Development Policy Review, 2012, 30 (4): 451-472

Policy Sequencing and the Development of Rice

Value Chains in Senegal
Matty Demont and Amy C. Rizzotto
In response to the world food crisis in 2008, Senegal developed a
productivist national food self-sufficiency programme. However, the
critical question is not whether the programme can meet its ambitious
target of self-sufficiency in rice production by 2015, but, if it does, how will
domestic rice reach urban markets, where consumers generally prefer
imported rice for its superior grain quality. Information collected through
interviews and a stakeholder workshop advances the argument that policy
sequencing will be crucial in order to upgrade Senegalese rice value
chains progressively. Any large-scale investments in productivity will need
to be preceded by investments in post-harvest grain-quality infrastructure
before sector-wide marketing strategies can be adopted that enhance the
chain competitiveness of domestic relative to imported rice.
Key words: Policy sequencing, food security, food quality, food crisis, public
investment, value chain, economic development, self-sufficiency, urban
consumer, import substitution

Introduction

Since independence in 1960, the demand for rice in Senegal has increased by 7% per
year on average (Rutsaert et al., 2012). With a growing urban population in the 1980s
and 1990s, rice overtook millet and sorghum as the main staple cereal in cities because
it cooks quickly and is relatively easy to prepare (Brntrup et al., 2006). With one of the
highest urbanisation rates in Africa, 3.2% a year during 200510 (United Nations
Statistics Division, 2011), the Senegalese appetite for rice as a convenience food is
unlikely to diminish. In 2011, rice consumption surpassed 1.14 million tons with an
average per capita consumption of 92 kg. National rice production amounted to

Respectively, Agricultural Economist (m.demont@cgiar.org), and Visiting Research Fellow/United States

Fulbright Research Grantee, Africa Rice Center (AfricaRice), B.P. 96, Saint-Louis, Senegal. Financing
from the European Union and United States Fulbright Program is gratefully acknowledged. This research
was made possible thanks to the valuable input of the stakeholders of the rice value chain in Senegal and
the partners ISRA (Institut Sngalais de Recherches Agricoles), PINORD (Plateforme dAppui aux
Initiatives du Nord), JICA (Japan International Cooperation Agency), ITA (Institut de Technologie
Alimentaire), USAID (United States Agency for International Development), and SAED (Socit
dAmnagement et dExploitation des terres du Delta et des valles du fleuve Sngal et de la Falm),
and from the participants of a workshop organised by AfricaRice, ISRA, PINORD, JICA and ITA in
Dakar on 10 March 2010. Participants at the Africa Rice Congress, Bamako, Mali, 22-26 March 2010 are
also thanked for their useful feedback on an earlier version of this article.

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Matty Demont and Amy C. Rizzotto

approximately 455,000 tons while imports exceeded 700,000 tons (USDA, 2011). To
ensure food security, Senegal needs to cover more than the 40% of demand that it
currently satisfies with its domestic production.
Historically, the Senegalese government has focused development efforts on
production. Since the 1980s, it has invested in fertiliser, finance and infrastructure for
production through its agricultural extension agency, SAED (Socit dAmnagement
et dExploitation des terres du Delta et des valles du fleuve Sngal et de la Falm),
but has failed to provide the support necessary to make domestic rice a viable
commercial competitor with imported rice. In 2008, the World Banks World
Development Report propelled agriculture to the forefront of the international
development debate. The same year, in response to the mounting food crisis, Senegalese
President Abdoulaye Wade launched the Great Agricultural Offensive for Food and
Abundance (GOANA). The Senegalese government has stated that it aims to entirely
cover national consumption needs with domestic rice by 2015, mainly through large
investments in existing and new rice perimeters in the Senegal River Valley (SRV). In
order to achieve this goal, the programme has to raise rice production to at least one
million tons (MAE, 2008). While GOANA and the subsequent National Rice Selfsufficiency Programme (PNAR) have ambitious aims and promising strategies to
bolster production, they suffer from the same flaws as past productivist governmental
attempts to develop the rice sector. In addition to their production focus, both
programmes largely fail to acknowledge the importance of the private sector and endmarkets in the growth of the domestic rice industry. If production does increase at the
rates prescribed in both plans, who will buy the rice? Recent surveys indicate that a
substantial proportion of urban consumers are unaware that SRV rice even exists (Fall
et al., 2007). In addition, an important segment of those who are aware perceive the
grain quality of SRV rice to be inferior to that of imported broken rice.
Much has been written about the agronomic and economic constraints confronting
growers of irrigated rice in the SRV (for example, Pearson et al., 1981; Haefele et al.,
2002; Johnson et al., 2004; Poussin et al., 2006; Rodenburg and Johnson, 2009; Demont
et al., 2009; de Mey et al., 2012), but little attention has been paid to the end-market
challenges of consumer preferences for imported rice, their lack of awareness of local
rice, and the general perception of its being of lower quality than imported rice an old
1
critique already raised by Ross (1983). What does exist is a large body of literature
analysing the effectiveness of price policies in reversing the trend from traditional
domestic coarse grains (maize, millet, and sorghum) to imported wheat and rice in West
Africa (Kelly et al., 1995; Reardon et al., 1997; Akindes, 1999; Diagana et al., 1999;
Diagana and Reardon, 1999; Singare et al., 1999). The conclusion from this research is
that price policies do not work owing to the low price response of rice producers and
consumers. This advances the proposition that policies should target the intrinsic, nonprice characteristics of rice for example, product quality tailored to consumer
preferences. The development world is beginning to catch on to this idea. In Senegal,
1. Ross (1983) argued that even the most comprehensive book on policy and economics of rice in West
Africa (Pearson et al., 1981: 336) failed to discuss the problem of consumer tastes and responsiveness to
the locally grown varieties which would replace rice imports. This issue is particularly important in
Senegal.
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Policy Sequencing and the Development of Rice Value Chains in Senegal 453
this is demonstrated by a recent joint development report on rice value chains
spearheaded by USAID (2009a), which highlights the need for demand-focused
strategies in West African rice sectors.
This article responds to this call and develops potential policy strategies to develop
rice value chains in Senegal. In particular, we argue that past attempts to develop the
rice sector in Senegal have failed to live up to expectations because of the poor
sequencing of policies. We therefore put forward a different sequence of policy actions
to be undertaken by policy-makers and stakeholders of the rice sector in Senegal. To
support our policy recommendations, we conducted fieldwork in Senegal during the
period 200711 using a variety of information sources. First, we conducted semistructured interviews with the major stakeholders involved in the SRV rice value chain:
farmers and farmer organisations, PINORD (Plateforme dAppui aux Initiatives du
Nord), SAED, JICA (Japan International Co-operation Agency), processors,
distributors, traders, consumers, restaurateurs, and the top three rice importers.
Secondly, we used some insights from a recent consultative Stakeholders Workshop on
Innovative Strategies for Tailoring Senegal River Valley Rice to Senegalese Consumer
Preferences, organised by the Africa Rice Center (AfricaRice) in Dakar, Senegal on 10
March 2010 (Ndour et al., 2010). During the workshop, stakeholders were split into
three groups, each providing a complete representation of the rice supply. The groups
were then asked to construct a virtual enterprise with a strategic action plan for bringing
a quality SRV rice brand to market. This experimental set-up generated interesting
information on the current constraints on value-chain upgrading, the prioritisation and
sequencing of policy actions and investments, and the potential role the stakeholders
and the government could play in value-chain governance.
Thirdly, we used data from recent surveys and expert consultations carried out in
Senegal by AfricaRice, ISRA (Institut Sngalais de Recherches Agricoles), ITA
(Institut de Technologie Alimentaire), SAED, JICA, DAI, USAID, and AFD (Agence
Franaise de Dveloppement) (JICA, 2006; Fall et al., 2007; Fall and Diagne, 2008;
Gergely and Baris, 2009; USAID, 2009a, 2009b, 2009c; Demont and Neven, 2012).
Finally, we used evidence from recent experimental auctions that have been conducted
in the markets of Saint-Louis and Dakar (Demont et al., 2010, 2013).
The rest of the article is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on
policy sequencing and discusses its potential role in value-chain development. Section 3
draws policy lessons from current development programmes of the rice sector in
Senegal and Section 4 puts forward a sequence of policy actions to be undertaken by
stakeholders and policy-makers in the development of rice value chains in Senegal.
Finally, Section 5 concludes with some take-home lessons for policy-makers.

The role of policy sequencing in value-chain development

Many development economists believe that there is, or ought to be, an optimal sequence
of policy reforms. The basic policy-sequencing argument is that there is a widely
applicable, clearly identifiable, set of policy and institutional changes which, if
implemented in a pre-determined order, will optimise the pace and direction of
economic reform (McPherson, 1995). Nsouli et al. (2005) theoretically define policy
sequencing as the order in which either macroeconomic policy actions or specific
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Matty Demont and Amy C. Rizzotto

reforms are introduced (p. 766), and conceptually as the optimal adjustment path that
will maximise the intertemporal social welfare function of a country, subject to financial
and structural constraints (p. 741). However, different authors emphasise the lack of a
theoretical basis for deriving optimal sequences of reform (Spooner and Smith, 1991;
McPherson, 1995; Cole, 1997). Moreover, the debate is often carried out in a vacuum;
typically, concepts are not fully defined, thereby rendering their analyses incomparable
(Nsouli et al., 2005). Lacking any theoretical foundation, analysts have no formal basis
for determining in advance whether particular sequences of policy changes are
optimal, or even right (McPherson, 1995). As a result, the extensive literature on
policy sequencing is inconclusive and often conflicting in the policy advice it provides
(Nsouli et al., 2005). In an attempt to embed policy sequencing in a theoretical
foundation, Toye (1999) analyses the contribution of welfare economics and political
economy to the problem and suggests that policy sequencing may need to be analysed
through operational research methods such as critical path analysis (CPA).
The debate on policy sequencing initially surfaced in the late 1970s and early
1980s with the reform experience of Latin American countries (Nsouli et al., 2005). In
the late 1980s and 1990s, the concept was applied to structural adjustment (Mosley and
Toye, 1988; Spooner and Smith, 1991; McPherson, 1995; Toye, 1999) and trade
liberalisation programmes (Asiedu-Saforo, 1989; Edwards, 1990; McKinnon, 1991;
Falvey and Kim, 1992; Funke, 1993; Cole, 1997; Kherallah and Govindan, 1999), and
later to post-conflict reconstruction (Timilsina, 2006). Much evidence is available on
the poor sequencing of policies in sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries (Asiedu-Saforo,
1989; Spooner and Smith, 1991; McPherson, 1995; Kherallah and Govindan, 1999;
Timilsina, 2006). Spooner and Smith (1991) argued that the structural adjustment
programmes had been carried out in a politically rather than economically rational
sequence and had failed to consider the need for sequencing the various interrelated
components and subcomponents. The failure to recognise the importance of sequencing
issues was a major factor limiting the effectiveness of recovery programmes, in
particular the transition from stabilisation to self-sustained growth. Moreover, the
sequencing of reform programmes can have an important effect on the credibility and
perceived sustainability of attempts at economic liberalisation (Edwards, 1990). There
is an abundant literature, reviewed by Kherallah and Govindan (1999), on the
appropriate sequencing of trade policies, and whether macroeconomic stabilisation
measures should precede efforts at sectoral liberalisation. A great deal of this literature
has focused on the order in which capital controls, domestic financial markets and trade
barriers (both tariffs and quantitative restrictions) should be liberalised.
Building on an earlier review by Funke (1993), Nsouli et al. (2005) provide the
most recent review of the literature on policy sequencing and highlight areas of
agreement as well as the main controversies surrounding sequencing issues. Their broad
overview, however, gives no guidance on specific reform priorities within a given
sector. This issue was raised two decades ago by Spooner and Smith (1991), who
argued that the academic literature and discussions by practitioners had so far focused
little attention on policy sequencing of measures to liberalise a specific market, for
example a produce market in agriculture. The authors argued that there is a profound
ignorance of these factors in most SSA countries, that is hampering the recovery
programmes in which most economies are involved. This so-called micro-policy
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Policy Sequencing and the Development of Rice Value Chains in Senegal 455
sequencing a bottom-up approach contrasting with the top-down macro approach
described above requires a more detailed knowledge of the current constraints facing
farmers and existing and potential traders, the structure and operations of the various
resource, finance and goods markets servicing them, and the linkages between the
farming and trading sectors.
The latter can be best understood through the concept of a value chain, which is
defined as a strategic vertical alliance of non-adversarial relationships between
stakeholders within a products supply chain (Hobbs et al., 2000). The value-chain
approach to market research is a holistic methodology that takes into account all firms
in a market system (Kaplinsky and Morris, 2001); this is especially important for staple
food commodity markets in developing countries in order to find ways to make them
more competitive at every stage. When such markets are more competitive, they will
contribute to self-sufficiency, food security and economic growth. Therefore, the World
Bank (2008) considers establishing efficient value chains as a first policy objective in
developing countries. Moreover, by linking producers to consumers through a shared
objective, value chains present a more sustainable approach to consumption and
production than segmented and adversarial production chains (Demont, 2010). The
main premise behind a value chain is to efficiently capture value in end-markets in
order to generate higher profits and create mutually beneficial outcomes for all firms
involved in a products supply chain from production to consumption. In a value chain,
it is in all stakeholders best interest to work co-operatively with open communication
and transparency.
The major lesson from the literature on policy sequencing is that measures which
aim to encourage supply-side effects need to be set and implemented within the context
of demand-oriented strategies in a mutually enhancing package. The implication is that
efforts at managing aggregate demand need to be in place if supply-enhancing stimuli
are to be effective (Asiedu-Saforo, 1989). Upgrading the SRV rice value chain may
prove to be a good solution for increasing competitiveness, reducing import dependence
and poverty and contributing to food security because it addresses the demand-side of
the equation that past productivist programmes have failed to acknowledge. In other
words, the failure of Senegalese policy-makers to develop competitive value chains for
SRV rice can be partly explained by poor policy sequencing following the abrupt
liberalisation of the rice sector in the early 1990s.

Policy sequencing lessons from the SRV rice sector

3.1 The GOANA programme

Historically, Senegalese policy-makers have focused their development efforts on urban
populations their most important voters and industrialisation. During the colonial
period, cheap broken rice from Asia was imported in large quantities in order to keep
food prices under control, while simultaneously promoting groundnut production as an
important cash crop. This import policy remained unchanged after independence in
1960. Today, Senegal is still a major importer of broken rice (Brntrup et al., 2006).
While the GOANA programme is an ambitious attempt to reverse this historical urban
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bias, Senegalese policy-makers need to realise that they also face the challenge of
reversing its footprint in important urban end-markets where consumers have developed
a marked preference for imported broken rice (Demont et al., 2010).2 The fact that the
two rice types are perceived as imperfect substitutes is reflected on the Saint-Louis
market by the price premiums paid for imported broken rice, averaging 16% relative to
conventional SRV rice (Figure 1). In May 2008, world rice prices tripled in just a few
months to reach 30-year, inflation-adjusted heights. Although the crisis may in part
have been driven by temporary speculation and a weak US dollar, the early evidence
from Figure 1 suggests that there are underlying structural trends that have caused an
increase in the price of rice (and other staple foods) to a higher plateau (Demont and
Neven, 2012). In November 2008, six months after the price spikes, rice prices sharply
eroded in the SRV when rice farmers were bringing the surplus generated by the
GOANA programme to market (Diaw, 2010). The time series further suggests that since
then the price wedge between domestic and imported rice has widened.

Figure 1: Evolution of retail market prices of alternative rice types

recorded on the Saint-Louis market, 1997-2011

Source: CSA (2010). Fixed exchange rate: 1 = 655.957 FCFA.

2. On its website, GOANA acknowledges this fact, but advises that local rice should be marketed as wholegrain rice since the production of (purposely) broken rice at the milling factory may not be cost-effective.
In particular, its argument Senegalese consumers will need to adapt to whole-grain rice or include a
pounding operation before cooking in order to obtain broken rice illustrates its lack of consumer focus
(http://www.goana-senegal.com).
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Policy Sequencing and the Development of Rice Value Chains in Senegal 457

This imperfect price transmission further confirms that the two rice types are
imperfect substitutes. Hence, the domestic rice industry has some significant challenges
to overcome in terms of quality and consumer awareness and perceptions before it can
bring an increased quantity to market; otherwise, the latter will do nothing more than
erode local rice prices. By ignoring integral components further downstream in the
supply chain like processing and marketing, some of the upstream investment value
fails to reach end-markets, jeopardising the national objective of combating import
dependence and food insecurity. This advances the role of policy sequencing in the
development of rice value chains, i.e. investment in local rice quality tailored to
consumer preferences in end-markets should precede any large-scale investments in
agricultural productivity in order to efficiently channel the generated surplus to endmarkets where it has to substitute for rice imports and enter the long-term consumption
habits of urban consumers.

3.2 The JICA rice initiative

Since 2004, the Japan International Co-operation Agency (JICA) has been working in
Senegal to develop the rice industry (JICA, 2006). From production to consumption, the
agency has launched initiatives to improve the capacity of the full range of SRV rice
stakeholders. It has attempted to address a plethora of issues including productivity,
technology transfer, quality enhancement, access to credit, distribution and marketing,
and while focusing the majority of its efforts on production and processing,
acknowledges the importance of end-markets. JICA developed a quality SRV rice brand
called SENRIZ, which was launched in 2005 and made available in limited supply to
several urban zones including Dakar, Touba and Kaolack. Initially, SENRIZ reached the
shelves of major supermarket franchises and appeared in several national press articles,
but then disappeared from the urban landscape owing to lack of demand.
SENRIZs failure has encouraged JICA to approach future development initiatives
with a focus on incremental upgrading and sustainability. JICA recently developed
labels aimed at informing consumers about the availability of local rice in boutique
shops in important urban areas. However, it acknowledges that investment in quality
infrastructure is needed before such labels can act as a credible quality cue for local rice
(Ndour et al., 2010). Indeed, experimental evidence has shown that the majority of
urban Senegalese consumers are not necessarily interested in local rice, but in quality
rice regardless of its origin especially if its quality is tailored to their preferences
3
(Demont et al., 2010). The lesson drawn from JICAs experience is that investment in
rice quality, certification and branding should precede but be quickly followed by
scaling-up and advertising in order to capture and secure a profitable, competitive and
sustainable share of rice in urban end-markets.

3. However, the authors also identified a price-sensitive market segment (1720%) of older, less educated
and less aware consumers with limited time constraints who prefer conventional to enhanced-quality SRV
rice, despite the additional work it involves during preparation (Demont et al., 2010). In Ghana, Tomlins et
al. (2005) identified a similar market segment (14%) for traditional local rice.
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3.3 The PINORD platform

The Oxfam-funded PINORD platform was launched in 2006 with the mission to
contribute to the food security of the Senegalese people by improving their living
conditions in a sustainable way through the promotion of local rice (PINORD, 2009).
The platform is in partnership with six farmer organisations in the SRV, private-sector
donors and a variety of other stakeholders in order to reinforce the organisational
capacity of rural micro-enterprises (RMEs) involved in the SRV rice sector. Its
collaborative approach to tackling the challenges and constraints confronting the sector
is in line with the value-chain principles described above. From its inception, PINORD
recognised the total absence of marketing for local rice as a major obstacle to the
mobilisation of quality SRV rice on the market. PINORDs promotion strategy is
fourfold: improving quality and packaging, improving transport, increasing market
share and points of sale in urban markets (especially in Dakar), and multi-medium
publicity of a quality rice brand (PINORD, 2007). This strategy addresses the awareness
gap, a perceived lack of quality and a missing market share in urban centres all issues
raised by recent surveys and research (Fall et al., 2007; Fall and Diagne, 2008; Demont
et al., 2010). Hence, the platform not only links rice growers horizontally through
producer organisations, but also links production, processing, distribution, marketing
and consumption vertically through a common SRV rice brand.
However, while PINORDs strategy to make quality SRV rice more competitive
on the market vis--vis imported rice is certainly a good preliminary step towards
competitiveness, its operational scale is currently too limited to significantly supply and
4
impact the market. Initial consumer attention for Rival in Dakar may quickly fade
because of the limited and unstable availability of the product throughout the year.
Hence, we retain that scaling-up (in space) and stabilising (in time) supply is an
important prerequisite before rice branding and advertising investments can have an
impact on large urban end-markets.

Policy sequencing in practice: upgrading rice value chains in

Senegal

In this article, the concept of value-chain upgrading is used to identify strategies,

actions, policies and investments for adding value to commodities, increasing the
returns or capabilities of stakeholders or accessing new market segments through
participation in particular chains (Bolwig et al., 2010; Riisgaard et al., 2010). In
essence, we argue that the pace and efficiency of value-chain upgrading can be
optimised by implementing this set of policy and institutional changes in an identifiable
sequence. Different authors have attempted to guide policy-makers in policy
sequencing. Mosley and Toye (1988) sketched a possible sequence for a liberalisation
process in a small, open economy, and Spooner and Smith (1991) elaborated a set of
rules for structural-adjustment policy sequencing. Nsouli et al. (2005) provided a
4. PINORD marketed 500 tons of milled Rival rice, produced by 10 RMEs, on the Saint-Louis market in
2007; 1,800 tons by 108 RMEs in 2008; 2,600 tons by 150 RMEs in 2009; and 6,200 tons by 350 RMEs in
2010. However, the last still represents only 1% of total SRV rice production.
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Policy Sequencing and the Development of Rice Value Chains in Senegal 459
practical guide for policy-makers in determining the appropriate speed of adjustment
and sequencing of reform programmes, and Timilsina (2006) developed a framework
for guiding policy prioritisation and sequencing in post-conflict countries. From the
examples in Section 3 we learned the following four policy-sequencing lessons for the
SRV rice sector:

Policy-sequencing lesson 1: Large-scale investment in rice productivity needs to

be preceded by investment in rice quality tailored to consumer preferences in
urban end-markets.
Policy-sequencing lesson 2: Branding of local rice needs to precede but be quickly
followed by scaling-up (of production, processing and distribution) and
advertising, otherwise local rice will prove unable to modify long-term
consumption habits and reverse urban bias in urban end-markets.
Policy-sequencing lesson 3: Scaling-up of production, processing and distribution
through investment in aggregation and storage infrastructure is required before
quality SRV rice can be promoted and advertised in urban end-markets.
Policy-sequencing lesson 4: Once rice quality is tailored to end-market standards,
it must be continuously governed for generic promotion and advertising strategies
to be credible and sustain a secure market share in urban end-markets.

Building on these policy lessons, in Figure 2 we put forward a three-stage

sequence for the policy actions required to upgrade rice value chains in Senegal. Each
stage is represented by a block arrow which indicates its inception and continuity in the
time dimension. By representing the stages as continuous, overlapping events, we imply
that upgrading activities need to take place simultaneously rather than as a sequence of
separate actions, but that certain milestones (for example, minimum quality standards,
critical mass) need to be met at each stage before the next stage can be efficient and
successful. In the first stage, supply in rural areas is tailored to demand in urban endmarkets through value upgrading. In the second stage, supply of quality produce is
scaled-up through supply-shifting policies. Policy-sequencing lesson 1 refers to the
transition from the first to the second stage. The second stage can only be successfully
implemented if a critical threshold in the first stage (for example, a minimum quality
standard) is met. In the third stage, the surplus created in the second stage is gradually
being absorbed by urban consumers and progressively substitutes for imports through
demand-lifting policies. Policy-sequencing lesson 2 refers to the pace at which the
second and third stage have to follow the first stage. Policy-sequencing lesson 3 refers
to the transition from the second to the third stage. Implementation of the third stage can
only be successful if a critical threshold in the second stage (for example, a minimum
marketable surplus) is met. Policy-sequencing lesson 4 refers to the continuity
(indicated by the arrows in the time dimension) of the investments in the three stages
which need to be continuously governed. In the following sub-sections, we review each
stage in detail.

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Matty Demont and Amy C. Rizzotto

Figure 2: Proposed three-stage policy sequence

for upgrading SRV rice value chains

4.1 Quality enhancement, certification, quality contracts, labelling and

branding
Enhancing food quality in the context of a food-insecure country may seem
counterintuitive at first. However, it is consistent with evidence from Benin and Nigeria
which reveals that quality is important in the demand for rice, even in the rural areas
(Erhabor and Ojogho, 2011; Demont et al., 2012). Quality needs to be governed at
different levels, namely, from on-farm varietal purity to post-harvest cleaning, sorting,
homogenising and packaging. In Senegal, there is a widespread belief that urban
consumers preference for imported rice is because of the inferior post-harvest quality
of conventional SRV rice which is notorious for its heterogeneous grain-size
composition and impurity (Seck et al., 2010). It typically consists of a mix of varieties
and grain sizes (broken, medium and long grain) and contains a fair amount of
impurities (foreign matter such as stones, dirt and husks) (Demont et al., 2013).
Senegalese consumers prefer 100% broken rice which is considered an inferior
product on international markets and therefore is cheaper than whole-grain rice
(Brntrup et al., 2006) because it is congruous with their national lunch dish cbu jn
(rice with fish), which is invariably the single most important meal of the day (Fall et
al., 2007). Hence, rice quality for the Senegalese is synonymous with pure and
homogenous 100% broken rice.
Recent evidence is available on the consumer response to rice quality in Senegal.
In 2007, PINORD started marketing enhanced-quality SRV rice. It controls the quality
of this product during production (through a quality contract detailing recommended
production practices), processing and thereafter (sifting, cleaning and packaging), and
provides micro-financing (PINORD, 2007). Consumers willingness to pay for rice
quality was elicited through experimental auctions on the markets of Saint-Louis and
Dakar (Demont et al., 2010; 2013). Consistent with the average price premium of 16%
recorded on the Saint-Louis market (Figure 1), under experimental conditions the
majority of Senegalese consumers were willing to pay a 17% price premium for
imported Thai 100% broken rice relative to conventional, mediocre-quality SRV rice.
However, after being introduced to the characteristics of enhanced-quality 100% broken
SRV rice, they were willing to add on 15% and pay an overall price premium of 32%.
These findings suggest that Senegalese consumers are willing to pay for intrinsic food

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Policy Sequencing and the Development of Rice Value Chains in Senegal 461
quality attributes and that SRV rice is able to compete against imported rice if postharvest quality is tailored to consumer preferences.
Moreover, consumers were willing to add another 6% for a branded rice product
and pay an overall price premium of 38% for PINORDs Rival (Riz de la Valle)
brand relative to conventional SRV rice (Demont et al., 2010). At the time of the
experimental auctions, November 2008, Rival was sold only at the level of the milling
factories in the SRV (50 km from Saint-Louis) at almost no price premium relative to
conventional SRV rice, and did not reach the urban market of Saint-Louis because the
limited quantities available were sold out immediately. Given that manual cleaning,
purification and homogenisation of rice is currently done on the Saint-Louis market at
713% of the price of conventional SRV rice namely, still less than the average price
premium of 16% for imported rice (Figure 1) value-chain initiators have some
flexibility for gradually scaling-up quality SRV rice (Demont et al., 2013). Branding
and labelling are an integral part of value-chain upgrading and innovation. Having a
solid brand identity not only attaches a tangible image to a product, but may also
contribute to the creation of status if promotion campaigns successfully manage to
attach this concept to the brand (see Section 4.3).
Efforts to improve the competitiveness of quality SRV rice through differentiated
brand images like Rival and SENRIZ are crucial steps towards increasing the
profitability of the SRV rice sector. However, their marketing strategies are only
moderately successful, with mixed results attributable to the limited scale and/or
longevity of their operations. A major limitation for scaling-up is the absence of postharvest infrastructure for grain quality. Most of the factories have out-dated milling
equipment, inhibiting the purification and homogenisation of rice grain types.
PINORDs Rival post-harvest quality is entirely based on manual operations. JICAs
rice quality programme addresses this issue by investing in new post-harvest quality
infrastructure and endowing milling factories with adapted complementary equipment
such as rice graders and sorters, enabling the mechanisation and scaling-up of postharvest quality SRV rice (Ndour et al., 2010).

4.2 Quantity increase, scaling-up, aggregation and storage infrastructure

Investment in research, development and extension is one of the key pillars of supplyshifting policies (Fisher et al., 2001; Dalton and Guei, 2003; World Bank, 2008).
However, perhaps more fundamental is that the SRV is not maximising its production
potential because of persistent production constraints such as inadequate access to
credit, land-tenure issues, weeds and birds (Rodenburg and Johnson, 2009; de Mey et
al., 2012) and missing price incentives for producers owing to flawed post-harvest grain
quality (Seck et al., 2010). The SRV rice sector is ridden with monopolies; the
government has a monopoly on fertiliser and the CNCAS (Caisse Nationale de Crdit
Agricole du Sngal) has a monopoly on credit. These limitations are further
compounded by the requirement that farmers use certified seeds in order to qualify for a
CNCAS loan. The certification process itself is incredibly complex and exclusionary.
These monopolies and certification schemes create gross bureaucratic and institutional
inefficiencies and limit the ability of farmers to scale-up their operations. Currently, the
formal sector covers only 40% of the financing needs in the SRV rice sector. It is clear
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Matty Demont and Amy C. Rizzotto

that this coverage will need to be increased and extended to include trade credit before
any scaling-up in the second stage can be successful. One possible solution is to link
trade credit to contracting agreements between buyers and farmers (Gergely and Baris,
2009).

Figure 3: Value-chain map of imported and SRV rice

Source: USAID (2009a), adapted and reproduced with permission of the authors. The subsistence rice channel
is not represented.

Facing such a limiting input structure, in the current SRV rice value chain,
represented in Figure 3 farmers usually bring two-thirds of their production to market,
half of it essentially in order to recuperate funds needed to repay credit taken out prior
to the start of the season (USAID, 2009a). Small, informal traders called bana-banas
buy SRV rice in relatively small quantities at the farm gate. Retailers obtain rice from
wholesalers, bana-banas or directly from producers. The lack of long-term relationships
between traders and producers and the shortage of working capital make it hard for
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Policy Sequencing and the Development of Rice Value Chains in Senegal 463
these traders to accumulate significant or consistent stocks. As a result, this large
network of traders engages in very short-term, transaction-oriented behaviour that has a
strong influence on the performance of the entire industry. The informal trade with
bana-banas critically weakens vertical linkages between producers and traders, but
without better chain-wide governance farmers are left with few other options.
Another natural aggregation and leverage point for supply would be with the
processors. Millers in particular express interest in playing a stronger role in the value
chain, but the lack of capital and the prevalence of small-quantity, irregular-interval
trading (bana-banas) again undermines this potential by creating major inefficiencies
further downstream. Industrial mills are over-capitalised with out-dated equipment, and
are not operating at full capacity. Constrained by the lack of working capital, the mill
operators do not buy paddy themselves; instead, they process it on behalf of bana-banas
or for individual farmers. Because of the function of rice as a means of smoothing
household cash flow, small-scale processors play a hidden but important brokerage
function in the value chain between buyers and sellers. Traders approach a local mill to
find out which farmers are ready to sell and have paddy processed at the same facility.

4.3 Advertising and generic promotion

Advertising and generic promotion strategies ensure that the surplus on the market
generated in the second stage (Figure 2) is taken up by consumers. When it comes to
consumer awareness of local rice, recent surveys and experimental auctions have
uncovered an awareness gap of over 40% in Dakar Senegals largest urban centre
(Fall et al., 2007; Fall and Diagne, 2008). Of roughly 60% of consumers in Dakar that
are aware of rice produced in the SRV, a much smaller share of people are aware of the
quality SRV rice products that are now available on the market (Demont et al., 2010).
This awareness gap can be explained by several phenomena. The number one reason for
the weakness of local rice consumption is the lack of availability, evoked by 42% of
consumers surveyed (policy-sequencing lesson 3). The second reason evoked by 40% is
the lack of marketing (policy-sequencing lesson 2). A lack of marketing means a lack of
notoriety, which also indicates ineffective communication promoting local rice. The
third reason is the perceived lack of quality, cited by 25% of the consumers (policysequencing lesson 1).
Although consumer preferences are deeply embedded in societal norms and
market behaviour, advertising and generic promotion have the power to increase
awareness of quality SRV rice by accelerating the transformation of these preferences
and encouraging consumers to go local when selecting rice for their families (Rizzotto
and Demont, 2011). Norman et al. (2008) treat advertising as a complement to a
product, saying that it can strengthen a products appeal in two ways: extending reach
and building value. When you extend the reach of a product you are informing greater
numbers of people about the products existence. Experimental auctions have shown
that urban Senegalese consumers are significantly more likely to purchase enhancedquality SRV rice when they are aware of it (Demont et al., 2010). This suggests that
generic promotion programmes that extend the reach of quality SRV rice could have a
real impact on urban markets. Marketing efforts need to target urban consumers because
they represent roughly 65% of rice consumers in Senegal; in particular, urban women
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Matty Demont and Amy C. Rizzotto

between the ages of 18 and 60 since they, as household managers, are the most likely to
purchase rice (Fall and Diagne, 2008). Furthermore, television and radio will probably
be the most successful reach mechanisms, since 95% of urban dwellers in Dakar, for
instance, watch television and 80% listen to the radio (USAID, 2010). The weekly
morning television, cooking and fashion programme, FAM (Femme Africaine
Moderne), on the Senegalese channel 2STV, for example, could be an outlet for regular
broadcasts on special recipes based on local-quality rice. Moreover, advertising should
be segmented according to the target dish for which the rice type is used and should
play an informative role as a complement to the product itself. A good example is the
cookbook with recipes based on SRV rice published by ITA (Gning et al., 2007).
Grassroots-style marketing can also be extremely effective in a setting like
Senegal. According to importer Marieme Diouck, when she first introduced fragrant
imported rice she focused her marketing efforts on grassroots tactics like tastings and
sample distributions in local markets. Dioucks approach paid off; her fragrant imported
rice in the famous blue Royal Umbrella bag is now one of the most popular rice
products on the Dakar market. Moreover, since Senegalese consumers rely heavily on
word-of-mouth communication to inform their preferences, viral marketing through
existing social networks (female networks, tontines, trader associations, religious
networks, etc.) may also be a potentially successful marketing strategy for extending
reach (Demont et al., 2013).
In addition to extending reach, advertising can also complement a product by
building value through widespread product recognition that connects the good with a
certain image or concept. Building value is also most effective with a differentiated
product, like quality SRV rice. In addition, if a product is given a brand name, its
identity grows stronger and advertising can add value by transforming it into a status
good (Batra et al., 2000). Advertisers have to be cautious, however, that their product
represents the quality standards they are promoting; otherwise promotion could serve to
undermine their credibility (policy-sequencing lesson 4). Loss of credibility has been
identified as a typical consequence of poor policy sequencing in developing countries
(Edwards, 1990; Falvey and Kim, 1992; Funke, 1993; McPherson, 1995; Nsouli et al.,
2005). Hence, generic promotion and advertising strategies need to adopt a gradual
approach, focusing first on extending reach, i.e. gradually transforming quality SRV
rice into a viable substitute for imported rice, and then progressively evolving towards
increasing value.
Owing to the nature of the investments in the second and third stages, their effects
increase of production, aggregation and absorption of surplus by urban consumers
will typically follow an incremental path. In other words, the transition from the second
to the third stage will inevitably be gradual. Once critical mass is attained in the second
stage, the third stage should be initiated to avoid a surplus that would erode market
prices, as previous experience has shown (Figure 1). Policy-makers should plan both
investments such that supply and demand increase synchronously without generating
substantial price changes namely, such that the downward pressure on prices because
of supply-increasing strategies is thwarted by the upward pressure generated by
demand-lifting policies. The unavoidable question now becomes: which actor(s) should
initiate these investments and govern rice value chains in Senegal?
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Policy Sequencing and the Development of Rice Value Chains in Senegal 465

4.4 Governance
Governance and interlinking of markets are essential for a staple food commodity sector
to properly distribute its surplus to markets in order to contribute to economic growth
and poverty alleviation (Swinnen et al., 2010). Bolwig et al. (2010: 176) define
governance as the process of exercising control along the chain through the
specification of what type of product needs to be supplied, by whom, in what quantity
and when, how it should be produced, and at what price. When a firm in a particular
functional position in a value chain is able to exercise this kind of control, it is said to be
in a lead-firm position. Until the liberalisation of the rice industry in the mid-1990s,
SAED was the main marketing organisation for the SRV rice sector. However, typical
of many large, bureaucratic institutions, it was often slow and inconsistent in its
marketing activities. Corruption and strict licensing requirements for traders and
wholesalers opened the door for what Morris (1988: 265) called a parallel, illegal rice
supply chain. These parallel rice marketing systems were run by private investment and
profit-motivated individuals, which consequently created a disincentive to share
marketing information amongst producers. In the short term, these parallel marketing
schemes were more effective than similar public schemes, but in the long term they
could not create the scale needed to be effective and were thus unsustainable. These two
approaches to rice marketing illustrate a common tension between the private and the
public sectors. While the government of Senegal has continued to support productioncentred R&D, it has never reclaimed its role as the primary marketing organisation for
the SRV rice sector.
To get a better sense of different public- and private- sector approaches to funding
agricultural marketing activities, we look at elucidatory examples from Ghana and
Nigeria. In Ghana, government policy dictates that a portion of funding for agricultural
development goes towards advertising. The Ghanaian government views food security
as a public good and therefore believes in the importance of investing in generic
promotion for locally produced staple food crops. However, in light of the limitations of
public-sector financing, both Ghana and Nigeria follow a shared private-sector approach
to agricultural marketing that may offer a more promising model for Senegal. Olam, the
largest regional rice importer in Nigeria, has invested a significant amount of money in
promoting production and marketing of local rice in Nigeria and Ghana. A USAID
study supports Olams approach, stating that one of the most important prerequisites
for developing a viable strategy for rice in West Africa will be to bring the private
sector into the discussion and empowering it to play a meaningful role in both designing
and implementing the strategy (2009b: 73). If they begin to see local rice as a viable
competitor with imported rice, a perhaps unexpected group of advocates for the product,
importers, could emerge as a key private-sector player in the marketing and promotion
of quality SRV rice.
The imported rice channel in Senegal involves a network of wholesalers and
retailers who primarily distribute imported rice but already take in about one-third of
SRV rice production (Figure 3). Importers buy shipload quantities of rice through a
cluster of 12 brokers located in Switzerland rather than directly from exporting
countries. They then store it in their own warehouses in Dakar. These importers are
often part of the same company with main marketing facilities in Switzerland and main
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Matty Demont and Amy C. Rizzotto

storage facilities in the exporting countries. By contrast, the smaller importers deal in
container-sized transactions that they tend to distribute quickly upon arrival. Semiwholesalers trade in a variety of foodstuffs and other products. They buy imported rice
from wholesalers or bana-banas, but rarely from large Dakar-based importers, and
purchase SRV rice from bana-banas, producers and wholesalers (USAID, 2009a).
Importers have emerging incentives to invest in the domestic rice industry because
of price volatility and export policies, which became all too apparent during the 2008
food crisis. When countries like India and Thailand began placing restrictions on their
exports, net-importers realised the real monetary risks behind their import dependence.
The realisation that the international cereal market is increasingly unstable has led some
importers to begin gravitating towards local rice. Moustapha Tall, a prominent
Senegalese rice importer, has been involved in rice importation since the early 1970s
and has significantly cut back his investment in the business since the 2008 crisis. Tall
sees many of his fellow importers involved in a risky and unprofitable race to the
bottom as they try to beat their competitors prices and gain more customers.
Uncertainty and dubious profitability are significant deterrents for businessmen like
Tall, who indicates that, while he would like to get involved in SRV rice, like many
investors, he lacks confidence in product quality (policy-sequencing lesson 1), quantity
and the sourcing and distribution channels for local-quality rice (policy-sequencing
lesson 3). If importers saw potential in offering quality SRV rice, one way to combat
uncertainty in the product might be a small tax on imported rice, with the revenue going
directly toward investment in quality enhancement (policy-sequencing lesson 1) and
promotion (policy-sequencing lesson 2). One such importer who is open to future
involvement and investment, Marieme Diouck, argues that if Senegal wants to develop
the SRV rice sector and put the brakes on importation, it must first ensure a higher
level of quality and more consistent quantity of local rice (policy-sequencing lessons 1
and 2). Diouck believes that it is up to private-sector actors to lead this effort, because
producers lack the necessary financial resources and the state has floundered in its
previous attempts.
The experiment conducted during the AfricaRice stakeholder workshop revealed
that stakeholders do not share a unanimous vision as to which actor should take the
position as lead firm and govern rice value chains in Senegal (Ndour et al., 2010). Lead
firms varied among the three proposed virtual enterprises and ranged from vertically coordinated partnerships between farmer platforms such as PINORD, processor
associations and government bodies such as ARM (Agence de Rgulation des
5
Marchs), to complete integration of post-harvest activities into a private-sector joint
venture. Moustapha Tall who was involved in the working group subsequently
proposed the latter model to the Ministries of Commerce and Agriculture, and on 25
November 2010, 14 Senegalese rice importers officially launched a joint venture with
producers and processors under the name SPCRS (Socit de Promotion et de
Commercialisation du Riz Sngalais), with total capital of 500 million FCFA, shared
5. ARM is an autonomous administrative structure under the technical custody of the Ministry of Commerce.
Its major role consists in providing (i) a decision aid tool for traders, (ii) a platform of strategic data for
policy-makers, (iii) a tool for monitoring and anticipating market dysfunctions, and (iv) support during
agricultural market liberalisation (http://www.arm.sn).
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Policy Sequencing and the Development of Rice Value Chains in Senegal 467
among importers (67%), farmers (24%) and processors (9%). The company aims to buy
SRV paddy rice, mill it and market it to Senegalese consumers by governing quality
along the chain through quality contracts with milling factories and farmers (Sadio,
2010; Mohapatra, 2011).
Following the stakeholder workshop, two other smaller-scale value-chain
initiatives have emerged, targeting different consumer segments in Dakar. Importer
Marieme Diouck went into partnership with USAID from 2010 and started contracting
with SRV farmers to market high-quality SRV rice, branded Bourou thieb yi (the king
of rices), and the Belgian investor Durabilis is currently contracting with SRV farmers
and millers to market medium-quality SRV rice, branded Terral, through its local
subsidiary Secosen. These recent developments clearly illustrate the interest and
potential of the private sector to play the lead role in the development of rice value
chains in Senegal.

Conclusion

One of the major challenges confronting the development of the SRV rice sector will be
to reverse the prevailing trend of consumer preferences for imported rice. With 60% of
the population predicted to be living in urban areas by 2020, rice, a staple component of
the urban consumers diet, is unlikely to decline in consumption (USAID, 2009a). If the
SRV rice sector is to survive, it will need to stake its claim on a larger share of this
essential market. Consumer preferences are deeply embedded in the psyche, but are not
unchangeable. Rice value-chain pioneers must continue to develop strategies to change
the consumer mindset about local rice. Field work, consumer surveys, stakeholder
workshops and experimental auctions conducted in Senegal suggest that policy-makers
and stakeholders need to gradually upgrade the SRV rice value chain according to the
following three-stage sequence: (i) investment in post-harvest product-quality
infrastructure, (ii) scaling-up of quality produce by investment in productivity,
aggregation and storage infrastructure, and (iii) adoption of sector-wide marketing
strategies that enhance the chain competitiveness of domestic relative to imported rice.
Policy-makers should also realise, however, that there is a trade-off between adding
value and increasing affordability (Tomlins et al., 2007) namely, not all rice should be
subject to the proposed three-stage sequence. The existence of a significant pricesensitive market segment of consumers who prefer conventional to enhanced-quality
SRV rice (Demont et al., 2010) suggests that value chains should supply both qualities
on the market. Private-sector actors and international organisations need to work with
value-chain initiators to increase the competitiveness of quality SRV rice and change
Senegals position as the largest importer of broken rice in the world (USAID, 2009b).
What is at stake goes beyond the livelihoods of SRV rice growers and the economic
viability of the sector. In the broader context, rice value-chain development and
upgrading have significant implications for food security, poverty alleviation and
overall economic development in Senegal and the rest of West Africa.
It is important to note that the policy-sequencing lessons identified in this article
are tailored to the specific case of Senegal. In other regions, other lessons may be
drawn. In general, post-harvest rice-quality issues are symptomatic of the larger subregion of West Africa (Seck et al., 2010), but the problem of consumer preferences for
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468

Matty Demont and Amy C. Rizzotto

imported rice is particularly pronounced in urban Senegal (Brntrup et al., 2006). In the
southern Casamance region of Senegal and neighbouring countries such as The Gambia
and Mali, for instance, local rice has been cultivated for centuries and is preferred to
imported rice by consumers (Moseley et al., 2010). Policy-sequencing lessons would be
different for those regions. Increasing productivity for example, through the adoption
of higher-yielding varieties such as Nerica (Diagne and Demont, 2007) would be a
first priority in order to bring rice systems from subsistence into surplus production
before the need to tailor quality to consumer preferences emerges.
first submitted October 2010
final revision accepted July 2011

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