Which laws of physics? thermodynamics? gravity? quantum mechanics? near or even pre- T=0 at the Big Bang? pre-quantum vacuum fluctuation? All which, taken together, remain unreconciled, non- normalizable? In our emergent cosmos, laws have, themselves, evolved. The regularities we observe may be very local, indeed. Cosmically, they may be as local, spatially and temporally, as the by-laws of your neighborhood fantasy football league. That's why, in fact, so many humeans resist extrapolating the methodological stipulations of the principle of sufficient reason into metaphysical conclusions about the principles of causation. I have no problem with the reasonableness of competing interpretations regarding causations, Aristotelian vs Humean, but one might best be consistent when characterizing laws as real vs apparent, as static vs dynamic, as meaningful inductive inferences or not. While methodological naturalism remains an indispensable epistemic stipulation, it has noadvantage, interpretively, in explaining empirical facts that elude probabilistic methods, because one cannot a priori know when one has been epistemically thwarted by methodological constraints, which might be temporary, or metaphysically halted by an in-principle ontological occulting, which would be permanent (due to some event horizon). I think of GK Chesterton who said something along the lines that it's not so much that anything in particular seems extraordinary to him. Everything, in general, seems extraordinary. I think of Wittgenstein who said that it's not HOW things are but THAT things are, which is the mystical. I think of John Haldane who said that reality is not only stranger than we imagine but stranger than we CAN imagine. Some theologians suggest, similarly, that nothing in particular but everything in general is supernatural. None of this is to suggest that divine interactivitymight not present in degrees, but I resist the temptation to overexplain how or why God might be intervening here vs there, now vs then, because it raises the same theodicy issues as the realities of suffering and evil. Consistent with the thrust of the OP, then, one brings an interpretive stance to reality writ large regarding the plausibility of the supernatural, in general, Regarding any putative exceptional degree of divine interactivity, in particular, a certain agnosticism seems appropriate, although the closer one is in relationship to the putative miracle or its recipient(s), the greater the epistemic force of the explanation, I reckon. No. My point remains that we cannot a priori know when our modeling power's limits are methodological (mapping errors) or metaphysical (territorial inaccessibility). And, no, there is no grand unified (fundamental) theory. A theory of everything, in principle, facesthe godelian implications of choosing between consistency or completeness (we have neither, yet, anyway). Axiomatic questions will always beg, in principle, when formulated in formal, closed symbol systems (e.g. mathematics). The godelian trope: we can model the rules but not EXPLAIN them. p.s. An emergentist stance is not terribly controversial? unpredictable novelty, that something more from nothing but we witness in evolution, from thermodynamics thru morphodynamics thru teleodynamics. Of course we stipulate to methodological naturalism. I absolutely agree that inquiry should proceed, never presupposing metaphysical inaccessibility. My point was that methodological naturalism doesn't entail philosophical naturalism. The suggestion THAT something probabilistically inexplicable may have taken place interprets empirical facts, that interpretation not aspiring todescribe HOW. It involves abductive inference regarding effects that appear proper to no known causes. Without additional information, abductive and deductive inference can cycle only ina plausibilistic manner without the benefit of inductive testing, probabilistically (with triadic inference). The interpretive stance relies, therefore, on possibly successful references to unknown causes but not to successful descriptions. We would need a LOT more info than appears available, presently, to begin hypothetical mapping. Not to suggest it might never become accessible. Descriptive modeling power failures lead to interpretive heuristic impasses precisely because competing plausibilistic inferences, like those surrounding the resurrection event, are incredibly weak compared to probabilistic inferences. Perhaps you are familiar with Ehrman's work: http://www .reasonablefaith.org... While I am sympathetic to Swinburne's account insofar as it seems eminently reasonable, plausible, I otherwise defer to Ehrman's observation that competing interpretations of the Resurrection Eventcan not be decisively adjudicated probabilistically, evidentially, historically. Foremost, it requires a leap. of faith. This is to observe that, unless new evidence turns up, your proposed mapping exercise remains untenable, in practice, although I endorse your pursuit, in theory, to get at the bottom of any event. >>> If you are going to add something with sucha high degree of complexity as bodily resurrection to your standard model, you'd better have a really good reason for doing so. <<< The normative impetus for any given interpretive stance will indeed vary based on what one aspires to do with it. For example, most seem to apply, consistent with our axiological evolutionary epistemology, an equiprobability principle, which prescribes the most life-giving and relationship-enhancing response, performatively, whenever epistemically thwarted, informatively. For another example, while we all use the same rules of evidence, juridically, we have established different burdens of proof, again, basedon what one aspires to do with that evidence. The rules of evidence function like our "standard model," descriptively and probabilistically. Our interpretive stances regarding putative ultimate realities are then justified normatively, like the burdens of proof and equiprobability principles. Our interpretive stances regarding ultimate realities go beyond our standard models but not without them, are suggestive not decisive. Those who affirm an interpretation of the Resurrection Event through the eyes of faith have already, whether implicitly or explicitly, justified the reasonableness of their belief via the philosophical preambles of faith. The Resurrection Event belief per se, then, becomes part and parcel of their interpretive stance toward ultimate reality, affirming THAT it happened, but not part of our standard model vis a vis HOW. What anyone aspires to do with this or any other interpretive stance, I'll grant, may or may not be justifiable. But it's not prima facie unjustifiable.Assuming that anything declared a miracle has dutifully and diligently been declared a statistical outlier, that, after earnest probabilistic inquiry, investigators are at the end of their epistemic rope ... It's no longer an evidential project, or it gets way backburnered, waiting for methodological improvements ... Which is why, when the church approves a miracle, all it's claiming is that it's not unreasonable to infer an extraordinary manifestation of divine interactivity or NOT. The "explanations" of faith (like a tautology) do not add new information to our probabilistic systems, which does not make them untrue only uninformative, not ampliative, scientifically. From a faith-based interpretive stance, one's mileage might vary--- not descriptively, but --- evaluatively, not just in terms of awe and wonder, cognitively, but relationally, going beyond love of self, other and cosmos, proximately, to various ways of being-in- love with ultimate reality, as celebrated by thedifferent sophiological trajectories (orientations toward different divine aspects or attributes) of our great traditions. The reasonableness of declaring something conceivably, not definitively, miraculous, likely involves a set of circumstances or combination of inexplicable phenomena that tend to be rather hypercomplex, a convergence of incidents, each with implausible odds. miracles, resurrection event, religious epistemology, methodological naturalism, metaphysical naturalism, philosophical naturalism, grand unified theory, theory of everything, equiprobability principle, rules of evidence, burdens of proof, supernatural