assuming that it
was validly issued, is clearly in the nature of a general warrant. A
warrant must identify clearly the things to be seized, otherwise,
it is null and void.

DOCTRINE:
A warrant of arrest issued by the Commissioner of Immigration, to be
valid, must be for the sole purpose of executing a final order of
deportation. A warrant of arrest issued by the Commissioner of
Immigration for purposes of investigation only, as in the case at bar, is
null and void for being unconstitutional

For the guidance of the bench and the bar, SC reaffirmed


the following principles:
1. Under Article III, Section 2, of the l987 Constitution, it
is only judges, and no other, who may issue warrants of
arrest and search:
2. The exception is in cases of deportation of illegal and
undesirable aliens, whom the President or the
Commissioner of Immigration may order arrested,
following a final order of deportation, for the purpose of
deportation.

The constitution does not distinguish warrants between a criminal


case and administrative proceedings. And if one suspected of having
committed a crime is entitled to a determination of the probable cause
against him, by a judge, why should one suspected of a violation of an
administrative nature deserve less guarantee? It is not indispensable
that the alleged alien be arrested for purposes of investigation. If the
purpose of the issuance of the warrant of arrest is to determine the
existence of probable cause, surely, it cannot pass the test of
constitutionality for only judges can issue the same (Sec. 2, Art. III,
Constitution).

RULING: Petition granted. Article 38, paragraph (c) of the Labor


Code is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL and null and void. The

FACTS:

12

Santiago Gatchalian, grandfather of William Gatchalian, was recognized


by the Bureau of Immigration as a native born Filipino citizen following
the citizenship of natural mother Mariana Gatchalian.
A year after, William, then twelve years old, arrived in Manila from
Hongkong together with a daughter and a son of Santiago. They had
with them certificate of registration and identity issued by the Philippine
consulate in Hongkong based on a cablegram bearing the signature of
the secretary of foreign affairs, Felixberto Serrano, and sought
admission as Filipino citizens.

b.

A month after, the Board of Special Inquiry admitted the Gatchalians as


Filipino citizens and issued an identification certificate to William. The
board of commissioners was directed by the Secretary of Justice to
Review all cases where entry was allowed on the ground that the
entrant was a Filipino citizen. Such included the case of William.
The Board of Commissioners then reversed and ordered the exclusion of
William. A warrant of exclusion was issued and thereafter, a warrant of
arrest. The case reached the Acting Commissioner who affirmed William
as a Filipino citizen and recalled the warrants of arrest.

c.

Seventeen years after, upon request by the NBI, the Secretary of Justice
charged William with violations of the Immigration Act of 1940. The
Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation issued an order
commanding the arrest of Gatchalian. William posted a cash bond for
his release.
William filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with injunction with
the RTC to enjoin the deportation proceedings. The TRO was granted.
d.
ISSUES:
1. W/N RTC and not the CA has jurisdiction
2. W/N the arrest of Gatchalian follows as a matter of
consequence based on the warrant of exclusion
HELD:
1. YES, RTC has jurisdiction because Bureau of Immigration is not a
quasi-judicial agency
2. NO, arrest does not follow the exclusion order
RATIO: (There are several issues in the case which made it reach 68
pages on iPad. But I will skip the ratio on the irrelevant issue)
1. SKIPPED
2. NO, arrest does not follow the exclusion order
a. Sec. 37 (a) of the Immigration Act of 1940
i. The following aliens shall be arrested upon the warrant of
the Commissioner of Immigration or of any other officer

e.
f.
g.

13

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designated by him for the purpose and deported upon the
warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration after a
determination by the Board of Commissioner of the
existence of the ground for deportation as charged against
the alien
Hence, in matters of implementing the Immigration Act insofar
as deportation of aliens are concerned, the Commissioner of
Immigration may issue warrants of arrest only after a
determination by the Board of Commissioners of the existence
of the ground for deportation as charged against the alien. In
other words, a warrant of arrest issued by the
Commissioner of Immigration, to be valid, must be for
the sole purpose of executing a final order of
deportation. A warrant of arrest issued by the
Commissioner of Immigration for purposes of
investigation only, as in the case at bar, is null and void
for being unconstitutional
Qua Chee Gan vs. Deportation Board: "The constitution does
not distinguish warrants between a criminal case and
administrative proceedings. And if one suspected of
having committed a crime is entitled to a determination
of the probable cause against him, by a judge, why
should one suspected of a violation of an administrative
nature deserve less guarantee?" It is not indispensable
that the alleged alien be arrested for purposes of
investigation. If the purpose of the issuance of the
warrant of arrest is to determine the existence of
probable cause, surely, it cannot pass the test of
constitutionality for only judges can issue the same (Sec.
2, Art. III, Constitution).
A reading of the mission order/warrant of arrest issued by the
Commissioner of Immigration, clearly indicates that the same
was issued only for purposes of investigation of William
Gatchalian. Paragraphs 1 and 3 of the mission order directs the
Intelligence Agents/Officers to: xxx xxx xxx
1. Make a warrantless arrest under the Rules of
Criminal Procedure, Rule 113, Sec. 5, for violation
of the Immigration Act, Sec. 37, para. a; Secs. 45
and 46 Administrative Code; xxx xxx xxx
3. Deliver the suspect to the Intelligence Division
and immediately conduct custodial interrogation,
after warning the suspect that he has a right to
remain silent and a right to counsel; . . .
Argument of Commissioner: Arrest was based on the warrant of
exclusion
SC: The argument has no leg to stand on. The exclusion order
wasnt mentioned in the warrant of arrest
In fact, the Board of Special Inquiry, submitted a memorandum
to the then Acting Commissioner recommending the

h.

i.
j.

k.

l.

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW | B2015


This is quite long but the relevant portion about arrest is here.

reconsideration of the decision excluding Gatchalian as Filipino


citizen. The memorandum inferred that the "very basis of xxx
reversing the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry was due to
a forged cablegram by the then Secretary of Foreign Affairs, . . .,
The Board of Special Inquiry concluded that "(i)f at all, the
cablegram only led to the issuance of their Certificate(s) of
Identity. It being so, even if the applicants could have entered
illegally, the mere fact that they are citizens of the Philippines
entitles them to remain in the country."
Eventually, then Acting Commissioner admitted Gatchalian as
Filipino citizens; recalled the warrant of arrest and revalidated
their Identification Certificates. The above order admitting
Gatchalian as a Filipino citizen is the last official act of the
government on the basis of which William Gatchalian
continually exercised the rights of a Filipino citizen to the
present. Consequently, the presumption of citizenship lies in
favor of William Gatchalian.
Dissenting opinion of Davide and Feliciano proposed the reopening of the question of citizenship.
Majority: The records of the Bureau of Immigration show that
Williams grandfather had been declared to be a Filipino citizen.
It is a final decision that forecloses a re-opening of the same 30
years later. The Commissioner do not even question the
grandfathers Philippine citizenship. It is the citizenship of
William Gatchalian that is in issue and addressed for
determination of the Court in this case.
Furthermore, the Commissioners position is not enhanced by
the fact that Gatchalians arrest came 28 years after the
alleged cause of deportation arose.
i. Section 37 (b) of the Immigration Act: deportation "shall not
be effected . . . unless the arrest in the deportation
proceedings is made within five (5) years after the cause of
deportation arises."
In this case, the cause of action and deportation against
Gatchalian arose in 1962. However, the warrant of arrest of
respondent was issued by Commissioner only 28 long years
after. It is clear that the cause of action has already prescribed
and by their inaction could not now be validly enforced against
William Gatchalian. Furthermore, the warrant of exclusion dated
July 6, 1962 was already recalled and the Identification
certificate of respondent, among others, was revalidated on
March 15, 1973 by the then Acting Commissioner Nituda.

Said paragraph (b) of Section 37 reads in full as follows:


(b) Deportation may be effected under clauses 2, 7, 8, 11 and 12
paragraph (a) of this section at any time after entry, but shall not be
effected under any other clause unless the arrest in the deportation
proceedings is made within five years after the cause of deportation
arises. Deportation under clauses 3 and 4 shall not be effected if the
court or judge thereof, when sentencing the alien, shall recommend to
the Commissioner of Immigration that the alien be not deported. (As
amended by Sec. 13, R.A. No. 503).
Note that the five-year period applies only to clauses other than 2, 7, 8,
11 and 12 of paragraph (a) of the Section. In respect to clauses 2, 7, 8,
11 and 12, the limitation does not apply.
(2) Any alien who enters the Philippines after the effective date of this
Act, who was not lawfully admissible at the time of entry;
Mr. Gatchalian is covered by clause (2); besides, the warrant for his
exclusion was issued within a period of five years following his entry.
Hence, Davide disagrees with the view advanced in the ponencia that
the State can no longer enforce the warrant of exclusion because it is
already barred by prescription
FELICIANOS DISSENTING OPINION
This is also long but the relevant portions on arrest are the same points
that Davide raises. The other importants points made are here.
What was involved in 1961 when the supposed children and
grandchildren of Santiago Gatchalian first descended upon the
Philippines, was the right of a person claiming to be a Philippine citizen
to enter for the first time and reside in the Philippines. On the part of
the Government, what was at stake was the right to
exclude from the country persons who had claimed the right to enter
the country as Philippine citizens but who had failed to substantiate
such claimed status. Aliens seeking entry into the Philippines do not
acquire the right to be admitted into the country by the simple passage
of time. Exclusion of persons found not to be entitled to admission as
Philippine citizens, must be distinguished from the deportation of aliens,
who, after having been initially lawfully admitted into the Philippines,
committed acts which rendered them liable to deportation. Normally,
aliens excluded are immediately sent back to their country of origin.
This is so in cases where the alien has not yet gained a foothold into the
country and is still seeking physical admittance. However, when the
alien had already physically gained entry but such entry is later found
unlawful or devoid of legal basis, the alien can be excluded any
time after it is found that he was not lawfully admissible at the time of

DISPOSITIVE:
Gatchalian is declared a Filipino Citizen. Commissioner is enjoined from
continuing with the deportation proceedings.
DAVIDES CONCURRING-DISSENTING OPINION

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his entry. Technically, the alien in this case is being excluded; however,
the rules on deportation can be made to apply to him in view of the fact
that the cause for his exclusion is discovered only after he had gained
physical entry.

Camara v. Municipal Court


June 5, 1967
White, J.
Jadd Dealino

SUMMARY: Inspectors of the San Francisco Dept. of Public


Healths Division of Housing Inspection sought to examine
Camaras premises due to it being used for residential purposes
despite the buildings occupancy permit not allowing such use.
The inspectors were never armed with a search warrant.
Eventually, Camara was charged with refusal to permit a lawful
inspection in violation of the Citys Housing Code. Camara filed
a petition for a writ of prohibition. The California Superior Court
denied the petition. The District Court of Appeal affirmed the
Superior Courts denial. The Supreme Court of California denied
Camaras petition. The US SC vacated the judgment of the
Supreme Court of California.

DOCTRINE:
1) Generally, a search of private property without proper
consent is "unreasonable" unless it has been authorized
by a valid search warrant (Stoner v. California, etc.)
a. Exception: Frank v. Maryland (The Court upheld
the conviction of one who refused to permit a
warrantless inspection of private premises for the
purposes of locating and abating a suspected
public nuisance.)
2) Warrantless administrative searches are significant
intrusions upon interests protected by the 4th
Amendment, and will be subjected to scrutiny by the
Court, particularly as to reasonableness and whether
there is an emergency or not.

November 6, 1963: An inspector of the San Francisco


Dept. of Public Healths Division of Housing Inspection
entered an apartment to make a routine annual
inspection (for possible violations of the Citys Housing
Code.)
o The buildings manager informed the inspector
about Camaras residential use of a portion of the
building.
o The inspector sought to make an examination of
Camaras premises on the ground that the
buildings occupancy permit did not allow
residential use. Camara refused on the ground
that the inspector did not have a search warrant.
November 8, 1963: The inspector returned (again, with
no search warrant.) Camara refused to allow an
inspection.
Subsequently, a citation was mailed ordering Camara to
appear at the District Attorneys Office. Camara failed to
appear.
November 22, 1963: 2 inspectors returned to Camaras
apartment, informing him that he was required by law
(Sec. 503 of the Housing Code) to permit an inspection.
Again, Camara refused to allow them to conduct an
inspection as they did not have a search warrant with
them.
Subsequently, a complaint was filed against Camara,
charging him with refusing to permit a lawful inspection
in violation of Sec. 507
Camara was arrested and eventually released on bail. He
sought to interpose a demurrer, but this was denied. He
filed a petition for a writ of prohibition.

ISSUES:
1) WON the arrest of Camara due to his refusal to allow
warrantless inspection of his apartment is contrary to the
4th and 14th Amendment
2) WON inspections should only be conducted when the
inspector has probable cause to believe that there is a
violation.
ARGUMENTS OF CAMARA: Sec. 503 is contrary to the 4th and
14th Amendments.

FACTS:

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1) It authorizes municipal officials to enter a private dwelling


without a search warrant and without probable cause to
believe that a violation of the Housing Code exists.
2) Therefore, Camara may not be prosecuted under Sec.
507 for refusing an inspection that is unconstitutionallyauthorized by Sec. 503.

ii. The majority in that case upheld the


conviction as, in its view, municipal
fire/health/housing inspections, at most,
touch upon the periphery of interests
safeguarded by the 14th Amendments
protection against official intrusion.
1. Such inspections merely determine
whether physical conditions exist
which do not comply with the
minimum
standards
in
local
ordinances.
2. The inspector does not ask the
property owner to allow a search for
evidence of criminal action, so what
is only involved is the right to be
secure from intrusion into personal
privacy (i.e., less hostile.)
3. Such inspections are designed to be
as non-demanding as possible, and
that the standard of reasonableness
will always guide the inspector.
These relate to policy, so those
granting warrants should act as
rubber stamps at most.
4. Finally, public interest demands that
such inspections are allowed.
iii. The Court agrees that a routine inspection
of the physical condition of private
property is a less hostile intrusion than a
policemans search for evidence, but the
4th Amendment interests at stake in such
cases are not merely peripheral.
1. Even the most law-abiding citizen
could have their security threatened
by criminal entry masquerading as
an officially-sanctioned search.
2. These inspections jeopardize selfprotection interests of property
owners.
a. Criminal processes are used
to enforce most regulatory
laws, both with regard to
refusal to comply and refusal
to permit inspections.

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS: Used the cases of Frank v.


Maryland and Eaton v. Price:
1) Sec. 503 does not violate the 4th Amendment as it is part
of a regulatory scheme that is essentially civil, not
criminal in nature.
2) It creates a right of inspection that is limited in scope and
may not be exercised under unreasonable conditions.
RATIO:
1) Yes. The arrest of Camara due to his refusal to allow
warrantless inspection of his apartment is contrary to the
4th and 14th Amendment
a. The Court discussed the 4th Amendments.
i. It safeguards the privacy and security of
individuals against arbitrary invasions by
government officials.
ii. It expresses a right which is basic to a free
society (Wolf v. Colorado).
iii. The 4th Amendment is enforceable against
the States through the 14th Amendment
(Ker v. California)
iv. The general rule is that a search of private
property without proper consent is
"unreasonable"
unless
it
has
been
authorized by a valid search warrant
(Stoner v. California, etc.)
v. Generally, the right to privacy and when it
must yield is to be determined by a judicial
officer (Johnson v. US)
b. The Court discussed the case of Frank v. Maryland
which was relied upon by the District Court of
Appeals.
i. Frank v. Maryland: The Court upheld the
conviction of one who refused to permit a
warrantless inspection of private premises
for the purposes of locating and abating a
suspected public nuisance.

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iv. The Court states that the arguments of


inspections being non-demanding and
being
guided
by the
standard
of
reasonableness unduly discount the
purpose of the warrants.
1. Presently,
when the inspector
demands entry, the occupant has
no way of knowing thing such as the
necessity of the inspection, the
lawful limits, and the authorization.
The only way to contest these is by
refusing entry.
2. Practically, the occupant is left to
the discretion of the person
conducting the inspection.
v. The argument of public interest begs the
question of whether such inspections may
be made without a warrant. The threshold
question is whether the authority to search
should be evidenced by a warrant, which in
turn depends in part upon whether the
burden of obtaining a warrant is likely to
frustrate the governmental purpose behind
the search (Schmerber v. California). There
has
been
no
showing
that
fire/health/housing code inspections cannot
be made without a warrant.
2) No. Inspections do not have to be conducted only when
the inspector has probable cause to believe that there is
a violation.
a. The standard of reasonableness is what is tested
against the standard of probable cause in issuing
a warrant under the 4th Amendment.
b. Therefore, it is important to look at the
government interest being advanced.
c. In this case, city-wide compliance with minimum
physical standards is the objective, to prevent the
unintentional
development
of
conditions
detrimental to public health and safety.
i. There is strong opinion that the best way to
achieve universal compliance is through
periodic inspections. This is where the
probable cause aspect might appear, since
the agencys decision to inspect is

unavoidably based on its appraisal of


conditions in the area as a whole.
d. Several factors support the reasonableness of
area code enforcement inspections.
i. Judicial and public acceptance
ii. Public interest demands that dangerous
conditions be dealt with, yet the
effectiveness of other area canvassing
procedures is doubtful. Some conditions
cannot be seen from outside, necessitating
an inspection.
iii. There is a limited invasion of privacy since
the inspections are neither personal in
nature nor aimed at discovering evidence
of a crime.
e. When public health and safety are involved, the
nature of probable cause is different from that in
criminal cases.
f. Area inspections are reasonable searches of
private property within the 4th Amendment.
Probable
cause
takes
the
form
of
legislative/administrative standards.
3) Despite what has been said, there are exceptions to the
need for warrants as to searches, such as unwholesome
food, compulsory smallpox vaccination, summary
destruction of tubercular cattle, etc. Routine area
inspections do not fall within this exception of
emergency.
RULING: Judgment VACATED.

SEE v. SEATTLE
June 5, 1967
Mr. Justice White
Krissy
SUMMARY: See refused to allow access to his commercial warehouse
without a warrant a representative of the City of Seattle Fire
Department for inspection pursuant to Seattles Fire Code. He then
was charged and convicted under 8.01.050 of said Code. The US SC
reversed his conviction and held as violative of the 4th Amendment
said entry without a warrant.
DOCTRINE: The 4th Amendment bars prosecution of a person who has
refused to permit a warrantless code-enforcement inspection of his

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business. 8.01.050, which includes the interiors of dwellings,
establishes a reasonable scheme for the warrantless inspection of
commercial premises pursuant to the Seattle Fire Code.

personal residence. This rule applies to similar inspections of


commercial structures which are not used as private residences. The
businessman, like the occupant of a residence, has a constitutional
right to go about his business free from unreasonable official entries
upon his private commercial property. When an administrative agency
subpoenas corporate books or records, the 4th Amendment requires
that the subpoena be sufficiently limited in scope, relevant in purpose,
and specific in directive so that compliance will not be unreasonably
burdensome. Administrative entry, without consent, upon the portions
of commercial premises which are not open to the public may only be
compelled through prosecution or physical force within the framework
of a warrant procedure. The agencys particular demand for access will
be measured, in terms of probable cause to issue a warrant, against a
flexible standard of reasonableness that takes into account the public
need for effective enforcement of the particular regulation involved.

SC: There is no justification for relaxing 4th Amendment safeguards


where the official inspection is intended to aid enforcement of laws
prescribing minimum physical standards for commercial premises.
A search of private houses is presumptively unreasonable if conducted
without a warrant. The businessman, like the occupant of a residence,
has a constitutional right to go about his business free from
unreasonable official entries upon his private commercial property. Such
right is placed in jeopardy if the decision to enter and inspect for
violation of regulatory laws can be made and enforced by the inspector
in the field without official authority evidenced by a warrant.
Official entry upon commercial property is a technique commonly
adopted by administrative agencies at all levels of government to
enforce a variety of regulatory laws; thus, entry may permit inspection
of the structure in which a business is housed, of business products, or
a perusal of financial books and records.
Another common investigative technique is the administrative
subpoena of corporate books and records, wherein warrants are a
necessary and a tolerable limitation on the right to enter upon and
inspect commercial premises.

FACTS: An inspection of appellant Sees locked commercial warehouse


was conducted by a representative of the City of Seattle Fire
Department as part of a routine, periodic city-wide canvass to obtain
compliance with Seattles Fire Code. Appellant refused the inspector
access thereto, hence he was arrested and charged with violating
8.01.050 of the Code:
INSPECTION OF BUILDING AND PREMISES. It shall be the duty of the
Fire Chief to inspect and he may enter all buildings and premises,
except the interiors of dwellings, as often as may be necessary for the
purpose of ascertaining and causing to be corrected any conditions
liable to cause fire, or any violations of the provisions of this Title, and
of any other ordinance concerning fire hazards."

When an administrative agency subpoenas corporate books or records,


the 4th Amendment requires that the subpoena be sufficiently limited in
scope, relevant in purpose, and specific in directive so that compliance
will not be unreasonably burdensome. The agency has the right to
conduct all reasonable inspections of such documents which are
contemplated by the statute, but it must delimit the confines of a
search by designating the needed documents in a formal subpoena. In
addition, while the demand to inspect may be issued by the agency, in
the form of an administrative subpoena, it may not be made and
enforced by the inspector in the field, and the subpoenaed party may
obtain judicial review of the reasonableness of the demand prior to
suffering penalties for refusing to comply.

Appellant: 8.01.050, if interpreted to authorize warrantless inspection of


his warehouse, would violate his rights under the 4 th and 14th
Amendments.
RULING OF THE SUPREME COURT OF WASHINGTON: Convicted
Appellant for refusing to permit the representative of the City of Seattle
Fire Department to enter and inspect his locked commercial warehouse
without a warrant and without probable cause to believe that a violation
of any municipal ordinance existed therein.

Minimal limitations on administrative action are constitutionally


required in the case of investigative entry upon commercial
establishment. The agencys particular demand for access will be
measured, in terms of probable cause to issue a warrant, against a
flexible standard of reasonableness that takes into account the public
need for effective enforcement of the particular regulation involved.

ISSUES: WON the inspection of appellants warehouse without a


warrant is violative of his 4th Amendment Rights. YES
RATIO: Camara v. Municipal Court (applicable): The 4 th Amendment
bars prosecution of a person who has refused to permit a warrantless
code-enforcement inspection of his personal residence. This rule applies
to similar inspections of commercial structures which are not used as
private residences.

Administrative entry, without consent, upon the portions of commercial


premises which are not open to the public may only be compelled
through prosecution or physical force within the framework of a warrant
procedure. The basic component of a reasonable search under the 4 th

SC of Washington: The US Supreme Court has applied different


standards of reasonableness to searches of dwellings than to places of

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Amendment that it not be enforced without a suitable warrant


procedure is applicable to business as well as to residential premises.
Therefore, appellant may not be prosecuted for exercising his
constitutional right to insist that the fire inspector obtain a warrant
authorizing entry upon appellants locked warehouse.

All of the doubts raised by the court could be resolved very


quickly. Inspectors all have identification cards which they show
the occupant and the latter could easily resolve the remaining
questions by a call to the inspectors superior or, upon demand,
receive a written answer thereto. These cases were based on the
4th Amendment, not on any of the circumstances surrounding the
attempted inspection. Inspections of this type may be made
without a warrant. This has been done so for over a century and
a half and it is a little late to impose a death sentence on such
procedures now. In most instances, the officer could not secure a
warrant such as in Sees case thereby insulating large and
important segments of our cities form inspection for health and
safety conditions.

RULING: Supreme Court of Washington reversed.

Mr. Justice Clark, Dissenting:


Frank v. Maryland: the power to inspect dwelling places, either
as a matter of systematic area-by-area search or, as here, to
treat a specific problem, is of indispensable importance to the
maintenance of community health; a power that would be
greatly hobbled by the blanket requirement of the safeguards
necessary for a search of evidence of criminal acts. The need for
preventive action is great, and city after city has seen this need
and granted the power of inspection to its health officials; and
these inspections are apparently welcomed by all but an
insignificant few.

In entry-to-inspect situations where consent is necessary,


inspections are most likely going to be denied and would place
an intolerable burden on the inspection service. The economics
of the situation (immediate prospects for costly repairs to correct
possible defects) will force this result.
Majority: As to the propriety of warrantless area inspections, the
basis for the probable cause for area inspection warrants begins
with the 4th Amendments reasonableness requirement; in
determining whether an inspection is reasonable, the need for
the inpsection must be weighed in terms of these reasonable
goals of code enforcement. There are a number of persuasive
factors: long acceptance historically, great public interest in
health and safety, and the impersonal nature of the inspections
not for evidence of crime but for the public welfare. Probable
cause exists if reasonable legislative or administrative standards
for conducting an area inspection are satisfied with respect to a
particular dwelling. These standards will vary according to the
code program and the condition of the area with reference
thereto rather than the condition of a particular dwelling.
Warrants may be obtained after a refusal of initial entry.

The Majority set up a new test for the long-recognized and


enforced 4th Amendments probable-cause requirement for the
issuance of warrants. They would permit the issuance of paper
warrants in area inspection programs with probable cause based
on area inspection standards as set out in municipal codes and
with warrants issued by the rubber stamp of a willing
magistrate this degrades the 4th Amendment.
Reasonable inspections are constitutionally permissible and in
fact imperative for the protection of health, safety and welfare of
the millions who inhabit the cities and towns. The inspection in
this case meets the 4th Amendments test of reasonableness and
is consistent with its commands. Nothing suggests that the
inspection was unauthorized, unreasonable, for any improper
purpose, or designed as a basis for criminal prosecution; nor is
there any indication of any discriminatory, arbitrary, or
capricious action affecting the appellant in either case.

Why the ceremony, the delay, the expense, the abuse of the
search warrant? This will not only destroy its integrity but will
degrade the magistrate issuing them and soon bring disrepute
not only upon the practice but upon the judicial process. It will
be very costly to the city in paperwork incident to the issuance
of the paper warrants, in loss of time of inspectors and waste of
the time of magistrates and will result in more annoyance to the
public. It will also be more burdensome to the occupant of the
premises to be inspected. Under a search warrant the inspector

The Majority says that under the present system, the occupant
has no way of knowing the necessity for the inspection, the
limits of the inspectors power, or whether the inspector is
authorized to perform the search.

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can enter any time he chooses. Under the existing procedures


he can enter only at reasonable times and invariably the
convenience of the occupant is considered. It destroys the health
and safety codes as they apply to individual inspections of
specific problems as contrasted to area ones. While the latter
are important, the individual inspection is often more so.

impose appropriate obligations and sanction their enforcement


by reasonable money penalties, giving to executive officers the
power to enforce such penalties without the necessity of
invoking the judicial power.

FACTS: Ocean Steam Navigation Company sought the recovery


of money paid to the collector of customs of the port of New York
which was exacted by that official under an order of the
Secretary of Commerce and Labor. The money was paid under
protest, and involuntarily because if it did not pay, the collector
would refuse a clearance to its steamships which would have
caused not only grave public inconvenience from the nonfulfilment of mail contracts and entailed serious pecuniary loss
consequent on its failure to carry out many other contracts. Both
the Secretary and the collector were expressly authorized by
Section 9 of the Act entitled An Act to Regulate the Immigration
of Aliens into the United States.
The act excludes from
admission into the United States those afflicted with a loathsome
or with a dangerous contagious disease.

Ocean Steam Navigation


Company v. Stranahan
June 1, 1909
White, J.
Francis

SUMMARY: Ocean Steam paid the collector of customs the fine


established in Section 9 of the Alien Immigration Act. Ocean
Steam challenged the constitutionality of such provision
arguing that it defines a crime and gives executive officials the
power decide whether it has been committed and inflict
punishment without judicial trial against due process of law.

Section 9 provides: 'That it shall be unlawful for any person,


including any transportation company other than railway lines
entering the United States from foreign contiguous territory, or
the owner, master, agent, or consignee of any vessel, to bring to
the United States any alien afflicted with a loathsome or with a
dangerous contagious disease; and, if it shall appear to the
satisfaction of the Secretary of the Treasury( now Secretary of
Commerce and Labor) that any alien so brought to the United
States was afflicted with such a disease at the time of foreign
embarkation, and that the existence of such disease might have
been detected by means of a competent medical examination at
such time, such person or transportation company, or the
master, agent, owner, or consignee of any such vessel, shall pay
to the collector of customs of the customs district in which the
port of arrival is located the sum of one hundred dollars for each
and every violation of the provisions of this section; and no
vessel shall be granted clearance papers while any such fine
imposed upon it remains unpaid, nor shall such fine be
remitted.

DOCTRINE: When Congress sees fit to further promote the


U.S. policy to forbid aliens or classes of aliens from coming
within their borders, and expel aliens or classes of aliens from
their territory by subjecting the persons of such aliens to
infamous punishment at hard labor, or by confiscating their
property, such legislation, to be valid, must provide for a
judicial trial to establish the guilt of the accused. When the
section is enlightened by an analysis of the context of the act
and by a consideration of the report of the Senate committee,
its various sections accurately distinguish between those cases
where it was intended that particular violations of the act
should be considered as criminal and be punished accordingly,
and those where it was contemplated that violations should not
constitute crime, but merely entail the infliction of a penalty,
enforceable in some cases by purely administrative action and
in others by civil suit. By a consideration of the report of the
Senate committee, it no doubt that the sole purpose of Section
9 was to impose a penalty, based upon the medical
examination for which the statute provided. Congress has
power to deal with the admission of aliens and to confide the
enforcement of laws in regard thereto to administrative
officers. It is within the competency of Congress, when
legislating as to matters exclusively within its control, to

Ocean Steam Navigation Company argues that Section 9 of the


immigration act of 1903 violates the Constitution relating to the
judiciary and violates the Constitutional provision relating to the

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taking of property without due process of law because it


authorizes the taking of property without judicial trial. It is also
argued that such Act is repugnant to the Constitution because it
defines a criminal offense, and authorizes a purely
administrative official to determine whether the defined crime
has been committed, and, if so, to inflict punishment.

But, in so far as the case of Wong Wing held that the trial and
punishment for an infamous offense was not an administrative,
but a judicial, function, it is wholly irrelevant to this case, since,
on the face of the section which authorizes the Secretary of
Commerce and Labor to impose the exaction, it is apparent that
it does not purport to define and punish an infamous crime, or
indeed any criminal offense. When the section is enlightened by
an analysis of the context of the act and by a consideration of
the report of the Senate committee, its various sections
accurately distinguish between those cases where it was
intended that particular violations of the act should be
considered as criminal and be punished accordingly, and those
where it was contemplated that violations should not constitute
crime, but merely entail the infliction of a penalty, enforceable in
some cases by purely administrative action and in others by civil
suit. By a consideration of the report of the Senate committee, it
no doubt that the sole purpose of Section 9 was to impose a
penalty, based upon the medical examination for which the
statute provided, thus tending, by the avoidance of controversy
and delay, to secure the efficient performance by the steamship
company of the duty to examine in the foreign country, before
embarkation, and thereby aid in carrying out the policy of
Congress to exclude from the United States aliens afflicted with
loathsome or dangerous contagious diseases as defined in the
act.

ISSUES: Whether or not the power conferred upon Secretary


and the collector was consistent with the Constitution.
RATIO: Yes. Resting, as the statute does, upon the authority of
Congress over foreign commerce and its right to control the
coming in of aliens into the United States, and to regulate that
subject in the fullest degree, it may not be doubted that it is not
open to discussion that the statute, was within the power of
Congress to enact
Repeated decisions of the U.S. SC have determined that
Congress has the power to exclude aliens from the United
States; to prescribe the terms and conditions on which they may
come in; to establish regulations for sending out of the country
such aliens as have entered in violation of law, and to commit
the enforcement of such conditions and regulations to executive
officers; that the deportation of an alien who is found to be here
in violation of law is not a deprivation of liberty without due
process of law, and that the provisions of the Constitution
securing the right of trial by jury have no application.

Congress has power to deal with the admission of aliens and to


confide the enforcement of laws in regard thereto to
administrative officers. It is within the competency of Congress,
when legislating as to matters exclusively within its control, to
impose appropriate obligations and sanction their enforcement
by reasonable money penalties, giving to executive officers the
power to enforce such penalties without the necessity of
invoking the judicial power.

We regard it as settled by our previous decisions that the United


States can, as a matter of public policy, by congressional
enactment, forbid aliens or classes of aliens from coming within
their borders, and expel aliens or classes of aliens from their
territory, and can, in order to make effectual such decree of
exclusion or expulsion, devolve the power and duty of identifying
and arresting the persons included in such decree, and causing
their deportation, upon executive or subordinate officials.

The authority, given by Congress in the Alien Immigration Act to


the Secretary of Commerce and Labor to impose an exaction on
a transportation company bringing to the United States an alien
immigrant afflicted with a loathsome contagious disease when
the medical examination establishes that the disease existed,
and could have been detected by medical examination at the
time of embarkation, does not purport to define and punish any
criminal offense, but merely entails the infliction of a penalty
enforceable by civil suit, and it is within the power of Congress to

When Congress sees fit to further promote the U.S. policy to


forbid aliens or classes of aliens from coming within their
borders, and expel aliens or classes of aliens from their territory
by subjecting the persons of such aliens to infamous punishment
at hard labor, or by confiscating their property, such legislation,
to be valid, must provide for a judicial trial to establish the guilt
of the accused.

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provide for such imposition by an executive officer, and the


enforcement is not necessarily governed by the rules controlling
the prosecution of criminal offenses.

carriers to desist from wanton disregard of existing rules,


regulations or requirements of the government regulating
agency.
FACTS: Philippine Airlines is the grantee of a legislative
franchise (Public Act No. 4271, as amended by Republic Acts
Nos. 2360 and 2667) to provide domestic and international air
service. In its domestic service, PAL provides, among others,
services between Tuguegarao and Manila (Flight 213) and
between Baguio and Manila (Flight 205).

The imposition of a penalty by an executive officer when


authorized by Congress in a matter wholly within its
competency, such as alien immigration, is not unconstitutional
under the Fifth Amendment as taking property without due
process of law. Where Congress has power to sanction a
prohibition by penalties enforceable by executive officers
without judicial trial on the ascertainment in a prescribed
manner of certain facts, the person upon whom the penalty is
imposed is not entitled to any hearing in the sense of raising an
issue and tendering evidence as to the facts so ascertained, and
is not therefore denied due process because the time which the
executive officer allows him after notice of the ascertainment
and imposition to produce evidence as to certain facts on which
the fine might be remitted is too short.
RULING:
Judgment AFFIRMED.
Immigration Act is Constitutional.

Section

of

the

On May 12, 1970, PAL had an excess of twenty (20) passengers


from Baguio to Manila who cannot be accommodated in its
regular flight. To accommodate these twenty passengers, PAL
required the aircraft operating Flight 213 (Tuguegarao to Manila)
to pass Baguio City on its way to Manila and pick up these
passengers. Flight 213 at that time was carrying only five (5)
passengers. In addition to these facts, it is undisputed by the
Civil Aeronautics Board that The expenses incurred by the PAL
in operating the flagstop at Baguio City far exceeded the
revenue that it derived from the twenty passengers that it
fetched at Baguio City. The flagstop, therefore, was motivated
not by profit but solely by PAL's desire to meet a public need for
additional service between Baguio and Manila on that date. and
that no one filed any complaints against PAL except the
Chairman of the CAB.

Alien

Civil Aeronautics Board vs


PAL

The CAB claims that PAL should have first obtained the
permission of the CAB before operating the flagstop and that
such failure to obtain permission is a violation of Republic Act
No. 776. Thus, the CAB imposed a fine of P5,000 on PAL through
a resolution, quoted below.

April 30, 1975


Esguerra, J.
Victor Galura

Considering that operation of flag-stops are not authorized and


must be operated only with prior approval by the Board and
considering further that Philippine Air Line, Inc. has conducted
such flagstop for its Flight 212/213 on May 12, 1970 and on
previous occasions prior thereto, the board, after conducting
hearings thereon and after due deliberations on the explanations
of PAL's counsel, resolves, as it is hereby resolved to impose a
fine of P5,000.00 against PAL to be paid within ten (10) days
from receipt hereof, pursuant to the provisions of Section 42(k)
of Republic Act 776.

SUMMARY: The CAB imposed a fine on PAL for having its flight
from Tugegarao to Manila to make a stop in Baguio without first
obtaining the permission of the CAB.
DOCTRINE: The fine imposed upon PAL is not in the nature of
fines as contemplated by the RPC. It is in the nature of an
administrative penalty which administrative officers are
empowered to impose without criminal prosecution. The
imposition of the fine is not so much on exacting penalty for
the violation committed as the need to stress upon the air

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The Board further resolves to warn PAL that a repetition of the


same will be dealt with more severely. Considering, however,
that flagstops may have to be undertaken with as short notice as
possible, the carriers may notify the technical staff thru the
Executive Director of the CAB of their desire to operate such
flagstops citing the reasons therefor and the Executive Director
may give initial approval thereto, but the same has to be
confirmed immediately by the Board at its next regular
meeting.

impose, remit, mitigate, increase, or compromise, such fine and


civil penalties, as the case may be."
It is clear that the fine imposed upon PAL by the CAB is the fine
contemplated under these powers granted to CAB. It is not the
fine contemplated under the RPC. The imposition of the fine is
not so much on exacting penalty for the violation committed as
the need to stress upon the air carriers to desist from wanton
disregard of existing rules, regulations or requirements of the
government regulating agency. In other words, it is an
administrative penalty which administrative officers are
empowered to impose without criminal prosecution. The CAB is
fully authorized to impose fines in the nature of civil penalty for
violations of its rules and regulations. To deprive the CAB of that
power would amount to an absurd interpretation of the pertinent
legal provision because the CAB is given full power on its own
initiative to determine whether to "impose, remit, mitigate,
increase or compromise" "fines and civil penalties", a power
which is expressly given to the Civil Aeronautics Administrator
whose orders or decision may be reviewed, revised, reversed,
modified or affirmed by the CAB.

Upon PALs Motion for Reconsideration, the fine was reduced to P


2,500.
ISSUES: Does the CAB have the authority to impose fines? ->
YESSSssss
RATIO: RA 776, which created the CAB, imposed upon it the
standard that in the exercise and performance of its powers and
duties, it shall consider among other things, "as being in the
public interest, and in accordance with the public convenience
and necessity" certain declared policies which include (c) The
regulation of air transportation in such manner as to recognize
and preserve the inherent advantage of, assure the highest
degree of safety in, and foster sound economic condition in,
such transportation and to improve the relation between, and
coordinate transportation by, air carriers; and (f) To promote
safety of flight in air commerce in the Philippines.

RULING: Resolution appealed from is MODIFIED by reducing the


administrative fine imposed on the appellant PAL to ONE
HUNDRED PESOS

The CAB has the power to "investigate, upon complaint or upon


its own initiative, whether any individual or air carrier, domestic
or foreign, is violating any provision of this act, or the rules and
regulations issued thereunder, and shall take such action,
consistent with the provisions of this Act, as may be necessary
to prevent further violation of such provisions, or rules and
regulations so issued
Likewise, the CAB has the power to "review, revise, reverse,
modify or affirm on appeal any administrative decision or order"
of the Civil Aeronautics Administrator on matters pertaining to
"imposition of civil penalty or fine in connection with the
violation of any provision of this Act or rules and regulations
issued thereunder." It has the power also "either on its own
initiative or upon review on appeal from an order or decision of
the Civil Aeronautics Administrator, to determine whether to

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membership, and thus (3) they had interfered with their right to
organize.

Scoty's Dept. Store v. Micaller

CIR DECISION:
The CIR found the employers guilty of unfair labor practice, and
ordered payment o a fine of P100, reinstatement, and backwages.
On appeal, they assail the findings of fact as well as the legality of
the imposition of a fine of P100.

August 25, 1956


Bautista Angelo, J.
SUMMARY: CIR imposed, in an unfair labor practice case, imposed a
fine of P100 upon the employers, pursuant to the penal provisions of
Section 25, Industrial Peace Act. The provision did not specify which
court may impose the penalty, but Section 2(a) of the same states that
"court" refers to the CIR, unless otherwise specified. The SC, however,
ruled that the "court" therein cannot refer to the CIR since (1) it would
violate the right of the accused, and (2) comparing the jurisdiction of
the Court of Agrarian Relations and the CIR, they were intended to have
exclusive jurisdiction over civil matters, not criminal.
DOCTRINE: The power to impose the penalties provided for in Section
25 of RA 875 is lodged in ordinary courts, notwithstanding the definition
of the word "court" contained in Section 2(a).

ARGUMENTS OF THE EMPLOYERS:


Section 25, Industrial Peace Act, on penalties for unfair labor
practice, being penal in character, should be strictly construed in favor
of the accused, such that guilt can only be established by clear and
positive evidence, not merely presumptions. The evidence against the
other owners are not clear enough to serve as basis for their conviction.
ISSUES:
[1] Did the employers commit unfair labor practice? YES.
[2] Can the CIR legally impose upon the employers the fine of P100?
NO.
RATIO:
[1] The law on this point is a recent enactment, such that what
constitutes unfair labor practice may be difficult to determine for lack of
precedents. However, American cases, with similar circumstances, may
be resorted to, such as NLRB v. Harris-Woodson Co., which, citing
another case, held that "questioning of employees as to membership in
the union and of anti-union expressions by the company's
superintendent made is such a way as to discourage union
membership" is unfair labor practice [the citation said it is "condemned
as a violation of the Act"]. Given the binding findings of fact of the CIR,
the employers did commit unfair labor practice.
[2] Section 25 does not specify which court may impose the
penalties provided. While Section 2(a) states that "court" refers to the
CIR, unless otherwise specified, it cannot be so under Section 25.
Otherwise, it would violate the constitutionally-guaranteed rights of the
accused.
The provisions laid down by law to be observed by the CIR in dealing
with unfair labor practice cases negates those rights, since, among
others, they provide that "the rules of evidence prevailing in courts of
law or equity shall not be controlling" and "all reasonable means to
ascertain the facts in each case speedily and objectively and without
regard to technicalities of law and procedure" shall be used. Also, CIR is
not bound solely by the evidence presented during the hearing. These
are against due process. Requiring the CIR to strictly observe the
applicable rules is no remedy, for it would be tantamount to amending
the law.
Compared to RA 1267, which provides for the jurisdiction of the Court
of Agrarian Relations (CAR), stating that "[c]riminal proceedings should
be prosecuted as in ordinary cases," RA 875 is silent as to the

FACTS:
Nena Micaller was employed as a salesgirl in the Scoty's Department
Store, owned and operated by Yu Ki Lam, Richard Yang, Yu Si Kiao, and
Helen Yang. She was earning P4.80 a day. After every new year, she was
given from P180 to P200 as bonus. Other employees were only given
P60. She was also given the first prize for being the best seller, most
cooperative, and most honest employee for 3 consecutive years.
On October 1953, she organized a union, later affiliated with the
National Labor Union (NLU), which then sent a petition to the employers
containing 10 demands. Micaller was then called for questioning, and
was asked who the members of the union were. She pretended no to
know them
Later, Yang and Kiao went to Micaller's house to question her again
regarding her union membership. Still later, she was brought to the
counsel for the employers and questioned about her union activities.
She was made to sign a paper of withdrawal from the union.
Lam, on the other hand, questioned asked each and every employee
of their union membership and threatened to close the store if they
would not dissolved the union. The union thus gave a notice of strike to
the management, which then hired temporary employees affiliated with
another union.
Soon after, an informations for threats and slander were filed against
Micaller. Then she was dismissed from work for "insulting the owner xxx
and for talking to the girls inside the store during business hours."
She filed charges of unfair labor practice, under Section 5, Industrial
Peace Act (RA 875), alleging that (1) she was dismissed because of her
membership in the National Labor Union, (2) prior to her dismissal, her
employers had been questioning their employees regarding their union

24

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW | B2015


LAW: Section 19 of Act No. 355 (AN ACT TO CONSTITUTE THE CUSTOMS
SERVICE OF THE PHILIPPINE ARCHIPELAGO AND TO PROVIDE FOR THE
ADMINISTRATION THEREOF)

procedure. This is a clear indication that, had the Congress intend to


confer criminal jurisdiction upon an administrative court, it would have
expressly provided so.
Again, Congress expressed its intention when it repealed, through RA
1409, this criminal jurisdiction of CAR. The legislative record of this
repeal show that the intent, in eliminating the criminal jurisdiction, is to
place CAR on the same footing as the Public Service Commission and
the CIR, that is, their jurisdiction is confined exclusively to civil matters.
In conclusion, the power to impose the penalties is lodged in ordinary
courts.

1. A complaint for lighter Maude was filed against the


accused, as the accused was moving her and directing
her movement, when heavily laden with hemp, in the
Pasig River, by bamboo poles in the hands of the crew,
and without steam, sail, or any other external power.
Said act was violative of Pars. 70 and 83 of the Circular.
2. The accused attacked the validity of par. 70 of the
Circular on two grounds: a) It is not authorized by Sec.
19 of Act No. 355 (the content of the said section was
not in the case); b) the interpretation of authorizing the
Collector to promulgate such a law, is void, as
constituting an illegal delegation of legislative power.
3. The Attorney-General argued that the accused must be
discharged on the first ground, citing that the rule of the
Collector was unauthorized and illegal,

RULING:
The imposition of fine is illegal. The CIR decision was modified.

US V. Barrias
24 September 1908
Justice Tracey

CFI RULING: CONVICTION.


SUMMARY: Accused was convicted under Circular 397 promulgated
by the Insular Collector of Customs. The accuseds vessel, heavily
laden with hemp, was navigating the Pasig River, without steam, sail,
or any other external power. The regulation required heavily loaded
cargo to be towed by steam or any adequate power. Counsel for the
accused assailed the conviction, arguing that the said Circular was
invalid for the Collector cannot fix the penalty of the law. The Supreme
Court upheld the conviction, NOT on the basis of the said Circular, but
on the basis of a valid Act (Act 1136) that declared that any act, which
violated the rules and regulations, promulgated by the Collector would
be considered a misdemeanor.

CA RULING: n/a
ISSUES: IS THE RULE VALID? NO. The Collector cannot fix the
penalty of the law.
RATIO:
I.

DOCTRINE: One of the settled maxims in constitutional law is, that


the power conferred upon the legislature to make laws can not be
delegated by that department to any body or authority. Where the
sovereign power of the State has located the authority, there it must
remain; only by the constitutional agency alone the laws must be
made until the constitution itself is changed.

If the Court will base the accuseds prosecution on


Sections 54 and 85 of Act No. 1136,then the
regulation of the Collector of Customs is valid. Under
this statute, which was not referred to on the argument, or
in the original briefs, there is no difficulty in sustaining the
regulation of the Collector as coming within the terms of
section 5. Lighterage, mentioned in the Act, is the very
business in which this vessel was engaged. The necessity
confiding to some local authority the framing, changing, and
enforcing of harbor regulations is recognized throughout the

SEC. 5. The Collector of Customs for the Philippine Islands is hereby authorized,
empowered, and directed to promptly make and publish suitable rules and regulations to
carry this law into effect and to regulate the business herein licensed.

FACTS:
RULE: Paragraphs 702 and 833 of Circular No. 397 of the Insular
Collector of Customs

SEC. 8. Any person who shall violate the provisions of this Act, or of any rule or regulation
made and issued by the Collector of Customs for the Philippine Islands, under and by
authority of this Act, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction shall be
punished by imprisonment for not more than six months, or by a fine of not more than one
hundred dollars, United States currency, or by both such fine and imprisonment, at the
discretion of the court; Provided, That violations of law may be punished either by the
method prescribed in section seven hereof, or by that prescribed in this section or by both.

No heavily loaded casco, lighter, or other similar craft shall be permitted to move in the
Pasig River without being towed by steam or moved by other adequate power.
3

For the violation of any part of the foregoing regulations, the persons offending shall be
liable to a fine of not less than P5 and not more than P500, in the discretion of the court.

25

II.

A.

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW | B2015


B. If the prosecution would base its complaint on the aforesaid
Circular, the accused must be exculpated. HOWEVER, there
is another law wherein the accused may be convicted, and
that is Act No. 1136. The reference to the said Circular is not
material. Where an offense is correctly described in the
complaint an additional reference to a wrong statute is
immaterial.

world, as each region and each a harbor requires peculiar


use more minute than could be enacted by the central
lawmaking power, and which, when kept within the proper
scope, are in their nature police regulations not involving an
undue grant of legislative power.
However, the complaint was based on violations of Act. No.
355, as amended by Act Nos. 1235 and 1480. Under Act No.
1235, the Collector is not only empowered to make
regulations, but also to fix penalties for violation
thereof, not exceeding a fine of P 500. This fact presents a
serious question.
PRINCIPLE: One of the settled maxims in constitutional law
is, that the power conferred upon the legislature to make
laws can not be delegated by that department to any body
or authority. (Cooley's Constitutional limitations, 6th ed., p.
137.) This doctrine is based on the principle that a
delegated power constitutes not only a right but a duty to
be performed by the delegate by the instrumentality of his
own judgment acting immediately upon the matter of
legislation and not through the intervening mind of another.
1.
In US V. Breen, an Act of Congress allowing the
Secretary of War to make such rules and
regulations as might be necessary to protect
improvements of the Mississipi River, and
providing that a violation thereof should constitute
a misdemeanor, was sustained on the ground that
the misdemeanor was declared not under the
delegated power of the Secretary of War, but in
the Act of Congress, itself.
2.
In US V. Ormsbee, an Act of Congress allowing the
Secretary of War to prescribe rules for the use of
the canals was upheld, but a law authorizing the
said Secretary to require alteration of bridge and
to impose penalties for vilations of his rules was
invalid.
3.
In In re Kollock, it was held that the criminal
offense is fully and completely defined by the Act
and the designation by the Commissioner of the
particular marks and brands to be used was a
mere matter of detail.
4.
In Martin v. Witherspoon, it was held that the
legislature may delegate to the governer the
power to make pilot regulations.
5.
In The Board of Harbor Commissioners V. Excelsior,
the Court held that Conceding that the legislature
could delegate to the plaintiff the authority to
make rules and regulation with reference to the
navigation of Humboldt Bay, the penalty for the
violation of such rules and regulations is a matter
purely in the hands of the legislature.

RULING: The judgment of CFI, convicting the accused based on


Act. 355 and 1235 us REVOKED. However, the accused is
CONVICTED of a misdemeanor punished by Act 1136.

RADIO COMMUNICATIONS OF
THE PHILIPPINES, INC (RCPI)
v BOARD OF
COMMUNICATIONS
November 29, 1977
Martin, J.
Ana

SUMMARY: The case is a consolidation of two petitions


regarding the jurisdiction of the Board of Communications over
claims for damages suffered by private respondents Diego
Morales and Pacifico Innociencio due to the failure of RCPI to
send them the corresponding telegrams sent to them by their
relatives. After hearing, the Board of Communications imposed
upon petitioner a disciplinary fine of P200 pursuant to Sec. 21
of Commonwealth Act 146, as amended by PD 1 and Letter of
Implementation No. 1. The Board found that the services
rendered by petitioner was inadequate and unsatisfactory. RCPI
filed a petition for review by certiorari with the Supreme Court
regarding the decision of the Board of Communications.
DOCTRINE:
1. The Public Service Commission and its successor-ininterest, the Board of Communications, being a
creature of the legislature and not a court, can exercise
only such jurisdiction and powers as are expressly or by
necessary implicationconferred upon it by statute.
2. The power of the Board to issue certificates of public

26

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW | B2015

6. RCPI filed a petition for review by certiorari with the


Supreme Court regarding the decision of the Board of
Communications.

convenience does not carry with it the power of


supervision and control over matters not related to
the issuance of certificate of public convenience.
3. Damages arising from breach of contractual obligation
must be ventilated in the regular courts.
4. The payment of fine under Sec. 21 of the Public Service
Act is imposed only for violations or failure to comply
with the terms and conditions of any certificate or any
orders, decisions, regulations of the Commission. It
does not include breach of contractual obligation.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the Board of Communications has the
power to impose a fine for the breach committed by
RCPI?
2. Whether or not the Board of Communications has
jurisdiction over the claim of damages for RCPIs breach
of contractual obligations?

FACTS:
1. The case is a consolidation of two petitions regarding the
jurisdiction of the Board of Communications over claims
for damages suffered by private respondents Diego
Morales and Pacifico Innociencio due to the failure of RCPI
to send them the corresponding telegrams sent to them
by their relatives.
2. In the case of Diego Morales, he claims that his daughter
sent him a telegram from Santiago, Isabela informing him
of the death of his wife. He did not receive the said
telegram and had to be informed personally about the
death of his wife. He had to take the trip by airplane to
Isabela. According to RCPI, the signal became
intermittent when they were relaying the telegram from
Isabela to Cubao, QC, which made the copy unreadable
and unintelligible.
3. On the other hand, Pacifico Innocencio claims that he
never received the telegram sent by Lourdes Innocencio
for the purpose of informing him about the death of their
father. The telegram was sent in Paniqui, Tarlac and was
supposed to be delivered to Innocencio in Cavinti, laguna.
He was not able to attend the interment of their father at
Tarlac and he was shocked when he learned about the
death of his father and claims that he suffered mental
anguish and personal inconveniences.
4. Both private respondents (Morales and Innocencio claims
for moral damages.
5. After hearing, the Board of Communications imposed
upon petitioner a disciplinary fine of P200 pursuant to
Sec. 21 of Commonwealth Act 146, as amended by PD 1
and Letter of Implementation No. 1. The Board found that
the services rendered by petitioner was inadequate and
unsatisfactory.

RATIO:
1. NO
a. Under Sec. 21 of the Public Service Act, a fine shall
be imposed if the public service violates or
failures to comply with the terms and
conditions of any certificate or any orders,
decisions, or regulations of the Commission.
b. In the two cases, RCPI is not charged with violating
or failing to comply with any orders, decisions, or
regulations of the Commissions. There are also no
complaints regarding the terms and conditions of
the certificate of public convenience issued to
RCPI. Rather, private respondents are asking for
damages for breach of contractual obligations
through negligence under the Civil Code.
c. Likewise, the charges does not relate toe the
management of the facilities and systems of
transmission of messages by petitioner in
accordance
with its certificate of
public
convenience.
2. NO

27

a. The Public Service Commission and its successorin-interest, the Board of Communications, being a
creature of the legislature and not a court, can
exercise only such jurisdiction and powers as are
expressly or by necessarily implication conferred
upon it by statute
b. The jurisdiction and functions of the Board of
Communications are those provided for in the
Public Service Act, which created its
successor-in-interest.
c. The Public Service Act confers upon the Board the
power to issue certificate of public convenience

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW | B2015


BP 33 also sets the monetary penalty for violators to a minimum
of P20,000 and a maximum of P50,000.
In implementation of BP 33, the DOE issued Circular No.
2000-06-10. Here is a breakdown of the penal provisions:
1. Sec. 4 No price display board
2. Sec. 5 No weighing scale
3. Sec. 6 No tare weight or incorrect tare weight markings
4. Sec. 7 No appropriate or authorized LPG seal
5. Sec. 8 No trade name, unauthorized LPG cylinders, no serial
number, no distinguishing color, no embossed identifying
markings on cylinder or distinctive collar design
6. Sec. 9 Underfilled LPG cylinders
7. Sec. 10 Tampering, altering, or modifying of LPG cylinder thru
any means by any person or entity other than the legitimate
and registered owner of the same
8. Sec. 11 Unauthorized decanting or refilling of LPG cylinders
9. Sec. 12 Hoarding of petroleum products including LPG
10. Sec. 13 Refusal to allow or cooperate with duly authorized
inspectors of the Energy Administration Bureau of the DOE
11. Sec. 14 Refusal or failure to pay fine

but it does not carry with it the power of


supervision and control over matters not related
to the issuance of certificate of public convenience
or in the performance therewith in a manner
suitable to promote public interest.
d. The claim for damages must be ventilated in the
proper courts and not through the Board.
RULING:
The decisions of respondent Board of Communications in both
cases are hereby reversed, set aside, declared null and void for
lack of jurisdiction to take cognizance of both cases.

PEREZ v. LPG REFILLERS


ASSOC.
OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC.

LPG Refillers Association of the Philippines, Inc. asked the DOE to


set aside the Circular for being contrary to law. The DOE denied.

June 26, 2006


Quisumbing, J
Luciano, Noel Christian

PETITION OF LPG REFILLERS: LPG Refillers filed a petition for


prohibition and annulment with prayer for TRO and/or writ of
preliminary injunction with the RTC.

SUMMARY: BP 33 penalizes illegal trading, hoarding, overpricing,


adulteration, underdelivery, and underfilling of petroleum products and
of underfilled LPG cylinders. It also sets the minimum and maximum
monetary penalty for violators. In implementation of BP 33, the DOE
issued Circular No. 2000-06-10. LPG Refillers Association of the
Philippines, Inc. asked the DOE to set aside the Circular for being
contrary to law. The RTC invalidated the Circular. The SC reversed, and
held that the Circular is VALID.

RTC DECISION: The RTC nullified the Circular. It held that:


1. The Circular introduced new offenses not included in the law
2. The Circular, in providing penalties on a per cylinder basis for
each violation, might exceed the maximum penalty under BP 33
DOE Secretary Perez filed a Motion for Reconsideration. The RTC denied.
Hence, this petition.

DOCTRINE: For and administration regulation to have the force of penal


law, the following requisites must be complied with:
1. The violation of the administrative regulation must be made
a crime by the delegating statute itself,
2. The penalty for such violation must be provided by the
statute itself
BP 33, which defines what constitute punishable acts involving
petroleum products and which set the minimum and maximum limits for
the penalties. The Circular merely implements the said law. Albeit it is
silent on the maximum pecuniary penalty for the refillers, marketers,
and dealers. Nothing in the Circular contravenes the law.

ARGUMENTS OF SEC. PEREZ:


1. The penalties for the acts and omissions enumerated in the
Circular are sanctioned by Sec. 1 and 3-A of BP 33 and Sec. 23
of RA 8479 (An Act Deregulating the Downstream Oil Industry,
and for Other Purposes)
2. Sec. 5(g) and 21 of RA 7638 (An Act Creating the DOE) also
authorize the DOE to impose the penalties provided in the
Circular
ARGUMENTS OF LPG REFILLERS:
1. The enabling laws, BP 33 and RA 8479, do not expressly
penalize the acts and omissions enumerated in the Circular
2. The Circular is not supported by RA 7638 since the said law
does not pertain to LPG traders

FACTS: Batas Pambansa Blg. 33 penalizes illegal trading, hoarding,


overpricing, adulteration, underdelivery, and underfilling of petroleum
products and of underfilled LPG cylinders.

28

3.

The Circular is not in conformity with the law it seeks to


implement

a.
b.

ISSUE: WON the RTC erred in declaring the provisions of the Circular
null and void, and prohibiting the Circulars implementation.

IV.

Note also that the enabling laws on which the Circular is based
were specifically intended to provide the DOE with increased
administrative and penal measures with which to effectively
curtail rampant adulteration and shortselling which are inimical
to public interest

V.

To nullify the Circular would be to render inutile government


efforts to protect the general consuming public against the
nefarious practices of some unscrupulous LPG traders

HELD: YES, the Circular is VALID.


RATIO:
I.
For and administration regulation to have the force of
penal law, the following requisites must be complied with:
3. The violation of the administrative regulation must be made
a crime by the delegating statute itself,
4. The penalty for such violation must be provided by the
statute itself
II.

III.

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW | B2015


Albeit it is silent on the maximum pecuniary penalty
for the refillers, marketers, and dealers
Nothing in the Circular contravenes the law

DISPOSITIVE: Wherefore, petition is granted. The assailed DOE Circular


is declared VALID. The RTC decision is REVERSED.

The Circular complies with the First Requisite


A. BP 33, as amended, criminalizes illegal trading,
adulteration, underfilling, hoarding, and overpricing of
petroleum products
B. Under the general description under BP 33, the Circular
merely lists the various modes by which the said criminal
acts may be perpetrated
1. The specific acts and omissions are obviously within the
contemplation of the law,
a. The law seeks to curb the pernicious practices of
some petroleum merchants

Public Hearing Committee of the


LLDA v. SM Prime Holding Inc.
September 22, 2010
Peralta, J.
Arn
Summary: In an inspection held by LLDA on the water
samples from SM Manila, it found that the effluent waters of
the establishment failed to conform to the standard impose
by law. Because of this, LLDA issued an order imposing a fine
on SM Manila. SM Manila now assails the authority of LLDA to
impose fines. CA reversed the order of LLDA and held that
there is no law specifically granting LLDA the power to
impose fines and penalties. SC reversed the CA and held that
LLDA has the power to impose fines pursuant to an earlier
decision and its charter, RA 4850.

The Circular complies with the Second Requisite


A. Under BP 33, the monetary penalty for any person who
commits any of the acts is limited to a minimum of P20,000
and a maximum of P50,000
B. Under the Circular:
1. The maximum pecuniary penalty for retail outlets is
P20,000
a. This amount is WITHIN the contemplation of the law
2. However, for the REFILLERS, MARKETERS, and
DEALERS, the Circular is SILENT as to any maximum
monetary penalty
a. But this silence DOES NOT amount to a violation
3. The mere fact that the Circular provides penalties on a
per cylinder basis does not itself run counter to the law
a. Note that all BP 33 prescribes are the minimum and
maximum limits of penalties
C. It is thus clear that:
1. BP 33, which defines what constitute punishable acts
involving petroleum products and which set the
minimum and maximum limits for the penalties
2. The Circular merely implements the said law

(Not explicitly stated) In general, an


administrative agency cannot impose fines or penalties
Doctrine:

FACTS:
The instant petition arose from an inspection
conducted by the Pollution Control Division of the Laguna
29

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW | B2015

Lake Development Authority(LLDA) of the wastewater


collected from SM City Manila branch. The results of the
laboratory tests showed that the sample collected from the
said facility failed to conform with the effluent standards
for inland water imposed in accordance with law.

impose fines for violations of effluent standards set by law.


Thus, the CA held that the assailed Orders of petitioner,
which imposed a fine on respondent, are issued without
jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion.

The LLDA informed SM Manila of its violation,


directing the same to perform corrective measures to
abate or control the pollution caused by the said company
and ordering the same to pay a penalty of P1,000 per day
of discharging pollutive wastewater until full cessation of
discharging pollutive wastewater.

ISSUES:
1. WON the petition for certiorari filed by SM with the
CA is premature? YES.
The Court agrees with LLDA that SM did not exhaust
administrative remedies before filing a petition
for certiorari with the CA. Also, the Court is not
persuaded by respondent's contention that the
special civil action for certiorari it filed with the CA
involved only purely legal questions and did not
raise factual issues. A perusal of the petition
for certiorari filed by respondent readily shows that
factual matters were raised. Since the matters
raised by respondent involve factual issues, the
questioned Orders of the LLDA should have been
brought first before the DENR which has
administrative supervision of the LLDA.

In a letter, SMs Pollution Control Officer requested


the LLDA to conduct a re-sampling of their effluent,
claiming that they already took measures to enable their
sewage treatment plant to meet the standards set forth by
the LLDA.
Later, in an Order to Pay, LLDA required SM to pay a
fine of P50,000 which represents the accumulated daily
penalty.
In two follow-up letters which were treated by the
LLDA as a motion for reconsideration, SM asked for a
waiver of the fine assessed by the LLDA on the ground that
they immediately undertook corrective measures and that
the pH levels of its effluent were already controlled even
prior to their request for re-sampling leading to a minimal
damage to the environment.

2. WON the CA has jurisdiction over the case at bar?


YES.
Rule 43 refers to appeals from judgments or orders
of quasi-judicial agencies in the exercise of their
quasi-judicial functions. On the other hand, Rule 65
of the Rules of Court specifically governs special
civil actions for certiorari, Section 4 of which
provides that if the petition involves acts or
omissions of a quasi-judicial agency, and unless
otherwise provided by law or the rules, the petition
shall be filed in and cognizable only by the CA. Thus,
it is clear that jurisdiction over acts or omissions of
the LLDA belong to the CA.

LLDA issued an Order denying respondent's request


for a waiver of the fine imposed on the latter.
SM filed a petition for certiorari with the CA. CA
rendered its Decision granting the petition of SM and
reversing and setting aside the assailed Orders of the
LLDA. Ruling that an administrative agency's power to
impose fines should be expressly granted and may not be
implied, the CA found that under its charter, RA 4850, the
LLDA is not expressly granted any power or authority to

3. WON SM is stopped from assailing LLDAs


power to impose fines? YES.
30

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW | B2015

The Court agrees with petitioners that respondent is


already estopped from questioning the power of the
LLDA to impose fines as penalty owing to the fact
that respondent actively participated during the
hearing of its water pollution case before the LLDA
without impugning such power of the said agency. In
fact, respondent even asked for a reconsideration of
the Order of the LLDA.

compensation for damages resulting from failure to


meet
established
water
and
effluent
standards. Section 4-A provides, thus:
Sec. 4-A. Compensation for
damages to the water and aquatic
resources of Laguna de Bay and its
tributaries resulting from failure to
meet established water and effluent
quality standards and from such other
wrongful act or omission of a person,
private or public, juridical or otherwise,
punishable under the law shall be
awarded to the Authority to be
earmarked for water quality control
management.

4. WON LLDA has in fact the power to impose


fines in the exercise of its function as a
regulatory and quasi-judicial body with
respect to pollution cases in the Laguna Lake
region? YES.
In Pacific Steam Laundry, Inc. v. Laguna Lake
Development Authority, the SC held that LLDA has
the power to impose fines in the exercise of its
function as a regulatory and quasi-judicial body with
respect to pollution cases in the Laguna Lake
region. The Court held that the adjudication of
pollution cases generally pertains to the Pollution
Adjudication Board (PAB), except where a special
law, such as the LLDA Charter, provides for another
forum. The Court further ruled that although the PAB
assumed the powers and functions of the National
Pollution Control Commission with respect to
adjudication of pollution cases, this does not
preclude the LLDA from assuming jurisdiction of
pollution cases within its area of responsibility and
to impose fines as penalty.

Dispositive:
WHEREFORE,
the
petition
is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals, and
the Resolution are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Orders of the Laguna Lake Development Authority, are
hereby REINSTATED and AFFIRMED.

In the earlier case of The Alexandra Condominium


Corporation
v.
Laguna
Lake
Development
Authority, this Court affirmed the ruling of the CA
which sustained the LLDA's Order requiring the
petitioner therein to pay a fine representing penalty
for pollutive wastewater discharge. In that case, the
Court acknowledged the power of the LLDA to
impose fines holding that under Section 4-A of RA
4850, as amended, the LLDA is entitled to
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