Jonathan Edwards‟

Incompatibility Argument

The Incompatibility of Divine

Foreknowledge and Libertarian
Free-will

Nathan Brummel

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 Published by:
Bound, Yet Free Publications
Copyright 2007
Contact author at:
Cornerstone Protestant Reformed Church
13251 W. 109th Ave., Dyer, IN 46311
www.cornerstoneprchurch.org
219-365-0144

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 Contents
Preface………………………………………………………….…5

Introduction……………………………………………………….7

Chapter 1: Edwards Incompatibility Argument………………….13

Introduction
Part I: Argument for Perfect Divine Foreknowledge
Part II: The Incompatibility Argument
Part III: Incompatibility Argument Consistent with
Ordinary Language
Part IV: Evidence needed for Foreknowledge
Part V: Whitby‟s objection
Part VI: An Objection from God‟s Timelessness

Chapter 2: “The Ockhamist response”………………………….37

Introduction
Part I: The Incompatibility Argument Derived from
Aquinas
Part II: Wierenga‟s Development of the Argument
Part III: An Argument for Fatalism
Part IV: The Prophetic Argument
Part V: The Ockhamist Hard/Soft Fact Distinction
Part VI: Objections to Ockhamist Hard/Soft Fact
Distinction
Part VII:: Theological Objections to Ockhamism

Chapter 3: The Molinist Response”……………………………69

Introduction
Part I: The Source Question
Part II: The Reconciliation Question
Part III: Theological Objections to Molinism
Part IV: Philosophical Objections

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4
 Preface
This book is a discussion of the argument that Jonathan
Edwards gives in Freedom of the Will for the incompatibility of
perfect divine foreknowledge and libertarian freedom. Edwards‟
argument is defended by an analysis of the two most plausible
Arminian responses to it. The first response is the Ockhamist reply
that has recently been defended by the philosopher Edward Wierenga
of the University of Rochester. The second response is the Molinist
reply that has recently found a defender in Alfred Freddoso of Notre
Dame University. Both of these methods of objecting to the
incompatibility argument are claimed to be problematic because first,
Edwards has anticipated some serious problems that they have, and
secondly, he has shown why his position is attractive. The conclusion
is that neither the Molinist nor the Ockhamist have given plausible
reasons for rejecting the incompatibility argument.
The issues discussed here are part of an ancient discussion in
the history of Christianity. Yet the issues are of increasing
importance today because of the influence of the “openness of God”
theology. This theology became influential in evangelical circles in
the twentieth century. In some sense it develops Arminian theology
to its logical conclusions. But it also involves a redefining of the
attributes of God that is out of sync with orthodoxy.

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6
 Introduction

Jonathan Edwards (1703-1758) published the Freedom of the

Will in 1754 to attack the „prevailing notions‟ about human freedom.
This book was written in the last part of Edward‟s life, shortly before
he became president of Princeton. He was at this time missionary to
the Indians in Stockbridge, Connecticut. The Editor of the Yale
edition points out in his Introduction that as one reads the book it is
interesting to remember that while Edwards was writing it he had to
take time out to catechize and teach English to the Indian children.
Freedom of the Will is the shortened version of the title that in its
entirety is A careful and strict Enquiry into the Modern Prevailing
Notions of that Freedom of Will. Which is Supposed to be Essential to
Moral Agency, Virtue and Vice, Reward and Punishment. Praise and
Blame.
Edwards‟ later writings were an extended criticism of
Arminian theology. Freedom of the Will attacked the Arminian view
of freedom, and The Great Christian Doctrine of Original Sin that
was written in the same period defended the Calvinistic view of
original sin and total depravity. The word „Arminianism‟ is derived
from the 17th century Dutch theologian Jacobus Arminius. He
disagreed with the doctrines of Calvinism that were predominant in
the Dutch Reformed churches. In opposition to the five points of
Calvinism, namely; total depravity, unconditional election, limited
atonement, irresistable grace, and perseverance of the saints,
Arminius formulated five points that took issue with each of the
above. The Canons of Dordt and the Westminster Confession were
written in defense of Calvinism as a response to the growing
influence of Arminius‟ thought.
Edwards realized that the intellectual culture of his day was
moving against Calvinism, especially its conception of freedom.
Hobbes‟ philosophical determinism had so prejudiced many thinkers
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in the 18th century against any concept of determinism that any
defense of a Calvinistic view of freedom was caricatured as
Hobbesian.
The concept of freedom is important to the controversies
involving the Christian doctrines of sin and grace because one‟s
position on freedom affects one‟s views of salvation and one‟s
understanding of the doctrines of original sin, total depravity,
sovereign grace, election, predestination, and providence. Two
traditions in the Christian church disagree about the nature of human
freedom. One is the Augustinian/Calvinistic tradition and the other
the other the Pelagian/Arminian tradition. Calvinists believe that God
has predestinated certain people to be saved and that he gives these
elect people faith so that they will be saved. The emphasis is on
Divine Sovereignty, God being the first cause of everything that
occurs in the salvation process, Humans are dependent on God for
their salvation in every way. They define human freedom in terms of
people choosing what they want in a spontaneous way. „Spontaneous‟
is not being used here in contradistinction from acting deliberately.
The idea is that the agents choices are reflections of their desires and
inclinations. For example, Martin Luther defined freedom in terms of
lack of compulsion. (Kenny, 73) This definition of freedom is
compatible with God predestining every choice. Humans are saved
only when God irresistably gives his Spirit to them so that they are
converted. God is in control of the act of salvation in all of its parts-it
is not in any important sense dependent on humans autonomously
choosing him.
The distinguishing feature of Arminian theology is that
humans freely choose to believe or not believe in God. Although
Arminians lay varying emphasis on the nature and influence of grace
on the free-will, the will is defined as free in a libertarian sense.
Libertarian views of freedom suppose that God does not determine
what humans choose. Rather, free creatures have the ability to be
originating causes of the choices they make. The Arminians that we
shall deal with, define freedom in terms of the ability of the free
creature to do otherwise than they in fact do.
The controversy discussed in this essay is abstracted from the
main theological controversy between Calvinism and Arminianism.
Edwards gives an argument against the Arminians that claims that if
God has foreknowledge of future human actions, libertarian freedom
cannot exist. This argument doesn‟t depend on which view of
freedom is theologically correct. But, we shall pay attention to the
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relationship between Edwards‟ and his opponents‟ theological
positions and the influence that they exert on their philosophical
thought.
Freedom of the Will is Edwards‟ attempt to show that
Christianity could best defend itself against Deists and Atheists by
adopting Calvinism. Edwards adopted this strategy because an
important element of orthodox Christian Apologetics in New England
during the 18th century was developing a theology that would most
effectively reveal the inadequacies of Deism and Atheism.
Edwards reacts especially to three men whom he thought
exemplified the contemporary Arminian position. Among the three
were a famous hymn writer, Isaac Watts, a Deist, Thomas Chubb, and
a professing Calvinist, Daniel Whitby.
The three were different in many ways. It seems that part of
the reason Edwards chose them was to show that many Deists,
Arminians, and „alleged‟ Calvinists were really in the same boat with
respect to their mistaken ideas of freedom. Edwards probably saw that
it was rhetorically effective to put intellectual foes like Watts and
Whitby who were favourably viewed by orthodox evangelicals in the
same camp as someone like Chubbs, whose views were regarded as
quite unorthodox by New England standards.
Sections 11 and 12 of Part II of Freedom of the Will are the
focus of the first chapter. The title of these sections are, respectively,
“The Evidence of God‟s Certain Foreknowledge of the Volitions of
Moral Agents” and “God‟s Certain Foreknowledge of the Future
Volitions of Moral Agents, Inconsistent with such a Contingence of
Those Volitions, as Is without All Necessity. And Infers a Necessity
of Volition, as Much as an Absolute Decree.” In these sections
Edwards develops his argument for the incompatibility of Arminian
freedom and divine foreknowledge. Although this argument is
important for the book, it is not his central argument that is probably
his argument for psychological determinism. To see where the
sections on foreknowledge fit into the book as a whole, I shall
summarize the content of Freedom of the Will.
Freedom of the Will has five main divisions-- Parts I-IV and
“The Conclusion”. Part I provides the definitions of terms. Edwards
defines what he means by the following terms; „will‟, „the
determination of the will‟, „necessity‟, „impossibility‟, „inability‟,
„contingence‟, „natural necessity‟, „moral necessity‟, „liberty‟, and
„moral agency‟. The first division, then, is an introduction to the
controversy and the terms that are important for it.
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 Edwards has been called a psychological determinist. He
develops this view in sections 1-10 of Part II. That Part is entitled
“Wherein It Is Considered, whether There Is, or Can Be Any Such
Sort of Freedom of Will, as That wherein Arminians Place the
Essence of the Liberty of All Moral Agents; and Whether Any Such
Thing Ever Was, or Can Be Conceived of” (Edwards, x). Edwards
argues against the self- determining power of the will, using a famous
„infinite regress‟ argument. Each choice that humans make must have
an antecedent cause. The Arminians claim that the will makes a
choice without being affected causally in any way by anything. The
will freely chooses because it is intrinsic to the will that it be the
originating cause of its choices. Edwards argues that there must he
some reason for the will making a choice, and he wants to define this
as the cause of the choice. He claims that it is incoherent to think that
the will can choose anything without there being a causal history that
brings about that choice. So it is up to the Arminian to show what
causes the will to choose.
But Edwards thinks that they cannot do this because their
theory has claimed that the will sovereignly chooses without any
outside causes. Part of the problem with the Arminians‟ argument is
that they assume they do not need to be able to exhibit a causal
history, while Edwards thinks that they should. Edwards argues that
given their theory, when asked to explain the causes of the will
choosing they will be forced to deny that the choice has causes or
assert that the choice is dependent on a preceding choice, that itself is
dependent on another preceding choice, and so on ad infinitum. This
is because there can be no cause for the choice in the sense Edwards
requires. Instead, the Arminians are left with the view that the will is
the only cause. For Edwards that is not a proper cause.
In sections 6 and 7 Edwards argues against the Arminian
idea of liberty of indifference. In section 8 he argues against the idea
that human liberty is opposed to all necessity. In section 9 he argues
that there is a connection between the way the will acts and the
„dictates of the understanding‟. Edwards‟ argument culminates in
section 10 where he claims that motives necessarily determine how
we act. He claims that there is a necessary connection between what
humans will and the strongest motive presented to them.
The next two sections in the book are the ones we will focus
on. In them Edwards argues, first, that God has perfect foreknowledge
of future human volitions. Second, he claims that if God foreknows
what humans will do, it is not possible that future human volitions are
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free in such a way as to be without necessity. He argues that God‟s
foreknowledge makes a future action as necessary as if God had
decreed that it take place. Therefore the Arminians, who endorse
foreknowledge, have as much of a problem with determinism as the
Calvinists. In the final section Edwards claims that even if future
human volitions are not connected with anything antecedent, they are
still necessary.
The above three sections conclude Part II. Part II has asked
whether the Arminians are correct with respect to their view of
freedom. Part Ill asks whether they are correct in claiming that people
must he free in the Arminian sense in order to be held morally
responsible for the acts they perform. Edwards puts the Arminians on
the defensive, claiming that freedom in their sense is incompatible
with moral responsibility. This is ironic because Arminians have
traditionally used this kind of argument against the Calvinistic
conception of freedom.
Part IV consists of Edwards‟ attempt to understand why
Arminians have the sort of views they do. He attempts to show that
their reasons for their beliefs are wrong, and in the course of that part
he responds to Arininian objections against the reasoning in Parts I-
III.
In “The Conclusion‟‟ Edwards shows what moral should he
derived from the conclusions which he has drawn in the book. He
argues that the Calvinistic doctrines are theologically defensible if
there is a philosophically defensible view of the presupposed idea of
freedom.
The intent of this book is to examine three different ways of
understanding arguments for the incompatibility of divine
foreknowledge and human freedom. Along with Edwards‟ views we
shall study the Ockhamist and Molinist responses to the
incompatibility argument. I have chosen two leading contemporary
defenders of Ockhamism and Molinism, respectively: Edward
Wierenga of the University of Rochester and Alfred Freddoso of the
University of Notre Dame, as spokesmen for their views. We shall
look at their objections to the incompatibility argument, noticing how
Edwards anticipates and objects to them.
This book is divided into three chapters. The first one is an
explication of Edwards‟ views, the second is a study of the Ockhamist
objection to them, and the final chapter explicates the Molinist
objection to the incompatibility argument.
This book is written in defense of Edwards project in
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Freedom of the Will to show the truth of Calvinism and the
inconsistency of Arminian theology. An important part of Edwards‟
argument in this book is his incompatibility argument. Arminian
critics can object to Edwards in two important ways. Therefore, a
large amount of space will be given to an explication and critique of
these two objections. The first chapter will be an explication of
Edwards‟ position and I will not be overly critical of Edwards‟
arguments because the Ockhamist and Molinist positions will bring
out all the important objections. I will focus on showing the problems
with the Ockhamist and Molinist positions, since a contemporary
defense of Edwards involves showing these two objections to be
implausible. If both of these Arminian attempts to object to the
incompatibility argument are problematic, then the Arminian is in a
difficult position because there does not seem to be any other
attractive line of argumentation left open to them. But if the
incompatibility argument is defensible, then libertarian freedom
cannot exist and therefore Arminian theology must be abandoned.

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 1

EDWARDS‟
INCOMPATIBILITY
ARGUMENT

Introduction

Anthony Kenney has some flattering words to say about the

incompatibility argument that Edwards gives in Freedom of the Will:

But...certain foreknowledge...is not, in fact, consistent with a

genuine lack of necessity in future events. This was shown
conclusively by the eighteenth—century American Calvinist
theologian Jonathan Edwards, in the chapter of his book On
the Freedom of the Will which bears the heading „Gods
certain Foreknowledge of the future volitions of moral agents,
inconsistent with such a contingence of those volitions as is
without all necessity‟ (Kenny, 82).

Edwards is attempting to prove that given perfect divine

foreknowledge, future events are necessary. His first step is to show
that God does have perfect foreknowledge. This will be the first thing
that we look at in this chapter. The rest of the chapter will be spent
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developing the incompatibility argument and examining the reasons
with which Edwards supports it. We will look at some objections that
he considers and his response to them.

Part I: Argument for Perfect Divine Foreknowledge

The incompatibility argument assumes that God has perfect

foreknowledge of the future. Edwards sets out to prove this
assumption in Section 11 of Part II. This is an attempt by Edwards to
show that both Calvinists and Arminians agree on the nature of divine
foreknowledge. He thinks that if he can get the Arminian to agree
with him that God has absolute and certain foreknowledge, he will be
able to show them how this is incompatible with libertarian freedom.
Edwards claims that divine foreknowledge as distinguished
from simple foreknowledge is absolute and certain. Simple
foreknowledge is something that humans can have. Many times they
know what is going to happen in the future, for example, that the sun
is going to rise tomorrow. But there are other more questionable
things that they believe themselves to know about the future and
which do in fact come to pass. For example, I justifiably believe that I
will teach a class on Wednesday. When Wednesday comes about and
I teach the class, this means that I had simple foreknowledge that I
would. Since simple foreknowledge is fallible, it might have been the
case that I got sick on Wednesday and had to miss the class, making
my simple foreknowledge false. The foreknowledge that humans have
can be false. However Edwards claims that God‟s foreknowledge is
infallible. God has certain and absolute foreknowledge because He
has predicted future events. If God does not foreknow future volitions
then He cannot certainly and „peremptorily‟ foretell future events.
While Edwards thinks it should not he necessary to prove this point to
Christians, he provides Biblical proof.
Edwards gives four reasons for certain foreknowledge by
showing that God has foretold 1) many instances of peoples moral
conduct or actions; 2) many events that were consequences of or
dependent on the actions of certain persons; 3) the future actions of
nations and peoples; and 4) many actions that were consequences of
the actions of nations and peoples. He gives numerous biblical
examples for each of these categories (Edwards, 240-244).
Edwards sets out to prove that God must have perfect and
complete foreknowledge of the future in order to have made the
prophecies that He did. This is because each prediction that God
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made was dependent in innumerable ways on many different
volitions. Edwards thinks that God must know a vast number of
volitions in order to foreknow events like the virgin birth or that Jesus
would be betrayed for 30 pieces of silver. In order to foreknow these
things God would have to have known all the volitions that figure in
their causal history. For it seems questionable that God could know
such specific consequences if he did not know all the preceding
causes of them. One might object that God need not know everything
about the future in order to predict certain events, for He could predict
an event and then when it came time for the prediction to be fulfilled,
use His power to interpose in the world and establish the end He
wanted. Edwards does not think this objection works. For if God
cannot foresee the state of the world, then He will not he able to
foresee when to miraculously interpose in it (Edwards, 250).
Edwards claims that Gods foreknowledge is a fundamental
belief for Christians because it is presupposed by many things that
they consider unquestionably true. For example, he argues that
Christians believe that God has foretold the future Antichristian
apostasy and the universal future reign of the Messiah. Christians also
believe that God promised to Abram, Isaac, and Jacob that they would
be saved. God promised Adam and Eve that the seed of the woman
would defeat Satan. Edwards rightly expects his orthodox readers to
be as convinced as he is that these specific instances of
foreknowledge are trustworthy and correct and therefore examples of
perfect divine foreknowledge. He points out that if God does not have
foreknowledge then these beliefs of God are based on conjecture-- a
view that Christians of his day would have rejected out of hand
(Edwards, 245, 246).
Edwards gives two further arguments for God‟s certain
foreknowledge. First he says that historical Christianity teaches that
God is immutable, i.e., unchangeable. Edwards argues that if God
does not know future volitions, then he must change his mind
continually. Since He is trying to bring about certain things He will be
constantly “changing his mind and intentions..[and] relinquishing his
old designs” (Edwards, 253). But this conflicts with the scriptures,
which show Him as knowing the end from the beginning and having
an unchangeable counsel, as Isaiah 46:10 says, “Declaring the end
from the beginning, and from ancient times the things that are not yet
done; saying, my counsel shall stand, and I will do my pleasure‟
(Edwards. 254).
The second argument is that if God does not have perfect
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foreknowledge then there is a significant chance that He will be
frustrated regarding His purpose in the creation. Edwards thinks that
it is possible that God might be frustrated by humans if what He
wants to accomplish is dependent on their cooperating with what He
desires. He thinks that it is not consistent with the Bible that God
could possibly he frustrated in his endeavors (Edwards, 255).
An objection has been given to the idea that perfect
foreknowledge is needed. It has been claimed that God might know
that his desires very probably would come about. The possibility of
them not obtaining might be so low that God does not have to worry
about being frustrated. But this position would entail that God would
gain in knowledge after He saw what actually would come about. For
one thing, He would not longer have knowledge of what was only
possible, instead He would know what was actual. But, as Charles
Hodge states, such a position that claims God gains knowledge “[I]s
so incompatible with all proper ideas of the infinite mind that it has
been almost universally rejected, both by philosophers and by
Christian theologians‟ (Hodge, 545).
Peter Geach claims that it might he plausible to think about
God as a Grand Master at chess who is in control of the game. Some
of the players in the game will support Him while others will oppose
Him. But no matter what moves the players make God can execute
His plan. He cannot be surprised because he knows all of the possible
moves that can be made. Herman Bavinck in attempting to explain
what such a situation would involve states:

God is ready for whatever may happen. He foreknows and

sees all possibilites, and he has made provision for all of
them. He knows beforehand what he is going to do if Adam
falls, and also if he does not; if David goes to Keilah, and also
if he does not; if Tyre and Sidon are converted, and also if
they are not, etc. Hence, the knowledge of “future contingent
events” precedes the decree concerning “absolutely future
events”. At every moment man chooses with complete
freedom and independence, but he is never able to surprise
God or annul his plans, for God in his foreknowledge has
taken into account every possibility (Wierenga, 1989, 161).

Contra Edwards the chess argument is assuming that God does not
have knowledge of future contingents. Instead, He only has an idea of
what is possible and probable. It could be argued that if the state of
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affairs that God wants to bring about is overwhelmingly probable,
then He would not have to worry about having his desires thwarted.
So this means that one need not follow Edwards in claiming that if
God does not have perfect foreknowledge His end in creation will be
thwarted. The central problem for such a response to Edwards is that
it falls short of the doctrine of divine omniscience. For according to it,
God does not have knowledge of future contingents.
Another way that some Arminians have sought to avoid the
conclusion that God has perfect foreknowledge of future contingents
is to deny that God has knowledge of the future. But they claim it is
not because God is limited by anything outside of Himself. Rather,
God willed that certain of his knowledge be hid from Him. The
example of Jesus can be used to increase the plausibility of this
position. It seems that as a man Christ‟s knowledge was limited in
certain ways even though He was a divine person. But this position
seems unattractive because it is not clear how God could choose not
to be omniscient. “This is to suppose that God wills not to be God;
that the Infinite wills to be finite” (Hodge, 546). Hodge argues that
the knowledge of God “is not founded on his will, except so far as the
knowledge of vision is concerned, i.e., his knowledge of his own
purposes, or of what he has decreed shall come to pass (Hodge, 546).
If knowledge is “not founded on his will, it cannot be limited by it.
Infinite knowledge must know all things, actual or possible” (Hodge,
546).

Part II: The Incompatibility Argument

In section 11 Edwards takes himself to have shown that God

has certain foreknowledge of future volitions. In section 12 he wants
to show how this proves that “events are necessary with a necessity of
connection or consequence (Edwards, 257).
It will help to have a broad overview of how this section is
divided in order to see how Edwards develops the argument and
where he lays the most stress. The section is divided by three roman
numerals. The first subsection, which is only a page and a half long,
presents the incompatibility argument. The second is about three
pages long and provides an argument and an example that allegedly
prove that if a future event is contingent, then it is impossible for God
to have certainly foreknown it. The third and longest discusses a
number of miscellaneous points. The incompatibility argument itself
17
has four premises. Since they depend on his view of philosophical
necessity, I will first explain this.

Philosophical Necessity

Edwards says that certain philosophers have used an

incorrect definition of „necessity‟, saying that it is “that by which a
thing cannot but be, or whereby it cannot be otherwise” (Edwards,
152). This definition is problematic for two reasons. First, defining
philosophical necessity in terms of “cannot” does not work because
“cannot” is synonymous with necessity. Secondly, „cannot‟ is a
relative term that has „relation to power exerted, or that may be
exerted, in order to the thing spoken of; to which, as I have now
observed, the word “necessity,” as used by philosophers, has no
reference” (Edwards, 152).
Philosophical necessity involves a certain and unbreakable
connection between two things--which Edwards calls the “subject”
and the “predicate”. Properly defined, it “is really nothing else than
the full and fixed connection between the things signified by the
subject and predicate of a proposition, which affirms something to he
true” (Edwards, 152). “When the subject and predicate of the
proposition, which affirms the existence of anything, either substance,
quality, act or circumstance, have a full and certain connection, then
the existence or being of that thing is said to be necessary in a
metaphysical sense” (Edwards, 152).
Edwards explains necessity in terms of a “certain and fixed
connection” between the subject and predicate. He claims that there
are three different ways that things can be necessarily connected, the
third of which is important for the incompatibility argument. The first
is “a full and perfect connection in and of themselves” (Edwards,
152). He thinks that some things are intrinsically connected because
of their nature. For example, it is necessary that a triangle have three
sides. Edwards uses the existence of Being as another example of this
type of connection. He thinks that it is necessary in and of itself that
Being eternally exists. In contemporary language we might say that a
term is analytic. A popular example of this is a bachelor is an
unmarried man.
The second sort of connection Edwards mentions is necessary
because the existence of that thing is already come to pass; and either
now is, or has been; and so has as it were made sure of existence”
(Edwards, 153). Everything that has come into existence, already has
18
been, and therefore it is now impossible that it not be. This idea is
sometimes referred to as the “fixity of the past”. In contemporary
philosophical language, following William of Ockham, this is called
„accidental necessity‟.
The third sort of necessary connection is a “certain
connection consequentially and so the existence of the thing may be
consequentially necessary; as it may he surely and firmly connected
with something else, that is necessary in one of the former
respects”(Edwards, 153). This sort of necessity is important for the
foreknowledge controversies because God is said to have past
foreknowledge of future human volitions. Edwards will argue that the
past foreknowledge has the proposition foreknown attached to it
necessarily, since they both already exist in the past, and therefore are
necessarily connected. Volitions are thus necessarily connected to a
past event (God having the foreknowledge) and hence necessary.

The incompatibility argument

Edwards begins by observing that:

„Tis very evident, with regard to a thing whose existence is

infallibly and indissolubly connected with something which
already hath, or has had existence, the existence of that thing
is necessary (Edwards. 257).

The first assumption he makes in the incompatibility argument is that

things that existed in the past are now necessary. Since the thing
already existed it is too late for any possibility of alteration in that
respect” (Edwards, 257).
Secondly, Edwards observes that God long ago has had
foreknowledge of future actions. He says that this foreknowledge

Is a thing which already has, and long ago had existence; and
so, now its existence is necessary; it is now utterly impossible
to be otherwise, than that this foreknowledge should be, or
should have been (Edwards. 257).

God‟s complete foreknowledge eternally has existed, since God is

outside of time. But it has also many times been revealed by prophets
in history. At any time in the past God could have revealed through
prophets what He foreknew. Edwards believed in the Bible and
19
therefore thought that this had been done many times.
Edwards‟ third observation is that when two things are
necessarily connected, and one of them is necessary, then so is the
other. Because they are indissolubly connected, even if the latter is
not intrinsically necessary, it is made necessary, because it is
indissolubly connected to a necessary thing (this is Edwards third sort
of necessary connection) (Edwards, 153). Edwards says:

To say otherwise, would be a contradiction; it would be in

effect to say, that the connection was indissoluble, and yet
was not so, but might be broken. If that whose existence is
indissolubly connected with something whose existence is
now necessary, is itself not necessary, then it may possibly
not exist, notwithstanding that indissoluble connection of its
existence. Whether the absurdity bent glaring, let the reader
judge (Edwards, 258).

The argument gets its force from the fact that an „indissoluble‟
connection is by definition a connection that cannot be broken, i.e., a
necessary connection.
Edwards uses these points to draw conclusions about God‟s
foreknowledge of future human volitions. He thinks it is evident then
that if God has foreknowledge (which is something that already
existed in the past) of something that will occur in the future, namely
a future human volition, then it is the case that the future volition is
indissolubly connected with the previous foreknowledge. Since the
foreknowledge already has had existence, the future human volition is
indissolubly tied (the third type of necessary connection) to
something that already is accidentally necessary (Edward‟s second
type of necessary connection). This means that both the
foreknowledge and the future volition are necessary (Edwards, 258).
His answer, in other words, is this:

(1) The past is accidentally necessary; i.e. nothing can change

it, [Assumption]
(2) God‟s forebeliefs are past in relation to the events he
foresees will happen. [Assumption]

Therefore,

(3) God‟s forebeliefs are accidentally necessary in relation to

20
 the events He foresees will happen [I & 2]

(4) Necessarily, if God forebelieves that an event e will

occur, it will occur (God is essentially omniscient)
[Assumption]

(5) What is necessarily implied by a necessary fact, is itself

necessary. [Assumption]

Therefore,

(6) What God forebelieves occurs necessarily [3,4,&5]

The conclusion of this argument is compatible with Edwards‟

conception of human freedom. He argues that it is also compatible
with common sense intuitions about the nature of necessity and
contingence. He defines necessity, contingence, and freedom in an
interesting way that is favorable to Calvinism.

Part III: Incompatibility Argument Consistent with Ordinary

Language

Necessity in common speech, according to Edwards, is

A relative term; and relates to some supposed opposition

made to the existence of the thing spoken of, which is
overcome, or proves in vain to hinder or alter it....which is, or
will be, notwithstanding all supposable opposition. To say,
that a thing is necessary, is the same thing as to say, that it is
impossible (it) should not be: but the word “impossible” is
manifestly a relative term, and has reference to supposed
power exerted to bring a thing to pass, which is insufficient
for the effect (Edwards, 149).

Necessity is important for Edwards‟ view of freedom, because he

thinks that human freedom when correctly defined is compatible with
it. He intends to prove that acts of the will are necessary and because
of this incompatible with Arminian freedom which is defined in terms
of libertarian freedom.
Edwards says that in vulgar use something is necessary:

21
 When we can‟t help it, let us do what we will. So anything is
said to be impossible to us, when we would do it, or would
have it brought to pass, and endeavor it; or at least may be
supposed to desire and seek it; but all our desires and
endeavors are, or could be vain (Edwards, 150).

In this way it is impossible that the convict escape from the locked
cell, because no matter what he does or wants to do, his desires will
be frustrated. So impossibility is defined in terms of being presented
by some opposition that no matter what a person tries to do can
overcome it. This definition is favorable to Calvinism because it is
not defining necessity in terms of determinism. If it was, then it
would imply that the opposite of it--freedom, would need to be
defined in a non-determinist sense. Edwards‟ point is that ordinary
language does not support this libertarian way of defining
impossibility.
When „necessity‟ is used in a context where there is no
opposition involved; then the word is not being used with its ordinary
meaning (Edwards, 151). An instance of this would be the Arminian
claiming that humans act in the Calvinistic framework in a
determined way and therefore act out of a fatalistic necessity.
Edwards would respond that the person is using „necessity‟ in either a
nonsensical way or is redefining the term (Edwards, 151). This is
because the Arminian has not presented anything as opposing the
humans in this situation.
In ordinary language, according to Edwards, something is
called contingent when one cannot see what the connection is
between an event and the causal structure that must have brought it
about. Therefore we might claim it to be contingent that we picked
the specific flower that we did out of a field of tulips. Edwards is
claiming that we call this a contingent action because we do not know
what the causal structure was that brought us to pick the specific
flower that we did. Contingence in this sense is compatible with
Calvinism.
Edwards realizes that Arminians and others have defined
contingence in other ways. For example, as something which has
absolutely no previous ground or reason, with which its existence has
any fixed and certain connection”(Edwards, 155). He claims that
these meanings are unnatural and forced.
Edwards gives a definition of „freedom‟ in terms of common
usage. He says that liberty (or freedom) is the “power, opportunity, or
22
advantage, that anyone has, to do as he pleases. Or in other words, his
being free from hindrance or impediment in the way of doing, or
conducting in any respect, as he wills” (Edwards, 163). It is not
properly speaking the will that is free but the agent who has the
freedom to do as he wills (Edwards, 163).
Edwards claims that „freedom‟ in ordinary language is
defined as the ability of one to do and conduct as he will, or according
to his choice” (Edwards, 164). He adds that if “there is nothing in the
way to hinder his pursuing and executing his will, the man is fully
and perfectly free, according to the primary and common notion of
freedom” (Edwards, 164). This definition of freedom is the important
sense in which Calvinists think that humans are free. That means that
the fundamental concept behind the ordinary meaning of freedom
supports Calvinistic intuitions.
Edwards claimed that the Arminians use “freedom” in a non-
standard way. Their definition consists of three parts: first, the will is
sovereign over itself because it is a “self-determining power”. The
Arminians claim that the will determines the volitions that will be
made and is not causally dependent on anything other than itself for
its volitions. Nor is it causally affected or determined by previous
choices that it has made (Edwards, 164). The second part is that the
mind is indifferent before the act of volition because it is in
equilibrium. Edwards attacks this view and considers himself to have
shown that Arminian freedom is clearly wrong. Commentators have
pointed out that in attacking this view Edwards has only shown some
of his contemporary Arminian opponents to be wrong, but he has not
shown more respectable Arminian definitions of freedom to be
implausible. The third part of the Arminian definition of “freedom”
states that contingence is defined in such a way that it is

Opposed to all necessity, or any fixed and certain connection

with some previous ground or reason of its existence. They
suppose the essence of liberty so much to consist in these
things, that unless the will of man be free in this sense, he has
no real freedom, how much soever he may be at liberty to act
according to his will (Edwards, 165).

Edwards does not mention it but included in this definition of

freedom are the Molinist and Ockhamist shared view that agents are
free only if they have the power not only to act otherwise if they
choose (which Calvinists allow) but also a power to choose otherwise.
23
This view came to be called liberty of indifference (Kenny, 61).
The Arminians suppose that future events that are free in the
libertarian sense (in a way opposed to all necessity) are contingent
events that God knows. This is why they explain how God can know
future contingent free choices and yet explain how the free agent
made a free choice.

Part IV: Evidence needed for Foreknowledge

Edwards wants to prove that “no future event can be

certainly foreknown, whose existence is contingent” (Edwards, 258).
He thinks he can prove this by showing that it is self-evident that it is
impossible for something to be certainly known without evidence. If
one has no evidence for something, then Edwards thinks that it is
clear that one cannot claim that one knows it, because there is no way
of knowing it. It is, he says, a contradiction to think that something
can be known which is without evidence. And it is this alleged
contradiction which he uses to argue that future contingent events,
cannot be known by God or man, because contingent things are by
definition things that do not have certain evidence for them (Edwards,
258-259).
Things are evident in two ways: they are either self-evident
or are proved by something else that is self-evident. Edwards claims
that future contingents cannot have evidence in either of these ways.
First, he thinks future contingent events cannot be self-evident.

[I]f it be, it may be now known by what is now to be seen in

the thing itself; either its present existence, or the necessity of
its nature: but both these are contrary to the supposition. It is
supposed, both that the thing has no present existence to be
seen; and also that it is not of such a nature as to be
necessarily existent for the future: so that its future existence
is not self-evident (Edwards, 259).

The point is that future contingent events are not self-evident because,
first, they are not necessary, and secondly, they are not in the present.
Since they are in the future they are not now present to the mind.
Therefore, Edwards concludes that propositions about future
contingent events cannot be self-evident.
The other way that things have evidence is by being proved
by something else, but Edwards shows this also to be problematic for
24
future contingent events. He says:

[N]either is there any proof, or evidence in anything else, or

evidence of connection with something else that is evident;
for this also is contrary to the supposition. „Tis supposed, that
there is now nothing existent, with which the future existence
of the contingent event is connected. For such a connection
destroys its contingence, and supposes necessity (Edwards,
259).

Once again we see Edwards using the definition of contingence to

show that a future contingent event cannot be proved by something
else. For if it could there would have to be a necessary connection
between the event and something that exists that it is connected with,
and if there were, then the event would not be contingent. He
concludes that future contingent events cannot be proved by
something else or by self-evidence.
Edwards uses an example to show what he means. He wants
us to suppose that 5,760 years ago only God existed. Next, we must
imagine that something else other than God, either the actual world or
another being came into existence out of nothing. It is to he supposed
that this being or world came into existence in absolute contingence.
Edwards reminds the person in the thought experiment what it is like
for something to come into existence by absolute contingence: (1) it
involves the thing coming into existence without being caused either
by God or by anything else; (2) the thing coming into existence has
no connection with anything prior to its existing; and (3) there can be
no reason for its beginning to exist. If it is the case that the thing did
come into existence in absolute contingence, defined in this way, then
Edwards is convinced that there cannot be any evidence present for
any mind, Gods included, for the thing before it comes into existence.
One could not find prior evidence in the thing itself because the thing
did not exist prior to its existing, so one could not have evidence of it
in this way. Also one could not have evidence about it from anything
else because this would involve there being some connection between
something else and the thing that comes into existence, but by
definition absolute contingence rules this out. The thing that comes
into existence then would be absolutely unknowable because there
would be no reason to think that it should come into existence, and
there is no evidence for it. Even a mind with infinite power of insight
could not find evidence where none exists (Edwards, 259-260).
25
Inconsistency in God’s knowledge

Edwards argues that God‟s knowledge would have to be

inconsistent for Him to foreknow something and yet know that this
thing is contingent. For if God truly knows that something is
contingent then He cannot really know that the thing will certainly be.
For if it will certainly be, and God knows it, it cannot be contingent.
Edwards thinks that some objectors might believe that God has
knowledge of both of these things at once but in a way that we
ourselves cannot understand. Edwards responds that this is no more
plausible than defending the claim that God can believe contradictory
things by saying that we cannot understand how God can know
contradictory things but He nevertheless does (Edwards, 260-261).
But clearly few thinkers are willing to defend the idea that God
believes contradictory things, so they will also want to reject the idea
that God knows events that are absolutely contingent.

Arminians must believe in necessity as much as Calvinists

The conclusions to be drawn from the incompatibility

argument are that one of the major weapons in the Arminian
theological arsenal can no longer be used as an objection to
Calvinism. The Arminians claimed that the necessity incurred by
Calvinistic divine decrees is incompatible with liberty and moral
responsibility. Edwards points out that the incompatibility argument
has shown that the Arminian belief in God‟s absolute foreknowledge
and divine omniscience also implies that future human volitions are
necessary.

There is no geometrical theorem or proposition whatsoever,

more capable of strict demonstration, than that God‟s certain
prescience of the volitions of moral agents is inconsistent
with such a contingence of these events, as is without all
necessity; and so is inconsistent with the Arminian notion of
liberty” (Edwards,268-269).

Since he believes that his argument has shown that consistent

Arminians must believe in the necessity of future human volitions, he
thinks that their system is as incompatible with libertarianism as the
Calvinist‟s. Arininian necessity is as strong as the necessity that
26
comes from God‟s decrees:

And it being so, the certainty can‟t be increased; and

therefore the connection between the knowledge and the
thing known, can‟t be increased; so that if a decree be added
to the foreknowledge, it don‟t at all increase the connection,
or make it more infallible and indissoluble. If it were not so,
there certainty of knowledge might be increased by the
addition of a decree; which is contrary to the supposition,
which is, that the knowledge is absolutely perfect, or perfect
to the highest possible degree (Edwards, 261).

The point is that the certainty of the connection (between the past and
the future) can‟t be increased by adding a decree.

Part V: Whitby’s Objection

Edwards introduces an objection that Whitby had earlier

made in response to an incompatibilist argument. Whitby‟s argument
is concerned with the origin of God‟s foreknowledge. Whitby says
that divine foreknowledge does not cause the future event to be,
rather it is the future event that causes God to have the foreknowledge
that He does. The foreknowledge is not the cause of the event, it is the
effect. Because of this, Whitby claims that foreknowledge cannot
make the event necessary, because it does not causally bring about the
event. Edwards quotes Whitby‟s Discourse on the Five Points where
that latter states:

God‟s prescience has no influence at all on our

actions….Should God (says he) by immediate revelation,
give me the knowledge of the event of any man‟s state of
actions? Surely none at all....Our knowledge doth not affect
the things we know, to make them more certain, or more
future, than they would be without it. Now foreknowledge in
God is knowledge. As therefore knowledge has no influence
on things that are, so neither has foreknowledge on things that
shall be. And consequently, the foreknowledge of any action
that would be otherwise free, cannot alter or diminish that
freedom (Edwards, 262).

Whitby assumes that showing something to be logically

27
necessary involves proving it to be causally necessary. If one cannot
show that something makes another thing causally necessary, then
one can have no reason to believe that it is necessary. Applying this to
the foreknowledge controversy, it means that if one cannot prove that
God‟s foreknowledge produces the necessity of future actions, then
one can have no reason to believe that the future actions are
necessary. And of course Edwards did not argue that foreknowledge
causally produces the necessity of the future events.
Edwards responds to this objection by claiming that although
foreknowledge may not be the cause of the event being necessary,
contra Whitby, it may still prove its necessity. Edwards points out that
Whitby‟s objection rests on the questionable assumption that one
thing can only prove a second to be necessary only if it is the cause of
its necessity. So foreknowledge might prove future events to be
necessary, while leaving open where the necessity comes from
(Edwards, 263). Even if foreknowledge is not the cause of future
actions being necessary, yet it can still be used to demonstrate that it
is necessary (Edwards, 263). He says:

„Tis as evident, as „tis possible anything should be, that it is

impossible a thing which is infallibly known to be true,
should prove not to be true: therefore there is a necessity that
it should (not) be otherwise; whether the knowledge be the
cause of this necessity, or the necessity the cause of the
knowledge (Edwards, 264).

Edwards presents an argument to show that knowledge, even

though it does not causally produce the necessity of something, can
show it to be logically necessary. His uses the example of “after-
knowledge”. This is knowledge of something that has already
happened in the past; and as Edwards has argued elsewhere, when we
have knowledge of something that occurred in the past, it is now too
late for that occurrence not to exist.

Certain after-knowledge proves that it is now, in the time of

the knowledge, by some means or other, become impossible
but that the proposition which predicates past existence on the
event, should be true (Edwards, 264).

Therefore, after-knowledge is knowledge of things that are now

necessary, because they have already come into existence, and it is
28
now impossible that they did not exist (Edwards, 264).
After-knowledge has proved that it is now necessary, for
example, that 200 years ago we had the American Revolution.
Edwards wants to argue that after-knowledge clearly implies that the
American Revolution is now necessary. Yet it did not cause it. But
this is precisely what Whitby claims does not work, for according to
Whitby something must causally produce the necessary event in order
to demonstrate that it is necessary. And since after-knowledge can
demonstrate the necessity of events, Edwards thinks that
foreknowledge can also do so. He says:

And so does certain foreknowledge prove, that now, in the

time of the knowledge, it is by some means or other, become
impossible but that the proposition which predicates future
existence on the event, should be true. The necessity of the
truth of the propositions, consisting in the present
impossibility of the non-existence of the event affirmed, in
both cases, is the immediate ground of the certainty of the
knowledge; there can be no certainty of knowledge without it
(Edwards, 264).

Since the proposition about the future that God knows is part
of the past, what the proposition affirms is also part of the necessary
past, hence is necessary. Edwards agrees with Whitby‟s claim that
“mere knowledge don‟t affect the thing known, to make it more
certain or more future” (Edwards, 265). But Edwards adds: „But yet, I
say, it supposes and proves the thing to be already, both future, and
certain; i.e. necessarily future” (Edwards, 265).
Edwards next turns the objection around to show that it
provides support for the incompatibility argument. If foreknowledge
does not cause the future event, but the opposite, then:

This is so far from shewing that this foreknowledge don‟t

infer the necessity of the existence of that event, that it rather
shews the contrary more plainly. Because it shews the
existence of the event to be so settled and firm, that it is as if
it had already been; inasmuch as in effect it actually exists
already; its future existence has already had actual influence
and efficiency, and has produced an effect, viz, prescience:
the effect exists already; and as the effect supposes the cause,
is connected with the cause, and depends entirely upon it,
29
 therefore it is as if the future event, which is the cause, had
existed already (Edwards, 265).

Edwards uses the example of a telescope to show how this

argument works (Edwards 265-266). He asks us to imagine a person
looking at the stars through a telescope. The images we receive are
effects of the heavenly bodies. From these effects Edwards thinks it is
reasonable to infer that a cause of them must exist.
The effects are tied to their causes, and as the image which is
an effect of the heavenly body shows there to be an actual heavenly
body that is the cause of the ray of light, in the same way God‟s
foreknowledge which is „telescopically‟ pointed to the future captures
images that are effects of what is actually going to be in the future,
and these effects must have a cause (the event that is going to occur).
Just as the image of the stars must have a cause (that already actually
exists), so too an image of a future human volition must have a cause
that already actually exists for God to be affected by it. Since the
effect surely exist, the cause must also exist.

The existence of the things which are their causes, is also

equally sure, firm and necessary; and that it is alike
impossible but that they should be, as if they had been
already, as their effects have” (Edwards, 266).

Edwards concludes by noting that Gods foreknowledge of future

events is eternally present in his mind, and so the causes of these
events also eternally exist (Edwards, 266).

Part VI: An Objection from God’s Timelessness

This last point leads Edwards to discuss an objection given

by “some Arminians”, he says, who appeal to the idea of divine
timelessness to evade the incompatibility argument. Two historical
examples of theologians who used this objection are Boethius and
Aquinas, both of whom used versions of the argument. According to
Edwards, the Arminian would object

That when we talk of foreknowledge in God, there is no strict

propriety in our so speaking; and that although it be true, that
there is in God the most perfect knowledge of all events from
eternity to eternity, yet there is no such thing as before and
30
 after in God, but he sees all things by one perfect
unchangeable view, without any succession (Edwards, 266).

This means that God does not have foreknowledge in a real sense.
Therefore the premises in the incompatibility argument that state that
he has foreknowledge, can be rejected. Hence the argument can be
rejected.
Edwards responds to this in three ways. First, he thinks that
strictly speaking the objector is correct in saying that God does not
have foreknowledge. But Edwards reminds us that this is because all
events are eternally present before God

As if they already had existence: and that is as much as to

say, that future events are always in God‟s view as evident,
clear, sure, and necessary, as if they already were” (Edwards,
267).

That these events are continually present to God‟s view is a sufficient

reason for believing that the incompatibility argument is correct. For
if God has all the events that will happen eternally before His mind,
future and past and present events are all as surely there before His
mind as if they already existed. If God is outside of time (as He is for
orthodox theology) then all things in time are there at the same „time‟
for God. Edwards thinks that God‟s having all events continually
present before Him establishes the certainty and necessity of all
events because whether future or past they all have existed eternally
in God‟s mind. When they do in fact occur in time, nothing changes
with respect to God (Edwards, 268). Edwards points out that the
orthodox doctrine of the immutability of God also supports this
reasoning. If God‟s knowledge is perfect and unchangeable, then it is
impossible for the knowledge of future events that are eternally
present before His mind, to change. Therefore if God has any future
event present in His knowledge, it is necessary that it occur and at the
time foreseen. If it were possible for God‟s eternally present
knowledge to change, then, says Edwards,

It would be possible for there to be a change in God‟s

knowledge and view of things. For if the known event should
fail of existence, and not come into being, as God expected,
then God would see it, and so would change his mind, and
see his former mistake; and thus there would be change and
31
 succession in his knowledge (Edwards, 268).

So Edwards uses the immutability and timelessness of God to provide

further support for the incompatibility of divine foreknowledge and
Arminian freedom.

The Prophetic Response

Edwards argues that divine prophecy also shows that God‟s

timelessness cannot be used to avoid the incompatibility argument.
God can record his knowledge of future voluntary actions in a book
such as the Bible. This shows that the same necessary connection that
exists between a prophecy and the future event can be made to obtain
between any belief of future contingents that God has and those
events. He does not need to write the foreknowledge down for them
to be in the same way necessarily connected with the future event.
God‟s mind does not need to be in time for the knowledge of future
contingents to be infallibly connected with the event foreknown. This
is because His knowledge is symmetrical to any prophecies that He
would cause to be written in a book, because He simply could cause
His knowledge to be written down at any time (Edwards, 267).
Edwards believes that divine prophecy shows that divine
foreknowledge is incompatible with libertarian freedom. The
argument goes like this:

(1) God has foreknowledge of every future voluntary action.

[Assumption]

(2) He can cause this knowledge to be written down in a

book. [Assumption]

(3) If God‟s “foreknowledge is infallible, then the

expression of it in the written prediction is infallible”
(Edwards, 267) [Assumption]

(4) Written foreknowledge is temporally before the event

foreknown. [Assumption]

(5) Prophetically foretold events are necessary. [3,4]

(6) Eternal divine foreknowledge is in some sense equivalent

32
 to temporally revealed foreknowledge. [1,2]

(7) The necessary connection between divine foreknowledge

and the thing known is as necessary as if the
foreknowledge existed temporally before the event, as
the written prophecy does.[5,6]
Therefore,

(10) Divine foreknowledge shows the necessity of future

voluntary action.

The original incompatibility argument argued that divine

foreknowledge was accidentally necessary because it was a part of the
past that it was at a later time impossible to change. So according to
the argument future contingent events were not free because they
were necessarily connected to the accidentally necessary
foreknowledge.
This concludes the overview of Edwards‟ reasons for
supporting the incompatibility argument. Now we will study two
prominent Arminian methods of objecting to Edwards‟ argument. I
will argue that there are internal inconsistencies in both these
objections. I will also claim that Edwards has anticipated various
problems that significantly affect the plausibility of the Ockhamist
and Molinist responses.

33
34
 2

THE OCKHAMIST
RESPONSE

Introduction

A contemporary defender of the Ockhamist response to the

incompatibility argument is Edward Wierenga. He discusses this issue
in his book The Nature of God and in an article called; “Prophecy,
Freedom, and the Necessity of the Past.” The Nature of God is an
examination of the divine attributes, although a substantial part of the
book focuses on the issue of freedom and foreknowledge. For
example, there are long chapters on such subjects as “accidental
necessity” and “middle knowledge”. The article is an examination of
prophecy and its relation to the foreknowledge/freedom controversy,
It is in part a response to the claim of Alfred Freddoso that prophecy
causes a serious problem for the Ockhamist.

Part I: The Incompatibility Argument Derived from Aquinas

Wierenga develops the Ockhamist response by first laying

out what he takes the incompatibilty argument to be. He derives the
35
basic argument from Thomas Aquinas:

Further, every conditional proposition, of which the

antecedent is absolutely necessary, must have an absolutely
necessary consequent. For the antecedent is to the consequent
as principles are to the conclusion: and from necessary
principles only a necessary conclusion can follow, as is
proved in Poster. i [Aristotles‟ Posterior Analytics,I,61. But
this is a true conditional proposition, If God knew that this
thing will be, it will be, for the knowledge of God is only of
true things. Now the antecedent of this conditional
proposition is absolutely necessary, because it is eternal, and
because it is signified as past. Therefore, the consequent is
also absolutely necessary; and so [the] knowledge of God is
not of contingent things (Wierenga, 1991, 425-426).

Wierenga says that the kind of necessity that Aquinas is discussing is

accidental necessity or what William Ockham called necessity per
accidense. This is the necessity that is attached to something that is
specified as past. Since a past event has already obtained, it is now
too late for that event not to have occurred, so that event is now
necessary. Since God‟s past foreknowledge of what will occur in the
future is now in the past, it cannot change, and because of that the
consequent or the thing known to occur in the future is also necessary.
Wierenga extracts three ideas from Aquinas. First, “true
propositions about the past (“signified as past”) are in some sense
necessary.” Hence,

(1) Propositions reporting God‟s past beliefs are now

accidentally necessary.1

Second, accidental necessity is closed under entailment. That is,

(2) If p is accidentally necessary and p entails q, then q is

accidentally necessary (Wierenga, 1989, 67).

Hence,

1
I will sometimes number the premises of the arguments differently from
what they are in the text to keep them consistently numbered.
36
 (3) Any (contingent) proposition that is entailed by an
accidentally necessary proposition is itself accidentally
necessary.

Aquinas is assuming that if something is accidentally necessary then

it is something that cannot be made false (Wierenga, 1989, 67).
Hence:

(4) If it is accidentally necessary that a person perform a

certain action, then, since there is nothing the person can do
to avoid it, the action is not free (Wierenga, 1991, 426).

Wierenga employs these assumptions to construct the following

argument using the popular example of God foreknowing that Jones
will mow his lawn:

(5) Eighty years ago God foreknew that Jones will mow his
lawn tomorrow...

(6) It is accidentally necessary that eighty years ago God

foreknew that Jones will mow his lawn tomorrow…[1,5]

(7) “Eighty years ago God foreknew that Jones will mow his
lawn tomorrow” entails “Jones will mow his lawn
tomorrow”;..

(8)It is accidentally necessary that Jones will mow his lawn

tomorrow...[3,6,7]

Therefore,

(9) Jones‟ mowing his lawn tomorrow is not free...[4,8]

(Wierenga, 1991, 426-427).

Part II: Wierenga’s Development of the Argument

Chapters 3,4, and 5 of The Nature of God discuss the

incompatibility argument in greater detail. Wierenga begins by giving
a preliminary account of the concept of accidental necessity required
by the argument:
37
 (C) There is a concept of accidental necessity satisfying the
following conditions: (i) if God in the past believed a
proposition about the future, it is now accidentally necessary
that he did, (ii) accidental necessity is closed under
entailment, and (iii) if a proposition p is accidentally
necessary at a time t, then no one is able at t or later to act in
such a way that p is false (Wierenga, 1989, 69).

He then provides an incompatibility argument, which he calls

„Argument A‟:

(12) Necessarily, if (C) then divine foreknowledge of human

actions is incompatible with anyone being able to do anything
other than what he or she does do.

(13) Necessarily, if no one is ever able to do anything other

than what he or she does do, then no one ever acts freely.

Therefore,

(14) Necessarily, if (C) then divine foreknowledge of human

actions is incompatible with anyone ever acting freely
(Wierenga, 1989, 70).

Wierenga first argues that if we slightly revise (C) to (C*)

then (12) is plausible. Let us first see why (C) needs revision. (C)‟s
first condition does not involve a problem for premise (12). He
clarifies the intuitions behind (C)(i), changing it to:

(i) for all times t1 and t2 such that t1 is earlier than t2 and for
every proposition p, if at t1 God believes p, then at t2 the
proposition, At t1 God believes p, is accidentally necessary
(Wierenga, 1989, 71).

But the second condition (ii) is problematic because it contradicts

“the claim...that only logically contingent propositions are
accidentally necessary” (Wierenga, 1989, 71). Wierenga assumes that
it is accidentally necessary that Carter was elected president. Now
consider a proposition of this form: Either Carter was elected
President in 1976 or 2+2=4. Wierenga points out that if “accidental
38
necessity is closed under entailment, this disjunction should be
accidentally necessary; but it is logically necessary, so it should not
be accidentally necessary” (Wierenga, 1989, 7 1-72). To avoid this
conclusion he changes condition (C)(ii) so that logically necessary
things cannot be classified as accidentally necessary. He does this by
stipulating that accidentally necessary things must be possibly false.

(C*)(ii) for every time t and for all propositions p and q, if p

is accidentally necessary at t, p entails q, and it is possible
that q is false, then q is accidentally necessary at t
(Wierenga, 1989, 74).

Wierenga says that the final condition of (C) is ambiguous.

The claim is: “If a proposition p is accidentally necessary at a certain
time then no one is able at that time or later to act in such a way that p
is false” (Wierenga, 1989, 72). This can be interpreted in two ways.
First, “It might be that a person S is able to act in such a way that p is
false just in case S is able to cause p to be false” (Wierenga, 1989,
72). Secondly, “It might be that S is able to act in such a way that p is
false is just in case there is an action A that S is able to perform and
that is such that if S were to perform A then p would be false”
(Wierenga, 1989, 72). Wierenga presents a counter-example to the
third condition on the first interpretation.

[I]f what the third condition of (C) tells us is that

Jones is unable to cause p to be false, does it follow that
Jones cannot refrain from mowing his lawn tomorrow? It is
not clear that it does. Perhaps Jones can go on an all-day bike
trip tomorrow, and if he did that action would be sufficient
for the falsehood of p even if Jones would not thereby cause
p to be false (Wierenga, 1989, 72).

In other words, Jones might be able to do something else which is

such that if he were to do it, p would be false without causing p to be
false. For example,

Let q be the proposition that last week Smith correctly

believed that Jones would trim his evergreens tomorrow, and
suppose that q is true. If Jones cannot cause q to be false,
does it follow that Jones is unable to refrain from trimming
his evergreens tomorrow? Clearly not. Jones can falsify
39
 Smiths belief without practicing backward causation. Jones‟s
not triming [sic] his evergreens tomorrow would be sufficient
for the falsehood of q, and if Jones were not to trim his
evergreens tomorrow, Jones can plausibly be said to have
made q false. But Jones can be able to make q false without
having the ability to cause it to be false (Wierenga, 1989, 72-
73).

The idea is that one can make something false without being able to
cause it to be false. Wierenga qualifies (C)(iii) to include this insight:

(C*)(iii) for every time tl and proposition p, if p is

accidentally necessary at t1, then there is no person S, action
A, and time t2 at least as late as t1 such that S can do A at t2
and if S were to do A at t2 then p would be false (Wierenga,
1989, 74).

Frankfurt Style Counterexamples

Wierenga next examines the plausibility of premise (13) of

„Argument A‟. It reads:

(13) Necessarily, if no one is ever able to do anything other

than what he or she does do, then no one ever acts freely
(Wierenga, 1989, 74).

Wierenga says that until recently this would have been

uncontroversial. But Harry Frankfurt has argued that examples show
this premise to be problematic.
Frankfurt objects to the „Principle of Alternative Possibilities‟,
which he defines as

(PAP) A person is morally responsible for an action he has

done only if he could have done otherwise (Wierenga, 1989,
75).

Wierenga presents a counter-example invented by Peter van Inwagen

that is similar to the one Frankfurt has given. A person named Gunnar
is planning to shoot Ridley. A third person, Cosser, also wants Ridley
shot. Cosser has the ability to play with Gunnar‟s mind so that he can
cause him to shoot Ridley, even if in the situation where he is
40
presented with the possibility, Gunnar decides not to. The point is that
Gunnar is morally responsible even though he could have done
nothing but kill Ridley. For if he chooses to shoot Ridley, then he is
responsible, but also if he decides not too, Cossar can still influence
him sufficiently so that he will shoot Ridley after all. So PAP does
not seem to Work.
Does it follow that (13) is false? No, for it:

Does not deny that it can happen that an action is both free
and that its agent could not have done otherwise. What (13)
says is that, necessarily, if no one is ever able to do other than
what he or she does so, then no one ever acts freely. Thus
(13) leaves it open that some actions are both free and such
that their agents could not have avoided them (Wierenga,
1989, 76).

So (13) is problematic only if it is shown that it is possible that all

free actions are unavoidable. Wierenga thinks that we can approach
this by asking “Whether Frankfurt-style counterexamples can be
constructed for every free action” (Wierenga, 1989, 77). He argues
that the example that Frankfurt gives, where one person causally
influences another‟s will, does not have much force since it is not
clear that such a thing is really possible. But he concedes that there is
a Christian tradition that believes that God can cause a person to will
in certain ways. Yet even if PAP is subject to counter examples, a
related principle is not:

(PAPC) Necessarily, for every person S and act of will A

such that S causes A, S is morally responsible for performing
A only if S could have refrained from causing A (Wierenga,
1989, 85).

Wierenga thinks that this principle is defensible because it ensures

that free creatures cannot be forced by another agent to choose
something that is contrary to their wills. The idea is that Cossar, who
can play with Gunnar‟s mind can not intrude into Gunnar‟s decision
making process in such a way that Gunnar cannot refrain from doing
what Cossar wants. Gunnar can be free only if he can refrain from
doing what Cossar is trying to get him to do. If when God causes a
free agent to choose something, the agent is not free, then likewise, if
another agent (Cossar) causes Gunnar to choose something, Gunnar is
41
not free (Wierenga, 1989, 85).

In addition, any act of an agent is free only if it is an act of will

caused by the agent or if it is caused by such an act. But then if
(PAPC) is true, so is (13). For if no one is ever able to do
anything other than what he or she does do, then no one ever
causes an act of will, and if no one ever causes an act of will,
then no one ever performs a free action (Wierenga, 1989, 85).

(12) and (13) are thus defensible.

Part III: An Argument for Fatalism

Wierenga uses an analogous argument for fatalism to

undermine the plausibility of the incompatibility argument.

He begins by claiming that, “Perhaps, every proposition

about the past is accidentally necessary, in which case (C*) may be
seen as an instance of a more general principle.” He then gives the
definition of the more general principle that he calls „(F)‟:

(F) There is a concept of accidental necessity satisfying the

following conditions: (i) for all times U and t2 such that t1 is
earlier than t2 and for every proposition p, if at t1 p is true,
then at t2 p is accidentally necessary, (ii) for every time t and
for all propositions p and q, if p is accidentally necessary, p
entails q, and it is possible that q is false, then q is
accidentally necessary, and (iii) for every time t1 and
proposition p, if p is accidentally necessary at t1, then there is
no person S. action A, and time t2 at least as late as t1 such
that S can do A at t2 and if S were to do A at t2 then p would
be false (Wierenga, 1989, 87-88).

The difference between (C*) and (F) is that (C*) only refers to God‟s
past foreknowledge, while (F) is more general and refers to all past
events. Wierenga then makes the claim that the “Ockhamist response
may be seen as a natural extension of a plausible response to an
analogous argument for fatalism” (427). He presents more general
propositions corresponding to (12), (13), and (14) of „Argument A‟:

(15) Necessarily, if (F) then all past events are incompatible

42
 with anyone being able to do anything other than what he or
she does do.

(16) Necessarily, if no one is ever able to do anything other

than what he or she does do, then no one ever acts freely.

Therefore,

(17) Necessarily, if (F) then all past events are incompatible

with anyone ever acting freely.

Then he shows how these can be used to construct an argument about

Jones mowing his lawn, corresponding to the earlier argument ((5)-
(9)) Wierenga derived from Aquinas.

(18) Eighty years ago it was true that Jones will mow his
lawn tomorrow

(19) It is accidentally necessary that 80 years ago it was true

that Jones will mow his lawn tomorrow.

(20) “Eighty years ago it was true that Jones will mow his
lawn tomorrow” entails “Jones will mow his lawn
tomorrow”.

(21) It is accidentally necessary that Jones will mow his lawn

tomorrow.

Therefore,

(22) Jones‟ mowing his lawn tomorrow is not free

(Wierenga, 1991, 426-427).

Wierenga believes that this argument for fatalism is analogous to the

argument for incompatibility. To avoid its conclusion, he denies that
(18) “is strictly about the past” (Wierenga, 1991, 428). This is
because it also refers to the future and so it is not accidentally
necessary. Now (18) is analogous to

(4) Eighty years ago God foreknew that Jones will mow his
43
 lawn tomorrow (Wierenga, 1991, 426).

For both (4) and (18) depend for their truth on the future. So if (4) is
accidentally necessary, so too is (18). But then we are forced into
fatalism (Wierenga, 1991, 428). Since fatalism is implausible, we
have reason to believe that (4) is not accidentally necessary. So if one
wants to claim that (4) is accidentally necessary as the original
incompatibility argument did, then one must also conclude that (18) is
accidentally necessary and that fatalism is true (Wierenga, 1991,
428).
Wierenga also wonders whether (C*) is just an implication
of a more general fact. For (C*) might just be one example of the
truth that all things that are in the past are accidentally necessary i.e.,
(C*) might be a special case of (F). But

(F) provides an argument for fatalism. I think that is sufficient

reason for rejecting (F), and if (C*) is supposed to be
supported by being an instance of (F), that is slim support
indeed. Of course, some philosophers have accepted fatalism,
and examining their arguments in favor of it is a worthwhile
philosophical activity. But we may legitimately decline to
engage in it here. We are also entitled to reject any argument
for the incompatibility of divine foreknowledge and human
free action which entails fatalism independently of premisses
[sic] about divine omniscience (Wierenga, 1989, 89).

Wierenga has argued that one must first accept fatalism if the
incompatibility argument is to work. But since he doesn‟t believe in
fatalism he claims that the incompatibility argument, which depends
on fatalism, can be rejected. The point is that the incompatibility
argument depends on (C*) and (C*) depends on (F). But (F) entails
fatalism. Hence, since fatalism is false, so is (F). Hence (C*) lacks
support. Consequentially, there is no reason to accept the
incompatibility argument.

Objection concerning Wierenga’s use of “Fatalism”

Wierenga might he criticised for running together

determinism, soft determinism, and fatalism in his definition of
fatalism. Does he misunderstand the position of the Calvinist such
that he does not see that they do not define fatalism in his way? Or is
44
he just equating all theories that are deterministic, including soft-
determinism, with fatalism? But there are theories that have been
traditionally distinguished for certain reasons. Following Peter van
Inwagen, Wierenga defines fatalism as:

The doctrine that it is a conceptual truth that no one is able to

act otherwise than he or she does (Wierenga, 1991, 427).

Jonathan Edwards believes that no one is ever able to do other than

what they in fact do, but Calvinists have always distinguished their
belief in the sovereignty of God from philosophical fatalism. Fatalism
as distinguished from Calvinism says that since the future is
determined to be the way that it will be and the future cannot be other
than the way that it will be, (since everything is determined) humans
do not need to act in any certain ways. They need not do anything,
need not strive to do good, do not need to try to serve God, because
everything will be the same no matter what they do. So fatalism is
distinguished from Calvinistic predestination in that Calvinists
believe that they should actively work at changing the world and their
lives, while the fatalist says that there is no reason to do anything.
Calvinists think that God uses humans who are consciously and
actively at work to create the future, while the fatalist thinks that
everything just comes about no matter what the person does.
Wierenga is equating fatalism and divine sovereignty in a way that
Calvinists would object to.
„Fatalism‟ in theological terms differs from Calvinistic
divine decrees in four ways. First, fatalism “excludes the idea of final
causes” whereas Calvinistic decrees are ordained “to accomplish the
highest conceivable or possible good” (Hodge, 549). Secondly,
fatalism claims that “the sequence of events is determined by an
unintelligent concatenation of causes and effects” while the Calvinist
claims that “the sequence is determined by infinite wisdom and
goodness” (Hodge, 549), Third, Fatalism does not believe in free
causes. This means that the choices of free agents are “as much
determined by a necessity out of themselves as the operation of
nature” (Hodge, 549). This is contrary to the Calvinistic view that
“the freedom and responsibility of man are fully preserved” (Hodge,
549). “The two systems differ, therefore, as much as a machine
differs from a man; or as the actions of infinite intelligence, power,
and love differ from the law of gravitation” (Hodge, 549). The final
difference is that fatalism gets rid of “moral distinctions” and leads to
45
“stolid insensibility or despair” whereas the Calvinistic decrees lead
to no such conclusion (Hodge, 549).
The incompatibilist might want to respond to Wierenga‟s
fatalistic argument by claiming that (F) does not in fact have a
conclusion that differs from (C*). For (C*) also concludes that
humans are not free and hence some sort of necessity must be the
case. So (F) should not be seen as providing a lack of support for the
plausibility of (C*) because (C*) itself leads to the same conclusions.
Here Wierenga is begging the question. The question at issue is
whether humans can freely choose. The two arguments (C*) and (F)
both conclude that they do not freely choose, therefore Wierenga sees
(F) as implausible and (C*) not supported. The problem with
Wierenga‟s move is that libertarian freedom is the issue at stake, so
Wierenga cannot just assume it, even though the arguments he gives
show it not to be possible. It seems that Wierenga is operating under
the assumption that something can show another to be necessary, only
if the first is causally necessitating the second. Since neither the
incompatibility or fatalistic argument show that human wills are
causally necessitated, Wierenga is concluding that they do not work.
But as we have seen in this essay, Edwards has argued in his reply to
Whitby that this is a problematic assumption.
I understand that Wierenga is claiming that (F) is a more
general instance of the particular case (C*). He thinks that since the
general rule (F) is not supported, therefore, (C*) also is not supported.
However, he has not given good philosophical reasons for rejecting
(F). In fact, he has given no argument at all, except that he believes in
libertarian freedom. He begs the question by simply assuming
libertarian freedom to get himself out of a difficult situation. I do not
think that he has sufficiently shown that this is a rational, much less a
biblical thing to do.

Part IV: The Prophetic Argument.

Wierenga is interested in showing that the Ockhamist

response to the incompatibility argument can be applied to the
prophetic argument. How does prophecy affect the incompatibility
controversy? Alfred Freddoso claims that “Ockhamism simply cannot
deal adequately with genuine prophecy of future contingents”
(Wierenga, 1991, 433). Why is this?

Stump and Kretzmann suggest that it is because “a prophecy

46
 brings some of God‟s eternal knowledge into time, thus
converting at least the revealed bit of it into foreknowledge.”
And they add, “Even though it is not God who has the
foreknowledge generated in this way, the standard arguments
against the compatibility foreknowledge and freedom would
apply to the prophet‟s foreknowledge which stems from God”
(Wierenga, 1991, 433).

This is a rejoinder to those who think they can evade the

problem by denying that God is in time.
Wierenga uses the example of Jesus prophesying that Peter
will deny him three times. The utterance “Peter will disown Christ
three times” seems to be accidentally necessary (Wierenga, 1991,
434).

(23) Christ uttered (Aramaic words whose translation into

English is), “Tonight before the cock crows you will disown
me three times” (Wierenga, 1991, 434).

Because this utterance is accidentally necessary the following

statement is accidentally necessary as well:

(24) Peter will disown Christ three times. (Wierenga, 1991,

434).

Wierenga says that the Ockhamist objection to the argument

from prophecy, is equivalent to its objection to the original
incompatibility argument (of Aquinas). (23) can be more accurately
stated as

(23‟) There was a token T such that (i) Christ used T, and (ii)
as used by Christ T expressed p. the proposition that Peter
will disown Christ three times, (iii) Christ believed p. and (iv)
Christ intended to assert p with T (Wierenga, 1991, 438).

Now it is accidentally necessary that Jesus say the prophetic words

that He does and it is accidentally necessary that those words are
expressed. “But it is not apparent that (23) as a whole is accidentally
necessary” (Wierenga, 1991, 439). Wierenga develops this idea:

It was clear from our discussion in Section 2 above that the

47
 Ockhamist is already committed to holding that God‟s past
knowledge of the contingent future need not be accidentally
necessary. Of course, the same holds for God‟s past belief,
for, necessarily, God believes a proposition if and only if he
knows it. So the Ockhamist will naturally want to deny that
the third clause of (23‟), that Christ believed that Peter would
disown him three times, is accidentally necessary, for this is a
belief about the contingent future. It is not a very large step to
hold the same thing about other divine mental states (or other
aspects of the divine mental state). In particular, the
Ockhamist can deny that the fourth clause of (23‟), that Christ
intended to assert that Peter will disown him, is accidentally
necessary. What Christ intends to assert is closely tied to
what he thinks is the case. And if what he thinks to be the
case is not fixed and inevitable, then what he intends to assert
is not, either (Wierenga, 1991, 439).

Wierenga concludes that the prophetic argument and the original

argument can both be handled by the Ockhamist. “Divine prophecy of
the future, like divine knowledge of the future, is not fixed, inevitable,
or accidentally necessary” (Wierenga, 1991, 439).
Freddoso claims that according to the Ockhamist, “Divine
prophecies might be deceptive and mistaken” (Wierenga, 1991, 440).
According to Freddoso:

Ockhamism commits one to having to choose between the

Scylla of claiming that God can undo the causal history of the
world and the Charybdis of claiming that divine prophecies
might be deceptive or mistaken (Wierenga, 1991, 439-440).

Wierenga replies that the Ockhamist too denies that God can change
the causal history of the world. But does this mean that the Ockhamist
is caught on the second horn of the dilemma--that claims that
prophecies might be mistaken? Wierenga claims that the Ockhainist
does not have to believe:

(25) It is possible that some divine prophecy is mistaken

(Wierenga, 1991, 440).

Instead, he is only committed to:

48
 (26) Some divine prophecy is such that it is possible that it is
mistaken (Wierenga, 1991, 440).

Wierenga explains himself:

That is, the Ockhamist will insist that nothing could be both a
divine prophecy and mistaken. Something that is a divine
prophecy, however, might not have been a divine prophecy,
and hence, could have been false: Christ‟s utterance might
have been mistaken, but if it had been, it would not have been
intended by him to express (24), and so would not have been
prophecy (Wierenga, 1991, 440).

The Ockhamist, in other words, thinks that if something was a divine

prophecy, it does not have to have been one, and therefore, might
have been mistaken, and as such would not have been a divine
prophecy.
We can formalize Wierenga‟s argument. The argument for
prophecy makes this kind of move:

(27) Christ asserted p entails p

(28) Christ asserted p is accidentally necessary

Therefore

(29) p is accidentally necessary

Wierenga believes that (28) is equivalent to a further proposition (30)

which is an explication of what Christ asserting p involves:

(30) [(a) Christ utters u. (b) u expresses p. (c) Christ believes

p and (d) intends to assert p by uttering U] is accidentally
necessary.

Wierenga thinks that (a) is accidentally necessary, but (c) is not. And
for a conjunction like (30) to be accidentally necessary, the individual
conjuncts must all be accidentally necessary. Therefore, premise (28)
is false. This means that the argument from prophecy does not cause
any special problem for the Ockhamist. In the original argument they
49
claimed that Gods past belief was a soft fact about the past. In the
same way they can claim that Christs belief and hence his assertion is
a soft fact about the past.

Objection to the Prophetic argument

An objection to Wierenga is that he makes a distinction in his

discussion of the prophetic argument between the possibility of Jesus
speaking mistakenly as the divine person versus being infallible when
his prophetic utterances are meant. This distinction seems problematic
because as I read Wierenga, he is saying that Jesus can speak
mistakenly. If we understand „speak‟ in the normal way it seems that
there is a problem here. Wierenga is apparently trying to distance
himself from the idea that when Jesus speaks mistakenly he means
what he says. But it is hard to think what it might mean to say that a
divine person utters words that he does not mean. It would of course
be deceptive for him to do this, because we would not know that He
did not mean them. Wierenga seems to make the distinction in order
to claim that some of Jesus‟ prophecies might not have been meant by
Him. So we must see which of the prophecies come true, and then
from that look back and decide which utterances Jesus meant. But this
view will not be attractive to most Christians. Wierenga claims that
“Christ‟s utterance might have been mistaken” (Wierenga, 1991,
440). It is objectionable to suppose that Christ‟s prophetic utterances
could be mistaken because it goes against an orthodox presupposition
that Wierenga himself has emphasized earlier when he talked about
Jesus speaking as a divine person and meaning what He says.
Wierenga claimed that the Ockhamist can claim that “What
Christ intends to assert is closely tied to what he thinks is the case.
And if what he thinks to be the case is not fixed and inevitable, then
what he intends to assert is not either” (Wiernga, 1991, 439). The
problem with this statement is that it assumes that God does not have
eternally fixed knowledge. But the Ockhamists assume that God‟s
knowledge does not change. They hold future contingent acts to be
soft facts relative to humans at another time. But Gods knowledge is
eternal and this is the knowledge Christ would have. Therefore it
seems problematic to claim that Christ would intend to assert
something to be the case that He does not think is fixed.
Further, Wierenga is led to make the claim:

(26) Some divine prophecy si such that it is possible that it is

50
 mistaken (Wierenga, 1919, 440).

Once again, this seems to make assumptions about prophecy that are
not plausible for Christians. For if something is by definition a
prophecy--by that is meant that it is a divine prophecy. And few
Christians would be attracted to the idea that a divine prophecy could
possibly be wrong, once it was made.
We shall later argue that Wierenga‟s argument is dependent
on a problematic view of what elements of revealed prophecy or
foreknowledge are a hard fact about the past. Here he seems to claim
that only the utterance is a hard fact about the past. The
incompatibilist can respond that if a prophecy is defined as an
utterance, then Wierenga‟s argument works. But the problem is that
there is more needed for something to qualify as a biblical prophecy.
It must include a dispositional belief state by a prophet in which the
prophet believes what God‟s revelation to him or her is. And as we
shall argue later in our discussion of hard and soft facts, the
Ockhamist is incorrect in assuming that only utterances are hard
aspects of the past.

Part V: The Ockhamist Hard/Soft Fact Distinction

Wierenga has drawn a distinction between hard and soft facts

to account for the reason why Gods foreknowledge of Jones mowing
his lawn in 80 years does not show that it is necessary that Jones mow
his lawn in 80 years. He claims that hard facts are facts that are fully
about the past. For example, the fact that Felix Mendelssohn
Bartholdy scored great musical successes in London in the 1830‟s is a
hard fact about the past because it is now at this later time--say the
year 2006, impossible that those events have not occurred. But the
Ockhamist will say that God‟s foreknowledge of the proposition
„Jones will mow his law in the future‟ is only a soft fact about the
past. This is because the proposition is not entirely about the past; for
it is also about the future--the future event of Jones actually mowing
his lawn at the predicted time. Wierenga writes.

Some propositions are about the past “as regards their

wording only and are equivalently about the future”...
Following recent tradition, we can put this point by saying
that (18) expresses a “soft” fact about the past as opposed to a
“hard” fact about the past (Wierenga, 1989, 90).
51
Only hard facts are accidentally necessary. This means that human
actions are not necessary because of the fact that they exist in God‟s
foreknowledge.
We can put the Ockhamist position in terms of present
foreknowledge about the future. Consider a proposition about the
present, such as „God has foreknowledge today that in eighty years
Jones will mow his lawn‟. The Ockhamist says that since this
statement involves something about the future, the truth of this
proposition, is dependent on the truth of a further proposition about
the future. The future proposition in this example, would be „eighty
years from now Jones is mowing his lawn‟. The Ockhamist is saying
that the first proposition “God foreknows that eighty years from now
Jones will mow his lawn” is dependent for its‟ truth on a second
proposition, namely; „eighty years from now Jones is mowing his
lawn”. The first proposition therefore expresses a soft fact. It will not
become accidentally necessary until Jones mows his lawn eighty
years from now.

Part VI: Objection to the Ockhamist Hard/Soft Fact Distinction

Anthony Kenny, responding to the Ockhamist hard/soft fact

distinction, says “In our time, Nelson Pike has shown that this escape
route is not open” (Kenny, 56). This is because

Any difficulty which arises from God has always known that
there will be a sea-battle tomorrow arises equally with „God
has always believed that there will be a sea-battle tomorrow”
(Kenny, 56).

For we can imagine that God has a past belief that Jones will mow his
lawn in 80 years. Eighty years later Jones will not he able to not mow
his lawn, because God‟s past belief is something about the past. Since
God is essentially omniscient, his past belief entails that Jones will
mow his lawn. There is nothing that Jones can do that could make it
that God had not earlier held the belief He did. So Jones is not free
with respect to mowing his lawn (Kenny, 56). Both Edwards and
Molina believe that God‟s past beliefs are as necessary as other facts
about the past. To this extent they agree in rejecting the Ockhamist
claim that God‟s past beliefs about the past are soft facts and
contingent, while other facts about the past are necessary (Freddoso,
52
58).
John Martin Fischer claims that the Ockhamist distinction
between hard and soft facts is problematic. He wants to show that any
conception of God‟s foreknowledge being a soft fact about the past
does not help the Ockhamist avoid necessity. He does this by
attempting to show that even if God‟s foreknowledge about a future
proposition is a soft fact about the past, it at the same time has a hard
property. He makes a distinction between “relational” and “non-
relational” properties. An example of a non-relational property is
“waking up at eight o‟clock”. This is distinguished from relational
properties like “waking up four hours prior to eating lunch.” Non-
relational properties are called “hard properties” while relational ones
are called “soft properties”. Fischer discusses non-relational
properties:

If one wakes up at eight, then “waking up and “waking up at

eight” are hard properties relative to eight o‟clock, as they
should be. And notice that, in general, when one combines a
soft property with an ordinary object, one gets a soft fact (for
example, In 44 B.C. Caesar dies prior to Fischer‟s writing
this paper in /985). Further, when one combines a hard
property with an ordinary object, one gets a hard fact (for
instance, In 44 B.C. Caesar dies on the steps of the senate.)
(Fischer, 1986, 597).

A problem arises for the Ockhamist when the hard property relative to
T1; “believing that Jones will mow his lawn at T2” is combined with
the person who bears this hard property--namely, God. God presents a
peculiar difficulty for the Ockhamist. It would be no problem for
them if it was a human that held this belief, because humans are
fallible and do not have perfect foreknowledge. But God‟s essential
omniscience creates a problem for the Ockhamist. This is because
God has his knowledge in eternity, and as the Ockhamist allows it is
unchangeable and fixed relative to him. So God has the hard property
of „believing that Jones will mow his lawn at T2‟. But this hard
property is combined with a soft fact because “an agent‟s [God]
having it [the belief that he does] at a time is a soft fact about that
time” (Fischer, 1986, 598). Fischer thinks that dispositional states like
having a „belief that Jones will mow his lawn‟ is something that is a
hard property because it is a state of affairs that is non-relational. A
human can have a belief that Jones will mow his lawn tomorrow even
53
though Jones will not mow his lawn tomorrow. This is because
human belief dispositions can be wrong. But it is different with God.

Now, when God believes at T1 that Jones will mow his lawn
at T2, it is logically impossible for God to be in that same
dispositional state and for Jones not to mow, but this does not
show that “believing that Jones will mow his lawn at T2” is
not a hard property (relative to T1), At most, it shows that
God believes at TI that Jones will mow his lawn at T2 is not a
hard fact about T1 (Fischer, 1986, 598).

So the Ockhamist must show how Jones can act in such a

way that God does not have the hard property he does at T1. Fischer
thinks that God‟s forebelief being a hard-type soft fact means that it is
already fixed, and there is nothing that Jones can do to make it such
that the hard property did not exist at T1. Fischer‟s point is that the
fact about God‟s belief is fundamentally different from the other soft
facts to which the Ockhamist assimilates it. It (unlike the others) is a
hard-type soft fact (Fischer, 1986, 599). The examples that
Ockhamists give of softs facts in support of their interpretation of
divine foreknowledge are not hard-type soft facts. Hence they do not
show that divine foreknowledge is contingent as these other soft facts
might be.
Fischer concedes that he has not shown that a free creature
cannot act so as to falsify a hard property about the past. The
Ockhamist might respond to his argument by claiming that just as soft
facts can be falsified, so too--hard-type soft facts can be falsified. But
Fischer‟s central point is that the Ockhamist will not he able to make
the ability to falsify hard-type soft facts plausible by using examples,
as they traditionally have, of soft facts being falsifiable. They must
show on other grounds that it is plausible to believe that hard-type
soft facts like instances of divine foreknowledge can be falsified
(Fischer, 1986, 600).
Fischer here has been arguing against Ockhamists who deny
“that God‟s belief is a genuine feature of the past” (Fischer, 1986,
600). He says that there are other Ockhamists who deny that “God‟s
existence is a genuine feature of the past” (Fischer, 1986, 600). His
argument against this position is similar to his claim that God‟s
foreknowledge of an event is a hard-type soft fact. So we will not
look at it. The insight that there are hard aspects to soft facts is the
important idea we are taking from Fischer. He explains what he is
54
doing in his critique of these two different Ockhamist positions:

[The] two criticism correspond to two different ways of

decomposing facts. One way fragments facts into component
states of affairs; this yields the response to the Ockhamist
strategy (suggested by Adams and Pike) which holds that
God‟s existence in the past is a soft fact about the past.
Another way fragments facts into constitutent properties and
their bearers; this yields the response to the Ockhamist
strategy which holds that God‟s belief in the past is a soft fact
about the past (Fischer, 1986, 601).

Fischer has suggested some ideas that are problematic for

Ockhamists. He has claimed that dispositions of God which are
forebeliefs about future contingent conditionals are dispositions that
existed in the past. Therefore it is a fact about the past that God had a
belief, just as it is another fact about the past that Julius Caesar was
assassinated. Facts about the past like these have had existence and
therefore seem to be fixed in some way (since soft facts have hard
parts). Fischer focuses our attention on the actual world and the
beliefs that God actually has and how these are eternally fixed. The
Ockhamists seem to support their intuitions about soft facts merely by
describing possible worlds. My intuitions tell me that the plausibility
of the Ockhamist position is lessened when one thinks about facts
about the past--like Christ‟s or prophet‟s belief dispositions (that are
revealed foreknowledge)--that are part of the actual world. For then,
if they are part of the actual world, this means that they come from
God‟s actual eternally fixed knowledge. And this means the events
foreknown will happen because they are a part of God‟s eternal and
fixed knowledge.
Edwards gave two objections against compatibilists. First he
said that it was impossible that God could have certain knowledge of
things that were contingent. Secondly, he claims that for God to have
knowledge there must be some evidence which provided him with
grounds for that knowledge. The Ockhamist answers these two
objections in an unsatisfactory way. The explanation that they give
for God knowing contingent things is that God knows them because
he knows what the creatures choose to do from His observing what
they do in fact choose to do. So the evidence that God has for a
contingent event is that He views the event taking place. But this
response ignores other claims that the Ockhamist makes. For they
55
make the claim that soft facts are facts about the past that are not
fixed and might therefore turn out otherwise. But this clearly indicates
that God can reveal a belief that is a soft fact and yet is not true. But
God‟s revealing a belief of His should lead anyone to assume that it is
a certain truth. For if it is not a certain truth, then God could possibly
be wrong, which is impossible. Furthermore, if this soft fact is
something that can he changed, then it is plausible to suppose it
possible that God has a belief that he holds and has revealed to
humans even though he does not have sufficient proof to back it tip.
But this implies that God is not perfectly rational.
The Ockhamist position seems to hinge on the ability to say
that a soft fact might not have been true, and that if it were not, God
would have believed something else at that point. But this mode of
argumentation is dependent on the idea that one can never allow that
one is talking about the actual world. If one is talking about the actual
world and about the soft facts that are a part of that world, then these
soft facts will always be true, because they proceed from the eternal
knowledge that God has. However, if you are talking about a non-
actual world, then there seems more plausibility in talking about soft
facts not coming about, because when something else comes about
than what the original soft fact claims, then that means we are in a
different world than what we were first supposing, and because of
that God would have believed otherwise, and would not have had the
wrong soft fact. This shows that when the Ockhamist is pressed into
discussions concerning the actual world, he or she will be pushed
towards intuitions that soft facts are necessary because of their
attachment to eternally fixed knowledge in the actual world.
The Ockhamist must not be thinking of a possible world as
an entire state of affairs which involves all that will happen in that
world throughout its history. Such a world will also involve God
holding all the beliefs about what will happen in that world. This is
the only way that I think it is correct to think of a possible world. It
must involve the entire history of that world, or it is by definition not
a possible world, but only part of one, The problem for the Ockhamist
is that once a possible world begins to be actualized, because the
history of that world begins occurring, at that time God is existing in
eternity. But if he is in eternity, then as Edwards has pointed out, all
times will be before His consciousness. But this means that God
already at an early time in the earth‟s history can reveal perfectly
what will happen in the future. What he knows will necessarily occur
because it is already occurring for him.
56
 The Ockhamist claims that backward causation occurs. This
means that what people do in the future can change what occurred in
the past. This position will be seen by most Christians as very
implausible. For it goes against normal intuitions that something that
has occurred can be made not to have occurred. The weakness of this
claim is very problematic for the Ockhamist. Furthermore, it does not
help them with respect to God. For as I was arguing in the previous
paragraphs, if God is outside of time, there is not really any
backwards causation in time that can affect the beliefs that God holds.
Only if he was in time could there properly be said to be backward
causation by future human choices on what Gods beliefs were.
Instead, the Ockhamist is forced to make the further questionable
claim that humans can freely choose certain things that will somehow
exert a backward causation on God in eternity. But such a backward
causation would deny that God is in eternity because it assumes that
he did not know what was going to happen in the future, and therefore
has need of changed or revised beliefs.

Humans Create the God who Exists

John Martin Fischer argues that one who follows the sort of
thinking that Wierenga does--in arguing that God‟s foreknowledge is
dependent on human volitions--must be seen as logically claiming
that humans by their acts of will create the God who exists. This is
because there are infinitely many possible beings who are God who
all have varying beliefs about the future. We may suppose that there
are an infinite set of possible God‟s who all have different
foreknowledge. This foreknowledge is comprehensive knowledge of
what will happen in the future. Now the God that exists in the actual
world is the one that has foreknowledge of what does in fact occur in
the entire history of that world. Since the Ockhamist has claimed that
God is dependent for his knowledge on what free creatures choose to
do in the actual world, the God that actually exists is the particular
one that free creatures instantiate by their free choices. And this view
runs counter to the orthodox Christian view that the being who is God
is absolute and is the cause of everything outside himself, and not
vice versa, This argument against the Ockhamists will have strength
for anyone who disagrees with Process theology, which is the idea
that God is evolving or changing through his interaction with the
world.
But the Ockhamists have a response to this. They can object
57
that the God that exists is not being created by the free choices of
humans, rather it is only the beliefs of God which are being created
by the free creatures. The Ockhamist can plausibly respond that the
God who exists is defined by his attributes and not by what
contingent beliefs he holds.
However, a critic of the Ockhamists can respond that they
are depending on a view that implies that a God who has a belief x is
necessarily the same God as one who does not have belief x, but
rather some other belief y. The problem with this is that we have
intuitions for there being two possible worlds in which there are Gods
who have different beliefs. And if it is plausible to think of a belief as
an attribute of some kind, then possible Gods who differ in beliefs can
be seen as distinct in some sense from each other, and therefore
making it plausible to claim that the Ockhamists have a theory in
which humans choose which possible God exists.

Ockhamists limit God’s ability to reveal Foreknowledge

It seems that the Ockhamist must logically be led to the

conclusion that at this present time, God cannot have perfect and
certain foreknowledge of all future human acts. Of course Wierenga
will object to this, but there is sufficient reason to doubt that he has
reason to. If we could get God to write out many of the future
volitions that were going to be done by humans, then it would seem
that the Ockharnist would soon convert to incompatibilism. The idea
here is that if the Ockhamist experientially saw that God knew
everything that he or she would do, then they would find their
position problematical. Imagine that God could write down for a
person his foreknowledge of what that person would do in all
important situations---in great detail. Then as the person read the
book and lived their life, they would find that what they read about
themselves doing the next hour, day, or year would always come to
pass. The person could actively try to do something different from
what is predicted in the book, but would find out that this was
impossible.
This leads one to think that the Ockhamist does not really
believe in divine foreknowledge. It seems that the Ockharnist allows
God to have foreknowledge that is hidden away in his mind, but that
cannot be revealed. One is led to think that they must have a weak
sense of divine foreknowledge, because it is necessary for their theory
that no free agents can know his foreknowledge in depth.
58
 The Ockhamist might respond that maybe it is not possible
for God to reveal his foreknowledge in an extensive way to free
creatures because that will interfere with their freedom. For it seems
plausible to think that there is no possible world where free creatures
can exist along with an extensive revelation of what they will do. So
Ockhamists will be willing to limit God‟s ability to reveal his
foreknowledge, not because he cannot do it, but because if he would
do it his free creatures would not be able to choose freely. This
explanation does seem to carry weight. Calvinists would disagree that
God cannot reveal his foreknowledge but their reasoning for this
would come from their reading of the Bible. It would not be clear
how they might come up with an argument against the Ockhamist.
They might try showing that in the Bible there were some instances
where revelations were made of some specific things that a free
creature would do, and these did not interfere with his or her freedom.
But the Ockhamist could respond that the revelations were not as
extensive as is needed for the above argument to work.
But what about the person of Jesus? Since He was a divine
person He would have perfect knowledge of what his future held.
Arminians would allow that He still lived out his life as a proper
functioning free creature. But this means that a free creature is not
disabled from freely choosing even though he or she has a knowledge
of the future. And Jesus had quite a bit of knowledge from quite
specific Old Testament prophecies about what He would do. The
Ockhamist can plausibly respond that Jesus limited his knowledge
while He was on earth--and therefore He did not know the future in
precise details. This would allow that free creatures can function
properly if they have limited knowledge of the future, even though
extensive knowledge might be problematic.
It is hard to conceptualize what it might be like in the
Ockhamist paradigm for God to reveal his foreknowledge. Let us
think about whether it is possible for God to reveal extensive
foreknowledge. We have seen that there might be a problem with God
revealing his foreknowledge in extensive detail to the free creatures
that the foreknowledge is about. But what if we picture God revealing
the future volitions of humans to a select group of angels who exist in
time? Since God‟s foreknowledge is dependent in the Ockharnist
paradigm on what humans in fact choose to do--the soft facts that he
has in his mind are not fixed until the events corresponding to them
actually occur. This means that a soft fact is not fixed until the free
creature actually makes the decision which is foreknown. But if God
59
would reveal the future history of humans to angels, this would mean
that he would also be revealing to them soft facts about the future.
But this would mean that these soft facts might not occur, because the
humans whom these soft facts are about can choose to do something
else.
How can the Ockhamist respond to this? They might try to
say that if the human in question does decide to do otherwise than
what God had a soft fact foreknowledge of, then God would have
believed differently and would have written that out instead. But that
means that God would not have been able to reveal the
foreknowledge to the angels as we presupposed earlier, because the
foreknowledge we supposed to have been revealed involved soft facts
which did not occur. But then it would seem that any possible
foreknowledge that God might reveal to any angels could never be
said to be foreknowledge of what is actually going to occur in the real
world, unless it would necessarily be the case that no human ever did
anything other than what the soft facts that were revealed contained
knowledge of.
Since Angels are in time like humans it would seem that the
time at which God reveals his knowledge to the angels is a time at
which the future volitions are not yet fixed. So the angels would know
soft facts but they would already be fixed because they came from
God in eternity where He sees all temporal moments at once. Hence
the soft facts in the actual world seem to be necessary because they
come from a source for which the facts were already metaphysically
fixed. The Ockhamist claims that God has eternally fixed knowledge.
This knowledge is not fixed relative to the angels. The actual eternal
knowledge God has involves soft facts that are, according to the
Ockhamists, facts that are not yet fixed, and because of this the facts
contained in them can possibly not happen. But then God would
mislead the angels by giving them foreknowledge that includes soft
facts. The point is that the soft facts are dependent for their fixity on
what humans actually choose, and this is not fixed until they actually
make the choice. Therefore, the actual knowledge that God had in the
actual world would be knowledge that was certain because it comes
from his eternally fixed knowledge. But this would mean that every
soft fact would actually occur. If every soft fact were to occur it
would seem that it is wrong to think that in the actual world the soft
facts that are revealed can possibly not come about; for it will never
be the case that a soft fact does not come about. From this it is
rational to assume that every prophecy will necessarily come about.
60
For it would be impossible for a prophecy in the actual world not to
come to pass.
This discussion implies that the Ockhamist paradigm with its
claim that soft facts in the actual world are changeable is false. So
changeable soft facts will never be revealed. Hence in the actual
world, contra the Ockhamists, God cannot reveal knowledge of future
contingents that are not fixed. This means that there are two
limitations attached to the Ockhamist conception of the ability of God
to reveal foreknowledge. First, God cannot reveal extensive
foreknowledge to free creatures because their freedom might not be
compatible with this. Secondly, he cannot reveal extensive
foreknowledge (that involves soft facts as the Ockhamists conceive
them) to anyone in the actual world (including angels).

Part VII: Theological Objections to Ockhamism

Weak view of Providence

Wierengas use of the word „dependency‟ rests on a weak

view of providence. He used this word to argue that God‟s
foreknowledge is dependent on the happening of the future event for
its existence. „Dependency‟ can be used in a strong or in a weak
sense. Wierenga takes himself to be using it in a strong sense, while
the incompatibilist defender, like Edwards would claim that he is
using it in a trivial manner. Wierenga claims that the proposition
“God foreknows that eighty years from now Jones will mow his lawn‟
is dependent for its truth on a second proposition “Jones is now eighty
years later mowing his lawn.” Wierenga takes there to be a strong
dependency of God‟s foreknowledge on the future event. Edwards
would agree that it is a necessary condition that the future event occur
for God‟s foreknowledge having been correct. But he would object
that the future event is not the cause of God having the knowledge
that he does. Rather, God knows what is going to happen from his
decrees. Wierenga‟s position is the opposite of Edwards on this point.
For the former, humans are trivially dependent on God‟s
foreknowledge for doing what they do. For if God exists necessarily
and is essentially omniscient it is necessary that he have
foreknowledge of what is going to happen in the future. But the real
cause of the future action is the free choice by the secondary agent.
The incompatibilist will respond that Wierenga has reversed
the situation that exists between God and humans. On his view
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humans are the cause of the events that occur, rather than God‟s
providential decrees being the cause of everything that occurs in the
actual world. Edwards, the Molinists, and Banezians all claim that all
the events that occur in the world originate in God‟s decrees. His
providential decrees are therefore the sole cause of his knowledge of
the actual world for the Calvinist. The Molinists combines God‟s
decrees together with his knowledge of what creatures will freely
choose in the situations he puts them in to explain how God knows
the future. If one has a strong view of divine providence then the
Ockhamist position will not seem attractive.

Neo-Barthian objection to Ockhamism

Karl Barth is known for doing theology from the top down.
This means that he begins by studying who God is and then proceeds
to draw conclusions from this about the nature of humans and the
world. Edwards tries to do something like this in his incompatibility
argument. He argues from the nature of God and his attributes to the
conclusion that humans are not free in the Arminian sense. Wierenga
seems to be doing something else. He does of course discuss the
attributes of God, but right or wrong. his focus is first on the nature of
human freedom, from which he comes to conclusions about how God
interacts with the humans who are free in the sense that Wierenga
thinks that they are. His compatibility argument seems to focus on
humans and makes them the criterion by which one decides whether
humans are free. So the claim that is being made here is that Edwards
is taking the Barthian approach by starting first with the nature of
God and working from there to the nature of human freedom. If
Wierenga is not taking the nature of God seriously enough in his
discussion, then he might be led to conclusions that a person using
Barthian methodology would not be led to. So if a thinker agrees with
the Barthian way of doing theology, then he or she will find reason to
object to Wierenga.

Edwards claims that God can’t know contingent facts

The Ockhamist claims that God has foreknowledge of future

contingent acts. Edwards has argued that God cannot have
foreknowledge of anything unless that thing is necessary. If God
knows that something will be contingent, then it means just that that
62
thing might not be. But if it might not be, and God knows that, how
can he believe that it certainly will be? If he knows that it will be
because he causally brings it about that the fact will occur, then it
seems that he is causally determining it. And if God knew that there
were certain probabilities operating, that said that a future contingent
had such and such a probability of occurring, then he could only
believe that it was probable. He could not believe that it would
certainly take place. But if God foreknows things to be probable then
he does not have certain and absolute knowledge of the event
occurring.
If prophesies were based on probabilities, then it seems that
God would be deceptive if He revealed them as based on perfect
foreknowledge, without adding the qualification that they were only
probable. But this seems to contradict the Bible where many times the
prophetic writers claim that the prophecy will surely come about. The
tone of biblical prophecy does not give the impression that it is
probability based. If God‟s knowledge was based on probabilities He
would be ignorant of many future actions. Many things that have a
low probability could not be foreknown because God would not have
sufficient grounds to make an educated guess either way. But the
Ockhamist cannot use probability to avoid the problem of how God
knows future contingents. For they hold that God has perfect
knowledge. Their theory suffers from the fault of not being able to
explain how it is that God can know future contingents. This is a
problem for the Molinists also, as we shall see. It is a weakness for
Ockhamism that its proponents are forced to plead ignorance of how
God can know future contingents. It is not strange that contemporary
Ockhamists cannot answer this question, for

Ockham was himself unable to present any coherent account

of divine foreknowledge. „I maintain‟, he says, „that it is
impossible to express clearly the way in which God knows
future contingents. Nevertheless, it must be held that he does
so, but contingently. This must be held because of the
pronouncements of the Saints‟ (Kenny,58).

In conclusion, I have argued that the Ockhamist response has

three central weakness. First, it depends on a weak view of
providence. Secondly, it cannot explain how God can have
knowledge of contingent future conditionals. Finally, I have pointed
out certain problems with the Ockhamist claim that divine forebeliefs
63
are soft facts about the past. I have argued that these forebeliefs are
more a part of the past than Wierenga has claimed. Therefore, the
Ockhamists have not given a plausible response to Edwards
incompatibility argument.

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 3

THE MOLINIST
RESPONSE

Introduction

Luis de Molina (1535-1600) was a Catholic theologian whose

book Concordia caused an outburst of controversy in 1588 over how
to reconcile divine foreknowledge and human freedom. Molina was a
member of the recently founded Society of Jesus (the Jesuits). The
Jesuits disagreed with the Dominicans about how to reconcile human
freedom with God‟s providence, foreknowledge. and predestination.
The Jesuits emphasized the freedom of created creatures while the
Dominicans, led by Domingo Banez, promoted the „divine
prerogative‟ (Freddoso, vii.). The debate between the two orders had
been smoldering, but with the publication of Molina‟s book, the
Roman Catholic church was plunged into twenty years of bitter
controversy. Concordia became “one of the most carefully scrutinized
books in Western intellectual history”, says Freddoso, after pope
Clement VIII established a Commission on Grace in 1597 to study the
issue of foreknowledge and freedom (Freddoso, viii.). Pope Paul V in
1607 forbade the Dominicans and Jesuits from calling each other
heretics and commanded them to refrain from “sour words showing
bitterness of soul” (Kenny, 65). He said that he would personally
65
resolve the issue “at an opportune time” (Freddoso, viii.). However,
neither he nor later popes ever did so (Freddoso, viii.).
Anthony Kenny writes that “In our own time there has been a
surprising revival of Molinism, not among theologians but among
philosophers” (Kenny, 65). Alfred Freddoso recently translated Part
IV of Concordia from the Latin to enable contemporary philosophers
to read Molina in English. His Introduction to this translation is a
development of the Molinist theory of middle knowledge and a
defense of it.
Freddoso hopes his translation of Molina will make
contemporary philosophers sensitive to the broader theological
context within which questions about God‟s knowledge have
traditionally arisen” (Freddoso, ix.). By looking at the theological
context he thinks that we can see what the problem is and the criteria
for an adequate resolution of it” (Freddoso, ix). He thinks that
contemporary solutions of the foreknowledge/freedom issue “have
only a loose connection with the problem that those who established
the tradition took themselves to be dealing with” (Freddoso, ix).
These quotes show Freddoso‟s interest in locating the controversy
within the orthodox theological framework that governed the early
Molinists and Dominicans.
The complete title of Concordia is: Liberi Arbitrii turn
Gratiae Donis, Divina P roes cientia, Pro videntia, Praedestinatione
ci Reprohatione Con corlia. Translated this is: The Compatibility of
Free Choice with the Gifts of Grace, Divine Foreknowledge,
Predestination arid Reprobation (Freddoso, ix.). This book is divided
into seven parts. Freddoso is interested in Part IV, which is entitled
“On Divine Foreknowledge”. He develops his views on Molinism and
objections to it in an eighty-one page introduction to his translation of
Part IV. We will concentrate on this in our examination of the
Molinist response to the incompatibility argument. Freddoso states
that the Introduction serves three purposes: 1) to help the reader
understand the modal notions and concept of freedom presupposed in
Part IV; 2) to make Molina‟s theory and criticisms clearer; and 3) to
show ways that a Molinist can respond to objections to their view,
Freddoso distinguishes two questions that are important for
understanding God‟s foreknowledge. The first he calls the “source
question”. This question asks how God can have certain knowledge of
future human contingent acts. The second important question is the
“reconciliation-question‟. This asks how divine foreknowledge can be
reconciled with the contingency of things foreknown. He thinks that
66
the reconciliation question cannot he answered „until we grasp clearly
the criteria for an adequate answer to the source-question‟ (Freddoso,
2). The first part of this chapter will focus on the source question and
the second part on the reconcilation question.

Part I : The Source Question

Molina’s definition of freedom

Molina has a libertarian view of freedom. He wants to solve

the problem of „foreknowledge and freedom” without abandoning a
theory of freedom that is defined in terms of the ability of a free
creature to choose to do otherwise than what he or she does in fact
choose to do. He believes that the will is free when it has three
options when presented with a state of affairs. These options include
the ability to; 1)choose an object, 2) reject it, or 3) refrain from either
choosing or rejecting it.
Molina claims that one is free only if one is not causally
necessitated by nature or by another free agent. Freddoso uses the
example of a woman named „Katie‟ voting in the presidential
elections. He asks us to imagine that a “powerful genius‟ is closely
watching her as she votes. The genius has the power to intervene in
her decision process so that she decides to vote for whoever the
genius wants elected. The genius will do nothing if Katie votes for
Mondale, but if she begins to vote for Reagan, then he will suddenly
interfere to insure that she votes for Mondale. Molina thinks that
contrary to the Banezians, our intuitions tell us that Katie is not free if
the genius interferes with her voting (Freddoso, 26-27).

Contingent Effects

The Molinist must define what is to count as a contingent

effect in order to be able to determine when free creatures are in fact
free. Because God is the undetermined first cause of everything, it
clearly will not work to claim that any effect is contingent if it has an
indeterministic cause somewhere in its history. For every effect has
God‟s action in its causal history and would therefore be free. Molina
thinks that if God is the only indeterministic cause then all
“contingency would be taken away from all the effects of secondary
causes and everything would have to happen by a kind of fatalistic
necessity” (Freddoso, 19). He thinks that for there to be actual
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freedom for free agents, secondary causes must be able to act
indeterministically. A contingent effect for humans or angels is
therefore defined by Molina as one whose causal ancestry includes at
least one indeterministic action by a secondary agent.

Shared views of divine Providence

Molina, Banez, and Edwards share some important beliefs

about the nature of divine providence. They all agree in defining
providence as the doctrine that God decrees everything that will
happen in the world. He plans the entire history of the world down to
the smallest details and then makes sure that everything occurs at its
correct time. Each action in the world is either intended by God or
permitted by him. When he permits a creature to do a defective thing,
then God uses this wrong act, for a good purpose (Freddoso, 3).
Molina and the Dominicans both held that God has 1) the
power to choose one out of the many possible worlds which he can
bring into existence, and 2) the ability to then will that the chosen
plan be causally brought about by his own causal action. (Freddoso,
4). Further, the Banezians and Molinists agree that God has
perfect knowledge of what will occur in the world because he is
provident. “More precisely, God‟s speculative postvolitional
knowledge of the created world--His so-called knowledge of vision--
is to he explained wholly by reference to (i) His prevolitional
knowledge and (ii) His knowledge of what He Himself has willed to
do” (Freddoso, 4). Because of this they hold that God does not
depend on causes external to him for his knowledge. Freddoso writes
that according to this view, God “as a being who is „pure actuality‟, ...
cannot depend causally on any other being for His perfections”
(Freddoso, 5).
This means that the Jesuits and Dominicans both agreed that
no contingent categorical truth is true prior to God‟s choosing a
certain possible world and willing it to be. This view of postvolitional
knowledge that is shared by the Molinists and Banezians shows that
“an adequate answer to the source-question must essentially appeal to
Gods active causal role in the created world and must eschew even
the faintest suggestion that God‟s knowledge of effects produced in
the created world is causally dependent on the activity of His
creatures” (Freddoso, 5).
Edwards, Banez, and Molina in that order have weaker views
of providence, from one perspective. Later we will see why Freddoso
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claims that Molina has a sufficiently strong view of providence.
Edwards has the strongest. He claims that God predestines everything
that is going to happen. This includes all the actions and choices of
secondary causes. Creatures have no autonomy. Domingo Banez has
a weaker view of providence than Edwards because he claims that
humans have a libertarian free will. They can autonomously choose
certain things, but Banez believes that they can only do what they will
if God concurs with them in the action. According to the Banezian
schema, in distinction from the Edwardian, God and created free
creatures act together, each as originating causes. Although creatures
cannot act without God‟s concurrence, God can also not act without
the creatures concurrence.
Molina goes beyond Banez by claiming that God does not
need to concur with free choices. Molina defines concurrence in a
different sense. Concurrence is simply God‟s choosing to create the
specific world that he does knowing that the free creatures in it will
do what he knows they will do.
The important idea of concurrence needs to be expounded to
explain some relevant distinctions that Molina makes. He thinks that
God is the indeterministic first cause of everything that occurs. All
creatures act as secondary causes who have this causal power only
because God continually conserves their causal power in existence.
(Freddoso, 16). The Molinists, being Aristotelians, believed that
human beings have authentic causal power. This was in opposition to
the occasionalists (like Edwards) who claimed that God alone had
causal power. Molinists make a distinction between primary and
secondary causes and, related to that, general and particular causes.
Freddoso explains:

When He thus cooperates with secondary causes, He acts as

a general or universal cause of the effect, and His causal
contribution is called His general concurrence or concourse
(con cursus generalis). The nomenclature is indicative of the
fact that in such a case the particular nature of the effect is
traceable not to God‟s causal contribution, necessary though
it is in order for any effect to be produced at all, but rather to
the natures and causal contributions of the relevant secondary
causes, which acts as particular causes of the effect”
(Freddoso, 17).

Medieval thinkers used the sun as an analogy to explain how God‟s

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general concurrence operates. The sun is the general cause of light--
and a calf being born is a result of the sun providing light and warmth
for (among other things) sufficient food to grow for the calf‟s parents.
The sun is needed for the particular causes in the world to bring about
the calls birth. The general cause of the calf is the sun, while the
particular causes are all the particular things contributing to bring the
calf about. in the same way God is the general cause of everything
that occurs but the particular causes are the various secondary causes
(among which are human actions) (Freddoso, 17).
The Molinists and Banezians both accept the idea that
secondary agents “make a unique and unduplicated causal
contribution” when they causally act (Freddoso, 18). And this causal
contribution exists only when it is contemporaneous with God‟s
positively acting with the secondary agent. The two factions disagree
on two aspects of the doctrine of general concurrence. First, the
Molinists think that God acts only on the effect and not on the
secondary agent, while the Banezians believe that God acts on the
effect only through his acting directly on the agent. The Banezian
believes that secondary agents can only act when God concurs with
the acting of the agent, while the Molinist thinks that the agent can act
without God‟s concurrence.
The second disagreement is over how to view the effects of
the human actions that God has concurred with. The Banezians
believe that God has two distinct ways of concurring with human
actions. On the one hand he can efficaciously concur with a certain
effect. This means that he will make sure that this effect comes about.
On the other hand, he can concur in a “sufficient” way--in which case
the concurrence is inefficacious with respect to any one desired event.
It is the secondary agent‟s fault when the concurrence is inefficacious,
because the agent did not choose to act with God. The Molinists claim
that God‟s concurrence is inherently neutral. It is not God who
decides whether his concurrence is efficacious or not, rather that is
left up to the secondary cause (Freddoso, 18). Why Molina claims this
will become clearer once his theory of middle knowledge is
understood.

Three rejected responses to the source question

Freddoso is unhappy with the popular view that the source

question is unimportant because it might be a “brute inexplicable fact
that God has foreknowledge” (Freddoso, 2). He decries this as a result
70
of the ahistorical perception of the controversy. The pervasiveness of
this idea “is symptomatic of the surprising extent to which the lively
contemporary discussion of foreknowledge and freedom is detached
from the theological context within which perplexities about
foreknowledge and contingency have traditionally risen”(Freddoso,
2).
Molina thinks that three different accounts of foreknowledge
are the most plausible alternatives to his view. The first account is his
reading of the Thomistic view of eternity which involves the claim
that future contingents are now eternally present for God. The second
account of foreknowledge is the Banezian reading of Aquinas which
includes their rejection of the theory of middle knowledge. The final
account is based on the notion of „concomitant decrees‟. This theory
holds that God‟s decreeing and knowing of a future contingent are
simultaneous or concomitant with its obtaining. Freddoso shows what
Molina‟s reservations are about these answers to the source question.
Aquinas claims that God knows future contingents because
they exist before him in the eternal present (Freddoso, 30). All
moments of time in the created world, are on this view, present to
God at once. Even though a future contingent event C does not exist
at an earlier time T, since God has all of times present before him, it is
correct to believe that at T God has eternal knowledge of C. The point
is that although God does not know C at a temporal time T (because
then he would be in time), it is the case that at time T it is true that
God knows C. Aquinas‟ view seems to depend on some sort of
relationship between eternal and temporal time. The intuitions
supporting such a relationship come from the doctrine of divine
timelessness, according to which all temporal times exist at once
before God.
Freddoso points out that the „Aristotelian Scholastics‟ all
agree that God exists in eternity and not everlasting time. Because
God is pure actuality he “does not have potentialities that need time in
order to be actualized (Freddoso, 31). Further, they try to explain
God‟s eternity by an analogy with His omnipresence. This latter was
taken to mean that God is present at every place that exists. He is not
present at some places and not others because he is equally present in
every place to which he gives existence. In the same way, God is
eternally present to every temporal moment. He is not bound to time
and is never present at one temporal time in distinction from others.
Therefore, Aquinas concluded that at any one time, God has
foreknowledge of what happens at all times. Molina criticizes this
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claim because he thinks it depends on an equivocation on the word
„now‟.
He thinks it wrong to draw the conclusion that since God is
eternal, all temporal moments „now‟ exist. Molina objects to the idea
that at a present time God has eternal knowledge of future
contingents. For when we say that God „now‟ has eternal knowledge
we are seduced into thinking that at this present moment God has
knowledge of future contingents--i.e. that God knows future
contingents in the temporal present. Molina only allows that God has
knowledge in the eternal present (Freddoso, 33).
Aquinas would most likely respond that he is not claiming
that God exists in the temporal present. Instead, he is claiming that
because God is in the eternal present it is plausible to infer that each
temporal time is always before God. Hence, one can truthfully say
that at any temporal present time Clod knows all things. Molina is
trying to gain more ground philosophically with this argument than he
can. He wants to draw the conclusion that eternal knowledge of future
contingents do not affect his theories. But he has not given an
argument for that.
Molina has a deeper criticism. As we shall see, Molina thinks
that God‟s knowledge of future contingents comes from his middle
knowledge. He thinks that God‟s knowledge of future conditioned
conditionals originates in his middle knowledge while his knowledge
of absolute future contingents originates from his knowledge of what
he has willed to do, or his free knowledge. Because of this “the
presence of things in eternity is wholly irrelevant to the question of
how a perfectly provident being comes to know absolute future
contingents” (351).
Edwards would probably respond that although eternal
knowledge might not be the cause of God knowing the absolute future
contingents that he does, yet they might still show their necessity.
Molina also thinks that the “perceptual metaphors” of the
standard interpretation lead to a problematic conceptual sequence. For
according to this view it seems that “A future contingent effect is first
there to be seen by God; then it is in fact seen and known by God; and
only then is it specifically decreed, that is, willed or permitted by
Him, depending on whether or not He approves of what He sees”
(Freddoso, 35-36). But this view of providence differs from Molina‟s
view that “a perfectly provident being knows each absolute future
contingent in, and not before, His specifically willing or permitting
it” (Freddoso, 35).
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 The second alternative answer to the source question that
Freddoso discusses is Banezianism, While Molina begins his theory
focusing on human freedom, as Freddoso states, the Banezians have
another approach:

Whereas Molina starts „from below‟ with creaturely freedom,

Banezians begin „from above‟ by stressing that God is
sovereign and the source of all goodness. Because God is
sovereign, they claim, no metaphysically contingent state of
affairs, not even a conditional future contingent, can obtain
without His antecedent approbation or permission (Freddoso,
36-37).

They claim that all goodness comes from God alone. No secondary
cause can originate any true goodness. It follows that God can know
both good and bad future contingent effects. He knows the good
because He knows that He will efficaciously concur with the
secondary agent to produce goodness, while He knows future evil
contingents because He knows that He will not efficaciously concur
(Freddoso, 37). Their answer to the source question is that God has
foreknowledge of conditional future contingents because he knows
which ones he will concur with efficaciously and which he will not.
The final alternative to Molinism is what Freddoso calls the
“concomitance theory‟ (Freddoso, 43). This theory comes from a
combination of two presuppositions, one of which is Molinist, while
the other is Banezian. According to this theory; l) God‟s decreeing
some contingent event as future, 2) his knowing it as future, and 3) its
obtaining are all things that occur simultaneously . They are
concomitant. (Freddoso, 43) The Molinist presupposition
“undergirding” this is that a contingent effect has “metaphysical
certitude” only after it is actually produced. The Banezian
presupposition is that a contingent effect can not have “epistemic-
certitude” until it has metaphysical certitude” (Freddoso, 43). This
last presupposition explicitly contradicts Molina‟s view of middle
knowledge. For his theory of middle knowledge claims that God can
have epistemic certitude prior to metaphysical certitude.
Concomitance theorists claim that as a future contingent
occurs, God at that moment makes it the case that he has always
known that that event would occur. So those theorists who believe
that God has eternal knowledge will say that „as (and not before)
contingent effects occur in time, God concomitantly causes it to he
73
the case that He eternally knows and decrees them”(Freddoso, 44).
Therefore, they can be taken to deny “that God antecedently plots out
in detail the whole history of the world, complete with all its
contingent effects”([44]). Before contingent effects occur God can
only know all the possible things that will happen in the world--but
not what will in fact occur.
Molina has three objections to this view. First, he points out
that it has a weak view of providence because God‟s knowledge of
future contingents is not based on his knowledge of possible worlds
and his creatures intentions. Rather than God providing for future
contingents, He literally reacts to them as to effects brought about
independently of His specific approval or permission” (Freddoso, 45).
God is not according to the concomitance theory bringing about His
foreknown future contingents, instead He is reacting to the secondary
causes that operate independently of Him in such a way that He then
makes them something He has always known.
Secondly, the Molinist objects that since the concomitance
theory cannot explain how God might have knowledge of conditional
future contingents, concomitance theorists seem forced to deny that
He knows them. Because they do not believe in either middle
knowledge or anterior decrees they have no grounds for claiming that
God has knowledge of conditional future contingents (Freddoso, 45).
Freddoso claims that Molina‟s third objection to the
concomitance theory is the most original. According to their theory
God must have control over and the ability to change not only soft
facts about the past, but also hard facts. The example that Freddoso
uses is of Jesus prophesying that Peter will deny him three times. The
concomitance theorist will claim that in the case of the prophecy of
Jesus, if we say that at an earlier time T1 Jesus makes the prophecy,
then at a later time T2, if the prophecy is not fulfilled, then at T2 God
makes it the case that at T1 Jesus did not make the prophecy that He
did. So we have a situation where a hard fact about the past, namely
the prophecy of Jesus, is now no longer a fact about the past. The
problem with this for Molina is that Jesus prophecy was a hard fact
and even the concomitance theorists do not believe that hard facts can
be changed (Freddoso, 46).

Middle Knowledge

Molina‟s answer to the source question is his theory of

middle knowledge. According to this theory God can have knowledge
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of the truth value of conditional future contingents. This is
prevolitional knowledge that Molina thought exists in a certain sense
„between‟ God‟s natural knowledge and his free knowledge. Natural
knowledge is God‟s knowledge of necessary truths. It involves his
knowledge of what is metaphysically necessary, metaphysically
contingent, and metaphysically impossible in every possible world.
When God is in a creation situation (deciding what world to create)
His natural knowledge tells Him what any world that He created
necessarily would or would not have and what would be contingent in
that world.
Free knowledge is God‟s knowledge of the things that he has
decreed. When God decides which world that He is going to
actualize, and wills that that world be actualized, then He knows from
His decrees what the actual world will be like, and this is called
God‟s free knowledge‟. Natural knowledge is prevolitional because it
exists in the mind of God prior to any decision to actualize any
specific world while free knowledge is postvolitional knowledge
because it comes from his decrees.
Middle knowledge is distinct from natural and free
knowledge because it is God‟s prevolitional knowledge of what free
creatures would choose to do in any possible situation that they might
be in. In the creation situation God can know, claims Molina, what
any free creature will do in any possible situation that God
providentially puts them in. Because of this God can
providentially plan to put creatures into situations where he knows
what they will choose and thereby put them in situations where they
will choose certain things that will bring about the events that God
wants to take place. God by comprehending what humans would do
in any possible situation can therefore actualize the world in which
what he wants to obtain will obtain. Freddoso says that--

[Gods] natural knowledge tells Him only what each in

deterministic secondary cause is able to do, not what it would
in fact do....So, according to Molina, if there is genuine causal
indeterminism in the created world, God can be provident in
the way demanded by orthodoxy only if His prevolitional
knowledge includes an understanding of which effects would
in fact result from causal claims involving indeterministic
created causes. (Freddoso, 23)

The point is that the only way that God can be providential, given free
75
creatures, is if he can know what they would do in any counterfactual
situation. In contemporary philosophical jargon, the infinite
conditional future conditionals that God has knowledge of are called
„counterfactuals of freedom‟.
Molina differentiates between three kinds of future
contingents. Conditional future contingents are prevolitionial future
contingents that are known by middle knowledge. They are distinct
from absolute and conditioned future contingents which are
postvolitional. Absolute future contingents are those conditional
future contingents that God has decreed will obtain in the actual
world by instantiating the antecedent of the relevant counterfactuals,
while conditioned future contingents are those that will not obtain,
because their antecedents have not been decreed ([22]).
The antecedent of a conditional future contingent
(counterfactual of freedom) has the form; „if God were to put a free
creature P into a certain situation X‟. The consequent has the form;
„then P would freely choose to do some action M‟. According to the
Molinist, God will know what every free creature will do in every
possible situation that God might put him or her in. Molina thought
that „If David were to remain in Keilah, Saul would freely besiege the
city‟ was a biblical example of a true counterfactual of freedom and
that the counterfactual of freedom „If David were to remain in Keilah,
Saul would not freely choose to besiege the city‟ is therefore false.

Supercomprehension

How is it that God can have middle knowledge? According

to the Molinists, there must be „positive‟ conditional future
contingents that God knows. Freddoso points out that the Banezians
do not have a problem explaining how God might know positive
conditional future contingents, because they claim that God simply
wills that the counterfactuals of freedom obtain. For them positive
conditional future contingents cannot exist in God‟s prevolitional
knowledge. This avenue is not open to Molina. Instead he appeals
“simply to God‟s cognitive perfection and to the depth of His
prevolitional grasp of all possible creatures” (Freddoso, 51).
Later Molinists claimed that God needs
„supercomprehension‟ to be able to know conditional future
contingents. This word is derived from the theological use of the term
„comprehension‟. For example, Molina defined God‟s comprehension
in terms of his natural knowledge. It involves “grasping the
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metaphysical modality of every state of affairs involving” a certain
entity (Freddoso, 51). Since middle knowledge requires more than
„comprehension‟ later Molinists referred to God‟s ability to know
positive conditional future contingents as an act of
„supercomprehension‟. Supercomprehension involves the ability to be
epistemically certain of events that do not yet have metaphysical
certitude (Freddoso, 52). Counterfactuals of freedom are
epistemically certain because they correspond to objectively existing
conditional facts. Molina thinks that humans (like God) can have a
good idea of how they would freely act in certain hypothetical
situations (Freddoso, 52). But divine knowledge of conditional future
contingents differs from human knowledge in that God‟s knowledge
is infallible and certain (Freddoso, 52).

An adequate view of Providence?

Freddoso argues that Molina‟s theory leaves enough room for

providence. He gives five reasons for why the theory of middle
knowledge supports a sufficient view of providence. First, God
chooses what world, if any, to create. Second, Molina claims that no
secondary cause can produce any effect without God‟s concurrence.
Third, according to this view a free creature needs assistance from
God to do good actions. For God must give grace to the creature for it
to be able to do a good act, although Molina admits this grace is not
in itself efficacious or deterministic. It is the situation that the creature
is placed in that makes it efficacious. Fourth, God is in control of evil
because no evil can come into existence unless he permits it. The final
reason that Freddoso gives for Molina having a strong view of
providence is that according to his view “Molina can still consistently
hold that God‟s providential act of will is absolutely comprehensive‟
(Freddoso, 50). Molina thinks that God‟s providence is “absolutely
comprehensive‟ because God decrees not only which possible world
is actualized, but also what he would decree in whatever possible
creation situation he might find himself in. Molina believes this to be
the strongest view of providence that is compatible with libertarian
freedom (Freddoso, 50).

Creation Situations

An important concept for Molina is the idea of a creation

situation. By this is meant the situation that God is in when he is
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„thinking about‟ creating a possible world. All of God‟s prevolitional
knowledge will exist in this creation situation. The Banezians claim
that the only prevolitional knowledge that God has in the creation
situation is his natural knowledge. Molina on the other hand thinks
that God by his middle knowledge can also know all of the future
contingents in every possible world. Freddoso describing the creation
situation states:

Creation situations constitute the antecedently fixed

frameworks within which God operates as a cause. So, as
intimated above, God has no control over the states of affairs
that belong to the creation situation He finds Himself in.
What He does have control over is each state of affairs that is
such that neither it nor its complement is a member of that
creation situation (Freddoso, 48).

Freddoso divides up the possible worlds known by middle

knowledge into possible worlds and galaxies. A galaxy is a set of
possible worlds that share the same counterfactuals of freedom.
According to Freddoso, “each possible world belongs to at most one
galaxy. What‟s more, it follows from what was said above that each
possible world belongs to at least one galaxy” (Freddoso, 49).

Part II: The Reconciliation Question

Freddoso says that the strong doctrine of providence

accepted by the Molinists has two consequences for the
reconciliation-question. First, an answer to the reconciliation-question
involves two things: 1) an understanding of simple precognition, and
2) an understanding of how contingency and freedom can be
reconciled with God‟s knowledge originating in his providential
decrees (Freddoso, 5).
The second consequence is that if one does not respect the
role that providence plays in foreknowledge then one will be led to
simplistic solutions that do not take providence seriously and because
of this attempt to answer the reconciliation-question in terms of
foreknowledge alone. Freddoso mentions three different ways in
which he thinks that this is done. First, certain Ockhamists claim that
creatures cause God to have the beliefs that He does and that they can
cause Him to have always had beliefs about the future other than what
He has (Freddoso, 6). This solution is incompatible with God‟s
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providential decrees being the sole origin of his knowledge. The
second problematic solution is “Thomistic” and says that God has
perceptual knowledge without “spatial or temporal limitations” of
future contingents (Freddoso, 6). Freddoso states that “this solution
apparently entails that God acquires His knowledge of vision from
created things themselves and thus that true future contingents have
their truth conceptually, if not temporally, prior to God intending or
permitting them to be true” (Freddoso, 6).
The third response that Freddoso finds problematic is the
view that God has no knowledge of future contingents. These three
alleged solutions should be rejected because they are contrary to
scripture and tradition. “Molina, like St. Thomas before him, would
undoubtedly respond in the first place that the theological authority of
Scripture and Tradition, along with sound philosophical scrutiny of
the notion of a perfect being, militates forcefully against any such
move” (Freddoso, 7). The strength and genius of Molina‟s work in
Freddoso‟s eyes, is that he retains the traditional view of providence
while employing a strong idea of freedom and contingency
(Freddoso, 7).
Molina attempts to reconcile foreknowledge with freedom.
Freddoso states that there is a “traditional maxim according to which
it is not the case that a contingent effect S will obtain because God
foreknows that S will obtain, but rather God foreknows that S will
obtain because S will in fact obtain” (Freddoso, 53). This is a maxim
that any orthodox answer to the reconciliation question must satisfy.
Molina claims that his theory of middle knowledge supports the
maxim (Freddoso, 53).
Freddoso argues that both parts of this maxim are
corroborated by the Molinist perspective. The first half says that the
event will not occur because God has foreknowledge of it. On the
Molinist scheme God‟s foreknowledge comes from His middle
knowledge of what the free creature will choose to do freely in the
situation. So His foreknowledge in no way is the originating cause of
the event (Freddoso, 53).
The second half of the maxim claims that “God‟s knowledge
that S will obtain depends on the fact that S obtains”. Molina‟s
explanation of how this happens involves pointing out that the event
will occur because God has decreed one specific possible world. And
this world is one that He chose because he saw by his infallible
knowledge what would happen in that world. God‟s infallible and
perfect supercomprehension allowed Him to see how the free
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creatures would act in that world--so the answer to the question “Why
does this event occur?” is that it will occur because the relevant
counterfactual of freedom is true and God chooses to make the
antecedent true (Freddoso, 54). Now if we use Peter denying Christ
as the example of a conditional future contingent, as Freddoso does,
then we see that Peter is not the cause of God having the knowledge
He does. God had the middle knowledge of what Peter would do,
long before he existed. Freddoso states:

So God freely knows that Peter will sin because it is already

true by divine decree that Peter will sin, just as God freely
knows that a given necessary effect will obtain because it is
already true by divine decree that it will obtain. And it is in
this sense--and this sense alone--that God knows by His free
knowledge that S will obtain because S will in fact obtain
(Freddoso, 54).

The actual free creature is not the cause of God having the middle
knowledge that He does. It was the possible free creature known by
supercomprehension together with God‟s free knowledge of which
available world He will instantiate that provided God with His
foreknowledge.

The Incompatibility Argument

The reconciliation question must be answered by showing

what is problematic about the incompatibility argument. Freddoso
presents what is generally acknowledged to be the most powerful
argument for the incompatibility of divine foreknowledge and human
freedom (Freddoso, 55). This argument includes premises having to
do with accidental necessity. The first is an attempt to define what
accidental necessity is:

(A) p is accidentally necessary at t if and only if (i) p is

metaphysically contingent and (ii) p is true at t and at every
moment after t in every possible world that shares the same
history with our world at t (Freddoso, 55).

Freddoso states that: “From (A) it follows directly that this necessity
is closed under entailment for metaphysically contingent
propositions:” (Freddoso, 55). „(B)‟ is a formulation of this intuition:
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 (B) if (i) p entails q and (ii) q is metaphysically contingent
and (iii) p is accidentally necessary at t, then q is accidentally
necessary at t (Freddoso, 55).

The idea is that if an accidentally necessary event p entails a

contingent event q, then it must be the case that q is also accidentally
necessary. „(C)‟ states that if a proposition is accidentally necessary,
then it is now at a later time too late for any agent to he able to make
the proposition false:

(C) If p is accidentally necessary at t, then no agent has the

power at or after t to contribute causally to p‟s not being true
(Freddoso, 55).

The fourth premise “gives a sufficient condition for a propositions

being accidentally necessary” (Freddoso, 55):

(D) If p is true at t, then the proposition Pp is accidentally

necessary at every moment after t (Freddoso, 55).

The point made here is that if a proposition is ever true at one time, it
is necessarily true at all later times (Freddoso, 55). Freddoso then
formalizes the incompatibility argument using the example of Peter
sinning:

(1) The proposition God foreknows, infallibly and with

certainty, that Peter will sin at T is now true. [assumption]

(2) So at every future moment the proposition God foreknew,

infallibly and with certainty, that Peter would sin at T will be
accidentally necessary. [(1) and (D)]

(3) But the proposition God foreknew, infallibly and with

certainty, that Peter would sin at T entails the metaphysically
contingent proposition If T is present, Peter is sinning.
[assumption]

(4) So at every future moment the proposition If T is present,

Peter is sinning will be accidentally necessary. [(2), (3) and
(B)]
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 Therefore, no agent will have the power at any future moment
to contribute causally to its being the case that the proposition
If T is present, Peter is sinning is not true. That is, no agent
(Peter, God) will have the power at any future moment to
make it true that Peter is not sinning when T is present. [(4)
and (C)] (Freddoso, 56).

Three Types of Necessity

Three different types of necessity play a role in Molina‟s

argument--metaphysical, temporal, and causal. Metaphysical
necessity is the strongest. Only those things are metaphysically
necessary that are absolutely necessary in every possible world.
God‟s knowledge of what is metaphysically necessary is called his
„natural knowledge‟. This is because every possible world will
automatically possess whatever characteristics are metaphysically
necessary and will not possess any characteristic that is
metaphysically impossible. God‟s prevolitional knowledge includes
his natural knowledge. But he can only know metaphysically
contingent events with postvolitional knowledge because anything
that is metaphysically contingent can only he known to be true once
God has willed it to be by willing a possible world (Freddoso, 12).
Temporal necessity has to do with the passing of time.
Things are temporally necessary when contingent events are
necessary because they are part of the past history of the world. For
example, if Susannah played baseball at an earlier time T, it is at a
later time T* necessary that at time T she did play baseball. Freddoso
points out that it is temporally necessary that Susannah played
baseball, even if at the time by supposition she freely decided to play
the game (Freddoso, 11).
Freddoso says that to understand Molina‟s view of causal
necessity it is necessary to understand the metaphysical framework
that medieval Aristotelians” use to approach such problems
(Freddoso, 14). They thought that the world was „a dynamic system
of interacting substances endowed by nature with causal powers,
dispositions, and inclinations‟ (Freddoso, 14). A substance‟s nature
provides it with different active and passive causal abilities.
Substances act upon each other to create certain affects. If one sets a
kettle of water over a flame, then that will bring about the effect of
the water boiling. Freddoso states that “The system is dynamic
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because the various substances are poised to make characteristic
causal contributions in the appropriate circumstances unless they are
in some way impeded or prevented from doing so” (Freddoso, 15).
Freddoso writes of “deterministic causation‟ by which he
means the state of affairs where a certain effect comes about as a
result of the cause‟s characteristic activity. For example, the water
will be caused to boil if it is kept over the flames in the appropriate
situation. Freddoso defines a “deterministic natural tendency” to be
“an all-things-considered deterministic propensity on the part of the
world towards [a] given state of affairs S at a given time T, a
propensity that, if left unimpeded by indeterministic causes, issues
forth in S‟s obtaining at T by a necessity of nature” (Freddoso, 15).
On the other hand, something is naturally contingent only if it occurs
at a time T by an „indeterministic cause,” an example of which would
he a free choice (Freddoso, 16).

Three Responses to Incompatibility Argument

The Molinist disagrees with three standard responses to the

incompatibility argument. First, they will disagree with the
Aristotelian response which is to claim that if the future sinning of
Peter truly is contingent then God cannot infallibly know that it will
occur. Molina finds this problematic “because he believes that future
contingent propositions are true from eternity by divine decree and
hence can be known from eternity by God as future” (Freddoso, 57).
Freddoso calls a second way of responding to the
incompatibility argument the Geachian response‟. According to this
view line (3) in the incompatibility argument is false because it claims
that Peter will certainly sin. Instead, the Geachian responder will
claim that the proposition “God foreknew, infallibly and with
certainty, that Peter will sin at T entails only that the world was at
one time tending toward Peter‟s sinning at T” (Freddoso, 57). He or
she will claim that this tendency can change by being impeded or
reversed. The problem with this response is that it entails that God
simply does not have comprehensive knowledge” of conditional
future contingents, which Molina clearly disagrees with (Freddoso,
57).
The third response to the incompatibility argument that
Molina disagrees with is the Ockhamist response. The Ockhamist
rejects (1) and (2) because they depend on (D) which does not
sufficiently distinguish, they claim, between hard and soft facts about
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the past. They claim that hard facts involve the “real‟ history of the
world” while soft facts are those facts in the past that are “still under
God‟s control” (Freddoso, 57). The Ockhamist believes that God at
later times can still change soft facts about the past. Molina disputes
this position because he thinks that no proposition that is a part of the
history of the world and was true at one point can later become false
and no longer part of history. Not even God can change the past, he
thinks (Freddoso, 57).

Molina’s Response

Molina‟s response to the incompatibility argument might be

astonishing at first glance, says Freddoso. Molina denies that „(B)‟ is
correct, which states that „accidental necessity is closed under
entailment” (Freddoso, 58). Molina explains what it means that
accidental necessity is not closed under entailment:

Even if (i) the conditional is necessary (because.. these two

things cannot both obtain, namely, that God foreknows
something to he future and that the thing does not turn out
that way), and even if (ii) the antecedent is necessary in the
sense in question (because it is past-tense and because no
shadow of alteration can befall God), nonetheless the
consequent can be purely contingent (Fredddoso, 58).

Freddoso says that since (B) follows from (A), (A) must be rejected.
But let us look at the reasoning behind Molina denying that accidental
necessity is closed under entailment, This is Freddoso‟s way of
justifying the move:

If God knew from eternity that Peter would deny Christ at T,

then no agent can now cause it to be true that God never
knew this. But if God‟s past foreknowledge is thus
accidentally necessary and entails that Peter will sin at T, and
if, in addition, Peter‟s action will satisfy the causal conditions
necessary for it to be free, then accidental necessity must not
be closed under entailment. Since this conclusions conflicts
with (A), it must be the case that (A) does not correctly
capture the necessity of the past (Freddoso, 58).

In the light of this criticism Freddoso comes up with (A*):

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 (A*) p is accidentally necessary at t if and only if (i) p is
metaphysically contingent and (ii) p is true at t and (iii) for
any possible world w such that w shares the same causal
history with our world at t, no agent has the power at or after t
in w to contribute causally to p‟s not being true (Freddoso,
59).

Molina claims that the past cannot be changed and hence a

future human action cannot change a belief that God earlier had.
Humans cannot bring it about that God believed something other than
what he did. So before a certain time T it is false that „Peter now has
the power to contribute causally to its being false that God foreknew
that Peter will sin at T” (Freddoso, 60). But it is true that “Peter now
has the power to contribute causally to its being false that he sins
when T is present” (Freddoso, 60). Hence (A*) does not imply that
accidental necessity is not closed under entailment. The point is that
Peter causally can contribute to his free action but he cannot causally
contribute to God believing something else. For the past belief of God
cannot be changed.
Freddoso does not think that the prophetic utterance of Christ
that Peter will deny him “make Peter‟s denial at T a necessity of
nature; nor is it a contemporaneous cause of Peter‟s sin” (Freddoso,
61). Therefore, Freddoso claims that even though Christ‟s uttering of
the prophecy is accidentally necessary before T, “Peter‟s denial
satisfies the causal preconditions for free action” (Freddoso, 61).
Freddoso closes by wondering whether (A*) is plausible as a
substitute for (A). He thinks that

[O]ur preanalytic intuitions are not, I believe, subtle enough

to yield a clear and definitive answer. So the choice between
(A) and (A*) in the final analysis must be made on systematic
grounds. But that puts Molinism in a relatively favourable
position, since the theory of middle knowledge is a tool of
immense philosophical and theological power (Freddoso,
61).

One thing that lessens the plausibility of denying that

accidental necessity is closed under entailment is divine timelessness.
Even if we suppose with the Molinist that foreknowledge is not the
cause of the contingent event, it may show it to be necessary. This is
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the claim that Edwards makes in reply to Whitby. It might be that
even though the Molinist assumes that free choices are not necessary,
their belief that God has eternal fixed knowledge implies that they are
necessary. Every event that God has knowledge of will necessarily
happen because if it did not happen, he would not have had certain
foreknowledge of it. So it seems impossible that the events which
God foreknows that the free creatures in the Molinist paradigm will
choose can be events that do not come about. But to say that
something is impossible is to say that it is necessary. It is true that the
necessity that is argued for here did not come from an analysis of how
the will is causally necessitated. In fact an argument has not been
given for how this might occur. But as Edwards would claim, the
argument shows the necessity of the free choices nevertheless.
The central problem with denying that accidental necessity is
closed under entailment is that there seems to be no positive reason to
think that such might be the case. No plausible reason can be given in
support of this, in fact our common intuitions seem to tell us that if all
other necessities are closed under entailment, it would be queer if
accidental necessity was not. Therefore, Molina‟s response appears to
be ad hoc.

Part III: Theological Objections to Molinism

Freddoso considers four theological and three philosophical

objections to Molinism. He wants to show that the Molinist can give
plausible responses to these objections. He states that he hopes “to
show at least that none of the objections is decisive as it stands and to
indicate promising lines of defense‟ for Molinist defenders (Freddoso,
62).
The first theological objection to be considered has been
given by Anthony Kenny. He claims that there is insufficient Biblical
proof for the view that God knows conditional future contingents. For
example, he argues that Jesus‟ statement about Tyre and Sidon is
rhetorical. Jesus said that if the acts that he had done in Chorazin and
Bethsaida had been done in Tyre and Sidon the people would have
repented. Because of this the citizens of Chorazin and Bethsaida
would be judged more severely. Kenny thinks that Jesus was doing
nothing but drawing conclusions from his knowledge of the character
and dispositions of the people in Tyre and Sidon. He takes Jesus to be
making a purely rhetorical claim. Three biblical passages were used
by Molina to defend middle knowledge. Kenny discussing them says:
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 It would commonly be thought nowadays by theologians that
the biblical texts quoted by Molina do not prove his case. The
passage about Tyre and Sidon is clearly rhetorical. The
knowledge of what people would have done if they had not
died, as attributed to God by the Wisdom of Solomon, is no
more than a knowledge of their characters and dispositions
when alive. The oracle consluted by David, the ephod, had
only two sides to it, probably marked yes and „no. Such an
apparatus would be incapable of marking the difference
between knowledge of counterfactuals and knowledge of the
truth-value of material implications. Since the antecedent of
David‟s questions was false, the same answers would have
been appropriate in each case (Kenny, 64).

Freddoso admits that it is a rhetorical claim but believes that it is also

more than that (Freddoso, 63). Nevertheless, if the Molinist is
dependent on these passages for the theory of middle knowledge,
there will be trouble. But the main strength of the Molinist position
comes from other positive aspects of it, for example, its explanatory
power, as Freddoso suggests.
Secondly, the Banezians object that since the Molinists hold
that Gods general concurrence is neutral, “God is related in exactly
the same way to both good and evil free actions” (Freddoso, 64). The
general grace that God gives is nondetermining and will therefore
result in both good and evil actions. The Banezians claim that this
leads to the view that just as God is the cause of good, he is also the
cause of evil. And the Molinist cannot deny that God is the cause of
evil without also denying the symmetrical claim that he is the cause
of good (Freddoso, 64). Molina responds to this objection by claiming
that grace is particular. But it is not efficacious. He describes grace as
being something that inclines the agent to good. This tendency is non-
determining and is a partial cause of the good event occurring. The
Molinist scheme can be viewed as asymetrical in the sense that God
inclines secondary agents to good, while those who do evil do so in
spite of God‟s influence. So God is not the cause of evil in the same
sense as he is of good (Freddoso, 64-65).
This shows that the Molinist position depends on intuitions
that support the idea that grace is inherently inefficacious. Various
theological traditions have defended the reasonableness of the
Molinist reply. Of course, the Molinist claims that grace is efficacious
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in certain circumstances, viz, in those circumstances in which God
knows by his middle knowledge that it will work. But this involves
classifying the situations that God decrees you to be in as grace. So
the Molinist does believe in the efficacy of grace but only in a limited
sense.
The modern Banezian, Reginal Garrigon-Lagrange, gives a
third objection. He claims that Christianity supports the “principle of
predilection‟, according to which „no one would be better than
another unless he were loved more and helped more by God‟
(Freddoso, 65). Unfortunately the Molinist theory leaves open the
possibility that two people could receive an equal quantity of grace,
but because of their differing situations, the one might do good, while
the other will not. This is because one person might be in situations
where he was tempted very much, so more grace would needed to
overcome the temptation, while the other person was presented with a
weak temptation, and the grace given him or her would be sufficient
to overcome the temptation. However, the Molinist can respond to
this that even if God gives the same amount of inclining towards
good‟ grace to two people--yet he can at the same time give more
grace to one of them overall by putting one in better situations than
the other i.e. into situations where good is more easily done. This
means that the definition of grace is broadened to also include God‟s
putting a person in a good situation. For example, God‟s choosing
Peter to have the life he does comes from His love for him while
Judas‟ life situation is a result of less grace on God‟s part. (Freddoso,
65) Therefore, the Molinist does have a plausible response to this
objection.
The final theological objection to Molinism that Freddoso
considers is that it entails that God is in some way dependent on
creatures. Because he knows by his middle knowledge what
conditional future contingents will obtain, it seems that he is
dependent on free creatures for his knowledge of what they will do
(Freddoso, 66). For he has to look at their autonomously and freely
functioning minds and conclude what they would do in certain
situations. This passivity in Gods knowledge is an imperfection. God
according to this view does not determine which future contingents
will obtain. He is instead passively affected by the secondary agents
of whom he has middle knowledge (Freddoso, 67).
Freddoso thinks that this argument does not have much force
coming from Banezians or other defenders of natural knowledge. For
they see no inconsistency in God‟s being the “sovereign “first
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determining Being” and yet (apparently) passively receiving his
knowledge of what is metaphysically necessary in every possible
world (Freddoso, 67). If this is not a problem for the Banezians, then
it is also not a problem for the Molinists that middle knowledge has
an ontological status (whatever it might be) that is similar to natural
knowledge (Freddoso, 67). For Molina denies that God gets his
foreknowledge from actual created free creatures. Middlle knowledge
is God‟s knowledge of counterfactuals of freedom.

Part IV: Philosophical Objections

The first philosophical objection Freddoso presents is the

Banezian objection that God cannot know conditional future
conditionals until He has willed them. The Molinist claim that by
middle knowledge God has supercomprehension of conditional future
contingents before he has decided whether or not to will a possible
world. The problem rests on the nature of supercomprehension. Many
thinkers find this concept problematic because it can not be
understood very well. The vagueness of how super-comprehension
works against it.
Furthermore, Robert Adams gives a „sophisticated argument‟
against middle knowledge claiming that “adequate metaphysical
grounds” are needed for the truth of propositions allegedly known by
supercomprehension (Freddoso, 69). Adams does not think that a
strong view of libertarianism is compatible with there being adequate
metaphysical grounds for the truth of the propositions about
creaturely free choices that God allegedly knows at the time He
allegedly knows them. And this means that there cannot be true
conditional future contingents” (Freddoso, 69).
Freddoso admits that the intuitions that Adams appeals to
have considerable intuitive appeal” (Freddoso, 70). Edwards has also
used this line of argumentation in claiming that events must have
metaphysical certitude to provide epistemic certititude. Adams is
doing something related to this, but weaker. For he is not claiming
that epistemic certitude depends on metaphysical certitude. He makes
the weaker claim that epistemic certitude is dependent on “adequate
metaphysical grounds” (whatever these might be). Freddoso notes
that Alvin Plantinga too has pointed out that what provides “adequate
metaphysical grounding” is far from clear (Freddoso, 69). We will
return to this objection in discussing the claim that conditional future
contingents are unknowable.
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 In the final two philosophical objections that Freddoso
discusses, he presents two objections that “try to show that Molinism
suffers from irremediable defects even if it is granted that there are
true conditional future contingent propositions” (Freddoso, 75). The
first of these is William Hasker‟s claim that an argument can be made
against Molinism based on its denial that created agents bring about
the truth of conditional future contingents. The Molinist claims that
God‟s knowledge of conditional future contingents exists before the
creaturely agents do. But if so, they do not play a role in determining
the truth of the proposition. Since the conditional and the antecedent
entail that an agent will do so and so, and since he or she has no
control over the antecedent and the conditional (i.e. they don‟t make
them true) they aren‟t free. Hasker claims that this contradicts the
important libertarian tenet that creatures are free only if they have the
power to choose what they will or will not do. Since actual free
creatures don‟t make the counterfactuals true but only conceptually
existing ones do, the latter may be free, but the former are not. By
„conceptually existing free creatures‟ I mean the possible free
creatures which God can instantiate and which are part of his natural
and middle knowledge.

Hasker claims that creatures need to be able to make

conditional future contingents true in order to be free. He states that
principle „Z‟ proves this:

(Z) If (i) agent A has the power to bring it about that p is true
and (ii) p entails q and (iii) q is false, then A has the power to
bring it about that q is true (Freddoso, 76).

Hence if Peter has the power not to deny Christ in some situation e,
then, since “Peter does not deny Christ in e” entails “If Peter were in
e, he would not deny Christ”, Peter has the power to bring about the
truth of the counterfactual.
Freddoso replies “that Hasker is taking the phrase „bring it
about that p is true‟ to be equivalent to „cause p to be true‟ or, better,
„causally contribute to p‟s being true,‟ (Freddoso, 77). The point is
that while (existing) creatures have the power to act in such a way
that if they were to act in that way the counterfactuals of freedom
would be different from what they in fact are, this kind of
counterfactual dependence does not involve causal dependence.
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Freddoso claims that the ability of free creatures to act in such a way
that a counterfactual of freedom would be false is not a causal
dependency. Instead, such an action would mean that God would
never have believed that counterfactual of freedom.
The Molinist might also respond that the created creature is
the one that causally contributes to an event p occurring, but that the
conceptual creature brought it about that God knew what conditional
future contingent would occur in the situation where p occurred.
Behind Hasker‟s objection must lurk a mistrust of the Molinist
conception of what a conceptual created creature is. To what extent
can that thing be related and identified with the actually created
creature?
The force of this objection comes from the intuition that by
God‟s middle knowledge he knows the truth value of a counterfactual
of freedom. Now if it is true, then God knows that the agent will
make it true because he sees this by his supercomprehension. But if
God sees with his supercomprehension that if the agent is put into the
situation in question that then the counterfactual of freedom will be
true, then it is impossible that when God actually creates the agent
and actualizes the situation the person has an ability to choose to do
otherwise than what God supercomprehended. Hence the person is
not free.
The Molinist reacts to this by being vague about what
happens during supercomprehension. They will claim that God does
not know that the person when actually created will necessarily
choose to do the action that was supercomprehended. For if he or she
necessarily chooses then there is no freedom. But this claim is
question begging.

Conditional Future Contingents must be Knowable

The final objection Freddoso considers is that it might seem

that even if conditional future contingents are true they are
intrinsically unknowable. The objection claims that the Molinist must
not only show that there are true future propositions, but also that they
are knowable (Freddoso, 78). Freddoso states that Suarez, a
contemporary of Molina, responded to this objection by claiming that
if a proposition is true, it is by definition intelligible which is the
same as saying that it is knowable (Freddoso, 78). However, as
Freddoso points out, Suarez‟s view can be criticized by drawing an
analogy between omnipotence and omniscience. In studying the
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attribute of omnipotence one „must distinguish what can obtain from
what can be caused to obtain by even the most powerful conceivable
agent” (Freddoso, 79). In the same way a study of omniscience must
involve a distinction between what is true and therefore intrinsically
knowable versus what is knowable to the divine intellect.
Freddoso pursues another line of argumentation against this
objection. He claims that we humans know certain conditional future
contingents about ourselves that we take to be true. For example, he
claims that he knows that if he was “offered a no-strings attached
grant to do research for five years and to do just as much teaching” as
he wanted, that he would accept the position (Freddoso, 79). He takes
himself to know that this that situation. Freddoso takes himself to
„have a highly justified belief” that he would accept the grant.
(Freddoso, 79) He thinks many philosophers would agree that there
are grounds for considering a belief like this to he justified, even
though it is epistemically only probable. The probability is high
enough for it to be considered a justified belief to hold. Freddoso
states: “The upshot is that if even we can have some limited
knowledge of conditional future contingents, it is hardly surprising
that God can know them” (Freddoso, 79). But there is a difference
between human and divine knowledge. Humans know by inference
and with varying degrees of justification, while God is completely
justified in all of his beliefs and has his knowledge non-inferentially.
Robert Adams argues convincingly that our knowledge of
what we would do in other situations is a far cry from proving that
there actually are true conditional future contingents. Adams claims
that he can not understand how it is that statements like Freddoso‟s
about accepting a grant, can possibly be true and therefore cannot
understand how God could know them (Adams,l977,1l0). Adams is
discussing the example of David deciding to leave the city of Keilah.
He had rescued the city from the Philistines. When he was in the city
he enquired of God whether or not he should stay in the city because
he had heard that Saul had plans to besiege it. David asks God by
means of the ephod (which would reply yes or no) whether Saul
would come to besiege the city and whether the inhabitants of Keilah
would surrender him to Saul. God answered „yes to both of these
questions.
Adams points out that as a result of the answer of the ephod,
Molinists claim that there are two propositions that God knows by
middle knowledge, and are therefore true conditional future
contingents:
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 (1) If David stayed in Keilah, Saul would besiege the city.

(2) If David stayed in Keilah and Saul besieged the city, the
men of Keilah would surrender David to Saul (Adams,
1977,110).

These must be true, Adams points out, to be examples of middle

knowledge. But what might this involve? He cannot understand how
it can be maintained that the free agents still act freely and yet these
are true conditional future contingents. (Adams, I 977, 110) He sees
four possible ways of reconciling free action with true conditional
future contingents but he does not think that any of them works.
First, he claims that the items of knowledge that are supposed
to be middle knowledge are not „categorical predictions‟. They can
not be because the objects of middle knowledge never did take place
in the future. Middle knowledge is not simple foreknowledge of what
is going to happen in the future. Since there will never actually be a
besieging of Keilah or an opportunity for the Keilahites to give David
up to Saul, (I) and (2) cannot be viewed as items of foreknowledge
that have a future event corresponding to them (Adams, 1977, 110).
So true conditional future contingents cannot be true because they
describe an event that will occur. This means that God can not know
counterfactuals from his knowledge of what will occur. The future
event never will occur and therefore cannot provide God with
grounds for knowing it would.
Adams next asks whether it is by logical or causal necessity
that Saul will besiege the city and answers that it cannot because then
Saul would no longer be acting freely. To reconcile true conditional
future contingents with freedom we must find non-necessitating
grounds for the truth of the middle knowledge. For example, it might
be claimed that Saul‟s besieging the city follows from his intentions,
desires, and character. But Adams agrees that this “is inadequate
precisely because it is not necessitating. A free agent may act out of
character, or change his intentions, or fail to act on them” (Adams,
1977, Ill).
The problem with the fourth suggestion is that the
conditional future contingents would only be probable. Instead of
saying that „If David stayed in Keilah, then Saul would besiege it‟ we
must say „If David stayed in Keilah, Saul probably would besiege it‟.
But the defenders of middle knowledge claim that God infallibly
93
knows what will happen, not whether the event is probable (Adams,
1977, 111). Freddoso responds to this kind of objection by claiming
that the conditionals are made true by the conditional facts they
describe and God knows them by supercomprehension.

Objection to Supercomprehension

Edwards claimed that two things could not be explained by

objectors to the incompatibilist argument. First, they could not
explain how it could be that God could have certain knowledge of
contingent events. Second, he argued that objectors to his argument
would not be able to come up with a coherent explanation of the
origin and nature of the evidence that God would have for belief
about future contingents.
As we saw earlier he thinks that it is impossible for God to
have certain knowledge of something that is metaphysically
contingent. This would mean that God can only have certain
knowledge of something that was no longer contingent. Therefore,
God could only know contingent events after they had occurred. This
is a problem for the Molinist perspective, because the theory of
middle knowledge claims that God can have knowledge of future
contingents based on his supercomprehension and his decrees. But the
event has not yet occurred. And if the event has not occurred, then
according to Edwards God cannot know the contingent event.
The Molinist is then pressed to give an explanation of how
God can know future contingents. And his reply is the theory of
supercomprehension. The infinite nature of Gods cognitive faculties
allows him to know what humans will freely choose. But how might
Gods cognitive faculties operate in this situation? The Molinists
cannot give an explanation.
The reason they cannot give a plausible explanation is
because all the plausible answers to the question involve an implicit
rejection of human autonomy. The only plausible explanation that I
can think of is that God can know what free creatures will choose
because he understands what they are like. He has infinitely detailed
knowledge of their mind, knowing everything about them, and can
therefore know what they will choose. The Molinists will agree to this
point. But now the question arises as to how there might be a
connection between understanding a persons mind and having
knowledge of what they will do. The only plausible explanation that I
can think of is that God knows all of the attributes of the person, since
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he knows everything about them in infinite detail, and can look at
certain situations and know that a person with such and such
attributes will make a certain choice p whenever he or she is in that
situation.
It is necessary that God knows that every time that a person
N is put into a specific situation S that he or she will choose p every
time. This is necessary for God to have middle knowledge. For if N
would sometimes do other than p in situation S then God would not
have grounds for his middle knowledge. For middle knowledge
depends on the idea that God knows the one choice that N would
make in any given situation. But of course if there are certain
attributes, characteristics, (or whatever one might want to call them)
that always lead a person to make the same choices, then it seems that
there is a necessary connection between these attributes and the
choices that result from them. Therefore, the Molinist will reject this
explanation. That is he is left simply appealing to the depth of Gods
cognitive perfection combined with His omniscience. Therefore, the
Molinist cannot provide an explanation of how God could know
future contingents or how God could have certain knowledge of
future contingents. The Molinist cannot come up with a plausible
explanation of the nature of the evidence that provides this
knowledge.

Final Objection

An argument can be made against the Molinist along the

following lines. In every possible world where God believes that a
free creature N will choose to do an action p, then in that world it is
necessary that N choose p. This is because it is impossible that there
be any possible world where God has a belief that is false. So if the
proposition “God believes that N will choose p‟ is true in a possible
world, then it is impossible that the proposition “N does not choose p‟
obtain. If this is a general truth that applies to every possible world
that God exists in, then in every world God exists if one of these
propositions obtains, the other must necessarily obtain. Molina
responds to this objection:

The second error has to do with the composed sense, namely,

we should not claim that because the divine foreknowledge
already exists beforehand, Peter is in reality not able not to
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 sin, as if because of the preexisting divine knowledge he has
lost something of his freedom and power not to sin in reality
should he so will....Indeed, even though that knowledge did
exist beforehand, it was just as truly within his power not to
sin as it would have been had that knowledge not existed, and
he was just as truly able to refrain from the act in light of
which he was foreknown to be a future sinner as he would
have been had that knowledge not existed, as has been
explained; thus this interpretation is not the one that the
theologians have in mind. Rather they are claiming,
absolutely correctly, that given the divine knowledge, Peter is
not able in the composed sense not to sin, because these two
things, namely, Peters being such that he is not going to sin
and God‟s knowing that he is going to sin, cannot both obtain
together. But if, as is now truly possible, he were not going to
sin, then that knowledge would not have existed in God, and
so that knowledge, which would not have existed if, as is
possible, Peter were not going to sin, does not in any way
prevent Peter‟s now being able in the divided sense not to sin,
in just the way he would have been able not to sin had such
knowledge not existed beforehand (Freddoso, l86).

But Molina‟s response is unsatisfactory because it depends on the

idea that something can only be shown to be necessary if one can give
arguments for how it is causally necessitated. Edwards has argued
that the necessity of something can be proved without showing the
necessity of the causes. He would argue against Molina, as he did
against Whitby that certain after-knowledge can show something to
be necessary even though it is not the cause of the thing being
necessary. Therefore, in the same way certain foreknowledge can
show a future event to be necessary without being the cause of the
necessity. For example, if in a possible world it obtains that God
reveals his foreknowledge that N will choose p, then it is necessary
that the state of affairs in which N chooses p obtains.
The Molinists can to a limited extent successfully conceive
of a coherent situation in which creatures freely choose. But any
explanation also has to cohere with the attributes of God, and it seems
that they are unsuccessful in this project. This is because divine
timelessness, omniscience, and immutability imply that if God reveals
foreknowledge of the future to humans then it is necessary that the
foreknown events occur. The Molinist project therefore fails for an
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orthodox Christian because any Christian world view must be able to
reconcile the nature of free creatures with the orthodox doctrines of
the nature of God.
In conclusion, the Molinists have not given a plausible
response to Edwards incompatibility argument. Edwards has
anticipated the weakness of the Molinist position in several ways.
First, he has pointed out that divine timelessness, immutability, and
omniscience work against any attempt at compatibilism. Secondly, he
has argued that the necessity of something can be shown without
showing how it is causally necessitated. Thirdly, his criticisms of the
impossibility of God knowing future contingents also apply to the
Molinists. Finally, his arguments that God needs evidence to have
knowledge of future contingents are not plausibly answered by the
Molinist‟s theory of supercomprehension.
Neither the Ockhamist nor Molinist responses to the
incompatibility argument are plausible for orthodox Christians. This
means that Edwards argument can be defended against the best
objections that Arminians can propose to it. This is problematic for
them because the incompatibility argument shows that divine
foreknowledge is incompatible with libertarian freedom. Therefore, if
Arminians admit that God has perfect foreknowledge then they must
abandon their theology which is dependent on a concept of libertarian
freedom.

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 Works Cited

Adams, Robert Merrihew. “Middle Knowledge and the Problem of

Evil”. American Philosophical Ouarterly. Volume 14,
Number 2, April 1977.

Edwards, Jonathan. Freedom of the Will. New Haven and London:

Yale University Press, 1985.

Fischer, John Martin. “Hard-type Soft Facts”. The Philosophical

Review. XCV, No. 4. October, 1986.

Freddoso, Alfred J. Ed. Luis Dc Molina. On Divine Foreknowledge

(Part IV of the Concordia). Ithaca and London: Cornell
University Press, 1988.

Hodge, Charles. Systematic Theology. Vol. II. New York: Scribner,

Armstrong, and Co. 1876.

Kenny, Anthony. The God of the Philosophers. Oxford: Clarendon

Press; New York:Oxford University Press, 1979.

Wierenga, Edward R. The Nature of God: An Inquiry into Divine

Attributes. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press,
1989.

_______. “Prophecy, Freedom, and the Necessity of the Past”.

Philosophical Perspectives. 5, Philosophy of Religion, 1991.

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